The Syndrome of Romantic Love

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by

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ABSTRACT
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The aim of this dissertation is to locate romantic love in the space of mental phenomena. Although romantic love is characterized as an emotion by a number of philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, I show that it is not an emotion. Instead I argue that it is best categorized as a syndrome – a set of dispositions – affective, cognitive, conative, and behavioral. The syndrome category allows to successfully capture the diversity and plurality of the symptoms or manifestations of romantic love.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the study of romantic love in the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. The majority of the philosophical accounts are criticized for their neglect of empirical data provided by other disciplines, and for constructing ideals of love rather than attempting to describe the kind of phenomenon it is. My goal is to rectify these shortcomings. The concept of limerence proposed by the psychologist, Dorothy Tennov, is taken to be the best characterization of romantic love as an obsessive passionate state.

In chapter 2 I explore an analogy between romantic love and emotions. Despite the fact that both share a number of core features, the examination of dominant theories of emotions shows that none of these theories can adequately categorize romantic love. That suggests that romantic love is not an emotion.

Chapter 3 takes on the categories of basic and nonbasic emotions used in psychology. My main argument against categorizing romantic love as a basic emotion is that it is not an affect
program. To show this, I attack the dominant evolutionary story of romantic love’s function as a link between lust and attachment as part of human reproductive and child rearing mechanism. This story mistakenly takes for granted the model of the nuclear family, ignoring the communal child rearing practices that have been dominant in most parts of the world throughout human history. I also show that romantic love is not a nonbasic emotion because it can maintain its integrity without the emotions and beliefs thought to compose it. I discuss and critique the tradition of social constructionism and their attack on the categories of basic and nonbasic emotions, notably addressing James Averill’s social construction view of romantic love. I show that emotions and romantic love are shaped by cultural scripts, but are not solely determined by such scripts. The critical analysis of basic and nonbasic emotions, as well as social construction of emotions lends further support to the claim that romantic love is not an emotion.

Chapter 4 takes on the rational norms applicable to emotions. After differentiating between them, I show that the main rationality norm of emotions – aptness – does not apply to romantic love. Unlike emotions, romantic love has no formal object. Instead, lovability should be thought of as a projected property. One is lovable because one is loved. The chapter concludes with a survey of the causes and eliciting conditions of romantic love. The arbitrariness of these conditions, as catalogued by some researchers, further supports the projection hypothesis of romantic love, demonstrating yet another crucial difference between it and emotions.

Chapter 5 provides a positive view of romantic love as a syndrome. It is first demonstrated that the category of sentiments sometimes used by scholars to describe romantic love comes close to an adequate characterization of romantic love. However, the main reason why romantic love is not a sentiment is that sentiments, like emotions, have formal objects and aptness conditions, whereas romantic love does not. Sentiments also have an internal rational
structure such that there are some emotions that cannot be their manifestations. Romantic love, on the other hand, can be manifested through virtually any emotion. I conclude that romantic love is a syndrome because it is an arational, projected attitude with a plethora of symptoms that vary across cultures and individuals. Some core symptoms have been identified by Tennov’s concept of limerence, including obsessive thinking and idealization.

One important implication of my view is that the ideology we attribute to romantic love with norms like sexual and emotional exclusivity are extrinsic rather than intrinsic to it. It is often thought that ‘true love’ requires adhering to these and other norms. However, I show that all norms applicable to romantic love are extrinsic rather than intrinsic to it because romantic love is arational. For this reason, it is up to the lovers to accept, reject, and modify the norms that govern their loves.
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CHAPTER 1 ROMANTIC LOVE: FIRST DEFINITIONS

The topic of romantic love has recently been gaining popularity, and numerous accounts of romantic love have emerged (Velleman, 1999; Kolodny, 2003; Helm, 2010; Solomon, 2006; Jollimore, 2011.) Many of them construct theories of romantic love, and argue about the nature of love on the basis of intuition and conceptual analysis. Very often these accounts move too quickly to a defense of norms surrounding romantic love, by-passing any serious examination of love as a phenomenon.

I have two quarrels with this approach: (1) conceptual analysis that is not empirically informed cannot provide a full picture of the kind of phenomenon romantic love is, and (2) getting clear about the nature of romantic love is an indispensable precondition for understanding how and what norms might apply to it. My purpose in this dissertation is first, to provide an adequate categorization of romantic love as a mental phenomenon, and second, to elaborate the relationship between it and the various norms applicable to it. In my analysis of romantic love I supplement the philosophical methods of conceptual analysis by looking to the research done in neuroscience, psychology, evolutionary biology, and anthropology to clarify the concept of romantic love. In the following chapters I consider the arguments and objections for categorizing romantic love as an emotion – a category that is most frequently applies to it. I show that romantic love is not an emotion. I further argue that it is not a sentiment, but rather is best categorized as a syndrome – a pattern of symptoms comprised of mental states and behaviors that have an underlying causal structure. I examine the ways in which moral, prudential, and other norms apply to it, and argue that all of them are extrinsic to romantic love. The psychological nature of romantic love and its lack of rational norms explain the malleability of
its symptoms. I conclude that since the norms governing romantic love are extrinsic to it, it is up to the lovers to decide what their love should be like.

In this first chapter I provide an overview of the different accounts of love across different disciplines, and outline a preliminary definition of romantic love on the basis of this analysis. In particular, I explore the approaches to romantic love in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience. I outline some of the advantages and limitations of the questions raised and methods used in these disciplines in studying love. I conclude by presenting a minimal conception of romantic love constructed from this analysis.

**Part I. Romantic love and philosophy**

In philosophy, as in many other disciplines, the topic of romantic love has been largely neglected. In the following section I present a brief overview of what has been said in philosophy about love throughout the ages. After that I present contemporary accounts of love and the current issues of the philosophical debates about love.

1.1. Romantic love and philosophy: A historical perspective

One of the most important texts on love ever written is Plato’s *Symposium*. In it Plato presents seven different speeches that praise love. It is generally thought that the ideas expressed by Socrates in Plato’s dialogues represent Plato’s own views. However, the diversity of the speeches in the *Symposium* have led some to argue that to understand Plato’s view of love, it is necessary to consider all the speeches (Nussbaum, 1979). For the lack of space, I will revert to the traditional approach, and give a brief account of love from the speech of Socrates.

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1 For an excellent overview of the history of ideas on romantic love see Irving Singer *The Nature of Love* volumes 1 through 3.
Socrates argues that love is a desire to possess Beauty. For Socrates, love is an ascent that begins with a particular individual person, a beautiful boy, and ends with the truly lovable object – Beauty itself. One climbs the Ladder of Love by first loving a boy because he has a beautiful body. However, soon one realizes that there are many beautiful boys, and so there is reason to love them all, since one loves the boy for his beauty (210b). After this realization, one begins to recognize beauty in a person’s soul, and comes to love them for the beautiful soul that they have (210b-c). From beautiful souls one moves on to loving more abstract objects, such as various human activities and the laws, realizing how unworthy physical beauty is of love compared to these other objects. Next, the lover will see that beauty is not confound to any one particular individual, subject, or activity but rather will find beauty in knowledge. Through philosophical discourse, one shall arrive at knowing Beauty in its purest form (211).

There are three important implications of Plato’s view: (1) lovability is grounded in the intrinsic qualities of the love object – beauty; it is because the boy is beautiful that he is lovable; (2) love can be justified or unjustified – if one loves a truly beautiful object then one’s love is fitting; if one loves an ugly object, one’s love is mistaken and unfitting; (3) it seems that loving persons while on the Ladder of Love is only of instrumental value, since the ultimate goal is to reach Beauty itself.

As Alfred Whitehead said, “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato” (Whitehead, 1979:39). As we will see, many discussions of love in philosophy grapple with the questions raised by Plato in the Symposium. Much of the current philosophical debate about love deals with questions of love’s justification, the grounding of lovability, and the moral implications of the answers to these questions.
Another philosopher who has left a mark on the topic of love is, perhaps surprisingly, Immanuel Kant. Kant, following the Lutheran tradition, takes sexuality to be intrinsically bad. He argues that sexual desire necessarily treats the other as a means to an end only, making them into an object. He says,

Love, as human affection, is the love that wishes well, is amicably disposed, promotes the happiness of others and rejoices in it. But now it is plain that those who merely have sexual inclination love the person from none of the foregoing motives of true human affection, are quite unconcerned for their happiness, and will even plunge them into the greatest unhappiness, simply to satisfy their own inclination and appetite. In loving from sexual inclination, they make the person into an object of their appetite. As soon as the person is possessed, and the appetite sated, they are thrown away, as one throws away a lemon after sucking the juice from it. The sexual impulse can admittedly be combined with human affection, and then it also carries with it the aims of the latter, but if it is taken in and by itself, it is nothing more than appetite (Kant, 1997, 27:384-5).

In order to legitimize sexual relations, a man and a woman must marry. I will not discuss Kant’s arguments for this claim, which has been extensively criticized by others (Soble, 2001, 2006; Soble & Halwani, 2017; Wilson, 2004; Herman, 1993; Mendus, 1992; Pateman, 1988). What is important here is that Kant seems to be saying that love is a good thing since it ‘wishes well’ and promotes the happiness of others. However, Kant seems to have in mind not romantic love, but love of humanity, which he calls ‘true love’:

Man in the civil state is called on to have love of rectitude only towards a few; yet truly the whole human race has an obligation to it for every single person; not, however, each individual, because his possibilities are lessened. From love of humanity, favour will arise, since it selects people, without special compulsion or desert. The love due to favour, if it is not to be artificial, too extreme, too overpowering, has to be built upon love of humanity (Kant, 1997, 27:66).

Kant says that love is rectitude not just towards one’s fellow citizens, but to the entire human race, independent of coercion or merit. The partiality of romantic love places it in conflict with morality since we tend to be in love with or love particular individuals, unlike the love of
humanity. At the same time, Kant gives high praise to friendship: “Between different persons there can certainly be sincere human love, though not in the degree of friendship; for the latter is the highest form of that love, and presupposes an identity of personality” (Kant, 1997, 27:56).

Could Kant’s views on friendship illuminate his views of romantic love or love between men and women? It seems not because Kant believes that the sexes are significantly different but complementary: men are dominant and strong, while women are submissive and delicate (Kant, 1997, 27:50). Men and women can have successful marriages but not friendships with each other because of the difference in their natures. Kant would also reject romantic love between two men since he considers homosexuality to be perverted and immoral (Kant, 1997, 27:391).

Romantic love as a topic of discussion does not directly get any attention or acknowledgement from Kant. He seems to concentrate on sex, marriage, friendship, and love of humanity. At the same time, his thoughts on these topics, and his silence on romantic love have influenced the way philosophers think of romantic love. Kant’s dismissal of love between individuals as being potentially morally deficient has inspired many philosophers to show that romantic love can be morally justifiable and even intrinsically moral in Kant’s terms (see Velleman 1999, Papadaki, 2010, 2017).

Two more historically significant philosophers are worthy of mention when it comes to romantic love. Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir both had pessimistic views of romantic love, though for slightly different reasons. Sartre sees love as a conflict. He conceives the lover as wanting to be loved. In order to be loved, the lover must possess and dominate the other in order to ground oneself in the other’s consciousness. One wishes to be perceived by the other as a perfect being, a god, the most central and important object for them. But in becoming an object for the other’s consciousness, the lover falls into bad faith by becoming in reality a mere object
in the mind of the other. Conversely, in dominating the other, one is subjugated, and thereby made an object as well. This is problematic too since the lover wants to possess another person and not an object. The person must remain free to be a person in order to ground the lover in their consciousness. Thus, Sartre says that love is a project that is based on an impossibility, and is doomed to fail (Sartre, 1956/1993).

Simone de Beauvoir argues that a woman is not born a woman but becomes a woman, a social category, “being for the other”, and love is in part to blame. Romantic ideology reinforces gender roles and perpetuates them. For men, love is but one project among many. For women, love is everything. Men are raised to be individuals, strong, independent, and bold. Women, on the other hand, are raised to be quiet, weak, obedient, and dependent. A woman cannot achieve self-realization in the same way a man can. She is raised thinking that men are superior. She can only marvel at their superiority because she is told she can never acquire such a status herself. The best she can hope for when passed from her father to her husband is to unite herself with a strong, admirable man because it is her best attempt at self-realization. To have any sort of status, recognition, and even respect, she must be attached to a male. Romantic love and marriage promise her a transformation as they promise her a noble knight who will legitimize her womanhood. Alas, romantic love cannot deliver on its promise because men are not gods, as the newly married woman soon realizes. She might then take a lover hoping for a grand amour and a true savior. Overcoming one’s gender role is extremely difficult in a highly gendered society. It is much easier for women to fall into their gender roles, experiencing love both as a solace and as a curse (Beauvoir, 1949/2011).

I have given a brief sketch of some historically important philosophical accounts of love. They reflect the concept and the attitudes towards romantic love through human history. In
section II.1.2, I discuss the development of courtly love, which differs from love in the Hellenistic period. Although the speeches in Plato’s *Symposium* attempt to defend love as a good, it was generally seen as a dangerous experience likely to culminate in a disaster (Singer, 2009b). In the Middle Ages, love became idealized, while maintaining forbidden character, not being love between spouses. With the rise of economic prosperity, which afforded young people to make their own choice of spouses, romantic love had slowly begun to make its way into the household in 18th century Europe (Brake, 2012). With the normalization of romantic love and its new association with marriage, it became yet another tool for female oppression (Beauvoir, 1949/2011; Firestone 1970). Even with first-wave feminism, one sees the criticism of love and marriage as oppressive structures of women (Wollstonecraft, 1792/1996; Nichols, 1855/2015; Stopes, 1918/2009). Today our society still struggles to free love of oppressive gender norms, and to make it into an egalitarian practice, finding a proper place for it within the greater social domain.

I have more to say about the history of romantic love below. I now proceed to discuss the treatment of love in contemporary philosophical debates. As will be clear from the upcoming discussion in this and later chapters, current discussions of love in many ways are informed by the works of Plato, Kant, Sartre, Beauvoir and others.

