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Persistence of Cultural Heritage in a Multicultural Context: Examining Factors that Shaped Voting Preferences in the 2016 Election

Anna M. Schwartz
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PERSISTENCE OF CULTURAL HERITAGE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT:
EXAMINING FACTORS THAT SHAPED VOTING PREFERENCES IN THE 2016 ELECTION

by

ANNA M. SCHWARTZ

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology
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Philosophy

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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
ABSTRACT

Persistence of cultural heritage in a multicultural context:
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By
Anna M. Schwartz

Adviser: Dr. Kristen Gillespie-Lynch

The prevailing discourse about the myth of the “melting pot” of American culture implies that heritage cultures are eliminated in favor of a homogenous “American” norm. However, this myth belies the persistence of our cultural heritage in forming our attitudes, morals, and habitual patterns of thought, each of which shape how we participate in our democracy through voting. By contextualizing voting predictors such as authoritarianism, social dominance, and sexism in developmental and ecological theories, this dissertation shows how they are shaped by culture and transmitted through consumption of media and interaction with members of one’s community and family. In an effort to model voting preferences using psychological constructs rather than demographic proxies such as race, gender or age, political scientists Feldman and Stenner (1997) have identified authoritarian parenting attitudes as a key parameter that predicts voting preferences for conservative candidates. Other scholars have identified additional parameters, such as hostile sexism (Glick and Fiske, 1996) and social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994) while scholars such as Graham et al. (2011) have drawn together these separate predictors into a comprehensive, multidimensional measure of political ideology situated in the literature on moral development, yet scholars have neglected the role of culture in shaping our voting preferences and the psychological constructs which underlie and drive them. While psychological constructs pinpoint the mechanisms for people’s voting
behavior rather than essentializing behavior to demographic groups, most of the literature on voting preferences categorizes the predictors as personality or individual difference variables, or not at all. Integrating three theories on cultural ecology (Bronfenbrenner, Greenfield and Hofstede) with Tajfel and Turner’s Social Identity Theory, this dissertation seeks to open a dialogue about the tensions between individual differences variables and cultural variables, and how they both contribute to shaping outcome behaviors such as taking a moral stance and then voting in accordance with it. This work assembles the threads from recent research to create a model which predicts voting decisions, contextualized in a multicultural environment, to tease out the role of culture as a contributor. Using an extensive online survey, we replicated findings from prior literature which indicated that hostile sexism (but not being a man), authoritarian parenting attitudes, and a social dominance orientation predicted voting preferences for Donald Trump compared to Hillary Clinton. A new predictor, heritage-culture individualism, was developed for this dissertation and significantly predicted participants’ preference for Donald Trump. Given ongoing debate in cross-cultural psychology about the degree to which culture can be studied as an individual difference or as characteristic of one’s heritage countries, we compared individual difference measures of cultural values with the mean cultural value orientation of one’s heritage country or countries. Findings suggest that the impact of heritage cultures, or the values, norms, and rules brought by our ancestors from our heritage countries and regions, is a significant component that shapes voting decisions while individual difference cultural variables are less predictive. Taken together and situated in theoretical perspectives, these findings suggest that voting preferences are shaped by cultural values, and prompts scholars to recast previous predictors, such as authoritarianism, as having a larger component of culture than previously acknowledged. This novel finding speaks to a broader debate in cross-
cultural psychology by providing support for Hofstede’s assertion that cultural values represent coherent wholes that are more than the sum of the values of the people comprising them. It suggests a model which combines elements of Hofstede’s, Greenfield’s, and Bronfenbrenner’s theories of cultural ecology. With a better understanding of where identities, values, and ideas come from, we believe that interventions aimed at persuading voters can be more pluralistically sensitive to different ideologies while still increasing awareness of social justice issues.

*Keywords:* culture, ecology, identity, morality, voting, polarization, individualism, media literacy.
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Overview

The ideals upon which the United States of America was founded, including democracy, freedom and equality, are not only cultural values intended to guide Americans in their voting decisions but cultural values that emerged from the particular ethos of the Enlightenment. However, modern day polling analyses of how people make their voting decisions have focused on demographics (what gender are you? What race?) or, at best, personality variables. Culture is mentioned as ineffable and indefinable quantity that indirectly may shape some of our thought processes. In this dissertation, I will argue for a stronger emphasis on culture as a shaper of voting preferences and other moral decisions. I believe that an understanding of culture as habitual sets of related thoughts that shape our expectations and interpretations of the world, from how our romantic partners ought to behave to whom we should endorse as a political leader for our entire nation, is a useful frame for viewing how people make moral decisions, especially about voting. The responses we have to others’ behavior are shaped by culture, and in the context of voting decisions for a national election, such as the 2016 presidential election, culture may be guiding our expectations in profound and yet as-yet-unexpected ways. While previous research has identified psychological variables such as hostile sexism and authoritarian parenting attitudes as strong predictors of electoral preferences, not enough has yet been done to interpret these findings theoretically. This dissertation will add to the evidence that not only are these variables increasingly relevant predictors of presidential voting preferences and psychological in nature, but they are rooted in and shaped by our heritage cultures. American culture, as such, and the idea of the melting pot, is over-emphasized in our narrative of coming together as one nation, whereas the reality is more likely to be a mosaic of cultures that perpetuate down generations
from our founding ancestors and situate us all as multi-generational immigrants. Americans generate new layers of meaning to add to their cultures, and these shared meanings bind us together, but they do not replace or eradicate the older systems of meaning that were there in our heritage environments, even after many generations; they have just been ignored and deemed irrelevant for too long.

A central paradox of our time is that many Americans do not identify as immigrants, and even fear immigrants, although they themselves are descended from immigrants. Prior research indicates that fear of immigrants, and of other aspects of social change, shapes our political decisions, but is rarely studied in a context where multi-generational immigrants are interacting with newer immigrants in high proportions at school, although most students then return to their families at night. The dissociations afforded by understanding how immigrants of different generations view and understand each other is invaluable to understanding the role of culture in shaping our ideals for how our society ought to run. In addition to participants of different generations in the United States, the context in which data was collected, students in Introduction to Psychology at the College of Staten Island, affords a view of different political ideologies in contact. Similarly, racial, religious and socio-economic differences occur across the population, all of whom come together to study and go home to families and neighborhoods at night. Does this multicultural context alter the predictions of previous research based on more homogenous populations (large scale studies have included heterogeneous participants, but they are rarely living in contact with one another, a unique affordance of a megapolis like New York City with a rural borough, like Staten Island)? What new pieces can be pulled out of this puzzle because of the complex diversity of the sample?
Hostile sexism and authoritarianism are two of the most replicated characteristics that have been found to predict voting preferences in presidential elections, so they are likely to be tied to voting preferences in this election. These characteristics, which reflect a desire for stable hierarchies, have been associated with prejudicial values against many types of diversity and with conservative political stances. Recent research demonstrates that fear-inducing events, such as terrorist attacks, can activate latent authoritarian tendencies and contribute to “unexpected” outcomes of elections in which voters lean towards candidates who appear strong on defense. However, prior research has not fully addressed whether hostile sexism or authoritarianism are cultural variables or personality variables. The current research situates them as two cultural variables, likely tied to heritage traditions in different communities, and posits a third cultural variable that is relevant to presidential elections: heritage individualism. Prior research has not assessed heritage ideals of societal structure, such as individualism, in the context of voting decisions, nor has it situated constructs such as authoritarianism as heritage ideals of societal structure. Given the degree to which immigration was a central aspect of the discourse surrounding the 2016 presidential election (and other recent elections around the world), a primary aim of this dissertation was to evaluate if our cultural heritage continues to shape how we relate to others and make political decisions even after our families have lived for generations as Americans.

A final dimension of culture that requires greater attention in research is the role of the internet media in disseminating information, and connecting us, culturally, across previously unimaginable distances. If the purpose of this data set is to look at multiculturalism and its role in shaping our cultural values, then to ignore the internet and its role in shaping our cultural values
is pennywise and pound-foolish. Ongoing debate about what constitutes “fake news” and how it can be deployed to shape political decision-making has made it essential to understand how voters consume information in the brave new world of digital media.

Understanding a system of thought that drives important decision making - like who to vote for - and is generalizable across cultures has proved fraught. The cross-cultural validity of theories that attempted to establish universal claims about the trajectories of development, such as for moral development, has been called into question (Gilligan, 1977; Dien, 1982). As the world becomes increasingly interconnected and more people are living with transnational identities, traveling great distances regularly, intermarrying with other groups, cultures, ethnicities, and speakers of other languages, people must navigate the accompanying complexities of merging their cultures with those of intimate partners, neighbors and increasingly complex communities (Hong & Cheon, 2017).

In looking at what leads people to decide who to vote for, we cannot ignore the role of culture, identity and ethical systems in perpetuating discriminatory attitudes based on gender, race and immigration status, nor of the importance of confronting xenophobia, which persists in our society, even in a broadly multicultural city. With better understanding of how changing ecological contexts can have an impact on cultural values, we can alter discriminatory assumptions which are deeply and implicitly embedded in the cultural values through participatory, agentic and collaborative contexts.

Another aspect of understanding multiculturalism is trying to understand how groups with differing values and practices co-exist in the tight spaces of New York City, where issues are never as simple as two groups but expand across dimensions including heritage countries,
multi-ethnic and multi-racial families and neighborhoods, and vast political and class differences in addition to the standard-issue nationwide diversity topics of tolerance of religion, disability status, developmental/age differences, gender, gender identity, and sexual orientation. This milieu provides an almost inundating amount of complexity to account for, tempered only by the focus on one critical lens, the moral-political decision of who to vote for on November 8th, 2016.

Some cross-cultural researchers, such as Hofstede, have represented the United States (as well as other countries, particularly large ones) as one monoculture, yet many Americans might argue that the experience of being American includes many sub-cultures which have oriented around political, religious, socio-economic and racial identities, and that these complex identities are crucially important to understand what have been referred to as the “Culture Wars” between (ostensibly) “liberal, educated elites” on the coasts and “values-oriented, Christian, working class, everyday Americans” in more rural areas (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998).

Voting in a democracy is the critical aspect that drives the structure of our society. Citizens vote to elect lawmakers who: a) write laws and b) elect judges to interpret those laws, all of which shapes the legal bones of our society. Indeed, voting is an activity which is intended to shape our country according to our ideals of what is good and what will benefit our society, although we may interpret “goodness” in different ways. What values are we expressing in the voting booth? How have these values come to polarize us so strongly when most of us vote with the intention of doing good? Are there values that unite us as well as divide us?

Most surveys surrounding voting decisions are interested in predicting who voters prefer quickly and simply, such as by using demographic predictors like gender or race (e.g. women above the age of 65 will vote for Hillary), based on the assumption that who we are defines our values. There may be less concern for unpacking the psychological motivations driving voters
making a decision of who to vote for, of whether or not to vote at all. The most recent election cycle, by contrast, has unleashed newfound energy into the arena of this post-hoc analysis as so many pollsters, such as Nate Silver, predicted that Hillary Clinton had a 64% chance of winning in the week leading up to the election, leading to many people being surprised by the eventual outcome of Donald Trump winning. Subsequent talk attempting to grapple with and comprehend the unexpected outcome talked of a media bubbles driven by social media (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017), lack of or presence of education (Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg & McKee, 2017), and of culture wars (Goren & Chapp, 2017).

So, how do we choose whom to vote for? How do we choose which cultural values we want our representatives to espouse as they elect other officials, enact laws, appoint judges? Some explanations have been based on demographics: women vote this way and white men that way, blacks another way and Latin@s yet another (Hansen & Ha, 2016). But what is it about these categories that drives voting behaviors? Are there differences in ability to consume media critically that explain the red/blue divide? Is exposure to greater diversity what leads urban voters to vote more progressively? Just exactly what are the deeper values, the ones tied to our identities and to the cultures in which we spend our lives immersed, that help us make a decision, alone, in the voting booth, let alone show up to vote at all.

In this work, to better understand the underlying construct that drive us to make important decisions, I have chosen the context of voting: a concrete, real-world decision involving moral beliefs, cultural values, and ideals of how our society should function and how we should each be situated within society’s structure. By choosing this context, I can discuss the affordances of different attributes contextually, which narrows but also concretizes the discussion of behaviors and beliefs to a specific historical time and place.
The research questions for this dissertation (described under Research Questions in this chapter), ask which overarching contributors may be shaping voting decisions and aims to begin a conversation about the role that identity, immigration, and ecology play in shaping a decision like who to vote for. In the process of exploring these ideas, I hope to pose broader questions about theoretical underpinnings of what culture is and how culture shapes personality and identity. Finally, I hope to be able to discuss how culture and the ecologies that shape it can contribute to prejudices that emerge as moral ideologies about what is “right” and therefore what political platforms to endorse.

Over the past few decades, some researchers have begun to identify constructs that better predicted the shocking electoral upsets of Brexit, the 2016 US Presidential election and the general rise of populism (De la Torre & Lemos, 2016; Nicoli, 2014; Pappas, 2014; Samet, 2013), yet questions remain unanswered. Some of the constructs that have been identified are: authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and sexism.

Previous research has found that sexism predicts populist voting patterns, but is this sexism held by men against women, or is it held by both genders depending on your enculturation experiences and cultural background (i.e. growing up in a “red” environment) (Lesthaeghe & Neidert, 2017)? These findings beg the question of the role of identity versus culture in driving voting patterns. For example, some research points to sexism, which could be either cultural (if both men and women harbor sexist sentiments) or perhaps identity-based (if gender is a better predictor of voting patterns than holding sexist attitudes). To understand identity, we can look at how race and gender predict voting preferences.

Other researchers have developed similar concepts, such as Graham et al., (2011), who combined many of these concepts into one measure with 5 dimensions that purports to measure
the 5 underlying psychological constructs that shape political preferences: they refer to these as our moral foundations. Recent works by MacWilliams (2016) and Taub (2016) have found relationships between fear of terrorist threats and discomfort with progressive social changes can alter voting patterns in people and convert liberals into authoritarian voters, while one researcher has suggested that the opposite is true – by making conservative voters feel safe you can liberalize their ideology, at least temporarily (Bargh, 2018; Napier, Huang, Vonasch & Bargh, 2017).

Authoritarianism has been tied to broad cultural values from political preferences about governance to opinions about how rear a child. When researchers identify successful precursors of voting behavior such as authoritarianism and social dominance, I wonder whether the underlying state is a matter of individual differences or is determined by cultural norms. For example, when we speak about parenting style, there are suggestions that parenting styles are heavily shaped by group norms. This research question sets out to try and identify, empirically, threads of evidence to help us understand the role of individual variability versus cultural variability in the values we have about how much control an authority figure ought to have, whether parent or politician. This is a central debate in the literature concerning individualism and collectivism already (Huang, 2015; Santrock, 2007; Snarey & Keljo, 1991; Tamis-LeMonda, Way, Hughes, Yoshikawa, Kalman & Niwa, 2008), and I propose that it is also important for understanding authoritarianism, social dominance, sexism, and morality in general.

For example, authoritarianism straddles an individual differences approach as well as a culturally shaped approach. MacWilliams’ doctoral work analyzed authoritarianism as a cultural variable to show that entire cultures can develop authoritarian leanings (2016). By contrast, previous work viewed authoritarianism less as a dimension of cultural variability and more as a
personality trait. An important goal of developing the research in this field of psychology is to tease apart the contributions of individuals’ personality characteristics and identities from the contributions of their cultures to their values. For example, if sexism predicts populist leanings, is that because men are likely to be more sexist based on their gender identities or because both men and women can be enculturated to hold particular values about gender roles? If culture shapes gender roles, then how can sexism be examined outside of its cultural context?

It is important to remember that there is some continuity of effect here. The purpose of this work is to examine the drivers of political preferences. If the drivers that are identified, such as authoritarianism and hostile sexism, are partly cultural, then one’s culture is driving one’s voting preferences, supporting the idea of “culture wars” and demanding more nuanced understanding of the subcultures within the United States.

It is important to highlight here that culture and personality differences are only two of the crucial ingredients in driving a person’s political preferences. Culture is sometimes thought of as determined by exposure to a homogenous set of values in one’s primary group of membership, but experiences with outside groups can be just as important. It is imperative that we keep in mind the way information is passed nowadays through communication networks supported by the internet, and what groups various media sources are trying to represent in their reporting. This is an ecological aspect of the world that has changed since much of the research on authoritarianism was done: the internet has afforded a level of daily global interconnectedness that allows multicultural exposure in ways never possible (Verboord, 2016). Many researchers have wondered if multicultural exposure, either by living in a multicultural neighborhood, attending multicultural schools or interacting with other cultures through the internet, can reduce outgroup prejudices that may also contribute to populist sentiments (Hong & Cheon, 2017). Can
positive contact with other groups reduce prejudice alone? The answer has proven more complex than expected (Verboord, 2016). How do crucial voting decisions get made in a multicultural geographical location, in a globally connected, digital era?

In understanding multiculturalism, it is important to recognize that America is a nation almost entirely made up of relatively recent immigrants (as compared with other nations around the world, and with the exception of Native Americans). A lot of the narrative of “American” identity gets wrapped up in the process of Americanization, including an entire field of research on acculturation processes and attitudes about biculturalism and multiculturalism. This narrative can sometimes lead us, as American scholars, to neglect or even actively deny that people who are multi-generational immigrants to America may also be maintaining significant aspects of their cultural heritage in our research perspectives. Identity divides that label some people as “Americans” and others as “Immigrants” may have been an underlying cause of some of the polarized sentiments during and after the election (Goren & Chapp, 2017). This identity divide drove arguments about how incoming waves of immigrants should be treated. Thus, identity may be important in political voting preferences.

As mentioned above, many of the fields of research studying immigration experiences start from a premise that Americans exist as a homogenous group, and that, therefore, some process must convert immigrants into Americans. Acculturation research claims that the influence of our heritage cultures diminishes in multicultural contexts, eventually disappearing almost completely after several generations (Harker, 2001). However, my position deviates from this point of view both theoretically and empirically. A central assumption of this dissertation is that acculturation work has missed important socio- and psychological aspects of the experience of being transnational after multiple generations. I believe that a theoretical shift is needed, from
viewing acculturation processes as something that immigrants pass through in the first three
generations, to an ongoing process we are all, still, undergoing, with repercussions to our
identities and intergroup processes. Instead, I see that immigrants and their descendants (or in
some cases, subcultures embedded in the dominant culture) occupy a permanent state of
transnational and transcultural connections between heritage(s) and host(s), situated in social co-
construction of culture. An important aspect of this theoretical perspective is that the
transmission and interpretation do not have to be accomplished at a conscious level. Instead, like
most culture, it can also be perpetuated through habitual, repeated examples of culturally-
influenced behaviors that the learner absorbs through constant exposure to the community
(which includes local contact with the local community and large-scale contact with the society
through media and the internet).

In these times of growing polarization, both sides want to characterize their opponents as
lacking moral fiber and engage in hurling accusations of oppression or moral turpitude at one
another (Willis, 2017). The conclusion that polarization is increasing has been demonstrated by
research on the polarizing “echo-chamber” created by social media “likes,” (Del Vicario et al.,
2016\(^a, b\)). The emerging structure of information-sharing in the social media paradigm (which
allows for viral events and instant feedback through likes, shares and clicks) has led to concerns
about the way information (and disinformation, such as fake news) is shaping our beliefs and our
ability to evaluate information and sources critically. Once we have formed an opinion, some
research suggests that corrective information does not always lead to rectification of the
mistaken opinion or belief (Flynn, Nyhan & Reifler, 2017; Nyhan, 2010). Given the global
increases in polarization of values in the context of current populist movements (De la Torre &
Lemos, 2016; Nicoli, 2014; Pappas, 2014; Samet, 2013), I hope to try and examine cultural
factors that have been identified as varying between geographically and politically separate
groups in relation to voting preferences. For example, I wonder how cultural values to prioritize
individualistic ideals relate to voting-decision contexts. How do variable cultural values emerge
from a multi-cultural, rather than a more culturally homogenous, environment? To accomplish
this, I focused on students at the College of Staten Island because of the wide cultural variety in
the population. While most City University of New York campuses have strong elements of
diversity, no others represent political diversity as well as cultural diversity. Residents of Staten
Island were over 300% more likely to vote for Donald Trump than the average resident of NYC,
and almost 600% more likely to vote for Donald Trump than residents of Manhattan or the
Bronx (Ali, 2016). Yet the College of Staten Island mixes the conservative viewpoints of Staten
Island residents with the strong progressive viewpoints of most of the rest of New York City: one
third of the participants were from Staten Island, the rest were from other (majority progressive)
boroughs of NYC.

One of the most entrenched accusations between “red” and “blue” voters regards
educational levels, with “blue” voters accusing “red” voters of being uneducated and rural and
red voters reacting by calling “blue” voters educated elitists (Election Poll Data, 2008; Graham,
Nosek & Haidt, 2012). Is there truth to the idea that red voters simply lack awareness and
knowledge of political issues? Or is it more likely that both sides are equally aware of political
facts? The difference between these two perspectives is the possibility that differences in belief
are not rooted in education, but in other differences, perhaps ecological differences, in the way
“red” voters and “blue” voters’ environments are socially organized.

**Rationale for sample population.**
New York City is primarily known as a heavily progressive region, like most urban regions in the United States. However, the borough of Staten Island is just as well known for being a conservative enclave within the city boundaries, in defiance of most urban voting norms. This divide provides the strongest rationale for collecting data at the College of Staten Island, which includes students from all 5 boroughs, but at least 66.0% are from Staten Island, and 49.6% of the sample are white. Residents of Staten Island were three times as likely to vote for Donald Trump as residents of NYC overall (Ali, 2016), creating political diversity within the sample, and pitting people with opposing ideologies against each other in direct contact.

Additionally, New York City is, by some measures, the most diverse city on the planet (http://elalliance.org/), particularly in terms of migrant communities.

Because this work is looking at cross-cultural differences, care should be taken to capture the historical impact of immigration on New York City as an example of how multiculturalism might operate at the psychological level. One aspect of multiculturalism is how individuals and communities negotiate identities and cultural practices between cultural influences from the heritage culture (e.g. Italy) and the host culture (e.g. the US). While it is expected that an immigrant maintains a shared identity with the heritage country, acculturation studies have tried to understand how specific groups identities shift over multiple generations, although few account for the types of extreme multiculturalism found in modern-day NYC (Ali, 2016; http://elalliance.org/). NYC has many people who are some combination of: immigrants, children of immigrants, and descendants of immigrants whose families have lived in this country for 5 or more generations (such as descendants from Irish, Italian, English, Scottish, and German immigrants who migrated to the United States in the 19th Century and who may not feel very
strong ties to the countries from which their ancestors emigrated) (“United States Census Bureau QuickFacts Richmond County (Staten Island Borough), New York”).

Despite feeling disconnected or not knowing their cultural roots explicitly, people whose families have been in the US for multiple generations may still have picked up cultural norms from their parents and grandparents, even after generations during which their families were living in the USA. It is also an empirical question of how well people do know their heritage background after generations living in the USA, and how those identities, shaped in other places, are transmitted through generations. For example, it is well documented that Italian Americans often identify with particular city-regions from which their ancestors originated and Italian Americans often settled and associated only with others of their same city-origin, creating enclaves around New York City that belie the idea that a unified, nationalistic heritage origin of “Italian American” is the primary identity of Americans of Sicilian, Neapolitan, Calabrian, or Barresi descent (Luconi, 2004).

Structure.

In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I will review some constructs that have been found by previous researchers to predict voting patterns, including measures of sexism, knowledge of current politics, authoritarianism, and demographics such as race, gender and immigration status (Bilewicz, Soral, Marchlew ska & Winiewski, 2017). Additionally, some researchers (Louis, Esses & Lalonde, 2013) have proposed that underlying fear of immigrants has been found to predict anti-immigrant voting patterns.

In this chapter, I will discuss the immediate environment in which the transmission of cultural values occurs, especially those that might contribute to our voting decisions: the
family. One of the strongest predictors that social scientists have found that predict voting decisions emerged from an intersection of political science studies of political systems converging with developmental theories of parenting, suggesting that the relationships and values we hold about the family system end up writ large across the political decisions and structures of our society.

Chapter 2 will look at the literature on the emerging science of how digital worlds are (re)shaping our political systems, from how they provide intercontinental cultural exchanges to how social media has been weaponized as a cybertool to shape and drive votes through values, misinformation (fake news) and creating self-isolating filter bubbles through both algorithms and our own preferences. These theories are starting to be addressed by a set of educational theories called New Media Literacies, aimed at measuring how people process digital information such as news, how it shapes their views and values, and what educational interventions can do to enhance critical consumption of information on the wild frontiers of the internet where information is unvetted by publishers, newspapers, universities or other institutions dedicated to the verification of things disseminated on a mass scale.

Chapter 3 elaborates on some of the theories attempting to understand the dimensions of societal organization structures that exist around the globe, usually represented in research as dichotomies (although this is limiting). We will focus on the history of the dichotomy of individualism and collectivism. This spectrum began as a way for Europeans to capture their own sense of difference from other regions of the world, particularly East Asia, and yet has continually and productively intrigued researchers as a framework for characterizing cultural dimensions: this framework was initially referred to as individualism and collectivism, but later was renamed and reworked into various other dichotomies with different underlying theoretical
assumptions. The variations are of an ecological nature, specifically attempting to explain how a group of people organizes itself and the psychological constructs perpetuate those principles of self-organization. One main proposal, which is novel to this dissertation, is that these organizational differences provide ecologies which shape voting patterns, over and above extreme multicultural contact in communities like New York City.

In Chapter 4, I will review theories of how culture shapes values, and how cultural values can change because of ecological bidirectional pressures to discuss how cultural values, afforded by the ecologies of different American communities, may be shaping voting decisions. This ecological perspective is especially crucial when trying to understand voting decisions in multicultural contexts where the different members have come together from a multitude of diasporas and transnational origins, as well as different political backgrounds.

