The Production of Space: Indigenous Resistance Movements in the Peruvian Amazon

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Indigenous Resistance Movements in the Peruvian Amazon

By
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ABSTRACT

The Production of Space: Indigenous Resistance Movements in the Peruvian Amazon

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The resistance movement that resulted in the Baguazo in the northern Peruvian Amazon in 2009 was the culmination of a series of social, economic, political and spatial processes that reflected the Peruvian nation’s engagement with global capitalism and democratic consolidation after decades of crippling instability and chaos. The recently discovered oil and natural gas reserves that occupy the subsoil of much the Peruvian Amazon provide the latest natural resource upon which the national project can continue to be implemented. In a context of neo-imperialism and neo-extractivism where through accumulation by dispossession, new markets are introduced into global capitalist structures after a history of neglect, indigenous spatial productions have developed in the northern Peruvian Amazon that have arguably contributed to the relative effectiveness of the Baguazo in meeting movement outcomes. This dissertation analyzes these spatial productions through the theoretical framework of Lefebvre’s Production of Space, which is applied to indigenous communities in Condorcanqui province in northern Perú. Unique indigenous nature-society relationship formulations, identity constructions, and productions of scale are considered for their contributions to the production of indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces. By analyzing the role played by the state, the law, and culture in indigenous productions of space, it is also hoped that a better spatial understanding of indigenous social movements can be gained. By conclusion, an inclusion of capitalist-emergent spaces onto Lefebvre’s conceptual triad of spatial production is proposed to facilitate further theoretical applications to the field.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

On June 5, 2009 in the isolated Amazonian town of Bagua in Northern Perù, 550 members of the National Police of Perù advanced towards a group of hundreds of activists who had commandeered the roadway between two large farming and timber estates. The activists were mostly indigenous residents of the rainforest to the north and east of the city of Bagua, protesting the impending signing of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States which made their ancestral lands subject to sale and exploitation by international interests. By the end of the episode, 34 people (25 policemen and 9 civilians) lay dead, 87 were injured and 74 were arrested (according to official figures). Although political violence has never been too far from the surface in Perù, the events in Bagua were considered a national tragedy. Bagua symbolized more than a resurgence in violence in a brutalized society. The incident brought back memories of the ruthless violence that had plagued the country during the internal war of the 1980s and 1990s. It also represented a culmination of a network of global, regional and local events. The protests and their aftermath, tragic as they were, led to the overturning of the decrees that made indigenous land available for sale and exploitation by corporate interests.

Studies of resistance movements often focus on historical and political contexts without sufficiently considering the spatial processes at play. As a territorial struggle, the events at Bagua and the rest of Amazonia provide an appropriate context in which to analyze resistance movements from a spatial perspective. This dissertation will investigate the unique productions of space that have allowed Amazonian resistance movements to preserve representational spaces, albeit significantly re-theorized to reflect indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces. This will be
juxtaposed with Andean productions of space and resistance movements. In addition to representing indigenous interests, Amazonian resistance movements also struggle to preserve fragile rainforest ecosystems. These rainforests are the source of 20% of the world’s fresh water and they process a majority of the oxygen humans breathe. The conservation of the Amazon is essential for the survival of human life. Understanding Amazonian spaces of resistance that produced the social movements culminating in the Baguazo is therefore of global interest. In addition, analyzing indigenous spaces utilizing the production of space theory provides an opportunity to test the adequacy of the theory. In doing so, a potential amendment to make the Production of Space theory applicable to non-Western, pre-capitalist spaces is proposed.

Unlike Amazonian indígenas, Perú’s Andean indigenous populations have long engaged with Europeans, criollos, and mestizos. The relationship that has developed as a result of this engagement has historically been a paternalistic one. Originating from Spanish and Catholic colonialist sentiments of superiority, paternalism has continued to define these relationships beyond the time of Independence and into the present. With the exception of the rubber boom of the late 19th century (when the goal was exploitation and extermination rather than assimilation), however, Amazonian contact with non-indigenous populations was minimal. The Peruvian state, seldom stable and often corrupt and ineffective, has been almost entirely absent in the Amazon. As a result, Amazonian indigenous people were never subjected to the paternalisms that Andean groups experienced. Resistance was never co-opted in the Amazon, and a culture of autonomy developed. In this way, Amazonian peoples have maintained autonomy over socio-spatial processes. In Lefebvrian terms, productions of space in the Peruvian Amazon continue, for the most part, to represent the interests and needs of the people, rather than those of multinational corporations and other capitalist interests. By forming coalitions with Amazonian indigenous
groups in other South American countries, Andean indigenous groups in Perú, and international human rights and environmental interest groups, Peruvian Amazonians were also able to produce, jump, and skip scales in a way that very local and insular Andean indigenous movements failed to do.

These spatial processes and developments are analyzed in Section I. After analyzing the social, political, economic, and spatial context that the Baguazo occurred in, three analytical concepts that describe indigenous spaces and shape indigenous spatial productions are considered: the nature-society relationship, identity construction and scale production. Section II outlines the socio-temporal development of capitalist structures that have culminated in the current global extractivist imperialist stage. These economic and historical developments and their manifestations in space very centrally shaped the contexts in which the production of space theory was formulated and are clearly reflected in the characteristics of the theory. The very different stage of capitalist development and democratic consolidation in Latin America, Perú, and the Peruvian Amazon means that the application of production of space theory to Amazonian indigenous spaces proves inadequate in helping to understand non-Western, non-urban spaces and social movements. Section III proposes the addition of “indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces” into Lefebvre’s conceptual triad, thereby transforming the triad into a more inclusive conceptual tetrad. This inclusion can provide a theoretical basis for analyzing the role that indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces play in the ever-changing global capitalist landscape, and the various forms of resistance that develop as a response. As rural, non-Western spaces are conceptually and practically introduced into national and international capitalist structures, the importance of highlighting the dialectical relationship between the city and the countryside becomes clear. Angotti (2013) asserts:
Struggles over rural land continue, often unnoticed in the cosmopolitan world, but they are no less important if we consider the environmental and energy crises affecting Latin America in the twenty-first century, to say nothing of the devastation of rural resources and communities. Struggles for land are at the heart of both urban and rural questions, and in the coming decades, depending on the pace of global climate change, they will be part of the struggle for sustaining humans on earth (p. 6).

By conclusion, the role that indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces play in newly formulated spatial productions is considered, with particular focus on how their inclusion into capitalist structures, and therefore into a proposed conceptual tetrad, is indicative of the need to understand the dialectical connections between the urban and the rural. In addition, the way in which these spatial interactions can help to address some of the critical contradictions introduced by capitalist development, as well as to shape the social movements these contradictions produce, are considered.
CHAPTER II

THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE

In *The Production of Space*, Henri Lefebvre argues that every society produces its own space. The production of these spaces reflects the “social existence” of the members of that society. Moreover, “the space thus produced… serves as a tool of thought and of action” (Lefebvre 1991). As such, productions of space reflect power dynamics. This becomes apparent when analyzing and applying his *conceptual triad* of spatial practice, representations of space, and representational spaces. Spatial practice refers to “the particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation”. Representations of space “are tied to the relations of production and to the ‘order’ which those relationships impose”. Representational space is “the dominated … space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate.” (See Figure 1.1)

**Figure 2.1 – The Conceptual Triad of the Production of Space**
Since the 1970s, Latin America has been subjected to the neoliberal policies that have accompanied the process of globalization. These policies facilitate the privatization of resources and services, while simultaneously opening the borders to stimulate foreign investment. Social welfare programs are replaced by policies that subjugate socio-spatial phenomena to the whims of the “free” market. Reflecting a history of colonial rule and post-colonial influence, Latin American spaces have always arguably been examples of “representations of space”.

Colonialization by Spain and Portugal meant that spaces were produced to impose the order of the relations of production that best suited the interests of European powers. Cities were designed to reflect Iberian urban planning and to facilitate exploitation and social control. Rural spaces were organized to serve the needs of the urban elites. Even after independence, spaces continued to be produced by criollo and European elites who continued to control Latin American economy and culture. While resistance was present throughout, the sheer brutality of colonial practices ensured that representational spaces had a relatively weak influence on spatial practices. Though the indigenous imagination never stopped “seek(ing) to change and appropriate” dominated spaces, in practice, this was seldom successful. In Perú, as in the rest of Latin America, Iberian influence permeated coastal and Andean spaces in colonial times and in the years immediately following independence. As Spanish territorial hegemony subsided, cultural and economic influence and domination based in the United States and other Western powers replaced it. Independence movements made it so that this new hegemony was based not on territorial control, but on economic and cultural subjugation that depended on the deepening of international economic and cultural relations (Berman, 1988). World-systems theory, developed by sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, attempted to theorize this phenomenon by conceptualizing social systems as existing within a world division of labor. States became either
part of the core (cultural, intellectual and spatial producers), or the periphery (producers of raw materials and manufactured goods) (Wallerstein, 1999). As a result, Perú was no longer territorially dominated. Instead, its culture and economy were influenced to an extent that its peripheral status served the economic interests of world powers.

Wallerstein saw the function of the state changing as post-war capitalism developed. Since territorially-based colonies were quickly disappearing, a state defined by geographic and political borders became a potentially powerful symbolic tool. As the basis for hegemonies transitioned from territory to economics, the true source of power (and consequently, the true producer of space) became capital (McMichael, 2012). The state, Wallerstein argues, rather than serving its subjects increasingly exists to serve the interests of capital (Wallerstein, 1999). Space, therefore, increasingly represents similar interests.

Firmly entrenched in the global periphery, and poised to once again attempt to enter global markets in an era of extractive imperialism, Perú finds itself in a position to reflect on its social and economic strategy. As global capital continues to expand, crises of overaccumulation are created, namely “surpluses of capital and labor power side by side without there being any means to bring them profitably together to accomplish socially useful tasks” (Harvey, 2004a, p. 63). While existing markets are saturated, new markets can provide ways to absorb existing capital and labor surpluses. Hegemonic powers manage these crises of overaccumulation by managing access to their own markets as well as through privatization and financialization. These tactics place global powers in the position to replace the absence of opportunities to reproduce capital in a saturated market with spatial-fixes in new markets where new spatial divisions of labor can be created and where the representations of space can continue to increase in influence in spatial production. Through what David Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession”, extra-capitalist
spaces and populations are forced into extractive imperialist capitalist structures through an appropriation of lands, culture, and wealth.

As states increasingly facilitate accumulation by dispossession, spatial practice increasingly reflects only the interests of those in power. Representational spaces – those spaces “which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate” – are largely absent from the discussion. Yet the implementation of globalization and neoliberalization has hardly been straightforward or easy. Pockets of resistance have always been present and are growing. Is there not room for productions of spaces of resistance and autonomy that deserve attention? Are representational spaces not maintaining the struggle for influence over spatial practices?

Colonial influence over culture and economics facilitated the comprehensive exploitation of indigenous populations in coastal and Andean Perù. A pervasive and racist culture of paternalism and dependence developed to such an extent that even revolutionary social movements followed the established colonial hierarchies in the Andes. Despite the ubiquity of colonial power structures in coastal and Andean Perù, Amazonian Perù has remained relatively isolated. The brutal exploitation during the rubber boom of the late 19th century did not prevent Peruvian Amazonian culture from surviving relatively untouched (Orta Martínez and Finer, 2010). The relative isolation of indigenous people in the Peruvian Amazon has arguably allowed representational spaces to continue to influence spatial practice.

The relative success of Amazonian indigenous movements in resisting globalization may be an encouraging sign that representational spaces are alive and well. However, representational spaces (and Lefebvrian spaces in general) were theorized as urban spaces in advanced capitalist (Western) societies. The theories themselves developed in a context of often antagonistic yet constant interaction between capital and the people. As a result, the application of production of
space theory to non-urban, non-Western spaces, though useful, quickly proves to be inadequate. The introduction of capitalist-emergent spaces into production of space theories can help to solidify the inseparability of rural spatial productions and urban processes, which could in turn strengthen the position of indigenous spaces as the stages for global resistance.

**METHODOLOGY**

*Knowing is always a relation between the knower and the known (Smith, 1990)*

To analyze productions of indigenous spaces of resistance in Perù and distinguish the unique characteristics of Amazonian spatial productions, two main methodologies will be employed. A historical analysis of colonialist paternalism has been conducted by the researcher and conceptually linked to resource extraction histories in Perù, providing a socio-political, economic and spatial context to the events leading to the Baguazo. This analysis examines the construction of Andean identities from the era of the Inca Empire through European colonialization and post-colonial national myth-building, and it compares it to Amazonian identities constructed in the context of geographical isolation and social, political, and economic neglect. It then relates these histories to the contemporary neoliberal age and the growing international interest in the potentially lucrative raw materials present in indigenous areas of Perù.

Interviews with indigenous leaders and resistance organizers were conducted using ethnographic methods that allowed for the collection of qualitative data while simultaneously incorporating the interpretive potential of participants’ contributions. Interviews have been conducted by the researcher with several key participants, including Dr. Miguel Ferrè, who is the Director of the School of Management of the Universidad de Piura in Lima, Perù, has collaborated extensively with indigenous leaders in the Bagua area, and has also worked with business interests in the area. His expertise has provided invaluable information about the cultural, economic, and
political climate of the Bagua area and has been a rich source of data regarding productions of scale as well as further key indigenous and extractive industry contacts.

Mr. Guarún Fernández*, an Awajún-Wampís indigenous leader active in the resistance movement in the Bagua region, has also been interviewed multiple times. His personal knowledge of Amazonian indigenous culture has been instrumental in analyzing the role that the specific Amazonian understanding of the nature-society relationship has played in shaping the movement. His involvement in the resistance as well as his continuing participation in representing indigenous interests have also proved indispensable in understanding the effects of neoliberal globalizing policies on the people whose lands are being appropriated. He has also provided a fundamental understanding of Amazonian indigenous identity and conflicting national identities.

Information was gathered through over 50 interviews and conversations which took place in Lima, Chiclayo and the Amazonas department of Perú and in New York City over the course of 3 years, as well as observations in the field in the Amazonas department in Northern Perú. Many non-governmental organizations concerned with Amazonian issues, such as the Instituto del Bien Común, are headquartered in Lima. Others have operational offices in the capital city. Several of these were visited in 5 trips to Lima between 2013 and 2016. Chiclayo, the nearest major city to Amazonas department, is the home to many Awajún and Wampís that have emigrated from their ancestral lands in search of educational and economic opportunities. The Amazonas department, where the Baguazo occurred, is also where most of Perú’s Awajún and Wampís population lives. In March and April of 2016, I visited both Chiclayo and the Amazonas department. This visit included a tour of the Curva del Diablo – the site outside the city of Bagua where the insurrection of June 5, 2009 took place, as well as visits to indigenous villages.
up river and deep in Condorcanqui province in the northern half of Amazonas department (See Map 1.1). It is these villages that are and will be most affected by the increasing incursions by extractive interests. As can be expected, these villages are also where many of the participants in the Baguazo originate from, and where resistance continues to develop. Because of the continuing political instability in the region, the enduring resistance, and the consequent legally precarious and repressive situation most activists in the area find themselves in, most of the names of interviewees as well as the villages visited have been changed. Town and names that have been changed are marked with an *.

A Note on Objectivity and Positionality

In the social sciences, objectivity has long been an elusive and arguably misguided goal for researchers. The quantitative trend in most social science disciplines reflects this attempt at focusing on the “science” aspect of our disciplines, often at the expense of the “social” dimension. Yet in the context of politically charged work, in a place where the people being studied are fighting to preserve their way of life and the spaces of their social reproduction, objectivity can be not only overly simplifying, it can also be dangerously problematic. This is especially true of work in the Amazon.

As will be discussed later, the search for objectivity in the social sciences was catalyzed by the desire to understand society in the same way that nature was understood. In order for this to be possible, the machinations of social phenomena needed to be equated to those of natural phenomena. With the advent of the enlightenment, and the scientific discoveries that followed it, the accurate and objective measurement of nature had a two-fold and somewhat paradoxical
result. First, it reified the methods used to measure nature as appropriate to understanding society. The scientific advances achieved encouraged the application of scientific methods to society. Secondly (and paradoxically), though society was theorized to reflect nature, in order for this to be possible nature and society needed to be conceptually separated. Moreover, this separation allowed for the exploitation of nature for the purpose of profit maximization as industrialization and capitalism developed. In order to understand the Amazon, where indigenous philosophy largely revolves around the complete integration of nature and society, objectivity quickly proves inadequate.
A researcher’s positionality complicates these considerations even further. Every researcher in the field has a social experience and history that situates her or him in a place that is very different from those being studied, making objectivity nearly impossible: “Concerns about the situatedness of the knower, the context of discovery, and the relation of the knower to the subjects of her inquiry are demons at the door of positivist science. The production of ‘legitimate’ knowledge begins with slamming the door shut” (McCorkel and Myers, 2003, p. 200).

Standpoint epistemologists argue that social science is always socially situated. Because of this, it is crucial to pay attention to both the “backstage” of the research process (the researcher’s historical and social positioning) and the “front-stage”, or how this social positionality frames the research process and interpretation:

Understanding how power and privilege shape social science research requires an analysis of the context of discovery and, therefore, an identification of the researcher’s positionality… Taken as a whole, standpoint epistemology requires that the researcher put her taken-for-granted assumptions about herself, her project, or her research subjects (McCorkel and Myers, 2003, p. 205).

These processes are necessary to meaningfully interpret any data collected of subjects that are socially and culturally situated differently from the researcher. Yet, none of this self-awareness speaks to the subject’s awareness of the researcher’s positionality and situatedness, and how these may affect her or his ability to gather information that, though not necessarily objective, is meaningful.

Sheppard (2002) used the term positionality “to describe how different entities are positioned with respect to one another in space/time” (p. 318). A standpoint epistemology that is purely self-reflective and ignores the situatedness of the subjects being interviewed fails to add any
interpretive strength to any analysis. The positionality of both the researcher and the subject – the interactive dialectic between the two - is what shapes the research process.

In situations where a daily struggle between capital, the state, and its citizens is being observed, the guise of apolitical objectivity is a political statement. As the distance between the state and its subjects, as Davis (1999) formulates it, decreases on geographic, institutional, class and cultural dimensions, the possibility of apolitical objectivity is nullified. After all, despite the relative isolation of Amazonian indígenas from the Peruvian nation, enough interaction has occurred to ensure that even residents of the most inaccessible indigenous villages are aware of what the presence of strangers usually means. Without this awareness, the Baguazo would have never occurred. Sheppard’s two-way positionality makes it so that in the Peruvian context, apolitical objectivity takes on the meaning of taking a stance against indigenous interests.

What are these positionalities that interact between subject and researcher? How do they affect the research process? In my privileged situatedness, my social and interpretive filter is shaded by the master narratives that I, as a person educated in the Western canon, have been repeatedly and consistently subjected to. Awareness of this is obviously important to meaningful interpretation of any collected information. But as the distance between the state and its citizens, and between the researcher and the subject shrinks, the subject’s increasing interaction with the master narrative will also affect how they interpret the researcher.

In the case of this specific project, my own personal positionality and situatedness and my interactions with the positionality and situatedness of the indigenous people I observed are particularly complex. I was born and partially raised in Lima, Perú. Though both my parents were born or have roots in the Peruvian provinces, my family is of largely European ancestry, and our social and cultural experience is that of the middle-class, white, urban elites. I left Perú
for the United States with my family in 1985, looking to escape political and economic chaos. As a result, most of my formal education beyond middle school took place in the Northeastern United States. Upon arrival in Condorcanqui for my field research, my social history became immediately apparent. My appearance – fair skin, Western clothing, electronic equipment – as well as my clear discomfort and difficulty negotiating the challenging weather and terrain, meant that upon meeting me, locals immediately assumed I was either from the United States or Europe. Since there is next to no tourism in this area, these assumptions carry with them clear expectations: most thought that I was in the area representing international extractive companies. These assumptions were modified as conversations began – Spanish was my only language until I was 11 years old, and though English is now my primary language, my accent when speaking Spanish is decidedly Limeño. Given the racist attitudes of many urban and coastal Peruvians towards indigenous people of both the Andes and the Amazon, my visible and audible status as a white Limeño shaped all my interactions from the very beginning. Despite my immediate clarification of my intentions as an objective researcher and scholar, it soon became clear to me that having honest and open conversations with people who had risen in violent protest against the policies that had been implemented by people who looked and sounded like me would be nearly impossible. In this context, claiming objectivity by occluding one’s political stance and intentions becomes equivalent to acknowledging the aforementioned perceptions as being accurate. After a few failed attempts at conversing with the notoriously reserved Awajún in Condorcanqui, I quickly found that it was not only necessary to divulge my politics to interviewees, it was also the responsible thing to do. In addition, from the perspective of a dialectic standpoint epistemology, this approach is methodologically sound. Much like I would have to take into account my positionality and my subjects’ perceptions of me as a social entity
in order to appropriately interpret their resistance to speak to me, I could just as meaningfully (if not more) take into account their knowledge of my political views when interpreting their words once I had gained their trust. In addition, in the context of a neo-liberal (or extractive imperialist as will be seen later) onslaught on their way of life, as a researcher and advocate of indigenous rights I feel it is my responsibility to express my support for their struggle, even if the only advantage that provides them is the knowledge that alliances with outsiders can exist.

This work significantly contributes to the understanding of spatial processes and their impact on shaping resistance movements. Spatial productions in indigenous spaces have been analyzed in the context of the shaping of resistance movements with outcomes that may or may not have been achieved precisely because of the types of spatial productions that shaped them. The opposing interpretations of the relationship between nature and society help to understand the damaging effects of a philosophy that separates the two, not only for the natural environment, but necessarily also for humanity. An exploration of local, indigenous and national identity constructions helps to understand how historical events and culture contextualize the productions of space that shape resistance movements and their outcomes. Finally, an analysis of indigenous productions of scale highlights not only the importance of resisting globalizing neoliberal forces by using supranational-scale strategies, but also the global significance of the environmental destruction of the Amazon by extractive industries.

To analyze the ways in which these concepts contribute to indigenous spatial productions, and in turn how these spatial productions shaped the Baguazo, a political, economic, social and spatial context of the social movement is provided.
SECTION I

CHAPTER III

THE BAGUAZO IN CONTEXT

On December 19, 2007, a year and a half before the Baguazo, the Peruvian Congress granted the Executive Power the ability to legislate and implement the Free Trade Agreement Perú-United States. In signing this agreement, Perú committed to loosen commercial regulations to encourage further development, to simplify administrative procedures, and the “modernization” of the state and of the administration of justice on commercial interests. As part of this implementation, Legislative Decree 1090 was passed on June 27, 2008. By defining them as being “of national interest”, this decree allowed for the exploitation of lands thus far protected by the comparatively progressive Law of Native Communities and Agricultural Promotion of 1974 to be exploited for commercial interests (Vilcapoma, 2017). Article 66 of the Peruvian Constitution of 1993 mandates that “renewable and nonrenewable resources are part of the heritage of the Nation. The State is sovereign in taking advantage of them”. The Constitution goes further in establishing that “the state is the only one with rights to develop underground natural resources. Subsoil resources are a component of state assets that must be developed in the name of public interest” (Vásquez, 2014, p. 70). Indigenous organizations throughout the Amazon, led by the Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (AIDESEP), quickly recognized the threat the decree posed and began to organize resistance. The main argument of the movement consisted of illuminating the contradictions the decree (and others passed) presented with the constitutionally guaranteed right of Amazonian indígenas to be consulted before any ancestral lands are ceded to commercial interests. In addition, AIDESEP accused the government of infringing upon the Convention 169 of the International Labor
Organization. Signed in 1993, the Convention required the government to consult indigenous groups before ceding ancestral lands, significantly tying the struggle to international structures.

In August of 2008, indigenous activists, with the support of AIDESEP, commandeered two natural gas extraction plants, one in southern Perú, the other about ten miles outside of Bagua in northern Perú. The protests pressured congress to, on August 20, 2008, overturn many of the offending decrees (though not decree 1090, the most contentious one), ending the takeover of the extraction plants. President Álan García called the action by congress “an historic error”.

In March 2009, AIDESEP called for a commission to analyze the constitutionality of the remaining decrees as well as the contradictions with the ILO’s Convention 169. When no answer from the state was received, AIDESEP called for a general strike on April 9. Though Prime Minister Yehude Simón promised to form such a commission, lack of action caused the strike to intensify. On April 23rd, indigenous activists once again took over the natural gas extraction plant outside of Bagua, and held the 38 policemen stationed in the plant hostage. On May 9, the government declared a state of emergency in four departments in the Peruvian Amazon. On May 20, a meeting was held and attended by Prime Minister Simón and Alberto Pizango, President of AIDESEP. Failing to reach consensus on overturning Decree 1090, Pizango called for a national strike for June 3 and threatened to turn to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. On June 5, the government ordered the forced removal of the activists controlling the Curva del Diablo, resulting in the clash that killed dozens, injured hundreds, and, for many even in Perú, introduced the plight of Peruvian Amazonians to the world conscience – the Baguazo (Mercado and Najar Kokally, 2011).

The Baguazo represented the violent clash between two worlds that had been approaching each other for centuries, but that had never truly met before. In order to understand the complexities
of the global forces coming together in one point in time in one specific place and with such tragic consequences, they must be contextualized in the geography, history, politics, economics and culture that contributed to unique indigenous productions of space. Doing so will facilitate an understanding of indigenous social movements and their potential contributions to global environmental activism.

GEOGRAPHY

Perù’s history cannot be understood without a consideration of its extreme geographical characteristics (see Map 3.1). The country is divided into three geo-climatic regions, each of which offers some of the most extreme conditions on earth. The thin coastal strip features arid desert dunes. The capital city of Lima, located in the Central coastal strip, receives the lowest average rainfall of any capital city in the world. Agriculture is possible only in valleys of rivers fed by Andean rains. The Andes mountain range – the second highest on earth after the Himalayas – rises from the coastal desert. Perù’s location in the tropics (the equator just clips the northern tip of the country in the department of Loreto) means that temperatures even in very high altitudes are often quite mild. In the southern half of Perù, the mountains rise to an expansive plain (known as the altiplano) where the elevation ranges between 10,000 and 15,000 feet above sea level. The topography in the Andean region of Perù is extremely treacherous, with deep valleys sided by steep rocky slopes. Agriculture here is defined by elevation. One mountainside can be made up of several small farms at different altitudes specializing in specific crops. A farm at the bottom of a valley may specialize in cotton harvesting and tropical fruits; small farms higher up will produce corn, potatoes and quinoa, while grassy fields close to the
tree line provide pastures for llamas, alpacas and other native beasts of burden (Geografía Sociedad y Naturaleza, 2009). The constant and quick changes in elevation and climate in this area mean that non-industrialized large-scale agriculture that focuses on a single crop is nearly impossible. This, in conjunction with the fertile coastal valleys, created a topographic verticality of economic relations where trade would occur between different elevation strata (Murra, 1995).
The eastern slopes of the Andes rapidly turn into rainforest. The Northeastern half of Perú is covered by the low-lying (200 to 3,000 feet above sea level) rainforest known as the Amazon. This region is traversed by the Amazon River, which contains about 20% of the world’s fresh water. The extremely dense jungle vegetation covering the Peruvian rain forest and the delicate ecological balance of the area limits the size of population that can be sustained comfortably. Despite taking up 60% of Perú’s land area, only 13% of the country’s population (around 3.5 million) is concentrated in the Amazon region. Of these, about 9% (330,000) belong to approximately 60 indigenous groups (Webb and Fernàndez Baca, 2011). The Peruvian Amazon is also where more than half of the country’s hydrocarbon productive areas are located. The first oil well began drilling in 1939 in the central Amazon. In the early 1970s, oil began to be extracted in the Corrientes River region in Loreto, the first in the Northern Amazon.

Across these three natural regions, Perú is organized into 25 departments and the autonomous port city of Callao. Each department is divided into varying numbers of provinces, which are in turn organized into districts. Bagua, where the Baguazo took place, is located in the Amazonas department in Northern Perú. The capital of Amazonas department, Chachapoyas, is situated 2,300 meters above sea level and in the mild, humid Eastern slope of the Andes that dominates the southern half of Amazonas department. The city of Bagua Grande, capital of Utcubamba province, together with its counterpart, Bagua Chica in Bagua province, is located at 450 meters above sea level. With a population of about 41,000, Bagua is the most populated town in the department. Located in a rice, coffee fruit growing area, Bagua’s economy focuses on the distribution of agricultural products. The town also serves as a transportation center, and gateway to the Amazon. It is situated in the ceja de selva, the hilly transitional region between the Andes and the Amazonian rainforest. Though the events of the Baguazo took place in this
area, most of the protestors and organizers originated from rainforest villages in Bagua province north of Utcubamba, and from the large Condorcanqui province that dominates the northern half of Amazonas department. It is in Condorcanqui province where the grand majority of hydrocarbon productive areas in Amazonas department are located.

At 230 meters above sea level, Santa María de Nieva is the capital of Condorcanqui province. Located at the junction of the Marañón and Nieva rivers, Santa María de Nieva (pop. ~15,000) is located well within the Amazon rainforest region. Though colonos and other non-indigenous settlers have been present in the main towns such as Santa María de Nieva since colonial times, the population of the northern half of Amazonas department is dominated by the Awajún and Wampís indigenous communities. Numbering around 60,000, the Awajún predominate in Central and Southern Condorcanqui province as well as northern Bagua province. Significant Awajún communities also exist in Utcubamba and Bongará provinces in Amazonas department, as well as in Northern Cajamarca department, Western Loreto department, and North of the border in Ecuador. The approximately 10,000 Wampís predominate in Northern Condorcanqui province, and are also present in Western Loreto department and in Ecuador. As fellow members of the Jívaro language family, the Awajún and Wampís have historically co-existed while still maintaining a mostly friendly rivalry. Intermarriage among the two groups is relatively common and there is a great deal of territorial overlap, particularly in Condorcanqui province. Indigenous neighborhoods in Santa María de Nieva are often populated by both Awajún and Wampís.

Travel to Santa María de Nieva and beyond is quite difficult. Infrastructure in the Peruvian Amazon is precarious at best even today: Iquitos, capital of the Loreto department, is the largest city in the world with no road connection. In Condorcanqui, even after the completion of the
highway in 2010, Santa María de Nieva is still 4 to 5 hours away from Bagua and 6 or more away from Chachapoyas. Even these larger towns are isolated. The closest airports of any size are in Tarapoto, 6 hours away from Chachapoyas and 7 from Bagua, and Chiclayo, a 9-hour bus ride from Bagua. A reasonably priced and planned trip to Santa María de Nieva from Lima can very easily take 24 hours or more. As recently as the early 2010s, before the highway was completed, the journey would have been significantly more difficult.

Though advances in transportation and communications have increased contact, Amazonian indigenous groups like the Awajún and Wampís, unlike indígenas in the Peruvian highlands, have remained relatively isolated throughout history. This isolation has until very recently shaped the social reality of the Amazon region as well as the ways in which its inhabitants organized and resisted with little influence from the outside. However, shifts in global and national political economy have recently threatened this isolation and autonomy.

POLITICAL ECONOMY

The characteristics of Peruvian political economy have always reflected its practical and aspirational position in the world order as well as its aforementioned geographical characteristics. This position has consistently been tied to the country’s natural resources. Sugarcane, potatoes, and minerals were the main exports during colonial times and for a few decades after independence. Guano joined the list in the late 19th century and rubber in the early 20th.

Difficulties with infrastructure and a challenging geography have often thwarted Perú’s attempts at exploiting its natural resources and its attempts at adapting to global economic fluctuations. Despite this, in pre-colonial times, the Inca nation went from being a small kingdom based
around the ancient city of Cuzco to a massive empire encompassing most of the coastal and highland areas of western South America by the 15th century. They set up intricate road connections and implemented mining, agricultural and other technologies (Fagan, 1995). These were taken full advantage of by colonizing Spaniards who arrived in the early 16th century and quickly made Perù the economic center of the Spanish empire.

Much of the “success” of the colonialization of Perù was due to the racist assumption of the inferiority of the indigenous population. This assumption facilitated attempts by the Catholic Church to “assimilate” the population through religious proselytization. This, in turn, facilitated the enslavement and exploitation of the colonized and provided an excuse for massacres for those who refused indoctrination (Areche, 1995). Despite the Bolivarian anti-imperialist sentiment of the independence movement in the early 19th century, this racist attitude persisted and oligarchies and hierarchies remained unchallenged through the early stages of the 20th century (Thurner, 1997; Deustua, 1994).

*Early Economic Globalization and Attempts at Democracy*

Perù experienced its first economic boom after independence in the latter half of the 19th century. The rich deposits of guano on islands off the coast led to Great Britain replacing Spain as Perù’s most important trading partner. The disastrous War of the Pacific (1879-1883) against Chile left Perù bankrupt and more economically dependent on Great Britain than ever before. The massive debts accrued during the war were forgiven by Great Britain in exchange for much of Perù’s infrastructure, including its railroads and ports. The war also brought about other changes. Between independence in 1824 and 1872, Perù had no democratically elected civilian president. The humiliating defeat to Chile resulted in a popular call for civilian rule. In 1895, a coalition of civilian commercial elites replaced the armed forces as leaders of the nation. In an effort to
maintain a civilian state, the “civilistas” promoted a model of government that served the international private sector while simultaneously investing in education and health. Most of these projects were financed by new foreign investment (mostly from the United States) further immersing Perù into global capitalist markets (Palmer, 1995).

As the guano boom ended and the country stabilized after the War of the Pacific, the Peruvian economy diversified. Silver, cotton, rubber, sugar and lead replaced guano as the main exports in the late 19th century. Copper emerged as an important export in the early 20th century and small-scale petroleum extraction in the North Coast led to minor exports from 1915. After World War II, fish meal produced from anchovies became a valuable export. Though small-scale industrial production for the domestic market had been encouraged since the late 19th century, industrial exports were not significant until the 1960s. Until then, the economy was almost entirely supported by natural resource extraction. This didn’t change until the late 1960s, when overfishing and failing copper production encouraged diversification into manufacturing. The foreign investment necessary to develop these industries created popular unrest as increasing portions of the Peruvian economy was controlled by foreign interests.

“Modern” Perù?

The late 1960s marked a seminal point in time in the history of modern Perù. The country counted with approximately 12,000,000 inhabitants. Interestingly, this is the population the Inca Empire is estimated to have had in the 16th Century at the time of Spanish conquest. A little over half of the population lived in urban areas. Lima had grown from about a million inhabitants in 1953 to 2.5 million in 1969. This growth had occurred in a period of time that had experienced volatile fluctuations between authoritarianism and weak, largely inept attempts at representative democracy.
As typical of Latin American politics of the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century as this instability may have been, the country’s economic policies were largely anachronistic. While most of post-War Latin American nations attempted to implement import-substitution industrialization, Perú instead further opened its doors to foreign investment in mining and agriculture. As the 1960s turned into the 1970s and right-wing dictatorships predominated throughout Latin America, in Perú the ruling authoritarian regime was instead left-wing. In the 1970s, most Latin American nations had transitioned from import substitution isolationism to more aggressively joining the global markets, often with the help of staged coups and brutal repression. In Perú, Velasco’s military regime reversed the economic openness of the 1950s and 1960s and nationalized most extractive companies. Land reform also attempted to reorganize agriculture to allow for the industrial growth that the growing and urbanizing Peruvian population required. In addition, Velasco’s policies also represented a pivotal point in redefining the Peruvian state from one that served the interests of caudillos to one that fluctuated between serving its citizens and the capital that promised to bankroll the development it hoped these citizens would welcome.

**THE STATE**

Does the state cement the hegemony of representations of space? Does it facilitate the influence of representational spaces? Does it simply reflect spatial practice and fluctuate along with it? The answer to all of these questions is potentially “yes.” Yet a spatial analysis of the state highlights the variability of the role of the state across different spaces. The Weberian state is defined as a centralized government that preserves a monopoly of legitimate use of force in a territory. In Perú, as in most former colonies, this territory has been defined and redefined not by cultural, linguistic, or geographic constraints, but rather as a reflection of power relations (Scott, 2009). Though Spanish born landowners were soon expelled, Peruvian independence simply
meant that the hegemony of deported Spanish landowners was transferred over to criollo landowners. Despite heroic declarations of autonomy and anti-royalism, in reality the expulsion of Spaniards simply removed an obstacle to criollo power (Béjar, 2011). Much like their Spanish-born predecessors, criollo landowners were concerned mainly with maintaining their economic power, and by the 19th century, criollo families owned much of the land that contained most of Perú’s natural resources, the most marketable of which was guano. Yet the interests of these politically and economically powerful criollo families often contradicted those of nation-building. This, in addition to the War of Independence, and the challenges of building a nation, meant that the national debt quickly became problematic.

In 1869, as the external debt reached record levels, control over guano production was taken away from the wealthy families and turned over to French financiers Dreyfus & Brothers. In exchange for monthly deliveries of guano, Dreyfus & Brothers would forward monthly payments and, most importantly, pay off the country’s external debt. The perceived success of this deal in bringing the country out of economic crisis led to further concessions of natural resources in exchange for cash payments from Dreyfus & Brothers. Much of the money was to be used to build railroads that would facilitate the transportation and delivery of the consigned natural resources. In addition to guano, salt was now mined and offered in exchange for cash. The problems began when guano prices decreased. Railroads took longer to build, at higher than expected costs, and were less profitable and effective than was predicted. The global economic crisis that began in 1872 threw the deal further into trouble (Béjar, 2011). Beyond the economic problems it caused, the Dreyfus & Brothers contract set an economic and cultural precedent that continues to influence Peruvian policy today. By tying state capital to speculative natural resource valuations, Perú firmly cemented its entrance into the global finance markets from a
peripheral position. This event represents the first concrete example of the Peruvian state’s commitment to tie its political economy to international finance, supported by natural resource export. In an early version of accumulation by dispossession, the Peruvian commons was increasingly sacrificed to foreign capitalist interests in the name of development. The viability of this model depended on cheap labor provided by exploited indigenous populations and former slaves. In short, state-driven nation-building in Perú depended on serving the interests of international capital, with most of the burden of serving those interests falling on indigenous people and former slaves.

As the economy continued to expand, the country, deeply entrenched in the Wallerstinián periphery, began to industrialize. Workers and peasants inspired by the Russian and Mexican revolutions began to organize under the guise of anarchism and communism. These agitations were dealt with by fluctuating democratically elected governments and authoritarian military dictatorships. These fluctuations tended to serve the interests of the new hegemonic power to which Perú had become dependent – the United States.

As will be discussed below, the early half of the twentieth century was also the time when indigenous identity began to reflect the work of indigenistas such as José Carlos Mariátegui, and his analysis of indianista, indigenista, and indígena literature. This identity was also defined under the guise of ideology: Mariátegui was the founder of the Communist Party of Perú and his life work was decidedly anti-capitalist in nature. As the state repeatedly shifted between democratically elected and authoritarian dictatorships, the formation of an indigenous identity in Perú, particularly the class-based Mariateguista identity that challenged the central but superficial place that Andean indígenas had been given in national myth-building, often occurred in opposition to the state.
Despite the good intentions of 1920s indigenistas, their work consisted of white, bourgeois, European intellectuals dictating what was best for indígenas. The reality was that, with high illiteracy rates, most Peruvian indígenas were not even able to vote until 1980. In addition, Peruvian leaders continued to be members and representatives of the Peruvian elites. Fernando Belaúnde Terry, who was democratically President for the first time in 1963 after years of military dictatorship, came from a traditional upper-class Lima family that had been forced into exile by the Leguía dictatorship. Educated in France and the United States, his policies very clearly represented the interests of his social class (García, 2008), and reflected his international contacts. When he took office in 1963, resistance in the Peruvian highlands was beginning to develop. Guerrilla movements and land occupations, inspired by the triumphs in Cuba and the emergence of similar movements throughout Latin America, had begun to become frequent enough to concern both bourgeois landowners and urban elites who worried their hegemonic position could be compromised (Kay, 2001), as would be their control over the production of space. Despite the ferocity of the repression unleashed by Belaúnde’s government, the resistance continued. To quell the tension, Belaúnde composed a new land-reform law. He encouraged the colonization of the jungle by peasants, invested in expensive irrigation projects on the coast and capital-intensive development initiatives in the highlands where the rugged topographic conditions made such investments counter-productive (Seligmann, 1995). In addition, large agricultural estates on the coast were not subject to expropriation. Many loopholes were used to avoid expropriation even in those estates that were originally considered to be eligible. Bureaucratic obstacles impeded land transfers while a clause in the reform law allowed landowner families to divide their estates among family members into tracts that were smaller than the required size for expropriation (Seligmann, 1995). Ultimately, only 2% of peasants
claiming land received any through Belaùnde’s policies (Matos Mar and Mejia, 1980). Representations of space clearly continued to dominate spatial practice.

Guerrilla activity evolved further while the armed forces continued to repress. The military, however, was aware that repression would not solve Perù’s problems. They considered Belaùnde’s policies ineffective and were convinced that the peasant uprisings produced an instability that prevented Perù from developing. In addition, the landed oligarchy did not contribute effectively to the national economy, further stalling development. Behind closed doors, the young, idealistic officers began to plan a more comprehensive reform that would stimulate growth. The components of this reform would organize the highlands into more efficient production models, diminish the socio-economic and political powers of the landowning elites and stop the migration of rural peasants into cities. Importantly, another goal of the reform was to depoliticize peasants and prevent the insurrections taking place throughout Latin America. Pacified indígenas would be less likely to demand rights over productions of space. On October 3, 1968, a successful military coup deposed Belaùnde and installed General Juan Velasco Alvarado as president of the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces of Perù (Seligmann, 1995).

**Agrarian Reform and Velasco’s Regime**

Though Velasco’s main goal was to contain revolution, his approach was unprecedented in Latin America. From a relatively humble background, Velasco’s revolution consisted of creating a new Perù revolving around the rights of indigenous population:

*Peruvians: This is an historic day. And it’s important that we all be aware of its full significance. Today, the Revolutionary Government has issued the Agrarian Reform Law, thereby giving the country its most vital instrument of transformation and development. History will remember this June 24 as the beginning of an irreversible*
process that will lay the groundwork for true national greatness, founded on social justice and the real participation of the people in the wealth and future of our motherland. Today, for the Day of the Indian, the Day of the Peasant, the Revolutionary Government honors them with the best of tributes by giving to the nation a law that will end forever the unjust social order that impoverished and oppressed the millions of landless peasants who have always been forced to work the land of others. Far, then, from an empty homage, with an instrument of unassailable judicial action the Revolutionary Government has given shape to a national goal of justice fought for in our Motherland. From this day forward, the Peruvian peasant will no longer be a pariah or disinherit ed and living in poverty from the cradle to the grave, powerless to make a better future for his children. As of this lucky June 24, Peruvian peasants will truly be free citizens whose motherland has finally recognized their right to the fruits of the land they work and a position of justice within a society where nevermore will they be second-class citizens, men to be exploited by other men. When we assumed the government of the country, the armed forces also made the solemn promise to carry out the vast task of national reconstruction. We were also always aware of the immensity of this responsibility. Ours could not be just another government. It emerged with the unforsakable mission to be the government of national revolution… Fellow countrymen: I repeat, this is an historic day, whose transcendence will grow with the passage of time. Today, the Revolutionary Government feels the deep emotion of a mission and a duty fulfilled. Today, on the Day of the Peasant, we look to the citizenry with faith, pride, and hope; and we say to all of Peru that we owe the inspiration of our acts to the people and to them we today deliver a law that will forge greatness and justice as its destiny. To the men of the land, we can now say in the immortal and liberating voice of Túpac Amaru: Peasant: the Master will no longer feed off your poverty! (Velasco, 1995).