**I.2. Romantic love and philosophy: Contemporary debates**

To zoom in on the topic of romantic love, it is useful to distinguish it from other kinds of love. How does it differ from love of sushi, love of one’s country, familial love, friendship, or love of oneself? While love of sushi or of tennis in most cases is likely to translate into ‘liking a lot’, love of one’s country, community, or religious institution involves self-identifying with these
types of social groups. It constitutes a part of one’s social identity – being an American, being a kibbutz volunteer, being a Hindu. Loving oneself means caring for one’s own wellbeing, and looking for what one takes to be one’s genuine interests.

Harry Frankfurt thinks that love of oneself is not at all different from the love of others, and that self-love is the most paradigmatic example of love (Frankfurt, 2009). Bennett Helm argues that loving oneself is a precondition for loving others (Helm, 2010). Both Frankfurt and Helm think that self-love has to do with identifying with one’s self interests for one’s own sake, and they argue that this sort of identification with the object of one’s love is at the core of any sort of love. For instance, Frankfurt believes that love of one’s small children is a self-identification with their best interests for their sake. This self-identification is easily achieved towards one’s own children because they are one’s own (Frankfurt, 2009:82). Although friendship is characterized by activity rather than simply by an evaluative attitude, Helm argues that the intimacy of friendship is captured by the joint agency of friends – their shared cares and intentions characterized by interpersonal emotions, desires, judgments, and actions (Helm, 2008, 2010).

It is difficult to divide various accounts of love into neat categories as there is a lot of overlap between them. Below I follow Bennett Helm (2010, 2017) in his attempt to classify these different accounts. As will be evident, a view of one philosopher can be sorted into more than one category. However, dividing them up in this way makes it possible to emphasize different features of these accounts in an attempt to zoom in on the nature of romantic love.

I.2.1. Love as robust concern
Frankfurt and Helm think that a common thread traceable in all kinds of love is identifying with the beloved’s interests. Helm argues that love in general is a mode of concern for the wellbeing of someone or something (Helm, 2010:145). Similarly, Frankfurt says that to love someone, is to have disinterested concern for them for their own sake. These are called ‘robust concern’ accounts of love (cf. Taylor 1976; Newton-Smith 1989; Soble 1990, 1997; LaFollette 1996; Frankfurt 1999; White 2001). They are characterized by caring for one’s beloved’s wellbeing for their own sake, and the desire to benefit them.

Robust concern accounts of love tend to be silent on the difference between romantic love and other kinds of love. Helm aims to give a unified account of love for persons, and ignores the question of romantic love altogether. Frankfurt seems to follow a similar path. Although Frankfurt places romantic love under the wide umbrella of love (Frankfurt, 1998), he also says,

> It is important to avoid confusing love—as circumscribed by the concept that I am defining— with infatuation, lust, obsession, possessiveness, and dependency in their various forms. In particular, relationships that are primarily romantic or sexual do not provide very authentic or illuminating paradigms of love as I am construing it. Relationships of those kinds typically include a number of vividly distracting elements, which do not belong to the essential nature of love as a mode of disinterested concern, but that are so confusing that they make it nearly impossible for anyone to be clear about just what is going on. Among relationships between humans, the love of parents for their infants or small children is the species of caring that comes closest to offering recognizably pure instances of love (Frankfurt, 2009:43).

While Helm and Frankfurt are happy to discuss long-term love between spouses, which resembles familial love and friendship, they have little to say about romantic love. W. Newton-Smith, who also defends a robust concern account of love, suggests that its paradigmatic cases involve sexual desire for the beloved. While this may be so, it does not provide a comprehensive
account of romantic love. Furthermore, Frankfurt’s claim that romantic relationships are not particularly useful in thinking about love suggests that on his view romantic love is either deficient or is not really love at all.

Furthermore, the idea that love necessarily involves disinterested concern for the wellbeing of the beloved is quite narrow, as it suggests that if an attitude does not take this form, it automatically disqualifies from being love. This claim strikes me as false because it construes love as an intrinsically moral phenomenon. Yet, it is clear that some cases of love will not be disinterested, and will not involve caring for the beloved for their own sake. Frankfurt acknowledges this. He says, “[T]he love of persons other than one’s children or oneself is rarely so thoroughly disinterested. It is nearly always mixed up with, if not actually grounded in, a hope to be loved in return or to acquire certain other goods that are distinct from the well-being of the beloved—for instance, companionship, emotional and material security, sexual gratification, prestige, or the like” (Frankfurt, 2009:83). This suggests that while there may be other kinds of love between adults, they are never as pure or good as the love of parents for their children can be.

It is clear that Frankfurt and Helm are interested in giving a normative rather than a descriptive account of love. They are talking about what love should be rather than what it is. While Frankfurt finds purity in familial love, Helm says that love is “a concern for the identity of another that is same in kind as the kind of concern you have for your own identity” (Helm, 2010:158). This quote illustrates the depth of the concern the lover must have for the beloved as well as the autonomy the lover and the beloved are supposed to preserve in the relationship. True love is not using the other as a means only but respecting them, recognizing their interests and goals as important and valuable. While this may be a morally praiseworthy way to love someone, it
doesn’t strike me as the only way or even a paradigmatic way of loving. In defending their ideals of love, Frankfurt and Helm exclude numerous cases of love that do not fit their normative criteria, raising the bar too high, or discount them as deficient without explaining what makes these cases cases of love.

I.2.2. Union theories

Union theories of love differ from robust concern theories in explicating the ways in which lovers care for one another and identify with each other. Robert Nozick says that the “...extension of your own well-being (or ill-being) is what marks all the different kinds of love: the love of children, the love of parents, the love of one’s people, of one’s country... The people you love are included inside your boundaries, their well-being is your well-being” (Nozick, 1990:69). While on robust concern accounts the lover and the beloved are supposed to retain their own personal wellbeing and identity, union accounts suggest a more integrated ways in which the lovers relate.

In an attempt to say what differentiates romantic love from other kinds of love, Nozick states that it is characterized by the desire to merge oneself with the beloved or by the actual merging of oneself with another individual (Nozick, 1990; Solomon, 2006). Roger Scruton also writes about romantic love, “just so soon as reciprocity becomes community: that is, just so soon as all distinction between my interests and your interests is overcome” (Scruton, 1986: 230). Thus, on the union view of romantic love, love is either the desire to form a ‘we’ or the actual being in a ‘we’, which is characterized by the merging of interests, values, and concerns. According to Nozick, this ‘pooling’ of identities results in the alteration of the individual
identities of the lovers, the emergence of the third entity, ‘we’, and the shared wellbeing that this entity represents.

Nozick argues that love and friendship are differentiated by the merging of identities in the former, and the non-merging of identities in the latter: “What is common to all love is this: Your own well-being is tied up with that of someone (or something) you love. When a bad thing happens to a friend, it happens to her and you feel sad for her; when something good happens, you feel happy for her. When something bad happens to one you love, though, something bad also happens to you”2 (Nozick, 1990:68). The key is that the changes in the lover’s wellbeing will positively correlate with the changes in the beloved’s wellbeing. On the other hand, the changes in the wellbeing of one’s friends might move one to sympathize, commiserate, and rejoice, but they will not bring changes to one’s own wellbeing.

The entanglement of identities and wellbeing in love brings forth two main criticism of union theories: (1) the construal of love as the merging of selves undermines the possibility of individuality and autonomy of lovers, (2) in a ‘we’ it is impossible to care for the beloved for their own sake since the shared identity means that one’s caring for the beloved is also caring for the ‘we’, and so for oneself. The latter objection has also been construed as an impossibility of sacrificing oneself for the sake of the beloved (Helm, 2010). Defenders of the robust concern accounts take their view of love to be superior to union theories because their view denies the radical merging of the selves, making it possible to maintain autonomy and to care for the beloved for their own sake. While this criticism might enable robust concern accounts to present a theory of love that is morally superior to that of the union view, it does not capture any mischaracterization of love by the union view. Although union theorists are often pressed to spell out the metaphysical status of the ‘we’, the attractiveness of their accounts seems to be the

2 Nozick’s emphasis
representation of what it is like to be in love. The union view closely resembles the idea expressed in the speech of Aristophanes, the central speech of the *Symposium*, that love is the desire to find one’s other half.

I.2.3. Romantic love as valuing

Robust concern accounts take the desire to benefit the beloved for their own sake to be a central feature of their view. As Harry Frankfurt says, love “is neither affective nor cognitive. It is volitional” (Frankfurt, 1999:129). His robust concern account conceives of love as a kind of motivation. Union accounts tend to characterize love by a reciprocated relationship which manifests the fusion of selves (Scruton, 1986; Fisher, 1990), or by the desire to form such a relationship (Nozick, 1990). On union views, love is the way in which the lovers relate to one another, or the desire to relate to someone in a way that would merge identities of two people. Both of these approaches are too loaded. Robust concern accounts can be accused of shifting the focus away from love to what it makes us do, while union accounts can be accused of discounting unrequited love, or love in which one does not wish to merge one’s identity with the other. Might there be theories that are simpler than these two?

A more basic approach characterizes love as a kind of valuing. This mode of valuing is either an appraisal – the idea that love is a response to the objective value of the beloved, or a bestowal – the idea that in love one assigns value to the beloved. I will now look at each one in turn.

I.2.3.1. Romantic love as appraisal
David Velleman defends a Kantian account of love in which he argues that in love we respond to the *dignity* of persons which supervenes on their rational nature, and their capacity to value (Velleman, 1999). Since, according to Velleman, love is a response to dignity, in love we value the beloved as an end in themselves. Furthermore, since Kant contrasts dignity with price, characterizing dignity as a value that cannot be quantified, the beloved’s being loved as an end in themselves also means that they are loved as irreplaceable.

Velleman contrasts his account with robust concern and union ones by pointing out that both are fantastical in assuming that love is always characterized by the desire to care for the beloved and to be with them. Rather, love and care, as well as love and the desire to be with the beloved come apart. It could well be that despite loving each other, the individuals cannot stand being together. Loving each other at a distance enables them to keep their sanity and preserve their wellbeing because love does not guarantee a blissful, happy, fulfilling relationship, which robust concern and union accounts seem to take for granted. Furthermore, the idea that love is characterized by a desire to benefit the beloved portrays love as paternalistic. It might be appropriate to express it or experience it this way with respect to one’s own children but not towards an adult lover. Velleman says, “In most contexts, a love that is inseparable from the urge to benefit is an unhealthy love, bristling with uncalled-for impingements. Love becomes equally unhealthy if too closely allied with…the desire to please or to be well-thought-of, and so on” (Velleman, 1999:353).

Velleman’s criticism of the union account seems at first to stem from a purely descriptive perspective, where Velleman shows that the desire for a union is not necessary for love. Then Velleman moves to criticize both union and robust concern accounts from a moral perspective. He says there is nothing noble about wanting to be with someone 24/7, or to constantly want to

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benefit them. For Velleman, union and robust concern accounts of love do not work primarily because of their moral deficiencies. Velleman’s own view is that romantic love is intrinsically moral because of the kind of value of the beloved the lover responds to. I will have a lot more to say about Velleman’s own account in the following chapters. For now, I will flag the main criticism of his view: just like the robust concern accounts, his view of romantic love is overmoralized. Indeed, his purpose is to show that Kant was wrong to say that love inherently stands in conflict with morality because of the partiality that it creates. Velleman argues that the partiality is impartial since in love we presumably respond to the objective moral value of persons. However, his view loses its appeal by becoming even more improbable than the ones he criticizes because it over-intellectualizes love by taking the Kantian notion of personhood in the other to be grounding love.

Another appraisal view of love is developed by Kate Abramson and Adam Leite (2011). They too argue that what makes someone lovable is their moral character. I critique their account in chapter 4. What is important about theirs and Velleman’s accounts is that they say that in love we respond to the intrinsic qualities of the beloved. The upshot of Abramson and Leite’s view is that love can be justified or unjustified depending on whether or not the beloved’s qualities can sufficiently ground lovability. This view is similar to that of Plato’s in so far as it deems objects and persons to be more or less worthy of love.

1.2.3.2. Romantic love as bestowal

Love is characterized as a bestowal by Harry Frankfurt (1999, 2009), Lawrence Thomas (1991), and Irving Singer (2009a). While appraisal accounts say that love apprehends value in the beloved, according to bestowal accounts, love projects value onto the beloved. Contrary to the
appraisal accounts, nothing grounds the value of the beloved qua beloved except for love itself.

Singer says,

Bestowed value is...created by the affirmative relationship *itself*, by the very act of responding favorably, giving an object emotional and pervasive importance regardless of its capacity to satisfy interests. Here it makes no sense to speak of verifiability; and though bestowing may often be injurious, unwise, even immoral, it cannot be erroneous in the way that an appraisal might be...[I]t is the valuing alone that *makes* the value (Singer, 2009a:5)^4.

While appraisal accounts hold that there is something about the beloved that makes them lovable, on bestowal accounts one is lovable because one is loved. I will defend a bestowal account of romantic love in chapter 4. For now, it is important to notice that construing love as a kind of valuing provides a more basic view of love than robust concern and union accounts do. Indeed, it would seem that either an appraisal or a bestowal account can underlie a particular robust concern or union view. For instance, Singer says, “Bestowal generates a new society by the sheer force of emotional attachment, a society that enables the lovers to discard many of the conventions that would ordinarily have separated them” (Singer, 2009a:7). This sounds very much like a union view. However, the bestowal view is not the same as the union view because the bestowal of value need not result in the formation of a union, which many union theorists take to be a necessary condition for love. Even if we take the desire to form a ‘we’ to be the necessary condition for love instead of the actual formation of a ‘we’, the bestowal of value does not seem to be identical with that desire. Rather the bestowal might be seen as a precondition for this desire.