In Chapter 5, I will begin to integrate the work summarized in chapter 1 and in chapters 3 and 4, pulling together political science predictors of voting patterns, developmental theory about parenting styles, and adding in the thread of culture, ecologies and cross-cultural differences to our discussion of voting preferences and their predictors.

In Chapter 6, I move on to addressing how identities lead us to prefer certain candidates over others, and how threats to our identity may be driving forces that override other concerns, such as our own political interests. This is particularly essential to analyzing voting decisions as a product of culture in multicultural environments where people have multiple identities based on race, national heritage, and gender, providing a tension between the identity of the heritage country or countries and the identity of the destination.

In Chapter 7, I will review acculturation theory and how work on this theory can contribute to a discussion of how identities and values shape our voting decisions. Acculturation
theories view the process of immigrants changing their cultures towards an “American” norm after migrating from a heritage country to a destination country. Acculturation models frame the heritage culture’s influence on a person as one that attenuates as the host culture grows and takes over the more generations there are in between the person and their most recent ancestor from the heritage culture. Acculturation research usually finds that by the third generation, immigrants have “Americanized,” thoroughly (Berry, 2005; Berry & Sabatier, 2010), but the current dissertation project proposes that this is not the case. Instead, while some aspects do change, and while surface-level identities are acquired, deeper cultural values are maintained, demonstrating the resistance of cultural patterns to change in transnational contexts. In fact, I propose that people maintain transnational contacts based on their heritage identities over many generations, whether intentionally or unintentionally, while also participating in the larger “American” culture — this applies to Americans of European descent as well. Finally, I propose that these heritage values may have an impact on voting decisions just as other cultural influences will also have an impact, despite assimilation claims.

In Chapter 8, I will discuss some of the complexities of America as a society of immigrants through the lens of contact theory. NYC has diversity not just in cultures but also in generations, with recent immigrants (referred to herein as Zeroth Generation), as well as 10th generation or descendants of pre-revolutionary immigrants. In New York City, issues are never as simple as two groups negotiating how to coexist, but expand across dimensions including immigration statuses, languages, heritage countries, religions, political, and class differences. Then there are mixed families: mixed race, inter-ethnic, mixed religion, or any mix of the dimensions of diversity. In addition to all of this, there are the standard-issue nationwide diversity topics of tolerance of disability status, developmental/age differences, gender, gender
identity, and sexual orientation that occur across every other dimension of difference. This complexity provides an almost inundating amount of complexity to account for, tempered only by the focus on one critical lens, the moral-political decision of who to vote for on November 8th, 2016.

In Chapter 9, all the threads introduced in will begin to draw together as the details of the methodology are presented in Chapter 9, *Methods*, Chapter 10, *Results*, and Chapter 11, *Discussion*. Finally, I will end with a conclusion and discussion of the implications and limitations of the current research in Chapter 12.

**Research Questions**

**Research Question 1: What best predicts voting preferences?**

What are the best predictors for modeling the values that explain voting preferences in the 2016 election?

1a: I hypothesize that constructs identified in previous research, including authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and hostile sexism, will replicate as predictors of voting preferences in the 2016 election.

1b: I hypothesize that certain roles and experiences, such as being non-white, being an immigrant, and being a woman, will align voter preferences with liberal policies.

**Research Question 2: New predictors of voting preferences: Deepening our understanding of the role of old and new culture.**

While authoritarianism and sexism have been found in prior research to predict voting preferences, there are larger theoretical questions which are driving the current research. Why are some people more authoritarian and sexist? Answers to this question provide both basic
scientific knowledge about the nature of decision making and prejudice, but also actionable recommendations for how to redress these issues in our society. Starting from a standpoint that most drivers underlying voting preferences are shaped by the values of those around us, or our culture(s), I make two hypotheses about the role of culture in the 2016 election.

2a: I hypothesize that values from the heritage cultures of current Americans will shape people’s voting preferences, even in geographical separation from the heritage culture’s original environment.

2b: I hypothesize that media literacy will play a role in voting preferences through people’s sense of agency in searching out solutions to current problems, and their capacity to accommodate corrective information to misinformation.

Research Question 3: The Melting Pot Myth: The role of heritage culture in the shaping of multigenerational transnational identities.

Is the myth of the Americanization/Assimilation/Acculturation overemphasized? Acculturation research assumes a gradual diminishment and vanishing of heritage culture through the process of assimilation over multiple generations. What connections do people have to their heritages, even after many generations? How are their heritage values reflected in their voting habits?

How many Americans know about their cultural origins explicitly and to what degree of specificity? I predict that at least half of multi-generational Americans will be able to name their heritage cultures and nations, and at least a third will be able to name heritage cities. Acculturation research predicts full assimilation with no cultural differences after about three generations (Berry, 2005).
3a: I hypothesize that ethnic identity plays a long-term role in the identity of most Americans.
3b: I hypothesize that in the absence of an ethnic identity, people adopt an alternate identity, such as race.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I gave an overview of what topics will be covered in this dissertation. First, I gave a statement of the overall problem, followed by a rationale for having conducted this research. I then gave a detailed summary of the topics that will be covered in each chapter and how they related to the overarching topic and rationale. I explained my rationale for using the sample population which was selected for this research and then stated my 3 main research questions. In the next chapter, we will begin a more detailed look at the literature that has previously looked at some of these questions, starting with the literature that has examined the central research question of this dissertation: what predicts voting preferences.
1. What Predicts Voting Decisions: The Intersection of Parenting Styles and Politics

Authoritarianism

In the Aaron Sorkin political drama from 1998-2004, The West Wing, a democratic candidate is frustrated by how the issues important to him are not driving up polling numbers. The chief of the campaign explains about the “mommy problem”: “When voters want a national daddy, someone tough and strong, they vote Republican. When they want a mommy to give them jobs, health care policy equivalent of matzo-ball soup, they vote Democratic,” (Attie, 2005).

As we saw above, the Mommy Problem has gone from West Wing fantasy to reality in the 2016 election. As is often the case with the West Wing, life followed art so precisely, that the writers’ intuitive joke of calling it the “Mommy Problem” relates, all too literally, to psychological research on parenting styles (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997).

Authoritarianism is a psychological construct which was successfully used as a predictor of who would vote for Donald Trump in the 2016 election (Taub, 2016), and has been used as a predictor for conservative voting for the past three decades. It began as an answer to understanding how democracies voted fascist leaders into power during the 20th century, but it may be unknown because the measures designed to capture it focused on statements endorsing fascism. Finally, one researcher (Feldman, 2003) connected authoritarianism in politics, known as authoritarianism to developmental research on parenting styles (such as Baumrind, 1991; Maccoby, 1992), suggesting that the root of that desire to vote for a fascist was in a general
belief about strong, controlling authority figures which would also be evident in people’s ideals for parenting authority.

Feldman (2003) then took this inter-disciplinary idea and created a 4-item scale, which was used to predict Trump’s election in March 2016 (MacWilliams, 2016a; Taub, 2016). In the political context of the 2016 election, authoritarianism is generally used to capture attitudes of a) desire for order, and b) a fear of outsiders.

The scale that predicted this outcome includes four questions, each with two forced choice answers that ask things like: “Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: obedience or self-reliance?” MacWilliams, a graduate student who was doing research on the prevalence of authoritarian parenting styles among African Americans, pondered the surprising results of the Republican primaries and caucuses. As far back as 2009, researchers Hetherington and Weiler (2016) realized that the GOP, by positioning itself as the party of traditional values and law and order, had unknowingly aligned itself with a large, bipartisan swath of Americans with authoritarian tendencies.

MacWilliams shows how African American culture has staunch authoritarian tendencies, which have developed out of, he claims, ecologies of oppression that favored authoritarian parenting techniques in promoting survival (2016b). According to MacWilliams, African Americans make their decision to vote, or abstain, based on psychological tensions between, a) policies aimed at reducing racism and oppression of African Americans, which usually align their vote with the Democrats, or b) authoritarian tendencies, meaning that the GOP could easily convert African American voters by eliminating racist policies from its platform.

Social Dominance Orientation and Latent Authoritarianism
MacWilliams’s (2016) findings offered a context in which to explore the interaction between the political realities of a group of Americans and how their conceptualization of authority, at a cultural level, may lead to internal tensions when at the ballot box. MacWilliams focused on these tensions within the African American cultural community. His research shows how parenting attitudes, as exemplars of how a community conceptualizes of and enacts authority, are integral to our political viewpoints, like the joke about the “Mommy Problem.” Other research has done so previously, identifying an interaction between the perception of threat and what has been termed “latent authoritarianism,” (Stenner, 2005). As Jonathan Haidt sums up: “In case of moral threat, lock down the borders, kick out those who are different, and punish those who are morally deviant.” The idea of punishing those who are morally deviant is highly related to descriptions of a “tight” society, where there are complex rules in place to guide behavior and adherence to norms is strongly enforced (Gelfand et al., 2011). In a “tight” society, norm-violators receive strong punishments such as ostracization, or worse, and they are considered a threat to the flourishing of the community’s cohesion and functionality. In a related sense, the most treasured qualities for authoritarians are those which reduce chaos and bring order to the world through structured hierarchies that are protective. Hetherington and Suhay (2011) found a distinction between physical threats such as terrorism, which could lead non-authoritarians to behave like authoritarians, and more abstract social threats, such as eroding social norms or demographic changes, which do not drive authoritarianism but do cause a similar type of reaction referred to as Social Dominance Orientation (Taub, 2016; Thomsen et al., 2010). Social dominance orientation (SDO), or a preference for hierarchical social structures wherein some groups wield power over others and has tied authoritarian beliefs and SDO to feelings of threat (Bilewicz, Soral, Marchlew ska & Winiewski, 2017; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Thomsen et
al., 2010). However, while research on voters who endorsed Brexit in the UK were found to independently believe in both authoritarian values and social dominance hierarchies, it is possible that social dominance can also present as a facet of authoritarianism, where the relationship between these two constructs is more tightly overlapping in other cultural contexts such as the USA.

Understanding factors that contribute to discriminatory attitudes is crucial for developing interventions to promote greater acceptance of diversity. Prior literature has tied authoritarianism and social dominance orientation to prejudicial, anti-immigrant sentiments, and documented the activation of both by perceived threats to different aspects of the self, but few clear recommendations for how to target anti-immigrant attitudes have emerged. Although contact with diverse others often predicts reduced prejudice, in some contexts, contact may spark fear and resentment leading to heightened anti-immigrant attitudes. Stereotypes about Latin@ immigrants “taking jobs from Americans” or Muslims and Syrian refugees being “terrorists” may activate latent authoritarian sentiments, provoking anti-immigrant attitudes by distributing the fear of specific criminal behaviors on whole demographics. For example, some of the current political rhetoric seeks to distribute fear of terrorism by attributing it to Muslims or Arabs as a group, rather than focusing fear of terrorism on the individuals who carry out acts of terrorism. By repeatedly suggesting that all Muslims are terrorists, some politicians are seeking to use fear to activate authoritarian tendencies, ignoring the fact that some of the most serious terrorist acts in the history of this country have been committed by people with no connections to Islam – e.g. the Sandy Hook shooting of 2012 (Esposito, Smith & Ng, 2012), the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 (Thomas, 1997) or the Las Vegas shootings of 2017 (Bui, Zapotosky, Barrett & Berman, 2017).
Research on attitudes towards immigrants has homed in on other determinants of prejudice, in addition to authoritarian beliefs, such as social dominance orientation. These findings have been replicated across cultures. However, discussions about whether authoritarianism and SDO are inherited, unchangeable personality traits, culturally entrained beliefs, or early predispositions that contribute to the development of beliefs (Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001) highlight the danger of considering authoritarianism or SDO as personality characteristics that lead invariably to racism, because this implies that large regions of the United States, and most white people, are irrevocably racist. To view a large group this way is to scuttle opportunities to effect change that might be productive, both in terms of electoral math and societal progress. To view prejudice as learned is to hope that there are actionable pathways to remedy the situation in the future, although it can also lead to reductionist ideas that conservatives simply lack education, which is an oversimplification (Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg & McKee, 2017).

Some researchers have suggested that many people are latent authoritarians, holding underlying viewpoints of the world that people should behave in predictable ways, only demonstrating their authoritarian beliefs when circumstances make them feel threatened (Hetherington & Weiler, 2016). In the case of the 2016 US presidential election and the Brexit vote, the spate of terrorist attacks coupled with the remarkable leaps of progress made to change social norms (awarding rights and respect to LGTBQ individuals, and creating pathways to citizenship for undocumented immigrants, or even attempting to break glass ceilings such as installing a woman in the white house as President) could create psychological discomfort that provoked a shift within people towards authoritarianism, where social change alone might have been tolerated, or terrorism alone, but not both together.
Case Study: Fear Underlies Authoritarianism and SDO, but Fear of Whom?

A careful examination of diversity is also relevant when considering how attitudes towards different groups may differ. Here we selected a case-study to use as an example of this type of analysis: in studying anti-immigrant prejudices, researchers have typically considered attitudes towards “immigrants” and “refugees” generally or by specifying one group, often Muslims (e.g., Berg, 2015; Craig & Richeson, 2014; Crowdson & Brandes, 2017; Esses, Medianu & Lawson, 2013; Pettigrew, 2017; Tannenbaum et al., 2015, Thomsen et al., 2008). However, dominant in-groups have varying attitudes towards different minorities depending on the national context in which the groups live. For example, Whites in the US may have a hierarchy of threat, preferring to limit immigration from Latin America before Asia (Alba, Rumbaut & Marotz, 2005), but this research was likely done with data that predates 2001, the fulcrum point at which high-profile anti-Muslim sentiment exploded across the media. In the US, prior to 2001, anti-immigrant rhetoric may have been most heavily focused on migrants arriving from Latin America due to the geography and political history of the United States, which is more accessible to migrants from Latin America. Europe, on the other hand, is more accessible to immigrants from Muslim-majority countries in the Near East, Far East Asia and North Africa. Therefore, researchers in European countries and Australia have been primarily concerned with rising anti-Muslim sentiments (see Abu-Rayya & White, 2010; Bilewicz, Soral, Marchlewska & Winiewski, 2017; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Saroglou, Lamkaddem, Van Pachterbeke & Buxant, 2009). Since 9/11, however, Muslims in the US have increasingly become targets of anti-immigrant sentiments due to decreasing stability in the Middle East, which has fostered violent
terrorists who target not only their own countries but also Western nations in shocking, high-profile attacks on civilians which may activate latent authoritarian.

Most previous research on anti-immigrant sentiment, authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (SDO) has examined dynamics between Americans and “Immigrants” (non-specifically), or perhaps between Whites and a specific immigrant group. However, a study by Craig and Richeson artfully compared Americans’ attitudes (84% Whites from a Midwestern University) towards immigration policies in the US to immigration policies in Israel and Singapore and found that SDO predicted anti-immigrant attitudes in all scenarios whereas authoritarianism only predicted anti-immigrant sentiment in the policies which affect domestic US policies. Similarly, Thomsen et al., found that Whites with stronger SDO ideologies perceived more victimization from Latinos than did Latinos from Whites, or Whites with low SDO, suggesting that one mechanism of SDO is to perceive the other group as a threat (2010).

Despite a few exceptions, little research has examined what might motivate reactions to different immigrant groups within the United States - as mentioned above, most papers with anti-Muslim specificity used samples in the EU or Australia, not in the US. While racial Whiteness has been used as a predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes in many studies, there are other demographic qualities, such as whether one is an immigrant oneself, which may be equally important.

Methodological Note

A methodological issue that has been unaddressed in previous research is whether participants are answering survey items as they think researchers want them to, possibly because of shame in their beliefs or fear of criticism or judgment. In two major recent votes, Brexit in the
UK, and the election of Donald Trump in America, the polls seemed to fail to capture existing sentiments, leading to outcomes that had been rated with low probabilities. Subsequent research demonstrated connections between authoritarianism and social dominance and both the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump. Yet ongoing research into authoritarianism and its relationship to prejudice have mostly failed to include measures of social desirability as a control variable (e.g., Bilewicz et al., 2017; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Louis, Esses & Lalonde, 2013), although some have addressed the issue, even in very early research (Batson, Naifeh & Pate, 1978). It is worth considering that all self-report research on sensitive issues should include social desirability checks.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed a summary of the history of development, theoretical underpinnings and empirical findings of research from sociology, political science and psychology which has attempted to identify the underlying psychological constructs that are driving voting behavior, including authoritarianism and social dominance, and their relationship to fear.
2. New Media Literacy, False News, Social Media, and the 2016 Election

False News and the Bubble

Vosoughi, Roy and Aral (2018) have been able to show that false news travels greater distances, with greater velocity, and becomes more entrenched than fact-based news by surveying the trajectories of 126,000 stories retweeted on Twitter between 2006 and 2017. This piece of data confirms our worst fears about the 2016 election, that false news stories can be disseminated through the mechanism of people sharing them on social media. However, people have previously treated the dissemination of misinformation as a problem of simple misinformation, whereas the information impacts the minds of the humans who consume it, altering beliefs or re-enforcing them, and interacting with people’s natural tendencies to accept or reject information depending on the authority they invest in the source and the threat that the new information provides to their identities. At the heart of this topic is the nature of democracy. The internet has brought us closer to a true democracy than ever before in history: a world where there are fewer inhibitions to the dissemination of information across large swathes of population due to the removal of cost of distribution (i.e. from printing on paper).

As far back as 1998, before Twitter, Facebook, the iPhone and even before Google (by four months), researchers were concerned about the way information was being disseminated in digital spaces. Some early data scientists were optimistic that “the Net,” as it was called back then, would democratize information, wresting it away from elites and putting it in the hands of the people, who would build a utopian community with it. Others feared that populists, as they were called even back then, would erode the control of information flow by journalists, newspapers, and political parties (Bimber, 1998) in a way that would restructure the foundations
of our society. Today, we no longer ask somebody to look something up, we ask them to “Google” it, (Oxford English Dictionary, 2017). We no longer use programs on our computers, we use apps. The lexicon has been changed by the burgeoning use of the internet and the mobile devices through which we access it (Lenhart et al., 2015; Rideout, 2015). In this environment, where children and adolescents who are alive today have grown up with no memory of pre-digital, pre-touchscreen days, where youth rely on social interactions through digital, social medias, there is no evidence of systemic instruction in how to safely consume information gleaned from the internet and social media across the country (Powers, 2017).

**News Media Literacies**

While most research on media literacy in children and adolescents has focused on the risks of the internet from porn, privacy, and cyber-bullying (Powers, 2017), there is increasing concern about the way that information masquerading as fact is consumed, and the strength of people’s able to critically winnow reliable information from the chaff of false news. This is termed media literacy, or sometimes new media literacy (e.g. Literat, 2014) or news media literacy (e.g. Hornik & Kajimoto, 2014), to distinguish it from research on older forms of communication.

There is little consensus on how best to measure if someone has it, and even less on what “it” exactly is (Powers, Brodsky, Blumberg & Brooks, 2018), other than the ability not to get bamboozled by online information. Renee Hobbs has proposed that media literacy taps three different abilities: the ability to identify the motivations of authors to persuade, the power of their messages to express intentional points of view, and the way that messages can present altered information through the omission or phrasing of that information (Hobbs, 2006).
Growing bodies of research suggest that mere exposure to the internet, like mere exposure to diverse others, is insufficient to develop critical thinking about information disseminated on the internet (Powers et al., 2018). Educational initiatives are needed, like that developed by Stonybrook University’s News Literacy curriculum, which was designed to increase news literacy, civic engagement, and improve the quality of media consumption (Weber, 2012).

One thing that is notable when reading research on media literacy is that no researchers view media literacy as one thing. Instead it is usually conceptualized of as a combination of self-report of one’s beliefs about one’s ability to detect unreliable information with tasks that directly measure behaviors (Literat, 2014; Powers, 2017; Weber, 2012), as inconsistencies between self-report measures and behavioral tasks have been found in previous research (Powers et al., 2018).

Educating students in New Media Literacy (NML, or media literacy for new medias) is crucial, not only to the development of critical thinking skills but to protect democracy. Two national studies, one in the US (Stanford History Education Group, 2016) and one in the UK (OFCOM, 2016) have demonstrated that many students, from elementary school to college, struggle to evaluate the quality of information widely available on the internet. The stakes of teaching students to parse cues that reveal how information is generated and stored have never been higher than in the current era of viral, false news, yet measuring NML skills is still a science in its infancy, with many researchers attempting to generate measures that will accurately assess critical NML skills.

NML draws from both prior media literacy research and from other educational domains which target goals such as critical thinking (Fleming, 2014; Hobbs, 2013; Weber, 2012). Although assessment of and education in NML is rooted in educational goals of improving
student critical thinking, information processing skills, and metacognitive awareness, NML has often been relegated to schools of journalism (Weber, 2012), rather than explicitly included in mainstream educational goals. There is little evidence that explicit instruction about the internet and social media use exists in US schools. For example, despite documents like the Social Media Guidelines provided by the New York City Department of Education (NYC DOE, 2013), there is no mandate that requires its use in NYC schools.

In addition to the lack of explicit and systematic teaching about media literacy in schools, researchers have found that people often react to corrective information debunking false beliefs by increasing their belief in erroneous stories (Jern, 2014; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Slater and Rouner, 1996, Tillema, 2000). Effective media literacy training, rooted in accurate assessment of NML, may help students avoid feedback loops wherein initial acceptance of erroneous information limits their openness to accurate new information.

Conclusion

Many Americans, and people from all over the world have become concerned about the role of new technologies in our lives, especially the consumption of information that is organized by the democratic principles of the internet. Information used to be controlled more by elites and specific organizations whose mandate and responsibility it was to vet information - publishing houses, newspapers, academia. Now, the internet has allowed anyone to put their thoughts out there, including those with nefarious intent. The result of this naturalistic experiment is that nefarious interests are out there, disseminating false news, and most people help that misinformation spread (Vosoughi, Roy & Aral, 2018). While many researchers have sought to frame this problem in terms of education and literacies, it is yet to be determined whether
targeted media literacy education can improve circumstances. It is also yet to be determined how the spread of misinformation reinforces people’s preconceived prejudicial notions, or whether it can be used as a tool to reduce prejudice. In short, the internet is clearly a tool of democracy, and has the power to alter or reinforce the beliefs of large swathes of people, suggesting that it is a pathway for the dissemination of cultural values, not just simple information.
3. Dimensions and Measurement of Cultural Variation in Society’s Self-Organization

Ecology is a term used to indicate that an organism in an environment interacts with the environment and that there is a bidirectional influence between organism and environment, such that the ecology is dependent on the presence of both. While individual people live in their cultural environments, culture itself exists in a larger ecological macro-context subject to ecological pressures (Mufwene, 2001). If we consider culture at this level, we can see how there are dimensions that can capture the types of variability possible between cultures in differing contexts and with differing histories such that some variables operate like a continuum along which a culture can vary. Just as a person may have high openness, a culture may have high individualism. Many researchers have proposed alternative concepts around which to base their continuums. In this chapter, I will summarize some of the spectrums that researchers have identified for understanding cultural-level variability.

The spectrums can have differing names according to different theories, although many of them have a great deal of overlap. On the other hand, researchers using the same names sometimes have different conceptualizations. Additionally, constructs with similar names are often measured differently, and so, in many ways, may lack any reasonable assumption of equivalency. Understanding the theoretical overlap and differences between constructs is important in understanding how these constructs may be operating as cultural shapers of values that lead to voting decisions.

Research shows that culture tends to be discernibly different when measured at the level of countries or nations, but some researchers have called into question the reason for these differences. Greenfield has pointed out that cultural differences may result from ecological
structures in which a culture exists, such as high population density, urban environments versus low population density rural environments. Park, Joo, Quiroz and Greenfield added that socio-demographics may be confounded with empirically identified national-level differences (2015).

In other words, the context of one person—such as living in a household where three generations cohabit—can shape their values separately from culture. There can also be variation in the expression of individualistic and collectivistic values within a person, elicited by the demand characteristics of the context in which they are in at a given moment (e.g. at school or at home).

One of the most intriguing thoughts that emerges from reading Park et al. is that heritage cultures can resist ecological changes on the cultural, family or individual level if the heritage values confer adaptive advantages. Is it possible that there is something about the American context which makes preserving heritage cultural differences an advantage? For example, by maintaining heritage cultural differences, people can connect with sub-communities in large urban American cities, providing them with a network of support and an identity. Even the quality of otherness can be a source of inspiration for new ideas that may be valuable to members of other cultures.

In addition to intrapersonal and inter-contextual cultural variation within a heritage cultural group or within a nation, there can also be macroscopic cultural patterns measurable at the national level. These macroscopic patterns may be held together by the laws and government at the national level. One possible explanation for cohesion at the national level is that laws and institutions within a given country operate in a given way, ecologically shaping the way that culture operates. Conversely, the culture of a nation must be homogenous enough to allow for the formation of laws. Countries that lack this consensus may fail to maintain their legal cohesion (e.g. Yugoslavia). Another reason could be that groups that live in proximal contact with one another or share dimensions of identity, such as religious affiliations, may endorse
similar values, and therefore laws, and therefore, emerge with somewhat similar ecologies, and 
therefore cultures. These shared cultures can be geographically dispersed and transnational, such 
as shared values among Catholics in Ireland, the US or in Spain. Or these shared values can 
connect us through languages such as when Anglophone countries, such as the US, the UK, 
Australia and South Africa have high individualism scores (Hofstede, 1983) and yet are 
distributed across four continents.

While there has been a great deal of focus on the individualism/collectivism divide 
between East Asia and the European-derived West, it is notable to remember that empirical 
measures of individualism have identified some of the strongest exemplars of national-level 
collectivism in South America, whereas Japan and South Korea have been undergoing cultural 
shifts towards collectivism in recent decades, just as the US underwent a shift towards 
individualism during the Industrial Revolution (Greenfield, 2013). In the paragraphs below, I 
will briefly summarize some spectrums used for cultural comparison, and address how each 
might be related to voting preferences.