The above quote is from General Velasco’s speech introducing the land reform to be implemented. It is remarkable on many levels. Perú has always been a land of contradictions, but a revolutionary government led by the armed forces with a leader speaking about liberation and quoting Túpac Amaru was a surprise even for Perú. More importantly, however, the speech contains language that would have deep consequences on Peruvian politics that went beyond the effect of the agrarian reform itself. Quite predictably the emphatic “Peasant: the Master will no longer feed off your poverty!” quickly became the slogan of peasants throughout Perú who now felt truly represented by a state that would look out for their interests. The speech was broadcast on National Television on June 24, 1969. This date is celebrated throughout the highlands as “El día del Indio” (the day of the Indian) since it corresponds with the traditional Inca harvest
festival Inti Raymi. The term “Indio” has historically been used pejoratively. In the times of indigenismo, it was replaced with “indigena”. In this speech, Velasco paid homage to Mariátegui by uniting ethnicity with class. June 24 was no longer “El día del Indio”, according to Velasco. It was now “el día del campesino” or “the day of the peasant”.

The reform itself was radical. A Peasant Communities Statute was passed, which formally recognized indigenous communities of permanent-resident, full-time collective farmers. Large estates in the highlands and the coast were converted into cooperatives. Some were organized into Agrarian Production Cooperatives (CAPs) where peasants who had worked for the deposed landowners were now asked to work the estates cooperatively. Peasants received a salary in addition to a percentage of the profit of the cooperative. In time, they would manage the estates themselves. Other estates that included large tracts of pastureland were combined into Agrarian Societies of Social Interest (SAISs). Communities bordering these estates would participate in the management of the SAIS and would receive a portion of the profits as well. To support these changes and facilitate their implementation, Velasco radically dismantled the court system, dismissing the entire Supreme Court and replacing it with progressive judges. He also implemented agrarian courts that were nearly completely autonomous from the civil courts. Land judges were selected through written examinations (which ensured they were of the appropriate ideological ilk) and could not own property in rural areas. They were appointed to serve in provincial capitals, decentering the political and economic activity that had traditionally revolved around Lima. Though officially neutral, they were expected to assist peasants in negotiating the process of obtaining land. Guillermo Figallo Adrianzèn, the first President of the Agrarian Tribunal, the body created to nominate land judges for the agrarian courts, described their modus operandi: “It is not correct that the landed elite and peasants submit their cases
before jurisdictional bodies under equal conditions; on one side is cultural level, social position, economic solvency, and remunerated professional advice; on the other is illiteracy, social marginalization, and the lack of resources” (Seligmann, 1995).

*Failure of Agrarian Reform*

The ambitious program of Velasco’s revolutionary agrarian reform ultimately failed. Conflicts soon arose as a direct result of the social and economic restructuring in the highlands. The Peasant Communities Statute created rifts in the community when land boundaries were disputed, especially when some lands were turned over to cooperatives instead of to communities. The regime failed to consider boundary disputes and inter-community reciprocal economic relationships that had existed since before the Inca Empire. Its requirement of full-time residency meant that individuals who through marriage or economic relationships with other communities worked lands in other areas were not recognized as community members. In an area where such labor and economic relationships were crucial to survival, this requirement meant that a significant proportion of the population was excluded (Seligmann, 1995). The policies of the agrarian reform, in attempting to empower indigenous communities, instead continued to impose capitalist modes of production on peasant communities. Productions of space, therefore, continued to represent the interests of those in power.

The Agrarian Tribunal and courts were also problematic. The sheer volume of cases presented caused there to be a backlog of up to four years. In addition, landowners could appeal any rulings in Lima, forcing peasants to spend time and money many of them didn’t have traveling to the capital city. A feeling of resentment towards the re-centralization of the Peruvian state, which persists to the present time, also grew (Kay, 2001).
The contradictions of the reform contributed to its ultimate failure. In its attempt to foment equality between urban coastal workers and rural peasants in the highlands, the regime’s key goal from the beginning was to improve the national economy and catalyze growth. To do so, the regime issued former landowners bonds that had to be invested in industry and could be redeemed in the years ahead. The rampant inflation that began in 1974, however, made these bonds practically worthless and the industrial growth that was expected never materialized (Seligmann, 1995). In addition, the reform created new inequalities. Resentment grew towards the relatively few peasants who had been organized into CAPs and SAISs and had accumulated wealth. Peasants who felt they were not properly represented by the political organizations created by the regime turned to alternatives such as the Confederación de Campesinos Peruanos, the Confederation of Peruvian Peasants (CCP). This grass-roots peasant organization was formed before the regime and supported peasant-led land invasions. This greatly undermined the regime’s efforts to pacify peasant movements. In response, the regime formed a paramilitary force (the Revolutionary Workers’ Movement) to suppress the increasingly combative labor unions. In the end, radical reform that simultaneously attempted to depoliticize peasants resulted in even more radical resistance (Seligmann, 1995). The promise of peasant autonomy and emancipation was well-received; the failure to deliver real political power and the expectation of docility ultimately led to failure and further distrust of the state.

By 1975, the failures of the regime, in conjunction with Velasco’s failing health, provided an opportunity for those opposed to the reform to act. A new coup, led by General Francisco Morales Bermúdez (Velasco’s former minister of Economics) overthrew Velasco and installed a new regime, the leaders of which were closely allied to the urban bourgeoisie. Bermúdez dismantled much of Velasco’s work and increased repression. He dismissed progressive
generals from the administration, overturned laws protecting workers in order to “promote investment” and befriended Argentina and Chile’s fascist military regimes (Rodriguez Beruff, 1978). The culture, however, had changed. Velasco’s reforms had increased popular expectations that could not be so easily repressed (Fitzgerald, 1976). As a land judge in Cuzco stated: “The Indian has ceased to be a pariah, no longer has to eat together with the dogs behind the kitchen or to sleep below the steps together with the cattle. The Indian has begun to gain access to all the places that free men can enter and leave.” (Seligmann, 1995).

Bermúdez’s policies resulted in further economic chaos. Prices rose by 45% in 1976. Unemployment and underemployment reached 60% in areas and funding for social services were severely cut (CVR, 2003). In June and July 1977, the Peruvian left organized the largest social movement in modern Peruvian history by calling a general strike (Rodrìguez Beruff, 1978). All working-class organizations took part in the strike except for, tellingly as will be seen later, the trade-union CENTROMIN, under the influence of the Maoist wing of Patria Roja (the revolutionary faction of the Peruvian Communist Party). Three thousand students in the Andean town of Sicuani rioted. Massive demonstrations broke out in the highland cities of Arequipa, Cuzco, Ayacucho and Puno. Soon students in coastal Tacna joined the struggle while violent protests in highland Huancayo and Lima resulted in multiple deaths (Rodrìguez Beruff, 1978).

Return to Democracy

As it implemented neo-liberal policies, the Bermúdez regime also planned for a transition to democracy by meeting with traditional bourgeois parties (including Acciòn Popular and the opportunistic APRA) to ensure that the elections would result in a victory over Izquierda Unida (IU) the coalition of leftist parties that included the pro-Soviet wing of the PCP and the Peruvian Socialist Party. Increased official support of bourgeois parties by the regime, its increased
cooperation with United States interests and the International Monetary Fund, as well as massive divisions within the IU resulted in a victory for Acciòn Popular, with Fernando Belaùnde Terry, whose ineffectiveness had led to the coup of 1968, as President of the Republic. Belaúnde’s second term was mired by a series of failed attempts at liberalizing the economy after more than a decade of isolationism. The intensification of guerrilla war in the highlands and its arrival in Lima further complicated his presidency (CVR, 2003).

The 1985 elections arrived with the country in chaos (Taylor, 1986). A divided IU and a discredited Acciòn Popular offered weak and ineffective candidates. On July 28, 1985, APRA won the first Presidential election in its history. The young, charismatic Alan Garcìà inherited a country on the verge of collapse. His term as president was characterized by corruption and economic chaos which led to an intensification of social disorder. During his administration, his orthodox, isolationalist policies led to per capita income in Perù falling to 1960 levels ($720 per year) and inflation rising to an absurd 7,649%.

By 1989, Perù was even closer to collapse than in 1985. Mismanagement and corruption had left the economy in chaos and the insurgency that had started in the isolated department of Ayacucho had reached the capital and threatened to overthrow the government all together. Very few Peruvians were optimistic about the upcoming elections. After Garcia’s failures, APRA was not expected to do well. Once again, internal divisions within IU ended any hope of success. Leading in votes was Mario Vargas Llosa, Perù’s most famous novelist. His right-wing tendencies (Kokotovic, 2001) had landed him in trouble when in 1983, as president of a commission formed to investigate the murder of 8 journalists in the village of Uchuraccay in Ayacucho, he concluded they had been murdered by peasants whose reality was stuck “in the 19th or even 18th centuries” while the rest of Peru strove for modernity (Garcia, 2008). His
program of shock economic reform and aristocratic background won him a majority of votes in Lima and other large coastal cities. He did not however, receive the 50% of the national vote necessary to avoid a run-off election. During the run-off, Alberto Fujimori, an agronomist and rector of the Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina, came from nowhere with a populist, center-left program of gradual reform. Despite opposition from urban bourgeois circles, his role as an outsider gained him the support of popular sectors and won him the presidency.

Despite Fujimori’s promise for gradual change, the program he implemented almost immediately after his inauguration was neoliberal in the extreme (Gutièrrez Sanìn, 2005). Dubbed “Fujishock”, the program consisted of the privatization of utilities, health and social security. Private sector price controls were relaxed and tax loopholes that allowed large and international businesses to avoid tariffs were introduced (Cotler, 2000). Social services were severely cut, sending a large portion of Peru’s already impoverished population further into misery (Fairlie Reinoso, 1997; Arce, 2006; Roberts, 1996; Stokes, 1997; Sheahan, 1997; Thorbecke et al, 2008).

Despite the problems Fujimori’s policies caused, the International Monetary Fund called his program “among the most advanced in the world” (Arce, 2006) and guaranteed loans to Perú that had been unavailable during García’s presidency. Foreign investment took advantage and flooded the Peruvian markets, eager to invest in the as-of-yet undiscovered or unexploited natural resources that poised Perú to experience the growth that had always eluded the country. The Peruvian economy grew at a record pace. At the same time, however, the poor continued to suffer. An outbreak of cholera – a disease that had been unknown in Peru since the 19th century – killed hundreds and infected thousands (Caretas, 1995). The number of visitors to soup kitchens (organized by neighborhood associations, not the state) more than doubled (Hays-Mitchell, 2002). Sendero Luminoso continued to terrorize the population with increased attacks,
as did the Peruvian military. Vargas Llosa’s FREDAMO party controlled Congress and continually blocked Fujimori’s further privatizations. In April 1992, with the support of the military, Fujimori carried out a presidential auto-coup (Mauceri, 1995). He suspended the constitution, dissolved the judiciary and shut down Congress.

The new constitution that was ratified in 1993 after the self-coup paradoxically contained articles that guaranteed indigenous rights. Article 2 “recognizes and protects the nation’s ethnic and cultural plurality” (Garcìa, 2008). In addition, in 1994, the Fujimori government ratified the International Labor Organization’s Convention 169, which obliged governments to consult indigenous groups before conceding their lands to industrial, commercial, or international interests. Fujimori continued to cultivate his role as an outsider, being photographed multiple times wearing traditional Andean garb and maneuvering an Ashàninka boat down the Ene River. But behind the scenes, Fujimori’s neoliberal agenda clearly showed that these concessions were only superficial. In addition to the rhetoric about recognition of indigenous culture and language, the 1993 constitution, as will be seen ahead, effectively rescinded the inalienability of indigenous communal lands (Greene, 2006).

Post-Fujimori Indigenismo

In September 2000, videos were broadcast on national television showing Vladimiro Montesinos, head of Fujimori’s intelligence agency, offering a bribe to an opposition congressman to defect to Fujimori’s party. The surprising support Fujimori continued to enjoy despite increasing abuses of power and authoritarianism had been bought off. Montesinos was imprisoned, while Fujimori went into exile in Japan. After a short interim presidency, Alejandro

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1 The Ashàninka are a large Amazonian indigenous group living mainly in Eastern Junín and Huánuco departments and Western Ucayali department in the Central Peruvian Amazon.
Toledo, Fujimori’s political nemesis, was elected to lead the country. He had been born and raised in a small village in the Andes. With encouragement from teachers and Peace Corps volunteers, he eventually completed a doctorate at Stanford University. In his inauguration, held for the first time in the Machu Picchu ruins, Toledo promised to protect the interests of Perù’s indigenous population (Barr, 2003). Despite this, Toledo continued Fujimori’s policy of privatization and corporate concessions (Leòn, 2002). It is in this context that Amazonian resistance movements began to strengthen and consolidate. The indigenista rhetoric, though clearly superficial and opportunistic, was apparently empowering, and was in many ways the first sustained contact with national economic structures.

APRA’s Alan Garcia was once again elected president in 2006 despite the fact that corruption charges filed against him for actions during his disastrous 1980s presidency had only been dismissed in 2001 upon his return from exile after the statute of limitations had expired (BBC World Service, 2001; Manrique, 2006). In addition, his presidency was unofficially sponsored in the press by the IMF when then Western Hemisphere Director Anoop Singh stated: “I’m impressed by the President-elect’s vision for Perú, especially his commitment to applying prudent economic policy” (Reuters, 2006). Garcia wasted no time implementing his neoliberal agenda with serious repercussions for indigenous people throughout Perú. Garcia’s “prudent economic policy” unleashed the sequence of events that culminated in the violence of the Baguazo.

Summary

By tying national capital to speculative natural resource valuations in the late 19th century, the Peruvian state firmly cemented its entrance into global finance markets. Since then, it has generally followed global political and economic trends, only seemingly a decade or two later
than most other Latin American nations. While isolationist import substitution policies in the 1960s encouraged industrialization in most Latin American countries, Perú remained an almost entirely agricultural and mineral exporting nation open to global markets. As military regimes enforced increasingly neoliberal policies throughout the continent, Perú’s authoritarianism was populist and isolationist. Belaúnde’s was perhaps the only presidency that followed the regional trends towards increased privatization. His efforts were arguably hampered by an inherited economic instability; a large, newly democratically represented population; and a violent insurrection that began after most guerrilla warfare had lost currency in the Latin American radical left. García returned to isolationism during the neoliberal late 1980s. His downfall was worsening political violence and rampant corruption. Fujimori’s authoritarianism and repression essentially brought an end to political violence, at least that which did not originate from the state. His extreme neoliberal shock economic policies were facilitated by superficial democratic concessions that exploited his own “outsider” identity. Toledo incorporated indigenismo into the neoliberal project, while García in his second term pushed for the privatizations that sparked the Baguazo. What is clear is that, whether anachronistic or timely, Peruvian state policy, as well as its political economy, has usually been driven by its engagement with or resistance to global economic trends, as effected by core countries. It has also been notorious for ignoring the needs of indigenous populations.

Until recently largely absent from indigenous areas, the Peruvian state has had relatively little impact on the production of indigenous spaces. What impact it has had is decidedly as a Lefebvrian representation of space – either as a neglectful, unattached entity, or as one that views the natural-resource rich and unexploited Amazon as a potential source of profit. As the extractive possibilities of the Amazon begin to be exploited, the presence of the state has
suddenly increased. Its position as a peripheral, natural resource-rich nation in a post-neoliberal global structure means that the state as a representation of space is increasingly involved in indigenous spatial productions. This influence is often in conflict with the needs of indigenous communities as representational spaces. The conflict, as well as the state’s power to sustain a dominant influence on spatial productions in indigenous areas, are facilitated by the glaring absence of any viable representation in legitimate political parties. At the time of the Baguazo, most political parties in Perú were either in crisis, or newly formed around a specific politician. Acción Popular had decreased in influence since Belaúnde’s presidency in the early 1980s. Although Fujimorismo had quite quickly recovered from the scandals of the 1990s, in the late 2000s they were still rebuilding. This left García’s APRA as the sole stable, nationally organized political party in Perú in 2009. Opportunistic as ever, APRA perfectly reflected the Peruvian state’s desperate desire to bankroll its development projects on its natural resources. The fact that these development projects often contradicted the needs of indigenous Amazonians was not sufficient incentive to deter the state’s willingness to serve capital. The complete and historical absence of stable, and capable political parties to represent indigenous interests further facilitated the Peruvian state’s integration into neo-extractivist capitalist structures.

POLITICAL PARTIES

It is clear that the unstable, ineffective Peruvian state has historically struggled to represent the interests of its citizens. Velasco’s authoritarian populism was arguably the most concerned with the plight of Perú’s poverty-stricken majority. Yet even his efforts were paternalistic and ineffective. Regardless of whether the state acted as a reaction to or in collaboration with global capitalist developments, the lack of a stable political structure to act as a conduit between the state and the people meant that any government was likely to be unattached from its constituents,
especially if they were away from Lima. For indigenous spaces, completely unrepresented by political parties, this has meant that largely autonomous indigenous spatial productions are now vulnerable to influence from a state mainly interested in extracting the Amazon’s newly discovered resources. The history of instability and lack of longevity of Peruvian political parties is indicative of this. APRA, the only consistently present political party in modern times (see Appendix A), claimed to represent the interests of the people. In reality, it has historically been inconsistent and collaborationist. Though APRA perhaps counts with the most loyal supporters in Perú, many have been lost to parties of both the left and the right as the party continued to opportunistically float between ideologies.

In the 1930s, APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, or American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) became the first organized political party representing the Peruvian masses. The party was founded in Mexico City by exiled Peruvian student Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre in 1924 (Haya de la Torre, 1995). Haya de la Torre was one of the more distinguished attendants at the Third-World Conference in Brussels where the concept of the Third-World as a political entity and force was developed (Prashad, 2008). APRA politics originally paralleled Mariátegui’s view that the solution to Peru’s problems lay in solving the Indian question. APRA, however, was not socialist or revolutionary for long, despite its name.

By the 1940s, APRA’s strength in support was such that through its influence it could control the result of any democratic election. Since right-wing political parties were weak (most conservative presidents ruled through a cult of personality that often ignored any specific ideology) elites turned to the military to defend their interests. The military had been the protector of commercial and oligarchic interests since independence and its early relationship with APRA was poor. This antagonism peaked in 1932 when violent skirmishes between the
armed forces and APRA militants in the coastal city of Trujillo resulted in many deaths on both sides. In 1933, an APRA militant assassinated President Sánchez, prompting further persecution. These developments resulted in APRA’s unique role in shaping Peruvian politics from that time until the present. Because of the hostility between the party and the armed forces, the military prevented APRA from formally ruling until the 1980s. Despite this, its massive influence in labor, student and lower-middle class sectors meant that the more radical political alternatives developing in the rest of Latin America did not emerge in Perú until much later. APRA’s strength also lay in the fact that it was concessionary and willing to compromise with almost anyone in order to gain political power. By the 1950s, APRA had become a centrist party. In 1956, it supported the campaign of conservative Manuel Prado and collaborated with his government when he won the election. The party also collaborated with its arch-enemy when in 1962 the armed forces, under the command of General Manuel Odría, intervened once again for one year before holding elections. Both the armed forces and APRA backed the reformist Fernando Belaúnde Terry of the centrist Acciòn Popular (AP) party (Palmer, 1995).

Founded in 1956, and having only been in power between 1963 and 1968 and 1980 and 1985, AP, much like APRA, began as a center-left party. By the 1980s it had evolved towards the center-right. Both AP and APRA, along with the center-right Partido Popular Cristiano and the Izquierda Unida coalition were the strongest performers in the first democratic elections in Peruvian history that did not require literacy for voting eligibility. Until 1980, the majority of Perú’s non-white, non-coastal population were impeded from participating in elections because of the literacy requirement. Despite this new right, few of the political options in the 1980 elections were particularly representative of non-elites’ interests, particularly if these non-elites were indigenous and Andean or Amazonian. Izquierda Unida, the coalition of leftist parties
formed in 1980, was largely Mariateguista in ideology, with strong Maoist, Trotskyist, and Socialist influences. Its platform was largely class- not identity-based. As attractive as their anti-imperialist, progressive ideology may have been to indigenous/rural interests, IU’s strength was to be found among the urban labor unions of industrializing cities such as Lima, Arequipa, Puno and Ilo. Indigenous people and rural peasants, having finally been given the right to vote in 1980 with the abolishment of the literacy requirement, had very few options.

As Julio Cotler (2006) argues, “Perú remains hobbled in its institutional development by a colonial heritage of profound inequalities broken neither during the Independence period nor since…. [I]t is difficult to talk of Perú as a ‘nation’ or a ‘demos’, given the legacy of uneven development and the lack of political rights among a large swathe of the population” (Crabtree, 2010, p. 361). At a time when the democratic ideology should have been consolidating in Peruvian society, Belaúnde’s Acción Popular (AP) “failed to transfer Perú’s traditional structures” during his second 1980-1985 term as president (p. 362). Meanwhile APRA, arguably the strongest and most enduring political party in Perú, “evolved as [a] vertical movement[, structured around clientelism and lacking in internal democracy” (p. 362). Despite its attempts to bring APRA back to its popular roots, García’s 1985-1990 government failed “conspicuously to engage with popular sectors, urban or rural, in any sustained way” (p 363). In addition, García’s “clientelistic instincts and … abject failure to build the base for a more genuinely democratic state concerned more with the recognition of rights than the distribution of favors” (p. 363) generated widespread disillusionment in a nation already traumatized by social, economic and political chaos.

The failures of reformist, paternalistic parties such as AP, and leftist in name, but collaborationist in practice APRA provided an opportunity for the genuine Peruvian left to organize stable
political parties that could contribute to the evolution of a viable party system. This opportunity was particularly promising given the Velasco regime’s willingness to allow socialist, communist, and revolutionary parties to organize workers and peasants. The Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (CGTP), the Peruvian Communist Party’s (PCP) labor federation, replaced APRA’s workers’ organization as the largest in the country in the early 1970s. Maoist, Trotskyist and Guevarist organizations also improved their organizational structures and influence. The Confederación Campesina del Perú (CCP), Perú’s largest peasant federation was controlled by the Maoists in the early 1970s, as was the Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Educación del Perú (SUETEP), the influential teachers’ union. Trotskyists were influential among mining and fishing workers and gained enough organizational power to in 1973 gain control of the CCP (Roberts, 1996). Bermúdez’s much more conservative military regime took over in 1975, as economic deterioration and growing labor militancy exacerbated internal divisions. Bermúdez halted many of Velasco’s reforms, implemented IMF austerity policies and repressed strikes. Well-organized leftist unions and parties, accustomed to having both the freedom to organize and influence on policy-making, responded with massive strikes and protests which compelled Bermúdez to call for elections for a Constituent Assembly in 1978 that would facilitate the transition to democracy in 1980. Despite their revolutionary ideology, most leftist parties decided to participate in the 1978 Constituent Assembly elections, jointly winning 29.5% of the vote (Webb and Fernández Baca, 1991). These encouraging results led most leftist parties (with the telling exception of Sendero Luminoso) to participate in the 1980 national elections. On the surface, a Lefebvrian analysis of the Peruvian democratic situation in 1980 paints a rather positive picture of Perú, at least from the point of view of the historically oppressed majority. To begin with, a revolutionary military government claimed to represent the interests of peasants
and workers. Though the dialectical relationship among the components of Lefebvre’s conceptual triad leave no room for discreet delineations among them, Velasco’s regime and its goals sought to further blur the lines between representations of space and representational spaces. The presence of an increasingly organized left kept in check any corporatist and overly authoritarian tendencies of Velasco’s regime, preventing the state from veering too far towards becoming a representation of space, exemplified by weakened traditional political parties and reactionary elements in the military. As the state ideology shifted towards authoritarian and neoliberal under Bermúdez, democratic and reformist under Belaúnde, and clientelist and statist under García, the Peruvian revolutionary left managed to, at least superficially, maintain the strength of representational spaces, by preserving the institutions that connected the people to the government. As leftist parties organized further, IU achieved encouraging results in the polls with the return to democracy, including the mayorship of Lima in 1983 and 30.5% of votes in the 1986 municipal elections. Yet IU quickly began to collapse under the weight of its own ideologies. And this collapse highlights the inadequacy of Lefebvre’s theory when implemented on Latin American spaces.

For all the rhetoric about representing the interests of the people, Velasco’s policies attempted to impose a utopian ideal (space as conceived – representation of space) onto a heterotopian reality (space as lived – representational space), an imposition fraught with problematic contradictions. His regime’s nominally revolutionary stance and attempts to address the oligarchic injustices of colonialist Peruvian culture on the one hand, placed the regime firmly in the realm of representational spaces. Yet, the imposition of state-defined economic organization onto already existing organic structures, as well as the regime’s efforts to address the contradictions that challenged capitalist development placed it simultaneously in the realm of representations of
space. The same can be said of APRA whose ideologies reflected what was most convenient to its consolidation of power. The place of both in the conceptual triad fluctuated between representations of space and representational spaces.

The leftist parties, whether Trotskyist or Maoist, or even Mariateguista, all reflected utopian ideologies developed in revolutionary Russia (or Germany, or Manchester) or China and implemented in very real, lived Peruvian spaces, thereby introducing their own sets of contradictions. In this case, the leftist parties’ positioning as representations of space is due to their attempts to impose ideologies that had evolved elsewhere (and therefore may have been representational spaces in Europe or China) onto spaces with an entirely different reality. As a result, Peruvian political parties were institutions that represented the interests of these parties themselves, whether in conflict with the Peruvian state’s ideologies or synonymous with them, and regardless of how these reflected the needs of the people they claimed to represent. In Lefebvrian terms, Peruvian representational spaces and representations of space are largely synonymous, even when many of their key characteristics continue to be antonymous. This is reflected in the failure of IU to consolidate power due to internal factionalism: after increasingly encouraging municipal election results between 1980 and 1986, internal differences based on the contradictions introduced by the implementation of various ideologies on Peruvian spaces led to the collapse of the IU. The violence inflicted by Shining Path and the public’s general condemnation of their methods split IU. Though they nominally shared an ideology and goals, IU was divided about whether to show support Shining Path or separate themselves from the violence of the organization. As Shining Path’s terror spread through the country, and any political activity remotely related to its ideology was associated with violent insurrection, this
split became wider and the ability of IU to represent the interests of its constituents continued to diminish (CVR, 2003).

Free and civil society officially returned with the transition from military dictatorship. Yet as the political situation became increasingly chaotic with the growth of Shining Path, membership in civil organizations became progressively politicized and their repression more ruthless. The first election in 1980 brought center-right reformist Belaúnde of AP back to the Presidency after having been deposed by the coup in 1968. But Belaúnde and his party failed to recognize that the Perú of 1968 was a very different place from the Perú of 1980. Though Velasco’s experiment had ultimately failed, it had resulted in a significant increase in expectations by a much larger pool of people than ever. AP’s neoliberal, Lima-centered reforms were inadequate in addressing the needs of this very large constituency. APRA did not offer any more political stability in the late 1980s. The worsening situation in the southern Andes and Lima surrounding the emergence of Shining Path and the economic chaos sparked by García’s policies (and the IMF response to the affront to their demands) further undermined APRA’s legitimacy.

The two most stable and enduring political parties in the country, APRA and AP had, in the first ten years since the return to democracy, thoroughly failed in effectively ruling the country. The one challenge to the historical hegemony of these parties, IU, had imploded. The lack of a reliable party system meant that there was an absence of structures to communicate the needs of the population, as represented by civil organizations, to the state. As a result, both of Linz and Stepan’s (1996) first two arenas of a consolidated democracy (free and lively civil society, and autonomous political society) were nominally present in 1980s Perú, but they were largely ineffective.
The ineffectiveness of civil society and political parties in Perú manifested itself in the increasingly precarious rule of law, exemplified by the growing territories effectively under Shining Path control, the human rights abuses that accompanied state repression, the government’s clientelism and corruption, and skyrocketing crime rates. A morally and economically bankrupt state resulted in the abject ineffectiveness of its entire bureaucratic structure to maintain social and economic order. As will be seen below, this legacy of illegitimacy and lawlessness has prevailed through the present.

*Guerrilla War*

On May 17, 1980, during the campaign that would lead to Belaúnde’s second presidency, a small group of masked students broke into the town hall of Chuschi, a small town high in the Andes in the impoverished and isolated department of Ayacucho. They stole ballot boxes and burned them in the central plaza. The now infamous PCP-SL, known throughout the world as Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) considers this day to be the beginning of the People’s War. In the next few months, sticks of dynamite were reported stolen from mining sites in the mountains. By December, people in Lima awoke to find dead dogs hanging from lampposts with placards around their necks reading “Deng Xiapong son of a bitch” (CVR, 2003). The insult directed at the Chinese leader who had overturned many of Chairman Mao’s policies in China to open the country to the capitalist market was lost on most Limeños who interpreted it as the work of obscure leftist fanatics of no consequence. The press did not cover these events with much interest since much attention was monopolized by the elections and the transition to democratic government (Degregori, 1990-91).

As minor as the actions in Chuschi or the hanging dogs in Lima may seem, they were the culmination of decades of organizing work and the beginning of what would soon become a
savage insurrection. Sendero Luminoso (SL) began in the classrooms of the Universidad de San Cristóbal de Huamanga in the impoverished and neglected city of Ayacucho in the south-central Andes. A young Philosophy professor by the name of Abimael Guzmán was then the chair of the small Ayacucho chapter of the PCP. In a few years, Guzmán, along with a number of professors from the university, split from the pro-Soviet PCP to form a Maoist Red Faction party.

As mentioned above, politics in Perú in the 1960s and 1970s was a mixture of paternalistic indigenismo and reforms that attempted to depoliticize peasants. As a result, repression of non-official leftist activism from both Belaúnde’s civilian government and Velasco’s revolutionary military regime was violent. Despite this, the Red Faction developed at a rapid pace in Ayacucho. When Guzmán was expelled from the PCP, he formed PCP-SL. Soon, PCP-SL took control of the university (CVR, 2003). Students and professors were recruited and work began to organize “generated organisms” – activist cells that worked within existing organizations such as labor and teachers’ unions to influence them through SL’s rigid and disciplined ideology (Degregori, 1990-91). The growth of SL is yet another example of the contradictions that seem to be a central theme in Peruvian history. It seems counter-intuitive for a revolutionary Maoist party to attract the interest of peasants during a populist government that seemed intent on pursuing the interests of the rural poor. But Velasco’s failed agrarian reform, in addition to the lack of viable legitimate political options upon the return to democracy, provided the perfect setting for such a group to flourish. Ayacucho, Apurímac and Huancavelica, the three departments where SL developed most quickly in the early years, were not a priority of Velasco’s reform. Isolated and impoverished, owners of large haciendas had abandoned the area long before. Peasants in areas like Chuschi mostly cultivated small plots. The extreme
topography of this area meant that the traditional and ancient system of reciprocity, where peasants assisted each other with farm and other labor, continued to dominate economic relations. As a result, most did not qualify for the agrarian reform that organized large estates into cooperatives (Isbell, 1994). Those that did qualify often resented what they saw as the imposition of a system less effective than their traditional one. In addition, inter-village rivalries dating from pre-Inca years continued to impede organization into cooperatives that crossed village boundaries (de Wit and Gianotten, 1994). Those cooperatives that were organized were soon plagued with mismanagement and corruption. Moreover, they introduced divisions in the community that didn’t exist before. Only the minority of peasants that were eligible for the reform qualified for aid from the state and international agencies in the form of loans. Many government-assigned managers often took bribes for preferential treatment, illegally appropriated harvests and grain and recruited ineligible peasants to work cooperative land in exchange for very low wages (Berg, 1986-87). The cooperatives had taken the place of haciendas and had begun to act like them as well. Many of the students at the Universidad de San Cristòbal de Huamanga came from these communities at great sacrifice to their families. Many of them also became some of the fiercest and most loyal cadres of SL (CVR, 2003).

One of the ways in which SL spread its influence was through formal education. The faculty of Education at the University was fully controlled by SL and nearly all of those who graduated from this department in the 1970s were party militants. Most newly licensed teachers were sent to teach at schools in their home villages. Other teachers in remote areas had been sent there by the government as punishment for having participated in the teachers’ strikes of 1977 (de Wit and Gianotten, 1994). These teachers began the ideological education of villagers who had never engaged with Western political structures, many of whom would later support SL.
In Andahuaylas province in the adjacent and equally impoverished department of Apurimac, large haciendas were more common than in Ayacucho. In 1970, three radical students, members of the Vanguardia Revolucionaria (VR) party arrived in Andahuaylas. Two of the students were locals returning from university, one was Julio Cèsar Mezzich from Lima. They began organizing the peasants and in a few years had achieved a complex network of peasant organizations. After a massive demonstration in which 15,000 peasants demanded land and protested against Velasco’s locally ineffective reforms, the peasants invaded all of the haciendas in the province between July and October of 1974. Despite the bloodless nature of the land takeovers, repression from the armed forces was swift. Peasant leaders of the occupations were arrested and the haciendas were taken over by the government and organized into cooperatives. Similar problems of mismanagement and corruption to those that occurred in Ayacucho followed. The paternalism of the Velasco regime had become obvious. The government had used the reform to suppress a grass-roots movement that had appropriated land for peasants (a major goal of the agrarian reform) only to organize the land under their direct (and clearly less effective) control. The message from the armed forces was clear – the revolution is ours and no diversions would be allowed. After these actions, VR merged with SL and Julio Cèsar Mezzich became an influential regional leader of SL (Berg, 1986-87).

What in retrospect is clear and would become apparent in the years to come, is that SL’s version of revolution was as paternalistic, if not more so, than Velasco’s. The members of “generated organisms” that worked from within existing leftist organizations to cement SL influence were usually not peasants – they were lower-middle class (or higher) urbanized mestizo intellectuals. Much like the Velasco regime refused to allow peasants to act on their own, SL leaders had no intentions of allowing peasants to become leaders in the organization (Starn, 1995a). Yet the
ferocity and discipline practiced by SL was in many areas the only political organization that, at least in theory, would address local needs. As the late Peruvian anthropologist Carlos Ivan Degregori wrote: “[t]he workers themselves had no capacity for initiative; they were simply passive spectators of the vanguard’s activities”. (Degregori, 1990-91).

Ironically, SL gained in strength after the return to democracy in 1980. Despite their brutality and authoritarian tendencies, SL capitalized on the national divisions they exposed. They also filled a void left by an ineffective state and unstable unrepresentative political parties. The peasants of the South-Central highlands had been brutalized for centuries. They had been treated like animals and infantilized by the hacendados (landowners) that enslaved them (Arguedas, 1995). The Velasco regime initially offered hope, but instead delivered further exploitation from corrupt managers of cooperatives and further social divisions resulting from inequalities created by the agrarian reform. SL offered the comforts of paternalism mixed with a violent rhetoric of freedom and vengeance (McClintock, 1984). By the end of 1981, SL controlled at least nine villages in the Ayacucho department. In addition, the organization enjoyed a great deal of support throughout Ayacucho department as well as in Andahuaylas province and Huancavelica department. Support was also growing in other highland areas. When 19-year-old Edith Lagos, a high-ranking SL cadre was killed by Peruvian security forces in 1982, her funeral in the city of Ayacucho was attended by tens of thousands (CVR, 2003). Despite the growing terror, national news media barely covered the events. The attitude of most Limeños consisted of apathy towards events that were occurring to peasants who were distant and “foreign” to them.

According to Dutch aid-workers Ton de Wit and Vera Gianotten, who worked in the Ayacucho area in the late 1970s and early 1980s: “Ignoring Shining Path was possible, therefore, because
of Peru’s lack of integration in economic, social, cultural, and political terms, which expresses itself territorially as well” (de Wit and Gianotten, 1994).

While in the countryside SL gained control of more villages, in Lima its early work remained relatively unnoticed. Before the official beginning of the people’s war in 1980, SL had organized “generated organizations” in Lima’s most important industrial districts. Districts such as Ate-Vitarte were particularly important for SL. A large portion of Lima’s (and therefore Peru’s) industry was located in this district (Matos Mar, 2012). SL began organizing by infiltrating existing radical labor unions in Ate-Vitarte’s factories. Ate-Vitarte’s population had grown at a much faster pace than the rest of Lima as unions set up housing cooperatives, allowing workers to live close to their places of employment. Though most of the Peruvian left was represented by Izquierda Unida, in Ate-Vitarte labor activism easily converged with community organizing given the close proximity of factories and workers’ residences. As a result, more radical options such as PCP-PR (Partido Comunista Peruano – Patria Roja, or Communist Party of Peru – Red Fatherland) and the aforementioned Vanguardia Revolucionaria (VR) managed to develop a foothold in Ate-Vitarte in the 1970s (Smith, 1994). Many SL leaders were professors and students at the long-radicalized Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos and Universidad Nacional de Educación Enrique Guzmán y Valle, known as La Cantuta. The organizational and ideological rifts within the IU meant that SL’s influence spread throughout the radical left in Lima.

As early as June of 1980, the first violent action took place in Lima as two hundred young men and women attacked the town hall of the working-class district of San Martin de Porras with Molotov cocktails, partially burning it down (Smith, 1994). In July 1982, the police station in Ñaña, on the Central Highway industrial corridor just beyond Ate-Vitarte was attacked. In May
of 1983 further attacks on industrial centers on the Central Highway were followed by bomb attacks on water and electrical towers and city-wide blackouts (CVR, 2003). Student SL militant and sympathizers occupied classrooms in San Marcos and La Cantuta universities and organized riots in the streets of Lima. Activity spread to the Catholic university and the Universidad Nacional de Ingeniería (UNI) (CVR, 2003). As parts of Lima began to resemble a warzone, Belaunde’s government and the urban bourgeoisie finally began to take notice. The repression that had once been limited to the highlands quickly became a part of daily life in Lima. As blackouts, bombings, and riots increased in frequency in the city, mass arrests, political murders and disappearances increased as well (CVR, 2003). By the second half of 1984, the majority of Lima’s population lived in fear.

Meanwhile, by 1983, the armed forces and police had nearly lost control of the situation in the highlands. The original strategy of terrorizing peasants to deter them from joining SL had backfired (Ron, 2001). Highland peasants had never trusted the armed forces or the police since they had historically represented the interests of hacendados and the urban bourgeoisie. The brutal repression drove previously non-political peasants into the arms of the Shining Path. SL was as violent, however. They intimidated the population by assassinating informants, capitalist merchants and wealthier peasants. The peasants of the Southern Highlands of Peru were being terrorized by two brutal forces. SL’s “liberated” territories were really spaces that represented their own political ambitions and had nothing to do with the interests of the peasants they were supposedly fighting for. By 1983 the government forces changed strategies. They began to organize “rondas campesinas” (peasant patrols) and arming and training peasants to resist SL (Fumerton, 2001; Starn, 1995b). Though this was certainly more successful in culling SL activity in the area (Taylor, 1998), the strategic shift created a chaotic situation. The armed
forces and police violently repressed anyone they suspected of having the slightest leftist political leanings. The immense social chasm and complete lack of understanding between the mostly middle-class armed forces and police personnel and the indigenous peasants meant that the former began to equate “ethnic” or “Indio” with terrorist and highland spaces with spaces of violent resistance. Meanwhile, SL murdered anyone who didn’t comply with their agenda. Terrorized peasants were armed by the government and organized into rondas campesinas. In this context, historical events in conjunction with the brutal war that had developed led peasants to think of any outsiders as terrorists.

SL, sensing an opportunity, intensified its actions in both the countryside and Lima (CVR, 2003). Repression, meanwhile, also increased. Curfews were set in Lima; classrooms in high schools and universities throughout the country were invaded mid-lecture by masked soldiers and students were arrested en masse. Massacres became disturbingly common, including the massacre at the island prison of El Frontòn where 200 inmates awaiting trial for terrorism charges were executed (CVR, 2003).

Summary
Much like the state, Peruvian political parties were unstable and ineffective. Those that like APRA and AP managed to gain a foothold and sustain some longevity were either collaborationist and inconsistent, and/or they largely represented the interests of coastal elites. Away from the capital, indigenous groups and, to a lesser extent, rural peasants had few political options through which to engage with a state that was suddenly interested. The vacuum left by the state and political parties was aggressively filled by Shining Path. The influence of the state and political parties on indigenous spatial productions was therefore historically negligible. Once the exploitation of the natural resources available in the Amazon became a viable base
from which to launch the national project of development, this absence of political representation meant that any influence the state had on indigenous spatial productions were a sudden imposition rather than a collaboration or negotiation. In the Andes, this imposition was facilitated by identity politics that had placed traditional Inca culture at the center of national myth building and an indigenismo that since the late 1960s had been used as a tool for advancement of national and economic policies, or to occlude these practices as they were being implemented.

**INDIGENISMO**

Perú’s territory encompasses the bulk of the former Inca Empire. It includes both Cuzco, the capital of the empire, as well as Machu Picchu, the global symbol for the grandeur of the pre-colonial civilization. In the absence of logical geographic, linguistic, or cultural boundaries, the identity of the Peruvian nation is instead built on these historical monuments. As a result of this national myth-building, indigeneity in Perú has been either appropriated for the purposes of legitimizing the nation in the case of Andean indígenas, or ignored and neglected until it presented an obstacle to national development. The diverse identities of Perú’s population therefore contributes to the unique productions of space throughout the different regions of the country. These indigenous productions of space, in turn, shape the movements that resist capitalist encroachments.

*Mariátegui*

The turn of 20th century marked a change in the European and mestizo elite’s view of the indigenous population. While the benefits of enslaving a population with the justification of

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2 Although definitions of race and ethnicity are fluid in Perú, in a survey (2006) by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática 59.4% self-identified as mestizo (mixture of European and indigenous ancestry), 25.4% as...
racial and spiritual superiority were enjoyed by Perú’s bourgeois elites, by the 20th century the extreme social inequalities no longer fit their idealized model of a modern Perú. José Carlos Mariátegui was one of the intellectuals contributing to the new yet diverse lines of thinking about Perú’s indigenous population in the 1920s. He theorized that the 20th century trends in world socialism linked perfectly with the unique ideas of indigenous groups of the time. To Mariátegui, the Peruvian modernization problem was not one of race, but one of class (Obando Morán, 2009). The solution to Perú’s problems would be radical economic and social change to be achieved through socialist revolution (Mariátegui, 1971). Central to Mariátegui’s argument was the importance he attributed to literature in formulating Peruvian political thought. Literature about “indios” could be placed into three genres: indianista, indigenista, and indígena. Indianista literature, according to Mariátegui, portrayed indigenous people and their lives in an idealized, infantilized way that ignored their exploitation and exclusion from society. He believed that “indianista” literature was racist and promoted the continued exploitation of indigenous people. “Indigenista” literature reflected the inclination of mestizo and European-Peruvian intellectuals to protect Indians and promote their well-being by incorporating socially conscious ethnic themes in literature. Indígena literature was the only way for the indigenous population to represent itself in an accurate and objective way. Yet, according to Mariátegui, this was not yet possible since Perú’s indigenous populations had not reached the cultural sophistication necessary to produce such literature. It was the mestizo intellectual’s responsibility to promote and protect Indians until they could develop the characteristics

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Quechua or Aymara (Andean ethnic and linguistic groups), 1.8% as Amazonian, 1.6% as Afro-Peruvian, 4.9% as white and 6.7% as “other” (Webb and Fernández Baca, 2011).
necessary to represent themselves politically and culturally. Only then, and through socialist revolution, could the Peruvian reality be adequately represented politically (García, 2008).

While Mariátegui argued that the Indian was the solution to Perú’s problems, his contemporary Manuel González Prada believed they were an obstacle to modernization. His suggested solution was the assimilation of the indigenous population through bilingual education and encouraged migration to the cities. This would “liberate” indigenous labor for entrance into the capitalist economy and facilitate Perú’s entrance into the world of modernity (Gonzalez Prada, 1995).

In the spectrum of 1920s Peruvian intellectuals, Mariátegui had a profound influence on progressive Peruvian politics of the time. As founder of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) and the intellectual father of the radical (for its time) indigenista movement, Mariátegui continues to inspire leftist thought and action throughout Latin America. Despite his good intentions, however, his indigenista movement was quite clearly paternalistic and vanguardist. As sympathetic as he was to the plight of Perú’s indigenous populations, he still believed they were (at least temporarily) culturally and politically inferior to mestizos and Europeans and incapable of representing themselves. Though revolutionary for his time, in retrospect his thoughts are a reflection of the Peruvian intellectual bourgeoisie’s collective supremacist thoughts and colonialist guilt. Regardless, indigenista thought created a rift between bourgeois intellectuals and landowners who feared the emancipation of indígenas would result in the end of the endless supply of cheap and free labor (García, 2008).