Singer also says,

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^4 Singer’s emphases
The bestowing of value shows itself in many different ways, not all of which need ever occur at the same time or in equal strength: by caring about the needs and interests of the beloved, by wishing to benefit or protect her, by delighting in her achievements, by encouraging her independence while also accepting and sustaining her dependency, by respecting her individuality, by giving her pleasure, by taking pleasures with her, by feeling glad when she is present and sad when she is not, by sharing ideas and emotions with her, by sympathizing with her weaknesses and depending upon her strength, by developing common pursuits, by allowing her to become second nature to him... (Singer, 2009a:7).

This description of how the bestowal of value might manifest itself sounds a lot like a robust concern view. However, a similar issue arises here as with the attempt to align the bestowal theories with union ones. The difference between love as bestowal and love as robust concern is that the bestowal view takes the robust concern to be an effect of the bestowal, and not the core of love (Helm, 2017). Indeed, it is conceivable for love as a bestowal to manifest itself in immoral and harmful ways for both the beloved and the lover. Thus, the bestowal view is not identical with either robust concern or union views. It also does not seem to commit itself to the claim that robust concern and some appraisal accounts make – that love is an intrinsically moral phenomenon5. I will have a lot more to say about this issue in chapter 4.

Similarly to the bestowal accounts, appraisal accounts are more basic than robust concern and union ones. One might appraise the person as lovable, value them for the qualities that ground their lovability, and then manifest this valuing in a variety of ways including caring about them and identifying with them but also in many other nonmoral and even immoral ways.

I.3. Romantic love as an emotion

5 An appraisal account of romantic love need not moralize it the way in which Velleman’s or Abramson & Leite’s accounts do. An appraisal view might say that love is a response to the intrinsic qualities of the beloved that need not be moral.
Robust concern and union accounts construe love as a kind of complex with a variety of affective attitudes including emotions, desires, volitions, as well as behaviors. On the other hand, appraisal and bestowal accounts suggest that romantic love can be thought of as one kind of affective mental state. As we will see, many philosophers and psychologists characterize romantic love as an emotion. To see why, it is necessary to get clear on what is meant by emotions by different scholars and different disciplines. I address this issue in chapter 2. The majority of scholars take emotions to be kinds of valuations that track matters of import. Their job is to correctly represent organism-environment relationships. If this is so, an appraisal account of love would be most fitting since it suggests that the function of love is to correctly recognize and track the value of lovability of the beloved. On the other hand, a bestowal account would not square well with love being construed as an emotion since it denies that love tracks anything.

I spend the remaining four chapters of the dissertation arguing that romantic love is not an emotion, thus rejecting appraisal accounts of love. Here I just wish to flag that it is a common view that philosophers and other scholars subscribe to. Indeed, Berit Brogaard’s book *On Romantic Love: Simple Truths about a Complex Emotion* is the best attempt made by a philosopher to adequately characterize romantic love as a mental phenomenon. Brogaard’s account is also empirically informed. I discuss her view in detail in chapter 2.

Although a number of philosophers have developed accounts of romantic love, many of them suffer from not spelling out what is different and special about romantic love compared to other kinds of love. Furthermore, many accounts of romantic love seem to take it for granted that romantic love is an intrinsically moral phenomenon discounting all cases of love that do not fit their moral ideal. In this way they neglect to capture the true nature of love. In the rest of the
chapter I briefly consider what has been said about romantic love in other disciplines with the aim of informing my discussion of this subject by these different perspectives.

**Part II. Romantic love and other disciplines**

Discussions of romantic love in psychology sometimes draw on inquiries of this subject in other disciplines such as neuroscience, anthropology, and history. In the following sections I bring out the overlaps between these different disciplines, while at the same time trying to highlight what is special about the discussions of romantic love in these specific fields.

**II.1. Romantic love in psychology**

Psychologists disagree about whether or not love is an emotion. I discuss the bases for this disagreement in the following chapters, demonstrating different approaches to emotions in psychology. In this section I bring out what I take to be three main ways in which the topic of love is approached in psychology. First, I discuss attachment theory and its relation to love. Second, I highlight the approach to romantic love by social constructionists of emotions and those who subscribe to the idea of basic emotions. Third, I zoom in on the view that identifies romantic love as a special kind of love, called limerence by Dorothy Tennov and further developed by Helen Fisher. I find Tennov’s characterization of romantic love promising.

**II.1.1. Romantic love and attachment**

Attachment theory developed by John Bowlby in 1960’s and 70’s demonstrates how the bond between the mother and the infant is formed under certain conditions. Bowlby shows that the
consistency of attention the infant’s primary caregiver, usually, the mother, gives in the time of the infant’s emotional need, significantly impacts the infant’s social development (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). An infant has a natural tendency to form a bond with its caregiver. Forming such a bond is evolutionary advantageous since the infant greatly depends on that bond for survival. The bond provides many benefits for the infant, including the security of exploring their environment safely (Hart, 2010). The mother’s consistent presence in the moments of potential fear is supposed to provide a safe base, and encourage the infant to feel secure in encountering unfamiliar situations. When the mother’s presence is consistent, the infant develops a secure attachment style, characterized by high self-esteem, trust in others, and satisfaction with one’s relationships as an adult. If, however, the mother’s presence is inconsistent, the infant will develop an insecure attachment style that may be characterized by low self-esteem, lack of trust towards others, and dissatisfaction with their relationships.

The attachment style developed in infancy is thought to persist throughout one’s lifetime, and to define the general way in which a person relates to others (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan, 1992; Feeney, Noller, & Callan, 1994; Kirkpatrick & Davis, 1994). I return to this point in chapter 5. Attachment, however, is not just discussed as part of parental love, and child-parent relationship. Helen Fisher argues that attachment between parents themselves is crucial for successful childrearing. Fisher says that when our humanoid ancestors acquired bipedalism, leaving the forests for the savannah, male parental investment came into existence (Fisher, 1989, 1992, 1998, 2006). This is because the females of Australopithecus afarensis now had to carry their babies in their arms, which greatly diminished their capacity to feed themselves and the offspring. At this time, to ensure the survival of the offspring, the males had to get involved in childrearing at least up to a point (see also Buss 2006).
Fisher dates the birth of romantic love to this period. She says that romantic love is characterized by “increased energy and focused attention in mammal, as well by exhilaration, "intrusive thinking," and the craving for emotional union in humans” (Fisher, et al., 1998:24). She believes that romantic love helps each individual to concentrate their attention and effort on interacting with another such individual to whom they are sexually attracted. This concentration of one’s attention coupled with positive feelings, and intrusive thinking, helps the individuals form a couple, and produce an offspring. By the time the offspring arrives, the attachment bond is formed between the parents, enabling them to stay together to raise their child at least for some time. According to Fisher, romantic love is a product of natural selection that serves as a link between sexual desire and attachment. All three systems are a part of the human reproduction mechanism (Fisher, 1989, 1992, 1998, 2006).

In chapter 3 of this dissertation, I present and critique Fisher’s account in detail. Here I only point out that some view romantic love as having been selected as part of the human reproductive mechanism. This hypothesis suggests that because love is an adaptation, it is likely to be universal, present across all cultures, and throughout human history.

II.1.2. Romantic love and social construction

The view just presented contrasts sharply with the social constructionist view, which claims that romantic love was invented in the Medieval Europe as an apology for sex in a religious context (Averill, 1985). Psychologist, James Averill, following Henry Theophilus Finck, argues that the idealization of the beloved in romantic love comes from the association of the beloved lady with purity and virtue, that one will not be able to experience romantic love, unless one was brought up in a culture in which romantic love is common, and that romantic love consists in a number of
different emotions, beliefs, and behaviors. Below I lay out a description of courtly love presented by philosophers Simon May and Irving Singer to shed light on the contrast between the social constructionist and the evolutionist view.

The concept of courtly love, which dates back to the early 11th century, contains many contradictions, as will become evident shortly. The phenomenon of courtly love is said to have originated from the conflict between Christian religious ideals, and love between persons for each other. In courtly love women are praised as embodying virtue of purity that inspires men to be virtuous too. This is perhaps the first time in history when the woman was not viewed as the corruptor of men, the sinner, like Eve. Rather, she is now viewed as representing the Virgin Mary, virtuous and virtue-inspiring, elevating men above sin (May: 2011, 121). She is worshipped as if she were the good itself, offering men a path to salvation. As Guilhem de Peitieu writes,

> For joy of her a sick man can be cured,  
> and from her anger a healthy man can die,  
> and a wise man go mad,  
> and a handsome man lose his good looks,  
> and the most courtly one become a boor,  
> and the totally boorish one turn courtly (Guilhem de Peitieu, quoted in Simon May, 2011:123).

Despite the seeming purity and platonic shape that courtly love acquired from the historically religious context in which it is situated, it was a forbidden love because it was adulterous, presumed to be incompatible with marriage and the household. There is a clear erotic charge to the poetry and the practice of fin’amor that is intensified by the impossibility of or a rejection of its consummation. This rejection of consummation was supposed to elevate love to a higher moral plane, making it an object of worship in its own right.
What we also find in the characterization of courtly love is an intense passionate state, “love is an intense, passionate relationship that establishes a holy oneness between man and woman” (Singer, 2009b:23). Additionally, it is characterized by the idealization of the beloved, coupled with the belief that love makes a person better (Singer, 2009b). Irving Singer argues that courtly love breaks from the tradition of Plato, who thought that love is aimed at achieving the knowledge of Beauty itself, a love for abstract ideas, not other persons. It differs from Aristotle, who emphasized the virtue of friendship above other interpersonal relationships. Furthermore, it departs from the Christian tradition in that it does not make out the love between men and women to be subservient to the love of God. Singer also points out that although one finds sexual love in pagan mythologies, it is usually described as a ‘controlling force in human nature’ that culminates in madness and destruction. It was not advocated to pursue this passion (Singer, 2009b:23). With courtly love, however, passionate romantic love was perceived as a good in itself, something that men and women could experience for each other as fellow humans. It justified the intensity of passion, and, to a degree, sexual desire. Singer himself concludes that although it is likely that people in many cultures and throughout human history have experienced romantic love, the concept of romantic love has been clearly defined in the most significant way for the first time by the practice of courtly love (Singer, 2009b:35-6).

Averill, on the other hand, is making a stronger point that romantic love has emerged in the Middle Ages as a response to the forbidding attitudes of the Church towards sex. Furthermore, Averill thinks that in love, one follows a certain script provided by one’s culture, when it comes to feeling, thinking, and behaving in ways that are characteristic of romantic love. Our culture tells us what counts as love, and what doesn’t. We become familiar with what romantic love is by learning about it through songs, film, fiction, etc. We internalize the cultural
model of love during our upbringing such that it becomes our second nature. We believe that romantic love occurs naturally and inevitably. However, this appearance of love is a result of the cultural attitudes towards it.

The social constructionist view suggests that romantic love is not a universal phenomenon but is specific to a time and a place. It belongs to the Western culture and stems from its repressive attitudes towards sex. In addition, the ways in which romantic love manifests itself will also vary across cultures and time periods. It is necessary that one receives a particular sort of acculturation in order to experience romantic love.

II.1.3. Romantic love and limerence

I will say a lot more about romantic love as an adaptation and as a social construction in chapter 3. In this section, I highlight the ways in which some psychologists characterize romantic love, and how they differentiate it from other kinds of love. As mentioned earlier, Helen Fisher argues that romantic love serves as a link between lust and attachment as part of the human reproductive mechanism. In her description of romantic love, Fisher takes on board a set of characteristics identified by Dorothy Tennov, who calls romantic love ‘limerence’ (Tennov, 1979/1999). Tennov has conducted numerous interviews with people who self-identified as being in love or described their past experiences of being in love. She also identified a class of persons whom she calls ‘non-limerent’, who say that they have never been in love, and who claim that they don’t really understand what this experience is like and what it is about (Tennov, 1979/1999:107-8)⁶. Today we call this type of people ‘aromantics’ (see Decker, 2014; Bogaert, 2012).

Tennov lists a number of features of limerence:

(1) intrusive thinking about one’s beloved

⁶ Fisher confusingly calls being in love ‘attraction’.
(2) acute longing for reciprocation

(3) variation of one’s mood in accordance with actions and perceived states of mind of the beloved

(4) inability to be in love with anyone else especially during the most intense phase of being in love

(5) feeling temporary relief from suffering in an unrequited love when fantasizing about the beloved’s reciprocation

(6) experiencing fear of rejection and shyness in the presence of the beloved especially at the beginning of relationship, or whenever things become uncertain

(7) intensification of love in the face of adversity (up to a point)

(8) interpreting neutral and even negative situations and behaviors of the beloved as being indicative of their hidden passion for oneself

(9) “an aching of the "heart" (a region in the center front of the chest) when uncertainty is strong”

(10) experiencing the feeling of buoyancy and walking on air when there is evidence for reciprocation

(11) “a general intensity of feeling that leaves other concerns in the background”

(12) an incredible ability to idealize beloved’s qualities, overemphasizing the positive ones, underplaying, excusing, or even admiring the negative ones

(13) in most cases, being sexually attracted to the beloved (Tennov, 1979/1999:23-4).

Fisher provides a similar list of features of romantic love, adding that the beloved acquires a special meaning for the lover, and becomes a kind of point of reference or a lens through which
the lover perceives the world (Fisher, 1998). Fisher also highlights the fact that when in love, one’s passion is perceived as uncontrollable (Fisher, 1998:33).

None of these characteristics are meant to represent necessary and sufficient conditions of romantic love. Rather, these are the characteristics of one’s experience often present when one is in love. Tennov points out that in order for limerence to develop, some uncertainty, doubt, or even threat to reciprocity is necessary. She says, “[l]imerence is first and foremost a condition of cognitive obsession” (Tennov, 1979/1999:33). Tennov also says that if all goes well, limerence can develop into love.

I take these characteristics to be describing being in love rather than simply loving. Helen Fisher agrees too that romantic love, often referred to as passionate love, is characterized by the intensity of feelings that is sustained for some time (Fisher et al., 2002). Romantic love can be differentiated from ‘companionate love’ that either occurs on its own or is preceded by romantic love. Companionate love is deemed to be more ‘realistic’ as it is easier to sustain over a long period of time, while romantic love is estimated to last on average between one month to four years (Fisher et al., 2006; Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986:384).