Hofstede

One of the earliest researchers who worked on identifying dimensions of cultural 
variation is Geert Hofstede, a Dutch psychologist who began his work in the late 1960s, who is 
most notable for developing cultural dimensions theory. Using the nation as the unit of analysis, 
and norming his original work using industrial/organizational samples from the same large 
multinational corporation (IBM Computers), Hofstede identified six dimensions of cultural 
variation along which national cultures vary independently, each dimension operating freely of 
the other dimensions, and taken together, providing a profile of the culture. The six dimensions
are: Power Distance, Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity, Long Term Orientation, and Indulgence vs. Restraint. Those who are familiar with the popular idea of individualism as a dichotomy that splits East from West may notice that only the word Individualism is used here, and that its usage is not accidental, but stems from the fact that Hofstede measured individualism and its absence, not the presence of collectivism.

Hofstede initiated research on categorizing cultures as varying along a spectrum, and while there are critiques of his work, a long line of scholarship has emerged from the idea that societies encode their principles of self-organization and cohesion in cultural values, and that these values create a deep structure (Greenfield, 2009). This deep structure could be shaping overall preferences and values which are related to our expectations for how our government should be run, and this may have an impact on voting preferences. One question I hope to address in this dissertation is whether a culture is passed down over generations, or whether a culture is something that is always defined by the ecologies in which it currently exists.

Critiques of Hofstede and Other Early Research on Individualism and Collectivism

The Three Fallacies

Hofstede measured the degree to which Individualism was present in the organizational structures of workplaces in different countries around the world, but he did not seek to measure what was there in its absence. The lack of a complimentary, opposing construct in the structure of Hofstede’s theory has been criticized by subsequent researchers, and is a possible limitation of his work. This limitation, along with critiques by Brendan Sweeney (Heffernan, Morrison, Basu & Sweeney, 2010), point out that Hofstede may have participated in three of the main fallacies associated with cultural dichotomization: Essentialism, Racialization, and Determinism.
The fallacy of essentialism refers to the idea that if you view culture as deterministic, you may assume that it defines a person’s essence or essentialize them. Racialization is a fallacy that assumes that genetic population differences – detectable via visible phylogenetic physical differences in appearance (e.g. skin color, shapes of facial features) – are the cause of group differences rather than cultural differences. The problem with racialization is that people have evolved distinctive physical differences in geographic isolation, and it is very difficult to be treated as an insider in many cultures when you neither look like the local population, nor have a known history as descended from the local population. Even if a person grew up in one of the cultures, the other members of the culture might be likely to treat them as an outsider from birth, meaning that their enculturation experiences would be different from that of a person genetically embedded in the culture. Racialization is the idea that race is a thing internal to a person, rather than a perceptual cue which, over time and historical circumstance, has led one group of similar-looking people to treat another group differently, so that each group develops a self-concept as distinct from one another within one society (Arnett, 2003).

The fallacy of determinism is that people have used culture to predict outcomes as if it defines someone else and they cannot escape. The deterministic fallacy (McSweeney, 2013) questions how powerful cultural values are in predicting outcomes - among the things which they fail to take into consideration are personality differences that might lead to greater or weaker resistance to following norms, and only account for a few percent of the variance between cultures.

These fallacies are important in exploring the role of culture and the role of various segments of our population in making voting decisions. My theoretical perspective is that cultural tendencies towards conservation compete with ecological pressures in changing the
overall nature of a culture, and that within this large-scale tug-of-war there are many other dimensions of intersectionality in our identities that may play a role in voting preferences and even in the expression of “cultural” variables. Likewise, variables which have been attributed to personality factors may have more of a cultural role than expected, a proposition which needs further empirical testing.

**Triandis: Adding Collectivism and a Vertical/Horizontal Dimension**

Triandis objected to the lack of theoretical specificity or operational definitions of either individualism or collectivism in previous research, as well as the lack of existing measures’ ability to measure orientations to individualism/collectivism at the level of a single psyche. He has contributed a lot of work to the field of cultural psychology by trying to flesh out the concepts and measures of individualism and collectivism. Triandis integrated a second dimension of cross-cultural variation: in addition to individualism and collectivism, he constructed his scale to also measure tolerance for inequality, which he characterized as a spectrum where high tolerance for inequality, or verticality, was at one end and an emphasis on equality, or Horizontality, were at the other end (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Hofstede, by way of comparison, created four and later added two more dimensions of cultural variability including one called Individualism, and another called Power-Distance (Hofstede, 1983; 2003). Power-Distance also aims to capture how a society tolerates hierarchical inequality. Like Hofstede, Triandis sought to characterize the constructs that clustered together to form an individualistic society rather than a collectivistic one. Unlike Hostede, Triandis paid attention to defining collectivism actively, rather than passively as the absence of individualism.

Subsequent researchers have raised the point that these constructs are considered to be spectrums because of nothing more than the fact that one occurs in China and the other in the US.
(Taras et al., 2014), and somehow calling it a spectrum creates a sense of universality in the expression of the human psyche through culture. However, others have asked the following question: perhaps individualism and collectivism represent two independent constructs? Taras et al. describe how different groups of researchers can be categorized into two groups: researchers who view individualism and collectivism as a single bi-dimensional spectrum, and those in the family of Triandis and Gelfand (1998) or Markus and Kitayama (1991) who conceptualize of the two as orthogonal.

Triandis knitted concepts from previous theories into his definition of individualism. For Triandis, then, Individualism is defined as: a sense of personal identity (Erikson), self-actualization (Maslow), internal locus of control (Rotter), and post-conventional principled moral reasoning (Kohlberg) (Triandis, 1995). This last comment should be noted, as there is clear enmeshing between Kohlberg’s post-conventional morality and westernized culture - particularly individualism - already noted as far back as the 1980s (Hofstede, 1988; Tamai & Lee, 2002).

Triandis also points out that all humans live in groups, but the way the person responds to the group and its needs may differ, such that individualists may have more in-group identities with less loyalty to any given in-group, dropping and switching if the cost becomes higher, where a collectivist would tolerate much greater cost before abandoning the in-group (Hui &Triandis, 1985). Triandis must be given credit for ascribing positive meaning to collectivism rather than leaving members of societies which have value-patterns of more collectivistic behaviors in a vacuum as “other,” subject to being racialized, essentialized, and determined.

Markus and Kitayama: Independence/Interdependence
Markus and Kitayama (1991; 2003; 2014) proposed a spectrum called Independence/Interdependence. Both Hofstede and Triandis were raised in individualistic cultures and their theories and the way those theories are described is individualistic. Markus and Kitayama departed from this tradition by incorporating in the theoretical design, the research team, and its inspiration, perspectives from people who grew up in collectivistic environments. Another departure was to structure their theory around self-construals, based on identity and self-perceptions. By centralizing their theory on self-perceptions, they attempt to avoid the fallacy of essentializing the “other.” Their theory attempts to explain how one orients and positions oneself in the group, as a single unit or as an interdependent member of the group. This theory added significantly more psychological explanation to how the spectrum worked at the level of the person and their internal mental states.

Specifically, the conceptual orientation of independence and interdependence has to do with the view of the self in the group, either emphasizing separateness (independence) or connectedness (interdependence). These self-construals are assumed to align with individualism and collectivism such that individualistic cultures will have people whose self-construal is more likely to be independent (Singelis, 1994). Their theory addresses the question of how the values of a culture bind and order society and encourage and coordinate prosocial behavior. How are they experienced and enacted by members of a culture?

If Neisser’s (1988) theory is from the perspective of the individual looking out at their position relative to others, and Bronfenbrenner’s is perhaps looking down on the person as they are situated within a nested framework of environmental levels of influence (Rosa & Tudge, 2013), then Independence/Interdependence theorizes about the intersection between those two perspectives.
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have summarized the history and structure of theories that have attempted to identify universal deep structures that underlie cultural differences. Over the past few decades, many researchers have confronted this idea, and in the next chapter, we shall see how the idea of a universal deep structure of culture was developed into a larger theory about the nature of cultural change and the way culture shapes us as we change during the process of developing. While these ideas are broad, they are relevant here because understanding the role of voting predictors, such as authoritarianism, requires an understanding of the dynamic nature of culture and its influence on us. This is especially true when considering whether or not authoritarianism, or sexism, or social dominance, are values expressed at multiple levels throughout a person’s ideology. For example, if authoritarianism in parenting is linked to authoritarianism in voting, then there may be cultural values underlying that linkage.
4. Cultural Ecologies

Ecological Theories in Cultural Psychology: How do Values and Norms Impact Voting?

If the overall goal of this research is to understand the pathway of choices and reasoning that leads a person to choose whom to vote for, in this case in the 2016 presidential election, then a significant component of that decision, I hypothesize, comes from cultural factors such as norms, values, beliefs, and stories that are passed around a community. These norms, values, and rules are transmitted to children through their parents, their friends, and community members via stories and social learning. In this chapter, I will specifically address the set of theories that seem most promising to serve as a basis for describing the contributions of culture to the process of deciding who to vote for.

Patricia Greenfield (2000) posits the existence of a “deep structure” of culture which is framed around some version of the individualistic/collectivistic spectrum. My definitions of individualism and collectivism are as follows: Individualism and collectivism are each a set of values, norms, and rules that help to give structure to the way a society self-regulates its members’ adhesions, cooperations and the tensions between members’ needs and the needs of the larger group. Individualism, as distinct from collectivism, is a type of system where the members’ needs receive high deference and priority, resulting in a more egocentric style of cognition. Collectivism is a type of system where the group’s needs receive higher deference and priority, resulting in a more collaborative style of cognition where the ego is subsumed by in-group identity. These definitions, of course, leave room for a great deal of variation, especially in the level of “group” which is being referred to (family? society?).
Greenfield’s theory suggests that the ecological needs of a society drive its internal principles of self-organization, which, in turn, become enshrined in cultural values. If collectivism and Individualism are truly the roots of the deep structure of human societies, a possibility which has become more likely in the light of recent work on how parenting styles translate to political values (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997), then Greenfield’s idea that all cultures exist on a spectrum of balancing (or not) the needs of individual and group are important to consider in any study of psychology. I believe, in light of Greenfield’s writing, that culture is an inescapable force in the formation of all humans.

In the remainder of this chapter, I would like to draw connections between ecological theories of culture and the way cultural values, norms and rules can shape voting decisions. First, I will review the literature that shows how ecological contexts shape the way a culture self-organizes into an individualistic, egocentric-emphasizing society or into a collectivistic, collaborative, self-inhibiting society. Then, I would like to connect ecological contexts through the way they shape culture, to habitual cultural norms that were discussed above, such as authoritarianism.

Theory of Social Change and Human Development: Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft

Researchers have identified how values and norms respond to constraints – which are at least partially driven by economic contexts (Park, Joo, Quiroz & Greenfield, 2015). Greenfield theorized that the process of industrialization drives migration to urban environments, and urban environments foster individualism and materialism, a psychological self-awareness and a sense of the unique self. By analyzing the words employed in publications scanned by Google into Google Books through the Google NGram viewer, Greenfield (Greenfield, 2013) identified a
shift in ideology in literature and publications in both British and American books from 1800 to 2000, from a focus on the ecological typology of gemeinschaft (or community) to gesellschaft (society) model. Gemeinschaft ecologies are rural, subsistence-based, employ simple technologies and education is often accomplished at home, focusing on practical skills. Gesellschaft is an ecological system that represents the industrialized urban environment with formal education, a commercial economy, complex technology and the possibility of accumulating great wealth for some members of the society. Over the past 200 years, the proportion of US citizens living in rural areas as opposed to urban ones has gone from being above 90% to almost 20%, with urban environments now containing the remaining 80% of the population as of 2000.

To draw a connection between this work and the context of voting, there is ample research that shows how population density is inversely proportional to one’s likelihood to vote conservatively, suggesting very strong linear ties between the way Greenfield’s theory about the impacts of ecology on culture would lead to voting preferences (McKee, 2008; Scala, Johnson, Rogers, 2015).

Many have criticized such work as enhancing a racist focus on the “other” as non-western (Greenfield, 2000) - particularly non-industrialized and formerly colonial regions of the world. In this dissertation, I am hoping to apply the idea of individualism and collectivism to sub-cultures within the United States, using it as a new predictor of voting patterns. The theoretical motivation to use individualism in predicting voting patterns inside the US is that individualism, at least according to Greenfield, would be higher in urban residents than rural residents. Many of the affordances of gesellschaft focus on the way societies in regions with higher population density, such as most of New York City, need to organize themselves, and the values which are
endorsed for residents of the city by the needs and affordances of a city. Conversely, in areas with lower population density, such as Staten Island, for example, the affordances of a gemeinschaft community would shape residents’ behavior towards collectivistic values. However, while Greenfield’s work emphasizes the fluctuating nature of culture in response to ecologies such as population density, I propose that there is a tension on people to adhere to their culture and resist change from ecological pressures.

Park, Joo, Quiroz and Greenfield elaborated on the idea that individuals within a society can vary in their degree of adherence to individualism and collectivism depending on a variety of ecological and sociodemographic factors (2015). This idea is problematic for cultural-level measures and theories such as Hofstede’s national-level measures of relatively stable cultures. However, research on implicit bias suggests that it is not abnormal for both of these perspectives to hold truth in them. Payne, Vuletich and Lundberg (2017) attempt to grapple with inconsistencies in research on implicit bias. While cross-sectional research on children and adults shows that implicit biases are learned early, implicit bias within a person can fluctuate longitudinally over weeks. Community levels of bias are strongly associated with disparities and discrimination, yet individual differences, such as in personality traits, are also weakly predictive of results on an implicit association test. These conundrums highlight the complexity of how culturally shaped attributes are constantly in flux and yet highly stable.

The Gemein/Gesellschaft distinction seeks to identify the underlying drivers of cultural differences such as individualism and collectivism, but fails to explain why cultural values sometimes prevail in defiance of ecological pressures. For example, Park et al. (2015) compared European American and Korean Americans with Koreans living in rural and urban settings in Korea. Park et al. studied how Korean culture has changed over the past four decades as a
function of access to technology such as computers and the internet. They compared cultural change among rural and urban Koreans to cultural change among Koreans who had immigrated to Los Angeles and found that Koreans living in America experienced a “freezing” of their culture as it was at the time of emigration. The study showed how ecological factors such as access to technology can lead to cultural change that mimics urbanization adaptations, even when the actual population density remains low, as it did in Korea (2015). This suggests that the intensity of contact with others is a factor that leads to cultural change, whether that contact occurs as a result of living in densely populated urban environments or as a result of access to contact with others through communicative technologies afforded by the internet.

In addition, the differences between Americans and Koreans on measures of individualism varied by setting intra-individually, such that individualism was strongest in the context of the school domain, where no differences were found between European Americans and Korean Americans. Most importantly, in contrast with predictions from Greenfield’s theory of social change and human development, the rural/urban divide did not result in differences on measures of individualism. The authors suggest that this may be due to a high level of technology and education in rural Korean homes, which may be allowing a sense of connectedness to vast human populations that was previously only achievable in an urban environment. The predictions of researchers such as Bimber, as far back as 1998, that the rising presence of the internet in our lives may be reshaping cultures, are supported by this work. However, Park et al., have added an additional mechanism of explanation: the internet is reshaping culture by reducing the impact of population density differences on our experiences.

Therefore, the impact of cultural values is likely something that is transmitted across generations, and highly variable at fine grains of analysis, such as at the individual or intra-
individual level, yet broad measures, such as Hofstede’s continue to capture something. The question then becomes, how does the tension between a tendency for cultural conservation of values and continuity and the need to adapt to changing ecologies play out over time? And how do these tensions apply to voting decisions within the US? In Greenfield’s analysis of Google NGram, some of the words whose use has declined in English since 1800 are “obliged,” and “duty.” Meanwhile, “choose” and “decision” have picked up steam during the period of industrialization in the US/UK and are intuitively aligned with the individualistic sensibilities that urbanites possess in the US (which often overlap with political liberalism).

Zeng and Greenfield used Ngram to analyze change over the past 40 years in China and the USA, since China has rapidly undergone industrialization, to see what would happen to the “collectivistic” values of obligation and obedience in China that Greenfield saw decline between 1800 and 2000 in the US and UK. Words indexing adaptive individualistic values increased in frequency in China between 1970 and 2008 (2015). In contrast, words indexing less adaptive collectivistic values either decreased in frequency over this same period or else rose more slowly than words indexing contrasting individualistic values. This work raises two points: 1) the model of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft positively contributes to the developing ideas of cultural differences such as individualism and collectivism, and these older works may benefit from the re-interpretation of their results based on this new paradigm; and 2) the shift that Greenfield found in the US and the UK did not occur in China the same way it did in the US, so there are factors beyond ecology at work, which I will term, for now, tendencies towards conservation.

Indeed, the tendencies towards conservation were also seen by Park et al. in the Korean-American mothers who lived in LA and preserved the values and norms of Korea at the time that they left, separated from the ecological drivers of the shifts that had occurred between the 1980s
Korea that they left, and Korea as it existed decades later, at the time of the research, having been heavily influenced by internet exposure (2015).

**Bioecological Systems Theory, Theory of Social Change/Human Development and Modeling Cultural Identity: The Individual embedded in the group**

Bioecological systems theory of Urie Bronfenbrenner (Rosa & Tudge, 2013), an earlier ecological theory of culture’s role in human development, is a natural fit for situating such an investigation of how the “deep structure” (as in Greenfield’s Theory of Social Change and Human Development) of society is transmitted across levels of social organization, since the deep structure assumes a framework for the developmental contexts in which people learn as they grow.

Bronfenbrenner’s theory differs from Greenfield’s in its emphasis on bidirectional influences. He developed a theory, influenced by Vygotsky social co-constructionism, in which the individual was at the center of a set of nested circles of bidirectional influence. From the perspective of a given individual, their immediate interactions (known as proximal processes), were with members of their families, communities, schools, etc. - the real people they interact with on a daily basis. He termed each of these settings (e.g. the family home) a microsystem. The microsystems in which one is embedded interact with one another in what Bronfenbrenner termed the mesosystem. The exosystem is a larger network of interactions in which the individual does not directly partake (Rosa & Tudge, 2013). Examples might be the work environment of the individual’s parent - the work environment affects the parent and the parent affects the individual child. Another example might be the legislator who drafts laws about
whether a child is required to attend school or not. The child is not interacting with the legislature but may still feel the effects of that group’s acts.

Such a framework, I propose, may be very useful in understanding the underlying processes which converge each time one makes a voting decision, as the proximal processes that form our moral compasses are likely forged in the larger societal values in which we are immersed since birth. Bronfenbrenner considered the contexts in which a person spends time - particularly within the family, as well as personal characteristics of the individual and the historical time period in which a person lives - to be drivers of how a person develops (Rosa & Tudge, 2013). Bronfenbrenner’s theory asks that researchers study: a) the settings in which a developing individual spends time, b) the relations with others in those settings, c) the individual characteristics of the person, d) their development over time, e) the historical time in which they live, and, finally, f) the mechanisms that drive development, also known as proximal processes. The current research has collected data, which at least nominally addresses each of these goals except (d).

Bronfenbrenner’s motivation for creating his theory has been described as a sense of frustration at the state of research in the 1970s, which regularly lacked a sense of ecological validity and did not consider any system of values (Rosa & Tudge, 2013). The idea of ecological validity emerged from criticism of early psychological work which attempted to control for as much variability as possible by testing one specific thing in the laboratory at the expense of understanding the complexity of humans in situ. Ecological validity is, therefore, the study of psychological factors in their normal environment, not in an artificial, laboratory-based setting. As Bronfenbrenner was participating in the revolutionary upending of psychological research values in the 1970s counter-cultural movements through focusing on ecological validity, he was
also viewing the role of psychological research in society differently: rather than suggesting that social policy be informed by research, he suggested research should take social policy into account by design.

These three levels are all concrete and thus differ from the final levels. The macrosystem consists of what might be termed culture: sets of values, norms, and rules that may permeate all the other levels and be transmitted through each level, guiding the behavior of all members of the system, or at least, those who are aware of its norms and values. Each of these levels changes with time, which is why Bronfenbrenner amended his earliest models to include a chronosystem enveloping the other levels (Rosa & Tudge, 2013).

![Figure 1: Model of Bronfenbrenner’s Model of Bioecological Systems Theory](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bronfenbrenner.png)

*Figure 1: Model of Bronfenbrenner’s Model of Bioecological Systems Theory*

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The concept of the chronosystem is relevant to Greenfield’s deep structure of *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*, of the theory of social change and human development as most of the active research on this theory uses cultural change to understand the ecological contexts which shape a cultural system (Greenfield, 2009). In other words, change is used to understand the parameters of the system, and especially to understand what is cultural and what is related to individual differences between people. Without observations of change, we would have no way of disentangling these parameters. The sort of contrast provided by capturing change in culture can, perhaps, also be glimpsed by using a different, synchronous method: by asking immigrants to the US about their experiences with their multiple cultures in contrast with cultural norms in the heritage culture, we can distinguish between personal acculturative change from navigating transnational contact rather than societal-level change as an entire culture changes under pressure from large-scale economic changes that exert ecological pressures on the culture.

For example, the internal ecology of a country can change based on temporary circumstances such as fluctuations in the financial markets: Park, Twenge and Greenfield found that American undergraduates’ values changed between cohorts as a function of an economic recession that occurred between 2008 and 2010 (2014; 2017). They also compared college students’ values prior to the Great Recession (2004-2006) with the values of students whose undergraduate years occurred during the Great Recession (2008-2010). The Great Recession created a useful context in which to study individualism and collectivism because society-wide financial hardship could encourage a change in cultural attitudes towards greater acceptance of emerging adults’ dependence on family financial support. This shift towards collectivism, if found, would represent an example of the vacillation between individualism and collectivism that occurs despite a general trend towards continuously increasing individualism as
industrialization and technological advancements increase. The shift suggests that when entire populations shift how they endorse certain values, it may be related to recent, profound ecological changes and represent cultural change. Park, Twenge and Greenfield found that cultural shifts did occur in college students’ values associated with the financial crises leading to 1) greater community mindset including concern for community programs and the environment, 2) greater materialism and 3) more negative self-views as they struggled with economic obstacles.

Taken together, work in this field suggests several factors that can impact cultural values directing social organization, such as economic pressures and the intensity of contact with others through either urban environments or digital communication technologies. When cultures change because of ecological factors, not only do they shift the social organizational habits of members of their population, but the accompanying justifications, norms, values and ideals of “good” behavior – that is to say, social organization.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I summarized major theories of how culture is situated in contextual ecologies that shape it. These theories are important for later discussion of the way voting preferences may be shaped by culture.
5. Parenting Styles Situated in the Deep Structures of Cultural Ecology

In this section, I will begin to draw the theories that have been discussed so far together and towards the goal of understanding how they work in the context of shaping our voting decisions. As we saw in chapter 1, political science research on why people vote for fascists merged with parenting research to create a powerful predictor of voting preferences called authoritarianism. In chapter 3 I described how cultures have been characterized as varying along a spectrum, and in chapter 4, how that spectrum has been characterized as a deep organizational structure of culture and society. I would now like to use parenting theory to review research on the mechanism of cultural transmission, which is likely to occur partly through exposure to media, described in chapter 2, and partly to the patterns observed socially and co-constructively in the family.

Parenting style research emerged from a desire to understand causative relationships between parent behaviors and children’s mental health outcomes later in life, and much research has addressed, and shown, that children parented authoritatively – with boundaries and yet also with empathy and dialogue – have better outcomes in life (Maccoby, 1992). However, when parenting styles are viewed from a cultural perspective, the picture becomes murkier. Two questions emerge from this line of inquiry: 1) how do parents from different points on the individualism/collectivism spectrum socialize their children to participate in the larger cultural patterns of behavior, and 2) does one culture normalize different responses for the same behaviors than another (e.g. the idea of emerging adulthood and becoming an adult may be more individualistic, or, certain parenting styles may be harmful to the emergence of an individualistic adult but helpful to the emergence of a collectivistic adult). For example, researchers studying Jewish and Arab Israeli adolescents found that Arab adolescents’ experience of closeness to their
parents was positively and significantly correlated with the number of rules laid out by the parents, but number of rules had no relationship with Jewish Israeli’s sense of closeness to their families (Snarey & Keljo, 1991).

The idea of authority as the glue that binds a society is a final way of conceptualizing the spectrums of culture. “Authority as structure” is a further step toward fitting the different theories into an overall ecological perspective: let us consider how ideas like collectivism and individualism (and the other similar terms) all translate into the most essential microsystem of all, the family unit. When one considers whether authority is expected to be autonomous or imposed at the familial level, one may automatically envision different types of parenting styles. Maccoby defines four types of parenting styles as: Authoritative, Authoritarian, Indulgent and Neglectful (1992). The first two are demanding, while the latter two are undemanding. On a different dimension, Authoritative and Indulgent are responsive while Authoritarian and Neglectful are unresponsive. Thus, authoritarian parenting is demanding but unresponsive (Maccoby, 1992).

The parenting style considered ideal by canonical researchers such as Baumrind (1991) or Maccoby (1992) is termed authoritative, although it is important to remember that the theorists are Westernized and the empirical support for them comes from participants living and growing up in Western, industrialized countries. In this type of parenting, the child is given space to develop autonomy, while there are clear limits and boundaries in place that define appropriate behavior, although the parent and child participate in a give-and-take as well. The parents provide encouragement, and will listen to children, expecting the child to listen to them as well. The very description of this type of ideal parenting and its goals of self-reliance, independence and individual align with many of the values of an individualistic society. In short, parents who
adopt this parenting style are employing ideal strategies to prepare their offspring for American society, particularly white American society.