Indigenista thought had a profound influence on Peruvian policy. In July 1919, liberal Peruvian president José Pardo was deposed through a military coup by Augusto Leguía, who proceeded to dismiss the Constitution of 1860 and formulate a new one in 1921. Despite his authoritarian and traditionalist style, Leguía included in the new constitution the first legal recognition of
indigenous communities since independence. He also created institutions and organizations such as the Comité Pro Derecho Indígena Tawantisuyo (Tawantisuyo Pro Indigenous Rights Committee). The committee brought together indigenous leaders from throughout the coast and highlands and decentralized procedures by opening sub-offices in the provinces. The committee demanded emancipation, education and citizenship and a representation of the Indian as literate and modern. Though initially supported by Leguía, the opposition to the committee by the Peruvian National Congress - members of which were mostly landowners - became detrimental to his political capital. This created divisions in the leadership of the committee which led to the resignation of the more radical members. The new leadership named Leguía president of the committee and a landowner was appointed vice-president. By 1927, Leguía had illegalized the committee and imprisoned many of its leaders. Indigenous affairs and concerns were re-centralized to the Lima-based Oficina de Asuntos Indígenas (Office of Indigenous Affairs). The institutionalization of the indigenismo movement was complete - social movements were no longer autonomous and any that diverted from the official state policy could now be repressed. (García, 2008). Indigenous social movements in Perú would take decades to recover.

Not surprisingly, scholars of resistance movements have long claimed that Perú has lacked a movement that is strictly indigenous in nature, especially relative to the rest of Latin America (de la Cadena, 2000). One of the reasons for this apparent lack of indigenous movements is Perú’s view of itself as the center of Andean culture. This “Andean pride” creates a symbolically indigenous space that effectively clouds the practically European and colonialized space that lies below the surface and is closer to social reality. Mariátegui’s radical indigenismo theorized that indígena Andean culture was the ingredient needed by Peruvian society to adequately apply a solution to the Peruvian problem in a way that was sensitive to the local situation – socialist
revolution. In doing so, Mariátegui defined the Peruvian dilemma as a class problem, as well as one of race or ethnicity. This distinction characterized social movements in Perú for decades. General Velasco’s revolutionary government introduced class-based policies that attempted to take race out of the equation completely, at least in the Andes. His official recognition of “comunidades nativas” formalized the differentiation between Amazonian and Andean indígenas. Mariategui’s work also solidified the paternalism that had always been present in Peruvian society. This facilitated the formalization of indigenismo, and its usurpation into official government policy. Any pro-indigena mobilizations that were outside the scope of government policy, or in the case of SL, outside the scope of revolutionary policy, were repressed. Indigenous movements in Perú were therefore severely restrained by fervent paternalisms that often provided the symbols and rhetoric of emancipation while simultaneously maintaining the colonialist status quo.

Mariátegui’s most radical achievement, however, was arguably an introduction of indigenismo into the national political spectrum that went beyond the superficial trappings of nationalist myth building. Whether advocating for assimilation of indígenas into capitalist structures by encouraging industrialization and urbanization as Prada argued, or promoting the incorporation of indígena thought (albeit under the guidance of an indigenista vanguard) as central to the socialist development of a modern Perú as Mariátegui contended, the indígena question became key to the national modernization and development projects. Between the end of World War II and 1968 when Velasco took power, Perú had been slow to industrialize and urbanize. Still, urbanization had occurred and by 1968 more than half of Perú’s population was urban. Much of this growth was driven by migration from poor and isolated indigenous areas of the Andes. Shanty towns quickly spread throughout the hills surrounding Lima as the state could not cope
with the rapid influx. More importantly, Andean indigenismo began to co-mingle with elite coastal criollo culture. More than assimilating into urban spaces, the centrality of Andean indigeneity in Perú’s identity as a nation facilitated a more dialectical relationship between often antagonistic coastal/urban and Andean/rural cultures which continue to shape both urban and rural life in contemporary Perú.

Ròmulo Acurio (2011) sees two parallel cultures developing in contemporary Perú in this context of paternalistic indigenismo. The first is a mestizo culture incorporating Andean and criollo characteristics, around which the national identity is built. Though by definition this approaches Mariàtegui’s indigenista sentiment, in reality it is exclusive of anyone unable to coopt or fit into its racial and cultural definitions: “Without doubt, the consensual acceptance of a supposedly mestiza culture has contributed to the neutralization, if not the elimination, of the always latent danger of social implosion. The illusion of an inclusive identity has superimposed the persistent daily exclusions among different Peruvians as well as the high level of interpersonal distrust” (p. 27).

This has resulted in the formation of a cultura achorada in contemporary Perú, both in the coast and in the Andes. This is an “encounter culture in a space that is not of conciliation – or of conflict – but of defiant dialogue. It is based on a pessimist and distrustful vision of life in Peruvian society – a clear consequence of the problems of racism and classism” (p. 43). This defiant dialogue helps people “in an almost therapeutic way to coexist daily with the taboos and violence of gender, race and class” (p. 45). Though cultura achorada allows the majority of Peruvians to negotiate the unique contradictions of Peruvian culture, it also accommodates existing racial, gender and social dynamics and creates new ones that “eliminate any hopes of solidarity outside the specific cultural frameworks of each individual” (p. 46). Cultura achorada
is a reactive response to the invasive incursions of representations of space. Though it performs a cultural function, it is not a proactive strategy that preserves the representational spaces that serve the interests of indigenous and other subordinate populations. As a result, productions of space that represent colonialist interests will be more successfully implemented in the Andes and the coast, where cultura achorada is entrenched. As cultura achorada acts as a conduit for representations of space encroaching onto representational spaces, resistance to these movements will therefore be weaker in the Andes than in the Amazon.

None of these cultural developments have had a profound effect on the Amazon. With the exception of scattered evangelists and the occasional guerrilla incursion, Amazon communities have lived a relatively autonomous existence, and their distance from the national culture and state has remained great.

Amazonian Distance from the State

On a more local scale, the consolidation of democracy was also precarious in Amazonian indigenous spaces, but in very different ways. Distance from the state in Amazonia was and is great on all four of Davis’s dimensions. Geographically, the Bagua area in Amazonas department is quite isolated from Lima. The indigenous villages in the Condorcanqui province where most of the protagonists of the Baguazo came from are even more so. Despite the tourist potential provided by the presence of the pre-Inca Kuélap ruins and the Gocta waterfalls (the third highest in the world) in Chachapoyas province to the south, infrastructure in Amazonas department in general, and Condorcanqui province in particular, is precarious at best. The road between Bagua and Nieva is problematic and can only be negotiated safely by 4X4 cars. Given the limited resources that most indigenous people can count on, access to departmental and national state is practically non-existent and geographical distance from the state remains great.
The indigenous identities that differentiate Andean and Amazonian indígenas from national elites also affect their cultural distance from the state. Andean identities, created as much by the state as by Andeans, have been afforded a central place in national myth building. As Radcliffe and Westwood (1996) argue, “the official project of nation-building may appropriate and/or recirculate … geographies of identity” through which “subjects express complex ideas about how they see the national community and their position in it” (p. 161). In this way, the official, state-created Andean indigenous identity is central to the national identity built around the “limited imaginary of the Peruvian ‘nation’ … that is wrapped up in Perú’s continual fascination with its Incaic patrimony” (Greene, 2006, p. 330). In practice, the nation is built around what Greene calls “Inca slot ideologies” (p. 331), while the state, located and concentrated in Lima, serves the interests of coastal criollo elites. Though Andean indígenas are certainly more distant from the state than white criollo elites, the superficial appropriation of Andean culture did result in significant practical gains during the Velasco regime. The pseudo-Mariateguista attempt by Velasco to equate cultural identity with economic class was, after all, an attempt to create a Peruvian utopia where the interests of Andean indígenas would be promoted (albeit by white criollos in Lima) in order to maintain the capitalist status quo. For all its revolutionary rhetoric, the Velasco regime was little more than an authoritarian Keyenesian welfare state infused with diluted identity politics. Yet it did, at least temporarily, produce some results that benefitted Andean indígenas in a way that no other Peruvian ideology or institution ever had.

Velasco’s policies also served to shorten the class distance between Andean indígenas and the state. The symbolic turn in Velasco’s speech introducing land reform, where he replaced the identity-based Día del Indio to the class-based Día del Campesino integrated Andean indígenas into the growing Peruvian working classes. As Davis states: “the history of state formation has
meant that groups organized around working-class identities are already more likely to be included in state structures” (p. 614).

**Emergence of the Amazon into the National Psyche**

As should be clear, indigenismo in Perú referred almost exclusively to indigenous people from the highlands. The grandeur of the Inca Empire, if anything, facilitated the development of a strong nationalist sentiment after independence. The beauty of the city of Cuzco and the “discovery” of the ancient city of Machu Picchu in 1911 by Yale professor Hiram Bingham contributed to the romance of Incas. The idealization of the Inca Empire by elites, combined with a pervasive white supremacy, produced a hybrid mestizo culture in the highlands (de la Cadena, 2000). Though mestizaje and indigenismo were mutually antagonistic throughout Latin America, in highland Perú indigenismo took on a different meaning where the cultural ideal was the upwardly mobile, urban mestizo adopting European ways while maintaining certain aspects of traditional indigenous culture. This had two important effects. First, the negative connotations often attributed to indígenas (illiteracy, backwardness, etc.) diminished slowly. Secondly, indigenous social movements resisting assimilation were almost non-existent. The central place of indigenismo in the production of a national identity meant that highlanders (whether indígena or mestizo) felt they were, at least symbolically, if not practically or economically, part of the nation. As a result, organized ethnic political action was nearly absent in Perú before 1980 (de la Cadena, 2000). Velasco’s policies further pacified highland residents. By replacing the racially charged “indio” with the more class-based “campesino” (peasant), Velasco temporarily pacified potentially volatile ethnic politics. In addition, the policies of the reform itself presented Andean people a government that would provide them with some the changes an ethnic movement would struggle for, at least temporarily. At a time when ethnic
movements were exploding in Chile, Ecuador and Colombia, Peru remained relatively calm (Kay, 2001).

Meanwhile, in the Amazon, Velasco’s policies had given official collective ownership of lands to the indígenas and officially recognized them as “comunidades nativas”. Since the end of the rubber boom, landownership in the Amazon had not been a point of contention. Oil had not yet been discovered, and hydrocarbons had not yet become as valuable as they are today, making it unnecessary to implement expropriations in the Amazon. As a result, none of the conflicts introduced by the agrarian reform in the highlands became problematic in the Amazon.

Though isolated, there was contact, especially in the Upper Amazon area adjacent to the Andes, and resistance was present almost from the beginning. Spanish missionaries had arrived in the jungle in the 16th century. The Ashàninka of the central Amazon had participated in several uprisings against the missionaries. In 1752, a Quechua Indian from the highlands, Juàn Santos Atahualpa led a rebellion in which Franciscan missionaries were expelled from Ashàninka lands. For nearly a century after this uprising, the belligerent resistance of the Ashàninka sealed the area off from European settlement (Brown, 1991). This all changed in the late 19th century with the advent of the rubber boom. The industrial revolution in Europe during this time encouraged the colonization of the Amazon by European settlers looking to accumulate wealth through rubber extraction (Còrdova, 1995). In 1909, Law No. 1220 established that native lands in the Amazon were automatically incorporated as dominions of the state. This law privileged rubber extractors taking advantage of the rubber boom of the time and led to the rapid development of large riverside cities such as Iquitos and Pucallpa (Mercado and Najar Kokally, 2011). These settlers enslaved Amazonian indígenas who were offered no protection from the Peruvian government. Despite the development of the indigenista movement in the early 20th century,
Amazonian Indians remained largely absent from the minds or interests of Peruvian intellectuals and elites, especially after the rubber boom waned in the 1910s. In fact, there was no attempt to even account for the size of the Amazonian population until the 1970s (Willaqnikí, 2013).

In the 1960s, Amazonian Indians gained the attention of the nation. In 1965, Guillermo Lobatòn, a leader of the MIR guerrilla (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria or Movement of the Revolutionary Left) organized the Ashàninkas to participate in guerrilla warfare (Kay, 2001). The Peruvian government repressed the 1965 movement by using napalm against peasant villages, killing most of the guerrillas and many Ashàninkas. The Ashàninka support of the guerrillas frightened both the Belaùnde government and urban and landowning elites. The national coverage of the event finally brought the poverty in which Ashàninkas lived to the forefront of less conservative factions of the population. The plight of the Ashàninkas also captured the attention of the idealistic armed forces who included them as examples of the gross inequalities that impeded Peru from becoming a modern country (Brown, 1991), and would later inspire Velasco’s coup d’état that deposed Belaùnde in 1968.

Once in power, Velasco’s radical policies changed the situation. In 1974, the Ley de Comunidades Nativas (Law of Native Communities) was passed, officially recognizing Amazonians as a legal ethnic group with collective land ownership rights. This recognition as “native communities” as opposed to “peasant communities” drew a clear and official distinction between Amazon and highland indígenas. More importantly, the lack of official recognition until 1974 (much less representation and protection) of Amazonian communities by the Peruvian government meant that they were not nearly as politically shaped by the paternalism highland communities had been smothered by.
Velasco, perhaps the most concerned with the plight of campesinos, many of whom were Andean indígenas. Yet his policies replaced traditional indigenous modes of production with programs and reforms that attempted to launch a capitalist development project on the shoulders of campesinos and indígenas. This same pattern continued with Shining Path. While their operations developed in the South Central highlands and most of their low-level cadres were Quechua-speaking, Shining Path discouraged the practice of any indigenous customs since they deemed these to be a distraction from socialist revolution. Their goal was not to create a state that responded to the specific needs of neglected indígenas. Instead, their project was one of Maoist revolution that sought to replace the current Peruvian state with a communist dictatorship. The paternalism of Andean indigenismo and the dependencies this created made Andean indígenas particularly susceptible to Shining Path recruiters. In the absence of representative political parties or reasonable access to the state, Shining Path provided access to the violence that had until now only been available to the state to use against them.

The terror continued into the 1990s. In February, 1992, the social activist and shantytown organizer Maria Elena Moyano was gunned down by SL militants in a working-class neighborhood in Lima. A live grenade was then placed under her dead body to send a message to other activists that SL was the only organization allowed to work with the poor. In July of 1992, two trucks packed with explosives exploded on Tarata Street in the posh Miraflores neighborhood of Lima, killing 40 and injuring hundreds. Fujimori’s response was drastic, brutal, and indiscriminate (Hunter, 1997; Burt, 2006). Days after the Tarata bombings, a paramilitary death-squad entered the campus of La Cantuta University and kidnapped nine students from their residence hall and one professor. All were “disappeared” without trial (CVR, 2003). Since Shining Path had developed deep in the Andes, and many of its militants were from Andean
highland villages, both the authorities and Peruvian civilians began to equate “indigenous” with “terrorist”. Repression was therefore unproportionately implemented onto Andean indígenas. Most of the tens of thousands of “desaparecidos” in Perú were therefore Quechua speaking peasants. In September 1992, Abimael Guzmàn, the charismatic leader of SL was captured in a middle-class neighborhood in Lima. With this capture, SL’s head had been cut off and it was never able to recuperate. Fujimori felt his defeat of SL had gained him political capital and popular support. Students, labor union activists and opponents of the regime continued to “disappear” on a daily basis (Solfrini, 2001). Though the capture of Guzmàn made peace a possibility for the first time in decades, Fujimori’s authoritarian tendencies continued (Levitsky and Cameron, 2003). Starting in 1996, as part of his poverty eradication program, Fujimori’s government oversaw a campaign that coercively or forcefully sterilized almost 300,000 indigenous women (CVR, 2003).

Amazonian Resistance

Isolated physically, socially, and economically, Amazonian indígenas were excluded from national conversations. Despite religious proselytization, enslavement by rubber barons, and being caught between revolutionary groups and a fascistic and repressive state, Amazon indígenas had maintained the type of autonomy that their Andean counterparts had been denied for centuries. Resistance had always been present in the Amazon, if extremely localized and isolated by topography. This was soon to change however. As Perú emerged from more than a decade of political violence, the global forces of neoliberalism brought exposure and, paradoxically, strength to indigenous resistance.

An example of this contradiction is the formation and dissolution of the Coordinadora Permanente de Pueblos Indígenas del Perú (COPPIP). In response to the threats of Fujimori’s
neoliberal policies, Amazonian leaders attended a conference on indigenous rights in Cuzco in 1997. Amazonian and Andean indigenous activists formed COPPIP with the goal of uniting their communities in resistance. A main goal of COPPIP was to reject Mariátegui’s, Velasco’s and Shining Path’s class-based, non-indigenous vision of revolution. The organization’s declaration after its second congress directly addresses this issue: “The juridical and political language of the denomination of the Indigenous Communities was erased and substituted with Peasant Communities... It is in our interest to take back this identity as an inalienable right and to use its international legal status that is currently recognized” (Greene, 2006).

The 2001-2006 Toledo administration attempted to seize the political capital that could clearly be gained from the Andean-Amazonian collaboration. First Lady Elaine Karp, a Belgian national who had fully participated in the production of Toledo’s neo-Inca image, established the Comisión Nacional de Pueblos Andinos, Amazónicos y Afroperuanos (CONAPA), the first organization to represent all of Peru’s ethnic “minority” groups and geographic regions. The true intention of the organization was soon apparent, however. In July 2003, Karp publicly resigned from the commission stating that it was time for a member of one of Peru’s ethnic “minorities” to take over leadership of CONAPA. On the surface, this seemed to be another step towards Peru’s Mariateguian socio-ethnic evolution from indigenismo to indígena. Before this public resignation, Toledo and Karp had offered the directorship of CONAPA to Gil Inoach, then an AIDESEP activist. They soon retracted the offer, however, when Inoach rejected the list of commission members the couple intended to name as a condition to his being named director. This list included board members of international extractive industry corporations. They instead named Miguel Hilario, a member of the Shipibo-Conibo peoples who had lived outside of Peru for many years and was much more amenable to Toledo and Karp’s aggressive suggestions.
CONAPA lost credibility since indigenous organizations were not consulted on either nomination (Greene, 2006). Clearly, this was yet another attempt to use the neoliberal façade of multiculturalism to conceal the real goal of privatizing the rainforest. Accusations by AIDESEP and COPPIP leaders led to an audit by the World Bank which found irregularities in the management of CONAPA funds and criticized Toledo and CONAPA officials for their thinly veiled relationships with consultants who had recommended the Pluspetrol gas project in the Central Amazon. By August 2003, all of Peru’s major indigenous organizations signed a declaration refusing to recognize CONAPA as representative of their needs. Toledo and Karp’s poorly managed strategic move backfired – the resistance to and rejection of CONAPA only served to strengthen the collaboration among Andean and Amazonian groups based on their common indigeneity (Greene, 2006). By the end of 2004, Congress legally created the Instituto Nacional de los Pueblos Andinos, Amazònicos y Afroperuanos (INDEPA), which would include four Andean, three Amazonian, and two Afro-Peruvian delegates (Greene, 2006).

While Andean indigeneity was being coopted by the state’s nation-building project, and ignored in favor of class-based denominations by anti-capitalist revolutionary movements, Amazonian indígenas continued to produce largely autonomous spaces. Mostly untouched by political parties, woefully neglected by the state, and unaffected by paternalistic indigenismo organized politically through non-governmental and non-ideological indigenous organizaitons such as AIDESEP and various environmental non-governmental organizations. In this way, Amazonian indígenas attempted to negotiate with national laws composed and enforced by a state with interests and goals that contradicted those of its indigenous citizens despite having next to no representation from political parties or the state.
AIDESEP, addressing the complete lack of political representation through legitimate parties, organized a movement that sought to engage with the Peruvian and international legal systems to guarantee their sovereignty and the protection of their ancestral lands. This all occurred in the context of a state that serves the interests of capital in the name of development. Yet this state, also desperately working towards democratic consolidation after a history of instability, is likely to pass and enforce laws with the goal of catalyzing the types of economic development that will facilitate modernization and entry into competitive global capitalist markets.

Amazonian indígenas, though neglected by the state and unrepresented by political parties, were actually protected by Ley de Comunidades Nativas of 1974, the 1993 Constitution and the Convention 169 of the ILO, which guaranteed their indigenous identity and autonomy over their ancestral lands. With these protections in place, AIDESEP acted as an effective conduit between the state and indigenous people. The Convention 169 of the ILO made it so that the state needed to consult with indigenous groups before any of their ancestral lands would be ceded for exploitation. In order for sale of lands to be approved, 75% of indigenous representatives in AIDESEP needed to agree. Simultaneously, several large lots of ancestral lands were officially titled and deeded to indigenous communities, further protecting them from sale to extractive industries. Much of this occurred in a climate of political and economic chaos in the 1980s and 1990s.

The 2000s provided an ironic new challenge to Amazonian indígenas – rapid national economic growth. The 2000s presented the first sustained economic growth Perú had arguably ever experienced. Much of this growth was based upon the extraction of natural resources such as minerals and hydrocarbons. The ancestral indigenous lands that were either now deeded to
indígenas, or that required previous consultation before exploitation were sitting on top of a massive as-of-yet unexploited reserve of natural gas that had the potential to facilitate Perú’s continued economic growth and that could provide a perfect investment for the overaccumulation resulting from unprecedented growth. Despite the environmental devastation that clearly results from natural gas and oil extraction, and even though such destruction in the Amazon poses a devastating dilemma for global sustainability, Peruvian law and its enforcement continues to facilitate accumulation by dispossession. Vásquez (2014) states that “more often than not the laws available to solve local conflicts are not clear or properly interpreted, and they are sometimes wrongly implemented, or contradictory” (p. 6). In addition, “weak governance, corruption, and nontransparent rules at subnational government levels often lead to inequitable allocation of new oil revenues and eventually to conflict” (p. 6).

State-level governance of Amazonian indígenas did not truly begin until the passing of the Ley de Comunidades Nativas, passed by the Velasco regime in 1974. This law recognized the legal existence of “native communities”. As has already been discussed Velasco, as part of his land reform project, had already redefined Andean indígenas in class terms as “campesinos”. This reconceptualization further cemented the centrality of Andean indígenas in the creation of the modern Peruvian nation, both in terms of cultural patronage as well as the basis of national economic development aspirations. By officially recognizing Amazonians as “comunidades nativas” the Velasco state created a series of political entities in the Amazon defined by their ethnic identity instead of their economic class position in a capitalist system. The already discussed 1993 Constitution, which provided indigenous autonomy over jurisdictional decisions in recognized ancestral lands, and Convention 169 of the ILO, signed in 1994, which required previous consultation by the state, further territorialized Amazonian indigenous political identity.
These legal protections were offered in a specific context. Oil supplies in the 1990s originated mostly from the Middle East, Mexico and the North Sea. Though oil and natural gas reserves had been discovered in the Peruvian Amazon in the 1970s, exploration was not yet a profitable proposition. Infrastructure was still largely non-existent, and transportation and communications development in the impenetrable Amazon would require prohibitive levels of investment. The steady supply of oil from other parts of the world diminished the profitability potential of Amazonian reserves. Local economies continued to be largely dominated by subsistence farming and agricultural trade. Between 1999 and 2003, the most common goods produced for trade in Awajún and Wampís villages in northern Amazonas department were bananas, chickens, cacao, bushmeat, and coffee (Chase Smith and Soria, 2017).

The new millennium changed the global extractive landscape. Turmoil in the Middle East and difficulties in extractive explorations throughout the world resulted in a soar in oil prices. This “played a fundamental role in rapidly turning previously expensive hydrocarbon resources into more available options. Risky, unknown, and largely unexplored areas deep in the Amazon jungle became suddenly more attractive for investors” (Vásquez, 2014, p. 12). The national and international laws of the 1990s that protected indigenous lands had provided a significant but superficial democratic shade to Fujimori’s otherwise authoritarian neoliberalism. The unrealistically high cost before the 1990s of exploration in the isolated Amazon and the political violence and instability of the time meant that these concessions did not harm any potential foreign investments. As Perú emerged from the political scandals of previous decades and desperately sought to enter modern capitalist structures of development, these laws quickly became impediments to the extractive national project.
García, under pressure to sustain the massive economic growth that Perú had experienced\(^3\) in the latter half of the 2000s, advocated for the passing of the aforementioned Legislative Decrees that circumvented the constitutional protections and the ILO agreement of 1994, allowing for the signing of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States. This signifies the beginning of what Stretesky, Long, and Lynch (2014) term “the treadmill of crime”, which holds that “systems of production shape systems of justice” (p. 15).

Magdoff and Foster (2011) contend that capitalism “recognizes no limits to its own self-expansion – there is no amount of profit, no amount of wealth, and no amount of consumption that is either enough or too much” (p. 43). Stretesky, Long and Lynch argue that “because continuous expansion of capitalist production is not ecologically sustainable, the normal development of capitalism produces continuous ecological disorganization and damage” (p. 22).

In an emerging economy like Perú’s, emerging from decades of grinding poverty and socio-political chaos, and experiencing economic growth for the first time in its history, the concern was not that “expansion of capitalist production is not ecologically sustainable”, but rather that ecological sustainability would impede the expansion of capitalist production that had seen the country experience such extreme growth. As will be seen below, this ideology goes directly against the indigenous conceptualization of the relationship between nature and society.

As evidenced by the state’s attempts to change or circumvent laws to facilitate the exploitation of natural resources, the law is clearly shaped by Perú’s changing position in global capitalist structures. These laws, which were passed at a time when the natural resources indigenous lands

\(^3\) According to the World Bank, the Gross Domestic Product of Perú grew by an unprecedented 16.54% between 2005 and 2006, 15.3% between 2006 and 2007 and 17.99% between 2007 and 2008. This follows a stagnant period in the early 2000s when GDP growth was only 0.55% between 2000 and 2001 after annual GDP shrinkage between 1997-2000.
contained were too isolated and unprofitable to be exploited, also provided superficial democratic concessions that often occluded the deleterious consequences of neoliberal policies. While Fujimori campaigned in indigenous garb in Asháninka villages, and Alejandro Toledo held his inauguration ceremonies in the Machu Picchu ruins, both were simultaneously implementing the policies that would soon facilitate and encourage foreign investment. As the state builds its development project based on the exploitation of natural resources, the law and its enforcement, as the treadmill of crime theory states, is shaped by the changing global political economy. Ecological disorganization was not to be seen as criminal if it was necessary for economic growth. In this light, García’s government sought to interpret Article 66 of the 1993 Constitution stating that “renewable and nonrenewable resources are part of the heritage of the Nation. The State is sovereign in taking advantage of them” in conjunction with the clause stating that “the state is the only one with rights to develop underground natural resources. Subsoil resources are a component of state assets that must be developed in the name of public interest.” The contradictions these interpretations introduced to constitutional protections of indigenous rights were what resulted in the Baguazo.

As neatly as Peruvian environmental law and its interpretation reflect the political economy of the nation, the enforcement of that law is also indicative of fluctuating power relations. Perú has a quite complex structure set up to enforce environmental protection laws. Gómez Apac et al (2018) describe these structures:

In 2004, Peru established a regulatory framework called the Framework Law of the National Environmental Management System (Law 28245) (SNGA for its Spanish acronym) to guide, integrate, coordinate, oversee, evaluate, and ensure the implementation of policies, plans, programs, and actions for the protection of the environment and the conservation of natural resources. SNGA is comprised of a set of agencies, led by the National System of Environmental Assessment (SEIA for its Spanish acronym), the National System of Natural Areas Protected by the State (Sinanpe: El
Sistema Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado), the National System of Environmental Information (Sinia: Sistema Nacional de Información Ambiental), and the The National System of Environmental Assessment and Control (Sinefa: Sistema Nacional de Evaluación y Fiscalización Ambiental). Sinefa was created in 2009 through the National System of Environmental Assessment and Control Law (Law 29325). It comprises the Ministry of the Environment (Minam), OEFA [Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement], and the Environmental Inspection Entities (EIEs) at the national, regional, or local level. Sinefa aims to ensure compliance with environmental legislation, which includes verification of the oversight in environmental matters by various State entities. As both a governing and specialized technical agency affiliated with Minam, OEFA carries out environmental control actions at two levels. First, it supervises the environmental obligations of companies in the areas of mining (medium and large sized), energy (hydrocarbons and electricity), fisheries (industrial fishing and aquaculture), and industry (beer, paper, cement, tannery, biofuel, among others). As Sinefa’s governing body, in addition, it supervises the performance of EIEs at the national, regional, and local levels and issues regulations for them.

OEFA’s environmental regulation centers on ex post control of companies’ activities, supervising them once the economic operation, including exploration has begun (Gómez Apac, Merino de Taboada, and Granados Mandujano, 2018, p. 74-75).

As promising as these enforcement strategies (many of which were implemented on or after 2009, in reaction to the Baguazo) seem, their practices once again reflect the development strategies of the state. To begin with, which laws are to be enforced is not clear. At the time of the Baguazo,

more than twenty oil blocks are located inside some of the sixty natural reserves that spread throughout Peruvian territory. Some forty oil blocks were superimposed on the territories of indigenous communities between 2003 and 2008, with four located in areas inhabited by Indigenous Peoples in voluntary isolation. This situation exists in spite of specific legislation that gives certain rights to voluntarily isolated Indigenous groups (Vásquez, 2014, p. 68).

Which laws should OEFA enforce? The constitutional ones that protect the rights of indigenous people to “enjoy a balanced and adequate environment” and previous consultation, or the ones that allow the state to exploit resources that are deemed to be “part of the heritage of the Nation”, or that are part of the subsoil which “the state is the only one with rights to develop”? The modification of existing laws show that the latter is the focus:
Since 2013, OEFA has been emphasizing preventive and corrective environmental controls that promote such voluntary correction. Law No. 30011 of 2003 first introduced this approach by issuing regulations stipulating that if a company rectifies minor breaches – involving either actual or potential harm – then it would not be subject to sanctions. In 2015, a new regulation extended the scope of this benefit to breaches qualified as ‘moderate,’ which involve potential damage to flora and fauna (Gómez Apac, Merino de Taboada, and Granados Mandujano, 2018, p. 76).

While oil companies calculate whether voluntary corrections or sanctions are more profitable, fragile ecosystems are compromised, and the livelihood of entire indigenous villages is destroyed. The treadmill of crime is as effective as ever, and a profitable place in which to invest overaccumulations for the sake of continued growth has been found.

Paradoxically, the presence of environmental non-governmental organizations often facilitates the treadmill of crime. As the Peruvian state encourages development through the production of commodities which in turn produces ecological disorganization (Stretesky, Long, and Lynch, 2014), indigenous populations are driven to perceive “time at the rhythm of capital accumulation, at the rhythm of development and the spending of resources, prioritizing investment rubrics identified through censuses and quantitative diagnostics over traditional principles” (Caviedes, 2008, p. 75). In the absence of representative political parties, an effective state, and a robust legal system, NGOs can often provide an organizational structure. In Condorcanqui, organizations such as APECO, NORCAFE, and Mongabay as well as UNICEF and Oxfam, promote sustainable economic development, environmental education, information, and the preservation of ancestral customs. Unfortunately, though the intentions of many of these organizations are benign, the consequences of their programs are often counterproductive. As much as NGOs often provide viable alternatives to largely powerless people, these alternatives are simply another, perhaps slightly less immediately damaging entry into the capitalist structures. As Stretesky, Long, and Lynch (2014) attest, “it is important to point out that even as
capitalists talk about environmental sustainability and achieving environmental stability through green technology, production continues to increase, which drives ecological disorganization” (p. 22).

The village of Huacunyal* in northern Utcubamba province is one of the larger indigenous communities in the area (pop. ~1000), and provides an illustrative example. It is located about a kilometer off the new highway, and a half hour drive away from Santa María de Nieva and is therefore one of the better connected of the indigenous villages in the area. Cool Earth, an environmental NGO based in the United Kingdom, has worked in Huacunyal for several years. Its mission is to halt tropical deforestation, and has collaborated with local authorities to preserve rainforest lands adjacent to the village. Tracts of land are delineated, and Cool Earth pledges to pay the indigenous community an agreed amount as long as the tract is preserved. Cool Earth arrived in Huacunyal at around the same time as the highway was being completed. Almost immediately, the first small store opened in the town. The store is the only structure in town with a (frequently malfunctioning) generator, and it offers soft drinks, candy, and bottled water in addition to toys, and lawn furniture – goods that a few months before were only seen in Nieva or further away. Down the path, a small bridge crosses a stream that feeds into the Nieva River. Caught up on the rocks gathered around the bridge’s structure, are hundreds of plastic bottles and candy wrappers. The garbage has been discarded by villagers for whom refuse has until now been strictly organic. Before the arrival of Cool Earth dollars and the store, locals only consumed what they produced. With the newly arrived capital, and easier access to goods thanks to the recently completed highway, Huacunyal has been thrust into a consumerist culture it has had very little contact with. The consequences of this are accumulating below the bridge. One of the tracts of land the NGO is paying to protect lies a few hundred meters downstream from the
bridge. In attempting to protect the rainforest Cool Earth have instead encouraged consumerism in an indigenous community thereby potentially accelerating the process of ecological disorganization.

**Summary**

In a context where the influence of representational spaces on spatial production is fading and being replaced by the increased leverage of representations of space, indigenous productions of space offer a unique perspective on current global economic fluctuations and capitalist development. Peruvian indígenas have played various roles in national capitalist development. Andean indígenas, inheritors of the grandiosity of the Inca Empire, play a central role in the building of a national identity. As significant as this may have been, this key position in national mythmaking, in conjunction with enduring racism, facilitated the usurpation of Andean indígenas into capitalist structures. Amazonian indigenous spaces, isolated by difficult geography and state and political neglect, have maintained a more autonomous existence, largely separated from capitalist structures and the general national interest until natural resource extraction became feasible. Though the neoliberal Peruvian state, ineffective as it may be, is a formidable force, Amazonian indígenas have produced spaces of stubborn resistance. The national, global, and local context in which the Baguazo occurred is indicative of the potential indigenous spaces have to re-invigorate the role of representational spaces in spatial production.

The Peruvian natural-resource-based political economy has become increasingly aligned with the extractive imperialist world order. In an era of unprecedented global and national economic growth, the until-recently unexploited (and newly profitable) natural resources in the Amazon represent a perfect opportunity for investment of accumulated capital. In this context, the Peruvian state, in its efforts to facilitate this process, is clearly an example of representations of
space. The same can be said of Peruvian political parties, most of which are collaborationist, opportunist, and/or ineffective. Their contributions to spatial production as representations of space are guided and structured by a legal system that represents the neoliberal state both in terms of legislation and enforcement.

Yet the Peruvian state and political parties have been largely absent from Amazonian indigenous spatial productions. The legal system has also been particularly ineffective. As a result, Amazonian indigenous spaces have remained largely free of undue influence by representations of space. As the next Chapter shows, the non-Western relationship between nature and society conceptualized by Amazonian indígenas, their unique identity constructions, and their ability to produce scale to further their interests are all evidence that representational spaces are alive and well in the Peruvian Amazon. As informative and enlightening as the implementation of the Production of Space theory to indigenous spaces will prove to be, these conclusions will also highlight the shortcomings of applying a Western, urban theory to a non-Western, rural space. These limitations as well as potential additions and modifications that can be made to the theory to expand its explanatory power to include not only rural spaces, but also the intricate dialectical relationship between urban and rural areas will be considered in Section II.
CHAPTER IV

INDIGENOUS PRODUCTIONS OF SPACE

Having only recently begun to engage with capitalist structures, Amazonian indigenous spaces have unique characteristics that have shaped a relatively effective resistance to powerful capitalist encroachments. The Baguazo was evidence that resistance movements produced in indigenous spaces were capable of having a strong impact. In this Chapter, three of the unique characteristics that have contributed to this strength are examined: The nature/society relationship, indigenous identity construction, and production of scale.

NATURE/SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP

The Amazonian relationship to nature is in direct conflict with Western views that separate the two. Nature and the earth are seen as sentient beings, intrinsically tied to society. Humanity is only a piece of that nature and separating nature from society, especially for the sake of exploiting the former, is not only counterintuitive, but also dangerous. This philosophy towards nature serves a function. Rainforest ecosystems are extremely complex and fragile. For the relatively few people the rainforest can sustain, even a small change in the ecosystem can have a significant effect. A large, multinational resource extraction project would be catastrophic. The protection of the environment is therefore central to Amazonian indigenous culture.

The separation of nature and society has been central to Western thought since ancient times. Though humanity was seen as one of many components of nature, Aristotelean thought placed humans at the very top of the natural hierarchy. Nature, as a result, has since then been assumed to be there for the benefit of man (Glacken, 1956).
This hierarchy developed into the Kantian dualism of external and universal nature. External nature is essentially the raw material used to build societies. It is autonomous, yet exists to contribute to the process of social production. Nature can also be defined as universal: the very humanity exploiting external nature for its social purposes is, by definition, part of that nature (Smith, 1984). This Kantian dichotomy has contributed to the Western anthropomorphization of nature – the conceptualization of nature as existing strictly for the benefit of man. The view of nature as “external” has become more entrenched through the social processes of industrialization and imperialism. The “Age of Imperialism” developed around the ideology of geographic determinism (Bassin, 2003). Late nineteenth century German political geographer Friedrich Ratzel promoted this ideology. Ratzel argued that human society, as no more than one of many components of nature, must be understood in terms of the laws of nature (Ratzel, 2011). He posited that all living organisms required territory from which to draw the necessities for survival. In order to reproduce and expand, this *lebensraum* (living space) needed to expand as well. Since humanity, as an “aggregate organism” is subject to the laws of nature, homogeneous populations, represented by a nation or a state, needed to expand territorially in order to survive and reproduce. Since the earth is finite, competition for space and nature therefore became central to the colonial acquisitions that defined the Age of Imperialism (Ratzel, 1899).

Colonialist history reveals an ongoing obsession with domination of nature. Judeo-Christian religious doctrine was used to justify the enslavement of the “uncivilized” and the exploitation of natural spaces in addition to parallel misogynist attitudes which placed European men in unquestioned positions of power (Leiss, 1974). These hierarchies reflected a culture that feminized nature (e.g., the reference to “mother nature”). Nature, like women, was to be
dominated. Indigenous populations encountered were similarly equated with nature (and consequently feminized), and subjected to exploitation.

This continues to this day, albeit in a more sanitized manner. Neoliberal governments attempt to altruistically bring impoverished peasants to enlightened civilization by imposing Western modes of production. In an interview conducted in the wake of the Baguazo, President Alan Garcia stated: “If 400,000 natives can say to 28 million Peruvians, ‘You can’t come here,’ that is a very grave error. Anyone who thinks that way wants to take us on an irrational and primitive retreat to the past” (Schmall, 2011, p. 115). This suggests an intent to dominate and exploit nature to accumulate capital and power disguised as benevolent modernization of primitives.

The Kantian concepts of external and universal nature became increasingly discreet with the advent of industrialization. Marxian scholars such as G.P. Plekhanov argued that “[i]t is the interrelationship of people in the social process of production which determines the entire structure of society. ‘For this reason, the influence of the natural environment on this structure is undeniable’” (Bassin, 2003, p. 24). Despite the clear anthropomorphization of Plekhanov’s analysis of nature, the role played by nature in capitalist industrialization can still be critiqued from a Marxian perspective. As society transformed itself to conform to the capitalist laws of accumulation, so did its relationship to nature. Capitalism, argued Marx, made nature nothing more than an object to be exploited and used by mankind (Harvey, 2004). This, in turn, has developed into a Cartesian view of nature, which defines humans, as thinking beings, as the only entities on earth with rights. Nature and natural resources are only assigned value or importance in the context of its or their present or future utility to humans. Not only are humans now disarticulated from nature, but nature itself is split into discreet categories and entities. The value of these entities is defined not by what they contribute to the flow of a natural ecosystem,
but by how each can be exploited by humans. The components of nature therefore become
discreet objects that can be categorized into property of different value. These discreet objects
no longer have value intrinsic to themselves in this anthropocentric model. Instead, their value is
entirely defined by humans.

This attitude has had a catastrophic effect on the environment, particularly since the
neoliberalization of the world order. As the market continues to increasingly drive policy,
natural resources become even more expendable as their meaning and reason for existence
become entirely tied to their value assigned by the market. The damage caused by the extinction
of a species, or the degradation of an ecosystem is only measured in the negative effects on
immediate corporate profits or, less frequently, on the repercussions to quality of human life.

The utilization of nature by humans and its effects on society were central to both Darwinist (e.g.
Ratzel) and Marxist (e.g. Plekhanov) analyses. Yet the effect of society on nature has not until
very recently been part of conversations about the distinction between the two.

The environmental devastation that has resulted from rampant industrialization and the
anthropocentric cultural manipulations of neoliberalism has complicated the way in which nature
and its relationship to society are viewed. Seemingly benign gains by indigenous interests
illustrate this complication. As the global commons is privatized and commodified, the
legalization of lands belonging to indigenous communities in 1974 takes on a new meaning. By
officially delineating indigenous lands, the Peruvian government is cementing the separation
between nature and society by delineating not only natural spaces (which thereby naturalizes all
those living within it, equating indigenous with nature), but also those spaces that were to be
deemed other-than-nature. As of 2013, 10,564,258 hectares had been legally recognized as
belonging to Native Communities (Gavaldá i Palacín, 2013). This represents 13.5% of the
Peruvian Amazon, meaning that 86.5% of the Peruvian rainforest has been consequently designated as open for exploitation.

Uruguayan ecologist Eduardo Gudynas (2014) describes 4 conceptual alternatives to anthropocentric utilitarianism characteristic of neoliberal modes of production described above. The first calls for the consideration of the cost the exploitation of nature will have on future generations, something which is not often included in valuations of natural resources. The second current insists on recognizing the value of maintaining a diversity of flora and fauna, appreciating that each specie plays a key role in the complex web of life on earth. The third current holds that nature is much more than a sum of market or ecological values. Nature has other values such as historic, religious, cultural, or aesthetic. Many of these attributes are very difficult if not impossible to valorize economically.

The fourth current is the one that most comprehensively contradicts neoliberal ideology and that, though clearly Western in form and logic, most closely reflects the Amazonian indigenous conception of nature. This framework argues that nature has intrinsic values outside of that which is derived from its utility to humans. These intrinsic values differ from mainstream Western conceptualizations of capitalist values. The intrinsic value of nature is instead derived from “indigenous peoples’ inseparable relationship with territory. Territory performs the functions of production and reproduction, as well as providing a framework where indigenous cosmovision develops. The displacement of an indigenous group from its territory has provoked its cultural disappearance.” (Gavaldá i Palacín, 2013, p. 44)

As Guarín Fernández*, a community leader of the Awajun and Wampis communities that populate the Condorcanqui province, an understanding of the conceptualization of the nature-
society relationship is central to understanding the indigenous people of the Peruvian Amazon and the events leading to the Baguazo:

We often speak of a horizontal relationship between humanity and the environment, where humans participate in nature and where there is a relational equilibrium. We speak of the earth as a living being – it is not simply a space where one resides, it is where one relates to nature. It has a sacred content. When we take ayahuasca and converse with our ancestors, there are certain physical spaces that become sacred spaces. It could be a mountain, a 500-year-old tree, or a waterfall. In my village, waterfalls are like temples where, under the effects of ayahuasca, one goes to rest on its waters and where the beyond manifests itself in one’s interior world. The relation between the earth and humanity is for us sacred and has a religious content (personal communication, December 23rd, 2014)

Andean views of society and nature are similarly integrative. Although Andean ecosystems are extremely different from Amazonian ones, they are equally fragile. There is a functional union of nature and society in the Andes as well. Yet Andean culture has for centuries been atrophied by the exploitative paternalisms of colonialist Iberian and Catholic hierarchies that have attempted to separate nature and society to further their exploitative interests. These hierarchies have contributed to the construction of a singular national identity based on the Inca myth. As Fernández notes, these nationalist discourses have always excluded Amazonian indígenas:

Perú’s vision for the past 180 years has been one of a singular nation. The concept of multi-ethnicity has only emerged in the last 15 or 20 years. Leaders have historically exercised a socially, economically and territorially homogeneous power. As we arrive in the 21st century, economic growth has resulted in concessions of territories where it was assumed that everyone was the same and had the same national goals. This is where we encountered the reality that there are communities that claim their territorial rights and say to the private sector: ‘wait a moment, this space where you have permission to drill for oil is where I have always lived. You cannot just do as you wish.’ The root of this attitude is our conceptualization of the nature-society relationship, and this is why we defend the environment – because we depend on it, on the water, the food, the home, the fish (personal communication, December 23rd, 2014)

Productions of space in the Amazon clearly reflect the intrinsic cultural integration of nature and society. Attempts to divorce this integration are a threat to Amazonian representational spaces.
Despite similar understandings of the nature-society relationship in Andean culture, productions of spaces of resistance in the Andes are compromised by paternalistic colonialist culture. This culture, which has defined, implemented, and redefined the concept of “development” to justify exploitation of indigenous lands and peoples, never takes into account whom this development benefits or how. As water supplies are compromised by mining practices in the Andes and pipe ruptures spill oil into rivers throughout the Amazon, fishing and small-scale horticulture become problematic. The proletarianization of indigenous populations also limits the time that can be spent tending to small farms or fishing. As a result, eating habits have changed from consisting mostly of freshly grown produce to sodas, crackers and noodles. This has resulted in a tragic paradox: “though they spend more money on food, chronic malnutrition is present in about half the children in native communities. In this case money brings poverty.” (Gavaldá i Palacín, 2013, p. 192-193). Though consumerism and the commodification of nature is encroaching, the relative isolation of Amazonian culture has arguably managed to preserve the presence of representational spaces as well their influence on representations of space and spatial practice.

IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

“When someone comes into the community and says ‘todos somos Peruanos’, watch out, he is trying to screw you” – young Arakmbut man, Madre de Dios, Perù, 1992 (Gray, 1997)

As a crucial component in the mestizo Peruvian national identity, Andean indígena identity has been coopted by a superficial nationhood that continues to represent hegemonic agendas while mitigating potential indigenous resistance movements. Amazonian identity was never usurped in this way. Racial, gender and social dynamics in the Amazon were therefore not subjected to the colonialist co-optations that Andean indigenous cultures were exposed to.
Amazonian indígenas occupied an even lower place in Peruvian ethnic hierarchies than Andean indígenas – in fact, until the second half of the 20th century they hardly occupied any place at all. Anthropologists Michael Brown and Eduardo Fernández argue that coverage of Amazonian indígenas by the Peruvian press in the 1960s “revealed the deep currents of racism that shaped relations between Indians and whites in Perú” (p. 135). “When the press dealt with the predicament of Amazonian Indians, it was as if these unfortunate natives lived on another planet” (p. 79). Despite this disadvantageous position in Peruvian social hierarchy, or perhaps because of their practical absence in these structures, Amazonian indígenas managed to continually resist challenges to their interests and identity. Colonialist attempts at classifying indigenous groups or to group them together by defining them, often derogatorily, using one all-encompassing term such as “chuncho”, “campa”, and “mashco” have been continually contested:

At the International Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, in April 1993, demonstrators marched up to government representatives with banners marked only with the letter ‘S’. These were indigenous protesters complaining vehemently that the final resolution of the meeting referred to ‘indigenous people’ and not to ‘indigenous peoples’ (Gray, 1997).

Though colonialist hierarchies have defined indigenous identities in the Andes, Amazonian indígenas have managed to maintain the social dynamics that arguably allow for productions of representational spaces, re-theorized as indigenous or capitalist-emergent spaces (See below). These dynamics, in addition, have made the organization of resistance movements necessary.

As Guarún Fernández states:

Amazonian peoples were never conquered because they were never a homogeneous civilization like the Incas were. The Incas had one great leader who governed everyone. In the Amazon there are family clans that live isolated from each other. When the Spaniards arrived, they visited with one clan, but others may be at least two days walk away. It was difficult, and they were never able to exercise their conquest because there
The Amazonian communities are dispersed. The organizational scheme of the Inca Empire. The system was similar to the German city-states, but more scattered. Each community was autonomous. But there was a shared identity. The struggle that led to the Baguazo is rooted in this. It is an identity construction that is different from that of the Incas, and from that of Perù in general. Our identity is deeply marked by the territorial space of our communities (personal communication, December 23, 2014).

Conflicting Multi-Scalar Identities

I met Rodolfo* in Chiclayo where he was studying tourism in a local institute. Originally from a Wampís village on the Santiago River in Condorcanqui, Rodolfo’s journey to Chiclayo had been circuitous. As an adolescent, he had moved with his family to Nieva for a few years before Rodolfo joined his uncle to work in a sugarcane farm in the Lambayeque department. He then joined the Peruvian army and was stationed in Ayacucho and Huancavelica – two of the departments that suffered the most from the violence of the 1980s and 1990s. Rodolfo was particularly interesting because his social attitudes and behavior were quite clearly wampís – he was polite but distant at first, open and friendly once trust had been gained, and refreshingly laid back and calm even in the chaotic atmosphere of downtown Chiclayo. Yet his responses differed greatly from most awajún and wampís I had conversed with. He told stories of mythical and rare jungle creatures that reflected the indigenous view of nature-society integration:

when I was a little boy, I went with my father to hunt in the jungle. We killed a deer and gathered fruit to take back to the village. I remember we had collected some of my favorite fruit that only grows for a few days each year. Once night fell and we had set up camp, I waited for my father to fall asleep and I took some of the fruit and ate it. I went to sleep. In the middle of the night I heard a commotion near us. Nighttime in the jungle is pitch black, so I couldn’t see anything. I could only hear my father fighting for his life, and I could smell a powerful odor – it smelled like a massive, dirty, and hairy creature. I was very scared. Finally, I heard my father get the upper hand and then footsteps running away and the smell got weaker. My father fell, exhausted, and slept until the next morning. When we awoke, I asked him what had happened. He said that this creature came when nature was being misused to punish us for doing so. I told my father about the fruit I had eaten after he fell asleep. He said that the creature must have come to
reprimand us for consuming nature selfishly. We are only supposed to consume nature in community. We commune with nature. If we consume it, the creature comes (personal communication, April, 2016).

Rodolfo was clearly raised with indigenous values that he holds to even as an urbanized adult today. The myths and belief systems Amazonian indígenas use to maintain the precarious balance allowed by nature society integration are still central to his world view. Yet his response to the next question is surprising. I had asked 48 Awajún and Wampís people in Chiclayo, Bagua and Condorcanqui whether they considered themselves Awajún or Wampís first, or Peruvian first. Most (39) unhesitatingly responded that they considered themselves Awajún or Wampís. Twelve said they did not consider themselves Peruvian at all. Eight hesitated before responding that they did in fact identify as Awajún or Wampís. Rodolfo was the first to immediately respond that he identified as Peruvian first and Wampís second. When I asked if this has been true since he has lived in Chiclayo:

   No, not exactly. There’s a small Wampís community here, so we try to maintain some of our traditions. I think it was when I was in the army when I started to see myself as Peruvian. That’s where I learned to be a man. When you’re freezing in the mountains, hiding behind a bush trying to ambush a cell of terrorists and your only hope is the guy next to you, and he’s from Ica or Moquegua, you no longer feel like a boy, you feel like a man, and you don’t feel Wampís or anything, you feel Peruvian (personal communication, April, 2016).

Rodolfo, having been fully integrated by the state through service in the armed forces, is now a Peruvian citizen, fulfilling a very Peruvian goal of urban upward mobility through practical education. There is very little room for indigenous identity in his new endeavors.

As uncommon on Rodolfo’s attitudes towards his indigeneity are, as the cultural and geographic distances between indigenous spaces and Peruvian ones shrink they are likely to become more common. As they do, the conflicts they incite in identity formation will increasingly influence the productions of indigenous spaces, and the social movements that emerge.
As government repression increased throughout the 1980s and peasant support faltered in the southern highlands, both SL and the armed forces changed strategies. The Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) is an isolated rainforest area in the northern Peruvian departments of Ucayali, Huànuco and San Martin. Until the late 1930s, the area was only accessible through a long and treacherous boat ride. Once a road connection was built, settlers from throughout the highlands and upper rainforest settled in the area. They brought with them the ancient custom of chewing coca leaf to keep the effects of thirst, hunger and fatigue to a minimum in the fields (Allen, 1995). They soon discovered that the climatic and soil conditions were ideal for the cultivation of a particularly potent strand of the coca plant. During the 1970s, the area’s characteristics piqued the interest of drug traffickers in Colombia and Peru trying to take advantage of the great increase in demand for cocaine from the United States. Coca cultivation increased rapidly in the area and the hamlet of Tingo Maria grew into a prosperous town of 30,000 inhabitants. SL saw the UHV as an ideal space for expansion. The Peruvian police, under pressure and with aid from the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) organized an antidrug excursion into the area in 1984. Though the goal was to eradicate coca crops in the area, signs of SL activity were discovered in small valley hamlets. Considering the volatile political situation and the fact that the coca trade employed a large number of people in a country where the unemployment and underemployment rate had reached 60% in areas, the Peruvian government was solely interested in fighting SL (Gonzales, 1994).

Both the Peruvian government and SL were aware of the autonomous nature of the local culture which dates back to pre-colonial times when Amazonian indigenous groups in the area were among the only ones to successfully resist Inca colonization. In July, 1984 the Peruvian state
declared the area an emergency zone and placed General Julio Carbajal in charge of the valley. General Carbajal thought the real problem in the area was not drug trafficking, but the presence of SL. During his six months in the UHV, Carbajal was able to disperse SL guerrilla columns. In the meantime, the antidrug efforts of the DEA and Peruvian police were thwarted. By allowing peasants in the UHV to maintain their economic lifeline of coca cultivation, Carbajal earned their support, as well as that of traffickers and drug lords, all of whom gladly participated by providing intelligence on SL in exchange for being left alone. The absence of SL and the police in the valley created a power vacuum that drug lords took advantage of. Rival drug lords ruled the valley through violent skirmishes with opponents. The growing violence as well as increased pressure from the U.S. DEA led Alan Garcia to once again change strategy. As stated above, the U.S. DEA had no interest in fighting subversion – its main concern was winning the drug war, which had become a serious political issue in the United States. Garcia lifted the state of emergency (removing military control and replacing it with police) and embarked on a new round of antidrug operations involving crop eradications and repression of the local population (Gonzales, 1994).

It was now SL’s turn to fill the power vacuum left by the military. The UHV population, alienated by the destruction of their crops and brutal police repression, turned to SL for protection. SL, in turn, took advantage of the situation by launching attacks on the police. This gained them the support of the coca-growing peasants, as well as massive financial backing from area drug lords who paid SL guerrillas to protect airfields from where coca crops were shipped to Colombia for processing. By 1988, SL controlled the bulk of the valley, including the large towns of Uchiza and Tocache. Unlike in the highlands, SL did not use the brutal methods in the UHV to gain and maintain control. Its awareness of the independent character of Amazonian
culture allowed SL to realize that paternalistic terror-based tactics would quickly alienate the population. Instead, the guerrillas organized inhabitants of towns for various social and educational projects in which even bank officials participated. The lucrative drug trade made control of the area a major priority for SL. Repeated attempts by the police to drive SL out of the valley failed. It wasn’t until 1989 that the situation changed. In August of that year, drug lords murdered one of Colombia’s leading presidential candidates. This led to a massive joint effort by the DEA, Peruvian police, and the Colombian government to put a stop to drug flights from the UHV to Colombia. The success of this operation led to a massive surplus of coca and a consequent dramatic reduction in price. Only then did a crop substitution program become realistic (Gonzales, 1994).

This episode is clear evidence of the Amazonian population’s ability to resist local, national and international forces. The relative isolation that resulted from official national neglect has meant that Amazonians have experienced paternalism differently than Andean and coastal Peruvians. Even the extreme authoritarian nature of both SL and the Peruvian Police and Armed Forces deferred to Amazonian indigenous autonomy (Nugent, 1996). The geographic impenetrability of the Amazon jungle, in conjunction with the cultural strength of Amazonian autonomy, has allowed local populations to, at least relatively, produce their own spaces and dictate their own spatial practices. As will be seen below, this type of resistance once again allowed the indigenous people of the Amazon to fight off multi-scalar exploitative forces.

PRODUCTION OF SCALE

Sally Marston accepts the definition of scale offered by *The Dictionary of Human Geography* (Johnston et al., 1994): that it is a “level of representation” (Marston, 2000). Neil Smith adds that “[t]he differentiation of geographical scales establishes and is established through the
geographical structure of social interactions” (Smith, 1992). Sociospatial processes and phenomena occur differently and have different effects depending on what scale they occur in. Moreover, most, if not all, social phenomena occur in many scales simultaneously. Though they can be thought of as “containers” of social behavior of various sizes, scales do not originate naturally or spontaneously. Rather, they are produced by social agents. Cities provide a perfect example for the further understanding of scale and its social production. Urban areas develop as spaces to accumulate surplus capital. Their specific characteristics reflect the very local geographic limitations imposed by the environment (e.g. New York’s high-rise nature vs. Los Angeles suburban sprawl) as well as culture. Neighborhood differentiation within the city reflects a more local scale of social action. Much of the capital accumulated to drive city growth has historically originated in its surrounding hinterland, making urban life regional in scale. As historical changes and technological advances facilitate globalization, city growth is increasingly driven by national and international capital accumulation. The city thus exists at multiple scales ranging from local to global. The scale(s) at which spaces are produced depend(s) on which best furthers the interests of spatial producers, namely, capital. Neil Brenner understands globalization as a “double-edged, dialectical process through which: 1) the movement of commodities, capital, money, people, images, and information through geographical space is continually expanded and accelerated; and 2) relatively fixed and immobile socioterritorial infrastructures are produced…” (Brenner, 1999). This “multi-scalar dialectic of de- and re-territorialization” exemplifies the social production of scale. As capital interests gain strength through globalization and neoliberalization, they de- and re-territorialize social spaces in order to produce scales that most conveniently serve their agenda. In Lefebvrian terms, as scale
production increasingly falls into the hands of those in power, spatial practice is further defined by representations of space, while representational spaces decrease in importance and influence.

*Production of Scale in the Amazon*

The first generally recognized instance of organized indigenous struggle in the Peruvian Amazon was the formation of the Congreso Amuesha in 1969. This inspired the organization of numerous local ethnic federations representing many of the various ethnic and linguistic groups in the Amazon. Most of these organizations emerged as a response to the threat of state-led colonization. By the late 1970s, many of these organizations had begun to work closely with Peruvian and foreign intellectuals, researchers, and development workers. This collaboration produced the formation of AIDESEP (Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana or Interethnic Development Association of the Peruvian Jungle) in 1980. Through the 1980s, AIDESEP worked to consolidate the collaboration among the diverse Amazonian ethnicities to defend their mutual interests under an explicitly indigenous banner. In addition, the organization looked to make connections with indigenous Amazonian movements in other South American countries, hosting a conference in Lima in 1984 that led to the formation of COICA (Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas de la Cuenca Amazónica or Coordinator of Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin). By 1987, AIDESEP had developed internal conflicts that led to the creation of a separate organization CONAP (Confederación de Nacionalidades Amazónicas del Perú). In 1990, COICA held a conference in Iquitos, attended by every major environmental and indigenous organization in Peru. This consolidated the strategic relationship between indigenous Amazonians and national and international conservationist and environmentalist NGOs (Greene, 2006).
Another global force that helped to consolidate Amazonian organization and resistance was the drug trade. The coca leaf had traditionally been used by peasants since Inca times. Coca plantations began to dominate areas such as the Upper Huallaga Valley in the Northwestern edge of the Amazon in the 1960s and 1970s, and soon it became among the wealthiest in the country. Colombian, Mexican, and Peruvian drug lords controlled large areas of the Upper Amazon (Gonzales, 1994). As the Shining Path, local and foreign landlords, and the US DEA/Peruvian armed forces fought for control of the area, AIDESEP and other local indigenous organizations worked to ensure that the needs of indigenous people did not get lost in the conflict.

As political violence waned after the capture of Abimael Guzmàn, concerns turned to the threat of neo-liberal reforms of Alberto Fujimori. The collusion between multiculturalism and neo-liberalism, if anything, strengthened the movement. At the same time that thousands of hectares of Amazon rainforest were being sold to multinational extracting companies, Fujimori was appearing in indigenous garb and “officially” recognizing the existence of indigenous people through his new constitution. This gesture, though accompanied by condescending overtures, provided Amazonian indígenas with legal capital. At the same time, the efforts to privatize their land strengthened the interethnic and international indigenous collaboration in resisting globalization.

Quite clearly, the claim that indigenous movements are minimal in Perù is a function of the Andean-centric Peruvian national identity (Greene, 2006). Amazonian indigenous resistance has been present for decades. The social isolation of Amazonian indígenas is also not entirely accurate. Despite geographic and cultural obstacles, Amazonian indígenas, through international environmental movements and the drug trade, have been globally interconnected for decades. As the cultural foundation for the constructed national myth, Andean scale production continues...
to be at the national level. This has facilitated the usurpation of Andean spaces into national level development efforts, even as these efforts very clearly do not represent the interests of Andean indígenas. It is a class-based scalar production aided by Velasco’s policies, and consist of efforts to enter the Peruvian and global capitalist structure. Amazonian scale production, on the other hand, is extra-national and indigenous in nature. Having escaped being used to construct a national myth, and counting on stronger ties to fellow indígenas and environmental interests beyond the national borders, Amazonian scalar production is indigenous in nature, as alliances are built around indigenous identity. Amazonian space and scale productions are not in resistance to the contradictions introduced by developed capitalism which threaten the class interests of the population (as it has been in the Andes). Instead, Amazonian space and scale productions are in resistance to the new attempts to incorporate Amazonian spaces into the capitalist structure which threatens to turn indigenous interests into class interests for the benefit of capitalist interests. As neo-liberal policies and indigenista rhetoric intensified simultaneously during Toledo’s presidency, Amazonian resistance responded accordingly (Greene, 2006).

NEGOTIATING SPACE AND POWER

Perù is a divided country (Klarèn, 1990). Three spaces have always existed separately from each other – the coast, the Andes highlands, and the Amazon rainforest. As colonialists or descendants of colonialists, coastal elites have always operated on national and international scales – exploiting labor throughout while maintaining economic ties with Spain, Great Britain and the United States. On a more local scale, urban elites enjoy a distinct coastal culture. Coastal elites enjoy the agency to strategically exist in whatever scales are most beneficial to their interests. Andean indígenas’s negotiation of scale is less autonomous. The Peruvian identification as the cradle of Inca culture forces Andean indígenas into a national scale of
symbolic exploitation. The tourist trade profiting from this “local” culture allows for a jump into international scales (Routledge, 2003).

The Andean peasant case, meanwhile, is a clear example of Lefebvre’s conceptual triad.

Highland peasants struggle to maintain a traditional culture (representational space) that has been co-opted by Peruvian elites to represent a mythic national sentiment and promote international tourism (representations of space) to conceal the polarizations developing in the background. Spatial practice is a complex combination of Inca and Spanish cultures which include bilingualism (Quechua or Aymara and Spanish), a unique hybrid pre-Christian and Catholic religious practice, and hierarchical systems.

Amazonians have had an entirely different experience. Isolated and ignored, they were never comprehensively incorporated into paternalistic national psyche or culture. Despite this national isolation, Amazonian indígenas have long been internationally connected (Robinson, 1999). Amazonian indígenas seem to exercise autonomy over production of both space and scale, at least relative to highland indigenous groups. Though enslaved and brutalized by rubber and oil barons early in the 20th century, they have managed to preserve cultural distinction. This autonomy has largely been achieved through a nascent culture of resistance. Amazonian indigenous production of scale feeds this resistance. Indigenous groups throughout the Amazon experience higher levels of identification with international ethnic and linguistic networks than with Peruvian national sentiment. Consequently, Amazonians have been able to develop national and international alliances as they resist unwanted changes.

As a result of these complex multi-scalar interactions, Andean resistance has never really had indigenous characteristics. Movements were almost always led by middle-class intellectuals benevolently and paternalistically applying foreign economic theories and organizing primitives
unable to take care of themselves. Their influence was too great to allow more grassroots resistance movements that adequately represented the interests of highland peasants. In Brennan’s terms, Andean spaces have been de- and re-territorialized strategically to further globalist neoliberal interests.

Amazonian resistance, on the other hand, was always indigenous in nature (Scholte, 1996). Reflecting their absence from the national psyche, Amazonian indigenous resistance always sought international connections to protect their interests, especially when neglected by national government or undermined by it. As such, Amazonian indígenas, in bypassing exploitative national spaces in favor of international solidarity networks are going further than jumping scales of resistance – they are “skipping” scales. Their relative success, however temporary, can perhaps be attributed to this innovative choice.

Although Amazonian resistance has shown signs of strength as evidenced by the Bagua incident, the contradictions that have strengthened it have also produced paradoxes within the movement. An example is the activities of CONAP, the organization that splintered from AIDESEP in 1987. CONAP controversially achieved a victory when an indigenous corporation of Awajún organizations sealed a deal with Searle Pharmaceuticals that recognized and compensated Awajún traditional medicinal knowledge through a “know-how” license (Greene, 2004). Though this recognition is a clear improvement over past events when the mere existence of indígenas was ignored, it is evidence of the potentially problematic and divisive consequences of identity politics. As the Awajún organize and negotiate the interests of their specific ethnic group, their successes can often result in damages to other Amazonian groups. The precarious balance of rainforest ecosystems means that the exploitation of Awajún territory by pharmaceutical companies will result in environmental degradation of the entire Amazon area
(not to mention the frightening repercussions for the rest of the world) while only the Awajún will profit economically. If the indigenous character of Amazonian resistance is one of the things that gave it strength, could it also cause divisions among the diverse ethnicities that make up the concept of “Amazonian”? The formalization of indigenous land ownership can also cause problems. In delineating indigenous land, land open for exploitation is also being delineated. There is a danger that an archipelago is being created where isolated “islands” of resistance are formed that are surrounded by an ocean of natural resource extraction and environmental degradation. As disturbing as this possibility seems, Katz’s concept of “doing topography” offers some hope by highlighting the possibility of pockets of resistance overcoming geographic isolation by exploiting their commonalities and solidarity. (Katz, 2001).

These dilemmas highlight the importance of understanding the spatial processes that have shaped the social movements that led to the Baguazo and that continue to resist extractive encroachments on indigenous lands and ways of life. These processes are not uniform. They are formed by specific spatio-temporal contexts that not only shape how the components of the conceptual triad interact with each other to produce these spaces, but also bring into question whether the production of space theory as it exists is even adequate to apply to indigenous spaces. Section II is an analysis of the spatial and temporal contexts in which not only indigenous social movements developed, but also the global capitalist world-order these movements are reacting to. In doing so, modifications to Production of Space theories are proposed that will facilitate the further theorization of indigenous and capitalist-emergent spaces.
SECTION II

This section of the analysis highlights the spatial and temporal contexts in which the production of space theory was composed. These contexts are very different to those experienced in the indigenous spaces studied here. As useful as the production of space theory and its conceptual triad are to understanding spatial processes, the difficulty in applying them to non-Western, non-urban, and non-capitalist spaces, as seen in Section I, highlight the need to consider ways to amend or modify the theory to reflect other types of spaces and social movements. As a respectful critique of the production of space theory and its applicability, the considerations and proposals below are made with the goal of better understanding indigenous spaces while providing a conceptual opening for the inclusion of capitalist-emergent spaces in our theorizing and understanding of spatial processes. Throughout Sections II and III, the following questions will be addressed: How can we re-interpret, append, and re-theorize production of space theories to meaningfully include indigenous and capitalist-emergent spaces? Can this conceptual exercise help us to understand indigenous social movements?
CHAPTER V

GLOBAL CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT – TOWARDS EXTRACTIVE IMPERIALISM

Much like social movements, the rise of the extractive industry has been a complex process that can be seen as the culmination of social, economic, cultural, and political events and machinations. These have dialectically interacted to provide the context in which today’s social conflicts have taken place. In this process of capitalist development, social theories such as Lefebvre’s Production of Space have been formulated as a reflection of these phenomena. Amazon spaces, until recently almost completely untouched by these capitalist developments. Indigenous productions of space have developed largely outside of these structures. Their introduction into capitalist modes of production at the current extractivist-imperialist stage has resulted in a new breed of social movements that are difficult to categorize into Political Opportunity Structures (POS) or New Social Movements (NSM) framewors.

CLASSICAL ECONOMICS – THE PHILOSOPHY BEHIND THE PERPETUATION OF PROFIT

Extractive imperialism is the latest stage in a series of capitalist strategies that develop as tools to address the contradictions that manifest themselves as capitalism matures as the hegemonic world order. As the capitalist stage during which indigenous resistance movements in the Peruvian Amazon developed, it is important to understand the historical processes that have led to extractivism-imperialism. In order to assess the adequacy of the implementation of productions of space theories, the spatio-temporal contexts in which they developed is critical as well.
The theories of classical economics developed alongside industrialization. As an outgrowth of the enlightenment, classical economics took a positivist view of the world, where social behaviors and trends could be understood and even predicted through the use of evidence accumulated using increasingly formalized methods of measurement borrowed from the natural sciences. Much like labor was rationalized and compartmentalized, so was the way in which the social and economic consequences of such a monumental change was understood.

In order to theorize the ever-changing relations of labor of the industrial revolution, the idea of markets was conceptualized and brought to ground from abstraction. It served as an idealized, self-regulating equilibrium around which economic and social fluctuations were theorized to revolve. This equilibrium echoes that which exists in the natural world. The order of the natural world had already been defined by Adam Smith in the 18th century, as the most advantageous to humanity, its increasingly measurable fluctuations being seen as more effectively predictive of human behavior than the intentionality of the constructed universe. The only source of wealth, according to Smith, was the exploitation of nature. Industrialization depended on, among others, three assumptions: the infinite supply of natural resources, the organization and division of labor dynamized by the natural order, and constant economic growth to incentivize further industrialization and wealth (Bifani, 1999).

Interestingly, Smith’s arguments address the nature-society relationship from diametrically opposed angles. In asserting that social order echoes the natural order, Smith first separates the two by stating that one (natural order) dynamizes the other (social order). By making one echo the other, he temporarily narrows the gap between them. By claiming that the only source of wealth for humans is nature, Smith conclusively splits the two. Society may be a part of nature in that its order most resembles natural order. Yet following Cartesian individualist post-
enlightenment ideology, nature is now something to be dominated. The order of nature only serves to problematize the status quo it imposes on economic fluctuations, which in turn, drive the social order. Nature itself becomes a separate entity. Through this conceptual division, classical economics defined nature as that to be measured and exploited for the benefit of human wealth accumulation through free-market-facilitated industrial expansion.

As seen in Section I, Amazonian indígenas do not separate conceptions of nature and society. Having never been fully integrated into capitalist modes of production, the separation of nature and society for the purpose of exploiting nature has never been a part of indigenous culture. Instead, the full integration between the two is central to Amazonian cosmologies. As such, the absence of this basic capitalist compartmentalization has further isolated Amazonian spaces. Productions of Amazonian indigenous spaces are therefore less shaped by engagement and conflict with capitalist structures than other spaces (for example Andean indigenous spaces) that have had more meaningful contact with these systems. As a result, indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces are not adequately captured by Lefebvrian definitions of representional spaces.

The first challenge to classical economics’ free-market theoretical construct was offered by John Stuart Mill who juxtaposed the concept of wealth with the idea of value. Mill argued that if nature and its resources were infinite sources of wealth, then they could not logically have any value. This had two consequences. Firstly, for the first time in modern history, a concern was shown not for the effect that nature had on man, but for the effect that man had on nature. Secondly, and perhaps more drastically, Mill argued that factors outside the natural world drove fluctuations in value. The rapid growth of industrialization and the indiscriminate exploitation of natural resources that drove it made it very clear that natural resources were undoubtedly finite. The scarcity of a particular resource, the difficulty in obtaining it given the technological tools at
hand, and its utility to humanity defined its value. This conceptual turn not only facilitated the commodification of nature, it also further concretized the theoretical construct of the market. Though Mill ontologically removed the market from the natural realm, the laws of natural order continued to define it and its ideal stationary state of equilibrium (Bifani, 1999).

Natural resources fluctuated in value constantly based on this formulation. Overexploitation made some resources scarce, increasing their value. Scarcity often made the resource more difficult to exploit, once again increasing its value. Technological advances often simplified extraction of natural resources, theoretically lowering their value, while at other times new scientific advances made some resources obsolete and replaced them with new, perhaps more easily available resources.

In addition to further analyzing scarcity, David Ricardo (1821) also examined the concept of property. A natural resource that is scarce and useful for industry can, by being located within the private property of an individual, produce great wealth for that individual. Yet, this individual’s increased wealth can simultaneously result in the impoverishment of society as a whole. The assumption of constant, unchecked growth needed for capitalism to survive had been challenged. The increased post-enlightenment rationalization of the world helped to overcome this first major contradiction (and potential crisis) of free-market capitalism by applying its positivism to the market itself. By the mid-19th century, Karl Marx furthered Ricardian thought on property and value by rejecting the linear tendencies of classical economics and theorizing complex dialectical relationships among infinite variables. Marx argued that these relationships culminated in a social and economic organization based on the means of production and control over them. If the means of production were privately owned and unequally distributed, then wealth would also be unequally distributed. The ideal neoclassical equilibrium sought by the
natural order of the mythical market was therefore problematic. Free markets did not follow the laws of the natural order – they instead followed the laws of capital, and represented the interests of those who controlled it. In order for more universal growth to occur, the markets needed to be controlled by the state.

Marx’s formulations were a direct affront to classical economics. Marx did not see the market as self-regulating or driven by the laws of nature. Instead, he believed that the market could be manipulated by outside forces that could ensure that their interests were represented. The market was more than just a mathematical model that predicted all social behavior. It was a social and political tool that simultaneously affected society and was shaped by it.

Classical economics, having based its legitimacy on its positivism, would be weakened by any connection to ideology. In order to divorce economics from ideology and address the contradictions proposed by Marx, late 19th century economists isolated the discipline from outside influences by attributing the neutrality of the natural sciences to economics. This echoed the increasing rationalization of thought that resulted in and was concretized by industrialization. By becoming isolated from non-positivist influences, economics gained the cache of being entirely anti-ideological and purely scientific. Yet this neutrality was fictitious. For all its objective methods and scientific pretentions, classical economics applied natural law not to reality, but to a conceptual construct, namely the market. As pure in intentions as Smith, Mill and Ricardo may have been in formulating this construct, the context in which it came to be, where those in control of the means of production were able to accumulate wealth at previously unseen rates, meant that it now served the interests of powerful people. The idealized equilibrium that through the laws of nature drove market behavior was not a benign, inevitable stationary state. The equilibrium the market sought out was the state in which those in control of
the means of production also controlled society. The formulation of Lefebvrian representations of space can easily be seen in this context.

To further legitimize the system that served the interests of capital, and that was aggressively challenged by Marx, the theoretical construct of the market was reified as the concept through which the law of nature organized society. This led to a change where instead of the market reflecting society, society was now regulated by the market. Since the irrefutable laws of nature (science), reputedly uninfluenced by emerging ideologies, explained the fluctuations of the market, then they and the market must explain society as well. The most effective way to improve society and negotiate the changes brought about by industrialization was to allow the market to regulate it unobstructed. Individualism and profit became the equilibrium. This, in turn led to the emergence of a new contradiction of free-market capitalism. As Bifani states, “Everyday reality at every instant shows us that what an individual desires for himself can result, upon aggregating it to the desires of others, in a situation that no one desires and reduces the well-being of everyone” (Bifani, 1999, p. 553). The ultimate example of this basic contradiction of capitalism was the world-wide Great Depression of 1929.

NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS: CONSUMERISM AS A STRATEGY FOR ADDRESSING CRITICAL CONTRADICTIONS

The capitalist response to the crisis of the Great Depression was offered by neoclassical economics, proposed most prominently by John Maynard Keynes. This theory held that the answer to the nihilistic tendencies of rampant capitalism was a welfare state. One of the assumptions of capitalism is a constant growth of the economy. A rampant, unchecked market, as the Great Depression showed, would eventually lead to a collapse of the economy, not its growth. The innovation that developed in response to these crashes was that of the welfare state.
In the context of the emergence of the West from pre-War economic collapse and post-War devastation, the welfare state seemed a viable option in that particular space and at that particular time. A state that guaranteed the basic needs of its population could also increase (and control) its consumer power. By turning workers into consumers, new spaces were created into which the market could grow. By controlling demand, supply could help to maintain a growing economy. In some ways, this was a direct contradiction to the classical view of free market economics. Yet in others it was a direct continuation. The modification of the market was innovative, but the motivation behind the welfare state was not purely humanitarian – the main goal was the maintenance of a growing economy that would address the contradictions which led to economic collapse and eventually global warfare in the 1940s. This required a deep, state-driven cultural change. This cultural change, in turn, required capitalist innovations that would facilitate its perpetuation.

Again, it is easy to see Lefebvrian representational spaces being developed in this context. Representations of space, having been defined and established by classical economics as the drivers of social behavior, were now being challenged by representational spaces acting in reaction to the contradictions introduced by the unchecked capitalism of classical economics. As will be seen below, the creation of a consumer working class, newly urbanized and industrialized, created a new form of proletariat – namely one that had all of its basic needs met by a generous post-War state. The interactions of these representational spaces and representations of space in this new neoclassical welfare-state world order interacted with spatial practices that reflected consumption driven economic growth.
Consumerism as a neoclassical strategy

The economic hardships of the Great Depression meant that the advertising of consumer products was challenged as unnecessary and antithetical to the needs of the times. This disdain continued into the beginning of World War II even though the effects of the Depression had somewhat subsided by then. The change occurred as a result of the debates surrounding the role of the United States in the war. Though President Roosevelt was already convinced of the necessity to enter the war, he could not count on support from a public that was opposed to participation. In order to accumulate the political capital necessary to enter the war, Roosevelt needed to convince the public that it was the correct thing to do. For this purpose, advertisers, broadcasters and other business leaders formed the War Advertising Council with the goal of launching campaigns that were “tightly controlled from the top down and [] carefully orchestrated at every level” in order to “create an appearance of consensus” (Spring, 2011, p. 4).

To do this, the council formed networks among advertisers, the media, and (crucially) the government. In direct contradiction to the classical economics credo of a clear separation between the market and the state, these networks established an unprecedented public/private partnership that united the interests of business and the state.

The council’s success in raising money for the war effort, and providing a system for the state to communicate to the people transformed an isolationist population looking to avoid the war in Europe at all costs into dutiful citizens eager to support a war that was now a moral imperative. In March, 1944, “President Roosevelt spoke to the War Advertising Council, praising its efforts in the war” (Spring, 2011, p. 23). The efficacy of advertising in turning public opinion showed that “’the best public relations advertising is public service advertising’ and the industry had
proven its capacity to launch large-scale, multimedia, multiplatform persuasive information campaigns” (Spring, 2011, p. 24).

A mere four months after Roosevelt’s speech to the War Advertising Council, leaders from 45 allied countries met in the Bretton Woods resort in northern New Hampshire to plan the global post-war economic system. Though in theory the attendants sought to design a system that would incite economic growth globally and inclusively (27 of the 45 nations represented were from the Third World), the institutions that were created (namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) very clearly represented the interests of the First World. The World Bank was controlled by the five biggest shareholders (all First World nations), the leader being selected by the United States president. In turn, the IMF director was appointed by the largest European nations. In addition, in order for poorer countries to obtain loans they had to meet certain criteria that encouraged import dependence (McMichael, 2012). This system encouraged the rapid industrialization of resource extraction in poorer countries for the use in the more advanced industries in wealthier nations. The urbanization necessary to facilitate this industrialization turned previously food-independent agriculturalists into urban workers dependent on the goods produced in advanced countries using resources extracted from poorer countries and exported back for absorption by the new consumer (and dependent) class. The perfect tool to encourage the consumerism necessary to implement the Bretton Woods System was the type of advertising that had been so successful in shaping public opinion during the war. As a result, “the War Advertising Council became a permanent peacetime institution, the Advertising Council” (Spring, 2011, p. 25).

In this way, the system was set up in which increasing numbers of people were convinced that they needed consumer goods. The growing demand would spark an increase in supply activities,
which in turn provided a recipient of capital overaccumulated in the triumphant post-war West, and guaranteed a steady growth of the economy. As comprehensive as this growth was meant to be, the industrialization that promoted growth was uneven. Poorer countries were expected to industrialize agricultural and mining extractive practices. Unlike the gradual industrialization that had occurred in Western Europe and North America over more than 100 years, industrialization in poor countries was expected to occur almost instantly, and following the plans composed by wealthier countries. Meanwhile, industrialization in the “first world” evolved from including resource extraction (which was exported to poorer nations where newly displaced and urbanized workers were willing to take unpleasant low-wage jobs), to industry that almost exclusively produced manufactured goods using raw materials acquired from the “third world”. The West’s (or global North’s) accumulation could then be achieved through dispossession of non-Western (global South) lands, cultures, and modes of production. The institutions set up by the Bretton Woods system, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund maintained this system by providing conditional capital to the “third world” that encouraged this type of industrialization.

As has been mentioned, this new post-war economic world-order was conceptualized by Immanuel Wallerstein (1999) as the world-system approach. The dependency created by conditional loans and consumerism created a world system where countries were organized into a core and a periphery. The natural resources of the periphery would provide the raw materials needed for economic growth in the core. The core, meanwhile would evolve into a deeply consumerist post-industrial stage which included unforeseen improvements in quality of life, while the environmental devastation of forced rapid industrialization plagued the periphery. Despite this, the cultural influence from the core and the creation of an urban industrial class in
the periphery created a consumerist dependency on imported goods from the core that sustained economic growth at the top.

This system had a perhaps unintended consequence that provided even more benefits for the core. Though resistance movements had existed in European colonies for centuries, the post-war Cold War provided an ideological platform from which to counteract the rampant capitalism of the new world order. Intense and effective movements gained in strength throughout the colonized peripheries of Africa (e.g. Algeria, the Congo), and Asia (e.g. Indochina). U.S. led post-colonial exploitation was also challenged in Cuba and throughout Latin America. The political and economic costs of keeping these insurgencies in check quickly rose uncomfortably. The new world system, however, provided an easy out. Colonial powers could offer what the resistance movements had been fighting for – independence - while maintaining an economic stranglehold on the area through the dependencies created by the new world economic order.

Instrumental to this perpetuation of hegemonies is the reinforcement of the nature-society split that had already facilitated the industrialization of the Western world. The industrialized West was seen as the epitome of modernity and civilization. Urban life, replete with consumer goods and commodified leisure was seen as the standard to strive for. Nature was more divorced from conscious daily life than it had ever been, serving either as a commodified space of leisure for civilized urbanites or a distant cornucopia of often undiscovered potential products for humans to eventually consume. The poorer countries, meanwhile, were marginalized as savage and rural. Poor cities were seen as cesspools of disease and pollution (conditions caused by rampant industrialization) while rural areas were uncivilized and waiting to be civilized by a benign West that would end poverty through modernization and urbanization (and natural resource exploitation). The maintenance of a perpetually growing economy of Western consumerism
would have been impossible without this “othering” of poorer countries as savage, uncivilized and “natural”. To further Wallerstein’s world-systems argument, the components of the world capitalist order are not just nations. Rather, consumerism-as-capital represents the core while extractable-raw-materials-as-nature represents the periphery. Much like the peripheral nations serve as tools for the reinforcement of consumerism and material improvements in the core nations, so does nature serve capital.

Two key instruments that facilitate the implementation of the new world order are the state and the global project of development. The defining influence of classical and neoclassical economics, which reifies the theoretical capitalist market as a practical reality that made sense of all social life, focuses on a strictly time-based ontology. With a few customizations to account for extra-economic differences, the implementation of capitalist modes of production should work similarly for places in a similar stage of capitalist development, regardless of location or cultural characteristics. The very different role that the state has played in Latin America and in Peru in the implementation of European capitalist modes of production (as was seen in Section I), and the fluidity of meaning in defining “development” in different spaces both highlight the importance of contextualizing these areas of analysis into a space-time continuum that can account for the distinct contradictions introduced by the encroachment of capitalism into new spaces. In addition, they clarify the ways in which fluid definitions of “development” address these new contradictions. This can also inform the understanding of spatial production in extra-capitalist spaces.
CHAPTER VI

EXTRA-CAPITALIST TO CAPITALIST-EMERGENT SPACES

Section II has up to this point shown the socio-historical basis for the formulation of production of space theory. The conceptualization of representations of space, representational spaces and spatial practice clearly reflect the fluctuations and conflicts which shaped social, political and economic relations as classical economics evolved into neoclassical economics. As a theory emanating from the global core, its implementations onto Western spaces that have endured similar capitalist development are straightforward. Yet capitalist development has occurred unevenly throughout the world. It would be a phallacy to assume that all spaces can be understood similarly when the theory is applied. Amazonian indigenous spaces have until recently been largely isolated from capitalist structures. As natural resource extraction pushes indigenous spaces into these volatile structures, how these extra-capitalist spaces react to this encroachment is key to understanding the spatial components of capitalist development.

SPACE AND TIME: SPATIAL DIFFERENTIATIONS OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

The historicism of economics occludes the spatial contexts in which economic and social processes manifest themselves. There are clear reasons for this. The fundamentally theoretical and ideological “market” has been afforded an equilibrating agency which, as explained above, has reified its social productive characteristics through the commodification of culture. A key part of this process is the fetishization of space. As Soja (1989) warns: “We must be insistently aware of how space can be made to hide consequences from us, how relations of power and discipline are inscribed into the apparently innocent spatiality of social life, how human geographies become filled with politics and ideology” (p. 6). This “illusion of opaqueness’ reifies space” and is “fixed, dead, and undialectical: the Cartesian cartography of spatial science”
In Lefebvrian terms, this oversimplified fetishized space is a “conceptualized space, the space of scientists, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 38), namely, the ‘conceived’, idealized space “tied to the relations of production and to the ‘order’ which those relations impose” (p. 33), or a representation of space. Focusing solely on these representations of space conceals the contradictions of purely economic analyses that are manifested in space. In theory, this shortcoming is applicable to both classic Marxist analyses based on class and neoclassical economic explanations based on the stages of capitalist development. Yet the role neoclassical economic theories play in legitimizing the perpetuation of market-centered economics means that neo-Marxist and/or post-modern critiques focus on highlighting the contradictions that catalyze capitalist crises and the increasingly exploitative nature of capitalist strategies implemented to overcome these crises.

The market is in a Foucauldian sense, a utopia, a “site[] with no real place…[that] present[s] society itself in a perfected form” (Foucault, 1984, p. 25). This “perfected form” has been reified by its modern scientism and historicism allowing for a purely temporal analysis of social life that obscures the contradictions of capitalism which nevertheless manifest themselves in periodic global economic crises. Foucault’s ontological response to utopias is a decidedly spatial heterotopia. Questioning the validity of purely historical views of the world, Foucault argues for the inclusion of space into the equation:

The problem of the human or living space is not simply that of knowing whether there will be enough space for men in the world… but also that of knowing what relations of propinquity, what type of storage, circulation, marking, and classification of human elements should be adopted in a given situation in order to achieve a given end. Our epoch is one in which space takes for us the form of relations among sites (p. 23).

John Berger takes Foucault’s ontological argument and provides a phenomenological layer. In *Ways of Seeing* (1972), Berger observes visual art and analyzes the viewer’s perception of art. In
arguing that “the way we see things is affected by what we know or what we believe” (p. 8), he asserts that we are attracted (“seduced”) to certain artists’ work because we accept what they are trying to communicate to us. “This is possible because we still live in a society of comparable social relations and moral values. And it is precisely this which gives the paintings their psychological and social urgency. It is this – not the painter’s skill as a ‘seducer’ – which convinces us that we can know the people portrayed” (p. 14). In interpreting a painting, the viewer is referencing the “simultaneity and extension of events and possibilities” (Berger, 1974, p. 40). To Berger, the experience of viewing a painting represented the perception of a temporal history accumulated onto a point in space. Soja concludes that this accumulation is dialectically made up of endless spatial simultaneities, so that “we can no longer depend on a story-line unfolding sequentially, an ever-accumulating history marching straight forward in plot and denouement, for too much is happening against the grain of time, too much is continually traversing the story-line laterally” (p. 23). In Ways of Seeing (as both a concept and a title), Berger sees in art, among other things, social class (p. 15), processes of cultural transmission (p. 28), property (p. 87, 108), and colonialism (p. 95) – all deeply spatial concepts, frozen in one point in time. Not only does Berger contextualize art, he concludes that the hermeneutics of art are essentially spatial as well.