Companionate love is characterized by a much calmer emotional state, an acquired intimacy, understanding, and trust between the lovers (Hatfield, & Rapson, 1996; Wang & Nguyen, 1995; Kim & Hatfield, 2004). Though less intense, companionate love “is a warm feeling of affection and tenderness that people feel for those with whom their lives are deeply connected” (Kim & Hatfield, 2004). It is closely associated with friendship, and involves shared values, strong and deep attachment, feelings of comfort, and a long-term commitment. It develops over a long period of time and can last for years, even a lifetime (Hatfield & Rapson, 1996; Contreras, Hendrick, & Hendrick, 1986; Hendrick, Hendrick, & Adler, 1988; Kim &
Companionate love is the attachment Fisher says is achieved by the progression of romantic love, which leads to pair-bonding necessary for child rearing. It is also likely that this is what Tennov has in mind when she says that limerence develops into love.

It has been objected by Bianca Acevedo and Arthur Aron that the distinction between passionate and companionate love is confused, and that it is not the case that romantic love disappears over a long period of time, replaced by companionate love (Acevedo & Aron, 2009). Acevedo and Aron wish to show that passion need not fade in a long-term relationship. In particular, they argue that love between long-term romantic partners can maintain “intensity, engagement, and sexual liveliness” (Acevedo & Aron, 2009:59).

They argue that most features identified with romantic love can be maintained except for the obsession and intrusive thinking. They have found that when testing for what they call romantic love, e.g., “I want my partner—physically, emotionally, and mentally,” “For me, my partner is the perfect romantic partner,” “I would rather be with my partner than anyone else,” “I sense my body responding when my partner touches me,” “My partner can make me feel effervescent and bubbly,” and “I possess a powerful attraction for my partner”, was nearly constant regardless of the length of the relationship. However, when they tested for obsession, e.g., “I sometimes find it difficult to concentrate on work because thoughts of my partner occupy my mind” and “Sometimes I feel I can’t control my thoughts; they are obsessively on my partner,” they found that it was virtually nonexistent in their subjects. Acevedo and Aron argue that obsession is not a necessary characteristic of romantic love.

Acevedo and Aron admit that that there is some decrease in the intensity of feelings, and love does transform into a calmer state over time. They claim that obsession and anxiety are only present in the beginning stages of romantic love because of the uncertainty about the relationship
and the great desire to be liked by the beloved. However, it seems that anxiety and obsession are an important characteristic of romantic love because they help maintain the intensity of feelings the lovers have for each other. Uncertainty fuels both anxiety and hope, contributing to the perpetuation of romantic love as passionate, and preventing the lovers from taking each other for granted. As Tennov says, “Reason to hope combined with reason to doubt keeps passion at fever pitch” (Tennov, 1979/1999:67). Ellen Berscheid also argues that temporary interruptions, such as brief separations and conflicts, may reignite latent passionate love (Berscheid et al., 1983). Similarly, Esther Perel, a couples’ therapist, advocates for creating distance between long-term partners in order to maintain intensity and passion in their relationships (Perel, 2007).

Since my goal is to define romantic love, contrasting it with companionate love is helpful. It seems that the Acevedo and Aron study and meta-analysis of other studies is the only source of criticism of the distinction between romantic love and companionate love. It is likely that a given case of love at a later stage will vary with respect to how many romantic elements it will maintain, and the degree to which it will resemble the paradigm of companionate love. Whether or not romantic love tends to last on average between a month to four years is an empirical question. For my purposes it is important to identify the features that make love romantic. Tennov’s thirteen-point description aided by qualifications from Fisher help to zoom in on what romantic love is.

Tennov’s and Fisher’s characterization of romantic love also help to differentiate it from familial love and friendship, since in most cases these kinds of love do not involve intense passion and sexual desire, even though love for one’s child might involve extreme idealization, and valuing them as the most important person, perceiving them as the main point of reference in
one’s life. Friendship and familial love are closer to companionate love in that in most cases they are manifested through calmer steady feelings, deep intimacy, and a feeling of security.

Romantic love in psychology is often discussed in connection with attachment theory because it is thought that the kind of attachment style one acquires through the interaction with one’s primary caregiver transfers to the person’s romantic relationships. Romantic love is also thought to be connected with attachment by those who think that romantic love is an adaptation selected to facilitate pair-bonding. It helps to focus one’s attention and efforts on the beloved, forming a bond that is necessary for childrearing. On the other hand, some argue that romantic love is an invention of the Middle Ages, taking its roots in courtly love. I discuss and critique the evolutionary and the social constructionist hypotheses in detail in chapter 3. Lastly, romantic love is contrasted with companionate love which characterizes the long-term romantic relationship. Unlike companionate love, romantic love is distinguished by the intensity of feelings, intrusive thinking, and obsession with one’s beloved. This contrast helps zoom in on what is romantic about romantic love. While the majority of research suggests that romantic love has a shelf life of up to four years, there are reasons to think that some romantic features are present to a certain extent in some cases of companionate love as well.

II.2. Romantic love and neuroscience

In discussing romantic love so far, I have referred to philosophy, psychology, and history. In the following chapters I will also draw on anthropology, cross-cultural studies in psychology, and evolutionary biology. In this section, I discuss the findings in neuroscience that support the characterization of romantic love proposed in the previous section.
The very first study of neuro-imaging of romantic love is a study by Bartels and Zeki (Bartels & Zeki, 2000). In mapping romantic love, they have contrasted it with companionate friendship love by asking their participants to look at pictures of their close friends, and at pictures of those with whom they claimed to be deeply and madly in love. Bartels and Zeki have shown that upon looking at pictures of one’s beloved, the brain regions responsible for generating dopamine, caudate nucleus and putamen, become activated. These regions are associated with euphoria and reward. These areas also become active under the influence of cocaine (Ortigue et al., 2010:3546). In addition, insula and anterior cingulated cortex are activated when looking at pictures of beloveds. These are regions that are correlated with sexual desire. In addition, posterior cingulate gyrus and amygdala, regions associated with anxiety and fear, became deactivated (Bartels & Zeki, 2000:3833). This suggests that in love, one is less likely to experience anxiety (see also Aron et al., 2005).

Although the studies cited above suggest that the level of anxiety and fear is rather low, other studies have indicated quite the opposite. Donatella Marazziti and her colleagues have found that the low levels of serotonin found in people in their early romantic love stages are comparable with the low levels of serotonin in OCD patients. These results are interpreted as supporting the claim that romantic love is characterized by obsessive preoccupation and idealization of the beloved (Marazziti et al., 1999). Furthermore, according to Hatfield and Rapson, anxiety gets highest scores on their Passionate Love Scale, a questionnaire developed to characterize romantic love (Hatfield & Rapson, 2008). Although it appears that Marazziti’s study is the only one that examined the levels of serotonin in lovers and OCD patients, Fisher argues that there is evidence that high levels of dopamine have been associated with hyper-excited fear-
like state, and with anxiety and panic (Fisher, 1998). Therefore, it is possible that anxiety is produced by sheer excitement through dopamine and adrenaline.

Although most of the studies of romantic love in neuroscience so far have used small subject pools, and even though there are very few of them out there, it appears that they generally support the definition of romantic love presented in the previous section. Romantic love is an obsessive passionate state characterized by intense and varied emotional experiences, intrusive thinking, and idealization of the beloved, who occupies center stage in one’s mind.

**Conclusion**

I have presented my dissatisfaction with an approach that some philosophers take and the hasty conclusions they draw about romantic love. I have talked about Plato, Kant, Sartre, and Beauvoir, when looking at romantic love through a lens of the history of ideas. Some of these ideas have significantly impacted contemporary theories of love: robust concern, union, and love as an appraisal and a bestowal. Construing love as a kind of valuing, in particular, an appraisal, suggests that love might be an emotion.

Romantic love is related to attachment in two ways: (1) the attachment style acquired in infancy influences the ways in which one experiences romantic love, and (2) romantic love might be a necessary component in a human reproductive mechanism that facilitates pair-bonding. The second claim suggests that the history of romantic love’s origins in nested deep in our ancestral past. This claim is contradicted by a social constructionist hypothesis that romantic love originated as late as the Middle Ages as a result of the development of courtly love. Lastly, limerence or passionate love seems to be most fitting characterization of romantic love that
helpfully contrasts it with companionate love, into which romantic love might morph over time, as well as familial love, and friendship.

Finally, the limited neuroscience studies of romantic love so far support the description of romantic love as passionate, obsessive, and intense showing that chemicals producing euphoria and motivation are released in the presence of the love stimulus. Furthermore, Marraziti and her colleagues have demonstrated low levels of serotonin in love, which supports attributing anxiety and intrusive thinking to romantic love.

In the following chapters I develop each of these ideas in order to locate romantic love in the space of mental phenomena. In chapter 2, I consider different theories of emotions in philosophy and psychology, and demonstrate that romantic love does not fit into any of them. In chapter 3, I examine the categories of basic and nonbasic emotions, and analyze the evolutionary and the social constructionist theories of emotions and of romantic love. I argue that romantic love does not fit into the categories of either basic or nonbasic emotions. I also reject both Fisher’s evolutionary account and Averill’s social constructionist account of romantic love. I argue that romantic love was not selected for the purpose of linking lust and attachment, and that if it has an evolutionary function, it is yet to be identified. I also argue that although romantic love is highly susceptible to cultural variation, it is not a mere social construction or script. In chapter 4, I consider different rational norms that might be applicable to romantic love. In particular, I consider whether or not it can be apt, thereby supporting an appraisal view of love. I show that romantic love is arational, and that lovability is a property projected onto, rather than grounded in, the beloved. In chapter 5, I present a positive account of romantic love, arguing that it is best categorized as a syndrome – a collection of mental states and behaviors that tend to co-occur. Furthermore, I argue that the rational norms applied to love are extrinsic to it,
demonstrating that the ideology of romantic love is not written in stone, and inviting lovers to define their own rules of the game.
CHAPTER 2: IS LOVE AN EMOTION?\(^7\)

Romantic love is often thought of as a paradigmatic example of an emotion. Indeed, according to the psychological research, many ordinary people categorize it this way (Fehr & Russell, 1984; Shaver et al., 1987; Shaver et al., 1992). Some philosophers and psychologists too think that love is an emotion (Wollheim, 1984; Rorty, 1986; Brown, 1987; Hamlyn, 1989; Baier, 1991; Badhwar, 2003; Averill, 1985; Shaver et al., 1996). In this chapter I consider whether or not love is an emotion by examining the ways in which love may or may not fit into the schema of the emotions. An immediate problem faced by this approach is that there are numerous theories of emotion. In Part I of this chapter I lay out what are commonly taken to be the core features of emotions, and argue that since romantic love does not possess all these features, it is not an emotion. In Part II I provide a brief survey of the two main camps of emotion theories: propositional attitude theories and perceptual theories of emotions. Without defending any particular theory of emotion, I highlight some general issues these emotion theories have. I further argue that, irrespective of these issues, none of the emotion theories can successfully account for romantic love, concluding that love is not an emotion.

**Part I. Emotions: preliminary remarks**

I.1. Core features of emotions

What are some of the basic characteristics of emotions? To answer this question, we must look at a variety of disciplines that attempt to answer it, including philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology.

\(^7\) This chapter contains some passages and sentences that also appear in an article I've co-written with Jesse Prinz called 'Is love and emotion?' forthcoming in C. Grau & A. Smuts (Eds) *The Oxford handbook of philosophy of love*. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press.
First, emotions are often thought of as reactive states that we experience passively. We are overcome with joy, overwhelmed by fear, gripped with anger, stricken by grief. The onset of an emotion tends to happen quickly and automatically, and we simply find ourselves in our emotional states. This characteristic of emotions makes them appear to be not under our control. Indeed, this very feature of emotions explains the presumed tension between emotion and reason, a topic that has been much discussed in philosophy throughout history (for analysis see Solomon, 1993). While we may try to reduce the intensity of our anger or get a grip on our stage fright, we may not be able to avoid experiencing the emotion altogether.8

Second, some emotions are also characterized by a particular bodily change that is associated with an action tendency or action readiness (Frijda, 1986). For instance, one may clench one’s teeth and fists in anger, or tremble and try to make oneself small in fear. Paul Ekman has argued that the bodily changes that accompany some of the emotions are universal and can be found in many cultures (Ekman, 1972, 1999, 2003).9 Furthermore, the resemblance of these bodily reactions to the ones found in our close nonhuman relatives suggests that they have an evolutionary function of preparing an organism for an action that would assist its survival in a certain situation (Darwin, 1872/1965; Zajonc, 1984; Griffiths, 1997). In addition to action readiness, emotions are also often categorized by the facial expressions that are unique to them, and are also said to be the same cross-culturally (Ekman, 1999). For instance, the most prominent advocate of the universality of the facial expressions of certain emotions, Paul Ekman, argues that some emotions, such as anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise, and others,

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8 This phenomenological point about emotions is often used to characterize them (Prinz, 2004; Deonna & Teroni, 2012). As will be clear from the rest of the dissertation, this does not mean that emotions cannot be subjected to rational assessment, and that we lack any sort of control over our emotional states. Other states such as beliefs and desires may occasionally have similar phenomenology: ‘I cannot help but believe or desire that x’. Yet, it seems that an emotional experience overcomes us, whereas beliefs seem to lack that kind of phenomenological character.

9 I will return to the discussion of the universality of emotions, their biological underpinnings, and evolutionary functions in chapter 3.
are found in a number of cultures that he and his colleagues have examined (Ekman, 1972, 1999). He asserts that when these emotions are induced, people of different cultures produce similar facial expressions, and when asked to identify an emotion by looking at a picture of a facial expression, the answers also turn out to be similar across cultures. Ekman later modified his view and now holds that the unique signal that signifies a universal emotion need not be a facial expression. It can be a specific vocalization, or a distinct set of bodily movements (Ekman, 2003).