On the other hand, the parenting style described as Authoritarian/Totalitarian is characterized by Maccoby and Martin as demanding but unresponsive, rather than demanding and responsive. Authoritarian/totalitarian parenting styles are often endorsed by groups that are more collectivistic, supporting what I have been suggesting, which is that both authoritarianism and collectivism are culturally learned and evolved as part of the need for human societies to self-regulate and maintain cohesion through the values that members hold. For example, one might describe an idealized version of a progressive American government as an Authoritative government that will have clear standards for its citizens, monitor the limits that it sets, and also allow citizens to develop autonomy. It also expects mature, independent, and age-appropriate behavior from its citizens. Punishments for misbehavior are measured and consistent, not arbitrary or violent. Often behaviors are not punished but the natural consequences of the citizen’s actions are explored and discussed - allowing the person to see that the behavior is inappropriate and not to be repeated, rather than not repeated to merely avoid adverse consequences. Simply substitute the word child for citizen, and one can see how the philosophy of authority is echoed between the levels of organization of family (microsystem) and government (exosystem) through the values of the macrosystem.

Authoritarian parenting is described as restrictive, non-responsive parenting style where children are expected to follow instructions and obey rules without any explanations. It has been associated with negative mental health outcomes and delayed development of agency (Maccoby, 1992). However, other research has shown that characteristics of an authoritarian style are notable in Asian cultures, but in those contexts, they are associated with positive outcomes.
(Santrock, 2007). Ethnic Minority style differs from strict authoritarian parenting by being highly responsive towards children’s needs, while also differing from authoritative parenting by maintaining high demands, and not placing children’s needs as a priority. This style promotes high demandingness and high responsiveness together to produce high academic performance in children (Huang, 2015).

**Situating Parenting Theory in Ecological Theories of Culture**

The perception that Authoritarianism is a cultural variable is not new, but neither is it yet universal. Tamis-LeMonda et al. viewed it as an expression of cultural individualism and collectivism at the familial level (2008). MacWilliams (2016) conducted research on authoritarianism in politics, not only as a cultural variable, characterizing the cultural tendencies of African Americans as authoritarian, but as an ecological cultural variable, shaped by historical process of oppression and inequality over centuries. Given the nature of authoritarianism, as a variable tied to the self-organizing principles of a society and the role of authority, obedience, and top-down rule as a cultural convention in a society, it is worth considering its role as a cultural variable, and as such, one that is subject to ecological shaping. This cultural authoritarianism, MacWilliams argues, would lead African Americans to vote for conservatives (MacWilliams, 2016), just as other researchers have identified high authoritarianism as a predictor of political alignment with conservative ideologies.

MacWilliams argue that African Americans do not vote for Republicans in higher numbers because liberal policies are often focused, to some degree, at improving the treatment and opportunities of people of color. For MacWilliams, this pits African Americans’ racial identities against their cultural tendencies. When the issue at hand engages African Americans’
authoritarian tendencies, authoritarianism can trump cultural identity. According to MacWilliams, the profound orientation towards authoritarianism, is essentially a cultural value shaped by ecological pressure on African Americans through slavery, Jim Crow and the ongoing asymmetrical violence experienced by the Black community in America. He points out that Black Americans have, uniquely among American sub-demographics, experienced ongoing threats of physical and psychological violence through our 400-year national history in the USA. MacWilliams’s work demonstrates how long-term threat can become an ecological factor shaping cultural change for an endogenous group within the United States (in the case of African Americans). As other work has demonstrated that perceived threat from violence can activate latent authoritarians (Feldman & Stenner, 1997), MacWilliams’ work suggests that perceived threat of violence can ecologically shape stable cultural values.

One interesting connection that can be made between this research and other work on culture, is with research which suggests that authoritarian differences between nations are a function of the way parents socialize their offspring towards that nation’s cultural requirements for participation in society, and how these socialization techniques, which are adaptive in the heritage culture, can lead to intergenerational conflict when immigrants apply them to their children growing up in America (Lansford, 2016).

The divide between individualism and collectivism flexes around a fulcrum of authority: authority to make decisions and judgments, whether that authority is internally and autonomously situated or external and deferential to the collective. Additionally, childhood and adolescence are crucial periods for the crystallization of these cultural tendencies, as emerging adults become responsible for how their decisions shape their society. Both theories allow for space to consider how cultural values can be passed to the emerging generation. Both theories
also provide opportunities to describe how changes to the ecology of the system can alter those values in the process of transmission through parenting, as well as interactions with the larger community, or even through the media.

Conclusion

In the section above, theories of how cultural differences occur on a spectrum were discussed, and one of the main methods of analysis was to analyze differences at the level of comparing different groups such as nations, since overall trends of a group may differ. However, any given member of the group, chosen at random, may not differ from a randomly selected member of a group whose overall means are different. This analysis might be thought of as being done at the level of the macrosystem, but as we have seen, political scientists and other social scientists are trying to understand how the values of the macrosystem percolate through the society. Developing theoretical and methodological ways to understand the contributions of cultural conservation, ecological pressures on culture and individual differences is important for disentangling voting preferences in the 2016 election.
6. Social Identity Theory, Belief Change Resistance and Politics

Identity can also play a role in the way we express the values of the culture(s) we develop within. While it is important to understand how we learn to be a part of our culture or cultures through social co-constructivism, our individual expressions of culture will be shaped by our individual roles in our microsystem environments. Indeed, this is one of the critiques leveled at Hofstede’s cultural spectrums by Markus and Kitayama: Hofstede failed to take into account how our self-perceptions and identities contribute to how our culture is expressed. In this chapter, I would like to take a look at how identity may interact with culture through a review of the Social Identity Perspective, which can be broken down into social identity theory and self-categorization theory. One of the strengths of using this particular identity theory in this research is that it attempts to address how we each “wear multiple hats,” shifting between various identities. This concept is useful for understanding voting preferences because if you might have a woman who is second generation and white, which of her identities is most likely to predict her voting decision: gender, immigration status or race?

Social Identity Theory

Identity research has come a long way to understanding, from the perspective of one person, how one self-construes one’s membership in various specific groups. The complexity of how one feels that they belong to different slices of larger groups is the purview of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). SIT specifically addresses how the values inherent in the macrosystem translate into interpersonal interactions between members of groups, and how we manage the different definitions we have of ourselves based on the context. Perhaps in the context of a bar, we might consider ourselves first and foremost by our
gender/sexual orientation, whereas when filling out a census form, we may consider how we align racially with other Americans, yet on holidays, perhaps we are a member of our family, or perhaps we are a practitioner of our religion. Who we are speaking to in the moment and the needs of the moment determine which identity is most salient for us in that moment, according to SIT. Later, Turner added Self-Categorization Theory, which, together with the earlier Social Identity Theory, comprise Social Identity Perspective (SIP) (Turner, 1978; 1982).

SIP clarifies how bioecological systems translate into real-world problems such as prejudice and belief change (Turner, 1978; 1982). In addition to SIT asking researchers to conceptualize of social identities as plural, sliding in and out of prominence depending on the situation, it also comprises a spectrum of focus between a holistic representation of the self (perhaps the Conceptual Self of Neisser, 1988) and specific group identities that are most salient in each moment. This theoretical piece may help to explain de-individuation events where a person behaves in ways that are outside of and perhaps contrary to their normal behavioral patterns (Haney, Banks & Zimbardo, 1973), such as fans at a football game taking off their shirts, painting their faces and bodies, and running screaming onto the field – all behaviors that are associated with the temporarily salient identity of football fan, not the holistic identity of a given person. In fact, Henri Tajfel conceptualized stereotyping (i.e. putting people into groups and categories) as based on a normal cognitive process: the tendency to group things together. In doing so, we tend to exaggerate 1) the differences between groups, 2) the similarities of things in the same group. Thus, in-group bias is the tendency to favor individuals that are part of our group over members outside of our group, now that we have developed mental categories of self and other (Turner, 1978; 1982). A corollary to in-group bias is that you will see the rich detail of those close to you but are more likely to simplify members of other groups, where you do not
know any or many members of that group well enough to see that group’s internal complexity, is
out-group homogeneity: the tendency to view people from the out-group as highly similar.

We have prototypical ideas of what people look like who belong to other groups so take a
moment and imagine a Muslim woman and keep her image in your head. Was she an African
Muslim? Or perhaps an Indonesian one? Many Americans are likely to imagine a prototypical
Muslim woman as a white middle eastern woman wearing a hijab, although depending on the
news cycle, one might imagine women from other parts of the world, other cultures within the
Islamic world. Out group stereotypes emerge from our need to form positive social identities for
ourselves and to define those identities in terms of how we differ from others. This need to have
a positive social identity may be part of what drives political divides in the US right now - we
vote with our sub-cultures to be a part of the community and to demonstrate that we belong to
that community by espousing the ideals of that community. We view others, outside our bubble
and across the divide as unimaginably different from us.

**Self-Categorization Theory**

Self-Categorization Theory, by contrast, adds an exploration of what it means to be a
“group”: “What is a psychological group?” “How are people able to act psychologically in a
collective way as group members?” “How do we manage many identities?” (Turner and
Reynolds, 2001). The focal point of this part of SIP is that, while we all want to be part of a
group, this does not mean we have to be in order to put down other groups. However, it does
relate to the discussions presented in earlier chapters about the human need to participate in a
larger organizational structure.
Social Identity Perspective in a Multicultural Context

Researchers have successfully applied SIP to show how managing multiple identities may affect other cognitive processes, especially for individuals who have to manage multiple identities within a category of identity, such as multi-racial or multi-ethnic identities. Sarah Gaither (2015) experimentally induced some multi-racial and some monoracial people to reflect on their racial identity(ies) and then asked them to complete a task measuring creativity afterwards. Multiracial participants who had been primed were compared to multiracial people who had not been primed and demonstrated statistically significant increased creativity, while monoracial people who were primed did not differ from monoracial people who had not been primed. However, monoracial people are not doomed to be less creative, as monoracial people experienced a similar, statistically significant increase in creativity when asked to think about multiple (non-race based) social identities they experienced. This idea is not new (e.g. see Hui & Triandis, 1985) but its empirical support has been scant until recently. One component mentioned by Gaither is that shifting among one’s multiple identities is not limited to cultural and/or linguistic identities of acculturation, but within that, there are dimensions which are always present and which are often treated differently in differently cultures, such as how men and women are treated, how LGBTQ members of society are treated, how people of different ages are treated, and how people of differing statuses within a given society are treated, such as differing SES or differing physical or mental abilities. While these dimensions are always present and represent important dimensions of identity, they also interact with culture where different cultures hold different attitudes towards each one of these dimensions of identity.

Identity and Ecological Systems Theory
In considering how the self is conceptualized in relation to other aspects of the environment and experience, Markus and Kitayama (1991; 2003; 2014) fit better with a Neisserian view of ecological systems (1988), rather than a Bronfenbrennerian one. Ulric Neisser conceptualized of five kinds of self-knowledge: the ecological self, interpersonal self, extended self, private self and the conceptual self. Neisser’s theory has a lot of overlap with Bronfenbrenner’s, but has two important differences (1988). The ecological self seems to encapsulate Bronfenbrenner’s conceptualization of the physical sense of self, that the skin is a line of demarcation separating one’s body from external elements, whereas the interpersonal self, as a concept, allows for more interactivity and interdependence than Bronfenbrenner’s description of the individual at the center of a series of spheres of influence, which emphasizes the individuality of the person, and less the interaction they have across various levels. The extended-self captures the role of time, as does the chronosystem, but the chronosystem encapsulates each and all levels of Bronfenbrenner’s theory, allowing for change throughout the system, whereas, by virtue of the focus on self-construals, Neisser’s extended self can only focus on the perception of the self as continuous in time.

However, Neisser’s addition of the private self (conscious experiences not shared with others) and the conceptual self (self-concept or, perhaps, identity), which are only possible in a system of self-construal and not possible in a system of ecological circumstances, adds a pronounced flavor of psychology to the way we can study how people situate themselves in society and culture (Neisser, 1988). In fact, it almost seems as if this is a necessary component of a bioecological systems theory, connecting the microsystem to the internalization of the microsystem within the person in different ways and helping to connect the bioecology to theories of identity formation.
Self-construals are important for understanding voting behavior as a culturally influenced behavior in multicultural contexts. For example, multicultural contexts provide opportunities for people from different cultures to intermix, leading to relationships and, often, multicultural families. The transmission of cultural values from parent to child is even more complex in multicultural families where there are differing and overlapping micro-environments within the home, each generated by different parents. As more families negotiate multiple cultural systems within their family unit, and situate themselves in the larger cultural narrative, the importance of understanding value transmission through Bronfenbrenner’s system levels becomes increasingly urgent, especially given the added dimension of changing cultures and having this additional dissonance: a kind of conflict where the parents are parenting what they learned in one culture, but their children are perceiving and experiencing it in a different culture, or one parent is parenting what they learned in their culture, and the other parent is parenting a different thing that they learned in another culture, while the child is living in yet another culture, can lead to conflict at worst and is complex at best. This idea, of the tensions on actors in culturally diverse societies as they are socialized into both the mainstream culture (e.g., via schools) and their ethnic/racial cultures (e.g., via families and neighborhoods) is called cultural discontinuity (Tyler et al., 2008; Vargas & Kemmelmeier, 2013).

7. America’s Promise as a Society of Immigrants: Acculturation Theory, and the Melting Pot

Acculturation models and identity

Acculturation theory attempts to address the transitional identity processes between heritage countries and host countries, particularly over multiple generations. First, I will present
a brief overview of acculturation theory, and then an equally brief consideration of its applicability to the complexities of the NYC context in which this research was conducted.

As mentioned above, acculturation theory contributes to our understanding of how Americans, as immigrants, situate their own identity at the crossroads of their cultures, whether their heritage culture(s) or their host culture(s). Berry (2005) describes three methodologies for assessing this information, from scales to vignettes, all of which ask respondents how they acculturate, or how value their various cultural communities and contexts. Acculturation is described, by Berry (2005), as having two dimensions out of which four patterns emerge. Dimension 1 can be described as the range of attitudes towards one’s heritage cultural identity, and dimension 2 concerns the desire to have contact with members of the larger (current) society. These two, 2-dimensional scales result, when crossed, in four possible outcomes, (1) assimilation, (2) integration, (3) separation and (4) marginalization. Assimilation refers to the individual’s wish to participate in the larger society without maintaining the heritage society. Integration, on the other hand, embraces both heritage culture and larger society. Separation indicates a desire to focus on maintaining heritage culture without participation in the larger society, and marginalization represents a rejection of both heritage culture and the larger society.

Alternate models of acculturation have attempted to capture the attitudes of specific groups that have large-scale representation in the United States, such as Latin@s or Asians or even, specifically, Mexicans or Chinese. Acculturation, or the idea that everyone must establish an attitude towards the cultures with which they are in contact, is valuable, but some critiques have been leveled at acculturation (for a dialogue, see Rudmin, 2008; Berry 2009), and there are a few concerns yet unmentioned with the theory. Acculturation is a useful way to understand a person’s attitudes towards two cultures, but it should be elaborated to address multi-cultural
environments. In addition, acculturation uses a model that somewhat vaguely refers to one’s attitudes towards one’s own culture, without specifying what that means. Most immigrants come from nations which are, themselves, multicultural with internal conflicts between groups, and they arrive in New York with those complex identities, not simply “I am Mexican.” According to an ethnologue of languages, Mexico has at least 287 distinct languages spoken within the nation, 68 of which are officially recognized by the government (Lewis, Simons & Fennig, 2013). Other countries with strong representation of immigrants in NYC have intricately complex ethno-linguistic diversity within the nation (see figure 2 for an example: a map of complex ethno-linguistic diversity in Nigeria, Cameroon and Benin).
Figure 2: A map of linguistic and ethnic diversity in Nigeria, illustrating the complexity within a nation that is not represented in national means such as Hofstede’s scale. A Linguistic map of Nigeria, Cameroon, and Benin. Ulamm, 2007, Wikimedia Commons. Used under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 generic license.

Underlying drivers for cultural differences, therefore, may be tied to explicit self-identities, as suggested by acculturation literature. A given person must make the choice to align themselves with one culture, another, or multiple cultures, and this choice may contribute to how that person views political values and chooses candidates when voting. Acculturation is an aspect
of identity that tries to capture the flux of options available to those living in multicultural environments, although it tends to focus on the development of the attitudes of people who are exposed to and need to navigate identities that demand more than one cultural self-construal. However, one failing of acculturation is that it focuses on immigrants as the only group to face this decision. In NYC, there is a large, non-immigrant group whose members face constant tensions between identifying with their group and with the dominant white culture, and that group is African Americans, who have a distinct culture that evolved within the US and does not exist elsewhere. This very fact disrupts some of the acculturation theory, which assumes a monoculture at the destination of the immigrant, but it also forces us to consider that recent immigrants are not the only people who have to navigate complex dual identities.

**Acculturation and the Negotiation of Differing Values for People Living in Multicultural Contexts**

Research on acculturation seeks to understand how people negotiate their identity in cross-cultural contact, and to understand the cultural changes that occur because of that contact. Added to this complexity is the notion that people, as single members of a group and as part of a larger group of immigrants, negotiate the internal influences of their multiple cultures differently (Berry, 2008). This process occurs when groups of different cultural backgrounds and their members interact, which can happen through immigration (in this case, referred to as acculturation) or, increasingly, through digital and rapid-transit enabled globalization contact. Theorists have proposed that one can take up a stance according to how closely one aligns with each of one’s cultures.
For example, in research on the family structures and relationships between parents and children among immigrant groups from East Asia, Asian American adolescents were more likely, in general, to be willing to make sacrifices for their families, and in particular, for their parents (Lansford et al., 2016). European Americans, on the other hand, were more likely to be willing to sacrifice for their siblings than for their parents, but showed less willingness overall to make sacrifices for their families. Asian Americans who reported higher levels of assimilation were less willing to make sacrifices, although the value was maintained despite assimilation.

There are three conclusions to be drawn from this research: one conclusion, also supported by other researchers, is that most Americans have maintained values from heritage cultures, even when their ethnic status in the United States has normalized to the mainstream (Alba & Nee, 2009), and heritage values should remain a dimension of analysis in understanding multicultural modern American youth. The second point and third point are related, that a value of making sacrifice for one’s family, in terms of money, dating or schoolwork, is a part of a collectivistic mindset, and when children are faced with dueling cultural values such as their parents expectation to be sacrificed for versus their peers and perhaps their teachers, and the media’s expectation of doing what is best for oneself, one’s future, and one’s career, these dueling values may provoke intergenerational conflict over the way resources are managed, because societal organization is designed to manage resources, but only when the complexly balanced intact culture is followed. If resources are meant to be shared back to the family from the child, it is often the case that the child can expect resources to be shared with them in turn (such as from their own children), while an individualistic resource management structure encourages curating one’s own resources because it is expected that nobody will contribute to them to help you later.
In other words, parents and children may navigate their multicultural existence differently, leading to conflict. Acculturation mismatch may then provoke conflict, which results in worse mental health and educational outcomes. A meta-analysis (Lui, 2014) demonstrated that acculturation mismatch did indeed correlate with intergenerational cultural conflict, which in turn was negatively correlated to good mental health outcomes and also negatively correlated with educational outcomes, although less strongly than mental health outcomes in Asian and Latin@ immigrants.

While Asian and Latin@ are broad terms that encompass countries with a range of collectivistic tendencies, the researchers treated them all as collectivistic (Lui, 2014). However, one critique of this type of research is that, while it purports to examine the role of cultural values such as collectivistic, family-oriented values, it is also using immigrants as a comparison group for non-immigrants - in other words, studying the culture of people living outside the geographical zone in which the culture developed is like studying a particular species of frog from the Amazon rainforest in the jungles of Borneo by comparing it to a species of frog which evolved in Borneo. Sure, you are studying the frog, but its behavior is likely to be as much in response to the new ecology as it was to the way it evolved in its old ecology, and using the Borneo frog as a reference species leaves a lot of variables out of your control. Studies have replicated these findings across different immigrant/non-immigrant contexts, such as former USSR immigrants living in Israel with non-immigrant Israelis, or immigrant adolescents in Germany with non-immigrant Germans. However, this comparison, and the structural values immigrant families enact, could also be due to the act of migration, which requires one to rebuild capital, monetary, social and otherwise, in the destination location (Lansford et al., 2016).
One study which examined this shortcoming found that, across nine countries and thirteen cultures, there are generational differences without taking immigration into account (Lansford et al., 2016). Parents’ attitudes are more highly correlated with one another than with their children across all thirteen groups and nine countries, which could be due to either assortative mating where people select mates with like values or to generational shift from a changing world. In terms of parenting behaviors, Lansford et al. found that, effectively, parenting styles accounted for within culture variation between families (warmth, control and neglect all led to within culture variability), but hostility and rejection only led to variability between cultures; overall a sizable portion of the variance was accounted for by between culture variations (Lansford et al., 2016). Ultimately, family obligation is likely to be an important cultural value in understanding both acculturation and the underlying heritage cultural values that immigrants bring with them, with support for family obligation being contributed via both conditions.

**Conclusion**

This chapter summarized a theoretical perspective on multiculturalism called acculturation theory, which has two applications to our discussion of what shaped the voting decisions in the 2016 election: how our cultures form a part of our identities, and how our cultures shape our values. Our identities and our values are the two largest components of models from research that has attempted to unpack the underlying reasons people make their voting decisions. In the next chapter, we will expand the discussion of multiculturalism from a theory of how individuals’ identities and values are shaped by multicultural contexts to a discussion of contact theory, or how multiculturalism can result in intergroup tensions or harmonies.
Conclusion

In this chapter I have integrated an identity perspective in the discussion of what psychological constructs predict voter preferences. In the next chapter, we will take this idea of identity and multiculturalism and compare it to acculturation theories, which study how immigrants with transnational ties and multi-cultural families negotiate how their different identities pull them in different directions.
8. Contact theory, multiculturalism and voting: does exposure to reduce prejudice?

The research described in this report focuses on college students within one of the most diverse metropolitan regions in the world, New York City (NYC), who are attending a college on Staten Island, the most insular and conservative borough within NYC. In comparison with the rest of NYC, Staten Island has a high density of residents who identify as White and are likely to be politically right-wing. Students come from all over NYC to attend the college. Therefore, some live in highly diverse regions while others live in ethnically homogenous enclaves.

Given the complexities of the factors contributing to voting preferences, a central issue which requires more investigation is the conflicting findings regarding the impacts of diversity on reducing authoritarianism and prejudice, with some research finding that exposure to minorities and diversity decreases prejudice (Dhont & Van Hiel, 2012) and some finding that it increases prejudice (Dhont & Van Hiel, 2014; Galor & Klemp 2017; Kauff, Asbrock, Thörner & Wagner, 2013; Van Assche, Roets), possibly related to contextual factors, including the degree to which one ethnic group outnumbers other ethnic groups in a given region.

According to contact theory, intergroup contact typically leads to reduced prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Indeed, intergenerational decreases in prejudice can be achieved by exposing adolescents to more diversity (Duriez & Soenens, 2009). A central prediction of contact theory is that greater neighborhood diversity will be associated with heightened acceptance of immigrants. If actionable measures to increase acceptance of immigrants, such as encouraging contact with diverse others, can be identified, then organizations can implement them (Berg, 2015). In the next section, I will describe the research context in which data for this dissertation was gathered.
The research context as an exemplar of multiculturalism and diversity

I examined cross-cultural differences in people who live in an extremely multi-cultural environment - New York City. New York City has several features which make it particularly interesting for researching the structure of culture, how ethics and morals play into cultural differences, and how people navigate multiple identity categories in a multicultural environment. Apart from being - ecologically speaking - an extreme instance of multicultural contact, it also contains multiple ecological contexts: some areas are less urban, others are more so; some are less diverse and others more so; some are heavily liberal, while others are more conservative; some areas have very high socio-economic indices, while other areas represent extremely low socio-economic conditions, some areas are mostly white, while others represent cultures from around the globe or particularly different local US sub-cultures.

This is urgently relevant to consider in the context of New York City. For example, immigrants in NYC make up 22% of the population in the state, in comparison with 13% nationwide, and second only to California (DiNapoli, 2016). In NYC, over 35% of the residents are zeroth generation immigrants (not born in the U.S.A), a number which is reflected in the membership of public colleges like CUNY, where the research was conducted. In contrast with some work on acculturation, which focuses on cultural contact between one dominant group and one immigrant group, NYC includes representatives from 150 nations, resulting in a resounding question of how people navigate this milieu, and how they form identities. NYC represents a case of long term multi-cultural contact, and very few theories try to pinpoint what happens when people from one culture migrate and then live for a long time in contact with people from
another culture, and fewer still confront the complexities of multiculturalism at a level represented by NYC (Crisp, Stathi, Turner & Husnu, 2009).

In addition to the intensity of the multiculturalism, much of NYC’s immigrant population is not newly arrived. Fully half of these immigrants, totaling 1.1 million people, are naturalized citizens. Two thirds of NYC’s immigrant residents arrived in the United States before the year 2000, almost 20 years ago. In fact, fewer than 5% of children under the age of 18 in NY are immigrants. Almost half of the American born children in NYC are first generation, meaning that at least one parent is foreign born (DiNapoli, 2016).