Through exercising these “ways of seeing” as both temporal and spatial simultaneities (Soja, 1989, p. 22) Foucault’s heterotopias emerge. Unlike utopias, these are “real places – places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society – which are something like countersites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted” (Foucault, 1984, p. 24).
These spatializations of social theory and analysis can be further conceptualized and neatly categorized through an implementation of Lefebvre’s production of space conceptual triad. By “identifying what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived” (p. 38), the market epitomizes Foucault’s utopias and exemplifies representations of space. Its reification from a theoretical entity to a practical one that shapes social phenomena provides the infinite causal arrows that integrate it with both representational spaces and spatial practice. The historicism and scientism of classical and neoclassical economics, re-conceptualized as modernization and development when applied to the periphery, cements the hegemony of representations of space in shaping spatial practice. Heterotopias, “embodying complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or underground sound of life” (p.33) on the other hand, represent a contrast to the utopian market. As a ‘kind of effectively enacted utopia’, it represents a representation of space that, through accentuating the contradictions of the reification of utopias, has evolved into a kind of representational space. Spatial practice is represented neither by utopias, nor heterotopias. Rather, it is “between utopias… and heterotopias [where] there might be a sort of mixed, joint experience” (Foucault, 1984 p. 25). Lefebvre agrees: “The spatial practice of a society secretes that society’s space; it propounds and presupposes it, in a dialectical interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it. From the analytic standpoint, the spatial practice of a society is revealed through the deciphering of its space (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 38, emphasis mine). Berger’s “ways of seeing” are essentially spatial practice.

Applying Lefebvre’s conceptual triad in this way provides a method to problematize the spatial differentiations in capitalist development. Through equating the reification of the market with modernization, the evolution of theoretical contradictions of capitalism to very real global crises
is facilitated by the oversimplification of the complexity of its own processes. This creates “conditions of intensified crisis in which everything seems to be ‘pregnant with its contrary’” (Soja, 1989, p. 26), arguably an interesting example of spatial practice as the product of utopian and heterotopian conflict. This reification of the free capitalist market as modern (in a purely temporal sense) “can be directly linked to the many different ‘objective’ processes of structural change that have been associated with the ability of capitalism to develop and survive… despite endogenous tendencies toward debilitating crisis” (p. 26-27). Yet a post-modern view of the market places space at the center of things: “Modernization is, like all social processes, unevenly developed across time and space and thus inscribes quite different historical geographies across different regional social formations” (p. 27).

In summary, social inequalities develop through time, but manifest themselves in space. Spaces where capitalism has significantly developed are produced in ways very different from spaces produced in extra-capitalist contexts. How social inequalities develop through time will therefore drive how these manifest themselves in specific spaces. These spatio-temporal manifestations of social inequalities will in turn shape resistance to these inequalities. Lefebvrian theory defines spaces of resistance that have been through significant capitalist development as representational spaces. However, the production of space theory as it stands fails to both define spaces of resistance in spaces that have not experienced significant capitalist development and to explain how these spaces (and therefore the resistance that occurs in these spaces) are produced. The infinite simultaneities coming together in one specific point in space highlight the spatial differences of how these social forces converge. The spatial productions theorized by Lefebvre reflect the economic relations resulting from decades of capitalist developments and negotiations. As the contradictions introduced by classical economics were
addressed by its morphing into neoclassical economics (and later neoliberal economics), the interactions among European representations of space, representational spaces and spatial practice produced spaces that manifested these strategic moves. The spatial productions inspiring Lefebvre’s theory were shaped by the very specific capitalist developments occurring in European spaces. Yet the process of modernization in Latin America has been very different than the same process in Western Europe. The development of the Latin American nation state reflected less the cultural and linguistic differences among nations and more the post-colonialist interests artificially created nations could serve. As these peripheral states emerged from colonialism and adapted to core-driven fluctuations in global capitalist development, previously isolated spaces are increasingly usurped into capitalist modes of production. This process is facilitated by state structures that increasingly serve the interests of international capital in their efforts to further consolidate democracy. In this context, indigenous extra-capitalist spaces transition into being capitalist-emergent states. Their inclusion into Lefebvre’s conceptual triad reflects this transition, and informs the types of resistance produced.

DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND CAPITALIST-EMERGENT SPACES
O’Donnell (1993) considers most Latin American systems to have technically transitioned into democracies since the exit from authoritarianism has, at least in theory, provided universal voting rights. However, he deems Robert Dahl’s (1989) concept of polyarchies as more appropriate to describe the Latin American condition, albeit one that is modified to encompass the unique characteristics of Latin American spaces. Since true participatory democracy is practically impossible in large-scale societies, Dahl theorizes a polyarchic system where institutions develop to provide aggregate political representation (e.g. political parties, ethnic
identity organizations, political and economic interest groups) to otherwise powerless individuals. Dahl’s polyarchies have the following characteristics:

- Elected officials are constitutionally given control over governmental decisions.
- Fair and free elections with limited coercion.
- All adults have right to vote in elections
- All adults have right to run for public office.
- Freedom of expression
- Access to alternative sources of information that are not monopolized by the government or any other single group.
- Right to form and join autonomous associations. (p. 233)

Belaúnde’s return to democracy in 1980 only partially met these criteria. The constitution enacted in 1980 after more than 10 years of military rule returned governmental power to elected officials. Velasco’s reforms, which took away Andean ethnic identity and replaced it with class status deepened the superficial national myth centrality of Andean indígenas and introduced them into national economic and political systems. Simultaneously, Amazonian indígenas were recognized as official, ethnic-based identity groups that had political rights. The new constitution did away with the literacy requirement for suffrage, thereby including a large percentage of the indígena population in both the Andes and the Amazon that had never been allowed to vote before. The constitution also guaranteed freedom of expression, access to alternative sources of information and the right to form and join autonomous organizations. These individual rights are necessary for the development of democracy. Once again, the expectation that the guarantee of individual rights will ultimately result in an improvement in democracy is a historicist, time-based analysis that largely ignores space as a potential variable. Dahl argues that the institutions that provide structures for otherwise powerless individuals to meaningfully participate in politics make polyarchies the most advanced development of democracy in the world system and one that, though not technically necessary to the
achievement of true democracy, is perhaps the most effective path towards true democracy. Yet his analysis applies largely to Western societies that have largely followed the conventional trajectory of hyper-liberal classical economics transitioning to welfare-state-based neoclassical economics and the social and political fluctuations that accompany these developments in specific spaces. The modes of production present in a specific place reflect the spatial productions of that place. Both the implementation of ideologically based modes of production (time) and the spatial productions (space) in a particular place shape the development of polyarchy and democracy in that place. The specific modes of production and productions of space in Perú highlight the obvious – that Perú is a different place in a different time in its historical development. Perú’s version of polyarchy is therefore unique. O’Donnell (1993) calls for the theorizing of the spatially specific polyarchies that exist in Latin America. Doing so will highlight how the differences in social, economic and capitalist development in Europe and Latin America have shaped the different development and consolidation of democracy in these two continents. Consequently, it will illuminate the necessity of taking these differences into account when applying production of space theory to different spaces.

The economic, social, and political chaos that defined Peruvian society in the 1980s resulted in conditions entirely incompatible with furthering the consolidation of democracy. An analysis of how competing ideologies and inadequate institutions interacted to pose the most serious challenge to the consolidation of democracy in the 1990s and the pervasive difficulties that culminated in the Baguazo will provide an opportunity to meaningfully situate production of space theories.
The Peruvian State and Ideology

The dominant post-military general ideology in Perú was democracy. Participation in the 1980 elections was mandated by law and included more participants than ever before, reflecting the abolishment of literacy requirements. Elements of neoclassical welfare state ideology were visibly present and had been strengthened by the populist characteristics of the Velasco regime. Though more Peruvians than ever participated in the 1980 elections, the transition to democracy was experienced differently in various areas of the nation. The Andes in 1980 were a very different space than the Amazon in the same year. Both were very different spaces from 1980 coastal Perú. Though democratic and participatory rights were, for the first time in its history, uniformly offered throughout Perú in 1980, the liberal component of democracy was experienced differently in different spaces. What did participation in a capitalist democracy mean in a space that had remained largely outside of capitalist development? What did it mean in a space where the capitalist modes of production at best recognized them as peripheral spaces delineated to, in the future, potentially serve the interests of an elite core? How can Lefebvrian representational spaces form when interaction with representations of space and national-scale spatial practice is minimal?

Ideologies, created largely in governmental palaces and universities in Westernized cities, may uniformly develop around addressing the crises created by the contradictions of hegemonic capitalist systems, or around exploiting the cleavages created by these crises with the goal of overthrowing the capitalist system. Yet the way in which these historical ideologies are received depends largely on the spatial productions taking place where they are being imposed. In Foucauldian terms, the democratic utopia will impose itself very differently in indigenous heterotopias that are heavily grounded in their spatial specificities than in places where
hegemonic ideologies have for centuries helped to produce spaces that are more receptive to it. Turning to Lefebvre, political representations of space will more effectively shape spatial practice in places where hegemonic ideologies have already cemented than in those where representational spaces (however redefined or re-theorized) remain strong and largely autonomous.

The Shining Path insurrection provided an almost immediate ideological challenge to the democratic (polyarchic) project of the 1980s and therefore had a meaningful influence on national and indigenous productions of space. The group had developed its Maoist ideology largely during Velasco’s regime. It challenged what it saw as counter-revolutionary reforms that worked to appease the exploited while containing them in the periphery. This critique did not prevent it from taking advantage of the class identity placed upon Andean indígenas and using it to organize a class-based revolution. Once again ignoring the spatiality of indigeneity, Shining Path represented another extremist distortion of Mariateguismo, where indianismo was overlooked in favor of an ideologically more advanced class-based system where the subordinate social classes would be in power as a result of class-based identities that made indigeneity obsolete. Shining Path sprouted in Ayacucho, an area long ignored by the state, where the national ideology was particularly contradictory to local interests. Velasco’s populist reforms were especially unsuccessful here, as they attempted to replace traditional reciprocal modes of production that had existed for centuries. In theory, Shining Path was attempting to reduce the distance between representations of space and representational spaces so that they would, by force, become synonymous in practice (though likely still conceptually different). Yet in ignoring indigenous modes of production and imposing exogenous ideologies to indigenous spaces, the Shining Path insurrection had the same effect as Velasco’s policies – namely it more
clearly delineated representations of space as a utopian ideal (in this case Maoism) and representational spaces as heterotopian spaces of resistance (in this case resistance to both the state and the exogenous ideology of the insurrection). The result was that in the 1980s, even the more nominal participatory rights of democracy were threatened in the Andes. The liberal component of democracy was similarly compromised. The superficiality of the central position of Andean indígenas in national myth-building manifested itself most noticeably during this crisis. The “inca block” (Greene, 2006) identity helped to place Andean indígenas in a subordinate position in the national economic and political democratic project, while its interaction with the imposed class-based campesino identity placed them in a precarious position in the context of political violence. Despite this, these “democratic” fluctuations and conflicts still strengthened the interactions among representations of space, representational spaces, and spatial practice in the Andes. These fluctuations and conflicts also further strengthened the engagement of Andean indigenous spaces with capitalist development. In this context, the application of the production of space theory onto Andean indigenous spaces seems appropriate.

*The State and Indigeneity*

As Andean spaces were being further integrated into engagement with capitalism, Amazonian spaces remained largely uninfluenced by either the state or Shining Path. Ironically, Velasco’s military dictatorship provided Amazonian indigenous communities more of the benefits usually attributed to democracies than previous governments. The access to the state that official recognition as an ethnic group provided was a double-edged sword. On the positive side, it provided rights not just as Peruvian citizens, but as distinct groups defined around ethnic identities within the Peruvian system. This was the exact opposite of the legal and symbolic reform implemented on Andean indígenas. Symbolically, Velasco’s ontological shift from “día
“del Indio” to “día del Campesino” effectively erased any indigenous characteristics in Andean identities, and replaced them with class. This cultural process was at first relatively seamless given the position of Andean indígenas in the national psyche as well as the theoretical developments that sprouted in Perú out of this position. As discussed above, the Peruvian national myth was based on the grandiosity of the Inca Empire, the cradle of which was the Peruvian city of Cuzco. As culturally central to the building of the Peruvian nation, it only followed that Andean indigeneity became central to its economic development. (Greene, 2006). This echoes Mariateguista thought by representing a key point in Perú’s evolution from an indianista nation to an indigenista nation and finally into and indígena nation. Centrally incorporating Andean indígenas into national economic structures served, at least symbolically, as a further catalyst in that evolution.

Yet what sort of nation were Andean indígenas being integrated to? I call attention to the real impetus for Velasco’s coup. For all its talk about revolutionary change in representativeness and inclusion, the real goal of the coup and its policies was arguably to nullify the burgeoning resistance movements that had begun to threaten the stability of Belaúnde’s first 1963-1968 government. These movements, inspired by the Cuban Revolution and sustained by the territorial positioning of Cold War powers, had been jeopardizing the process of democratization taking place throughout Latin America that was necessary to ensure its entrance into the capitalist market-based system. The Velasco regime attempted to provide the basic needs that resistance movements promised so that those resistance movements could be kept in check. As Rochabún Silva and Yañez (1988) argued, Velasco’s reforms stole the left’s program. In doing so, Velasco was attempting to modernize Perú by weakening supposedly anachronistic anti-capitalist social movements and replacing them with “modern” movements that would ultimately
facilitate the country’s integration into “developed” capitalist markets. The land reform the regime implemented provides evidence of this. Land redistribution was at least partially achieved. Yet the reorganization of peasant agriculture into large cooperatives was less representative of Andean indigenous interests than of capitalist market-based ones. First, it replaced ancient reciprocal aide systems that had sustained Andean indigenous life since pre-Inca times. Secondly, it implemented production strategies that maximized the market-value of the product, regardless of its impact on existing local systems. In doing so, the Velasco regime was implementing Perú’s transition from a nation deeply entrenched in an economic system that loosely reflected classical economics, to one that roughly fit into neo-classical economics. Velasco’s authoritarian welfare state policies attempted to address the approaching crises caused by rampant capitalism, allowing the now partially regulated market to retain its status as the driver of social relations. By addressing capitalism’s contradictions, his policies, whether intentionally or not, reified the market and helped to perpetuate its hegemony. By turning indigeneity into class (thereby “modernizing” the nation by reducing its reality to the objective scientism of economics), Velasco attempted to erase space from social processes in order to force the nation’s entrance into the timeline of capitalism. As different as Velasco’s utopian impositions onto indigenous heteropias were, they were still capitalist utopian impositions. These impositions placed Andean spaces firmly in the realm of representational spaces in dialectical engagement with representations of space.

In the Amazon, meanwhile, indígenas (or comunidades nativas, as Velasco had defined them) experienced Velasco’s reforms in an entirely different way. While in the Andes indígenas had been redefined along class lines, in the Amazon their official recognition was based on ethnic lines. In the Andes, Western agricultural and economic systems were being implemented,
forcing indigenous communities into the capitalist structure of the state. The Amazon region was largely untouched by Velasco’s land reform. While in the Andes the modes of production were being re-organized to adapt to international capitalism, the modes of production in the Amazon largely continued to reflect indigenous culture and values. The modernizing state, ever-present in the Andes, remained largely absent in the Amazon during Velasco’s regime, and heteropias remained mostly intact. Productions of space in the Amazon were therefore quite different. While Andean spaces fit quite neatly as representational spaces due to their historic engagement with capitalist structures, Amazonian spaces, having been almost completely isolated from these structures, do not. As capitalist development more aggressively encroached onto indigenous spaces, these were forcibly introduced into the conceptual triad, not as Lefebvrian representational spaces, but rather as indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces. The different point in time and space that these spaces have entered into the conceptual triad help to explain not only the uniqueness of spatial productions in indigenous spaces, but also the way in which these productions shape resistance.

*Democracy and Indigeneity*

The Andean culture around which the splendor of the Inca empire was built provided the perfect tool to facilitate the process of nation-building. It also facilitated state coercion. As a central, if superficial, part of the national structure, Andean identities provided a Durkheimian attachment to society that compels participation in national projects. Yet Perú was a capitalist state, not an indigenous one; the national project was utopian, not heterotopian. As a result, Andean identity was transformed from ethnically based to one defined by economic class that would perpetuate exploitative economic relations. It is an interestingly temporal, a-spatial transition. In a way, it is a perversion of the Mariateguismo that had clearly influenced Velasco’s reforms. His policies
represented an attempt to insert the Peruvian Andes into a chronology of development. To Mariátegui this was supposed to be an evolution from the indianista stage to the indígena stage of socialist development. What made Perú the potential center of socialist revolution for Mariátegui was that Andean indigenous modes of production were a practical example of socialist ideals. These very local modes of production could help define the socialist reorganization of society. But in reality, Velasco’s policies represented a stage in the evolution of capitalist, not socialist, development. It replaced Mariátegui’s indigenista and indígena stages with a campesino stage, a stage that legitimated the subordinate economic position of Andean indígenas despite their cultural centrality. By replacing relatively effective traditional modes of production based on reciprocity with contemporary Western modes of production, the Velasco regime tried to temporally revolutionize Perú’s integration into world markets, while completely ignoring the spatial characteristics that shape that integration. The appropriation of a real, heterotopian localized culture to legitimize an idealized utopian nation is a very spatial process. However, the attribution of Andean indigenous culture to represent a colonialist capitalist nation renders that spatiality meaningless: ignoring the function that indigenous cultures, which are the direct result of indigenous spatial productions, play in indigenous spaces, and adopting their superficial characteristics to represent the antagonistic interests of a nation that encompasses them, negates indigenous spaces for the benefit of a national-scale space striving to enter the hegemonic globalized capitalist timetable of development.

In the Amazon, Velasco’s official recognition of “comunidades nativas” had very different consequences. The term “comunidades nativas” itself suggests spatiality. Communities that are “native” are those that have originally occupied a specific space that happens to at least partially fall within the borders of the modern nation of Perú. The identity of comunidades nativas
revolves around their historical presence in that space and, by logical conclusion, the very specific spaces they have produced. The modes of production continue to represent those spatial productions. Identities in Andean comunidades campesinas, by contrast, are based on economic activities imposed by the state. In Lefebvrian terms, the Velasco regime conveyed strong representations of space in the Andes which, though in theory shaped by representational spaces, in practice only served to weaken the influence of representational spaces on spatial practice. In Mariateguista terms, during Velasco’s regime Andean identities went from the indian stage, skipped over indigenista and indígena stages and clumsily stumbled into a campesino stage. Though this may have provided a phenomenologically temporal update on Mariateguismo (the theory was, after all, being applied some 40 years after the inception of Mariateguismo), the a-spatiality of this update made it phenomenologically flawed, as the subjectivity of space (representational or indigenous spaces) gave way to the objectivity of time (representations of space or the capitalist nation).

While Andean identities were barreling from the Indian stage to the campesino stage, Amazonian indigeneities went from no stage at all, to the comunidades nativas stage. The comunidades nativas stage is ethnically, and therefore spatially, defined. On the one hand, the innately spatial characteristics of Amazonian identities highlight the importance of spatially analyzing indigenous social movements. On the other hand, it also highlights the inadequacy of Lefebvrian analysis in non-Western, non-urban and non-capitalist spaces. It is very difficult to place Velasco-era Amazonian identities in Lefebvre’s conceptual triad. As spaces that had at the time, barely, if at all, entered global capitalist markets, who the agents of representations of space are comes into question. It is certainly not the chronically absent state. Despite Velasco’s reforms,
official recognition does not necessarily translate into a meaningful relationship with the state. It is not the market, which outside of local economic networks, had yet to commandeer social life.

Perú’s eventual transition into democracy was as fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions as any other in Latin America. This transition was further complicated by the populist nature of Velasco’s policies, the more traditionally authoritarian characteristics of the Bermúdez regime that immediately followed it, and the unique role that indigeneity played in the development of the Peruvian nation. The spatio-temporal conditions existing in Perú have shaped its continuing transition to democracy as well as the social movements that address the unique contradictions it poses.

As can be seen, it is very difficult to implement Western theories and ideologies to analyze the impact of democratization on Amazonian indigenous spaces. Post-Marxist and post-structuralist theories fit well when applied to spaces well-entrenched in the chronology of capitalist development, even if that entrenchment was imposed by colonialist interests, as is the case in the Peruvian Andes. Yet what is appropriate for spaces such as indigenous Amazonía that have hardly been exposed to capitalism? What would Lefebvre’s conceptual triad look like in spaces where representations of space have next to no impact on spatial practice, where utopian cosmologies are nearly perfectly parallel to heterotopian practice?

It will be a useful exercise to ponder these questions through analyzing the spatially diverse reactions to national- and increasingly global-scale impositions of capitalist modes of production onto different spaces in the 1980s and 1990s. As Peruvian ideology travelled from a hopeful neoclassical “tercera vía” transition to democracy, through struggling to survive volatile political and economic upheaval, to attempts at further democratic consolidation through authoritarian neoliberalism, and finally to neoliberalism and extractive imperialism, the differences in
reactions to the contradictions introduced by the imposition of capitalist modes of production will perhaps shed light on how these differences reflect various spatial productions. On the way, opportunities to suggest theoretical contributions that will allow for the meaningful application of production of space theories to non-Western, non-urban spaces will surely emerge.

THE SPATIO-TEMPORALITY OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

Linz and Stepan (1996) suggest five arenas of a consolidated democracy:

interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions [that] must also exist or be crafted for a democracy to be consolidated. First, the conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society. Second, there must be a relatively autonomous and valued political society. Third, there must be a rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and independent associational life. Fourth, there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government. Fifth, there must be an institutionalized economic society (p. 7).

The internal war between Shining Path and the state was problematic for the maintenance or crafting of all of these conditions in increasingly large swathes of the country. Shining Path itself prohibited the formation of any self-organizing groups or movements outside of Shining Path. The state, despite its shift from authoritarian to welfare-state, “tercera vía” democratic ideology reacted to the violence in a manner that worked to further threaten the very democracy it claimed to ideologically promote. As the violence increased, state policies became increasingly repressive. Belaúnde’s economic policies failed and his social and security policies became increasingly authoritarian, bringing the country closer to chaos in the mid-1980s.

The chaos only intensified once Álan García’s presidency began in 1985. As mentioned before, APRA’s ideology shifted conveniently to fit the national mood and maximize key strategic alliances. This afforded them a longevity and popularity that no other Peruvian political party ever enjoyed. Despite this, García was the first Aprista ever elected to the presidency. As Shining Path’s totalitarian violence spread throughout Perú, García’s economic policies further
destabilized the nation. Perú had accumulated a crippling external debt during the military regime of the 1970s and Belaúnde’s second presidency in the early 1980s. To address this, García attempted to implement a heterodox, post-Keynesian economic model where the state controlled prices of basic goods and interest rates in order to promote internal production growth and increased consumption. As part of this policy, García vowed to lower external debt payments to 10% of exports from the 60% demanded by the World Bank as a prerequisite to receiving loans. The heterodox characteristics of García’s policies were, in many ways, an attempt to implement neo-classical Keynesian economics that had been the ideological structural base of post-War capitalism, but in a manner that would, at least in theory, serve national interests and not those of international organizations such as the IMF. Again, in theory this could be seen as an attempt to introduce a spatial dimension to a temporally based hegemonic economic model by aggressively placing national interests ahead of the interests of increasingly globalized capital. This heterodox Keynesian state ideology seems to also be an attempt by García to bring APRA back to the original populism that it had deviated from in its efforts to consolidate power in an ever-changing nation. As an ideology, it posed a refreshing challenge to the hegemonic colonialist Bretton Woods status quo.

Yet the spatial context that García attempted to introduce into the capitalist chronology was once again an inaccurate one, and his agenda was less than benign. García’s policies showed promising growth in his first year. Yet the contradictions of implementing populist, isolationist economic policies in an increasingly globalizing and neo-liberal world began to take their toll. After a first year of record growth, the consequences of these policies in this context became apparent. The affront to the IMF meant that foreign investors were hesitant to work with Perú. Soon the industrial growth that was necessary to afford the welfare state policies hit capacity.
The parallel unofficial economy that developed beside the heavily state-controlled one meant that inflation levels sky-rocketed and the state’s economic policy was continually questioned. Using the excuse that Peruvian banks were more interested in foreign investments than in helping national development, García then attempted to nationalize all banks. Traditional economic elites, which had up until now benefitted from García’s policies suddenly began to doubt. Soon the entire economy collapsed, with hyper-inflation causing extreme stress on the entire population. In addition, the disturbing growth of the Shining Path movement throughout the country and the increasingly repressive state response threatened the further consolidation of democracy necessary for García’s policies to work.

To exacerbate the problem further, the corruption that had always existed in the García administration began to emerge. Since the same elites that benefited from García’s economic policies also controlled the media, the fact that public administrative positions were increasingly given to APRA militants was not publicized in the first couple of years of García’s presidency. Though not officially investigated until after the end of García’s term in 1990, it was a well-known “secret” that the president had been taking bribes for years.

As can be seen, post-1980 democratic Perú was a victim of the contradictory global context it found itself in, creating a specific spatio-temporal setting that helped to shape (and impede) the process of democratic consolidation. The populist policies of the Velasco regime had endowed the previously disenfranchised with a political power that could only be served in democracy through a turn to Keynesian welfare state economic policy. Belaúnde’s government was mainly concerned with consolidation of democracy in a time of crippling international debt and a burgeoning insurrection in the Andes. García inherited both problems. In an effort to bring APRA back to its leftist, populist roots after decades of increased collaboration with the military.
and conservative elites, García proposed a return to the left with efforts to increase state control of the economy and other policies that were an affront to neoliberal multi-national organizations.

As much as it seems that from a Lefebvrian perspective García’s policies sought to consolidate a Peruvian representational space, in reality APRA’s turn to the left was much more of an example of representations of space. It is important to remember that, much like Keynes intended and theorized, the goal of orthodox and heterodox (as was the case with García) welfare economics was to maximize consumer power, increase production, and, ultimately, maintain the capitalist status quo. Even García’s attempts to nationalize the banks and to implement state-controlled industrial growth in the end served the interests of capital (both corporate and his own). Spatial practice in Perú was not increasingly shaped by representational spaces, certainly not more so than under Velasco. International and national capital interests continued to define and idealize Peruvian spaces to guarantee that they would serve their needs not the needs of its citizens.

The manner in which Peruvian spaces were increasingly usurped into global capitalist structures is also very telling. The European and global north representational spaces that had developed alongside industrialization and through a constant interaction with capitalist representations of space and spatial practices did not really exist in Perú. The Europan welfare state, if seen as a spatial practice resulting from and influencing the infinite relationships between representations of space and representational spaces developed in the context of the global core, not the periphery. These spaces had the luxury of a relatively slow industrialization during which the interests of the people were in constant interaction and conflict with capital. Peruvian spaces were produced in a context of a rapid industrialization that occurred not during a post-war era of reconciliation and recovery from rampant capitalism, but instead was beginning to develop at a
neoliberal time when the world-order was antagonistic to nations that attempted (at least in rhetoric) to address the wishes of their people.

The development of the concept of citizenship was again quite different in Perú than in Europe and it contributed to the unique productions of space in both Perú and the Amazon that differed significantly from spaces defined by the production of space theory. Though most Peruvians gained the right (and legal obligation) to vote with the return to democracy in 1980, most did not enjoy the liberal rights of citizens of an effectively consolidating democracy. Institutionalized corruption put the interests of the Peruvian people further down the hierarchy of priorities. Though democracy ideologically represents the interests of all citizens, in practice spatial productions in Perú did not represent the interests of the people any more than they did under military dictatorship if one takes citizenship into account, as O’Donnell suggests. The plight of Amazonian indígenas provides evidence of this concept.

Echoing O’Donnell’s call for a theorization of Latin American polyarchies, Davis (1999) states that “Latin American state formation has proceeded quite unevenly, with the state reaching strongly into some population sectors or geographic regions of its territory while avoiding others” (p. 598). In the Amazon, official recognition by Velasco’s state formally introduced Amazonian indígenas to the state apparatus. Yet recognition of a group’s existence in this case did not translate into meaningful citizenship. The spatial isolation of the Amazon made it nearly impossible to bridge any distance from the state. Under Belaúnde, the Peruvian Amazon remained as isolated from the national state as it had ever been, despite the significant change in state ideology. Few of the natural resources the area had to offer had been discovered yet, and infrastructure was nearly non-existent, maintaining the Amazon as geographically isolated from Lima as it had always been. García’s first term policies further isolated the Amazon.
García’s goals were to maximize consumer power with the hopes of stimulating industrial growth. This reflected the increasing urbanization of Peruvian society. Consumerism and industrialization both represented the interests of Lima’s population, both old and established urban families and the newly arrived. Lima’s growth was equated with Perú’s growth, and the ideal nation was seen as one that served to facilitate industrial Peruvian growth. Lima was the idealized utopia the entire nation should strive to emulate – the ultimate representation of space. The entire Peruvian nation outside of Lima was seen as the capital city’s hinterland – geographically and culturally distant from the state until its natural resources pulled it into national spatial productions. This also applied to fluctuating definitions of and experiences with citizenship. In October 2007, as the tension around extraction in the northern Amazon was about to reach an early peak, President García published an op-ed in Perú’s most influential newspaper *El Comercio*:

> There is a great deal of resources that we are not able to trade, that do not receive investment and that do not generate jobs. And all of that because of the taboo of antiquated ideologies, because of laziness, because of indolence, or because of the law of the orchard dog who pleads: ‘If I don’t do it, no one else can’. The most important resource is the Amazon. It has 63 million hectares and abundant rain (Mercado and Nájar Kokally, 2011, p. 71).

In publishing this op-ed, García required participation in and contribution to the national development project as part of being a citizen, regardless of the deleterious and often catastrophic consequences of doing so. As the state negotiated its transition towards democracy, it attempted to manage fluctuations on democratic consolidation by affording superficial citizenship rights to previously neglected indigenous groups. In the pre-2000s national reality, these concessions afforded the state the political capital of expanding democratic rights to new populations. The costs of doing so were minimal since extraction of the natural resources found
in the Amazon continued to be less than profitable given global natural resource value fluctuations. The only requirement for the newly afforded citizenship was residence within national boundaries. Now that the natural resources were suddenly valuable, the conditions for citizenship changed. Rather than protecting their ancestral lands and livelihoods, Amazonian indígenas were accused by García of being antiquated, indolent, lazy orchard dogs. Citizenship in the extractive imperialist state had little to do with political and civic participation and more to do with serving the interests of multinational capitalist interests with which the emerging, yet still peripheral Peruvian state so desperately sought to engage. As long as Amazonian indígenas refused to cooperate with extractive imperialism, indigenous productions of space would never contribute to national-level spatial productions.

Until these capitalist encroachments happened, however, heterotopic indigenous spaces both in the more connected Andes and the still isolated Amazon remained similar to representational/indigenous spaces. Though in a local scale representational/indigenous spaces shaped spatial practice with minimal influence from representations of space, this disconnection with representations of space meant that indigenous representational spaces had little to no influence on modern national- or international-scale spatial practice. Indigenous Amazonian spaces have therefore been largely outside the realm of Lefebvrian productions of space. The recent and abrupt entrance of indigenous spaces into the capitalist structure calls for a theorization of indigenous productions of space that takes into account this spatial-temporal process of modernization instead of assuming that it has already occurred. It is therefore necessary to meaningfully append Lefebvre’s conceptual triad to expand its explanatory power to non-Western, non-Urban and non-capitalist spaces.
Space, Time, and Modernity

An important component of the introduction of indigenous spaces into capitalist structures is the concept of modernization. Indigenous spaces are often characterized as pre-modern or uncivilized. Capitalist attempts at economic integration have often justified their efforts as attempts to modernize the desperately primitive. The introduction of Andean indígenas into national capitalist structures represented a state-driven implementation of modernization (Greene, 2013). Berman (1982) provides a useful operationalization of these features:

- the industrialization of production, which transforms scientific knowledge into technology, creates new human environments and destroys old ones, speeds up the whole tempo of life, generates new forms of corporate power and class struggle; immense demographic upheavals, severing millions of people from their ancestral habitats, hurling them halfway across the world into new lives; rapid and often cataclysmic urban growth; systems of mass communication, dynamic in their development, enveloping and binding together the most diverse people and societies; increasingly powerful national states, bureaucratically structured and operated, constantly striving to expand their powers; mass social movements of people, and peoples, challenging their political and economic rulers, striving to gain some control over their lives; finally, bearing and driving all these people and institutions along, an ever-expanding, drastically fluctuating capitalist world market (p. 16).

Velasco’s land reform was certainly an example of “industrialization of production”. By imposing state-led economic organization based around stable community membership, the Velasco regime created “new human environments” where traditional reciprocal inter-community economic organization had for centuries endured colonialist and oligarchic impositions. Velasco’s policies were, at least in spirit, post-colonialist and post-oligarchic, but they were still an imposition of capitalist modes of production onto pre- or extra-capitalist spaces.

This continued with the return of democracy. As has already been mentioned, the Velasco regime provided bonds in exchange for the lands expropriated from old land-owning oligarchs.
These bonds were expected to be invested in industrial growth in the cities and on the coast, showing a clear attempt to industrialize production and rapidly urbanize the country. To encourage this further, labor unions were encouraged to organize and empower workers and catalyze further urbanization and industrialization. Belaúnde’s developmentalist policies continued to encourage industrialization and urbanization. As political violence grew in the Andes, migration to Arequipa, Lima and other urban centers continued well into García’s presidency when even coastal cities had become virtual warzones. Lima’s population grew from 3,573,227 in 1981 to 5,363,270 in 1993 (Webb and Fernández Baca, 2011), an increase of 50.1%. This clearly represents two of Berman’s “material forces which contribute to the restructuring of the experience of modernity” (p. 16), namely an “immense demographic upheaval” and “rapid and often cataclysmic urban growth”. By “severing millions of people from their ancestral habitats”, Velasco’s process of modernization of indigenous people by incorporating them into the capitalist class system continued.

This temporal phenomenon of incorporation into the capitalist development structures manifested itself in ways that reflected the specific spaces in which it occurred. Lima had always been a diverse city populated by criollo elites as well as mestizos, Andean indígenas, Afro-Peruvians, and Chinese and Japanese communities. The great demographic changes occurring in the city in the 1980s however, meant that the share of Lima’s population composed of indigenous Andeans grew. Yet Lima remained a center of wealth and power. As the largest city in the country, most national-level economic activity centered on Lima’s commerce and industry. As the capital of Perú, it was simultaneously the center of political power. Anyone who spent any significant time in Lima in the 1980s (the author lived in Lima until 1985) witnessed a very typical Latin American urban structure: a center dominated by wealthy criollo
elites in posh districts such as Miraflores and San Isidro, surrounded by growing hillside shantytowns. As the city’s population exploded, precarious housing grew in undeveloped areas closer to the city center such as dry riverbeds and city parks.

This new spatial reality effectively reduced the geographic distance from the state many Peruvian indígenas had suffered in the past since most migrants to Lima maintain the social networks of their home communities by settling and organizing with other migrants from their areas. This has been particularly prevalent as a result of natural disasters and political violence. For example, El Nazareno and José María Arguedas settlements in the San Juan de Miraflores (not to be confused with the wealthy Miraflores district in the center of the city) district were populated by migrants from Ayacucho, Apurímac, and Puno departments in the 1960s. After the devastating earthquake that destroyed the city of Yungay in 1971, many of its surviving residents settled in the San Silvestre shantytown in the San Juan de Lurigancho district. Many spatial and cultural characteristics of Yungay have been replicated in the neighborhood, including a reproduction of the Yungay central plaza and restaurants serving food typical of the area. This in turn attracts further migration to the area from Yungay. The Huanta neighborhood, also in San Juan de Lurigancho, was populated by migrants from the province of the same name – Huanta in the Ayacucho department – by Huantinos fleeing the political violence that nearly destroyed that area in the 1980s. Perhaps the most extreme example of this form of migration is that of the Chincho neighborhood in the Ate district, where nearly 100% of the inhabitants originated in the community of the same name in Huancavelica department, another area ravaged by political violence (Matos Mar, 2012). Even those residents from these communities who remain behind now had access to the state through the social and economic networks established by their community’s emigrants.
If we were to look at Andean indigenous spaces as representational spaces – lived spaces that represent the interests of those that occupy it; - and Lima as representation of space – an industrialized example of what the ideal modern capitalist Perú should strive to be; - then these Andes-Lima migrant networks represent the infinite lines of influence uniting representational spaces and representations of space occurring at the national level. As seen below, cultura achorada presents an example of spatial practice dialectically interacting to complete the conceptual triad. Through cultura achorada, urbanized Andean indígenas are integrated into capitalist structures and into the proletariat required for the nation to develop economically and industrialize. Attempts at “modernizing” Amazonian indígenas, for better or worse, did not begin until much later. Social movements, as discussed in Chapter VII, were largely shaped by these differing interactions.

Modernity through Cultura Achorada

Yet, to return to Davis’s (1999) conceptualizations of distance from the state, though geographic distances may have been shortened by migration, class and cultural distances from the state have fluctuated in ways which may counteract improvements in other dimensions. Acurio’s (1995) aforementioned analysis of cultura achorada is a profound example of this. The word achorado itself, a very Perú-specific slang term, is difficult to translate. It usually describes a normally shy or subservient person, suddenly becoming outspoken or aggressive. There is a connotation of behavior that is inappropriately out of place, or “uppity”. Acurio uses it to describe the culture that developed in Lima among the lower classes in the 1980s as a result of a combination of immigration into the city from the provinces and the new, closer interactions with criollo elites; and the general hopelessness brought about by economic chaos, political violence, and racism. This “pessimist and suspicious of life in society” culture seeks to provide a meeting point in the
“face of official mestizo culture, and parallel to chola and chicha⁴ cultures” (p. 43). Though this new culture seems to have developed as a representation of new urban spaces (confusingly, representational spaces in Lefebvrian terms), in reality cultura achorada is a consequence of economic and political forces that seek to further cement the subordinate position of once rural and agrarian Peruvian indígenas into a new, modern and urban industrial capitalist economic hierarchy. It is the culture of indígenas emerging into the urban working classes dominated by criollo and mestizo elites. In Berman’s experience of modernity terms, cultura achorada “bear[s] and drive[s] … people and institutions along an ever-expanding, drastically fluctuating capitalist world market” (p. 16). As Acurio states, cultura achorada is:

popular among the young who, not yet being situated in the inner workings of the social power dynamics of adult life, find in it license to create an illusion of navigating, using a common language, among society’s different sectors and cultures, without assuming a definite social position.

In adult life, on the other hand, where class differences are imposed, cultura achorada, outside of performing practical and therapeutic functions, proves to be severely limited as a cultural meeting point. On the one hand, it is a culture that ignores collective memory: the achorado demonstrates a complete lack of interest in the ethnic, class, local or

⁴ The terms “cholo” and “chicha” also have complex meanings specific to the Peruvian context. “Cholo” is the derogatory name that is used to describe darker-skinned people who have emigrated to urban areas (as opposed to “indio” which is usually used to describe those who have remained in the Andes). It is used to denote both indigeneity, since most of those to whom the term applies are of Andean extraction, and class. Domestic workers are often called “cholas” and the expression “que cholo” is used to describe behaviors or characteristics that are indicative of an inability or unwillingness to adapt to urban (namely Lima) culture. The widespread use of the term has expanded to describe anything that is seen as in poor taste or of a lower class, regardless of whether that which the term is being applied to originated in the Andes. An example of this is the common affirmation that fútbol (soccer) is a “deporte de cholos”. Fútbol, popular among the lower classes and seen with disdain by elites, is largely played on the coast, with an overrepresentation of Afro-Peruvian players, not Andean ones. Only recently has the sport begun to be practiced away from the cities. “Chicha” is used similarly. Chicha is a traditional drink made of fermented corn which was ceremonially consumed by Incas before the arrival of Europeans, and which continues to be central to Andean rituals. As an example of the superficial centrality of Andean culture in the Peruvian national myth, chicha (along with pisco sour) is considered to be the Peruvian national drink, and is available throughout Perú. Yet, like “cholo”, “chicha” is also used to describe people or objects that are of a lower class or quality. “Chicha” music is a hybrid of traditional Andean huaynos and salsa music popular among the urban working classes. It is seen as the lowest level of culture in Perú and treated with disdain and mocked by elites. Low quality products such as inexpensive cell phones are known as “teléfonos chicha”. As this type of language permeates throughout Peruvian society, derogatory terms such as “achorado”, “cholo”, and “chicha” become almost interchangeable insults that have developed to describe the new Perú of massive (and modernizing) demographic changes.
regional histories of his community. On the other hand, this kind of culture does not offer individuals an optimistic vision of the collective future, and only offers tools for a minimal communication limited to the present, encouraging them to be satisfied with provisional cultural exchanges. Neither retrospective nor prospective, the achorada identity limits itself to facilitate a short-term and temporary coexistence (p. 45).

As an ineffective, temporary culture, cultura achorada only manages to further marginalize subordinate groups, arriving in Lima as displaced indígenas, and assimilating as exploited working and lower classes. In this way, cultura achorada further strengthens the hegemony of representations of space in shaping productions of space in a Lima-centered Peruvian society. No longer the campesinos represented by Velasco’s land-reform and not quite part of the urban working-class, new, mostly indigenous migrants to Peruvian cities created a temporary, ineffective culture that has permeated throughout marginal urban Perú. The modernizing qualities of urbanizing demographic changes has created this new class/culture hybrid which helps to maintain an appropriate distance from the state – short enough to maintain peace, yet large enough to maintain traditional sources of power intact.

The migration of Andeans to coastal cities has strengthened the networks connecting Andean indigenous spaces with modern urban spaces. These connections have been meaningful – neighborhoods such as San Silvestre, Huanta, and Chincho, which developed in the 1970s and 1980s in the arid hills on the outskirts of Lima, often closely replicated the social and economic relationships from their villages in the Andes. Distance from the state obviously shortened for migrants, who now had access to state institutions that were almost completely centralized in Lima. But it also shortened for those who stayed behind in the villages, as contact with their urbanized neighbors remained strong. As these networks solidify, and distance from the state shortens, the integration of Andean indigenous spaces into capitalist modes of productions also strengthens. In a similar way, and reflecting the longevity of Andean engagement with capitalist
structures, production of space theory seems to provide an increasingly powerful analytical framework from which to understand Andean spaces, especially as these continue to further interact with urban spaces. As an example of this, cultura achorada as spatial practice contributes to and facilitates the dialectic interactions of Andean indigenous spaces as representational spaces and coastal, urban, modernizing representations of space. In doing so, it facilitates the incorporation of Andean indigenous spaces into the national development project. This, in turn, has shaped the way in which Andean resistance movements developed.
CHAPTER VII

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

In helping to integrate Andean indigeneity with urban criollo spaces, cultura achorada works to more intricately weave Andean indígenas into capitalist structures. It represents the latest cultural development in response to the continued negotiations between capital and indigenous interests. As ubiquitous as Acurio argues cultura achorada is in the Andes and poorer coastal districts, it is almost entirely absent from Amazonian indigenous spaces. Rates of migration to large cities of Amazonian indígenas are much lower than those of Andeans. With the possible exception of Chiclayo, communities of Amazonian indígenas large enough to constitute a functional enclave have not developed in urban Perú. As a result, the cultural artifacts such as cultura achorada which facilitate integration of Andean indigenous spaces into the national capitalist economy, have not developed in Amazonia. The hundreds of years of interaction and conflict between capital and Andean indigeneity that have shaped Andean social movements are also absent in Amazonia. Amazonian indigenous social movements will therefore be shaped by different spatial productions than Andean movements.