It is argued that the facial expressions as well as other bodily indicators of certain emotional states serve a communicative function in relating the inner mental states to other creatures (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983; Keltner, 2003; Mesquita et al., 2015). Since emotions are categorized as action tendencies, the emotional expressions communicate the creature's intentions. They also work as coordinating forces of social interaction by producing emotional reactions in others. For instance, one's expression of anger may communicate that the person is not accepting the current state of affairs. Expressions of anger also tend to produce fear responses in others (Dimberg & Ohman, 1996), whereas, an expression of distress produces a sympathy response (Eisenberg et al., 1989).  

Third, emotions have a phenomenological component and are paradigmatically taken to be felt even though it is also possible for an emotional episode to be nonconscious (Damasio, 1994). The feeling component of the emotions is linked to the awareness of the bodily changes that occur during the onset of an emotion. Indeed, one emotion theory proposed independently by William James (1884) and Carl G. Lange (1885) holds that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. James famously states, "What kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of

\[^{10}\text{For a detailed analysis see Keltner & Haidt (1999).}\]
weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible to think" (James 1884:193-4)\textsuperscript{11}. Although some argue that there are no particular feelings that could identify each emotion (cf. Solomon 2006; Nussbaum, 2001), typically most emotional occurrences are characterized by a subjective experience of some kind.\textsuperscript{12}

The occurrent states of emotions are usually short-lived and may last from a few minutes to a few hours. At the same time an emotion can exist in a \textit{dispositional} state and remain with the person for a lifetime. When a disposition is triggered, other things being equal, an episode of an emotion will take place. For instance, I may be angry at my parents for years, and yet only experience anger with respect to them when I am reminded of them. I may be afraid of heights all my life but not feel fear of heights while being on flat low ground.

Emotions are also characterized by their \textit{valence} or the positive or negative character of their experience. Often this feature is fleshed out in terms of pleasantness and unpleasantness of what it is like to experience a given emotion. For instance, it is pleasant to feel joy. So, joy has a positive valence. It is unpleasant to feel sadness. Therefore, sadness has a negative valence. It may be of course that a certain episode of sadness may feel good, or that a certain emotional episode has a mixed hedonic character. For example, nostalgia may be an instance of being both pleasant and unpleasant at the same time. Furthermore, the valence of many emotions may vary in different contexts. For instance, anger may feel good if in the state of anger one might feel a surge of energy, and a motivation to fight back, while feeling amused upon hearing an inappropriate joke might feel bad. Given this variability of emotions’ pleasantness and unpleasantness, many philosophers and psychologists prefer to cash out emotions’ valence in

\textsuperscript{11} I will discuss this theory in more detail below.
\textsuperscript{12} It seems difficult to distinguish between guilt and shame, for instance, just by pointing to what it is like to feel either of the two emotions.
terms of action tendencies or in terms of assessment of the state of satisfaction and frustration of one’s goals. McLean (1993) thinks that the subjective character of an emotional episode might move one to seek proximity or to get away from the object of the emotion. Prinz (2004) conceives of valence as the motivation to continue to experience the emotion or to stop experiencing it. Lazarus (1991) thinks that the valance of a given emotion indicates how the current situation bears on some of the other goals the person may have.

The experiential characteristic of emotions may inform the person of the particular features of the environment and the ways in which these features are relevant to them. This aspect of emotions points to the fourth feature they have – intentionality. Emotions are intentional states. They represent certain features of the world and of ourselves to us. While the question of intentionality of emotions is a complex one, there are at least two kinds of 'object' of emotions: the target, which is the primary object of the emotion, and the formal object (Kenny, 1963). The target of an emotion is that at which the emotion is directed. The formal object represents the value that supervenes on the focal properties of the target (de Sousa, 1987). For example, fear of a dog is directed at a dog, which is its target, whereas the formal object of fear is dangerousness. To fear the dog is to attribute to it the property of being dangerous. Emotions, therefore, are evaluations of objects and situations relevant to those who are experiencing them.

What makes it possible for emotions to be directed at a particular object? To answer this question we must look at how it is that emotions access the information that they represent. Ordinary perceptions like sight or hearing access objects and events they represent through their or own internal sensory pathways. Emotions, on the other hand, require other mental states to access information about situations and objects. For instance, in the case of fear of a dog, I must perceive the dog through my senses, perhaps through sight or hearing, in order to experience
fear. On the other hand, my indignation with the current election process is made possible by my holding the belief that racist remarks ought not to be a part of one’s running campaign. Mental states like perceptions and beliefs can serve as cognitive bases for one’s emotions (Deonna & Teroni, 2012).

Bennett Helm also talks about the focus of an emotion, which is a background concern that explains why certain emotions are experienced. That is, the reason why one perceives the dog as dangerous when fearing it, is because one has a concern for one's wellbeing, which is the focus of this instance of fear (Helm, 2010).

Thus far, we can say that emotions are felt evaluations. Just as beliefs and desires have functions (the function of beliefs is to track truth, the function of desire is to track the good), the function of emotions is to track that which matters to us (Prinz, 2004). Therefore, another characteristic of emotion is that it adheres to a particular standard of correctness. An emotion may be apt or inapt depending on whether or not it correctly tracks its formal object. This is what it means for an emotion to be rational. An emotion is apt if the formal object which it is picking out is actually provided by the target. For example, fear is apt if the dog of which one is afraid is actually dangerous. Certain aspects of the target are supposed to warrant the attribution of dangerousness (de Sousa, 1987). So it would be apt to experience fear of a large dog, which is showing its teeth, growling, while fixing its eyes on you, and preparing to pounce. It would not be apt to experience fear if the dog exhibits no such behavior, and instead is acting friendly, ignoring you, or is dead.

At the same time the question of fittingness is sometimes confused with other norms, like the practical or prudential, and the moral. These norms are also thought of as norms of rationality. For example, one may think that one should still be afraid of the dog because of some
prudential concerns (one should always be afraid in order to be prepared to flee). Or one may
think that no matter what, one should not experience fear because fear is not morally
praiseworthy. One should instead always aim at courage out of moral considerations. Even
though these norms may be used to evaluate emotional episodes, they have no relevance to the
issue of aptness of emotions. To say that it is irrational to experience fear in a fear-warranting
situation is to use a standard of rationality for emotions that is different from aptness. While
there are many different criteria for rationality of emotion\(^\text{13}\), to confuse them with that of aptness
will amount to committing a moralistic fallacy (D’Arms & Jacobson, 2000a). I discuss the
question of rationality of emotions in chapter 4.

I.2. Romantic love and core features of emotions

Now that we have the core features of emotions on the table, let us examine whether or not
romantic love possesses them as well. At first glance it may appear that romantic love does have
these paradigmatic characteristics of emotions. However, in this section I will show that there are
important differences between emotions and romantic love that suggest that it is not an emotion.

Like other emotions, romantic love is \textit{reactive}, since it is something that happens to us
involuntarily, and we have little control over loving and not loving. Although it is true that we
may seek love by registering on dating sites, going on blind dates, going out to singles bars and
hoping to meet someone we could fall in love with, none of these actions guarantee that we
would fall in love. Similarly, when it comes to falling out of love, we may desire to do so in
certain circumstances, perhaps after judging that the beloved is no good for our wellbeing,
because there are no prospects of a happy future together, or because our love is not reciprocated.

\(^\text{13}\) See for example Karen Jones (2004). Emotional Rationality as Practical Rationality. In Cheshire Calhoun
For these reasons we might decide to stop calling, delete all the pictures, move to a different place, start dating other people, but, once again, none of these activities guarantee that the feeling of love will go away.

There is also no doubt that the onset of romantic love as well as its occurrent manifestations correspond to a set of bodily changes in the lover. However, unlike emotions, it is not clear that romantic love can be characterized by a particular action tendency or action readiness. Perhaps it can be said to direct our attention to the beloved and seek intimacy and nearness but it is perfectly conceivable that one isn’t moved to do anything in particular when experiencing love. Similarly, it is not obvious what sort of facial expression or some other specific bodily state could be said to be unique to it. There does not seem to be any particular look of love. I will explore the possibility of action readiness below and the facial expression of romantic love in more detail in chapter 3.

Romantic love has a phenomenological component. We feel love towards our beloveds, and, like emotions, love is not reducible to an occurrent feeling. When one is in love, one may not experience love 24/7. But just because love is not occurrent at all times, doesn't mean that one is not in love. One may be in love with one’s beloved for months and years, which shows that romantic love can exist in a dispositional state and occasionally manifest itself in the feeling of love.

What sort of feeling is the feeling of love? Here we may find that, unlike other emotions, love’s phenomenology is incredibly rich. This is because romantic love seems to not just manifest itself in one particular feeling, but instead in a variety of feelings as sexual desire, passionate longing, painfulness of being separated, cuddly, warm and fuzzy feelings of intimacy, and even rage and fury all can be said to be feelings of love.
Given the highly variable phenomenology or romantic love, it is difficult to speak of its *valence*. While most people are likely to think that, paradigmatically, romantic love feels good, feelings of longing and pining are also often feelings of love. This is true of reciprocated as well as of unrequited love.

If one were to approach the question of valence as an assessment of one’s goals or as a motivation to continue to experience the emotion, the valence is likely to vary once again, depending on whether or not one perceives one’s current state of being in love as a happy occasion or as a misfortune and inconvenience. Similarly, if valence is synonymous with seeking proximity with the object of one’s emotion, then whether or not one seeks proximity with the beloved will depend on how one perceives one’s current state of being in love.

Like other emotions, romantic love requires a *cognitive basis*. At the very least a set of perceptions would need to occur prior to love’s coming into existence. This would be a way of making sense of love at first sight. A set of beliefs about a given person may also serve as the basis for the occurrence of romantic love. Very minimally, it would be that there is a person. It is not obvious that one’s beliefs need to be clear or specific about the kind of person the beloved is. This can be made evident by the love the fans of certain musical groups experience towards certain members of the group. In other extreme cases it may even be unnecessary that the beloved is a real person, for it is conceivable that one may fall in love with a fictional character from a book or a film.

Does romantic love have *intentionality* and *rationality*? At first glance, it seems that love is intentional, for one is never simply in love; one is always in love with someone *in particular*. Clearly then romantic love always has a target. But does it have a formal object that is sometimes correctly and sometimes incorrectly represented by it? In the following section I will present
preliminary arguments against love's aptness. I will fully address the issue of love's intentionality in chapter 4, and argue that it lacks aptness conditions.

I.3. The picture so far

In this part of the chapter I have given a list of features that are commonly attributed to emotions. Romantic love shares some of them but lacks others. The highly variable phenomenology, the lack of a concrete action tendency, as well as the apparent lack of aptness conditions sets it apart from emotions. This gives us reasons to think that it is not an emotion. In the remaining part of the chapter I argue further that romantic love is not an emotion by illustrating the ways in which various emotion theories cannot adequately capture romantic love. I will conclude that romantic love is not an emotion.

**Part II. Emotion theories**

Given the general remarks about the emotions made above, we can now dig deeper into the category of emotion by looking at specific theories that attempt to give full accounts of what emotions are. Roughly, emotion theories in philosophy can be divided into two camps: the first one – propositional attitudes camp, the second – perceptual camp. Let us look at each one in turn.

II.1. Emotions as propositional attitudes

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14 In this chapter I mainly concentrate on discussing philosophical theories of emotions. For an overview and criticism of psychological theories of emotions see Prinz 2004, especially chapter 2.
Propositional attitudes camp defines emotions as being constituted partly or wholly by mental states that consist of a representation of a proposition and an attitude toward it. (Prinz, 2004: 22). They are characterized by a that-clause. For example, I may believe that it is sunny outside. The proposition is that ‘it is sunny outside’ and the attitude is belief. I may also hope, desire, resent, etc., that it is sunny outside. Emotion theories that take propositional attitudes to be constituents of emotions take beliefs and judgments to be their core features.

II.1.1. Emotions as beliefs and judgments

Robert Solomon (1993), and Martha Nussbaum (2001) hold that emotions are a combination of beliefs and evaluative judgments.¹⁵ These judgments represent certain aspects of the world as being value-laden. On their views, to be afraid of a dog, is to believe that there is a dog here and to judge it to be dangerous. To be amused by a joke is to believe that a joke was told and to judge it to be funny.

For Solomon emotions are a kind of evaluative judgments, and what makes emotions different from other kinds of evaluative judgments is the level of one’s involvement in that judgment. Nonemotional judgments for him are characterized as disinterested, whereas “[e]motions are self-involved and relatively intense evaluative judgments” ¹⁶ (Solomon, 1993:127). A characteristic intensity of the emotions, which distinguishes them from other kinds of judgments, is accounted for by the idea of the particular importance certain objects and states of affairs may have for us. They are “matters in which we have invested our Selves” (ibid.).

¹⁵ For detailed overview and criticism of propositional attitudes view see Deigh, 1994; Prinz, 2004; Robinson, 2007; Deonna & Teroni, 2012.
¹⁶ Solomon’s emphasis.
Solomon, in his many discussions of romantic love, appears to characterize it as an emotion (e.g. 1981, 2006). For instance, Solomon calls romantic love an 'elusive emotion' because it is so hard to capture its essence (Solomon, 2006:35). Solomon provides a contrast between romantic love and familial love by stating that the three distinctive features of romantic love are: romantic love is sexual in origin; "it is spontaneous and voluntary and is a matter of will and not just circumstances"; it is an emotion that is possible only between equals, that is, love serves as a kind of equalizer between lovers, erasing their ranks and social positions (ibid., 43, 45).

Solomon applies his definition of emotions to romantic love by pointing out that like other emotions, love is not simply a feeling, since it can last over a long period of time (ibid., 78). He also points out that there is a variety of feelings in which love can manifest itself (ibid., 81). Although he says that love is a spectrum of emotions, "at one end perhaps the totally devoted obsession that the poets celebrate, of which few people are capable (or willing), at the other the quiet, caring familiarity that does not distinguish itself from friendship and uses the word "love" not as a desperate expression of passion but because, in such relationships, one is expected to" (ibid., 93-4), which make it sound like a kind of emotion complex, he then continues, "love varies in its intensities, like any other emotion" (ibid., 94).