The data were collected at College of Staten Island: Staten Island is a unique ecosystem within New York City. In comparison with the rest of New York City, Staten Island has a high density of residents who identify as White - 76.7% in 2015, up from 72.9% in 2010 (“United States Census Bureau QuickFacts Richmond County (Staten Island Borough), New York”), are likely to be politically right-wing - 56.85% voted Donald Trump in Staten Island versus 18.4% citywide, (Ali, 2016). The combined percentage of residents over the age of 25 who have a college degree or an advanced degree is 35.7%, roughly equal to the percentage whose highest level of education is a High School Diploma or equivalent (34%). The most numerous cultural backgrounds represented on the Island are Italian, at 35.4% and then Irish at 14.2%, followed by German at 5.8% (“United States Census Bureau Selected Social Characteristics in the United States: 2005-2009 more information 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates for Richmond County”)

This research was conducted at the College of Staten Island (CSI). CSI has a unique population that differs from the residents of Staten Island: Students attend CSI from all over the city, leading to an admixture of residents from all five boroughs, particularly Staten Island,
Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx. While Staten Island has a different demographic profile than the rest of New York, the particular circumstances at CSI mean that the College is neither representative of Staten Island, nor any other specific borough, but more representative of New York City overall, including Staten Island. Consistent with US Census data, 74.8% of surveyed students in Introductory Psychology at the College of Staten Island who identified as “caucasian/white” (31% of total) report being of either Irish or Italian descent or both ($n=728$), with the largest portion identifying as, at least partly, Italian (Schwartz & Guan, 2017). Of the students who take Introductory Psychology at the College of Staten Island, only 46.09% ($n=953$) report living there, with the remainder commuting from all over the metropolitan New York area. While some New Yorkers live in enclaves where they primarily are surrounded by individuals from their own culture or a culture relatively like their cultural identity, CSI brings students from all over the city into multi-cultural contact as a microcosm of the processes which occur in New York City as a whole.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, we discussed how contact theory predicts that exposure to more diverse others will reduce prejudice, at least under the right sort of circumstances. The background and context of the sample used to gather data for this dissertation was elaborated so that the reader can situate the theory in both a specific moment of deciding who to vote for in the 2016 election and a specific population and ecology: introductory psychology students at the College of Staten Island in New York City.
9. Method

Participants and Materials

This research collected self-report and survey data from undergraduate students participating in the research pool at the College of Staten Island. Participants completed an online consent form and an anonymous online survey. Measures have been selected, mostly from validated questionnaires, inventories and scales:

Participants

Undergraduate students at the College of Staten Island, of the City University of New York, received two research credits for completing an online survey. After participants completed an IRB-approved consent form, the survey was administered through Qualtrics survey software.

Students attend CSI from all over the city, leading to an admixture of residents from all five boroughs, Long Island, and New Jersey. While Staten Island has a different demographic profile than the rest of New York City, the circumstances at CSI mean that the College is not representative of Staten Island but more representative of New York City overall.

Table 1.

Number and Percentage of Sample by Gender.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender Fluid/Other</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N = 948</td>
<td>348 (36.7%)</td>
<td>591 (62.3%)</td>
<td>9 (0.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The percentage of participants who identified as female (table 1) was 62.3% (with 9 participants identifying as gender fluid/other). While 90.4% of the participants were emerging adults between the ages of 18-24, the ages of participants ranged from 18-60 years old.

Table 2.

**Age Distribution of Sample**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Frequency (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>864 (90.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-30</td>
<td>55 (5.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35</td>
<td>16 (1.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>5 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>12 (1.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>3 (0.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the current sample (n=920), 28.9% of the respondents were primarily of European ancestry, 21.9% had roots in Latin America, and 12.7% were Muslim, Arab or Middle Eastern. The remaining 24.4% were of various other ethnicities and races including 5.3% West Indian, 9.1% Black (two categories which overlap, and which were distinguished based on self-identification). Of the total sample, 20% reported living in Staten Island, of which 49.62% were White (table 3 and figure 3).
Table 3

*Census Categories N=936*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Am. Indian/Alaska Nat.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin@ Not Otherwise Specified</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Race</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Latin@ or Afro-Caribbean</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin@ with European or Arabic Ancestry</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 presents the generational identities of participants in the sample, with almost twenty percent of the sample being composed of zeroth generation immigrants, and almost thirty percent being composed of first generation immigrants. The remaining half of the participants were composed of 1.5, second, 2.5 and third generation immigrants. Third generation immigrants should be thought of as 3+ since there is no data to determine how long their ancestors had been living in the US.

Table 4

*Percentage of Participants by Number of Generations in the USA*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Birth USA or Other</th>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Frequency (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self not born in USA</td>
<td>Zeroth</td>
<td>189 (19.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-born in USA, neither parent born in USA</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>261 (27.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-born in USA, one parent born in USA</td>
<td>First</td>
<td>87 (9.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self and parents born in USA, all grandparents not born in USA</td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>78 (8.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self and parents born in USA, some grandparents not born in USA</td>
<td>Second</td>
<td>93 (9.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self, parents, and all grandparents born in USA</td>
<td>Third +</td>
<td>226 (23.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 3: Census Categories (Race and Ethnicity), n=920**

In addition to diversity in heritage culture and generation, the sample population had diversity of political preference as well. While participants who preferred Hillary Clinton outnumbered those who preferred Donald Trump by 2 to 1, almost half of the sample Preferred...
Not to Vote, almost outnumbering voters who stated a preference for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton Combined.

Table 5.

_Voting Preferences/Decision in 2016 Election (n=955)_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Frequency (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hillary Clinton</td>
<td>308 (32.25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump</td>
<td>162 (16.96%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jill Stein</td>
<td>13 (1.36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gary Johnson</td>
<td>13 (1.36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred Not to Vote</td>
<td>459 (48.05%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>955 (100.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The college of Staten Island also has a high degree of religions diversity, with only 48.0% of the sample reporting some form of Christianity as their affiliation.

Table 6.

_Religious Affiliations_

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Frequency (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian (unspecified)</td>
<td>126 (13.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic or other Orthodox (including Coptic)</td>
<td>230 (25.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>86 (9.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Affiliation</td>
<td>Count (Percentage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Abrahamic Sect (e.g. Jehovah’s Witnesses, Rastafarian)</td>
<td>6 (0.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>26 (2.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>100 (10.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular/Atheist/None</td>
<td>152 (16.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual/Agnostic/IDK</td>
<td>70 (7.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>17 (1.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Age (including Pagan, Wiccan, Hare Krishna, Satanism)</td>
<td>5 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>6 (0.7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Materials**

*Social desirability.*

The Brief Social Desirability Scale (Haghighat, 2007) consists of 5 items (3 are positively coded, e.g., “Would you smile at people each time you see them?” and 2 are negatively coded, e.g. “Would you ever lie to people”). It assesses susceptibility to the social desirability bias, or how likely people are to answer items in a way they believe the researcher desires. It has low reliability in the current data set (Cronbach’s alpha = .50).

*Measures of voting preference and eligibility to vote*

Participants answered closed-ended questions about who they voted for (or would have voted for if they were ineligible to vote at the time) and whether or not they were eligible to vote at the time of the election (see table 5). The original 7 categories included the four nationally balloted candidates: Hillary Clinton, Gary Johnson, Jill Stein, Donald Trump. They also included
three versions of “Preferred Not to Vote,” including “because disliked all options,” “because had no opinion,” and “other.” In the multinomial regression presented in table 10, 11, 12 and 13, the categories presented to participants were reduced from 7 to 3 (Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton and Preferred Not to Vote, where Johnson and Stein voters were eliminated from the analysis).

*Authoritarianism*

A four-item scale measuring parenting attitudes was used to measure authoritarianism (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997). Drawing from attachment research on parenting styles, Feldman’s measure of authoritarianism identifies people’s worldview on authority and order through their self-reported parenting style. The scale has four questions with two options. The score is calculated by summing or average the forced-choice responses. While the scale often has had low reliability, it has had enormous success in predicting prejudicial attitudes towards minorities. The scale uses forced choice options which require participants to choose which they value more: fostering a sense of authority (authoritarianism) or fostering autonomy. It has low reliability in the current data set (Cronbach’s alpha = .57).

*Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)*

Graham et al. (2011) have normed their Fairness/Reciprocity dimension by cross-validating it with social dominance orientation, importance of being fair/just and endorsement of social justice attitudes. It represents the inverse of social dominance, but is intended to be used to capture political attitudes about social dominance and social justice. The Fairness/Reciprocity dimension of Graham et al.’s scale has low internal reliability in the current data set (Cronbach’s alpha = .66).
Perceived threat from Immigrants.

In two separate items, participants were asked to rank, on a 5-point scale from *A great deal* to *None at all*, “How much danger or risk do the following issues put you in?” “Mexican or other Latino Immigrants,” and “Muslim or Arab Immigrants.” Higher scores indicate more perceived threat.

**Sexism**

To gain greater detail on one issue, that of sexism, I included a scale to measure their endorsement of two forms of sexism, hostile sexism and benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Hostile sexism assumes that feminists are using complaints about sexism, Title IX, etc., to intentionally manipulate the system for gain. Benevolent sexism, on the other hand, assumes no insidiousness but views women as fragile, weak and in need of protection and saving. The scale has moderate reliability in the current data set (Cronbach’s alpha = .71).

**Media literacy**

**Literat**

Of the 12 original subscales published by Literat (2014) in her New Media Literacy Scale (NML), we selected 6 for relevance to the current work: Play, Distributed Cognition, Collective Intelligence, Judgement, Networking, Negotiation. Overall the scales had moderate reliability in the current data set (Cronbach’s alpha = .85). In addition, we included a separate scale that Literat used for purposes of validating the underlying constructs of the NML scale and which she called “Civic Mindedness.” Each subscale was composed of 5 items, and civic mindedness was composed of 4 items (Cronbach’s alpha = .68).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscale name</th>
<th>Literat definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Play</td>
<td>the capacity to experiment with one’s surroundings as a form of problem-solving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributed Cognition</td>
<td>the ability to interact meaningfully with tools that expand mental capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Intelligence</td>
<td>the ability to pool knowledge and compare notes with others toward a common goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment</td>
<td>the ability to evaluate the reliability and credibility of different information sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networking</td>
<td>the ability to search for, synthesize and disseminate information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>the ability to travel across diverse communities, discerning and respecting multiple perspectives, and grasping and following alternative norms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Belief change  Resistance*

Belief change was measured with a task designed to capture students pre-conceived opinions and their possible belief change after reading two websites: a) a site which supported misconceptions but had clear indicators of unreliability such as no attribution to author, no citations, clickbait ads, etc., and b) a Snopes.com page that specifically addressed false news (a “corrective article”). Snopes.com is a site whose purpose is to debunk Internet myths and false news, to fact check and source references, and has many indicators of reliability, including author bios as well as author attributions and references. The first story was about genetically modified organisms creating super-pests and health problems. The second story claimed voter
fraud was perpetrated by undocumented voters in the 2016 presidential election. Both stories are widely circulated and debunked, but one is related to the current political climate while one is not. Students rated their agreement on a 5-point Likert scale from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree at three-time points: before being exposed to any site (preconceived opinions), after being exposed to an unreliable site and after being exposed to Snopes.com debunking the myth. The variable “belief change” was calculated by subtracting their rating at the first time point they were exposed to that issue from their rating at the third time point they were exposed to that same issue.

**Identity.**

I included open-ended questions that allow students to describe themselves and their cultural origins in their own words, as well as short-answer open-ended questions that prompt students to give the most specific information they know about their families and family origins. For example, many cross-cultural studies ask about country of origin, but several countries with strong representation of zeroth generation (immigrants) students have intricately complex ethno-linguistic diversity within the nation (see figure 2 for an example: a map of complex ethno-linguistic diversity in Nigeria, Cameroon and Benin).

Using an open-ended question, we asked participants to describe their ethnicity in their own words. Additionally, we asked participants to share the country or countries that they or their ancestors came from. Finally, we asked participants what are the cities, towns, regions or other more specific heritage origins that they or their ancestors were from. All three of these questions were open ended and used to generate codes for identity (for reliability, see section on Identity Coding below). The codes included: specificity of knowledge of heritage origin, specificity of
geographic origin in identity statements, and type of identity statement, as well as basic census
categories.

At the opening of the survey, students received the following prompt:

Please write 1-2 words that you feel best describes your ethnicity. For example: You could use the name of people from the country where your ancestors came from - such as “Chinese” or “Chinese American,” OR a group of people that do not overlap with one country - such as “West Indian,” “African American,” “Han Chinese,” “Hausa.”

Whatever was written in this box by participants was then piped throughout the survey so that, on any question where the question was specific to the participant’s ethnicity, their own words would be inserted. For example, if a participant wrote “Italian American,” then on the question of “What percentage of your neighborhood is like you,” they would see “What percentage of your neighborhood is Italian American.” This question will be referred to as participants’ ethnic identity statement.

In addition, participants were asked to state their religion in their own words (religious affiliation), their heritage countries (heritage country) in their own words, and the cities, towns or regions (heritage region) their ancestors came from in their own words. From these variables, qualitative coding systems were developed as described below.

**Census Categories**

Using three categories – ethnic identity statement, heritage country and heritage region – I developed a coding scheme to establish how participants might have answered a standard
Census Category question. The nature of the data led to some minor modifications, since the census would force a participant to choose between Latin@ - White and Latin@ - Black, and an open-ended statement cannot do that. Additionally, a large percentage of participants in the sample seemed to consider themselves racially black, from a theoretical perspective of what “Race” is (Foner & Fredrickson, 2004), yet specifically identified using terms like West Indian, Afro-Caribbean, Afro-Latin@. I made the decision to treat identities of West Indian like those, on the census, of Latin@ - Black, since they represent a distinct group and identity from African Americans whose ancestors have been in the United States for 5 generations or more, but only when the specifically identified this way in their ethnic identity statement. If their ethnic identity statement represented their identity as simply “Black” and I could tell from the other variables that they were not African American, I left them as “Black” to respect their identity statements (see table 3 above). Many participants were from central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan. The census considers Arabs to be “White,” and so I decided to group countries that were west of Afghanistan as “White,” such that Iranians would be “White” and Pakistanis would be “Asian,” since many of the Pakistanis identified as Asian. Finally, Latin@s who identified as Latin@ or Hispanic and additionally made a statement about being “White,” “Caucasian,” or including a heritage country in their identity statement whose historic population is now considered “White” were categorized as “Latin@ - White,” but it is important to note that the heritage countries in this category were partially European and partially Arab countries.

For all codes, reliability was calculated with Kappa. A second coder independently coded 20% of the data in this column, and the value of Kappa for the two coders was .81.
**Religious Categories**

Thirty distinct religious identities were used in the data sample, which were coded into eleven codes. The thirty identities were: Christian, Catholic or other Orthodox, Coptic, Eastern Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Protestant, Baptist, Born again, Evangelical, Lutheran, Methodist, Pentecostal, Presbyterian, Seventh Day Adventist, Other Abrahamic Sect, Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon, Rastafarian, Judaism, Muslim, Muslim - Shia, Muslim - Sunni, Buddhist, New Age, Wicca/Pagan, Hare Krishna, Atheist, Secular, Agnostic, Spiritual.

These thirty codes were grouped together into eleven codes. Some participants identified as only Christian, and after some debate as to what this might mean, they were grouped together. Some participants, as can be seen above, identified orthodox Christian institutions, so that became a code, grouping Greek, Eastern, Catholic and Coptic Orthodox churches together. The protestant religions, most of which emerged in the United States, were grouped together as Protestant. The only exceptions to this were Jehovah’s Witnesses, who occupy a complicated place among Christians, and so they were identified, along with Rastafarians and Mormons as “Other Abrahamic Sects.” Some Muslims specified whether they were Sunni or Shia, but many did not, and so Muslims were grouped together as “Muslim,” as “Jews” were grouped together as “Jews” regardless of statements of orthodoxy, reform, etc.

The most challenging codes to apply were “Secular/Atheist” and “Spiritual/Agnostic.” For all codes, reliability was calculated with Kappa. A second coder independently coded 20% of the data in this column, and the value of Kappa for the two coders was .95.

**Know Specificity**

This variable was coded from heritage country and heritage region/city variables. Six codes were established, with “I Don’t Know” being coded as 0, and “Refuse to answer” as 5.
other four codes were “Region,” “Country,” “Sub-National Region,” and “City/Town/Village.”

Italian levels of specificity were complex because most cities are also regions, such that Napolitano can refer to someone from Naples or the surrounding area. In these cases, I chose to defer to the category of city.

Sicily, Fujian and Gujarat were common codes that were coded as sub-national regions as well. Puerto Rico was coded as country even though it is not technically an independent country, because sub-national region was meant for regions that are clearly contiguous with the rest of the country legally if not geographically (e.g. Sicily). Many people knew the name of a heritage city but the city was a large metropolitan center, presenting a similar conceptual problem to those described in this paragraph already.

The coded was assigned based on the most specific level of the participant offered. For example, if they said they were Irish and Italian and then said Bari (an Italian city-region) and Northern Ireland, they would still be coded as city because they named the city of Bari.

For all codes, reliability was calculated with Kappa. A second coder independently coded 20% of the data in the responses in this qualitative variable, and the value of Kappa for the two coders was .729, a moderate level of reliability.

*Types of IDs (race, place, religion)*

Three dimensions of the ethnic identity statements were established: Place (as in heritage or host places), Race (defined here as self-identified visual characteristics that suggest some level of descent from a genetic population defined by major geographic features such as continents, oceans and mountain ranges), and religious affiliation. Only 1.7% of participants employed
religion in their ethnic identity statements. Place was conceptually divided into two components, heritage identities and host identities (i.e. using the word American in your identity statement).

Table 8.

Coding Scheme of Types of Statements Used in Ethnic Identity Statements. \( (N=920) \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American + Religion</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion + Race</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race (including Black, African American, White and Caucasian, mixed)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American + Race (e.g. White American, Black American)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Country (including former countries)</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American + Heritage Country or Region (e.g. Irish American, Arab American, or Hispanic American)</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribe</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (pan-national, including Hispanic, Latino, West Indian, and Latin American)</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (Autonomous sub-national zone, including protectorates and reservations)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City or other Sub-national Zone (non autonomous)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place + Religion (e.g. Russian Jew)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place + Race (heritage country or region, e.g. Afro Carribean and Haitian)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Country + Heritage Region</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9.

Occurrence of Dimension of Type of Specificity of Identity Self-Descriptors (Note that codes can co-occur) (N=920)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of type of specificity of identity self-descriptors</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place-based heritages</td>
<td>67.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>28.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“American” as part of identity</td>
<td>27.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For all codes, reliability was calculated with Kappa. A second coder independently coded 20% of the data in this column, and the value of Kappa for the two coders was .77, a moderate level of reliability.

Acculturation and Immigration Measures

Generation (and recent immigrant versus multi-generational immigrant)

Participants were asked three questions, all of which were close-ended, about their residency history in this country. The first question asked whether or not they were born in the US. The second question asked whether one, both or neither of their parents was born in the US. The third question asked whether some, none or all of their grandparents were born in the US.

The variable “immigrants” was created from combining Zeroth Generation participants with First and 1.5 Generation participants who had one or two parents who had immigrated to the U.S. in their lifetimes, suggesting close ties with the experiences of immigrants. All others
were coded as multi-generational immigrants (i.e. “non-immigrants,” including Second Generation, 2.5 Generation and Third Generation participants)\(^1\) (42.6% of the sample).

Six individuals reported that they were not born in the US but both parents and all four grandparents were born in the US. These participants were coded as Zeroth Generation. Two participants reported that one parent was born in the US but they, themselves, were not born in the US. They were coded as Zeroth Generation as well. Four participants reported that one parent was born here but all four grandparents were born here. These participants were coded as 3\(^{rd}\) generation.

**Acculturation Scales**

The validated scales draw from the literature on acculturation. Research on acculturation seeks to understand how people negotiate their identity in cross-cultural contact, and to understand the cultural changes that occur because of that contact. I pulled from two validated scales, 1) Berry’s model of acculturation attitudes, which looks at immigrants’ negotiation of the tensions between their culture of origin and their current cultural environment (Berry, 1997; Berry, 2005; Berry, 2009; Berry, 2010; Berry, 2011) and 2) the Suinn-Lew Asian Self-Identity Acculturation Scale (SL-ASIA), which focus more on navigating identity but is particularly

\(^{1}\) Zeroth generation represents a person who was not born in the US. First generation represents a person who was born in the US, but both parents were born outside the US. Generation 1.5, represented a person who was born in the US, and one parent was also born in the US, but the other parent was born outside the US. Second generation represented a person who was born in the US along with both of their parents. Similar to 1.5 generation, 2.5 generation represented someone who was born in the US along with both parents, but only some of their grandparents were born in the US. Third generation (Conceptualized of as 3+) represented a person who had been born in the US along with both parents and all grandparents. I chose this scheme because 0 is the foundation of the number line, but is also fundamentally unique from other numbers. Conceptually, American law treats citizens and residents who were not born in the USA differently from citizens who were born in the USA, and culturally, this is likely to have an impact too, with Zeroth generation residents having much more direct transnational experience and contact than other Americans. However, I have no intention of implying that Zeroth generation Americans are not American, they are as American as other Americans as 0 is a number like 1, 2, and 3.
designed for Asians rather than phrased to include any immigrant group, like Berry’s (Suinn, Rickard-Figueroa & Lew, 1987).

**Berry**

Berry describes three methodologies for assessing this information, from scales to vignettes to a single continuous measure, all of which ask respondents how they acculturate, or how value their various cultural communities and contexts. Acculturation, in general, is described as having two dimensions out of which four patterns emerge. Dimension 1 can be described as the range of attitudes towards one’s heritage cultural identity, and dimension 2 concerns the desire to have contact with members of the larger (current) society. These two, 2-dimensional scales result, when crossed, in four possible outcomes, (1) assimilation, (2) integration, (3) separation and (4) marginalization. Assimilation refers to the individuals wish to participate in the larger society without maintaining the heritage society. Integration, on the other hand, embraces both heritage culture and larger society. Separation indicates a desire to focus on maintaining heritage culture without participation in the larger society, and Marginalization represents a rejection of both heritage culture and the larger society.

**Suinn-Lew**

The second source of a validated scale draws from the Suinn-Lew Asian Self-Identity Acculturation Scale (SL-ASIA). This scale was originally devised to evaluate how immigrants from East Asian and South East Asian countries acculturated, and the phrasing targets Asian Americans (Suinn et al., 1987). Many items are oriented towards Asian-specific things that may not be applicable to other regions from which people have emigrated to the USA (e.g. Question: Which identification does (did) your mother use? Answers: 1. Oriental/2. Asian/3. Asian American/ 4. Chinese American, Japanese American, Korean American, etc./5. American), so
these items were dropped. Items that asked questions that were not represented by the Berry scale were adapted to use terms like “your cultural group” versus “another cultural group.” I tried not to imply that one culture was dominant, or prioritized, or that America had a monoculture. Open-ended questions asked at the beginning of this section can be used to pipe text based on students self-identified cultural identity and cultural “opposition” or “contrast” identity.

**Perry**

Perry’s Acculturation measures include Assimilation, Multiculturalism, Colorblindness. Assimilation measures one’s attitudes towards immigrants, and a high score on this subscale would integrate a general attitude that immigrants are obligated to “Americanize” by sacrificing elements of their heritage culture, and that they are unwelcome unless they do so. Multiculturalism, by contrast, represents the idea that “America’s promise is as a nation of immigrants,” (Gonzalez, 2018)

**Measures of cross-cultural constructs**

In the context of understanding how different cultures may differentially shape the way people reason about moral decisions and reasoning, the source of authority is a very important concept to understand. The source of authority may be focused on many different levels, for example, “authority” may refer to the findings produced by empirical scientific findings. Authority may, for others, stem from a deity or a philosopher or an institution such as the Catholic Church. Authority may also be situated within an individual or within various levels of group structure, such as the immediate family, extended family, the extended community, society, or even humanity. Authority may be inflexible or flexible. Attitudes to authority may a) be related to moral reasoning and b) be related to culture. When authority is related to culture, it may be detectable by using scales for evaluating individualism and collectivism. While both
individualism and collectivism likely serve the same function of binding a community with cultural values, norms and prescriptions for interactions, they orient towards different foci of authority. Extreme individualism may be localizing the focus of authority internally to a single person, whereas collectivism localizes the authority at some level of the group, either the family, the community, the society or some other level.

*Neighborhood diversity.*

Participants were asked “What percentage of your neighborhood are ______,” with the blank auto-populated by piping in the self-reported ethnicity that the participant had written in. This variable is referred to below as “%Neighborhood Diversity.” Future research with the current data set will be able to determine the accuracy of these perceptions based on matching the data with census reports of neighborhood composition.

*Individualism/Collectivism*

I will include three measures of individualism/independence versus collectivism/interdependence. The first measure of personal-level Individualism and collectivism is Triandis and Gelfand. Triandis and Gelfand suggested a bi-dimensional approach, including “horizontal” and “vertical” dimensions (Triandis & Gelfand 1998).

The second measure for individualism/collectivism is a published adaptation of Markus’s and Kitayama’s (1991; 2003) scale evaluating independence and interdependence (Singelis, 1994). These terms are like “collectivism/individualism,” except that the authors were able to create a more sensitive description of interdependence drawn from an internal perspective of a member of an interdependent culture. The features they associate with a self-construal of interdependence are belongingness, reliance, dependency, empathy, occupying one’s proper place, and reciprocity.
Country Code (Hofstede and Gelfand transformations)

The third way we will be assessing individualism/collectivism is by using participants statements about their heritage countries to create a variable which predicts that the cultural means of individualism in each person’s combined heritage countries will predict something about their behavior. We used Hofstede’s research on his 6 cross cultural dimensions, plugging in the predicted rank number for a given country that a person claims as part of their heritage.

For example, Hofstede ranks Italy as a “76” on his scale of individualism, where higher numbers indicate greater levels of individualism. If a given participant reported having Irish and Italian heritage, they would receive a 70 in the first column for Ireland, and then a 76 in the second column for Italy. Since no person stated more than 6 countries, that is the maximum number of columns. Our participant of Irish-Italian descent would simply have the remaining 4 columns blank. To calculate the person’s score on Hofstede’s Individualism Scale for the purposes of our study, we would take an average of 70 (for Ireland) and 76 (for Italy) and the person would then have a score of 73. This score would be used as a continuous variable. Since Hofstede has 6 dimensions, a score is calculated for each dimension, of Power Distance (Pow/Dist), Individualism (IDV), Masculinity (MASC), Long Term Orientation (LTO), Uncertainty Avoidance (Uncert. Avoid.), and Indulgence (Indulg.).