As the 1980s exploded into violent political conflict, Amazonian indígenas barely participated. Instead, their introduction into capitalist spaces occurred suddenly and violently, and only much later when global economic fluctuations made the area’s natural resources profitable. Having never significantly engaged with capitalist structures, Amazonian indigenous movements cannot, like Andean movements, be said to be pro- or anit-capitalist. These, until now have been extra-capitalist spaces. The Baguazo, and other conflicts that encompass a nascent interaction with capitalism have turned Amazonian extra-capitalist spaces into indigenous capitalist-emergent
spaces. Their contributions to spatial production should be analyzed from that perspective not from that of Amazonian indigenous spaces as representational spaces.

MODERNITY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Ineffective or non-existent state interventions, combined with an absence of political parties to serve as a conduit between indigenous interests and the state, contributed to the creation of a temporally and spatially specific context in which social movements developed and collided with the Peruvian status quo. In the Andes, the process of modernization occurred at a time of increased access to the state provided by the Velasco regime. As the Bermúdez regime sought to undo many of Velasco’s policies, Andean social movements reflected a class-based reaction to class-based state impositions. Though Andean indígenas had been provided increased access to the state, this access was enjoyed as a socio-economic class modernizing into the capitalist economic structure, not as an indígena identity group. This introduced further contradictions into already problematic policies. It also facilitated the shaping of Andean social movements with the return to democracy. Movements such as Shining Path, though taking place in indigenous Andean areas, and claiming to represent the interests of indígenas in those areas, were strictly class-based, and violently forbade any identity-based interpretations of social situations that went beyond orthodox Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine. As much as Shining Path’s influence was strongest among Quechua-speaking indígenas in the southern Andes, their ideology represented the increasing influence of foreign philosophies. Shining Path developed as radicalized professors, with degrees received from the best universities in Perú’s largest cities organized and influenced indigenous students who have travelled to the city hoping for upward mobility. In many ways, Shining Path were the ultimate achorados.
In order to be able to analyze and theorize the spatial characteristics of specific Andean and Amazonian social movements in Perú it is necessary to first place them in the context of social movement theory. This will in turn inform the proposal for an amendment to production of space theories to include capitalist-emergent spaces.

Social movement theories can be roughly placed into two frameworks: New Social Movements (NSM) and Political Opportunity Structure (POS). New Social Movements theory emerged in Post-War Europe and conceptualized social movement activists as seeking autonomy from state institutions and formal political processes. As Europe recovered from the violence and socio-political chaos of the first half of the 20th century, governments sought to develop economic and social prosperity and political stability. This construction of welfare states that made it the responsibility of governments to meet the basic needs of the population was achieved through the semi-corporatist cooperation of organized labor with the state. This reinforced the working class’s loyalty and political allegiance to the state. As state mismanagement led to growing political disillusionment, social movements developed around an understanding that the state and labor stood on one side of the struggle while citizens without primarily working-class allegiances who were organized not in parties or unions, but in independent organizations of civil society, stood on the other. As a result, NSM sees civil society and the state as two distinct, oppositional spheres. Any social movement in opposition to the state would therefore be located in civil society (Davis, 1999).

The Political Opportunity Structure (POS) framework developed in North America as a reflection of the civil rights movement. POS sees social movement activists as seeking citizenship rights and inclusion in the state system, not to work outside of it. Unlike Western European social movements, the state and the formal political system were not seen as the target
for resistance. Instead, participation and access to the state and the formal political system was seen as the object of social mobilization for many activists as they struggled to get state actors and institutions involved in creating social conditions for a more just and democratic society. In Western Europe, a strong and benevolent state was already attempting to achieve these goals. When the practical realities did not match the idealistic goals of the official rhetoric, the state was the clear object of resistance. In the United States, the state was much more decentralized. Social welfare was not seen as a state function, but a private responsibility. The extreme inequalities this system produced and the failure to protect the basic civil rights of significant portions of the population were judged to be a consequence of the liberalization of the market. The primary goals of North American movements were therefore to struggle for a more socially benevolent and responsive state that would offer protection from the whims of rampant capitalist market economics by seeking to exploit political opportunities to enter the existing state structure (Davis, 1999).

Where do Amazonian social movements fit into these conceptual frameworks? The short answer is that they do not. Amazonian indigenous movements at their most basic definitions are neither Western European, nor North American. As a result, many of the assumptions that facilitate NSM and POS theorizations do not hold true for these mobilizations. It is important to first place these movements in the Latin American context before analyzing their more specifically local characteristics.

As mentioned above, NSM locates social movements in civil society. In doing so, the state and civil society are considered two distinct, oppositional spheres. In Latin America, where there is much less conceptual differentiation between state and societal spheres, this is clearly not the case. State and class/civic structures have been historically embedded in each other in Latin
America. Many social actors such as teachers and public-sector employees are also state actors, as evidenced by the central participation of state employees in even the most radical social movements such as the Shining Path. The key distinction in Latin America is between elites and the masses (Eckstein, 2001). This distinction crosses state/society divisions. Understanding Latin American social movements therefore requires a theoretical framework that acknowledges these dual identities and conceptually encompasses both state and civil society simultaneously instead of pitting them against each other.

The POS framework assumes that social movements seek opportunities to provoke the state to act and respond to demands. This framework was formulated in a context (the United States) of a heavily decentralized, democratic state, where local interests (or at least the interests of those that held local power) needed to be met in order to ensure political longevity. Movements, such as the civil rights movement and student movements of the 1960s, sought to enter this existing structure since this political participation in the existing structure was thought to be the vehicle through which movement goals could be achieved.

As has been discussed, however, Latin American democracy is quite different from that of the United States. Until very recently, most democratic systems in Latin America were quite precarious. After the almost ubiquitous military governments that in most countries ruled until at least the 1980s, the democratic systems that replaced them were highly authoritarian, deeply centralized, and hardly representative. Movements in Latin America that sought entrance in the existing democratic system (a democracy that returned at an entirely different stage in global capitalist development than in Europe) could hardly expect that this would lead to the representativeness necessary to achieve movement goals as POS would claim. This is particularly true when the movement is indigenous in character.
Escobar and Alvarez (1992) analyze the practical implications of applying NSM and POS theories to the Latin American context. In the most simplistic terms, they argue, Latin American social movements could more readily be classified as fitting the NSM model. Latin American movements of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s sought to overthrow authoritarian military governments. This fits into the NSM model where movements are placed firmly within a civil society completely separated from and in direct conflict with the state apparatus. Yet even these movements differed from the classical European movements that led to the formulation of NSM theory in very significant ways. Post-war European movements sought to depose democratically elected governments that were ineffective and corrupt, but also, at least in theory, populist welfare states. These movements derived their resistive power from a rigidly ideological (Marxist, Trotskyist, Anarchist, and/or Maoist) anti-capitalist base. Pre-1980s Latin American social movements sought to overthrow not welfare states but authoritarian, largely fascist governments. While these movements were largely located in civil society, the only ideological requirement necessary to oppose the state was anti-fascism. The ideology of these movements ranged from Marxist (Tupamaros or Uruguay, MIR of Chile), Trotskyist (PRT/ERP of Argentina), and Maoist (MOIR of Colombia), to the Peronismo of Argentina’s Montoneros (a volatile mixture of Marxism, Catholicism, Nationalism and, ironically, Fascism). Yet these movements, unlike European ones, “derived their power not so much from opposing the state as by the fact that the state has systematically opposed them” (Calderon, Piscitelli and Reyna, 1992). Though pre-1980s Latin American movements were largely at least influenced by some form of Marxist ideology, their main motivation was anti-authoritarianism. This is clearly evidenced by Peruvian movements against the Velasco regime of the late 1960s and 1970s.
These movements sought to depose this government because of its anti-democratic authoritarianism and not for their economic policies, which were often anti-capitalist themselves.

Latin American movements fit even less comfortably with the POS framework. POS theories claim that social movements seek to exploit political opportunities as they present themselves in evolving state systems. Most authoritarian states in 1960s, 1970s and 1980s Latin America offered few, if any, political opportunities for social movements to exploit. The very act of seeking political opportunities to exploit was interpreted as an effort to overthrow existing regimes, and was repressed as such. Even after the return to democracy, ineffective states and/or weak political parties limited political opportunities.

It is therefore clear that both NSM and POS are inadequate frameworks from which to analyze and theorize Latin American social movements. Latin American social movements are not strictly located in civic society as NSM theory would insist, and they do not necessarily seek to destroy existing state structures. Neither do they necessarily seek to participate in democratic structures, as POS theory argues. Perhaps Latin American movements seek autonomy from existing democratic structures, not their overthrow, and perhaps they seek to change these systems, not opportunities to engage their responsiveness. What is clear is the need for a further theorization of Latin American social movements.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

The arrival of democracy (at least nominally) to most Latin American countries in the 1980s forced social movements to seek new ways of operating. Similarly, the way in which POS and NSM theories could be used to interpret them became increasingly complex and inadequate.
Democracy provides, in theory, political opportunity. However, the unique Latin American context disqualifies it from being adequately interpreted by POS for two reasons. First, democracy means something entirely different in Latin America. The fluctuations of democratic consolidation have taken a very different path than in the global north. The legacy of colonialism continues to permeate social and economic life. The indigenous identity (and corresponding “othering”) of large portions of the population mean that the “colonies” to be exploited by a hegemonic power are now territories within national borders. Firmly in the Wallerstinian periphery, Perú is expected to provide raw materials for global capitalist development. As a result, the democracy that supposedly serves the interests of citizens, instead represents the interests of globalized capital looking for new sources of raw materials and new markets onto which to invest overaccumulations. Second, Latin America is entering into the capitalist system at an entirely different time and an entirely different stage of capitalist development than those places whose social movements led to the formulation of POS and NSM. Latin American spaces are resisting a very different version of capitalism. A social movement like the one that culminated in the Baguazo in 2009, occurring in the specific time and place where it occurred, seeks to both enter the state and resist against it: the Baguazo sought to gain representation by the state so that autonomy from it could be officially recognized.

The conflict that culminated in the Baguazo was in essence a legal conflict. AIDESEP had organized indigenous resistance based on a legal argument regarding the unconstitutionality of laws that had recently been passed to circumvent previous protections. The Baguazo was an outcry to be allowed to have a voice in national conversations – a very POS-sounding goal. Yet the outcry seeks mainly to pressure the state to simply follow its own laws, and for legislation and enforcement to service the needs of the people, not of capital, which is indicative of NSM.
As a result, indigenous social movements in the Peruvian Amazon take on the characteristics of both POS and NSM, and also contradict both of them. A new social movement theory that encompasses indigenous movements needs to be formulated.

*Social Movements in the National Scale*

In order to better formulate indigenous social movements, one needs to explore contexts that are more local than Latin America. On a national scale, a leftist military government followed by Maoist insurrection of Shining Path fits quite well in the NSM framework. As Andean movements became entangled in the contradictions of nationalist sentiments and violent cultural revolution that sought to overthrow the state, the nation was embarking on a project of modernization that sought to cement Peru’s place in the world economy. The violence of these revolutionary movements was matched only by the violence of the government’s repression. As the strength and influence of these movements waned, state policy became increasingly neoliberal. The difference from the European context is that Latin America is not entering the capitalist market led by a welfare state, in a pre-Cold War world where socialist influences were seen as the antidote to fascism and widely accepted. Latin America emerged into the post-colonial world system in the middle of the cold war when any socialist influence was shunned and Latin America became the grounds for hyper-capitalist socioeconomic experiments led by the United States. Added to the equation is a deeply engrained racism that permeates every aspect of society and facilitates the implementation of capitalist exploitations. Unlike Argentina and Chile, among others, Peru was not led into this hyper-capitalist system by U.S. backed military regimes. Instead, Peru sought to enter this system led by weak, nominally democratic governments which arguably succeeded in implementing neoliberal privatizations only when
they bordered on an authoritarianism that exploited complex identity politics. How, then, can we analyze the social movements that led to the Baguazo?

We have established that even as geographic distance between the Andes and the state was decreased by urban migration and the social networks resulting from these demographic shifts, the class and cultural distances from the state increased as part of the modernization process. Despite this, Andean spaces were well integrated into capitalist structures and spatial productions. The situation for Amazonian indígenas is decidedly more isolated. Geographic distance from the state is greater. Much of the Amazon basin is, in terms in transportation, virtually cut-off from the rest of the country. Though the Federico Basadre road to Pucallpa, the capital of the Amazonian department of Ucayali, was built in 1940, it is still in the process of being paved. Even the stretches that are asphalted are frequently washed away by landslides and heavy rains. The same is true of the aforementioned road to Santa María de Nieva in the department of Amazonas. The highway to Puerto Maldonado, the capital of Madre de Dios department in the southern Amazon was completed in 2010. Though its quality has improved in the past few years, the city is still about 10 hours away from Cuzco, the nearest major city. Beyond those options, access to the Peruvian Amazon is limited to airports in Iquitos, Puerto Maldonado, Pucallpa and Tarapoto, the few highways already mentioned, and riverboats.

Though migration from the Amazon to Lima and other large cities has increased, it has been at a rate much lower than Andean migrations. Whatever migration has occurred is more likely to have been to Amazonian cities than to Lima or other coastal cities that represent the centers of Peruvian contemporary development and growth. Iquitos has more than doubled in population since 1981, though much of this growth is likely composed of non-Amazonian immigrants. Pucallpa’s population has more than tripled in the same period, with more than half of this city’s
immigrants coming from the coast or the Andes. Though very little information exists about the
migration patterns of Amazonian indígenas into Peruvian cities, their continued geographic
isolation and small numbers mean that even as urbanization increases, the critical mass that
allowed Andean urban migrants to reduce distance from the state on multiple levels is not likely
to materialize outside of small provincial capitals such as Santa Maria de Nieva. In addition, the
hybrid cultura achorada that developed in Peruvian cities as Andean immigration increased was
not adopted by Amazonian indígenas, who stayed in their ancestral lands or more accessible
cities at higher rates.

Cultura achorada, as exploitative and perpetuating of capitalist interests as it may be, is certainly
a change from the one-directional cultural hegemony of criollo elites. In contrast to a national
culture firmly entrenched in colonialism where largely inaccessible criollo elite culture was the
only acceptable alternative, Acurio (1995) found that:

Thanks to a psychological defense mechanism, with cultura achorada people feel secure in themselves, uninhibited and direct, without fear of existing hierarchies and freer to
determine their own social lives, which helps them in an almost therapeutic way to
cohabit daily with social taboos and gender, race and class violence. Because of this,
certain aspects of cultura achorada have recently expanded from the disadvantaged
sectors to the entire society, creating certain shared behavioral norms, especially a certain
uniformity of language, humor or music (for example salsa), which is intensely
encouraged by the media (p. 45).

In the end, cultura achorada served to introduce non-indigenous disadvantaged groups into
exploitative (and still racist) cultural artifacts that only worked to perpetuate colonialist
hegemonies. Traces of cultura achorada and its colonialist consequences can be clearly seen in
the development of the Shining Path and other, largely Andean social movements. The
connective tissue it provided with large Peruvian cities and beyond was sturdy enough to also
shape the resistance movements that developed in the Andes. Though SL developed in the
isolated city of Ayacucho, the Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist ideologies it espoused had arrived in
Ayacucho from Eastern Europe and China via elite universities in Lima and Arequipa. It is evidence that Andean social movements, like Andean spatial productions, are quite intricately connected to national urban social processes and international political ideologies. This connectivity has been almost entirely absent in the Amazon.

**SUMMARY**

The Production of Space theory was formulated by Lefebvre in a context of prolonged interaction between the people and capital. Having endured the implications of industrialization, classical and neoclassical economics and their implementations onto society, the interactions among representations of space, representational spaces and spatial practice reflect the capitalist structures they form an integral part of, whether in resistance or collaboration. Though Latin American and in particular indigenous spaces have experienced very different histories and interactions with capitalism, they are still being encroached upon by a stubbornly aspatial capitalist development that seeks to impose its latest stage of expansion while ignoring the characteristics of the spaces it is trying to integrate. Though the influence of capital is powerful and its strength continues to increase, the unique spatial characteristics observed in indigenous Amazonia have complicated the introduction of extra-capitalist spaces into capitalist structures. In Amazonian indigenous spatial productions driven by unique nature-society relationships, indigenous identity constructions, and autonomous productions of scale, this interaction with capital will differ drastically from that which occurs with spaces that have long engaged with capitalism. Andean spaces, having communed with capitalism since colonial times, provide an example of capitalist-integrated spaces. As such, production of space provides a powerful framework from which to understand Andean spaces. Amazonian spaces, however, with their distinctive history and relationships with the state and political parties, and their enduring
physical and cultural isolation, have only recently begun their engagement with capital. In order to understand the productions of indigenous spaces, particularly as those are meaningfully introduced to capital, it is necessary to theorize that point of entry. To do so, indigenous spaces and their entry into capitalist structures must be analyzed not as representational spaces, but rather as indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces.
SECTION III
FROM TRIAD TO TETRAD: EXTRACTIVE IMPERIALISM AND INDIGENOUS CAPITALIST-EMERGENT SPACES

The context of the transition of Amazonian indigenous spaces from extra-capitalist spaces to capitalist-emergent spaces was most meaningfully constructed by Fujimori and his policies. Fujimori seemed as surprised as anyone by his successful run. In his search for advisors to add substance to the superficial noise his campaign had been based on, Fujimori found Hernando de Soto.

De Soto, a prominent economist with extensive international contacts, had served as Vargas-Llosa’s economic advisor during the election. He had written the influential book “El Otro Sendero” (1986) in which he argued that the most effective antidote to the growth of the Shining Path would be the introduction of indigenous and poor people, particularly those in areas most affected by the violent insurgents, into the national capitalist economy. This was to be done through the official recognition of indigenous peoples as part of the nation, whose identity and existence was to be respected and protected. This official recognition, not as an economic class of campesinos as Velasco argued, but as an ethnically based identity group, would facilitate the privatization of the raw materials present in many indigenous areas. Much like the proletarianization of Andean indígenas by shifting their ethnic identity to one based on social class, the official recognition of Amazonian indígenas as comunidades nativas swiftly introduced them into the national capitalist structure.

Having important contacts in the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the United Nations, de Soto argued that the private and international exploitation of natural resources would
spark the economic growth necessary for Perú’s development. It is in this context of extreme privatization and a globalizing economy increasingly shaped by international organizations pushing the agenda of ever-larger corporate conglomerates that Amazonian indígenas began the capitalist modernization project and entered into the national and international productive structures. The new de Soto-influenced strategy by which to navigate this introduction is well-defined by what Veltmeyer and Petras (2014) have termed “extractive imperialism”.

Peruvian Amazonian indígenas in the early 1990s found themselves largely isolated from a nation mired in chaos. The violence of the Shining Path and MRTA movements and of the government’s reactions to them resulted in a civil society that was neither free nor lively. The abject failure of traditional political parties in representing the interests of anyone produced a deep institutional crisis. The clientelism and corruption of the García government had left the state bureaucracy in chaos, while astronomical inflation and international isolation posed a serious challenge to institutionalized economic society. Political violence, rising crime rates and institutionalized corruption meant that the rule of law was largely non-existent. In the ten years since the end of the military regime, Peruvian democracy was deeply troubled.

Despite this precarious situation (or perhaps because of it), democracy and the disorder that ensued in its implementation and consolidation had hardly affected Amazonian indígenas. With the notable exception of the Asháninka community in the central Junín and Ucayali departments, the violence of the Shining Path and MRTA had very little direct impact on Amazonian indígenas. The insurgent groups were almost exclusively active in the Andes and in coastal cities – even the eventual spread of political violence into the coca growing areas in Huánuco and San Martín departments affected mostly colonos who had been encouraged to settle in these areas from the Andes. Political parties had also always ignored Amazonian indígenas. As the country attempted to industrialize, AP, APRA and IU were all almost exclusively concerned with urban workers and elites. The geographic, institutional, class and cultural distance of Amazonian indígenas from the state meant that courting them resulted in very limited political gains for established parties. As could be expected, the state bureaucracy and the rule of law were also
entirely absent. Most importantly, Amazonian indígenas had never been a part of the institutionalized national economic society, except when the natural resources available in the Amazon became valuable, as exemplified by settlement, exploitation and interest during the rubber boom, and isolation and neglect after the rubber bust. As Greene (2006) states:

native peoples from tropical hunting-gathering societies have always been defined by the racial categories of European colonialism, never to be temporarily ‘promoted’ to a class in Marxist modernisation terms. Highly decentralised forms of political organisation, forested environments, an often greater detachment from the colonising/modernising frontier, and the occasional presence of visual signs of ‘Indianness’ (nakedness, body paint, adornments, etc.) made them the obvious targets for the ‘civilised’ world’s racial scorn (p. 332).

With these clear exclusions in mind, it becomes clear that Amazonian indigenous resistance movements developed differently for two reasons. On the one hand, the temporal stage of capital development at which Amazonian indígenas were introduced into production structures – namely a post-neoliberal extractive imperialist stage was key in shaping the resistance. On the other, the produced spaces where these temporal “simultaneities intervene, extending our point of view outward in an infinite number of lines connecting the subject to a whole world of comparable instances, complicating the temporal flow of meaning, short-circuiting the fabulous stringing-out of ‘one damned thing or another’” (Soja, 1989, p. 23) – were also instrumental in the development of indigenous social movements.

The Perú of 1990 was poised to enter the neoliberal machine after decades of isolationism and corruption. Rich in natural resources, the nation continued to struggle with political violence and instability as well as economic chaos. As Fujimori struggled to find a sensible economic plan, he turned to his opponent’s advisor, Hernando de Soto, whose ideas turned Fujimori’s populist leanings into a privatizing, neoliberal machine that would reintroduce Perú into global economic networks driven by multi-national organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF.
De Soto understood the stage in global capitalist development that Perú was being introduced, and how it could play an integral role in addressing the contemporary conditions that created a crisis. The global neoliberalism of the 1970s had created a massive demand for natural resources. The rising prices of natural resources in emerging industrializing economies led to a demand for new pre-capitalist areas to exploit. This led to a global period of imperialist “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2003). In this period, global economic powers materially and militarily supported governments throughout the periphery that were friendly to Washington Consensus policies. Uncooperative governments were sabotaged or forcibly removed (i.e. Guatemala, Chile, Brazil). As Veltmeyer and Petras state: “The 1970s could be viewed as a period of transition from state-led capitalist development to a new world order of free market capitalist and neoliberal globalization” (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014, p. 8). This new world order allowed for the commodification and privatization of national lands that could potentially hold the natural resources that could ease the crisis unleashed by increased demand. Peripheral states, as managers of common lands, became the facilitators of these privatizations. Hardt and Negri (2000) argue that during this time, the role of the state was weakened greatly by the new centralization of power to capital. As increasing amounts of capital were necessary for ever larger acquisitions of the commons and for the industrialization of new markets, the multinational corporation provided the resources necessary to privatize the world. National governments no longer functioned to lead capitalist development and provide social welfare. Instead, the role of the government became to facilitate the consolidation of power by multinational companies. Unattached to any nation, and with institutional support from global-scale Bretton Woods organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, multinational corporations became the new imperialist power.
THE SCALES OF EXTRACTIVE IMPERIALISM – NATION AND STATE SERVE THE MARKET

While Chile, Brazil, Argentina and Southeast Asia (among others) provided the willing laboratories to test the neoliberal experiment, Perú spent the early 1970s under a leftist military regime that led capitalist development efforts. The Bermúdez regime that followed from 1976 to 1980 attempted to introduce Perú to the global neoliberal machine, but was impeded by the empowered labor unions and leftist parties. The return to democracy under the reformist Belaúnde was also somewhat anachronistic as it attempted to slowly privatize while continuing to provide some of the social basics that had been first guaranteed by Velasco’s policies. As democracy tentatively attempted to consolidate in Perú, the rest of the world was liberalizing at break-neck speed. García’s isolationist policies further distanced Perú from global economic trends.

By the time Perú was ready to play along with global forces, the resource demand crisis had already created a critical contradiction in the neoliberal stage of capitalist development. Despite the claims of development (and the reconceptualization of the meaning of development), the inequalities created by the neoliberal order had quickly become unsustainable. Perú provided a perfect antidote – emerging from a decade of economic decline and social unrest, Perú contained a large Andean indigenous population in the early stages of proletarianization after further recent integration to the capitalist economic system by a Velasco regime which ended the essentially feudalist structures that organized Peruvian economic structures. Amazonian indígenas had not reached even this basic stage of proletarianization. A nation in crisis, with a government willing to cede its commons in exchange for the foreign capital that it hoped would spark development, and a supposedly malleable indigenous population ripe for proletarianization and exploitation
was an ideal new market for capital to expand into without the difficulties presented by nations further along in the capitalist development timeline and with their correspondingly formed social movements. Perú was the perfect place for a neo-imperialist version of accumulation by dispossession: extractive imperialism.

THE INDIGENEITY OF EXTRACTIVE IMPERIALISM – IDENTITY AS AN AGENT OF DEVELOPMENT AND PRIVATIZATION

The regional context in which Fujimori’s Perú found itself was one where rampant privatization had brought about unprecedented and unsustainable levels of inequality in Chile, Argentina, Brazil and elsewhere. The officialization of identities and ethnicity-based handouts of the Peruvian government offered a benign patina to the extreme shift in ideology and its painful consequences, while still opening the Peruvian market to privatization and exploitation. As Veltmeyer and Petras argue:

The reprimarization of Latin America’s economies began in the 1990s under the ‘structural reforms’ imposed by the new world order of neoliberal globalization. These reforms permitted governments in the region, both neoliberal and post-neoliberal, to exploit a comparative advantage in natural resources to increase exports and thus generate the foreign exchange and additional fiscal revenues needed to service their accumulated external debts, as well as to make some move towards a more inclusive form of development based on the post-Washington Consensus (PWC). Given the relatively low prices for primary commodities at the time, this did not happen, but the reforms did open up the region’s extractive industries to foreign investment (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014, p. 36).

As Andean and Amazonian indígenas celebrated their newly official existence and the decreasing distance from the state brought about by roads and schools, their ancestral lands and human labor were being commodified and primed for exploitation by foreign capital – all in the name of “development”.

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Despite the identity-based concessions and increasing infrastructural projects, the proletarianization of Amazonian indígenas was more difficult than was expected. The return of Perú into global capitalism after García’s isolationist policies occurred at a time when global-scale privatizations were ubiquitous throughout the developing world. Fujimori came to power only a year after, according to Veltmeyer and Petras (2012), the global development agency community “came to the conclusion that they had gone too far in the direction of unregulated market” (p. 38). The Fujishock economic restructuring implemented in 1990 represented the kind of policy that organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank had already concluded were counterproductive to development. Given the time – post-neoliberal, state-regulated massive privatization –; and the space – largely heretofore ignored places barely entering the capitalist structure –; Fujimori’s extractive imperialist project in the Amazon required a new ideology of development.

**DEVELOPMENT AS AN AGENT OF EXTRACTIVE IMPERIALISM**

The heretofore unexploited natural resources in the Amazon became key to Fujimori’s (via de Soto) neoliberal economic strategy which sought to overturn the isolationist policies of García’s first presidential term. Fujimori’s ethnicity and non-political past provided the “otherness” that could serve as the link with Amazonian indigenous groups necessary to more efficiently integrate them into the capitalist system. It didn’t matter that as a first-generation Peruvian, he was far from “indigenous”. His cultural distance from the Peruvian political and economic elites that had driven the country into chaos was seen as a point of agreement. This, combined with infrastructural projects such as schools and roads, and frequent “flash” visits in the government helicopter to isolated villages that had never been visited by a President before, allowed Fujimori to enjoy (and continue to currently enjoy) support throughout the Peruvian Amazon, even while
enacting and implementing policies that were particularly harmful to his very supporters. In a
cultural manifestation of the spatial fix, and under the guise of development, building schools
allowed him to deliver a more skilled, and still very cheap labor force for extractive companies
to exploit. Road construction opened new markets and encouraged urbanization, further
widening the rift between indigenous youth and traditional ways of living. Even as “Amazonian
natives achieved their most tangible territorial victories since the Velasco era” (Greene, 2006, p.
356) during Fujimori’s regime, this served to enclose indigenous spaces and commodify them for
future consumption, further introducing them into capitalist and extractive imperialist social
structures. As popular as his measures were in the Amazon, they very clearly served the interests
of the extractive industry that new World Bank- and IMF-approved policies hoped to attract.
The central question of the new development was not whether to plunder or civilize, but how to
civilize to plunder.

Pre- (or extra-) capitalist indigenous spaces are being brought into the capitalist structure for
different reasons than traditional imperialism, with the ideological aid of classical neoclassical
economics, had. These reasons are not, as DeSoto would argue, to officially introduce them into
the state and thereby provide them with the opportunity to participate fully and on equal footing
in the economy and benefit from state services. In the Fujimori and post-Fujimori neo-liberal
world order of rampant privatizations, this entrance into capitalist structures was hardly on equal
footing, and the promised state services were largely non-existent. An update on traditional
imperialism, extractive imperialism is a new strategy that addresses the contradictions introduced
by the previously implemented stages of global capitalist development (classical economics
followed by Keynesian economics) by introducing new populations and spaces into a structure
that serves capital accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003):
Our first insight into the capitalist development process is that the incorporation of non-capitalist social formations into the orbit of capital (the subordination of the subject population to the dictates of capital, and the active intervention of the state and the projection of imperial power) is a fundamental feature of the process. Imperialism, as a geopolitical project based on the agency of the imperial state – the projection of its power on behalf of and in support of capital – is a key pillar of the capitalist system, as vital to its expansion and development as are private property, capital-labor relations, the market and the state apparatus itself. We suggest that extractive imperialism in the current context has turbocharged the engine of capitalist development in the region, creating conditions for another period of accumulation by large-scale, long-term foreign investments following dispossession (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014, p. 5).

The stage was set for the implementation of a new extractive imperialist ideology that could potentially address the contradictions to capitalism introduced by rampant privatizations and market-centered policies. These policies created crisis-level global inequalities. The economic and development gaps between core and periphery countries in the 1990s were unprecedented. The capitalist crisis this created resulted in a shifting epicenter of economic growth from Europe and the United States to the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries. This shift required the exploitation of natural resources in less-powerful periphery countries. The relative economic growth in these peripheral nations created new emerging consumerist markets and it increased the consumer power of growing urban elites. Meanwhile, in the hinterland, extraction simultaneously destroyed environments that were central to traditional indigenous ways of life, while forcing indígenas into the new capitalist economic structures by either integrating them into the extractive process itself, or pushing them to urban areas to seek economic opportunities no longer available in their traditional homelands. The new conceptualization of development – namely the introduction of a consumerism that can only be satisfied by urbanization and entry into the extractive economic system – was centered on the idea of “inclusionary state activism” (Arbix and Martin, 2010, p. 7) which saw the exploitation of natural resources as a catalyst of development and therefore benign. The environmental destruction and disruption of traditional indigenous ways of living was occluded by the superficial identity concessions offered by
increasingly indigenista governments. The only “inclusionary” aspect of this new state activism is that previously ignored and excluded indígenas are now being integrated into the economic structures that address the global capitalist crises introduced by the Washington Consensus. This post-neoliberalism “views resource extraction as a matter of the state’s capacity to regulate the operations of the mining and oil companies, to extract a better deal from these agencies of global capital, and to hold the companies accountable for the environmental and social impacts of their operations” (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014, p. 27). Yet, in a state that increasingly privatizes social welfare, promotes superficial identity politics, consumerizes and destroys traditional cultures, and depends on privately-led and IMF and World Bank-supported economic growth schemes that benefit international and multi-national corporations, state regulation of mining and oil company operations is counter-productive to the role it is supposed to play in the world-economic order. As a result, legislation and legal enforcement, as seen in Chapter III, addresses the interests of multinational corporations. According to the treadmill of crime theory (Stretesky, Long, and Lynch, 2014), the capitalist state is promoting ecological disorganization and therefore is criminal itself. Instead, under the guise of “inclusive state activism”, the post-neoliberal world order, or as Veltmeyer and Petras (2014) call it – “extractive imperialist” order – promotes the superficial identity politics and unrealistic promises of privately-funded social welfare programs to facilitate the proletarianization of newly integrated indígenas and their exploitation for the benefit of international capital.

Extractive imperialism in the Field – Amulpash

We arrived in Amulpash in early April. It was where our driver decided to stop for breakfast on our way to Santa María de Nieva from Bagua. The capital of the Imaza district in Northern Bagua province, Amulpash has around 2000 inhabitants. I was interested in visiting Amulpash
since it was the site of a large oil spill in January of 2016. A pipeline operated by PetroPeru, the national oil company, burst a few kilometers upriver from the town, spilling over 2000 barrels of oil into the Amulpash and Marañon Rivers. The town straddles the highway leading to Santa María de Nieva. At its center, Amulpash, looks like a typical colono village in the jungle – a small plaza radiates from the highway, bounded by a church and larger homes stretching two blocks from the main road. Though colono towns in this area could never be accused of being attractive or comfortable, Amulpash in early 2016 was a particularly difficult town. Commercial activity predictably centered around the main road. The heavy rains typical of the wet season had turned the areas separating the main road from the various restaurants that had opened in garages and private homes into a thick mud that covered everything. It was mid-morning when we arrived, but there was a great deal of movement. Workers, brought to Amulpash by PetroPeru to manage the clean-up travelled through the area in large SUVs, walking through town in sturdy rubber boots. Gas masks, a protection against the toxic fumes emanating from the spilled oil, hung from their necks as they navigated the endless mud. PetroPeru workers often spent the entire day in Amulpash, travelling back and forth between the clean-up sites and the eateries on the roadside and heading back to the more acceptable hotels in Bagua for the night. Restaurant food is not cheap in Amulpash. Most ingredients not locally grown have to be transported into town at high cost. There is almost always no more than one choice – guiso de pollo – available, even at breakfast-time. The restaurant where we stopped opened directly onto a mud-pit that separated it from the road. The kitchen and dining area were separated by a short counter. Like many structures in the Amazon, the transition between inside and outside was largely seamless. Given the new traffic driven by the clean-up in Amulpash, this meant that mud seeped into everything, covering the white plastic tables and chairs in the dining area and the
food being cooked in the kitchen. Menacing and relentless insects and stray dogs roamed
aimlessly about, contributing to the unsanitary conditions. I had at this point travelled through
various towns and villages in the area. Most of these had been more isolated than Amulpash and
had less access to services such as running water and electricity. Yet in no place did I feel as
unsafe eating as I did in Amulpash. Despite this, the cost of the food made it prohibitive for
anyone other than PetroPeru workers and researchers such as ourselves. The areas on the edge
of the town were clearly inhabited by indigenous families. The architecture of the homes was
more traditionally indigenous, with grass roofs and elevated foundations to keep flood waters at
bay during the rainy season. Here one could observe indigenous clean-up workers who had been
picked up in their villages deeper in the jungle and brought to Amulpash for the day. Tellingly,
these workers were largely barefoot, though some wore long-pants and running shoes, likely
provided by PetroPeru. Unlike the PetroPeru workers, the indigenous workers had no gas masks,
having instead to make do with flimsy surgical masks. Eusebio, a 19-year-old from a small
village about 45 minutes upriver explained the process by which he ended up in Amulpash.
“The spill hit close to my village. Luckily, we noticed there was something wrong with the
water before too many of us got sick. PetroPeru came by and reassured us that everything was
going to be fine. But we ‘commune’ with the water, and we knew right away that things were
not going to be fine. Of course we were angry. We’ve been angry for a long time. They keep
talking about progress and development, but the only progress we’ve seen is problems. Still we
were fine before all of this happened. We had food, we had our neighbors. The outsiders mostly
left us alone. Then when this happened they began coming by offering to pay us to help clean
up. By that point we were running out of food, and the water was unusable. So we didn’t have
much choice but to go clean up and hope that this would provide us with what we needed to eat.
They give us 20 soles\(^5\) for every barrel of oil we bring out from the river. That’s not bad, but you have to realize that this is the money we need to survive now. Before, our work produced food for the community. Now they give us money for our work and we have to trade that for food. It’s a very strange process. You’ve noticed that we can’t eat in Amulpash – we’d be trading all our money for food. And that’s not our food, it’s city food. It’s dirty and has nothing to do with what we know to eat. So we eat out here, where our brothers and sisters feed us.

They understand that for each one of us working here there are three or four more in the village that no longer know how they will feed themselves.” Marcos*, a man of about 40 from a village in Condorcanqui, adds: “In Amulpash, they only care about the money they can make. A lot of those people used to live in the village. But with the road being finished and all of these people coming in from the outside, they’ve become used to a different way of life. Now they sell the same things they used to share for money, and they can go to Nieva or Bagua and buy things they can use to make even more money. Instead of going to the village, they go to town. Now a lot of those people don’t have the same feeling they did when they went to the village. They’ve forgotten how to live in community. Now, without the oil companies, they’re nothing.” At this point I ask what PetroPeru has given to the community. It is here that I experience my positionality in the face of the distrust of outsiders the Awajún are known for. Up here, in these circumstances, the phrase “independent researcher” is meaningless. On the front-line delineating international capitalist interests and indigeneity, everyone must take a side. Their response to my question is stoic and questioning. “Usted sabrá” (you must know) Eusebio responds, interestingly switching back to formal Spanish. When I suggestively point at the surgical masks hanging from their necks, they both smile. “Yes they gave us these,” Eusebio chuckles, showing

\(^{\text{5}}\) About $6.00
me the two tell-tale dark spots where the mask protects the nostrils, “you know some of us wake up in the middle of the night choking from the fumes.” Marcos steps away for a moment and returns with a short but powerfully built man seemingly in his 30s. “Don’t forget this” Marcos says, lifting the other man’s shirt to show a painful looking rash that has spread across his abdomen. “The shaman in the village had no idea what to do with this. We took him to the doctor in town, but he would do nothing without money, so we’re trying to get that together.” Eusebio chimes in “when I was a kid my older brothers and sisters went to Curva del Diablo to fight against what they were doing to our lands.” He is referring here to the Baguazo of 2009. “I was just a kid then, didn’t understand anything. Some people around town and in school said that the oil companies would bring progress and development. And you heard everyone say ‘we want progress, but not like this’. But what is this progress? What is this development? The only development I’ve seen has brought us hunger and sickness. The river used to be life and now it smells like death. So you tell me, sir (back to usted), what is this progress that my people want so badly?” As he’s eloquently posing his question, I flash back to a news interview with Alberto Pizango, leader of AIDESEP during the standoff on the Curva del Diablo that culminated in the Baguazo. In the interview, Mariella Balbi, a prominent journalist for Perú’s main newspaper, El Comercio, interrogates Pizango in quite a hostile manner about the indigenous occupation and blockage of the roadway that connected the oil wells with the city of Bagua in May 2009:

Balbi: “Lima could collapse and lose electrical power. You will not call back the order to forcefully occupy the roadway?”

Pizango: “This situation may not have developed perhaps if the government had even begun to understand or listen to the demands of the indigenous people.”

Balbi: “You are aware that you are putting the entire country in a terrible position”

Pizango: “What about the rights of indigenous people? We are citizens of this country, we are Peruvian too.”
Balbi: “Well, if you are forcibly removed, it is almost necessary. The country can’t just stop for you people.”

Pizango: “So the state protects the rights of the investors – for them there are rights. But for the territory of indigenous people there are no rights?”

Balbi: “Well, I’m not going to lose my electric power because you people have a problem with dialogue and compromise, as you will understand. No one in this city will. Let’s hope that you become more open to dialogue.”

Pizango: “We are very open to dialogue”

Balbi: “It doesn’t seem like it. Thank you for coming.” (Choque de Dos Mundos, 2016)

With this exchange in mind, I ask: “Do you have electric power in your village?” Marcos responds: “Electric power in the village? No. We had a solar panel that an organization donated, and that used to give us power in the community center an hour or two a day, but that hasn’t worked in years.” I ask again, “so, what has changed since the arrival of the oil companies?” Marcos again: “Not much. The air and the water smell funny sometimes, and that wasn’t happening a while ago. And now we’re getting rashes and people can’t breathe. And we have to work for someone else and they give us food now because we can’t grow it ourselves anymore. And Amulpash used to be a nice town. There was that boarding school run by the Jesuits over there, but for the most part, this was our town and it was nice. Now, as you can see, it is a piece of shit.”

Later that same day we arrive in Santa María de Nieva, the capital and largest settlement in Condorcanqui province. Located at the end of the recently completed highway, Nieva (as it is known to locals) has a frontier-town feel to it. Unlike Amulpash, though, Nieva is orderly and clean, organized around a colonial plaza. The center of town is connected to the power grid and has running water. Across the Nieva River from the main town is the Velasco district, accessible only by motorized peque-peque boats. After days spent deep in the jungle, we immediately
headed for the town’s internet café, likely the only one in the province. In the midst of enjoying
the connectivity we have grown accustomed to in the West, the power shuts down. The reaction
is similar to that which I remember from 1980s Lima. As the Shining Path insurrection
encroached upon Lima from the Andes in the early 1980s, *apagones* or blackouts became a
weekly occurrence as power lines throughout the country were bombed. What had previously
been terrifying, quickly became routine, and Limeños ingeniously adapted. In Nieva, this was a
daily occurrence (in the three days I spent in Nieva, I counted seven blackouts lasting between a
half hour and eight hours), and the people reacted as such. As the fans stopped gyrating, the
oppressive heat drove everyone outside. I sat in the central plaza waiting for time to pass and
power to come back on, and joined those who had been there all day – the unemployed, the
displaced and the desperate. The demographic shifts in the jungle has meant that Santa María de
Nieva has grown from a riverine village to a large town in very little time. The energy
infrastructure was outgrown years ago, hence the constant outages, and unemployment rates have
soared. After about an hour, a young man approaches his friends: “I just got back from
Amulpash. No luck. They don’t need any more workers down there. Anyone have anything to
eat?” This scene, with some variations, repeats itself several times during my stay in Nieva.
Meanwhile, as the young people of Nieva sit in the dark plaza trying to make sense of their new
realities in ever-changing spaces, in Lima the middle- and upper-classes settle in for the evening
in well-lit living rooms, flipping channels on flat-screen High Definition televisions until they
find a program that will numb them to the realities of mysterious rashes, gas masks, or the source
of their next meal, not to mention dialogue and compromise.

The Amulpash example illustrates extractive imperialism and the changing meaning of the term
“development”. Amazonian indígenas are being brought into the capitalist system under the
guise of national and local development. By allowing for the exploitation of natural resources, indígenas contribute to this “development” by producing the revenue needed to pay for the new schools, roads and hospitals. The remaining question is obvious: after centuries of complete neglect, why is the state so interested in providing for the basic needs of Amazonian indígenas now? Until the destruction of the environment brought on by exploration and extraction, and the introduction of consumerism encouraged by improved infrastructure, Amazonian indígenas had been forced to meet their own basic needs without an issue. Environmental destruction (dispossession) has created new needs. Now that natural resources have been discovered and a demand for their exploitation has been created (accumulation), indígenas are suddenly part of the nation and are expected to contribute towards the services that are now necessary to address the issues introduced by these newly created needs. What’s more, Amazonian indígenas are expected to negotiate with a newly aggressive capitalism without the strategic and operational knowledge that decades of interaction with capital has provided for Andean indígenas, as well as Western, urban resistors. As a result, it is difficult to look at Amazonian spaces as representational space, or to clearly see how they fit into the production of space conceptual triad.

*The Consolidation of Extractive Imperialism*

The new extractive imperialism is a continuation of capitalist development in a neo-liberal, post-colonialist world order. The changing definitions of the development project shifted alongside global shifts in the economic strategy. As classical economics morphed into the welfare state, and as de facto colonialism emerged as economic imperialism, development evolved from a concept to a project to be implemented onto the emerging economies of the Latin American periphery. As McMichael (2012) states:
while industrialization produced new class inequalities within each society, colonialism racialized international inequality… At this point, the colonial rule of subjects under the guise of civilizing inferior races morphed into the development project, based on the ideal of self-governing states composed of citizens united by the ideology of nationalism. By the twentieth century’s end, the global development project focused on market governance of and by self-maximizing consumers (p. 4).