In his article, "Reasons for love" (2002), Solomon attempts to argue that love can be rational, which suggests that he thinks that love, like other emotions, has aptness conditions. Even though it is not altogether clear what he thinks aptness conditions of love may be, it seems he wants to propose what he calls 'Aristophanic' reasons, as reasons designating the fittingness of the attitude. Aristophanic reasons are the relational qualities which allow the two people to 'fit' together like the two halves of the one whole as in the myth told by Aristophanes in the
Symposium (Solomon, 2002:19). On Solomon's view, the lover has beliefs about the beloved's values, interests, and goals, which they themselves value, and desire to share or participate in with their beloved. Perhaps this desire to share can be cashed out in terms of the motivational component of the evaluative judgment that constitutes the emotion of love.

Martha Nussbaum thinks that emotions “always involve thought of an object combined with thought of the object’s salience or importance…” (Nussbaum, 2001:23). Emotions are eudaimonistic judgments as they pertain to the person's wellbeing. They evaluate the world from the point of view of the person's goals and projects, assessing how they fare in a particular circumstance.

Nussbaum mentions romantic love in the context of discussing emotions. For instance, she says that according to the Stoics, the objects at which emotions are directed are vulnerable to reversal. Agreeing with them, she states that emotions like fear, hope, pity, anger, envy, jealousy, and grief have the kind of propositional content that asserts that change is possible. She then says, "Erotic love notoriously involves the thought of instability…linking love with envy, jealousy, suffering, and astonishment" (Nussbaum, 2001:42). This appears to show that she thinks of romantic love as an emotion.

Nussbaum denies that specific bodily changes are necessary for any particular emotion. However, she acknowledges that romantic love, "unlike many other emotions, does appear to be bound up with a desire that has at least some necessary bodily elements" (Nussbaum, 2001:475). Nussbaum dismisses this worry of romantic love having a different structure from other emotions by arguing that sexual desire itself does not pertain to any particular bodily manifestation (ibid., 476).
An advantage of a view like Solomon's and Nussbaum's is that it can account for the intentionality of emotions in a seemingly simple way. Since beliefs and judgments are taken to be propositional attitudes\textsuperscript{17}, the content of these attitudes, particularly the evaluative judgment that the dog is dangerous, represents the formal object of the emotion. By tracking the formal object of the emotion through an evaluative judgment, the theory is able to individuate emotion-types. Furthermore, to account for aptness of emotions on this view, we must look at the evaluative properties that would ground the judgment. For instance, one’s anger towards Jane is justified if she was rude and intended to cause harm. One’s anger is not justified if Jane was not rude at all but was, instead, misheard. On this view, emotions are tracking something objective and have a mind-to-world direction of fit. Additionally, it offers a seemingly compelling account of the motivational component of emotions by suggesting that evaluative judgments motivate.

If a theory of this sort were to account for romantic love, what kind of beliefs and evaluative judgments would it use to describe it? It would have to be that the lover believes that the beloved possesses a certain set of properties in virtue of which they are judged as lovable – the formal object of love. What might these properties be? When having the misfortune to be asked "What do you love him for?" or "How can you possible love her?" people tend to cite some intrinsic properties of the beloved in their justifications. They say that their beloved is kind, smart, funny, caring, has a good taste in music, etc. But do these properties really make the beloved lovable? If the formal object of lovability is grounded in the focal properties the beloved possesses, then, as with other emotions, the conditions that make a given emotion apt generalize over all cases for that emotion. If fear is always apt in the presence of danger, so too love would

\textsuperscript{17} In the article “Emotions, Thoughts, and Feelings” (2004) Solomon presents his view of emotions with some clarifications and revisions. He denies that his conception of judgments implies that they must always have propositional content. He believes that nonhuman animals and babies are capable of emotions, and that some of the emotions are similar to kinesthetic judgments (2004:82). He admits that he wrongfully left out bodily feelings from his account before, and states that feelings are ‘felt bodily engagements with the world’ (2004:88).
always be apt in the presence of certain focal properties of the beloved.\textsuperscript{18} Therefore, if we love our beloveds for properties $x$, $y$, and $z$, we should love all those who possess the same set of properties. However, it is clear that we can judge people to be kind, smart, funny, caring, etc., and yet fail to love them. One may also explicitly judge the beloved to be a bad person either in general or for oneself in particular but love them regardless of these explicit beliefs and judgments.\textsuperscript{19}

This objection to love being a combination of beliefs and evaluative judgments applies to this kind of theory of emotions in general because evaluative judgments are neither necessary nor sufficient for the presence of an emotion. They are not necessary because often one feels an emotion despite having made an evaluative judgment of an opposite kind: one may still feel afraid of flying, even if one judges that flying is one of the safest modes of transportation (Tappolet, 2000; Peacocke, 2004). They are not sufficient because one may judge something to be dangerous and yet fail to feel afraid. It is evident, therefore, that emotions and evaluative judgments come apart.

What of the evaluative properties cited as justifications for love? Upon reflection, one may find properties like being smart, funny, caring, etc., to be too generic to truly capture the unique essence of one’s beloved. One may also realize that not everyone finds the same properties attractive or lovable in a person, which creates more problems for specifying love’s aptness conditions. Furthermore, propositional attitude theories of love face a further difficulty owing to their cognitive commitments as we are sometimes unable to articulate what it is we love about a person. It seems perfectly intelligible to say that one just loves the beloved for no reason in particular. Given the ineffability of reasons for love together with their apparent

\textsuperscript{18} For a detailed discussion see de Sousa 2014.
\textsuperscript{19} See Smuts 2014.
nongeneralizability, it appears that love, unlike fear, has no clear formal object. I will pursue this point further in chapter 4.

Additionally, do evaluative judgments possess the kind of phenomenology that is attributed to experiencing emotions? It seems odd to say that an evaluative judgment that something is dangerous is characterized by the sinking of one's stomach, and the feeling of being very small, or the judgment that one has been wronged is characterized by the racing of one’s heart and clenched fists. Solomon attempts to capture the phenomenology of emotions by calling them 'intense' judgments. But intensity does not seem like a real dimension of a judgment. Unless one already thinks that emotions are judgments, one wouldn’t call emotions ‘intense judgments’ (Roberts 2003:15). Solomon later softened his view and has acknowledged the importance of the body in the emotional experience. He writes that emotions can be thought of as ‘the judgments of the body’ (2004:87), and his view begins to look a lot like a view of Nico Frijda, who argues that emotions are action tendencies or bodily responses to a given situation (Frijda, 1986). However, as I have already said in Part I, romantic love does not seem to have a specific action tendency. I will come back to this point in chapter 3.

Finally, some propositional attitude theories require too much from an organism to be able to experience emotions, for they require an organism to be able to have beliefs and make evaluative judgments. Martha Nussbaum’s account attempts to include human babies and nonhuman animals in the group of creatures capable of emotions. However, it seems that her account still requires too much since it requires those who can experience emotions to make judgments about judgments (Prinz, 2004:9). It is clear that nonhuman animals and human babies do experience many kinds of emotion (though perhaps not romantic love) (Darwin, 1872/1965; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1973). But the kind of cognitive sophistication presupposed by the propositional
attitudes view makes it hard to account for the experience of emotions by these creatures. For all these reasons it seems unlikely that emotions are reducible to beliefs and evaluative judgments such that an account of emotions can adequately capture the nature of romantic love.

II.1.2. Emotions as beliefs and desires

Another view of emotions says that emotions are reducible to a combination of beliefs and desires (Marks, 1982; Green, 1992; Searle, 1983; Taylor, 1985). For example, to feel fear is to believe that there is danger and to desire to avoid it, to feel anger is to believe oneself to be wronged and desires justice.

Similar accounts of emotions cash out emotions in terms of beliefs and wish-frustration or wish-satisfaction (Gordon, 1987; Schroeder, 2006; Wollheim, 1999). For instance, your anger that Jeff insulted you is reducible to the belief that Jeff said that p, and either the satisfaction of your wish to be insulted by Jeff or the frustration of your wish to not be insulted. The satisfaction and the frustration of your wishes can explain the valence of your anger, which may be gleeful in the first instance and hurtful in the second.

On the face of it, these views may look promising as the content of each emotion is cashed out in terms of the propositional content of beliefs and desires constituting it or the content of beliefs and the assessment of the status of the fulfillment of one's goals. These views can also accommodate the motivational aspect of the emotions through the presence of desires. Additionally, one may say that the phenomenology of the emotions is explained by the phenomenology of desires or the satisfaction and frustration status of these desires.

Could love be classified as an emotion on these views? Indeed, romantic love has often been linked with desire. As I mentioned in chapter 1, in Plato's Symposium Socrates says that
love is the desire to possess Beauty, and Aristophanes believes that it is the desire to find one's other half. We might add that the belief required for Socrates' view is that this thing or person is beautiful, and for Aristophanes the belief would be that this is the missing half of my self.

Similarly, Sartre (1956/1993) thought that love is the desire to possess the other's consciousness, thereby asserting one's own existence. However, he thought this desire is impossible to fulfill because, ultimately, love is the desire to be loved, which renders mutual possession and domination impossible. One may not agree with Sartre's radical views on the matter, and yet acknowledge that love does involve the desire for reciprocity – the desire to be loved back. Because of the presence of this desire lovers are often motivated to pursue their beloveds in hope of being with them, and perhaps spending their lives together. Indeed, according to Robert Nozick, love is the desire to form a super-identity "we" (1990). Perhaps on this view, love would be the same as having a belief about the object of one's love and a desire for intimacy or reciprocation. Furthermore, the high variability of the valence of love may be accounted for by the frustration or satisfaction of one's goals of intimacy and closeness of the beloved. It may explain why unrequited love can be so painful.

But is love reducible to these kinds of combinations? It seems not, since although love may produce various desires, desires themselves are not necessary for love. One might feel love without experiencing any desires, as in cases when the desires for intimacy and reciprocation are fulfilled. Indeed, reducing love to desire, or a combination of belief and desire, suggests that upon fulfilling the desire, romantic love goes away. This is an implication of Aristophanes' view – once one finds one's other half, the project of love is complete, and there is no more love (Nussbaum, 1979). One could insist that in love one desires to benefit the beloved (Frankfurt 1999, 2006) or care for them (Nozick, 1990; Helm, 2010) but it is easy to conceive of a lover not
having these desires, while still being in love. For this reason it seems that these desires may be outcomes of love, rather than identical with love (Velleman, 1999). One may lack these desires and yet be in love.

One problem with reducing emotions to a combination of beliefs and desires is that beliefs are cognitive states because they have a mind-to-world direction of fit. They are supposed to represent how things are. Desires, on the other hand, are conative states because they have a world-to-mind direction of fit. They represent states of affairs that have not come into existence yet. The aptness conditions for emotions suggest that they are cognitive states, have a mind-to-world direction of fit, and for this reason cannot be reduced to the rationality of either beliefs or desires (de Sousa, 1987; Goldie, 2000; Ben-Ze'ev, 2000; Helm, 2001). Moreover, this view assumes that an emotion is present if there is a co-occurrence of a particular belief and a particular desire. However, all three can come apart, for in my anger at the offensive remark, it is the offensiveness that is being tracked and not my wish for revenge or apology. The evaluative properties of emotions, therefore, are not reducible to those of desires.

As for the view that emotions are beliefs coupled with the assessment of the status of desires, it can maintain the mind-to-world direction of fit, and so maintain the possibility for the rational assessment of emotions. However, the view appears to be over-intellectualized, for not only does it require both a belief and a desire to be present but also represent the fate of a given desire in a special way. Given the metarepresentation requirement of this view, it seems to exclude human infants and nonhuman animals from the category of creatures capable of emotional experiences. As stated earlier, there is a large body of evidence that suggests that both groups are capable of emotions. For this reason, it is very unlikely that emotions are reducible to a belief and assessment of desire combination.
II.2. Emotions as perceptions

In the previous section I have discussed two kinds of propositional attitudes theories of emotions. Those views generally hold that the content of the emotional experience can be reduced to a set of propositions as in the case of beliefs, evaluative judgments, and desires. For this reason they are often characterized as cognitive theories of emotions. I think that the propositional attitude theories are not very promising in accounting for emotions given the objections presented above. Another reason is also that the content of an emotion cannot be reduced to a proposition (Peacock, 2001; Goldie, 2000; Wolheim, 1999; Tappolet, 2003). However, I also think that describing them as cognitive is misleading. As de Sousa points out in his article "Emotion" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, a cognitive state does not necessarily have to be a propositional attitude. Instead, a more basic characteristic of cognition is that it has a mind-to-word direction of fit. This feature indicates that a cognitive state may be judged as representing a state of affairs correctly or incorrectly. Perceptions, therefore, can be characterized as cognitive states. While the content of perceptions may not be reducible to a set of propositions, they may represent or misrepresent whatever is being perceived.

The analogy between perceptions and emotions is often used to capture the nonpropsoitional nature of the content of emotions. In the following sections I examine different kinds of perceptual theories of emotions and attempt to apply them to romantic love. While this brand of emotion theories fares better in accounting for emotions, I argue that they do not adequately capture the nature of romantic love.
II.2.1. Jamesean theories of emotions

The tradition of identifying emotions with perceptions was started by William James (1884) and Carl Lange (1885). Both argue that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. At the beginning of the chapter, I have presented a quote from James that suggests that if we try to conceive of the emotion of fear while imagining the experience as lacking the bodily changes that accompany it, such as the racing of the heart, the sweating of the palms, the trembling of the lips, etc., we would be unable to do so. Similarly, he says that one is unable to imagine the state of rage, without at the same time imagining the boiling feeling in the chest, the heat in the face, the flaring of the nostrils, etc. (James, 1884:194). In the same vein, Lange rhetorically asks, "If from one terrified the accompanying bodily symptoms are removed, the pulse permitted to beat quietly, the glance to become firm, the color natural, the movements rapid and secure, the speech strong, the thoughts clear,—what is there left of his terror?"(1922/1985:675). The implication of these examples is that once we remove the physiological changes that accompany each emotion, we are left with nothing – emotion itself disappears. This thought experiment became known as the 'subtraction argument'. Given this argument, James and Lange conclude that emotions are perceptions of these physiological changes of one's own body.