Fuligni Family Orientation

Just as individualism and collectivism are broad, society-level, organizational strategies, the bonds and responsibilities one is expected to show to one’s family can vary by culture and are part of the cohesion and organizational functioning of that culture. Fuligni’s scale has three components (2007), a measure of one’s sense of obligation and willingness to provide current
assistance to members of one’s family, to provide future assistance to one’s family, and respect for one’s family, particularly elders.

**DUREL Religiosity.**

I included a published measure of religiosity (Koenig & Büsing, 2010), because religion is an important part of most cultures, and many people define themselves in terms of their religiosity. Religion, prior to philosophy, was the dominant force that overtly and implicitly codified the ethics of believers. Philosophical writings often stem from the values of and writings on institutional religion or occupy the place of theistic ethical codes where “religion” does not take charge of moral behavior. In a bidirectional interaction, these philosophical-religious values impact the routines, rituals and daily expressions of the religion that constitute a large portion of the ideology present in all individuals of that society, whether they are believers or not. Societal emphasis on religion (an ecological factor) has been shown to mediate the impact of religious belief on moral behavior (Stavrova & Siegers, 2014). Therefore, I included a scale to evaluate religiosity.

**Graham - Moral Foundations Questionnaire**

The Moral Foundations Questionnaire, or MFQ, (Graham, et al., 2011) has five subscales, including Harm/Care, Purity/Sanctity, Authority/Respect, Ingroup-Loyalty, and Fairness/Reciprocity. It was intended to understand political differences between left and right ideologies in terms of moral attitudes, equating political ideologies with morality.

Graham and colleagues have done extensive cross-scale validation work to identify and demonstrate which psychological constructs their five dimensions are tapping into and to situate their research in larger, interdisciplinary traditions. Harm/Care is associated with empathy, Fairness/Reciprocity is the converse of social dominance/social justice sense, In-Group Loyalty
is associated with loyalty, national security and family security, similar to collectivism, Authority/Respect is authoritarianism, and finally, Purity/Sanctity measures the emotion of disgust and self-reported religiosity.

**Big Five Aspects Scales “Intellect”**

An intermediate point of precision between the original Big Five and the Revised NEO Personality Inventory, which has 6 facets for each of the Big Five, the BFAS has two aspects for each of the big five (DeYoung, Quilty & Peterson, 2007). Intellect is one half of the Openness/Intellect trait. These items were included because previous research had found that Openness to experience was a predictor of liberal or socially progressive political values (Hiel & Mervielde, 2004), and it seemed important to understand whether it was openness to general experiences/arts or something closer to a need for cognition (NFC) (Cacioppo, Petty & Feng Kao, 1984)
10. Results

Analytic Approach

Multinomial Logistic regressions were used to compare how well different constructs predicted voters’ preferences for Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton and Preferred Not to Vote. First, a multinomial regression model comparing predictors of voting preferences was run between participants who preferred Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton and those who Preferred Not to Vote using Hillary Clinton as a reference category. Using one of the candidates as reference category allows a comparison of the preferences of participants who stated a preference for a candidate. Second, the same model was run again, rotating the reference category from Hillary Clinton to those who Preferred Not to Vote. This second version highlights the differences between those who actively stated a preference and those who, more passively, Preferred Not to Vote, an important consideration since the largest category was participants who Preferred Not to Vote.

Two models were run, each of which is presented first with Hillary Clinton as the reference category and then with “Preferred Not to Vote” as the reference category: In the first model, the predictor variables were limited to what has been found in prior research (hostile sexism, authoritarianism, social dominance, fear of immigrants) in order to replicate earlier findings in a diverse and unusual sample. In the second model, several new predictors were added, based on emerging ideas about the role of culture in shaping values and moral decisions, and thus in voting preferences. Data were collected on many variables, so it was important to check for collinearity between variables used in the model, particularly between parallel constructs such as Triandis’ individualism and Hofstede’s individualism codes. No variables exceeded recommended limits for collinearity, even in a complex model such as this one. (Note:
model fit data does not change when the reference category is rotated, so model fit data is only presented once).

**Research Question 1 and 2: Voting Preference Predictors**

**Replication of previous research on predictors of voting preferences?**

I hypothesized (1a) that constructs identified in previous research, including authoritarianism and hostile sexism, would replicate as predictors of voting preferences in the 2016 election, and in a multicultural community. Two multinomial logistic regressions were performed to ascertain the effects of Hostile Sexism (Glick and Fiske, 1996), authoritarianism (Feldman & Stenner, 1997), and social dominance orientation calculated from Graham et al.’s Fairness/Reciprocity Dimension (2011) on the likelihood that participants preferred to vote for Hillary, Donald, or preferred not to vote.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Donald Trump</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-2.81</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexism - Hostile</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldman - Authoritarianism</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair)</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preferred not to vote</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexism - Hostile</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldman - Authoritarianism</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair)</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** The reference category is *Hillary Clinton*
The logistic regression model was statistically significant, $\chi^2(8) = 86.82, p < .0005$. The model explained 10.4% (Nagelkerke $R^2$) of the variance in voting preference. Of the 3 predictor variables, 2 were statistically significant predictors of whether participants preferred Hillary Clinton or preferred not to vote: low hostile sexism and low social dominance orientation. Of those same 3 predictor variables, 2 were statistically significant predictors of whether participants preferred Donald Trump over preferred not to vote: high authoritarianism, and high hostile sexism. High sexism, and high social dominance orientation were statistically significant predictors of a preference for Donald Trump over a preference for Hillary Clinton.

Table 11

| Multinomial logistic regression of prior predictors for voting preference (n=633) |
|---------------------------------------------|----------|--------|--------|
|                                            | $B$      | $SE$   | $p$    |
| **Hillary Clinton**                        |          |        |        |
| Intercept                                  | -0.77    | 0.60   | 0.20   |
| Sexism - Hostile                           | -0.24    | 0.08   | <0.01  |
| Feldman - Authoritarianism                 | 0.04     | 0.06   | 0.51   |
| SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair)                     | 0.05     | 0.02   | 0.01   |
| **Donald Trump**                           |          |        |        |
| Intercept                                  | -3.58    | 0.76   | <0.01  |
| Sexism - Hostile                           | 0.62     | 0.11   | <0.01  |
| Feldman - Authoritarianism                 | 0.17     | 0.08   | 0.03   |
| SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair)                     | -0.02    | 0.02   | 0.50   |

NOTE: The reference category is Preferred Not to Vote

**New predictors of voting preferences: Deepening our understanding of the role of old and new culture.**

Why are some people more authoritarian and sexist? Answers to this question provide both basic scientific knowledge about the nature of decision making and prejudice, but also actionable recommendations for how to redress these issues in our society. Starting from a standpoint that most drivers underlying voting preferences are shaped by the values of those
around us, or our culture(s), I make three hypotheses about the role of culture in the 2016 election.

1b: I hypothesized that certain roles and experiences, such as being non-white, being an immigrant, and being a woman, will align voter preferences with liberal policies.

2a: I hypothesized that values from the heritage cultures of current Americans will shape people’s voting preferences, even in geographical separation from the heritage culture’s original environment.

2b: I hypothesized that media literacy will play a role in voting preferences through people’s sense of agency in searching out solutions to current problems, and their capacity to accommodate corrective information to misinformation.

A multinomial logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of 21 predictors on participant’s preferences to vote for either one of the main candidates or their preference not to vote at all. Participants who preferred Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton were significantly whiter, less recent immigrants, had higher hostile sexism, higher authoritarianism, higher social dominance, belief change resistance about GMOs being toxic\(^2\), higher Hofstede-based heritage-culture individualism, and more fear of immigrants.

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\(^2\) Belief Change Resistance - GMOs: Participants preconceived beliefs about GMOs were initially high, but dropped, on average, by .20 Likert scale points (n=915), after exposure to the corrective information. This outcome could be considered, generally, as belief change acceptance. In task 2, however, preconceptions were higher than after exposure to corrective information, also by .2 (n=915), in the opposite direction. This can be described as belief change resistance. The acceptance of corrective information for GMOs was statistically higher than the response to corrective information about undocumented immigrants voting in the 2016 election, \(t(935) = 6.213, p < .001\).
Table 12

<p>| Multinomial Logistic Regression of Hypothetical Predictors for Voting Preference (reference category = Hillary Clinton) (N=633) |
|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|
|                  | B      | SE     | p      | Exp(B)    |
| Intercept        | -6.17  | 1.85   | &lt;0.01  | 2.20      |
| Sexism - Hostile| 0.79   | 0.16   | &lt;0.01  | 1.38      |
| Feldman - Authoritarianism | 0.33   | 0.13   | 0.01   | 0.89      |
| SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair) | -0.12  | 0.04   | &lt;0.01  | 1.31      |
| Fear of Immigrants (Threat) | 0.27   | 0.11   | 0.02   | 1.34      |
| Literat Civic Engagement | 0.30   | 0.22   | 0.18   | 1.34      |
| Literat NML      | 0.50   | 0.40   | 0.22   | 1.64      |
| Political Knowledge | 0.16   | 0.12   | 0.16   | 1.18      |
| Belief Change (Immig) | -0.08  | 0.10   | 0.41   | 0.93      |
| Belief Change (GMO) | -0.29  | 0.10   | 0.01   | 0.75      |
| Hofstede - Individualism | 0.03   | 0.01   | &lt;0.01  | 1.03      |
| Triandis - Individualism | 0.19   | 0.12   | 0.12   | 1.20      |
| Triandis - Collectivism | -0.02  | 0.13   | 0.88   | 0.98      |
| Kitayama - Independence | -0.44  | 0.28   | 0.11   | 0.64      |
| Kitayama - Interdependence | -0.12  | 0.29   | 0.67   | 0.89      |
| Haghhighat - Social Desirability | 0.29   | 0.65   | 0.66   | 1.33      |
| Neighborhood Homogeneity | -0.01  | 0.01   | 0.14   | 0.99      |
| Elig. To vote 11/09/16 - Not | 0.20   | 0.30   | 0.51   | 1.22      |
| Elig. To vote 11/09/16 - Yes | 0.26   | 0.31   | 0.40   | 1.30      |
| Gender - Male     | 0.26   | 0.31   | 0.40   | 1.30      |
| Gender - Female   | 0.26   | 0.31   | 0.40   | 1.30      |
| Immig. Status (0-1.5 Gen) | 0.99   | 0.37   | 0.01   | 2.70      |
| Immig. Status (2-3 Gen) | -1.61  | 0.43   | &lt;0.01  | 0.20      |
| Preferred Not to Vote | Intercept | 1.15   | 1.18   | 0.33      |
| Preferred Not to Vote | Sexism - Hostile | 0.27   | 0.10   | 0.01   | 1.30      |
| Preferred Not to Vote | Feldman - Authoritarianism | -0.09  | 0.08   | 0.24   | 0.91      |
| Preferred Not to Vote | SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair) | -0.07  | 0.03   | 0.02   | 0.94      |
| Preferred Not to Vote | Fear of Immigrants (Threat) | 0.01   | 0.08   | 0.87   | 1.01      |
| Preferred Not to Vote | Literat Civic Engagement | -0.33  | 0.14   | 0.02   | 0.72      |
| Preferred Not to Vote | Literat NML | 0.18   | 0.26   | 0.50   | 1.19      |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief Change (Immig)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief Change (GMO)</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.88</td>
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<td>Hofstede - Individualism</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<td>1.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Triandis - Individualism</td>
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<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Triandis - Collectivism</td>
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<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitayama - Independence</td>
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<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitayama - Interdependence</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haghighat - Social Desirability</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Homogeneity</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elig. To vote 11/09/16 - Not</td>
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<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elig. To vote 11/09/16 - Yes</td>
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<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.02</td>
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<td>Gender - Female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender - Male</td>
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<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immig. Status (0-1.5 Gen)</td>
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<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immig. Status (2-3 Gen)</td>
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<tr>
<td>White - Non-White</td>
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<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>White - White</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The reference category is Hillary Clinton

The multinomial logistic regression model was statistically significant, \( \chi^2(40) = 260.65, p < .0005 \). The model explained 38.6\% (Nagelkerke \( R^2 \)) of the variance in voting preference. Of the 21 predictor variables 4 were statistically significant preferences for Hillary Clinton over a preference not to vote: Low hostile sexism, low social dominance orientation, high civic engagement, and high belief change acceptance of corrective information about GMOs.

Table 13

Multinomial Logistic Regression of Hypothetical Predictors for Voting Preference (reference category = Preferred Not to Vote) (n=633)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hillary Clinton</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-1.15</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sexism - Hostile</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feldman - Authoritarianism</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>t-Value</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
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<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Immigrants (Threat)</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literat Civic Engagement</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literat NML</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
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<td>0.08</td>
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<td>1.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belief Change (Immig)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief Change (GMO)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofstede - Individualism</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triandis - Individualism</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triandis - Collectivism</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitayama - Independence</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitayama - Interdependence</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haghighat - Social Desirability</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Homogeneity</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elig. To vote 11/09/16 - Not</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elig. To vote 11/09/16 - Yes</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender - Male</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender - Female</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>immigr. Status (0-1.5 Gen)</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White - Non-White</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White - White</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-7.32</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexism - Hostile</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldman - Authoritarianism</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair)</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Immigrants (Threat)</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literat Civic Engagement</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literat NML</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief Change (Immig)</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief Change (GMO)</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofstede - Individualism</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triandis - Individualism</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triandis - Collectivism</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitayama - Independence</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitayama - Interdependence</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haghighat - Social Desirability</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bernie Sanders

In the sample collected for the current research, approximately 32% of participants who reported preferring Donald Trump in the general election also reported that they would have preferred to vote for Bernie Sanders if he had been an option in the general election when asked if there was a candidate from the primaries that they would have preferred. Of the participants in the sample who reported preferring Hillary Clinton, 85% of would have preferred Bernie. We can speculate that the remaining 15% of Hillary voters would likely have also voted the Democratic ticket, but even if that is not true, Bernie could have fared significantly better than Hillary did. A chi-square test of independence was conducted between voters who preferred Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump and voters who would have chosen Bernie Sanders rather than either main candidate had he been on the ballot, or not. All expected cell frequencies were greater than five. There was a statistically significant association between buyer type and type of property purchased, $\chi^2(1) = 120.81, p < .001$.  

NOTE: The reference category is Preferred Not to Vote
Table 14

Percentage of Participants Who Would Have Preferred Bernie Sanders to the Candidates on the Final Election Ballot (N=486, including 26 likely voters for Gary Johnson and Jill Stein)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did not prefer Bernie Sanders to available candidates</th>
<th>Trump</th>
<th>Hillary</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did not prefer Bernie Sanders to available candidates</td>
<td>104 (21.4%)</td>
<td>46 (9.5%)</td>
<td>150 (30.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred Bernie Sanders to available candidates</td>
<td>54 (11.1%)</td>
<td>256 (52.7%)</td>
<td>310 (63.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>158 (32.5%)</td>
<td>302 (62.1%)</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predictors used to model the attitudes of participants who would have preferred Bernie Sanders over either Clinton or Trump.

The binomial logistic regression model was statistically significant, $\chi^2(3) = 28.0$, $p < .0005$. The model explained 8.2% (Nagelkerke $R^2$) of the variance in voting preference. Of the 3 predictor variables 2 were statistically significant preferences for Bernie Sanders had he been on the ballot: Low hostile sexism and low authoritarianism.

Table 15

Binomial logistic regression of prior predictors for voting preference (n=815)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>p</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexism - Hostile</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldman - Authoritarianism</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As with the regression models predicting a preference for Donald Trump, versus Hillary Clinton or a preference not to vote at all, a second binomial logistic regression model was run, with the full 21 predictors used about. The model was statistically significant, $\chi^2(20) = 81.90, p < .0005$. The model explained 17.0% (Nagelkerke $R^2$) of the variance in voting preference. Of the 21 predictor variables 4 were statistically significant predictors of preferences for Bernie Sanders had he been on the ballot. As in the first model with prior predictors, low hostile sexism was predictive, as was belief change resistance to accepting corrective information about the myth that undocumented voters participated in the general election. Being ineligible to vote at the time of the election (due to being underage) and being a more recent immigrant (0, 1 or 1.5 generation) were also significant predictors of a preference for Bernie Sanders, had he been on the ballot.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 16</th>
<th>Binomial Logistic Regression of Final Predictors for Voting Preference of Bernie Sanders (n=622)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$B$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexism - Hostile</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feldman - Authoritarianism</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO (Inverse MFQ-Fair)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Immigrants (Threat)</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literat Civic Engagement</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literat NML</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief Change (Immig)</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief Change (GMO)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hofstede - Individualism</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triandis - Individualism</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triandis - Collectivism</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitayama - Independence</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitayama - Interdependence</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Research Question 3: The role of heritage culture in the shaping of multigenerational transnational identities

3a: I hypothesized that ethnic identity would play a long-term role in the identity of most Americans.

3b: I hypothesized that in the absence of an ethnic identity, people would adopt an alternate identity, such as race.

3a: I hypothesized that ethnic identity plays a long-term role in the identity of most Americans.

Zeroth generation participants were most likely to report a city-level of specificity as their origin, and predictably, the specificity declined over generations, but surprisingly, 65% of 2 and 3+ Generation participants could specify to at least the country, if not the city level what their heritage background is, suggesting that there are transnational ties maintained in American communities that may also maintain heritage organizational/value systems from the heritage culture. This raises a critical question about the national melting pot myth of Americanization.
Figure 4: Percentage of participants who knew their heritage origins by degree of geographic specificity

3b: I hypothesized that in the absence of an ethnic identity, people would adopt an alternate identity, such as race.

Why do people choose to incorporate different constructs, such as race, heritage or “Americanness” into their identities? Do people start to forget their heritage identities after multiple generations in the US? Yes, some do (see figure 5). However, this number was less than expected.
Figure 5: Proportion of participants who reported heritage country origins vs. race in their ethnic identity statements.

Yet what happens when people lose ties to their transnational heritage cultures, how do they identify, instead of by ethnicity? When people reported not knowing their heritage, they are more likely to incorporate the race construct, but many people who identify by race are multigenerational Americans who have a clear concept of their heritage background.

Figure 6: Proportions of people who reported knowing their heritage countries and used place-based or race-based identity statements (n=891).
Participants who reported not knowing their heritage origins were numerically more likely to self-identify using racial words (e.g. “White American” as opposed to “Italian American”). Although the US Census does not consider Latin@ a race, the data suggest that people who do not connect with specific countries in Latin America use the term Latin@ in a similar way to Americans who do not know heritage country and use the terms Black and White when participants are asked to define their ethnic identity in their own words and given a few examples to encourage specificity.

*Figure 7:* Proportion of participants from different census categories who made identity statements based on race vs. place by whether or not participants know heritage country (*n*=49).

When participants did not know their heritage country, they were twice as likely to identify by race (34 participants versus 14 participants). Conversely, when participants did know their heritage, they were almost thrice as likely to identify by heritage place/transnational heritage identities as by race (574 participants versus 192 participants).
Figure 8: Proportions of participants from different census categories who made Identity Statements based on race vs. place, when participants KNOW heritage ethnicity ($n=842$).

**Summary of Key Points**

Different patterns of variables predicted participants’ preferences for different candidates. Participants who preferred Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton were significantly whiter, less recent immigrants, had higher hostile sexism, higher authoritarianism, higher social dominance, belief change resistance about GMOs being toxic, higher Hofstede-based heritage-culture individualism, and more fear of immigrants. Preferences for Hillary Clinton over a preference not to vote predicted low hostile sexism, low social dominance orientation, high civic engagement, and belief change acceptance of corrective information about GMOs. For Bernie Sanders, low hostile sexism was predictive, as was belief change resistance to accepting corrective information about the myth that undocumented voters participated in the general election. Being ineligible to vote at the time of the election (due to being underage) and being a
more recent immigrant (0, 1 or 1.5 generation) were also significant predictors of a preference for Bernie Sanders, had he been on the ballot.
11. Discussion

There are many assumptions about what drives voting preferences, which makes voting decisions a useful context in which to study how culture feeds into major decision-making processes. The public assumptions of what drives these decisions are often focused on demographics like education/SES/elitism to racism/prejudice (Schaffner, MacWilliams, Nteta, 2018), but more attention is finally being paid to the underlying cultural drivers, which emerge through emotional expressions that guide our decision-making processes, such as when our view of how different groups should be integrated within a multicultural society is enmeshed with fear. The long-term contributions of heritage cultures and transnational connections of ourselves and our ancestors require greater attention as explanatory variables for our preferences in structuring our vision of the United States.

The aptly named “Culture Wars,” between Conservatives and Liberals revolve around competing conceptualizations of what it means to be American, how the variety of identities and interpretations of being American can differ, and how our society should be structured to function as a cohesive whole. While political polarization in the USA may dominate the news cycles, there may be something more profound underlying the “Culture Wars,” and that is the possibility that culture is contributing to those wars through 1) the ecologies of living in urban versus rural environments may be shaping our cultural values and reinforcing polarization, and 2) the multicultural composition of cities, with more representatives of diverse nations from around the globe, may fundamentally differ from the more homogenous populations in rural areas of America where 1-2 ethnicities predominate, a hypothesis that I hope to address in follow up studies with broader samples. In addition, heritage cultures may also be polarizing urban and
rural voters away from each other’s points of view. It may be enormously fruitful to situate psychological constructs like authoritarianism as cultural variables which accurately predict voting preferences because they are cultural variables which replicate our attitudes towards who should hold authority and how it should be wielded across large (national election) and small (parent-child) scenarios. A further tension is that culture is not deterministic of who we are – our experiences and our genotype also contribute, which is why you find an occasional conservative emerging from a liberal context and vice versa. Although there can be interactions between the cultural environment and the individual makeup of a given person, in most cases those who grow up in a community with a dominant political ideology adhere to the values of their community and family. We don’t assume that people are innately determined to be Catholic or Protestant – we assume they learn it in their homes and, mostly, stick with the religion in which they were raised, although some people leave their church. Why would politics be any different?

While previous research has identified a slew of individual predictors, not enough theory has been done to fit them together into a cohesive whole. If authoritarianism is cultural, then perhaps people adopt sexist attitudes by emulating the sexist behaviors of others in their social environment and on the media, meaning that sexism is cultural as well. Perhaps the predictive power of constructs such as social dominance (a desire to maintain stratified social hierarchies as they are) come from an anxiety of being in an unstructured environment where the rules of social interaction are not clearly prescribed and the propensity to make mistakes is high. This response to anxiety with a desire for structure which is characteristic of social dominance orientation may overlap with sexism (a desire to keep women in their traditionally determined roles) as it also does with authoritarianism, accounting for why they are all predictors of the same outcome (in
this case conservative preferences), even though they are not collinear. The term conservative indicates a desire to avoid change and maintain the status quo, which may be expressed through one or another of the three constructs being discussed. Duckitt and Sibley (2009) have done interesting work to propose how to differentiate between social dominance (concern for violations of the hierarchies within one’s society) and authoritarianism (concern for the maintenance of rules protecting the society from invasion from without), yet it is undeniable that the root of both is fear and an attraction to order and traditional forms of order, and more work must be done to validate Duckitt’s and Sibley’s across different contexts and to integrate it conceptually within a map of other constructs that underlie prejudice.

One neglected dimension of cultural values in voting decision contexts is how we carry attitudes inherited from our familial backgrounds forward in time from previous generations, something that can uniquely be studied in a multicultural environment. First, the number of heritage countries that participants in the sample report a connection to (n=112 out of 195 countries in the world) allows for the use of culture as a continuous variable through the application of Hofstede’s rankings. Second, the geographical separation of members of a culture from their heritage cultural origins allows us to determine whether there is any continuity in culture after people have emigrated and lived in another space for a long time, even for generations. Thirdly, this multicultural context allowed us to determine how different cultural group memberships contribute to our voting preferences; cultural heritage is one dimension of culture, but where we live and the political ideologies of those around us are, in effect, another cultural group membership. In this dissertation, I am not intending to make a claim that heritage cultures fully capture our experience, just that our American culture is an additional culture in
which we are embedded, in tension with or in parallel with or on top of our heritage cultures. Hopefully future research can do more to build on Turner’s and Tajfel’s theory to better understand how multiple identities become expressed in our cultural values, norms and morals. Finally, in a world with increasing contact, Turner’s theory allows for a window onto what that contact means; if we live in a world where we have access to many other cultures through the internet, through travel, and through immigration, how will those other cultures shape us? Will they exacerbate prejudice or lead to plurality?

This new conceptualization of the role of heritage cultures as another shaper of political preferences views heritage cultures as continuously transmitted across generations, running in parallel to, or possibly underneath, newer, “American” values and attitudes and is an alternative conceptualization of the role of our heritage cultures from the “melting pot” idea that American culture displaces our heritage cultures. To understand these differences, and how they relate to who we choose to vote for in elections, this dissertation explored two unspecified aspects of this alternative: 1) different cultural viewpoints for how society and responsibility ought to be distributed within a society, as expressed through voting preferences, and 2) the role of heritage cultures in our society, particularly in multicultural communities where contact between groups is likely.

**Replicating Predictors from Prior Research in a Multicultural Context**

I hypothesized (1a) that constructs identified in previous research, including authoritarianism and hostile sexism, would replicate as predictors of voting preferences in the 2016 election. The findings do indeed replicate prior research, showing the utility of
authoritarian parenting attitudes, hostile sexism and social dominance orientation as strong predictors of voting preferences in the 2016 election.