These processes are clearly visible throughout Condorcanqui and are illustrated by the above example in Amulpash. The nature that had provided a way of life for centuries had been compromised by profit-seeking extractive industries, forcing indígenas into a consumerist structure where they were now obligated to trade their labor for consumer goods. Their identity, revolving at least partially around their conceptual integration of society and nature, was characterized as uncivilized or undeveloped by lingering colonialist attitudes. As a result, the exploitation of nature and its necessary separation from society was seen as a civilizing aspect of development. The level of civilization or development (or modernism in the Latin American sense) indígenas had achieved could be measured by the amount they could consume. Returning to McMichael: “specifying development as consumption privileges the market as the vehicle of social change” (p. 4). As Amazonian indígenas forced into the capitalist system are unable to acquire sufficient consumer power, racist colonialist attitudes attribute this to racial inferiority. Their identity, fully integrated with nature, must be exploited in a similar way. This exploitation serves the interests of extractive imperialism while claiming to contribute to the modernization of uncivilized savages. Official recognition as comunidades nativas incorporates Amazonian indígenas into a nation they had never before been allowed to be a part of. Yet this nation offers very little and takes a great deal. For all the new roads, schools, and hospitals, it is still colonos who own the restaurants and hotels in downtown Nieva, and it is mostly newly urbanized indígenas loitering in the plaza searching for odd jobs and/or food; it is still extractive companies cutting corners to maximize profits and indígenas who are forced to clean-up the mess.
Contrary to popular Peruvian belief, Amazonian indígenas have a sophisticated understanding of the situation. As Hernán, a young man newly arrived in Nieva from an indigenous village in Utcubamba province states “when those oil pipes burst the companies lose some oil, but they gain hundreds of workers who now have to do whatever necessary to eat” (personal communication, April, 2016).

THE PRODUCTION OF INDIGENOUS SPACES IN RESISTANCE TO EXTRACTIVE IMPERIALISM

Though Fujimori set-up the post-neoliberal, extractivist imperialist stage of capitalist development in Perú, President Alejandro Toledo consolidated it. As the first indigenous president to be elected into the office in Perú, Toledo capitalized on his ethnicity, holding his inauguration ceremony in the symbolically charged Machu Picchu ruins in Cuzco department instead of in the traditional center of political and economic power of Lima. He along with his Belgian-born wife, Elaine Karp, founded CONAPA (Comisión Nacional de Pueblos Andinos, Amazónicos y Afroperuanos) with a participatory agenda of multicultural democratization. After a series of scandals and financial improprieties and mismanagement, it became clear that rather than promoting participatory multicultural democratization, CONAPA instead worked to further Toledo’s neoliberal agenda. In August of 2003, all the major indigenous organizations in Perú signed a declaration denying CONAPA’s role as the organization that represented indigenous interests.

Toledo’s politics are quite evident in his presidency’s policies in dealing with the national oil company PetroPeru. PetroPeru had become nationalized as a result of the expropriation of the international Standard Oil of New Jersey in 1969, during Velasco’s regime. As part of his revolutionary agenda, the focus of PetroPeru became economic, socially-responsible growth for
the people of Perú, as opposed to for the sake of capitalist profit. This set two precedents. First, it challenged Perú’s status as a periphery country serving the interests of the capitalist core by implementing import substitution industrialization. Despite the affront to the global free-market inclinations of Washington-Consensus influenced IMF and World Bank policies, the nationalization of PetroPeru provided an opportunity for state-led exploration of the Peruvian Amazon for the purposes of resource extraction. As discussed above, as revolutionary as the Velasco government claimed to be, its larger goal was to quell the truly revolutionary movements sprouting throughout Perú (and which would explode with the return of democracy with the declaration of the people’s war by the Shining Path and later by MRTA) and maintain Perú in the capitalist world structure, albeit a less extreme version than that promoted by international organizations. As such, the nationalization of Perú’s industries put a more benign face to the introduction of indigenous spaces into the capitalist structures.

This is where the Peruvian example highlights the shortcomings of Lefebvre’s Production of Space theories as well as social movements theories. The left in Europe in the 1960s was a working-class and intellectual coalition that resisted the ineffectiveness of the nominal welfare-states that had developed as a reaction to fascism and communism. As such, the representational spaces they occupied had already been deeply entrenched into capitalist structures through a gradual (though admittedly traumatic and violent) industrialization process that had begun more than a century earlier. The dialectic relationship between representations of space and representational spaces were truly dynamic and mutually influential. Spatial practices were further formed in the context of post-colonial shifts in the exploitative relationships with the global South. Social movements were therefore formed in resistance to a state that had attempted to provide for the basic needs of its citizens. New Social Movements theories
recognized that these social movements exploited the contradictions introduced by welfare-state models in a world order that was increasingly free-market oriented. As a result, European social movements were anti-capitalist in nature, in addition to being anti-state. This created a line of demarcation between representations of space and representational spaces (and therefore, as a result of the dialectical relationship among the three components of the triad, between these two and spatial practice as well) that was porous enough for the infinite lines of influence among the three to continue to influence production of space, but solid enough to clearly place one side (representational spaces) in the anti-capitalist/anti-state milieu, and the other (representations of space) in the pro-capitalist/pro-state sphere.

The Perú of the Baguazo was an entirely different context from that which produced European social movements and productions-of-space theories. Toledo’s nominally indigenista campaign exploited the successful “otherism” of Fujimorismo, yet distanced itself sufficiently from its corruption and repression by playing up the authenticity of his more Peruvian brand of identity politics. While celebrating his election in the Machu Picchu ruins and continually referring to his Andean indigenous roots, Toledo continued many of the neoliberal policies that Fujimori had promoted. As mentioned above, CONAPA was formed under the guise of an indigenous organization which in reality was organized to undermine the representativeness and combativeness of AIDESEP. Simultaneously, Toledo’s government continued to work to weaken PetroPeru. As a state-run company, PetroPeru was at least nominally a Keynesian Velasco-era project that attempted to use the profits it accrued in the international capitalist market to subsidize the basic needs of Perú’s citizens. This model had long been anachronistic to international capitalist interests which sought to exploit the unmeasured profits thought to be available in raw materials and which could help to address the contradictions introduced by
rampant neoliberalism. Begun by Fujimori, the undermining of PetroPeru was continued by Toledo. University of San Marcos economist Jorge Manco Zanconetti affirms that neglecting PetroPeru was part of the implementation of the neoliberal order put in place by Fujimori. Toledo’s indigemismo only served as superficial cover for the exacerbation of privatizations. By the time Alan García began to serve his second term in 2006, the neoliberal structures had been so fully entrenched that the guise of indigenismo was no longer needed. García’s “orchard dog” rhetoric reflects Perú’s entry into an extractive imperialist stage. Veltmeyer and Petras describe this extractive imperialist stage as one where

the neoliberal world order weakened the state in its relation to capital to the point of generating a powerful new actor in the world economy, the multinational corporation, and that such corporations are in the service of and are instruments of a transnational capitalist class that has no allegiance to the nation state nor is it beholden to it…. [I]mperialism as a geopolitical project of world domination [is] passé, and in the new ‘empire’, power had shifted from the state to the multinational corporation, or from the capitalist class located within and in the control of nation states at the center of the system to an ‘international capitalist class’ (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014, pgs. 8-9).

Rather than the weak, absent state that had historically neglected the Amazon, García’s state during his second term in power actively served extractive imperialist interests. Classical economics viewed the state as an obstacle to cleaner, theoretically purer market-driven change. Neo-classical economics viewed the state as a tool through which to address some of the contradictions introduced by rampant privatizations thereby preserving capitalist modes of production. The extractive imperialist model sees the state not through a Keynesian welfare-state lens, and certainly not as an absent, laissez-faire passive state. The socio-spatial situation in Perú (and in much of the global South) called for a new model – one with a state that, in an “actively absent” manner, worked to intentionally strengthen the economic structures that promoted the interests of capital – often at the expense of the people it is theoretically designed to serve. According to Zanconetti, Perú has been steadily heading towards extractive
imperialism since the days of Toledo: “Since Toledo and through García’s presidency there has been one practice: work so that Petroperu does not meet its goals. The idea is to encourage private capital to operate in land parcels in the Amazon, often in conflict with national interests” (Moreno, 2015). This is key given Perú’s specific socio-spatial context. The natural gas that potentially lies below the soil in the Peruvian Amazon is of relatively low-quality and requires considerable economic and technological investment to refine profitably. Since privatized extractivism has been seen as the solution to Perú’s economic problems, the Peruvian economy has become one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Perú’s annual GDP growth peaked at 17.99% in 2007-08 (Webb and Fernández Baca, 2011). The market-centered macro-economic policies that led to this growth was applauded by the IMF and the World Bank, which often cited Perú as an example of neoliberal success for other countries to follow. As the country emerged from the democratic compromises and corruption of the Fujimori era, Toledo and García placed much of their political capital on the symbology behind maintaining high growth numbers. Yet this growth was not uniform, stable, or sustainable. Though the Gini coefficient of inequality has been decreasing since 2000, as has the percentage of the population living below poverty level in both urban and rural areas, rural poverty rates were still three times higher in 2009 than urban poverty rates. In addition, the meaning of “poverty” is subjective. An indigenous family that in 1990 may have existed in complete isolation from capital and the state, yet met all of its basic needs through its community would have been considered to have little or no income, and would have therefore been deemed to fall below the poverty line. Meanwhile, that same family ten years later may have been displaced to Santa María de Nieva or Bagua, where they struggle daily to survive in their new urban reality. Yet since this family now has access (at least in terms of proximity) to health and educational services, and since they now
have an income, however inadequate, they may be considered to now be above the poverty line. Economic growth and development in this sense, is misleading.

Part of this can be explained by the economic realities for multinational extractive companies. As mentioned above, the natural gas that has been found in the Peruvian Amazon is of relatively poor quality and requires expensive treatment for it to be marketable. Many of the lots believed to have oil are in extremely remote areas. Historically neglected, these areas have no infrastructure of any form, and they contain vibrant and diverse populations that have had very little contact with Western forms of social organizing. Addressing these issues requires much investment which only the most powerful of multi-national organizations can afford to sponsor.

In order to arrive at a business model that is sufficiently profitable, the tools of production (both material and human) must be of the lowest cost possible. This results in leaky pipelines, and cheap surgical masks for the natives in Amulpash who are forced to clean up the mess, thereby providing cheap labor.
CHAPTER IX

THE PRODUCTION OF SPACES OF RESISTANCE – THE INADEQUACIES OF THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE

Indigenous spaces such as those visited in Condorcanqui province are just now being meaningfully incorporated into the capitalist systems that had ignored them for so long. Unlike European peasants (and to a different degree, North American peasants), who were brought into the capitalist structure at a time of simultaneous transition from feudalism to industrialization and from superstition to reason, Amazonian indígenas are being usurped into the capitalist system at a time of transition from neo-liberalism to extractive imperialism, and from the infallibility of reason to the politics of objectivity. There has been no, as in Europe, century and a half of gradual industrialization around which class-consciousness was built and resistance strategized and organized, arguably culminating in the Paris riots of 1968 - the context in which Lefebvre (1991) composed The Production of Space. Spatial production in 1968 Paris was well-reflected by Lefebvre’s conceptual triad. The Keynesian welfare state, still responding to and recovering from the totalitarianisms sprouting from World War II, worked to ideologically and practically separate itself from fascism and communism, with the ultimate goal of preserving the capitalist status quo. In this sense, the 1960s French state fits well into the representations of space category in that it is “tied to the relations of production and to the ‘order’ which those relations impose” (p. 33). Yet the fresh memory of the dangers of fascism and unchecked capitalism, as well as an influential, experienced, and well-organized proletariat meant that the state also considered itself responsible for meeting the basic needs of its constituents, if only for the purposes of maximizing consumerism. The welfare state, therefore, fits well into the
representational spaces category of the triad inasmuch as it represents the interests of the “’inhabitants’ and ‘users’” (p. 39) of the space, AND into the representation of space category in that it implements an ideology of benign but, more importantly, sustainable, capitalism that will allow actors to continue working towards the same goal – increasing profits. Workers and students also occupied both spaces. Workers were organized through labor unions that had been very influential in constructing the type of state that the riots of 1968 so vehemently resisted. Students resisted the system that allowed them to be students in the first place. Both, echoing NSM social movements theories, viewed the structure of the capitalist state itself as faulty, and sought the type of change that would result in the demise of its conceptualization at the time and in that space. All this occurred in a context of global unrest, adding to the myriad of causal arrows among the three components of the conceptual triad. The barricaded Paris streets merely reflected a normally invisible delineation of spatial practice influenced by and influencing the conflicts and contradictions introduced by negotiating capitalism (representations of space) and the interest of the people (representational space). The conceptual triad fits nicely onto this spatial and temporal context. The maelstrom of causal arrows connecting the three components of the conceptual triad neatly delineate the spaces produced in modern Western European contexts that have fully consolidated democracy and firmly been entrenched in capitalist modes of production. The representational spaces of resistance described by Lefebvre also fit well into NSM theories of social movements.

THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE APPENDED - CONDORCANQUI

But what about indigenous spaces that have not had the same history of spatial production? Instead of more than a century of capitalist consolidation, Amazonian indigenous spaces have until very recently been extra-capitalist. Instead of existing in a state of steadily consolidating
democracy, where the contradictions of capitalism have been addressed through various implementations of colonialis threaten plunder, Keynesian welfare policies, and neoliberal globalized reform encouraged by the IMF and the World Bank, Amazonian indigenous spaces have until recently been largely ignored by a state that is still in the process of democratic consolidation after decades of military dictatorships and violent uprisings. The infinite causal arrows that so meaningfully provide shape to the conceptual triad are, at best, dotted or blurry in the Amazon. Amazonian spaces are entering into a well-developed capitalist order that has already addressed many of the contradictions that conflicted with the interests of capital, while simultaneously introducing new ones. How indigenous people in Condorcanqui negotiate new encounters with capital can help to analyze the production of indigenous spaces and the types of social movements that culminated in the Baguazo of 2009.

*Encounters with Capital*

As discussed previously, my presence in indigenous spaces highlights many of the issues surrounding positionality in the field. This is particularly the case when my identities and positionalities are juxtaposed with those of the people I was observing. It is important to highlight the social gap that instantaneously emerged as I negotiated my identities as a middle-class Limeño living abroad, in a space where most outside identities were often reduced to the threatening idea of “Occidente”. In many ways “Occidente” is synonymous with “outsider”. It is nearly impossible for a Westerner to understand how the Awajún conceptualize the meaning of “outsider”. A culture with a cosmology that fully integrates society and nature and that has not been influenced by Cartesian spatial and temporal delineations will have a view of outsiders that is quite different from how those of us who have been fully incorporated into Western thought processes would. The social interaction upon encounter is likely to be driven by a mutual
unfamiliarity that, at least from the Western perspective, cannot be fully addressed by reading the relatively sparse anthropological studies of Awajún culture. I was warned of this upon my visit to the Instituto del Bien Común, a Lima based NGO that represents the interests of indigenous people in the Peruvian Amazon. Various scholars there warned:

the Awajún are a very war-like people. They are very proud of the fact that they were never conquered by the Incas and that they have maintained a relatively autonomous existence until today. This makes them fiercely independent, but also very mistrusting of strangers. Because of this mistrust, they generally reject Western thought processes and social practices such as consumerism, hospitality and the use of money. You should be safe, just do not try to enter any indigenous villages without a local guide (Calienes, C., personal communication, April 2, 2016).

A good deal of this thinking reflects Limeño stereotypes of Amazonian indígenas – though these words were never used in this specific interview, they are seen as savage, uncivilized and un-“Occidente”. The colonialist history of constant threat yet preserved isolation, dating back to Inca times and stretching to today’s attempts at neo-liberal land-grabs, has led to the production of an indigenous space that shapes social interactions. Rather than the innate backwardness of the Awajún suggested by Peruvian urban elites, the social behavior encountered by outsiders as well as the social structures and changes that led to the Baguazo in 2009 reflect the counter-spaces produced in Condorcanqui. These spaces continue to exist outside of capitalist structures and therefore outside of the realm of Lefebvre’s conceptual triad. These spaces are more than just a predictably representations-of-space infused representational space. Instead, these are indigenous spaces produced in a pre- or extra-capitalist context. At best, the infinite causal arrows that shape the three components of Lefebvre’s conceptual triad are blurrier. At worst, they’ve until very recently been nearly non-existent. The solidifying effects of classical and neoclassical economic policies are almost absent here. As indigenous spaces are increasingly introduced into capitalist structures they are also ontologically introduced into the conceptual
triad. Yet these are not representational spaces shaped by and shaping representations of space and spatial practices well-entrenched in capitalist structures. Instead, indigenous spaces must be introduced into the triad as just that – indigenous spaces conceptually different from representational spaces and representations of space. The combination of a non-Western cosmology that maintains the integration of society and nature, a cultural identity separate from that of the nation, and ethnicity- and environment-based extra-national scale alliances, allows indigenous spaces to become spaces of resistance (and as such, a more “modern” space increasingly resembling representational spaces) as they are introduced into capitalist structures and the conceptual triad.

Solidifying Dialectics

These indigenous spaces are illustrated by several observations from the field. Although the events described occurred in different spatial and cultural contexts, when considered in unison they provide a vivid picture of indigenous spatial production, highlighting the ways in which indigenous spaces can be conceptually integrated into the existing triad as they are increasingly integrated into capitalist structures.

Travel to indigenous spaces can be disorienting to Western visitors. This is particularly true of villages along the Nieva River, beyond where the highway ends. The jungle here is hypnotically monotonous. The lack of man-made landmarks makes it nearly impossible for nonlocals to find their way. The strong and largely invisible undercurrents make it necessary to hire experienced local peque peque drivers to negotiate the treacherous path. Arriving in villages such as Tsemeya and Pajawaaw* requires docking the boat at a small clearing on the riverside. To reach the village, one must climb a steep and muddy path about 50 feet to a footpath above (See Figure 9.1). While locals of all ages climb the path nimbly, visitors must struggle slowly to avoid
slipping and falling into the river below. If the visit has been announced and cleared with the apu, arriving groups are only greeted by local children.

**Figure 9.1. Path to Tsemeya** (Photo by Christian Calienes, 2016)

Given the difficulty in reaching these isolated villages, visitors from outside Condorcanqui are extremely rare. It is quite probable that many of the younger children have never seen a light skinned person before. My Limeño clumsiness leads me to arrive in Tsemeya a few minutes after my indigenous colleagues who have begun playing with the children. Upon my arrival, the
children take one look at me and run away in fear. As disconcerting as my arrival in Tsemeya was, my entrance into Pajawaa was actually frightening. I was travelling with a group of mostly local agriculture students who went from village to village inoculating chickens. As stated before, all visits from outsiders to indigenous villages must be cleared by the apu in advance. The agricultural student group, based in a larger village along the highway, had sent a message to Pajawaa’s apu the previous day alerting him of our upcoming visit. Given the complete absence of telephone or electric service, messages are slow to arrive. In this case, the apu had been in a nearby village the night before, had not arrived back in Pajawaa until the morning we arrived, and had not been informed of our visit. As my fellow travelers negotiated our return trip with the peque-peque driver at the landing, I took advantage of the extra time to try to get a head start up the cliffside path. Not knowing about the miscommunication with the apu, I expected the now familiar crowd of excited children quickly becoming frightened and running away. Instead, after setting foot in the village itself, I am surrounded by eight to ten men in their 30s. None spoke Spanish. Schools were built in the villages about ten to fifteen years ago, with travelling indigenous teachers offering lessons in both Spanish and Awajún about once a week. As a result, most children are bilingual while many adults speak very little Spanish. Despite our linguistic differences, it is quickly clear to me that they are not expecting me or anyone else I have travelled with, and that my presence is not particularly welcome. Soon enough, the school teacher appears. Aggressively he asks, “what are you doing here? Have you cleared your visit with the authorities?” At this point, my fellow travelers had already arrived and explained the confusion. Despite this, no one in the village would speak to me until the apu had verified that our visit was sanctioned.
In another, larger village, I attended a small fair where local residents sold traditional Awajún pottery and jewelry to visiting NGO workers and researchers. After speaking to Norberto, a particularly friendly man from a neighboring village, an older woman in traditional garb stood behind me. She spoke aggressively to me in Awajún, cleared her throat dramatically and spit at my feet. It turns out that Norberto is her husband, and having engaged in conversation with him a few minutes before, he runs over to us and speaks to his wife in Awajún while shaking my hand and putting his arm around my shoulders. Despite his friendly gesture, she simply walks away from me.

The Awajún are not a generally unfriendly people. Centuries of warfare – with other Amazonian indigenous groups (particularly the Wampís who occupy some overlapping territories), with expansionist Andean warriors during the Inca era, with Spanish colonizers in the past few hundred years, and finally, with multinational extractive corporations in the present – mean that strangers and unauthorized visitors represent danger. The expectation of strangers being welcomed is a very Western social convention. The semiotics of my presence pose a very real threat – until my research and political intentions are made clear, my Limeño accent, and Western social behavior symbolize an intrusion into a very locally produced space. The violent capitalism that has been trying to force itself upon indigenous spaces represents only the latest round of encroachment upon them. As I let go of my unrealistic goal of social scientific objectivity and converse with village residents about my intentions and my stance on the political realities in Condorcanqui, their original disdain turns into hospitality and openness.

What are the Awajún reacting to when they interact with Western outsiders? Can it be said that indigenous spaces are representational spaces practically encompassing the spatial interests of the Awajún and resisting the encroachment by technocratically and ideologically produced
representations of space symbolized by my presence? A demonstration at yet another fair, this one in the central plaza of the provincial capital of Santa María de Nieva, brings some light to this question. At this fair, two Awajún men from different villages demonstrate the traditional formal greeting that Awajún visitors continue to practice. In traditional garb, the two men face each other in warlike positions, tapping their spears against the other’s and taking turns aggressively yelling at each other. My Awajún friend informs me that the visitor is first announcing his presence. The man being visited asks what the visitor’s intentions are. The visitor then describes in detail the reasons for his visit. In response, he gets a detailed explanation of how the village will address his visit. This goes on for at least ten minutes, after which the two men bow at each other, put their spears in their holsters and walk away together.

This interaction shows the true nature of indigenous spaces. Awajún villages are largely isolated from each other. They have, as a result, developed quite autonomous systems of survival in a very precarious and fragile ecosystem. Village-dwellers work in unison for the benefit of the village. All agricultural and artisanal products and any goods (or increasingly money) that these may have been traded for are distributed throughout the village by the apu. In this environment, this cooperation does not always extend to those from the outside. Often, visits from outsiders have meant a threat to the delicate system that has sustained village life. Unconditional hospitality could result in disaster for the entire village. Indigenous spaces cannot therefore be said to be Lefebvrian “lived” representational spaces resisting encroachment by a capitalist “conceptualized” representation of space. Though my presence may in fact embody representations of space that “are tied to the relations of production and to the ‘order’ which those relations impose” the Awajún’s initially unwelcoming attitude towards my visit are not necessarily reflective of representational spaces in a Lefebvrian sense. Indigenous spaces,
though absolutely spaces of “‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’”, are not interacting with representations of space through the lens of centuries of capitalist development. Unlike in Lefebvrian representational spaces, indigenous resistance is not resistance to capitalist representations of space. The reaction of the village’s residents to my presence was not necessarily a reaction against the capitalism that my visit may have represented, it was more an extra-capitalist reaction to the uncertainty of my intentions. My positionality encompassed this uncertainty. Recent increased exposure to Occidente may have tainted this perception with stereotypical vision of the colonizing criollo. Yet as my intentions and politics were communicated, it became clear that the resistance was less to a racialized and politicized identity (which we, as Westerners, constantly assign to ourselves) and more to an unidentified and unfamiliar identity.

Upon my arrival in Santa María de Nieva, I was invited by a local contact to a meeting in Velasco, a neighborhood across the Nieva River from the main part of Santa María de Nieva. Lacking a bridge crossing the river, Velasco, known by locals as “El Otro Lado” or “The Other Side”, was accessible only by peque peque. While visitors from all over Perú and abroad regularly travel on the highway to visit Santa María de Nieva, few venture across the river to El Otro Lado. As a result, indigenous homes are much more common in this district. While the presence of a Limeño in the Santa María side of the river is barely noticed, in El Otro Lado, it was very quickly clear that I had entered an indigenous space where I was seen as an outsider. The meeting was attended by representatives from the various districts of the Condorcanqui province who had gathered to discuss the sustainability of an agricultural project that was to take place in areas that had been designated as National Parks. We gathered around a table in the building where the national park service was headquartered. Having studied in Lima and abroad, Porfirio Hèjun*, the Awajún manager of the National Parks organization, and a community
leader and organizer, welcomed me warmly. The same could not be said for the 8 attendants from the interior districts of Condorcanqui, who looked at me with suspicion. Hējun, who understood the tense social dynamic he was witnessing, invited me to introduce myself to the group and explain the reasons for my visit.

Thank you all for welcoming to your meeting. I am a student in the United States and I am here to try to understand various aspects of life in Condorcanqui. I am particularly pleased to hear about your organization because it allows you to use the agricultural projects only you can do, with the knowledge only you have, to improve your lives. This effort comes from your way of life, and these efforts will hopefully allow you to tie your future prosperity to your own work, not from cleaning up others’ accidents (personal communication, April, 2016).

Here I am referring to the aforementioned oil spill in Amulpash. Though I do not mention it specifically, the recognition of my reference is immediately apparent. The polite, but stern stares I was experiencing as I began my introduction almost instantly turned into open smiles. As the formal proceedings began to wrap up and lunch was served, a fluid, frank and open conversation developed that lasted for hours.

THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE AND MODERNITY

The political sophistication that Amazonian indígenas show in dealing with strangers is therefore not evidence of modernity. It is instead evidence of emerging encounters with modernity and capitalism. These are not spaces produced in the context of a modernizing industrial revolution where capitalist economic development arises alongside resistance to that development. Unlike Lefebvrian representational spaces, indigenous spaces are not modern, much less post-modern spaces, either in the European sense, or in some newly formulated Latin American sense. Lefebvre’s Production of Space is an urban theory. Cities, particularly European cities, are arguably creators and consequences of capitalist modernizations. The “science of space” that Lefebvre seeks to theorize “represents the political use of knowledge […] which] is integrated in a
more or less ‘immediate’ way into the forces of production, and in a ‘mediate’ way into the social relations of production” (p. 8-9). The process of politically integrating the knowledges that make up the dialectical causations among the components of the conceptual triad is a modernist process. As Soja (1989) defines it, “modernism is in essence a ‘reaction formation’, a conjunctural social movement mobilized to face the challenging question of what now is to be done given that the context of the contemporary has significantly changed. It is thus the culture-shaping, programmatic, and situated consciousness of modernity.” (p. 29). Returning to Berman’s (1982) operationalization of modernity:

the industrialization of production, which transforms scientific knowledge into technology, creates new human environments and destroys old ones, speeds up the whole tempo of life, generates new forms of corporate power and class struggle; immense demographic upheavals, severing millions of people from their ancestral habitats, hurling them halfway across the world into new lives; rapid and often cataclysmic urban growth; systems of mass communication, dynamic in their development, enveloping and binding together the most diverse people and societies; increasingly powerful national states, bureaucratically structured and operated, constantly striving to expand their powers; mass social movements of people, and peoples, challenging their political and economic rulers, striving to gain some control over their lives; finally, bearing and driving all these people and institutions along, an ever-expanding, drastically fluctuating capitalist world market (p. 16).

Berman’s conceptualization of Western modernization makes it clear that the “culture-shaping, programmatic, and situated consciousness of modernity” is a capitalist consciousness. The consciousness of the urban spaces theorized by the Production of Space is the product of centuries of negotiations between the interests of capital and the often antagonistic interests of the people, fittingly and eloquently captured by Lefebvre. Once again returning to Berman, the European cities of 1968 had witnessed the industrialization of production which had turned largely agricultural nations, to manufacturing centers, to post-industrial service economies. They had benefitted from demographic upheavals that shifted populations and allowed for the continued proletarianization of former peasants and colonized peoples. They had experienced
increased urbanization which helped to develop systems of mass communication through which to further integrate knowledges into forces and social relations of production. They had encountered social movements that challenged states to fluctuate (often violently) between colonialism, clericalism, fascism, socialism, Keynesian welfare-statism, and early neo-liberalism. Modern and post-modern European spaces in the 1960s had been very clearly produced by the modernizing process encompassed by the dialectical relationships among representations of space, representational spaces, and spatial practice.

But what of spaces that have not undergone the types of modernizations required to shape the “consciousness of modernity”? As has been observed, indigenous spaces have not gone through the process of “industrialization of production, which […] creates new environments and destroys old ones, speeds up the whole tempo of life, generates new forms of corporate power and class struggle.” A key requirement for the industrialization of production – the separation of nature and society for the purposes of exploitation of nature for the benefit of (capitalist) society – is culturally absent in indigenous spaces. In order to industrialize production in a post-neoliberal world order, the intrinsic integration of nature and society that is central to the nature of indigenous spaces, must be broken.

Indigenous spaces also fail to meet most of Berman’s other criteria of modernity. The immense demographic upheavals that have marked Perú’s modernization process have been largely absent in most Amazonian indigenous spaces. Colonialization first by the Inca empire and then by Spanish conquerors meant that most Andean indígenas that survived the genocidal practices of Europeans were often displaced. Economic shifts, political violence and systematic racism forced many to leave ancestral lands in the mountains for opportunities in the growing cities. Yet the Awajún and Wampís were never conquered by the Incas, and had limited contact with
Spanish colonizers beyond the presence of the Jesuits in some of the larger towns in Amazonia. With the exception of an increase in the colono population facilitated by improved transportation connections, Condorcanqui’s demographic profile has remained relatively unaffected by national-level fluctuations in modes of production and the social relations surrounding them.

“Rapid and often cataclysmic urban growth” has also not occurred. Bagua has grown from a riverside backwater in the 1950s to the largest town in Amazonas department, with a population of almost 50,000. Yet Bagua is not in traditional indigenous land. Located in the extreme west of the department, in what is topographically “ceja de selva”, or the transition from the Andean highland to the rain forest, Bagua’s population is made up largely of colonos who moved to the area in the 1960s to work in wood, rice and oil processing plants and to serve the town’s function as a transportation gateway linking Jaén and other larger towns closer to the coast and the Amazon. Santa María de Nieva has also grown from a small village to a town of more than 10,000. Much of this growth has occurred since the highway reached the town in 2010. Yet, the process of urbanization in Santa María de Nieva has resulted in a space that is quite clearly different from that of towns outside of indigenous areas. And the villages further upriver that have not been reached by the highway show very little sign of Western-style urbanization.

Modern and Indigenous Architecture

Being near the very end of the highway, Santa María de Nieva has the feel of a frontier town. Though the population is largely indigenous and Awajún, Wampís and other indigenous languages can be heard as often as Spanish in the streets, the atmosphere of the town is decidedly different from the indigenous villages and towns along the highway. The traditional central plaza has been carved into the hillside one block Northeast of the intersection of the Nieva and Marañón rivers (See Figure 9.2). It is ringed by hotels, internet cafes, bars, restaurants, and
businesses. Were it not for the intensely dense vegetation sprouting in every available space, the central plaza area of Santa María de Nieva could be mistaken for a more recently settled Andean town, or a poorer district center of Lima. The large Catholic church and Jesuit rectory sits on top of the hill, overlooking the town and commanding it. The streets emanate from the square in an orderly grid pattern. One can almost see the landscape being flattened and demolished to make way for roadways, concrete, and structures. The center of Santa María is a testament to man’s triumph over nature. Here, human habitation and urbanization drive spatial practice. Nature is at worst an obstacle, at best a tool. Nature and humanity are clearly delineated and juxtaposed.

Despite central Nieva’s familiar layout, the outskirts of the town are increasingly populated by indigenous residents newly arrived from traditional villages. As economic and environmental

Figure 9.2. Central plaza – Santa María de Nieva (Photo by Christian Calienes, 2016)
devastation continue to drive larger numbers from traditional areas to growing towns, indigenous enclaves have developed which seem to represent a transition from traditional indigenous spaces to modern urban ones. Velasco or “El Otro Lado” exemplifies this (See Figure 9.3). Across the Nieva River from central Santa María de Nieva and its road connection to the outside, El Otro Lado maintains the feel of an indigenous village. Homes are built of wood, with straw roofs and elevated floors. Clusters of houses dot the hillsides, nestling around the natural landscape instead of reshaping it to fit human needs.

Figure 9.3. View of “El Otro Lado”, or Velasco district, from Santa María de Nieva (Photo by Christian Calienes, 2016)

The traditionally Spanish central plaza seems out of place in El Otro Lado, and its emptiness is an extreme contrast to the bustling and always busy plaza in central Nieva. People in this, more
indigenous side of town, don’t socialize in designated central areas. The quiet desolation of Velasco’s central plaza illustrates the inadequacy of Lefebvre’s conceptual triad in describing indigenous spatial productions, even in increasingly urbanized spaces (See Figure 9.4). In El Otro Lado, people work on chacras (small family farms) or small carpentry and artisanal workshops. Social life takes place in private homes, in scattered community centers, or in impromptu volleyball courts and soccer fields in spaces between homes. The central plaza remains largely empty. Unlike central Nieva, where capitalist economic activity radiates with grid-like precision from well-designated profit-maximizing spaces, spatial practice in El Otro Lado does not “embod[y] a close association … between daily reality” (“space as directly lived” or “representational space”) “and urban reality (the routes and networks which link up the places set aside for work, ‘private’ life and leisure; the “conceptualized space, the space of … technocratic subdividers and social engineers” or “representations of space”).

The delineations between work, private, and leisure spaces have not yet been solidified, and spatial practice has yet to provide the path of least resistance towards the maximization of profits. This is an extra-capitalist, extra-modern space, just now emerging into the realm of capitalist spatial production. The graffiti on the incongruous concrete structures sprouting from the El Otro Lado’s central plaza represent the implementation of traditional indigenous cosmologies onto spaces imposed onto the land by outsiders: on one side of the monument, it reads “tú y yo, 3 metros sobre el cielo” (“you and I, 3 meters above the sky”); while on the other, “tú y yo, 3 metros sobre la tierra” (“you and I, 3 meters above the earth”).
Villa Unión* also represents a departure from the western grid of central Nieva. High above the central part of town and connected to the main highway by a steep mud path, the neighborhood is populated by largely Wampís, but also Awajún migrants from various villages in the Cenepa region, close to the border with Ecuador. The neighborhood is not much more than a single dirt road, with traditional Awajún and Wampís houses on either side. A community center where residents meet to discuss community issues looks no different from the other structures in the neighborhood. The ubiquitous volleyball court is located, almost randomly, in the middle of the road. Cliffs plummet on either side of the road towards the town below. Unlike central Nieva, homes are built *around* the cliffs, instead of *into* them (See Figure 9.5). One edge of the
structure lines up with the top of the cliff, providing access to the road. Precarious looking wooden columns bear the weight of the homes and extend as far as necessary down the cliff. The architecture and urban layout here morph around nature, clearly seeking to co-exist instead of to conquer. Compared to the grandeur of hilltop churches and right-angled gridlines in central Nieva, Villa Unión is essentially a transplanted indigenous village from up the river. Much like villages accessible only from the river, access to Villa Unión is through a muddy and steep dirt road connected to the highway. The atmosphere is languid. The free ranging chickens, ever-present in all Awajún and Wampís communities, run in and out of the houses.

Figure 9.5. Cliffside house in Villa Unión* (Photo by Christian Calienes, 2016)
All of the residents, with the exception of one family, are from indigenous communities. Though there are several residents from rival communities, they have named the community Villa Unión to symbolize their commitment to collaborate and succeed in the growing town.

The physical distance between Villa Unión and the main highway is at most 100 meters. The difficulty of the muddy access to the neighborhood mimics the access paths from the boat-landings to indigenous villages. As in indigenous villages, a young man, Eriberto*, greeted us as soon as we entered the neighborhood. Though he was cordial, the tension was obvious until he finally recognized the friend I was travelling with who had grown up in a village close to Eriberto’s in the Cordillera del Cóndor region on the border with Ecuador. He had been elected apu of Villa Unión since he had helped to build it from nothing. The relative newness of the neighborhood means that Villa Unión has no electric or water service, and representation in the political life of Occidente is as absent as in the most isolated villages. The apu represents the practical and political interests of the neighborhood. When asked about life in Santa Marí, Eriberto offered a great deal of insight:

“We generally get along. There is a lot of solidarity. Almost everyone attends the community meetings and helps each other out when people need something.” The “almost” in Eriberto’s comment is meaningful. He is talking about the one non-indigenous family that lives in Villa Unión. They had bought the house from a friend of Eriberto’s who had moved to Iquitos. There was still quite a bit of resentment in the community towards Eriberto’s friend for having sold to an outsider. He adds: “the colonos living over there don’t contribute to the community. They don’t come to the meetings and don’t participate in anything. I don’t understand why they want to live here.”
Much like the spatial organization of indigenous villages further upriver, the urban layout of El Otro Lado and Villa Unión reflects a harmonious collaboration with nature. As one approaches Nieva’s central plaza, the utopian workings of capitalism drive spatial production. Here, the use of space is organized to maximize profit – roads and walkways radiate around commerce rather than around communal social collaboration and reproduction. The urban hustle and bustle, and the slightly unhinged, chaotic ambience of a frontier town at the very end of the road truly reflects the struggle to acquiesce to a new idealized capitalist reality. The stubborn maintenance of indigenous spaces in the peripheral neighborhoods of growing towns nevertheless gradually shortens the geographic, institutional, class, and cultural distance from the state.

The symbology of the conceptual triad is both convenient to theorizing and a potential pitfall. Despite his best efforts to blur all lines, in defining the three components of the triad Lefebvre inevitably delineates them, both conceptually, and spatially. Of course, the complexity of the relationships among spatial practice, representations of space and representational spaces means that none of the three components can be exemplified by a discreet and exclusive space. Similarly, all discreet spaces exemplify differing levels of all three components. Though admittedly a gross simplification, it is often difficult to avoid defining a delineated space as either a representation of space or a representational space. As an example, the Lower East Side of New York City, with its old and uneven row houses, riverside housing projects, unidentified ethnic food stores and bodegas, and numerous community gardens and murals very clearly “embod[ies] complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or underground side of social life, as also to art” (Lefebvre, p. 33), all key characteristics of representational spaces. The presence of an unhealthy power plant, the distance from public transportation, and the substandard housing facilities mean that representations of space are
obviously present and constantly interacting. Yet the Lower East Side, a “space where the imagination seeks to change and appropriate” (Lefebvre, p. 39), is clearly a representational space. By contrast, the Upper East Side of New York City, with its stately homes and luxurious apartment buildings, symmetrically tree-lined streets and perfectly landscaped parks reflect “the relations of production and … the ‘order’ which those relations impose” (Lefebvre, p. 33). Though the representational spaces it dominates are ever-present in spatial practice in the Upper East Side, the neighborhood’s role in the spatial production of the city clearly conforms more to representations of space than any other of the components of the triad.

It would be neatly convenient to apply similar simplifications to indigenous spaces. The encroachment of capitalist modes of production through the rapid urbanization apparent in the central areas of Amulpash and Santa María de Nieva clearly reflect representations of space. These are, after all, conceived spaces, seemingly forced upon the natural environment instead of organically sprouting from it for the purposes of capitalist profit instead of integration with human settlement. Indigenous villages, by contrast, can be said to be the space of the ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’. Their isolation and limited (though increasing) contact with the capitalist modes of production shaping spatial practice in urbanizing areas characterize indigenous spaces as outside of representations of space. But are indigenous spaces “dominated” by representations of space, as Lefebvre very carefully proposes of representational spaces?

Even Villa Unión and El Otro Lado, existing on the peripheries of, but still within, the developed urban area of Santa María de Nieva cannot be said to conform to descriptions of representational spaces.
THE CONCEPTUAL TETRAD? THE INTRODUCTION OF INDIGENOUS CAPITALIST-EMERGENT SPACES

The conceptual triad manifests itself quite physically and spatially in Santa María de Nieva. Travelling on peque-peque back and forth between central Nieva and El Otro Lado, one cannot help but equate the paths covered by the endless trips with the infinite causal lines uniting the three components of the conceptual triad. The same can be said for the path worn into the mud on the road between central Nieva and Villa Unión. Similar patterns increasingly exist in the indigenous villages away from the highway. Ubiquitous peque-peques connect all but the most isolated villages to Nieva and beyond. However, the difficulty of the trip and the relative infrequency of contact mean that the dialectical causal lines are perhaps still less than solid.

But what exactly are these causal lines connecting? It is important not to reify Lefebvrian conceptions of spatial production in indigenous spaces where such formulations may, upon application, not offer meaningful explanatory power. Representations of space are more easily discernible here. The urbanization encroaching on towns along the highway clearly reflects the post-imperialist, extractive modes of production originating from Lima and beyond. Nieva’s tidy plaza, central grid-like pattern and hilltop church, all struggling to settle into and dominate the seemingly infinite and overwhelming natural vastness surrounding it, are evidence of an idealization of potential, or a conception of what this space could be in terms of how much profit it can offer in the near future. Nature must be seen (imagined, conceived) as separate from humanity and society because it needs to be in order for it to be dominated and exploited. As such, this is a representation of space.

Meanwhile, indigenous villages and neighborhoods are very meaningfully different spaces. The integration and harmony with nature are apparent in the architecture and daily life. Yet these are
different from representational spaces in that the patterns of urbanization do not reflect a fully realized dialectic with capitalism, whether that is in gradual accommodation (and therefore addressing of contradictions) of capitalist modes of production, or in resistance to them. This is an extra-modern space resisting an unfamiliar outside force (as unfamiliar as previous invading forces) that can be described as post-neoliberal or extractive imperialist. As a result, these are not representational spaces, they are indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces. These spaces do not, like representational spaces, “overlay physical space, making symbolic use of its objects.”

Indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces ARE the physical space, its symbols and objects do not represent nature, they ARE nature. Any attempt to separate the two will inevitably result in a violent conflict, such as that witnessed on June of 2009.

At this point in time, and at the point in time that led to the Baguazo, production of space in indigenous villages represented the interests of its residents and their extra-capitalist way of life, not their interests in the spectrum of capitalist structures. Any causal arrows emerging between indigenous villages and Lefebvrian spaces are largely one-directional and still nebulous at best. The causal arrows are not embarking on a well-travelled path. Instead, they are forging an unknown trajectory that, as evidenced by the shock of the Baguazo, was impossible to predict (See Figure 9.6). Indigenous neighborhoods such as El Otro Lado and Villa Unión represent a stage in modernization as described by Brennan. The context of this modernization, however, is entirely new. As a result, these are not spaces being gradually usurped into spatial productions that serve to address the contradictions that developing capitalism introduces upon itself. Unlike representational spaces, indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces have not meaningfully contributed to shaping the capitalist spaces it resists against. Unlike Western and modern representational spaces, indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces are not intrinsically integrated into Production of
Space dialectics by the nature of their existence. The Baguazo did not occur as a result of a clash between representational spaces and representations of space in interaction with spatial practice. Instead, the Baguazo was the result of indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces being forced into such an interaction, bringing them into a violently globalized, hyper-capitalist, extractive imperialist structure after a history of almost complete isolation from it.
This historical isolation is in many ways a detriment to the potential of indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces to become spaces of resistance since the lack of indigenous familiarity with capitalist modes of production and exploitative innovations make it particularly vulnerable to quick usurpation into the capitalist system. Yet this relative isolation and cultural persistence also give it a strength. Cultural norms that have persisted for millennia with relatively little influence from (and certainly not dominated by) outside cultures and/or ideologies, produce spaces that are likely to intensely resist any attempted impositions. Indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces aren’t dominated spaces, at least not yet – the violence of the Baguazo is evidence of this. Even indigenous areas that have significantly integrated into capitalist structures (El Otro Lado, Amulpash) or that have originated as part of that structure (Villa Unión) maintain a level of cultural and organizational autonomy that separates them conceptually from representational spaces. More precisely, this autonomy from capitalist modes of production makes the application of Production of Space theories to indigenous spaces problematic. Doing so blurs the causal arrows connecting the components of the conceptual triad enough to call for the inclusion of a new conceptual space, an indigenous capitalist-emergent space. The addition of the indigenous capitalist-emergent space into the conceptual triad helps to solidify the causal arrows, both conceptually and practically (See Figure 9.7). As the role that indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces play in spatial production emerges with their introduction to the newly formulated conceptual tetrad, the causal arrows among the original three components of the triad become increasingly solid as the theory is applied to indigenous spaces. The indigeneity of these spaces and their emergence into capitalist systems help to
Figure 9.7 – The Conceptual Tetrad (Graphics by Curtis Tow)

clarify what representations of space, representational spaces and spatial practice look like in the Peruvian Amazon. As these dialectic relationships stabilize, so do the causal arrows connecting indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces to the remaining components of the tetrad. This addition helps to address the conceptual gaps that emerge from the application of a theory produced in the urban West onto a non-Western, rural space, allowing for the application of Production of Space theory (albeit significantly modified) to spaces in the process of being introduced into capitalist structures. It also allows for an analysis of indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces as spaces of
resistance that reflect the spatio-temporal characteristics of its introduction to capitalist structures.