The perception of the bodily changes is achieved through being aware of them, particularly of the way in which they feel when they take place. On this view, we feel happy because we smile, we feel sad because we cry, and not the other way around, as common sense would suggest. More specifically, the sensation of crying is constitutive of sadness, as the sensation of smiling is constitutive of joy. The phenomenological component of emotions is the central feature of the theory, for emotions, on this view, are simply feelings. For this reason, the view is also known as the feeling theory.
An advantage of this view is that it is not as cognitively demanding as the ones discussed earlier. It can account for human infants and nonhuman animals being capable of experiencing emotions. On this view love would be the perception of one's bodily changes in the presence of one's beloved, for example. Perhaps this account would even explain love at first sight — the feeling of elation and a strong immediate pang one might find oneself feeling in the presence of the beloved. Yet, as argued earlier, the phenomenology or romantic love is too rich to fit the feeling theory of emotions. One can be sexually aroused by one's partner, experience a cozy feeling from being near, long for the beloved, or be infuriated by the beloved's treatment (Baier, 1991). All these feelings may be said to be feelings of love, or its manifestations. At the same time, these feelings when occurring in different circumstances may be manifestations of lust, contentment, missing someone, and anger. It is not clear how on this view one would distinguish occurrences of love from other emotions that share some of its phenomenology. The feelings of love are too numerous to be characterized by the feeling theory.

Furthermore, it is also not clear that bodily feelings are sufficient to differentiate emotion-types, for each one would have to be distinguished by a particular set of bodily sensations. In fact evidence suggests that except for a small number of emotions, most emotions do not have a distinctive physiological profile (Cannon, 1929; LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998).

Yet another great difficulty of the view is accounting for the ways in which emotions are thought to represent the formal object attributed to the target. Fear of a dog is supposed to represent dangerousness and be directed at the dog. However, since on this view, emotions are perceptions of bodily changes, the object the emotion is directed at is not the dog but rather the person’s body. It becomes difficult to account for the rationality of emotions and their mind-to-word direction of fit, for it seems that the feelings lack intentionality.
To answer this difficulty, Jesse Prinz (2004) defends a Neo-Jamesean account in which he argues using Dretske's account of representation that the bodily states have the function to represent the formal object because these bodily states tend to co-vary with certain types of situations. Since some bodily changes co-vary in the same way with certain types of situations, these bodily changes can be said to have the function of representing these situations in a particular way. For example, perception of snakes systematically triggers the bodily changes associated with fear. Therefore, a set of bodily changes associated with fear is supposed to represent dangerousness. Prinz says, "Emotions track bodily states that reliably cooccur with important organism-environment relations, so emotions reliably cooccur with organism-environment relations. Each emotion is both an internal body monitor and a detector of dangers, threats, losses, or other matters of concern. Emotions are gut reactions; they use our bodies to tell us how we are faring in the world" (Prinz, 2004:69). On the most basic level the function of representing the formal object by the bodily changes that occur in certain circumstances is selected for by evolution. However, many emotions have a social dimension. For example, disgust may be said to have an evolutionary function of preserving one's health by averting the organism from a rotting object. But disgust is also a dominant emotion in some moral contexts. For instance, disgust is the emotion that is often directed at transgressions of sexual norms and practices such as homosexuality and masturbation (Haidt, 2003). The cases of moral disgust illustrate how emotions that have been selected by evolution to represent aspects of environment that bear on the wellbeing of the creature in a certain way may be adapted to other circumstances and contexts.

Although the account of representation of emotions that Prinz presents is appealing, it seems to be unable to capture the way in which emotions present formal objects to us. Since
Prinz accounts for the intentional content by arguing that there is a causal relation between the feeling we experience and conditions that produce it, the intentional content need not be a part of the feeling itself. This is because the intentional content is located on the level of the causal relationship between the feeling and the elicitor rather than the phenomenology of the feeling. So while there is a sense in which emotions represent their formal objects in virtue of being caused by a certain set of elicitors, it does not show that the phenomenology of emotions on this view represents their intentional content (Whiting, 2012).

When it comes to love, the objection stated against the James-Lange view still holds against Prinz's theory. That is, even this sophisticated version of the view is not capable of capturing the variability of the phenomenology of romantic love.

Furthermore, the Dretskean model of representation does not appear to be adequate for love since there is a presumed reliable causal connection between the eliciting conditions of a given emotion and the emotional response. This is the way in which the view allows for the rational evaluation of emotions. Instances of fear are judged to be apt when they are responses to situations that truly exhibit danger. However, there does not appear to be such a steady causal connection with respect to love since it is not clear what objective set of properties love may be picking out the majority of times. For this reason, a James-Lange type theory is particularly unsuited for showing that love is an emotion.

**II.2.2. Perceived-response theory**

Berit Brogaard in her recent book on love (2015) presents another kind of Neo-Jamesean account of emotions and argues that romantic love is an emotion. More specifically, it is a complex
emotion\textsuperscript{20} that is comprised of more basic emotions of joy, anger, sadness, surprise, fear, and others (Brogaard, 2015:45). It also involves other elements such as care, concern, and a special link to sexual desire, where the two lie on a continuum, such that romantic love is a kind of transformation of sexual desire.

Brogaard rejects the pure James-Lange theory by presenting a peculiar but horrific experiment conducted by a Soviet surgeon, Vladimir Demikhov, who attached the head, shoulders, and front legs of a puppy onto the neck of a mature dog (ibid., 60). The two heads attached to the same body exhibited different emotions, reacting to each other. For this reason Brogaard concludes that emotions are not simply perceptions of bodily changes, since the dogs shared a body but had different emotional experiences.

Brogaard says that the physiological changes together with our awareness of them are not enough to have an emotion. In addition to the bodily arousal, there also must be a cognitive component, which is a kind of interpretation of the physiological arousal one experiences in a certain situation. For instance, one's arousal when one is being attacked by a dog is interpreted as fear rather than anger or shame (ibid., 63). The same is supposed to be true of love. She says, "If you consider your new crush romantically attractive and lovable and you respond with sweating and heart palpitations, then your response constitutes the emotion: romantic love. If you do not consider your childhood friend romantically attractive and lovable because she is like a sister to you, then the very same response is not a case of romantic love." (ibid., 64). The interpretation of the bodily arousal is partly constituted by viewing a particular object as being the cause of one's reaction. This provides for love's representational content.

Her view appears to be very close to the two-factor theory of emotions proposed in the 1960's by Stanley Schachter and Jerome Singer. In their famous experiment two groups of

\textsuperscript{20} A category I will more fully address in chapter 3.
students were injected with either epinephrine, which affects the sympathetic nervous system, and tends to increase blood pressure and heart rate, or a placebo solution. Both groups were told that a new drug, Suproxin, was being tested for the ways in which it might affect vision. The groups were then divided into the following four: epinephrine informed – this group was told of the potential side effects that may occur such as hot flashes, shaking of hands, pounding of the heart; epinephrine ignorant – this group was injected with epinephrine but was not told about the side effects; epinephrine misinformed – they were told that there may be side effects that would include a headache, itchiness, and numbness of feet; and a control group, which was injected with a placebo and was given no side effects to expect (Schachter & Singer, 1962). The students were then placed in a room with a confederate for 20 minutes. The confederate was introduced as one of the subjects, and was either instructed to act angrily or in a euphoric manner.

When primed for euphoria, the groups were ranked as most susceptible to share euphoria in the following order: epinephrine misinformed, epinephrine ignorant, placebo, epinephrine informed. When primed for anger, the groups most susceptible to anger were ranked in the following manner: epinephrine ignorant, placebo, epinephrine informed. Both results showed that the participants who were not informed of the side effects were most susceptible to adopt the emotional attitude exhibited by the confederate. On the basis of this experiment Schachter and Singer concluded that emotions are labeled on the basis of the environmental cues instead of the phenomenological character of the experience.

Brogaard points out that the two-factor theory does better in terms of accounting for the intentionality of emotions than the James-Lange theory. The intentionality is derived from the person's attribution of the causal connection of their emotional experience to some feature of the environment. Furthermore, the label that the person attributes to their arousal is the cognitive
component of the view. It is a kind of judgment that explains our affective state with relation to our environment.

Brogaard presents two issues with respect to the two-factor theory. First, she says that this theory faces a ‘connection problem’, which is illustrated by the following scenario. Alfred is a stray dog catcher. He finds himself in front of a scary stray dog, which is wild and mad. Alfred isn’t usually afraid of stray dogs because he deals with them every day. But today he is feeling afraid. He notices that there is a poisonous brown snake next to the dog. He is clearly afraid of the snake and not of the dog. However, Brogaard says that on the two-factor theory, we would have to say that because Alfred is perceiving the changes in his body as a fear-response, and because he judges that there are two dangerous objects in the vicinity, he is afraid of both of them (ibid., 65).

It does not seem that this is a direct implication of the two-factor theory, for on Schachter and Singer’s view, it is not enough that one feels arousal in a fearful situation or even that one feels arousal and has the belief that one is at risk. Rather, it must be that the subject attributes a causal connection to some factor of the situation in labeling their arousal as fear (Gordon, 1987). Therefore, Schachter and Singer might reply to the connection problem by saying that Alfred might take the snake to be the cause of his fear, and avoid saying that he is afraid of both the dog and the snake.

The second issue Brogaard thinks the two-factor theory faces is the fact that it cannot accommodate our emotional responses to fiction (Brogaard: 2015: 65-8). This is because in our emotional responses to fiction, we may have explicit beliefs that these characters and events are not real. However, it is not obvious that Schachter and Singer would disagree, for all that seems
to be needed for the labeling of one’s state of arousal is an attribution of the causal connection to some factor. This does not preclude us from thinking that this factor is merely fictional.

Brogaard defines emotions as perceived responses of one's body to the emotionally salient qualities of the object or situation that one deems important (ibid., 69). She also says more generally that emotions are "perceptual or imagery appearances of the body or mind responding to the emotion-relevant properties of the object" (ibid., 241). Given the emphasis put on the perceptual part of the process of the emotional experience, suggests that the view is not cognitively demanding and can accommodate the view that nonhuman animals and human infants are capable of emotions as well. Indeed, Brogaard explores some animal emotions in her book (ibid., 137-142).

Brogaard defines romantic love as "an experience of your body and mind responding to your beloved’s lovable qualities" (ibid., 69). To bring out the perceptual aspect of her view with respect to love, she says "[L]ove is not a conjunctive psychological state consisting of perceived bodily changes and a cognitive judgment (or perception) regarding the beloved. Rather, it is an appearance of the body or mind responding to a particular rendition of the beloved" (ibid., 71). The particular rendition of the beloved is likely to be influenced by one's upbringing and emotional conditioning. She discussed the attachment styles first described by Bowlby (1973) as the ways in which people participate in their romantic relationships. Those are acquired from the interaction of the infant with its primary caregiver. Brogaard also describes the prototypical phenomenal properties that accompany various emotions. These seem to be learned through social interaction (ibid., 72). She also holds that romantic love has aptness conditions and can be rational and irrational. I will address the question of rationality of emotions and love in chapter 4.

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21 I discuss attachment theory in detail in chapter 5.
I think that there are two issues with Brogaard's view. First, it is underdescribed. This is true with respect to both romantic love in particular and emotions in general. What does it mean to say that in love one is experiencing one's own body and mind as responding to lovable qualities of the beloved? Does it presuppose a kind of self-awareness akin to Sartre's account of love? There are many metaphors and analogies that are used in describing the experience of romantic love, however what love itself consists in is hard to pin down. Brogaard does describe the brain chemistry of being in love, and from that description it appears that romantic love is passionate obsessive state (ibid., 14-16). The brain chemistry involved, however, seems to be a lot more specific than the general state of arousal can adequately account for.

Second, with respect to the emotion theory in general, Brogaard's account seems to be very much like the two-factor account. But the view of Schachter and Singer has been criticized from both practical and theoretical standpoints. From the practical standpoint, there have been difficulties with replicating the experiment (see Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979; Maslach, 1979). These studies have shown that the physiological state of the subjects was more of a determining factor in their emotional states than the environmental ones that were supposed to provide for labeling of the arousal. Furthermore, peripheral arousal (the activation of the sympathetic system, where the arousal produced is presumed to be undifferentiated) by itself seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient for an emotional experience. There also seems to be no convincing evidence that labeling unexplained arousal produces an emotional state (Reisenzein, 1983). This last point connects up with the theoretical issues the two-factor theory faces. The labeling of the arousal requires that there be an appraisal that would characterize the arousal in an 'emotional way', and a causal attribution of the arousal to some feature of the environment. For instance, in the case of fear, there is a general arousal, an emotional appraisal of one's
pounding heart as *fear*, and a causal attribution of the fear to the lion standing in front of you. So an emotion arises out of two cognitions that accompany the arousal – the *appraisal* or *construal* of one's arousal in an 'emotional' way, and the *judgment* that it is produced by some condition in the environment. This begins to sound a lot like a propositional attitude theory of emotions with evaluative judgments of one's bodily states and the environment. I have already dealt with evaluative judgment theories in section II.1. and will not repeat my objections here. While there are many interesting and insightful points made by Brogaard about love and emotions, her general account does not seem to do well against these objections.