**Hostile Sexism**

In addition, I hypothesized (1b) that certain roles and experiences, such as being non-white, being an immigrant, and being a woman, would align voter preferences with liberal policies. This prediction was not entirely born out. While being non-white and being immigrant were predictive of voting preferences, being a woman was not, and sexism was. After the seismic impact of the “surprise” 2016 election outcome, many people questioned the role of gender and prejudice against women in Donald Trump’s success against Hillary Clinton. Sexism was an obvious candidate, exacerbated by the idea that some voters were attracted to Donald Trump’s comments about women, with the added challenge that his opponent was a woman trying to break the ultimate glass ceiling and enter a leadership role as one of the most powerful people in the world.

Glick and Fiske’s scale of Ambivalent sexism separates sexism into two paradigms, one of benevolent and one of hostility towards women (1996). The hostile construct includes attitudes that women and feminists are a threat and are out to steal power from men through subterfuge. This version of sexism seems likely to be linked to a fear that the social order where men are dominant will be violated. Benevolent Sexism is an attitude that women are vulnerable and weak and need protection. It was possible that benevolent sexism would be related to people’s feelings in the election, particularly if they couldn’t envision Hillary Clinton as a leader because women are vulnerable, weak and need protection, but the lack of a relationship between benevolent sexism and voting preferences for Trump, Clinton or abstention suggest this is not the type of sexism at play in this context. Hostile sexism, then, which was a significant predictor of
voting for Donald Trump, seems to be the likely candidate, bringing us back to the idea of fear as a motivator in this election.

Sexism is associated reflexively with men, yet the data in this dissertation dissociates the psychological construct from a person’s identity. This finding raises the question of the nature of sexism, just as it raises the question of how to understand predictors of voting preferences: Voting preferences have been understood, erroneously (Mutz, 2018), as logical outcomes of the self-interest of a given voter such that the rich would prefer low tax policy associated with the GOP, while African Americans, immigrants, and women would support Democrats whose policies purportedly aim to support access to opportunities for gaining equal access to basic necessities like jobs and health care. However, while the data here presented support the notion that sexism, especially a hostile form of it, was a component of voting preferences for Donald Trump, it dissociates this finding from the gender identity of the participant. The implication of the finding is that sexism is not a logical conclusion of protecting one’s privilege as a man. This means it is either a cultural value or a personality characteristic – the determination of which it is (it is possibly a bit of both) is left to future researchers, but with some urgency. It is also possible, and would be ideal, if sexism is entirely accounted for by cultural value transmission, because then it is more likely remediable – more work needs to be done to explore the nature of these constructs and to establish better theory for explaining what they are and why they exist. This work is needed for the basic purpose of understanding human behavior towards others, but the urgency arises when you consider the application of the theory: If sexism is a cultural value, then it is more likely amenable to manipulations than if it is a random personality characteristic. Thus, disentangling personality from culture should be a general goal of understanding
psychological constructs such as sexism for the practical purpose of moving into the future with high hopes of actively reducing stigma and prejudice against the historically oppressed.

**Authoritarianism, Fear of Immigrants and Latent Authoritarianism**

Prior literature has linked authoritarianism to fear of outsiders, and shown that it is a predictor of conservative voting preferences in multiple countries (Choma & Hanock, 2017; Cohrs & Asbрок, 2009; Craig & Richeson, 2014; Duriez & Soenens, 2009; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Feldman, 2003; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Kauff, Asbrock, Thörner & Wagner, 2013; Perry, Paradies & Pedersen, 2015; Van Assche, Roets, Dhont & Van Hiel, 2014), yet the type of psychological variable which authoritarianism constitutes is poorly understood. In seminal articles, it is explicitly referred to as a personality trait (Altemeyer, 1988), but it may be, at least partly, a culturally transmitted value. Perhaps the activation of latent authoritarianism is an activation of a subdued cultural pattern? Or perhaps authoritarianism is a new development in response to ecological pressures that are currently reshaping our society (and our political system) as Vox’s Amanda Taub claims (2016).

When these events occur, Taub suggests, latent authoritarians then become authoritarian, and thus are more likely to vote conservatively. Because of the occurrence and timing of events like the Orlando shooting in June and the attacks in Nice in July, a theory of latent authoritarianism would predict higher authoritarianism within 6-9 months post an attack like those. Long term data analysis on authoritarianism may be able to detect changes in occurrence of authoritarianism in a period of months after an attack occurs, although that has not been analyzed here. However, if true, then that could have been one of the contributing factors to the outcome of the 2016 election that has received less attention than Mueller’s investigation into Russian election tampering through troll-bots on Facebook and other social media platforms.
In favor of the ecological pressures theory is the prediction that, if social change and physical threats coincided at the same time, both authoritarians who fear social change and latent authoritarians who are only activated by specific events (such as the spate of high profile terrorist attacks described below) would vote for a conservative leader they perceived as strong: one to stop social change, the other to address security concerns, albeit with drastic measures (Taub, 2016). Latent authoritarians are less likely to be identifiable as authoritarians because their authoritarianism is contextual, triggered by events reported in the news. When Taub published the article on Vox.com, the memory of attacks such as on the Paris attacks on November 13, 2015 (130 fatalities), or San Bernardino on December 14 of the same year, (14 dead and 22 injured), had faded a bit, as research suggests that the public consciousness of such attacks gradually fade to normalcy over six to nine months (Collins, 2004).

Vox published the article on March 1st, 2016, when many possible triggers in current events had already occurred. Subsequently to the Vox prediction, a series of new terrorizing events occurred in the United States and around the world, with high casualty rates.

- On March 27th, 2016, attacks on families in a park on an Easter Sunday outing in Lahore, Pakistan killed 72 and injured 338 (Eleazar, 2016).
- On June 12th, 2016 the Orlando nightclub shooting killed 50 (Alvarez & Pérez-Peña, 2016).
- On July 14th, 2016, a truck was used to terrorize Bastille Day celebrations in Nice, France (80 fatalities).

Thus, we can summarize the climate leading up to the election as characterized by terrorizing events at a rate of at least one every few months, well inside the range of 6-9 months.
to forget that Collins identifies (2004). Several critical terrorizing events preceded the election only by months, and others preceded it by a year or two.

At the same time, a steady stream of social change events over the course of Obama’s administration could have challenged those in a position of privilege to feel fear from challenges to their hegemony, and to traditional social norms that provide a sense of safety through structure and predictability, values authoritarian parents prize. Social change, however, was dominating the headlines and airwaves in 2015/2016 in the form of debates over who can use which bathroom (Fausset, 2017) and the new mainstream attention directed at transgendered individuals such as Caitlin Jenner (Somaiya, 2015), both of which could be viewed as the culmination of a series of Obama-era progressive changes – e.g. the creation of DACA (Preston & Cushman, 2012), the federal legalization of gay marriage (Liptak, 2015).

If authoritarianism is not completely separable from social dominance orientation, where people prefer to adhere to existing/traditional social hierarchies, then sexism might be something partially accounted for by authoritarianism, and social dominance may or may not be a fully separate construct. While Donald Trump promised strong defense against terrorism and stronger border control, his opponent was the first female candidate of a major party in American history. Once fears are activated by current events, people who endorse authoritarian parenting styles may then resist any modification to their opinions or decisions based on evidence or reason because of the strength and power of their emotional needs (Bilewicz, Soral, Marchlewksa & Winiewski, 2017).

The cultural resurgence of authoritarianism, occurring at the level of the populace, is then transferred up through the actions of voters to the level of government. The Trump administration provides a case study of this phenomenon, as the United States Customs and
Immigration Service, a federal agency, changed its mission statement in late February of 2018 to the following statement (Gonzalez, 2018), bold added to highlight authoritarian attitudes exemplified in the text:

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services administers the nation’s **lawful** immigration system, **safeguarding** its integrity and promise by efficiently and fairly **adjudicating** requests for immigration benefits while **protecting** Americans, securing the homeland, and **honoring our values**.

The previous mission statement posted on the USCIS website, by contrast, was exemplified by inclusive and respectful language, highlighted in bold below. Keyword differences between the new (authoritarian) statement and the old (inclusive) statement are lawful/safeguarding/adjudicating/securing as compared with promise/customers/granting/citizenship/promoting/awareness.

USCIS secures **America’s promise as a nation of immigrants** by providing accurate and useful information to our customers, granting immigration and citizenship benefits, promoting an awareness and understanding of citizenship, and ensuring the integrity of our immigration system.

It is simple to say that some people or even some cultures are xenophobic, racist, bigoted, but this is a reductionist and essentializing thought pattern that does little to expose mechanisms which could explain the role of xenophobia in voting decisions in a way that allows meaningful resistance to those mechanisms. If we can better understand how media representations of immigrants and other marginalized groups allow them to become representative of the negative events, as average Muslims have become conflated with fundamentalist terrorist factions who happen to be Muslim, or deconstruct media representations of Latino immigrants as criminals by
deconflating poverty and ethnicity, we may be able to effect positive change in how marginalized groups are treated.

A complimentary interpretation of the literature on authoritarianism, fear and latent authoritarianism could be that authoritarianism is partly influenced by individual differences in anxiety and susceptibility to fear, and partly influenced by the way certain cultural memes, such as the conservative claim that “Mexicans are criminals,” or “Muslims are terrorists.” Future research will need to address what type of fear, and what or who is provoking that fear, since it seems as if different fears lead to different psychological constructs. For example, appears that fear of immigrants has been suggested as a factor in latent authoritarianism and status threat in social dominance. An anxious person may desire scripts which empower them to control the stress of uncertainty, for example, in social interactions, or in navigating workplace politics. This anxiety may emerge in their parenting preferences for a structured environment that scaffolds the child’s behavior and the relationship between parent and child. After all, authoritarian parenting is defined as non-responsive to the child’s needs (at least the Western version of authoritarian parenting), so it is all about the parent, and their emotional dysfunction, possibly related to anxiety. The relationship between anxiety in the face of uncertainty and authoritarianism should be clear, but it does not mean that culture plays no role in authoritarian attitudes. Future directions could include comprehensive clinical assessments and a titrated approach to the levels of society at which authoritarian values are endorsed by authoritarians and latent authoritarians (Societal level? Parenting level? Community?). After all, culture is essentially a giant schema-structure designed to simplify the choices we make in navigating the complexity of human interactions, so interrelationships between personal differences in anxiety levels about structure and culturally transmitted endorsement of rigid adherence to structure would not be surprising.
Social Dominance Orientation

In their dual-process model, Duckitt and Sibley (2009), dissociate SDO from authoritarianism by classifying authoritarianism as a fear of outsiders and SDO as a desire to maintain social hierarchies within a society. Duckitt and Sibley might predict that Obama-era political actions for progressive social change might activate social dominance orientations whereas terrorism is more likely to activate latent authoritarians. They would also predict that the two constructs are not identical, which aligns with the results in this work because both constructs predict voting patterns and yet are not collinear. Graham cross-validated the construct of social dominance with complimentary constructs at the opposite end of the spectrum of SDO, such as concern for fairness and justice, implying the social dominance is on a continuous spectrum, at the other end of which is fairness. Using Graham’s Fairness/Reciprocity dimension we were able to replicate previous research which identified both authoritarianism and SDO as predictors of conservative voting preferences, particularly pertaining to the 2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom.

Whiteness: Conflicting explanatory motivations: self-interest or fear and identity threat?

While sexism and authoritarianism, two psychological constructs associated with prejudice, were strong predictors of voting preferences for Donald Trump in the sample, it is also true that participants’ preferences were under tension between different motivations. In the 2016 election, the dominant demographic that caused seismic shifts to the political establishment appeared to be white, working-class Americans defying the party elders of the GOP and supporting Donald Trump in the primaries and again in the general election. However, a large number of white liberals also defected from the Democratic Party establishment, and voted for
Bernie Sanders in the primaries, although this defection did not lead to Sanders capturing the party nomination, as it lead to Donald Trump capturing the party nomination. One interesting aspect of this data set is that approximately 1/3 of the participants who reported preferring Donald Trump also responded that, if Bernie Sanders had been on the ballot, they would have preferred to vote for him.

Could the insecurity about economic conditions and job prospects among white voters be expressed as both support for Bernie Sanders’s economic platform and as an authoritarian desire to reduce competition by driving away immigrants and excluding minorities and women from increasing their job prospects at the same time? While Mutz’s research (2018) suggests that economic self-interest did not drive voters’ preferences, the profile of participants who were attracted to Bernie Sanders as a candidate was quite different from the profile of participants who preferred Hillary Clinton. Table 15 presents a binomial regression model of the prior predictors used in the main analyses, with the dependent variable being a preference for Bernie Sanders or not. As in the first model with prior predictors, low hostile sexism was predictive of preference for Bernie Sanders, as was belief change resistance to accepting corrective information about the myth that undocumented voters participated in the general election. Being ineligible to vote at the time of the election (due to being underage) and being a more recent immigrant (0, 1 or 1.5 generation) were also significant predictors of a preference for Bernie Sanders, had he been on the ballot.

The sample of voters who preferred Bernie was composed of approximately 10 Clinton supporters for each Trump supporter. It may be that the Clinton supporters, being the majority, are driving the results. An important avenue for future research is to better explore the differences and similarities between attitudes held by Trump supporters who preferred Sanders
as compared with Clinton supports who preferred Sanders. There is a need to explain the
psychological motivations that drove the white voters who defected from the GOP to vote for
Donald Trump while accommodating an explanation for the white voters who defected from
Hillary to vote for Bernie Sanders. Fear of economic insecurity may be one of the underlying
fears that drive latent (and non-latent) authoritarians, but researchers have found that economic
interests did not predict voting preferences for Trump, but a perception of threat to one’s
privileged status as a man, or as white, were powerful predictors (Mutz, 2018). While a
limitation of this dissertation is the lack of a variable assessing class or socio-economic status in
our analyses, Mutz’s findings suggest they would not have played a role and support the
possibility that cultural values and fear shape prejudicial attitudes like sexism and racism, and
this is why demographics have failed to be predictive. Women can be sexist, and whiteness is not
causative of racism. Some pundits have claimed that Bernie Sanders’s platform was successful
because it was addressing economic concerns; this data suggest he could have attracted at least
1/3 of Trump voters, possibly allowing a victory over Trump in the Electoral College. However,
when we look more closely at a regression model of what predicted a preference for him, what
seems to be happening is that non-whites with low authoritarianism, low sexism, and high
fairness are the ones attracted to Bernie. Future research should explore the different patterns of
values of voters who preferred Bernie and Hillary. This is a thought worth pursuing in future
research, and worth considering as the midterm elections of 2018 are a few months away at the
time of publication of this document.

New predictors of voting preferences: Deepening our understanding of the role of old and
new culture.
Culture and the habits of thought that culture shapes, are transmitted through person-to-person contexts in our face-to-face interactions with parents, friends, colleagues and neighborhoods, but it is also transmitted through the internet and representations in the news media and entertainment media, and especially, all over the different forms of long-distance communication and media creation on the internet.

Media Literacy

At the start of this project, the context of the 2016 election involved a great deal of discussion of terms like “fake news,” “social media bots,” and “filter bubbles,” which indicated that social media and the internet had played an important role in the outcome of the election. The idea that voters who preferred one candidate may have been misled by misinformation on the internet into making their voting choice was a prominent topic of discussion, so the construct of media literacy was pulled in to evaluate that claim. I hypothesized (2b) that media literacy would play a role in voting preferences through people’s sense of agency in searching out solutions to current problems, and their capacity to accommodate corrective information to misinformation.

First, three scales evaluated media literacy. Media literacy is the ability to navigate information on the internet (or other media) and evaluate its veracity and credibility using both internal (critical thinking) and external (information literacy) resources. The first scale, Weber’s (2013) political knowledge scale, simply assessed whether participants were aware of current political facts. Having basic background knowledge is critical to one’s ability to critically evaluate whether a new piece of information is suspicious. The second scale, New Media Literacy Scale (NML) attempted to measure, holistically, how participants approach the use of
the internet – do they feel agentic about using available resources to navigate to the information they want and to evaluate its usefulness for a given purpose, including weeding out misinformation (Literat, 2014)? Literat recognized, however, that a key component of this behavior is the agency or self-efficacy of the activity of searching and consuming, not just the ability to judge, and so she included a separate scale, which she called Civic Engagement, to attempt to separate out agency as a personality variable that contributes to one’s media literacy, by evaluating agency in civic behavior rather than in internet usage and information consumption. In so doing, her work serves the purposes of this dissertation ideally, because we included both scales.

Literat’s full NML (New Media Literacy) scale was not predictive of voting preferences. Political knowledge (Weber, 2013) was predictive of voters who preferred Donald Trump compared to participants who Preferred Not to Vote, but did not predict preferences for Hillary Clinton compared to participants who Preferred Not to Vote.

Literat’s Civic Engagement scale was predictive of both preferences for Trump and Clinton. This suggests a dissociation: knowledge from agency. Knowledge was not the driver of voting preferences despite public concerns that Trump supporters were simply uneducated and ignorant. Because civic engagement was predictive, we know that agency is a more likely candidate, and because it drove both Clinton and Trump supporters when compared to voters who Preferred Not to Vote, it seems that what it is predicting is the activity of making a choice and participating. Along with civic engagement, whiteness was also predictive of preferences for both candidates, and taking these two pieces of information together, the implications are that minorities may feel disempowered to effect change, leading to abstention. Further research
should most definitely explore the relationship between agency, civic engagement, and voting activities, and trying to understand the specific roadblocks to empowering non-white voters to participate in voting. Preliminary qualitative assessment of open-ended responses suggested that many voters who Preferred Not to Vote felt disconnected from the information needed to make a good decision. Does this occur because of parental disconnection? Is a connection to information about politics related to economic stability? To neighborhood? These are important future directions to explore in this current data set.

Overall, however, media literacy is an emerging construct with poor definitions and new measures that lack replications. In addition, a counter-hypothesis within our exploration of the contributions that new medias made to participants’ voting preferences could be that belief change resistance and status threat played a role in the assimilation of media information. A juxtaposition of media literacy (NML) with a task to measure belief change resistance (BCR), therefore, could help to disentangle the possible roles of social media and the internet in the election outcomes.

In two tasks measuring belief change, participants showed differing patterns of response to corrective information. In task one, participants were asked their preconceived notions about the internet myth that genetically modified food is toxic to consume, followed by exposure to the full internet myth, and then finally a debunking page on Snopes.com. In task two, participants were asked about their preconceived beliefs about the internet myth from the 2016 election that undocumented voters were able to cast 2.8 million votes, and that this explains why Hillary Clinton won the popular vote even though Donald Trump won the electoral college. The participants received the same two subsequent prompts: a prompt showing them the internet myth as presented by a fake news website, and the corrective information presented by
Snopes.com. Participants’ preconceived beliefs about GMOs were high, but dropped, on average, by .20 Likert scale points, after exposure to the corrective information, \( t(935) = 6.213, p < .001 \). This outcome could be considered, generally, as belief change acceptance. In task 2, however, preconceptions were higher than after exposure to corrective information, also by .2, in the opposite direction. This can be described as belief change resistance.

What is interesting is that these two opposing patterns fed into voting preferences in very different ways. In the Snopes task with the prompt about GMOs, participants who were able to accommodate the corrective information changed their minds after exposure to the Snopes corrective information. While changing your mind on this topic of GMOs was not predictive of preferring Hillary Clinton, failing to change your mind was predictive of preferring Donald Trump. Interestingly, the variable that was a significant predictor for Bernie Sanders was resisting corrective information which tries to convince others that undocumented individuals are “free-loading.”

One possible explanation for the contrast between participants’ belief change acceptance of the correction regarding GMOs is that the participants in this study didn’t really have an emotional “skin” in the discussion about GMOs in our food supply, and so their cooler, logical thoughts prevailed, allowing them to change their minds. However, for the topic of immigration, many participants may have strong feelings, as shown by the responses that made up the “fear of immigrants scale.” Thus, it is possible that the emotions of either experiencing being an immigrant or having a close relative who is an immigrant may have caused some participants to engage with the topic emotionally on the Snopes immigration task. Conversely, participants who have no connection to immigration stories may feel threatened by immigrants. Their fear of immigrants may have activated emotions which change how they responded to the Snopes
corrective information about immigrants relative to how they reacted to the corrective information about GMOs. It is unclear why participants who preferred Bernie Sanders would resist corrective information that undocumented voters had managed to contribute to the pool of voters who helped Hillary Clinton win the popular vote, although it raises some interesting questions about this population: It may be that Bernie supporters came from both strong left-leaning and also moderately right-leaning ideological backgrounds, although the majority of the voters who preferred Bernie Sanders were likely strongly left-leaning. I hope to explore the attitudes of participants who liked Bernie Sanders in future research and, specifically, to identify whether he attracted elements of both sides in a de-polarizing way.

In the search to understand the nature of predictors of voting preferences, I have sought to situate the act of voting as an expression of our vision for an ideal society, shaped by what we learn from our culture(s). I have argued that we should consider some component of constructs such as sexism and authoritarianism, which have been found in prior research and in the current, multicultural context, to predict voting preferences for conservatives, as cultural. In chapter 4, I discussed theories which have begun to explain how culture is shaped in ecological contexts, and how it is transmitted to new generations, but previous theories have not yet been updated to address the role of new medias in the dissemination of culture. I propose that culture, up until the internet age, was transmitted through families, through neighborhoods, but also through books and television and other media. Now, the internet is a new vehicle of transmission in the vein of books and media, and should not be viewed as a transmitter only of information, but of values embedded in that information.

An exploration of culture and its role in shaping voting requires some investigation of how our interactions with that information are shaping us. The most obvious question is whether
misinformation led voters to vote for Donald Trump because they were uninformed. However, there are no significant differences in the ability of a measure of political knowledge to predict whether a participant preferred Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump.

Since participants did not appear to be misled into voting for Donald Trump by an inability to identify false news, the next question is: how did the misinformation that was spreading rapidly throughout the internet (Vosoughi, Roy & Aral, 2018) shape their preferences? There is a great deal more work to be done on this, but previous work by researchers who study belief change resistance (Flynn, Nyhan & Reifler, 2017; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010) suggest a possible explanation of how this information might have affected voters: the information didn’t affect them at all, it simply identifies those who had a pre-disposition to believe certain facts before they encountered the misinformation. It is likely that many voters had notions about immigrants, about minorities, and about women which were circulating in their families, communities and in the media landscape long before the election, most likely cultural values which are traditional, deeply embedded and possibly tied to the identities of some voters. The values may have to do with the roles of men and women in society, the entitlement of European Americans to privilege, and the notion that exclusion of other groups would cement that entitlement and preserve those roles. Information that contradicts these cultural values would lead to resistance, marking the voters who hold the values, but not because they are gullible, uneducated or ignorant. Viewed in this light, belief change resistance could be viewed as a measure of how internet users might view information that contradicts their cultural values. Those who embrace corrections, altering their views would be open to changing their minds. Those who maintain their views would be resistant to change. Those whose belief in the false news/misinformation increases after receiving corrective information could be characterized as
contrarian. So what is belief change resistance? Is it a personality variable? Is it, like authoritarianism, tied to emotional responses and to cultural values?

Participants who resisted accepting corrective information (high belief change resistance) – about the internet myth that genetically modified organisms (GMO) used to produce food are toxic to humans – were significantly more likely to prefer Donald Trump than Hillary Clinton. For those participants who began the task believing the myth about 2,864,974 undocumented voters, there was no change in belief. This belief resistance is in line with previous research, but the most interesting thing is that, on the topic of GMOs, which are currently very salient, participants were willing to accept the corrective information, and those that did so were less likely to have voted for Donald Trump.

In the beginning of this project, I expected media literacy to be one construct, where the driving factors were “cold” (or something like it) cognitive processes of critical thinking, yet the analyses are leading me to consider the possibility that they are separate processes which operate independently. The idea that belief change resistance and media literacy are different constructs, driven by different thought processes, is supported by the existence of correlations between each of the two pairs of similar constructs: Belief change GMO correlated with belief change immigration and Literat NML measure correlated with political knowledge (Weber, 2013). In addition, BCR – GMO correlated with Literat and both political knowledge and Literat NML had significant first order correlations with BCR – Immig. (see Appendix D). The converging evidence of NML and BCR, therefore, present a more complex but more compelling narrative, where voters who preferred Trump were able to distinguish misinformation intellectually, but unable to do so emotionally.
The complex nature of belief resistance is extraordinarily important. Hypotheses such as the idea that lack of education or ignorance drove the vote for Donald are unsupported. It seems that media literacy is not a unitary phenomenon, but is composed of multiple, dissociable processes such as having knowledge and processing new information under “cold” cognitive conditions where one’s emotions are not engaged. The experience of processing information that engages one’s emotions could be “hot” cognition (Unsworth, Heitz & Engle, 2005). The fact that participants in this study resisted corrective information about undocumented voter fraud is unsurprising but the fact that they accepted a corrective change on a less salient topic is hopeful, and possibly key to finding opportunities for persuasion.

**Hofstede rankings**

For all the attention to the new, shiny context of the internet and new media, it would be unhelpful to discount the role of our traditional cultural values and the tension between those traditions and new ways of thinking, or to ignore the possibility that the values we have inherited from our heritage cultures are deeply rooted and implicit. This was why we looked for research that provided a way to understand culture as a continuous variable. Two researchers had done work like this: Hofstede was the first, perhaps the best known, and with the largest number of countries in his data set. Gelfand and Triandis have attempted to deepen Hofstede’s work and address some of its major limitations. Together they created an individual differences scale intended not just to measure individualism better than Hofstede and to balance his construct of individualism with a polar opposite, collectivism. Individualism, however, shares a central feature with authoritarianism and social dominance and sexism: they are all cultural ideals about how we our society should scaffold intergroup interactions. Individualism, however, is focusing on the behavior and identity and self-construal of one person, while the former three focus on
inter-group relations and hierarchies. We have discussed some of the limitations of Hofstede’s work in chapter 3, and they are legitimate critiques, yet Hofstede’s rankings proved the only significant predictor of voting preferences. Why? Future research is needed to understand whether the Hofstede variable of individualism was predictive where Triandis and Gelfand’s was not because of the context (voting preferences in the election), the nature of the items in the different scales, or the nature of the analysis. These are ongoing debates in the field of cross-cultural research.