THE BAGUAZO AND THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE

The events of June 5, 2009 were a culmination of a series of movements that had begun years before. After the already discussed op-ed piece authored by President García in 2007 where he referred to indigenous groups as “orchard dogs”, the Peruvian congress began in December 2007 to set in motion the legislation that would facilitate the signing of a free-trade agreement with the United States. By June 2008, the Peruvian government, complying with the requirements of the free-trade agreement, had passed decrees that practically overturned the Law of Native Consultation confirmed by the new Peruvian constitution of 1993. AIDESEP immediately organized a protest against these decrees. Beginning in August of 2008, several oil facilities throughout the Peruvian jungle were occupied. Despite pressure from President García to uphold the decrees in order to facilitate sale of indigenous lands to international corporations, the Peruvian congress eased the tension by supporting the AIDESEP protest and abolishing two of the decrees and promising to analyze the constitutionality of the remaining ones. In March 2009, AIDESEP called for an official report on the analysis, which went unanswered, leading the organization to call for a general strike throughout the Amazon. The government once again promised to analyze the decrees, but the lack of action led to an intensification of the strike. Oil processing centers and various highways, including the Curva del Diablo outside of Bagua, were occupied, crippling national oil production. As the tension intensified, the Peruvian government declared a state of emergency and sent police forces to remove the occupiers from the highway. A group had been occupying Petroperú’s Station No. 6 since late April. Inside this station, dozens of Petroperú workers and police were being held hostage. The road connecting Station
No. 6 and the city of Bagua was also occupied at the Curva del Diablo. This provided for an interesting situation:

The Peruvian government, having emerged from one of the bloodiest insurrections in Latin American history, followed by a corrupt and authoritarian (even by Peruvian standards) regime, and inept superficially indigenista presidencies, was desperate to exploit the opportunities for economic growth presented by the new extractivist world order. Historically ignored, the natural resources in the Amazon were suddenly of interest. The Peruvian government, true to post-neoliberal extractivist ideology, and in collusion with international capital, began to conceive indigenous spaces less as pre-modern and empty, and more as potentially modern and with an abundance of the natural resources that could bring the economic growth Peruvians were primed for. Indigenous spaces were thus conceived as what they could be, instead of what they actually were. The Peruvian Amazon was an extractive imperialist utopia. The Peruvian government had begun a process in the Amazon of production of idealized spaces in service not of the practical needs of the people living in them, but of the profits it could engender for outsiders. The “lived” indigenous space was now in danger of becoming the “conceived” space feeding the post-neoliberal world order. The “lived” indigenous space and the “conceived” post-neoliberal space met and clashed in the Curva del Diablo with tragic consequences. It is not difficult to imagine that the result would have been somewhat different had indigenous spaces experienced a similar capitalist economic development as representational spaces.

Lefebvre’s Production of Space is more clearly visible in Nieva. The spatial practice visible in and around the colonial central plaza reflects a spatial intersection. Representations of space are prominent. Despite the fact that one can hear as much awajún and wampís as Spanish spoken in town, the hotels, restaurants, and internet cafés, almost entirely owned by colonos, represent an
idealized version of what these investors hope the town will be: a spatial manifestation of
capitalist potential. Yet the dialectical relationships that emanate from these representational
spaces do not interact with Lefebvrian representations of space. As already discussed, these
representations of space are not interacting with representational spaces that encompass a society
or culture that has been sustainably shaped by exposure and/or resistance to capitalism. Instead,
the capitalist representations of space are interacting with spaces that have been produced to
represent indigenous extra-capitalist interests. These indigenous interests are based upon identity
and an innately integrative relationship with nature, not upon a position gradually achieved in a
developed capitalist structure. As such, they are not representational spaces. Instead, they are
more accurately defined by Foucault’s heterotopias – not idealized, but real; not contoured by
this imposed idealization, but shaped by an identity based on a deep integration with nature -
they are indigenous spaces. Perhaps Nieva is the key space where the Baguazo was produced –
the meeting-point between indigenous spaces and Western capitalist spaces. It is a space where
the process of modernization is visible, where the entry of indigenous spaces into the capitalist
structure can be observed and where indigenous spaces become indigenous capitalist-emergent
spaces. This space may be said to “embrace a multitude of intersections, each with its assigned
locations” (Lefebvre, p. 33). This space can also be said to be the place where many different
points in time (represented by different stages of capitalist development) intersect in one place.
Nieva is the spatial representation of the introduction of indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces
into the conceptual triad. In the grid-like streets radiating from the central plaza, the trajectories
of the peque-peques connecting the town with El Otro Lado and indigenous villages beyond, and
in the dirt road connecting Villa Unión to the rest of the town one can observe the dialectical
causal arrows emerging between indigenous spaces and the conceptual triad where imaginary
dotted lines could barely be imagined under the strictly Lefebvrian Production of Space model. It is where these violent intersections accumulated into a real and practical space of resistance in the Curva del Diablo. The Baguazo cannot be understood by looking strictly at capitalist spatial productions. It is necessary to include indigenous spatial productions to understand it. The production of space of the Baguazo requires a conceptual tetrad incorporating indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces.

The introduction of indigenous spaces into Lefebvre’s conceptual triad (thereby converting it to a conceptual tetrad) represents the introduction of indigeneity into the modernization process. This introduction has not occurred gradually and it has not reflected a negotiation between two antagonistic but co-dependent systems. It has been violent. In this case, modernism is not, as Soja (1989) describes it, “a response to modernization” (p. 29). The term “response” implies a conversation or two-way interaction. This is not a negotiated modernism, it is an imposed one. It is not a gradual manipulation, it is an immediate, almost sudden injunction. This imposed introduction into the post-neoliberal, extractive imperialist capitalist structure without the benefit of a negotiated history of dialectic conflict or interaction means that the resistance to the unfamiliarity of the intentions of the capitalist invader will be violent, as the Baguazo proved to be. Indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces, not representational spaces, provide the analytical power necessary to understand this violence.

How do the characteristics of indigenous productions of space that led to the relative success of the social movements that led to the Baguazo translate into an ability to continue to resist now that they’re officially introduced into the triad? Western-based theories divide social movements into roughly two areas – POS and NSM. Indigenous movements are both. Where European based NSM movements focus on working outside of and against the state (this is a space of
resistance that is based on an ideology, an imagined reality, a representation of space) and POS movements seek to participate in the existing capitalist state (this is a space of resistance that is practical, lived, based on ideology, but also on practical democratic/capitalist development – arguably, a representational space), indigenous movements seek participation in the state, but not for the purposes of entering into its capital-serving structure. This isn’t an effectively democratic, economically powerful modern state that indigenous movement is trying to enter. It is a fragile, corrupt, post-neoliberal, extractive imperialist state. As such, it is not seeking entry into this state, as POS would explain. Instead, it is seeking official recognition that would preserve its autonomy from that state. It isn’t seeking entry into a Keynesian welfare-state that will represent its interests, it is seeking protection from a post-neoliberal capital-representing state, by that very state – with the help of multi-scalar international pressure. The process of modernization in Condorcanqui is taking place in the era of extractive imperialism, and is thus shaped by that spatial-temporal context. The relationship with the extractive imperialist state complicates the rather clear implications of POS and NSM theories that pose resistance movements either in opposition to or searching for incorporation with the state. Indigenous capitalist-emergent movements often seek both. As we incorporate indigenous spaces into a newly formulated conceptual tetrad in order to better understand productions of non-Western spaces, we also need to incorporate indigeneity into our understanding of the resistance movements in Condorcanqui.

SCALE AS STRATEGY

One of the strengths gained in adding indigenous spaces into the Lefebvrian conceptual triad is that it highlights a new, perhaps critical contradiction of capitalism: that of environmental apocalypse. The Amazon jungle is not only home to various and diverse ethnic groups – it is
also a critical piece in the natural structures that sustain the earth as a viably inhabitable place. As a result, the interests of Amazonians are global interests.

There are well-intentioned and well-received arguments which hold that the conversation should not focus on the global consequences of the exploitation of the Amazon rainforest. Instead, what needs to be discussed is the rights of the indigenous as human rights in themselves. The rights of the indigenous to their way of life exists outside of the environmental consequences to the rest of the world of the exploitation of the Amazon (Gudynas, 2014). Arguing for advocating for indigenous rights on a global scale, where the importance of the preservation of the Amazon to world survival is highlighted, further introduces them in to a capitalist system that will discard them when contradictions are addressed and/or when their land is no longer valuable. Yet the sheer weight of the consequences of exploiting the Amazon gives the indigenous movement in Perú a power that transcends the already important local interests. This power can facilitate Amazonian interests bearing the neglect and conflicting interests of the state by allowing for the skipping of the national scale through the advancement of identity-based contacts with Amazonian indígenas throughout South America as well as environmental interest groups globally. It is clear that the innate rights of the indigenous must be recognized for themselves. But in a time when capitalist forces are working on a global scale, perhaps it is time to consider a global-scale resistance. The distance of Amazonian indígenas from the state is shrinking. Democracy is slowly, but steadily consolidating in Perú. Despite these advances, the interests of Amazonian indígenas take a back seat to the interests of capital. The state, representing capital, has only begun to recognize Amazonians since the monetary value of their land, and potentially their labor, was noticed.
In the current global extractive imperialist context, the movement will need to exploit any advantage it can gain. Indígenas that have been largely isolated from global developments for millennia are facing a resistance against a system that has been developing globally for centuries. This development has been addressing any contradictions that it may have introduced along the way, in this case utilizing several strategic myths to address any potential contradictions introduced by exploitation of the Amazon. Much like superficial identity-based concessions offered by the state, these environmentalist myths have actually facilitated the commodification of nature.

*Strategic Environmentalist Myths*

The first of these strategic myths is that the Amazon is a space empty of people and property. As already stated, the population in the Peruvian Amazon, though low, is significant. By 2007, the Peruvian Amazon had a population of more than 3.5 million (Dourojeanni, 2011). Ignoring that this population exists makes it much easier to environmentally devastate their land for profit and national “development”, as evidenced by President García’s opinion pieces. This myth has also been paradoxically exploited by environmental groups. These organizations advocate for the conservation of the Amazon for all of humanity, forgetting that it should be preserved for the sake of the vibrant cultures and communities already living there (Gavaldá i Palacín, 2013).

Another myth is that of biodiversity. Many arguments for the preservation of the Amazon claim that the rainforest’s biodiversity is unique in the world and can potentially hold undiscovered natural riches. Though the protection of biodiversity is a noble goal, the function this performs is counter-productive. As the biodiversity of the forest is hailed for its potential, that very biodiversity that is to be protected is thereby commodified. As the value of natural resources
that make up this biodiversity increases (e.g. pharmaceuticals, super foods), the protection of biodiversity is discarded in search of profits (Dourojeanni, 2011).

The next three myths are the ones that most effectively facilitate the exploitation of the Amazon. The thick forest that covers more than half of Perú’s territory makes it convenient to argue that Perú is a forestry country. Yet forestry has never been a significant sector in the Peruvian economy. In fact, Perú imported 3 times more wood products than what it exported in 2009 (Dourojeanni, 2011). Though the natural resources are there for Perú to develop a forestry economy such as Finland’s, this has failed to occur. Perú lacks many of the characteristics necessary to develop such a sector, such as reliable infrastructure. In addition, the legal structures necessary to regulate a forestry industry that needs to be sustainable to remain profitable is entirely absent. Sustainable forestry requires state action to protect the balanced exploitation of forests, as exists in Finland. In Perú, still firmly entrenched in the periphery of the Wallerstinian world system, the forest represents the raw material to be privatized exploited to feed the industrialization of core nations. Unlike Finland, where the regulated forestry industry helps to sustain a wealthy and stable welfare state, Perú depends on raw materials to sustain the economic growth that will help the country emerge from decades of grinding poverty and violence into a prosperous and consolidated democracy. It is much more difficult to exploit natural resources sustainably and responsibly when there is global (through the neo-liberal state) pressure to produce quickly in order to maintain levels of growth. As the state continues to neglect the needs of Amazonian indígenas, forest dwellers are forced to extract wood or minerals illegally or turn to extractive companies to provide the basic needs the state refuses to provide (Dourojeanni, 2011). The view of the forest as a commodified resource with monetary value, however, is now cemented, and the proletarianization of Amazonian indígenas begins.
The myth of environmentalism is also dangerous. Much like protecting biodiversity commodifies nature, environmentalism can often prove to be a superficial concession.

Organizations such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certify forestry companies with a “green seal” which guarantees that the company practices are ecologically responsible and sustainable. According to Dourojeanni (2011):

Forest certifications, also known as ‘green seals’ is an ingenious initiative that originated in the 1980s and developed in the 1990s, to support utopian sustainable forest management, especially in tropical forests, where this practice has rarely been applied. As is well known, many think that the sustainable use of forest is the only possibility to maintain its benefits for future generations, since ‘if they are not used, they have no value for society’ and, consequently, would be destroyed and substituted with agricultural activities. This theory is the basis for forestry legislation in almost all the tropical countries of the world. It seems to be working well in developed countries with temperate and cool climates. But it has not worked at all in developing countries… The problem is not that the certifications are misused in temperate forests in developed countries where forest legislation is generally obeyed. The problem is in the natural tropical forests where forest legislation is a dead letter (p. 74-75).

The certification of logging companies is meaningless unless the state is willing to enforce the criteria of the certification. In a neoliberal state like Perú, where the state represents the interests of capital, certification from organizations such as the FSC, which is made up largely of businesspeople in the wood industry, serves mainly to facilitate extraction.

The final myth, and perhaps the most damaging, is that the Amazonian region makes a relatively low contribution to the national economy. The informality of the economy in the Amazon, particularly in indigenous areas, means that much of what is produced in the Amazon is not included in the calculations of economic contribution until it finally enters the official economic structures as products of the Andes or the coast. This underestimation, in conjunction with the demands for basic services that go along with the beginning stages of proletarianization and entrance into the capitalist system, legitimizes the demands that Amazonian indígenas need to
contribute more towards paying for the benefits of being Peruvian. The exploitation of precarious and globally necessary ecosystems is thusly neatly justified.

Encompassing all of these myths, the politics of delineation of protected lands is also problematic. Dourojeanni argues that delineation and protection is necessary for sustainable development, since which lands are to be exploited and when needs to be spatially defined. This is problematic in places like Perú where corruption and ineffective laws make protected lands obsolete (as seen in Chapter III). What delineating protected lands does is simultaneously delineate un-protected lands. By defining which lands not to exploit, delineating protected lands also defines which lands are open to exploitation. In corrupt countries such as Perú, where the state defends the interests of capital, and where organizations such as the FSC facilitate rampant extraction, even these superficial and counter-productive delineations and protections become meaningless. It is clear that these strategies commodify nature for the purposes of multinational corporate profit maximization, under the guise of national-scale development, and at the expense of more local-scale interests.

The Baguazo was the manifestation of the clash that occurs when indigenous spaces are introduced into a Lefebvrian conceptual triad of Production of Space the definitions of which demand interaction with capitalist structures. The conflict that ensued was not a result of the dialectic interaction between utopian representations of space and the representational spaces that have developed alongside capitalism for centuries of industrialization. Instead, it was the reaction of a largely neglected space, new to the machinations of capitalism, being forced to participate in its own destruction for the sake of national-scale development. The goal of the movement was and continues to be the protection of indigenous lands and ways of living. The Baguazo was successful in overturning the 2008 decrees that would have allowed for the ceding
of indigenous lands without prior consultation, as well as in bringing down the government that had led to their passing. It could be argued that in the face of global-scale capitalist onslaught the only effective resistance must be global in scale as well. The effectiveness of indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces in resisting impositions from global extractive imperialist representations of space may depend on their ability to interact with them on this global scale. In the meantime, the number of plots of Amazonian lands being ceded to extractive companies continues to increase.

Though the rights of the indigenous should, from an ethical perspective absolutely be recognized and defended, the interconnectedness of Peruvian indigenous spaces to indigenous spaces in other countries as well as environmental organizations provides a strategic opportunity for the movement to gain even more traction. After all, it is doubtful that the decrees would have been overturned and that García’s entire cabinet would have resigned simply because the rights of indígenas had been trampled. It is quite clear that international pressure, procured by indigenous political work, led to many of these concessions. In this way, indigenous productions of scale can influence the dialectic relationships that will ensue as indigenous spaces are introduced to the conceptual triad.

As way of conclusion, I will now consider how Production of Space theories can inform an understanding of indigenous spaces and resistance movements, and how they, in turn, can inform Production of Space theories. In this way, it is hoped that an effective strategy of resistance can be formulated that will place the well-being of the earth and its inhabitants as the central goal to strive for, not the maximization of profits and preservation of increasingly rampant capitalism.
CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

The Baguazo represented much more than another violent social conflict in a country too familiar with such events. In many ways, the Baguazo served as an introduction of Amazonian indigeneity to the Peruvian nation. The sheer violence of the event meant that people previously only known as primitive *chunchos* and *campas* had now emerged into the national psyche as human beings with rights that were being trampled by the alliance between international companies and the state. Despite social movements having been equated with terrorism in Perú since the excesses of the Shining Path insurrection of the 1980s and 1990s, the Baguazo successfully elicited sympathy and support from significant portions of Peruvian society. The overturning of the offending decrees and the resignation of President García’s cabinet can only be interpreted as an unprecedented success for the movement. The strategies that were used to reach this success have been discussed at length: The absence of Amazonian indígenas in the national myth building that focused on Andean culture as its centerpiece meant that Amazonian organizations were able to successfully escape the overtures by national development interests. While Andean indígenas were exploited to sustain national economic growth, Amazonian indígenas resisted when the attempt was made to force them into the national structure. The commitment to the resistance was largely shaped by the nature-society integration central to indigenous cosmology. As capitalist interests via government repression attempted to destroy this integration, Amazonian indígenas rose up in struggle. Pressure from indigenous rights groups beyond national borders as well as environmental organizations forced the government to make the necessary changes. Yet the struggle continues. The following describes the strategies
that are necessary for the resistance to continue, with a view to placing these strategies in the context of gaps highlighted by this analysis in Lefebvrian Production of Space theory.

**STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE**

Is the ultimate strategy to diminish the influence of market on social and political life? Is it to end the markets all together? Is it to enter the market? How does this contradict indigenous nature-society relationships? Perhaps what is needed is a dialectic – a system that allows for indigenous influences on global social life; where indigenous spaces are introduced into the calculus of spatial production as entities that are as solid and influential on spatial practice as representations of space and representational spaces.

Why have indigenous spaces not been included as influential in spatial production? Perhaps it is because they present another contradiction to capitalism. In fact, the new attention paid to indigenous cosmologies is a reaction to the clash between neoliberalism (in the form of privatization of previously ignored lands that needs protection from the state) and the modes of social organization that had allowed vibrant communities to survive in inhospitable environments for centuries. The Baguazo certainly represents this clash. Latour (2007) helps to explain why this is. His “chains of experiences” negotiate smaller-scale understandings into larger-scale common epistemological solidarities. The modes of production drive these negotiations. Knowledge then emerges from the accumulation of chains of experiences. Capitalist chains of experiences strategically categorize (with the ultimate goal of dichotomizing) knowledges to reflect exploitative modes of production, creating a system where “certain subjects can move from knowledge to the world while others move in the opposite direction” thereby reifying “the gaps generated by modern machines of stratification of subjectivities” (Gonzalez and Vazquez, 2015, p. 7). Indigenous thought and cosmology has gone from being
summarily ignored to being clearly delineated and categorized into the losing end of the increasingly dichotomized Peruvian landscape of knowledge. Amazonian indígenas are therefore introduced into capitalist modes of production in an already disadvantaged position. Their knowledges have nothing to do with a struggle against capitalism since they haven’t interacted or negotiated with capitalism.

Though creating a rift between nature and society is a conceptually distinct process, it serves similar political interests as the creation of a rift between subject and object, and between knowledge and the world. Knowledges seen as separate from and inferior to the hegemonic world often exist in a capitalist (and especially in a neoliberal and extractive imperialist contexts) society, and in representational spaces, where those knowledges represent the interests of those in the space. The world understood as knowledge that has become largely, if not universally accepted (and likely dichotomized), and which through proliferation as a desirable system reinforces capitalist modes of production, exists in representations of space. A perfunctory reading of Lefebvre’s conceptual triad of the Production of Space could suggest that his conceptualization of representations of space and representational spaces as two entities reifies the dichotomizations and categorizations that address by occlusion the contradictions to capitalism introduced by neoliberalism. Yet Lefebvre prefers to theorize not about the role played by conceptual gaps between representations of space and representational spaces in producing space, but about the role the connections between them play. As a truly dialectical relationship, the interaction between representations of space and representational spaces in producing space is made up of an infinite number of factors. These factors are in turn made up an infinite number of Latourian chains of experience and the infinite relationships among them. The interactions are so complex, and so entrenched and comprehensive, that much like nature
and society, subject and object, knowledge and world, it is counter-productive and counter-intuitive to try to separate them. The epistemological understanding of knowledge and of spatial production overvalues those chains of experience and knowledges that represent capitalist interests while those that contradict it are undervalued or entirely absent. It categorizes nature to facilitate its commodification and exploitation for capitalist interests in the same way that it idealizes representations of space and defines representational spaces as “the dominated space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 39).

Yet the presence of spatial practice (“the particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 33)) in the conceptual triad, with the myriad of causal arrows pointing to and from this and the other two pieces of the triad, suggests a more Latourian ontological approach where “knowledge” (as prior to, or aspirant to “world” - similar to the Lefebvrian representation of space) “is added to the world;” (as practically applied - similar to the Lefebvrian representations of space) “it does not suck things into representations or, alternatively, disappear in the object it knows. It is added to the landscape” (the landscape here being similar to the Lefebvrian spatial practice) (Latour, 2007, p. 100). The landscape as spatial practice influences as much as it is influenced by both knowledge (representation of space) and the world (representational space), which in turn influence each other endlessly. Trying to separate knowledge and the world, much like trying to separate nature and society, is thus logically unproductive. Any attempts to do so therefore have to perform some other function. In this case, indigenous knowledges that reunite nature and society as inseparable entities contradict the capitalist need to exploit nature. In practical terms, the indigenous influenced Buen Vivir paradigm which “does not depend so much on changing the relations of production, but rather the mentality of the citizenship” and as such occupies conceptual spaces between representations...
of space, representational spaces, and spatial practice, rather than discreetly within them, is still seen as anti-capitalist and therefore Orientalized and dichotomized as primitive, exotic and “other”. In reality, Condorcanqui is an indigenous space, practically and conceptually different from representational spaces precisely because they are extra- (not anti-) capitalist. They are extra- (not anti-) capitalist because they have not had the history of resistance and interaction with capitalist representations of space to formulate knowledges specifically and reactively against it. Indigeneity exists conceptually between representational spaces, representations of space and spatial practice, but it also exists separately from these. Is it possible that the application of European, class-based definitions of spatial productions to non-European spaces are entirely and misguidedly temporal and aspatial attempts at explaining very place-specific Latin American social developments? Could a new conceptual space, outside of the realm of representational spaces and representations of space, be theorized to tease out the problematic existing conceptualizations and improve our understanding non-Western, non-urban spatial practice? The space and time of indigenous spaces is different from the space and time of Lefebvrian entities. As such they warrant a separate conceptual entity to be introduced, namely, the indigenous capitalist-emergent space.

The inadequacy of social movements theories in explaining the Baguazo also contributes to the argument for the theorization of an indigenous capitalist-emergent space. Both NSM and POS theories highlight the role of the state in shaping social movements. NSM theories, produced in an environment of post-war welfare-state corruption, theorized social movements that occurred outside of the state and largely worked to radically change it or allow for political action outside of it. POS theories, produced mostly in de-centered North American democracies in the midst of civil rights movements, theorized social movements that sought inclusion and representation in
the state. On the one hand, European social movements resisted paternalistic states that sought to provide the basic needs for its citizens, with the ultimate goal of quelling the extremist political and social upheavals that had brought the continent to its knees during the world wars. Perhaps because of its ultimate goal of sustaining capitalism, or perhaps because of the corrupt implementation of Keynesian policies, social movements in Europe resisted the state itself. On the other hand, North American social movements fought for inclusion into the supposedly representative democratic system. The Civil Rights Movement was largely (with notable exceptions such as the Black Panthers and the Weather Underground) a struggle to be included in the democratic process, not a resistance to the process itself.

The social movements that led to the Baguazo fit into both POS and NSM models in some ways, and in others both POS and NSM fall short. Velasco’s regime was a Latin American version of the Keynesian European welfare-state in that it sought to meet the basic needs of those most negatively affected by colonialism and arch-capitalism. In seeking to preserve capitalism, and neglecting to recognize the cultural specificities of Andean and coastal Perú, Velasco’s plan failed. It could be argued that Shining Path developed ideologically and organizationally as a reaction and in resistance to this ineffective government. Amazonian indígenas took no part in this interaction. Other than being officially recognized as comunidades nativas, Amazonian indígenas remained isolated and neglected. As democracy returned and attempted to consolidate, this neglect continued. It was not until the natural resources of the jungle became commodified and accessible that an interaction with the state and capitalism began. At this juncture, the economic situation in Perú and the stage of capitalism that had developed in the world was entirely different. In 2009, the developed world was just emerging from one of the most extreme economic crashes since the Great Depression. The contradictions introduced by speculative
financing were addressed by demanding even more from periphery countries. The raw materials necessary for industrial growth and increasingly popular “clean” energy efforts were to be provided with the aid of newly democratic governments addicted to the economic growth promised by the new economic world order. Perú in 2009 was economically booming. In 2008-2009, the economy had expanded by 9.8% (Webb and Fernández Baca, 2011). The demands on indigenous lands were not made by a country in desperate need, as Perú had been in the 1980s. Instead, the privatization of indigenous lands was expected to bolster the unsustainably high economic growth the country had begun to experience.

The Peruvian state, having fluctuated in ideology from authoritarian welfare state in the 1970s, to isolationist in the late 1980s, to authoritarian neoliberalism in the 1990s, and finally democratic (and superficially indigenista) neoliberalism in the 2000s shaped this policy. After all, it is the state which provides, defines, limits, and shapes the market’s agency, not the market itself. This is echoed by national legal and enforcement policies and practices. The absent state is not absent at all for capital.

The social movements that led to the Baguazo were not specifically fighting to remain outside of the state. If anything, the goals of AIDESEP revolved around asking the state to hold up its end of the bargain by honoring the signing of Convention 169 of the ILO. Unlike NSM theories, the Peruvian Amazonian movement sought to enter the state, or at least to interact on equal terms with the state. Unlike POS, the movement’s goal to dialogue with the state was not necessarily to gain representation within that state, but to protect its autonomy from the state. Recognizing that Perú’s government represented the interests of capital over those of its citizens, the Amazonian indigenous movement sought protection from the state by the state.
The clash was as violent as it turned out largely because of its suddenness. Andean spaces, fully entrenched in national mythmaking, and thoroughly colonized by European conquistadores and their ancestors, had learned to interact and dialogue with capitalism for centuries. Consequently, it had also learned how to resist it, with varying degrees of success. The Shining Path and other such movements developed slowly and gradually, changing tactics as the global capitalist structure shifted. The movement’s Maoist (or in the case of MRTA – Trotskyist) ideology and methods clearly defined it as anti-capitalist, providing evidence that it developed in dialogue with and resistance to capitalism. Andean spaces, therefore, fit more neatly in Lefebvre’s conceptual triad. Their interactions with capitalist ideologies that attempted to integrate them into capitalist structures had been firmly in place for centuries, solidifying the dialectical causal arrows that tied it, as a representational space, to representations of space and spatial practice.

The same cannot be said for Amazonian spaces. Interaction with capital had been sporadic at best. Indigenous spaces did not even become conceptually viable for inclusion into the conceptual triad until the raw materials in their land had been commodified and deemed viable for entry into the capitalist structure. As a result, entry into the state, or resistance against it took an entirely different meaning than it does for POS and NSM social movement theories. In addition, the history of interaction with and resistance to representations of space necessary to form a representational space is almost entirely absent in Amazonian indigenous areas. The incursions of capital and the state into indigenous lands that led to the Baguazo were unexpected, sudden, and violent. The reaction was as unexpected, sudden, and violent. As a result, neither NSM nor POS theories are adequate for understanding the Baguazo. Consequently, Production of Space theories are similarly insufficient.
THE BAGUAZO AS MODERNISM

Soja (1989) defines modernism as “the cultural, ideological, reflective, and I will add, theory-forming response to modernization” (p.29). How a space responds to modernization reflects the spatial productions in that space. Almost by definition, different spaces will respond to modernization in different ways. Therefore, modernism is innately space-specific. The Baguazo served as an introduction of indigenous spaces to the process of modernization. This introduction was imposed without the luxury of sustained significant historical interaction.

Lefebvre’s Production of Space assumes an advanced social understanding of capitalist modes of production. Representations of space and representational spaces have developed in the context of capitalist (or anti-capitalist) development. Amazonian indígenas, meanwhile, remain largely unaffected by western rationalizations. The concept of an innately integrated society and nature so central to indigenous culture means that the solid space (the earth, nature) is as important in producing social space as economics, politics, culture, and any of the myriad of possibilities offered by Lefebvre.

This cosmology has developed almost completely isolated from global social and economic upheavals. In the developed world (and to a certain degree, in more connected spaces in the developing world) these fluctuations shaped how representational spaces interacted with representations of space. But Amazonian indigenous spaces entered the capitalist structure suddenly and at a very different stage in global capitalist development. Amazonian indigenous spaces are therefore not representational spaces – they are indigenous spaces based not on historical capitalist formulation of class, but on indigenous identity. Latourian “chains of experience” help to not only problematize indigeneity and indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces, but also to highlight a potential strength of this aspect of the movement.
The knowledges these chains of experience produce are delineated and dichotomized in order to facilitate their conformity to rationalized capitalist modes of production. In the post-colonial, neoliberal Peruvian context, knowledges are dichotomized as indigenous (inferior and uncivilized and pre-modern) and Western (superior, civilized, and modern). This means that, as indigenous spaces are introduced into the conceptual triad, they become conceptually connected to the components of the triad, through dotted lines representing an incomplete, stuttering dialog. These lines are also largely one-directional, emanating from representations of space, representational spaces and spatial practice that have been molded through centuries of capitalist development, and forcing their influence onto newly introduced indigenous spaces. As dichotomized and marginalized as indigenous knowledges have been, the Latourian chains of experience are two-directional. ALL chains of experience contribute to the landscape, not just hegemonic ones.

How then, can indigenous spaces in the Peruvian Amazon contribute to a landscape that represents their interests? Perhaps indigenous identity itself is the answer. The indigenous identities of the Awajún and Wampís of Condorcanqui province – who made up a large portion of the organizers and participants of the Baguazo, are not based on national boundaries. The Awajún and Wampís territory extends into Ecuador, and cultural affinities are greater with indigenous groups throughout the South American Amazon than with other groups within Peruvian national borders. In addition, the integration of nature and society that is central to indigenous cosmology has allied Amazonian indigenous movements with global-scale environmental movements. These extra-national-scale alliances and interests have provided the movement with the power necessary to overturn laws and bring down governments.
In the eight years since the *Baguazo occurred, the smoke has mostly cleared and tempers have mostly calmed. Yet traditional indigenous lands continue to be ceded and exploited. As important as it is to fight for the rights of Amazonian indígenas as human rights, the question remains – what is the best strategy of resistance? From an ethical perspective, the innate human rights should be defended. Yet, who will care about 60,000 indigenous people resisting encroachment from oil companies? As journalist Mariella Balbi responded to Alberto Pizango, leader of AIDESEP in an interview in the days leading up to the Baguazo: “I’m not going to lose my electric power because you people have a problem with dialogue and compromise. The country can’t just stop for you people” (Choque de Dos Mundos, 2016). In reprimanding Pizango, Balbi fully integrated rural, non-Western matters with urban, Western phenomena. Her statement encompassed the development that is also captured by the inclusion of indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces into the until-now-urban-centric conceptual triad: that rural spaces are intricately intertwined with urban spaces. The Amazon is no longer a disconnected uncivilized backwater. The more the chains of experience linking the Amazon with capitalist modes of production solidify, the clearer it becomes that what happens in the Amazon can and will have significant impact on what happens in Lima and beyond.

Despite attitudes such as Balbi’s, indigenous spaces have potential influence too. They are largely unaffected by an ineffective state that represents capital, or by nationalist sentiments. In addition, the indigenous integration of nature and society could potentially address the critical contradictions introduced by extractive imperialism - namely that of global environmental devastation.

The chains of experience are, in fact, two-directional, regardless of strategic hierarchies. As the distance from the state decreases and interaction with capital increases, the causal lines
connecting indigenous spaces with the conceptual triad solidify and may even become meaningfully two-directional, making for a newly formulated conceptual tetrad. Indigenous knowledges can have a significant influence on spatial production – one that may help to preserve the earth as a habitable planet. In the long run, the strategy to seek international environmental alliances may ultimately commodify nature (if only to save and protect it). It may also address a critical contradiction of capitalism. If indigenous cosmologies succeed in having any influence on spatial production, perhaps a more environmentally responsible mode of production could develop which would ultimately preserve capitalism itself. In light of the environmental devastation plaguing increasingly larger areas of the world, and as an alternative to more long-term and radical propositions, the function that indigenous spaces can play in world preservation may be the only way to sustain them.

AFTERWORD

More than eight years have passed since the Bagua insurgency. Since then, the constitutional rights of the indigenous population have been upheld and the international networks of NGOs, conservationists and human rights advocates have been maintained. In 2011, Ollanta Humala of the Peruvian Nationalist Party was elected president of the Republic. His pro-indígena, anti-privatization center-left stance originally alienated foreign investors weary of similar trends throughout Latin America. Predictably, he enjoyed the most support in the Andean highlands and the Amazon. Within weeks of his inauguration, a law reflecting the sentiment of Convention 169 of the ILO was approved unanimously by Congress (Amnesty International, 2011). He also promised to revise the free-trade agreements with the United States and other countries that threatened the country’s sovereignty (Rènique, 2013). Two years later, however, Humala seems to have taken a sharp turn to the right. In 2012-2013, Humala had served as president of
UNASUR (Unión de Naciones Sud-Americanas). UNASUR’s goal is to create a political bloc of South American countries to offer an alternative to the United States attempt at maintaining its regional hegemony by creating the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Even during his presidency of UNASUR, he reaffirmed his alliance with the Pacific Alliance, an organization formed in 2011 with the very purpose of undermining UNASUR by collaborating with United States interests. In addition, Humala’s Minister of Economy and Finance refused to lead UNASUR’s Financial Integration Group, then responsible for the implementation of the Banco Sur – the financial arm created to break the hegemony of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank in South America (Rènique, 2013). On April 28, 2013, Humala delivered a speech in which he stated that

There are no native communities … in the [Andean] highlands; the majority are agrarian communities. For the most part, native communities are [only] found in the Amazonian jungle, those indigenous groups that years ago were out of contact, but which we are now trying to articulate to the national community with infrastructure and modernity (Humala quoted in Rènique, 2013).

Clearly this is an attempt at circumventing his very own Indigenous Peoples Prior Consultation Law for the purposes of ceding Andean lands to multinational mining companies against the wishes of the Andean people. His attempt to “articulate” Amazonian indígenas to the “national community with infrastructure and modernity” is a thinly veiled strategy to disqualify Amazonian indígenas from being protected by that law. Since then, multi-national mining operations in various highland areas, notably in Cajamarca department, have been approved and implemented despite fervent opposition. Meanwhile in the Amazon, the ONDS (Oficina Nacional de Diálogo y Sostenibilidad, or National Office of Dialogue and Sustainability) has been formed as an organization that provides “spaces for dialogue” between indigenous communities and the government. In essence, ONDS is the body through which the prior
The use of the natural resources of the Amazon has contributed to the economic growth of the country, but it has also generated a series of worrisome tensions, controversies and social conflicts that need to be dealt with in an integrative way by the State, not just with politics that are effective in managing conflicts, de-scaling and canalizing them towards avenues of concrete solutions, but anticipating events with a focus on prevention that allows facing the potential causes of their emergence and controlling them in their initial phases. This is exactly the global orientation that guides the actions of the ONDS in the Amazon (Willaqniki, 2013).

The elections of 2017 were held in this context. The run-off election pitted Keiko Fujimori of Fuerza Popular against Pedro Pablo Kuczynski of Peruanos por el Kambio (PPK), who won by only a few thousand votes. Fujimori’s platform has largely been a continuation of her father’s neoliberal privatizing right-wing authoritarianism. Meanwhile, PPK was formed in 2011. The party’s entire platform is based on Kuczynski’s neoliberal center-right philosophy (the change of the first letter of Cambio to K to match Kuczynski’s initials – PPK – is indicative of this). In this context, AIDESEP has been all but decimated. Neither the state nor the multinational extractive companies negotiate with AIDESEP any longer. Instead, negotiations usually take place with less powerful organizations representing specific ethnic groups. The pan-Amazonian organization offered by AIDESEP no longer exists. Taking advantage of this de- and re-territorialization, multinational extractive companies now have access to more than 70% of Amazonian lands for exploration or extraction (Chase Smith and Soria, 2017) in the Northwestern Peruvian Amazon. In Condorcanqui, these companies originate from, or have extensive contacts with Spain, the United States, Canada, Philippines, China and Argentina. What’s more, much of any hydrocarbons discovered and extracted from the area will be distributed via PetroPeru managed pipelines, such as the one that ruptured in Amuelpash in 2016.
(described in Chapter VIII). As PetroPeru continues to be neglected in the interests of eventually ceding it to private interests (Moreno, 2015), how many more indígenas will be forced from their ancestral lands and into uncertain futures in nearby cities? Will AIDESEP or another uniting organization emerge to re-establish the scale producing capabilities of indigeneity? Or will Perú become the ultimate example of accumulation by dispossession? As 2018 begins, and new corruption scandals affect both Fujimorismo and PPK, the outlook is grim. In speaking to an Awajún activist in Lima in 2017, I ask what the goal of his newly formed organization is:

“Our goal is to negotiate directly with the multinationals with no state intervention. We want to pressure the companies to build infrastructure like schools, roads, hospitals, etc. in exchange for getting permission to explore. We also want jobs once they establish a presence here.” I then ask the obvious: “What if they explore and find nothing. Isn’t your land still devastated? Won’t the multinationals simply leave without fulfilling their promises?” With hardly a pause, he responds: “we’ll figure that out if it comes up. In the meantime, we can’t just sit back and wait for the state to intervene. We have something someone wants and we’re going to get schools, hospitals and jobs” (personal communication, December, 2017). The disconcerting full-circle emerges – the state is capital, the commons is well on its way to be fully privatized. Unless Latourian chains of experience work to solidify the dialectic relationships between indigenous capitalist-emergent spaces and representational spaces, representations of space, and spatial practice, the ultimate contradiction of capitalism – environmental devastation – may ensue. The outlook is not only disturbing for the Amazon’s indígenas, but also for Lima and the entire world.
## Appendix A – Political timeline of modern Perú

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>APRA</th>
<th>Acción Popular</th>
<th>Fujimorismo</th>
<th>Izquierda Unida</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 27, 1930 – March 1, 1931</td>
<td>Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
<td>Party officially founded on Sep 20, 1930 as a leftist anti-imperialist party</td>
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<td>March 1, 1931 – March 1, 1931</td>
<td>Mariano Holguín Maldonado</td>
<td>Independent (Catholic Church)</td>
<td>Appointed by outgoing junta</td>
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<td>March 1, 1931 – March 5, 1931</td>
<td>Ricardo Leoncio Elías Arias</td>
<td>Military</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 5, 1931 – March 11, 1931</td>
<td>Gustavo Jimenez</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 11, 1931 – December 8, 1931</td>
<td>David Samanaz Ocampo y Sobrino</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Appointed by outgoing junta</td>
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<td>December 8, 1931 – April 30, 1933</td>
<td>Luis Miguel Sánchez Cerro</td>
<td>Unión Revolucionaria</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>Sánchez Cerro assassinated by APRA militant. APRA is illegalized.</td>
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<td>April 30, 1933 – December 8, 1939</td>
<td>Oscar Benavides Larrea</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Appointed by Constituent Assembly after Sánchez Cerro’s death</td>
<td>Repression of APRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date Range</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Coalition/Legislature</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<td>December 8, 1939 – July 28, 1945</td>
<td>Manuel Prado y Ugarteche</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>Repression of APRA</td>
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<td>July 28, 1945 – October 28, 1947</td>
<td>José Luis Bustamante y Rivero</td>
<td>Frente Democrático Nacional</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>Repression of APRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 29, 1948 – May 31, 1950</td>
<td>Manuel Odría</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
<td>Repression of APRA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Party founded June 1, 1956</td>
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<td>APRA Rebelde secedes from collaborationsist APRA.</td>
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<td>Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria is founded in 1962.</td>
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<td>March 3, 1963 –</td>
<td>Nicolás Lindley López</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>July 28, 1963</td>
<td>Fernando Belaúnde Terry</td>
<td>Acción Popular</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>Lead the opposition and encouraged instability which leads to military coup of 1968.</td>
<td>PRESIDENCY</td>
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<td>July 28, 1963 – October 3, 1968</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Beginning of MIR armed struggle</td>
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<td>October 3, 1968 – August 30, 1975</td>
<td>Juan Velasco Alvarado</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
<td>Opposition to military regime</td>
<td>Opposition to military regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 30, 1975 – July 28, 1980</td>
<td>Francisco Morales Bermúdez Cerrutti</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Coup d’état</td>
<td>Opposition to military regime</td>
<td>Opposition to military regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 28, 1985 – July 28, 1990</td>
<td>Alan García Pérez</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>PRESIDENCY</td>
<td>Alliance with FREDEMO – Mario Vargas Llosa’s Center-right party</td>
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<td>July 28, 1990 – April 5, 1992</td>
<td>Alberto Fujimori</td>
<td>Cambio 90</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>Opposition to Fujimori presidency</td>
<td>Opposition to Fujimori presidency</td>
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<td>Internal rifts fracture the party. Only three parties remain in coalition by 1993 municipal elections.</td>
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<td>Period</td>
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<td>Event</td>
<td>Opposition to</td>
<td>Opposition to</td>
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<td>January 9, 1993 – July 28, 1995</td>
<td>Alberto Fujimori</td>
<td>Cambio 90</td>
<td>Ratified Democratic Constituent Congress</td>
<td>Fujimori regime</td>
<td>Fujimori regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 28, 2000 – November 21, 2000</td>
<td>Alberto Fujimori</td>
<td>Sí Cumple</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>Fujimori regime</td>
<td>Fujimori regime</td>
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<td>July 28, 2001 – July 28, 2006</td>
<td>Alejandro Toledo Manrique</td>
<td>Perú Posible</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>Gains 6% of votes in 2002 regional elections</td>
<td>Vamos Vecino forms alliance with Cambio90 and Nueva Mayoría to form</td>
<td>Vamos Vecino forms alliance with Cambio90 and Nueva Mayoría to form</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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