Another concern in cross-cultural research is the way values for individualism and collectivism may impact participant’s responses to survey items. Authoritarianism and individualism/collectivism share a purpose in providing a scaffold for how to interact with other members of our society and how those other members would expect us to respond under a variety of different conditions. Another construct that may has been previously defined as a personality variable but may actually be capturing implicitly defined cultural responses prescribed by our heritage cultures is social desirability. Our cultural norms train us through habitual exposure, to know when smiling is permissible and acceptable and the degree to which we should defer our needs to the needs of others. Social desirability (Haghighat, 2007) was designed to measure westerners’ individual differences in their tendency to respond to researchers’ prompts obligingly rather than honestly, but in an extremely diverse sample, it may inadvertently capture cultural differences in participants’ likelihood to answer obligingly rather than honestly. Thus, a major limitation of the data sample is also one of its greatest strengths: the diversity of the sample and the little we know about how other cultures respond to online surveys and self-report measures makes the interpretation of the data challenging. Making it all the more challenging is the fact that the participants all live in the New York City metropolitan area: If
limited research has been done to establish the psychometric affordances of how participants self-report in online surveys, even less has been done on how culture shapes the responses of participants whose cultural influences are transnational. While these limitations create a risk that the data here would not be replicated, I hope that the findings and the theory generated from this dissertation open new avenues of research and lead to similar work on multicultural, transnational influences of heritage cultures so that we can better understand how cultural values and habits shapes us and how they are transmitted, diachronically, across generations as well as how they are transmitted, synchronically, across a contemporaneous community.

Hofstede’s items are not publicly available for a face-validity based comparison with those of Triandis and Gelfand or Singelis’s items based on Marcus and Kitayama’s work. However, it may be that Hofstede’s items tap a very different level of consciousness, focused on one’s relationship to one’s national-level society. This is likely given his theoretical perspective. Triandis and Gelfand’s work, along with Marcus and Kitayama’s, on the other hand, focuses much more on relations between oneself and one’s immediate surroundings – what Bronfenbrenner would call the micro-level ecology. It is entirely possible that different cultures prioritize individualistic and collectivistic behavior differently at different levels of interaction. For example, the US has the highest ranking in the world of individualism, yet there is a high degree of patriotism as well, especially among conservatives, and this is a very collectivistic value. These findings, viewed from a position of Greenfield Theory of Social Change and Human Development, make a lot of sense since conservatives are increasingly bound by rural geographic settings and liberals by urban settings. Again, this suggests that Hofstede’s data may be biased towards having measure American individualism through a perspective of monoculture which happened to sample urban participants in creating the ranking. Indeed, the use of
Hofstede’s rankings to rank participants based on heritage cultures, and the utility of that method in predicting voting preferences goes against Hofstede’s main claims quite directly, and is something he explicitly rejects as a fallacy. An interesting aspect of Gelfand’s theoretical work is his sensitivity to reporting, in his data, detailed characteristics of the sample population he used to norm a “national” level of value (in this case, tightness and looseness; Gelfand et al., 2011).

However, the data here seem to support one of Hofstede’s other main claims – that individual differences provide too much noise in data to assume that any given group of persons will represent cultural trends if the individual level data are used, for example, in a regression model, to predict a behavioral outcome, as was done here. In that case, the group-level means may prove more valuable, and in fact, that is what was found in this dissertation. There are several explanations: one could be that the items are different, as mentioned above, another could be that individual level scales tap into explicit beliefs people hold about themselves, which could be dissociated from actual attitudes. Support for this perspective comes from literature on implicit bias, a field of research which has made invaluable contributions to the study of prejudice and the legitimization of the experiences reported by marginalized groups. Implicit bias literature also is grappling with contradictory evidence from group-level and individual-level approaches to analyzing data, where the individual levels, similarly to the data in this dissertation, present too much variability or “noise.” This has led critics to question whether implicit bias is a real phenomenon, despite findings that implicit bias not only exists but is quite robust across regions of the US when measured at the group level (Payne, Vuletich & Lundberg, 2017).
I hypothesized (2a) that values from the heritage cultures of current Americans would shape their voting preferences, even in geographical separation from the heritage culture’s original environment, and while many of the heritage value predictors were not strong enough for the complex regression model, individualism was. This is likely due to the nature of the construct of individualism, especially as measured by Hofstede, as a national level orientation to the nation and how each of a nation’s citizens should position their responsibilities to one another so that all members have similar expectations and the society maintains its cohesion. An interesting future direction, here, would be to collect data from other multi-cultural urban environments as well as from more rural, more conservative, more homogenous environments and to deconstruct the myth of American mono-culture by unpacking how ecological differences in population density, homogeneity, and cultural heritage may be related to voting preferences in other American contexts in light of Greenfield’s theory of social change and human development (2000).

**Identity and awareness of transnational connections**

Can these heritage cultures play a role in shaping the communities that help us decide how to vote? Apparently, they do, and enough so to warrant further research into transnational continuities between the similarities of communities’ culture between the heritage environment and the post-migration environment, such as the work done on Korean mothers in Los Angeles and Korea by Park et al. (2015). Ethnicity is supposed to be a matter of identity and race externally applied to one by outsiders (2007), but I hypothesized that participants may be using race as an identity in the absence of other ethnic connections (3b).
Implicit bias raises another point, too, which is the awareness we have of our cultural values. Is it possible that culture can shape us in ways that aren’t salient to us? What is the identity statement like for Americans who don’t know their ancestry? One element analyzed in this data set was heritage backgrounds, and while many participants used heritage as part of their identity statement, people’s identities didn’t always fall neatly along the lines of race, ethnicity, religion or heritage regions, with most participants identifying themselves based on heritage places, whether regions, countries, or cities. Only a third of the participants included “American” in their identity descriptions, even though almost eighty percent were born in the US, showing how transnational ties are also a strong component of identity formation. But most interestingly, for those who stated that they didn’t know where they were from, instead of self-categorizing as an ethnic region (say Europe, Africa, Asia, etc.), they self-categorized under race-based terms like “White,” “Caucasian,” “African American,” “Black.” Interestingly, although the census and most researchers define “Latin@” as an ethnicity or language group (Foner & Fredrickson, 2004), participants used Latin@ in the same way as they used race: as a substitute group for ethnicity when they did not know of or feel an identity connection to a country, region or place. This poses an important question about the role of experiences and identity in discriminatory behavior: when people align their group identity based on race, does that alignment involve prejudicial cognitions about other races, whereas when people align their identities based on national heritages and geography, perhaps their sense of others aligns with the others’ national heritages, which is harder to determine visually, and therefore, may lead to lesser focus on essentializing or determining expectations about character based on origin when it is often undetermined.
In line with my expectations, participants in the data set continued to possess detailed knowledge of their heritage countries, even cities, after multiple generations of their ancestors living in the United States, supporting the hypothesis that ethnic identity plays a long-term role in the identity of Americans (3a). If people have an explicit awareness of where they are coming from, shaped by the histories of the places where their ancestors lived, then how much more likely is it that implicit cultural values and explicit cultural rituals, such as cooking specific dishes or celebrating holidays, are also being transmitted? The ongoing transmission of culture from generation to generation may have an incidental effect of being self-reinforcing, leading to people seeking out and creating enclaves with others from similar heritages in order to recreate ex-patriot communities. This results in America being a composite patchwork or mosaic, rather than a melting pot. Further research is needed to understand the historical movements of populations from various heritage backgrounds from region to region within the United States, some of which is being done by historians. For example, Colin Woodard, in his book *American Nations: A History of the Eleven Rival Regional Cultures of North America*, argues that colonial Americans began in enclaves, and then brought the cultures that developed out of their pre-American heritages and the emergent cultural traditions from the ecological context of each colony with them during westward colonization (2011).
12. Implications and Conclusions

Potential Implications of Findings

The story of American Politics for the past fifty years has centered around a narrative of economic and cultural conservativism versus economic and cultural inclusion, yet the surprising alliances that emerged in the 2016 election suggest that permanent changes are underway (Taub, 2016). The root causes of these changes may be linked to globalization, rapid international transit, instantaneous communication, access to information, infinite amounts of storage for human creations that are accessible to virtually anyone, and digital platforms that allow the shaping of new identities and the rousing of enormous mobs. The affordances of living in 2016 may have reached a point where the changes to our ecology are restructuring our society. Yet we have more tools than ever before to understand what those changes are, and what the underlying drivers are, and have been. Is the heightened polarization in the US and around the world an inevitability? It is a bellwether of the disintegration of our society?

Education has always been the answer of the academy to improving attitudes towards minorities and the oppressed, but most recent research, including this dissertation, find that education is unsuccessful when the model of transmission relies on information transmission and lecture, because it information transmission relies on acceptance of what is being taught and assumes that students will have no belief change resistance to controversial material. We must adjust teaching methods for this material for it to be able to effectively repair our society. While it may be true that critical thinking is an important ability, its lack doesn’t seem to be the explanation for the rise of populism, and the attitude that populists are ignorant can be destructive and increase polarization. This doesn’t mean that there is no hope, it just means we
must identify the roots of our disagreements and test methods of persuasion and rhetoric that will accomplish our goals.

I believe that one of the patterns at the root of our disagreement is the misconception that prejudice stems from hate, when it is more likely to stem from fear: Fear which is driving authoritarianism and SDO and sexism. Progressive policies threaten current social order and deconstruct its hierarchies, activating social dominance tendencies through fear. Open borders and global perspectives reduce the solidity of our perceived boundaries with the rest of the world and also attacks the privilege of being a multigenerational American through rising populations of unfamiliar others whose behaviors don’t fit familiar schemas. Feminism adds to the pressure by demanding that a marginalized majority, women, should have equal access, and as Mutz puts it, people perceive each of these equations as a zero-sum game (2018), where the advancement of others is at cost to ourselves. An implication of this finding is that we seek ways to better understand how to present progressive policies in ways that communicate that it is not a zero-sum problem, but a benefit to all through productive exchange. Fear can manifest in different dimensions of our identities, but if it is manifesting across many identities at once, it is unsurprising that you would see an outcome like this election. The good news is that more research (Napiers, Huang, Vonasch & Bargh, 2017) is generating practical ways of diminishing fearful outcomes and addressing status threat, but the bad news is that our collective human cultural heritage is unlikely to be eliminated by progress. What is more likely is a permanent scenario of tension between our cultural heritage and more progressive notions that will have to re-navigate continually.
Synthesis of three ecological theories of culture to form a new model of cultural continuity and cultural change.

A model of how these multiple theories of cultural ecology might fit together advantageously, drawing heavily from Greenfield’s innovations but adding a mechanism for the individual to contribute ecological pressure to the shaping of culture can be seen in figure 9.

*Figure 9*: Merging cultural theories into a model of how our environments shape our voting decisions and our voting decisions shape our environments dialogically.

Each of the ecological theories included in the model have specific affordances and limitations, and the model is not intended to contradict any of the theories, but simply to show how their affordances are complementary, and it does so at the expense of some of the rich details provided by the theorists in their work, which is less than ideal. The model is intended to be used in conjunction with those primary documents, so that this detail is not lost to the future.
researcher. The major contribution of this dissertation was achieved because of Hofstede’s rankings, which allow culture to be transformed from a nominal variable into an ordinally ranked one, however Hofstede’s work also has some severe limitations which have begun to be remedied by other researchers. For example, Hofstede’s work lacks any comprehensive theoretical explanations or definitions of culture and how it is transmitted. Bronfenbrenner provides some robust ecological ideas that also address cultural transmission and how it shapes development, by describing the levels of interaction through which a culture is transmitted to an individual. One of the unique strengths of Bronfenbrenner’s theory is that it provides an explicit mechanism for the individual to provide feedback to their culture – the individual is both shaped by the culture and shapes the culture. Yet Bronfenbrenner’s theory lacks a lot of the specific dimensions of how culture is shaped ecologically that Greenfield’s theory possesses. They complement each other in many ways. Greenfield has the richest theory, but because it is so complex and focuses on socioeconomic differences that are central drivers in accounting for cultural change, there are no mechanisms for the individual’s actions or contributions to feedback into the ecology and shape the culture.

The use of the Hofstede rankings in this research speaks to the validity of his work, but he would never have used his data in this way, and has limited explanations for how culture works at all. The Hofstede rankings are a critique of Greenfield’s work because she seems to view culture as a product of a specific ecological context, with no clear place in her theory for continuity and values that emerged from previous contexts. The diagram of her theory only has a mechanism for explaining how new contexts will change a culture, which is the strength of focus of her theory. Using Hofstede’s rankings as a variable in juxtaposition to Greenfield’s gives us
the opportunity to start discussing the mechanisms for continuity of culture, and not just the change.

For example, MacWilliams’ proposition that prolonged ecological pressures on the African American community from asymmetrical exposure to violence and threat leading to a cultural tendency towards authoritarianism provides an example of the tensions between Greenfield’s work and the model proposed in figure 9, where an ecological pressure was hypothesized to cause cultural-level changes over time which have now become habitual and encoded in cultural behaviors and likely to perpetuate themselves as cultural traditions even in the absence of the ecology that produced them. Conservation tendencies operate in tension against ecological pressures. This pull and push is the context in which the American political system ought to be analyzed in order to understand voting patterns more broadly.

The model presented in figure 9 attempts to show how Greenfield’s, Bronfenbrenner’s, and Tajfel and Turner’s Theory can be integrated into a holistic structure which draws on each of their strengths, and to show the trajectory of cultural transmission envisioned in this particular context of making a voting decision. In some ways, it also answers critiques within the field, such as Marcus and Kitayama’s critique that measures of individualism have no room for self-identity, by incorporating an identity theory into one of the levels. This also addresses a weakness of ecological theories, which generally lack a mechanism of conversion from experiences into psychological constructs in the mind of a person, because they focus on the environment at the expense of the internal construals. For example, Neisser’s 5 selves (1988) are complementary to Bronfenbrenner’s levels (Rosa & Tudge, 2013), and provide a mechanism for the person to process their cultural inputs. Tajfel and Turner (1979), however, provide the strongest identity theory to place in this lowest level of the diagram, because their theory
specifically deals with the social experience and how intergroup tensions lead us to position our identities. As a supplement, but not a replacement of Bronfenbrenner’s micro-level, I have specified face-to-face versus media exposure to cultural values, as it seems there are two general mechanisms by which we are exposed to such values. Bronfenbrenner envisioned our exposure selectively through face-to-face interactions, which I think is a weakness of his work, since at the time of his writing, book, radio and TV media formats, among others, were already an important mechanism of transmitting culture through news and stories. In fact, some researchers argue that the written word itself fundamentally altered human cognition, and I would argue that each new form of media that has emerged in human culture since the invention of writing has contributed to altering our cognition in similar, if less profound ways (Olson, 1996; 2016). Crucially, the emergence of social media is the most recent example of this, because just as the written word altered the affordances of memory and allowed us to offload burdens from human memory by recording information for posterity rather than transmitting orally, social media has re-aligned and democratized the nature of truth and facts by eliminating publishing bottlenecks related to the cost of printing and disseminating printed words. The lower cost of disseminating written words on the internet, and the networking offered by social media have combined to allow untrained non-professionals to generate content widely available, something which has never happened before in history. This has placed a burden on each individual to vet information for his or herself, creating a need for media literacy where before professionals such as book editors and newspaper editors and journalists were responsible for this vetting, and had received professional training and ethical guidelines for doing so. Therefore, we are in the midst of, in many ways, an ecological transformation of the nature of information that must, necessarily, reshape our culture, so that we may reshape our own cognition to accommodate the new
technology. After all, this is the purpose of culture: to allow humans to evolve within the lifespans of living individuals by changing their experiences and expected responses.

The model I am presenting here draws a specific affordance from Bronfenbrenner which could strengthen Greenfield’s theory of social change and human development, not to replace her theory but simply to supplement it: the possibility that individuals in a society can act as part of the ecology which shapes culture itself in a bidirectional or circular pattern of interaction. As part of the conceptualization of bidirectionality, which is represented in the large arrows feeding back up from the voting decision into the cultural shapers at the top, there is a smaller bidirectional system of tensions between the triangles underneath the cultural values, such as authoritarianism, sexism and individualism/collectivism, and the triangles above them. The triangles are intentionally oriented so that the base of the triangle faces the cultural values, so as to represent the weight or pressure being applied to the cultural variables. From beneath, norms, texts and laws act as pillars or brakes, which encourage cultural continuity and transmission, a feature notably absent from Greenfield’s theory. On top events, population density and economics are intended as examples of the variables Greenfield indicated as ecological shapers that drive cultural change. The tight bidirectional relationship between these two sets of triangles exerts opposing tensions on cultural values, one set holding them up in place while the other set bears down. This dissertation’s strongest contribution to the discourse around the nature of culture is the addition of the these variables into the concept of cultural change – the role of media and text in transmitting culture both as a pathway of transmission through the digital bubbles which shape what texts we are exposed to, as the availability of texts themselves, and the sharing of stories, at the level of directly counteracting the effects of ecological change through norms, laws, and texts. These norms, laws and texts are generated by individuals or teams of individuals,
disseminated, adopted, and then become habitual scaffolds of our schema of interacting with other people, which can be useful, but can also result in prejudicial attitudes which can lead to intergroup conflict. This is the most critical tension in my work, since it is impractical and highly unethical to throw out the texts generated by our ancestors, including documents such as the Bible or Quran as well as recent documents of purportedly less importance, yet nonetheless shape our attitudes, such as the children’s book Where the Wild Things Are. As much as we want to keep Where the Wild Things Are and excise some of the anachronism in the Bible or Quran, it is impossible to eliminate those texts and their ideas from modern culture without denying fundamental historical events. Yet without excision, we cannot eliminate the anachronistic ideas, which are doomed to reverberate through the future, at risk of being used in negative ways. This is the tension I hoped to expose by adding this layer of texts, norms and laws beneath cultural values, to act in opposition and tension with Greenfield’s exhaustive and profound list of ecological drivers of cultural change.

**Future Work**

Future work could examine avenues that may reduce authoritarianism or social dominance orientation by calming perceived threats. One possible avenue would be to present participants with readings or virtual reality games that allow them to enter the experiences of immigrants to increase empathy, while simultaneously decreasing fear of outgroup members. While media can produce false news, it is also a central mechanism of enculturation through storytelling. All the variables in this dissertation, particularly individualism/collectivism, authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and morality remain poorly understood as either changeable (learned cultural values) or unchangeable (personality traits or individual
differences). Without further work to disentangle the mutability of these attitudes, it will be
difficult to come up with plans to attenuate them, or at least their relationships prejudice and
discrimination. Overall, our findings provide evidence that prejudice is partly culturally learned,
indicating that there are actionable pathways to remedy the polarized situation our society
currently inhabits.

Both morals and ethics are understood to be fundamentally adaptive ways of maintaining
cooperation among human groups for basic needs such as survival (e.g. food production,
defense, reproduction) but which has morphed or been co-opted into a more uniquely human
tool: social cooperation became codified in various societies according to cultural habits, and
developed into an abstract, symbolic and arbitrary system of rites, beliefs and habits with the
goal of preserving and passing forward important technological know-how while maintaining
group cohesion. Language is a powerful tool for maintaining culture, or the habits and patterns of
behavior and beliefs, over generations with only minor changes due to drift and changes in
ecological pressures, where adults pass (at least parts of) the symbolic system to the next
generation implicitly and explicitly. It is important to understand how flexibly parts of culture
can change in multi-cultural contexts, especially with increasing globalization that is thought to
be decreasing the variation among world cultures through media exposure and increased tele-
communicative contact – both a function of the digital, internet age.

While the current research will not look at comparisons between groups in geographic
separation, such as people from one country in that country versus people from one country in
another country, I hope to establish a methodology that will be applicable for creating a profile
that captures group concordances and is also capable of understanding variability within
populations, and which can, ultimately, be used to understand cultural change.
However, this goal should also take into account a fundamental truth which Hofstede has ignored, but others, such as Gelfand, have at least tried to acknowledge: that a nation does not represent a monoculture. As psychologists, there is a great deal of work to be done to identify what culture is, and where it rests. Is it something that exists within the human mind? Is there consistency of culture across all members of a cultural group? It is likely that there is no consistency, and that culture somehow manages to emerge as a pattern across a great number of individuals without guaranteeing much in any one person. Culture allows for the uniqueness of each individual. This variation emerges from personality traits, and also intersectionality within members of a group. For example, we are all American, but in addition, I am a woman, and a secular Jew.

Furthermore, the variations of cultures across regions, predicted by ecological theorists such as Greenfield (2009) would also account for intra-national but group-level cultural variation. The role of this ecological factor is still poorly understood as well: where are the boundaries between a society: which is gemeinschaft and one which is gesellschaft? What exceptions may defy this categorization?

Another way of looking at how people align themselves with various options for group membership has been provided by Turner & Reynolds (2003) with Self Categorization Theory (SCT) and Social Identity Theory (SIT). Both SCT and SIT emerge from the idea that identity is complex and exists as a self-definition in opposition to other near groups, and that it is important to understanding collective behavior. For example, the creation of (even artificial) group categories can spur competition and discrimination between groups in SIT (Turner, 1999). One issue that is addressed by self-categorization theory is how social identity can result in a tendency to perceive an outgroup as homogenous and with uniform, less individual
characteristics (Turner, 1999). Take this, combined with the perseverance of cultural traditions across multiple generations, and it goes a long way to explaining the stubborn persistence of sexist and racist cultural assumptions, as the pull of identity like race magnetically attracts us to our in-group while amplifying cultural norms of interpreting out-group homogeneity.

On the other hand, learning more about the factors that lead to differences in moral and ethical beliefs within American sub-cultures can help us to understand the political situation in which we all live. It can also help us to form educational practices which better train students to apply their own moral systems, whether we agree with them or not, to critical thinking, scientific literacy and awareness of other social perspectives. Current efforts to create educational interventions aimed at increasing moral reasoning on specific issues, such as sexual harassment training or diversity sensitivity training have a poor record of improving sensitivity to other groups and changing the minds of attendees (Kearney, 2004). While training may increase participants’ ability to recognize discrimination and poor behavior, it doesn’t increase empathy, and some training procedures considered “best practices” have negative effects, increasing resistance (Perry, 2010). Finally, the alliances between minority groups such as Blacks and Latin@s and the Democrats are likely to be uneasy and fraught in the future, since both history and our data here show that people often vote in ways that are important to them emotionally but may not be in their best interest practically, with the strongest predictors being culture. Recent research has begun to show that both (growing) demographics have tendencies towards authoritarianism, and the tensions between cultural tendencies of authoritarianism and Democratic policies intended to protect oppressed minorities will likely become more apparent over the next few decades.
Cultural values that result in fear and prejudice may persist into the future, but more and more researchers, journalists and artists are harnessing the media to share stories of their experiences in order to alter standing perceptions and engage in dialogues about injustice. The #MeToo movement, which began a few months ago in October 2017 (Guerra, 2017), seems to be encouraging dialogue about sexual assault, sexual harassment in the workplace, and holding powerful individuals accountable for their predatory behavior. #MeToo demonstrates that we can, at least, add new habits and attitudes to our cultural toolbox through the vehicle of the internet and the power of sharing our stories publicly.
## Appendices

### Appendix A: Summary of Existing Scales Used in Study

Table 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale Description</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Cronbach’s Alpha</th>
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<td>Durel Organized Religious Activities (ORA)</td>
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<td>Std Dev</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
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Valid N (listwise) 428
Appendix B: Heritage Identities in the Sample Population

Figure 10: Heat map of how many participants claimed heritage from each country: Darker blue represents a higher percentage of participants who claimed at least partial descent from that country.
## Appendix C: Hofstede and Gelfand Rankings

Table 18

*Hofstede and Gelfand Rankings paired with each country represented in the sample. (n=112)*

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| Georgia          |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Germany          | 35  | 67  | 66  | 65  | 83  | 40  |
| Ghana            | 80  | 15  | 40  | 65  | 4   | 72  |
| Greece           | 60  | 35  | 57  | 100 | 45  | 50  |
| Grenada          |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Guatemala        | 95  | 6   | 37  | 99  |     |     |
| Guinea           |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Guyana           |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Haiti            |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Honduras         | 80  | 20  | 40  | 50  |     |     |
| Hong Kong        | 68  | 25  | 57  | 29  | 61  | 17  |
| Hungary          | 46  | 80  | 88  | 82  | 58  | 31  |
| India            | 77  | 48  | 56  | 40  | 51  | 26  |
| Indonesia        | 78  | 14  | 46  | 48  | 62  | 38  |
| Ireland          | 28  | 70  | 68  | 35  | 24  | 65  |
| Israel           | 13  | 54  | 47  | 81  | 38  |     |
| Italy            | 50  | 76  | 70  | 75  | 61  | 30  |
| Ivory Coast      |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Jamaica          | 45  | 39  | 68  | 13  |     |     |
| Japan            | 54  | 46  | 95  | 92  | 88  | 42  |
| Jordan           | 70  | 30  | 45  | 65  | 16  | 43  |
| Kazakhstan       |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Korea            | 60  | 18  | 39  | 85  | 100 | 29  |
| Kosovo           |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Latvia           | 44  | 70  | 9   | 63  | 69  | 13  |
| Lebanon          | 75  | 40  | 65  | 50  | 14  | 25  |
| Lithuania        | 42  | 60  | 19  | 65  | 82  | 16  |
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**NOTE:** Countries in Italics are either not formally recognized internationally, no longer countries, or stateless peoples
## Appendix D: Correlations Matrix of Associations between Variables Measuring Media Literacy

### Table 19

*Pearson Correlations Matrix of Associations between Variables Measuring Media Literacy (n=902)*

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[United States Census Bureau QuickFacts Richmond County (Staten Island Borough), New York]. (n.d.) https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/36085