### II.2.3. Emotions as perceptions of value

Under the heading of perceptual theories of emotion lies another kind of view defended by de Sousa (1987) and Tappolet (2000) in which they argue that emotions are analogous to perceptions in that emotions are *perceptions of value*. On this view it is not that the object of one's perception is the changes of one's body. Rather, the perception is supposed to capture value directly. Emotions are affective perceptions or patterns of salience that are triggered by various situations. So to be afraid is to see danger, to be angry is to perceive injustice. More precisely, to experience a particular emotion is to identify some feature of the situation as salient. De Sousa argues that emotional reactions are tied to paradigm scenarios for these emotions. He denies that there needs to be a set of simple or basic emotional responses from which more complex responses can be built. He says instead,

> We are made familiar with the vocabulary of emotion by association with paradigm scenarios. These are drawn first from our daily life as small children and later reinforced by the stories, art, and culture to which we are exposed. Later still, in literate cultures, they are supplemented and refined by literature. Paradigm
scenarios involve two aspects: first, a situation type providing the characteristic objects of the specific emotion-type..., and second, a set of characteristic or "normal" responses to the situation, where normality is first a biological matter and then very quickly becomes a cultural one (de Sousa, 1987:182).

Emotional responses are learned first from the interaction with one's caretaker. Innate capacity of the infant to smile (and cry) will trigger a variety of responses in the caretaker. These responses will be reinforced from the feedback the infant receives. The way in which the infant is treated determines its emotional repertoire, which is later enriched by its interacting with other facets of its environment.

The parallel drawn between emotions and perception is supposed to show that like perceptions, the content of emotions is not reducible to judgments or propositional attitudes, which allows the content to remain more fine-grained. This view easily accounts for emotions' intentionality, maintaining that they can be evaluated in terms of aptness. Furthermore, the view does not advocate identifying emotions with a unique bodily instantiations. Thus, the approach has some advantages over the previously discussed theories of emotions. On this view, too, nonhuman animals and human infants are capable of emotions.

To love, on this view, would mean to perceive the beloved as lovable. Indeed, the metaphor of "seeing as" is often used in describing love. The analyses of the perception of the beloved range from claiming it to be a complete delusion to an absolute clarity of vision. For instance, Stendhal in his On Love (1822) has famously described the phenomenon of "crystallization" as follows:

At the salt mines of Salzburg, they throw a leafless wintry bough into one of the abandoned workings. Two or three months later they haul it out covered with a shining deposit of crystals. The smallest twig, no bigger that a tom-tit's claw, is studded with a galaxy of scintillating diamonds. The original branch is no longer recognizable.

What I have called crystallization is a mental process which draws from everything that happens new proofs of the perfection of the loved one. (Stendhal, 1822/1967:221)
Just like an ordinary twig becomes a gem covered in beautiful crystals, so under the gaze of the lover the beloved transforms into a creature of divinity and perfection. Stendhal's view is that in love we reside under a constant illusion of the perfection of our beloved, never loving them for their true selves. Similarly, Freud (1933) explains this romantic idealization as transference of the feelings one actually feels for someone else. Although transference is discussed in the context of psychoanalysis when the patient falls in love with their analyst, Freud maintains that there isn’t much difference between this kind of love, and romantic love in general. He says, "It is true that the [transference] love consists of new editions of old traits and that it repeats infantile reactions. But this is the essential character of every state of being in love. There is no such state which does not reproduce infantile prototypes. It is precisely from this infantile determination that it receives its compulsive character, verging as it does on the pathological" (Freud, 1915). According to Freud, when in love, one is reenacting some past experiences using beloveds as surrogates for the love attitudes.

A more moderate view is proposed by Irving Singer (2009a) who acknowledges the extreme idealization in love but denies that one is completely deluded about the beloved's true nature. Rather, love is an imaginative engagement with the beloved, in which one may not be blind to the shortcomings and faults of the beloved but perceive them as lovable. Singer quotes one of Rousseau's characters as saying “"Love did not make me blind to your faults, but it made those faults dear to me”" (Singer, 2009a:18). The lover is not blind to the faults of the beloved but they affirm the beloved’s significance by placing positive value onto a negative trait. J. David Velleman (1999), on the other hand, claims that only in love the beloved is seen as they truly are. He says, "Many of our defenses against being emotionally affected by another person are ways of not seeing what is most affecting about him. This contrived blindness to the other
person is among the defenses that are lifted by love, with the result that we really look at him, perhaps for the first time, and respond emotionally in a way that's indicative of having really seen him" (Velleman, 1999:361).

It is certainly true that in love one perceives the beloved as particularly lovable. The level of idealization of the beloved will probably depend upon the lover, i.e. their upbringing and the culture surrounding their attitude towards love, and may be explained in terms of the paradigm scenarios they have learned. However, this idea has a similar issue as we have seen with the theory of emotions being reducible to beliefs and judgments. For one may ask whether the perception of the beloved as lovable is a justifiable way of seeing them such that the perception of them in this way can be either apt or inapt. Idealization already presupposes a kind of delusion and a departure from rational norms. Therefore, it is not at all clear how love can be tracking anything given its tendency to place high value on seemingly trivial quirks of the beloved, as well as underplay the negative characteristics that a beloved may have.

If one were to insist on the analogy with perceptual states and their correctness conditions, which are usually determined by causal relations, where perceptual states represent features of the world that they reliably detect, one would be facing the same objection made against Prinz's neo-Jamesian theory of emotions. Since feelings of love can be triggered by an endless range of idiosyncratic quirks, love seems to lack reliable causes, which undermines the analogy between love and perception.22

When it comes to the theory of the emotions itself, can the thought that emotions are direct perceptions of value be sustained, or should the analogy between perceptions and emotion be taken as a metaphor? One problem this view faces is that there is no particular perceptual modality that is involved in perceiving values (Whiting, 2012). De Sousa acknowledges that

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22 I discuss the multitude of causes of romantic love in detail in chapter 4.
there are no emotional transducers (1987:150) but Tappolet states that just because there is no organ of perception of emotions, does not mean that emotions cannot be a kind of perception unless one thinks that perceptions are necessarily sensory (Tappolet, 2012:215). Tappolet points out another difference between emotions and perceptions. While both have mind-to-word directions of fit, emotions possess rational requirements, whereas perceptions can only be assessed in terms of correctness (ibid.) While one cannot expected to correct one's experience of the Müller-Lyer illusion, that is, stop seeing one line as being shorter than the other, one can be expected to correct one's anger upon finding out that there was no offense.

This is an interesting view. It uses the analogy between perceptions and emotions to draw out certain characteristics of emotions to show that they are not judgments, and do not involve concepts and propositional attitudes. I stated why I think this view is unable to accommodate romantic love. In the next section I will discuss another objection to this view, and present yet another theory of emotions that uses the perceptual theory as a point of departure for establishing its own original position.

II.2.4. Attitudinal theory of emotions

According to the view defended by Tappolet, emotions are a *sui generis* category, where each emotion-type is individuated by its formal object (see also Döring, 2007). The evaluative property of each emotion-type is contained within its *content*. This raises an issue of capturing the emotionality of each emotion. Consider attitudes like beliefs, judgments, speculations, and perceptions. It appears that any of these attitudes may have the same content. That is, I may believe that there is a red apple in front of me, judge that there is a red apple in front of me,
speculate whether or not there is a red apple in front of me, and perceive the red apple in front of me. It appears that what differentiates these kinds of mental states is not the content, which remains the same in the example, but rather the kind of attitude by means of which this content is represented. It would appear that emotions too can be directed at the same object but it becomes difficult to capture how taking an emotional attitude towards some object makes that attitude different from other kinds of attitude such as beliefs, judgments, and perceptions. This is, once again, because emotions are individuated by their formal objects, where the formal object appears in the content of the emotion.

Furthermore, if emotions are a *sui generis* category, it becomes difficult to differentiate emotions amongst themselves. Consider for instance anger, sadness, amusement, and fear. It is possible that all four of these emotions are directed at the same object. Thus, I can be angry that the dog chewed my shoes, sad that he did that, amused that he chewed them, and fearful of him chewing the shoes. Each of these emotions has its own formal object: for anger it is the wrongness, for sadness it is loss, for amusement it is the funny, for fear it is dangerousness. Since Tappolet thinks that emotions are *perceptions of value*, it seems that the formal object of an emotion is present in the *content* of the emotion. In perceiving the dog having chewed my shoes as an amusing situation rather than a sad one, the loss or the funny are part of the content of my emotion. However, this implies that actually no emotion can share its content with any other (as opposed to attitudes like beliefs, construal, suppositions), which appears to be a very strange implication of the view like Tappolet's.

In order to address these worries, Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni (2012, 2015) defend a view of emotions, which they call the *attitudinal theory* of emotions. According to it, emotions do not constitute a unique category, and share a set of properties that would put them all in the
same class of things. Instead, they argue that emotions-types should be viewed as unique attitudes, like beliefs and desires. They state that each emotion is individuated not by the formal object it represents in its content. Rather, the evaluation is part of the attitude itself. This allows them to say that each emotion can be directed at the same content, and yet be a different kind of emotion in virtue of its evaluative property being a part of the attitude itself. This will also enable us to differentiate between emotion-types and other kinds of mental attitudes. For example, Julienne is afraid of the dog, while John is amused by it. The content of the two emotions is the same. Yet, they are two different emotions because they represent that content in different ways (Deonna & Teroni, 2012:77). One may also have beliefs, desires, aspirations, etc., towards the same content. Various emotions, therefore, are different modes of presentation with respect to some content.

Deonna and Teroni say that their view is more intuitive in making sense of the aptness conditions of various emotions. When we think of beliefs and conjectures, for example, we judge each attitude to be correct not simply because beliefs represent something as true, or because conjectures represent something as probable, but because the proposition at which these attitudes are directed is in fact either true or probable. Similarly, they say, “To the question: ‘Why is fear or anger correct if the object or situation to which these emotions are directed is dangerous or offensive?’, the straightforward answer is ‘Because one has the attitude of fear or anger towards it’ and not ‘Because it is represented as being dangerous or offensive’” (Deonna & Teroni, 2015:299). The correctness of a given emotion is cashed out in terms of whether or not a given emotional attitude is directed at the target with focal properties that would justify the presence of that attitude.
According to Deonna and Teroni, the word ‘attitude’ should not be taken to mean that emotional attitudes are always directed at propositions. At the same time they reject the idea that emotions have a purely nonpropositional content. Instead they say that different emotions will have different kinds of content. This is because different instances of emotions have different kinds of cognitive bases. Emotions like regret will always have a propositional content, since they seem to require a belief as their cognitive basis, while disgust (except for moral disgust) will always have a nonpropositional one, since it requires perception as its cognitive basis (Deonna & Teroni, 2015:299). Emotions like fear and anger may be directed at both propositions and objects.

Deonna and Teroni say that they are defending a Neo-Jamsean view because they take bodily phenomenology as being central to emotions. They say that the best way to characterize these bodily changes is in terms of action readiness. Emotions provide a kind of global bodily awareness, in which, “the subject feels herself taking a certain stance or posture, or indeed attitude, towards something outside her own body” (ibid., 302). The intentionality of emotions is captured by saying that emotions are experiences of the body that is disposed to act in a certain way given the situation. In this way emotions are not strictly speaking directed at the body but rather at some relevant feature of the world.

Does this view fare any better with respect to romantic love? Deonna and Teroni themselves seem to think that love is not an emotion but a sentiment, a mental category I will address in chapter 5. But for the sake of exploring the possibility of what love as an emotion would look like on this view, we would say that to love is to take the loving attitude towards the beloved. More specifically, feeling love is feeling oneself taking a bodily stance towards the beloved. This kind of stance is characterized by an action readiness, and Deonna and Teroni say
that action readiness should be construed broadly as motivating one to "move away, towards or against a given object, to contemplate it, to submit to it, to be attracted by it, to disengage from it or even to suspend any kind of interaction with it" (ibid., 303). Once again, it is not at all clear what the specific action tendency of love may be. One might seek proximity but one might also contemplate the beloved, submit to them, and be attracted by them. Therefore, romantic love does not appear to have a specific action tendency.

I will not be restating the objections to the perceptual theories of emotions again even though they apply here too. As to the theory itself, it appears to present a unique new way of thinking about emotions. On this view, emotions do not constitute a natural kind. Indeed, de Sousa has argued that they do not because they have no unifying formal object (1987:185), and Deonna and Teroni's account seems to be in agreement with this point. The view also needs to have an empirical backing. Deonna and Teroni are optimistic as they look to Scherer's (2009) and Scarantino's (2014a) work which suggests that such evidence exists.

**Conclusion**

As the overview illustrates, there is a plethora of emotion theories, and each one comes with its own set of issues, though some clearly fare better than others. At the same time, none of them seem to be particularly fitting in accommodating romantic love. As we have seen, propositional attitude theories with their reductionist views would have to categorize love as a combination of beliefs and evaluative judgments or as beliefs and desires. Neither of these two ways of categorizing love is successful since a combination of beliefs and evaluative judgments suggest a
generalizability of reasons for love which appears to be lacking. The presence of desires too seems to not be necessary for the presence of love.

The perceptual theories of emotions, the James-Lange theory and the Neo-Jamesean accounts fail to categorize love as an emotion, since they would have to categorize love in terms of unique bodily changes or action tendencies which are difficult to pinpoint with respect to love. Furthermore, since the analogy with perception commits them to a causal way of understanding aptness conditions of emotions, they fail to show that love is an emotion, since there are no particular eliciting conditions that always hold in cases of love's occurrence. A perceptual theory like Tappolet's faces the difficulty of grounding the metaphor of 'seeing as lovable' in something more substantial than the subjective experience of the lover.

In the following chapter I present more arguments for thinking that romantic love is not an emotion by exploring its biology and the cultural factors pertaining to it, and by using the categories of basic and nonbasic emotions. I argue that romantic love is neither a basic nor a nonbasic emotion. I also show that romantic love is not a social construction.
In the previous chapter I have examined a number of emotion theories primarily in philosophy and have argued that romantic love does not fit the category of emotion. In this chapter I begin to zoom in on the question of love’s intentionality and rationality – topics that will be fully developed and addressed in chapter 4. In this chapter I begin my initial probe into intentionality of romantic love by examining the categories of basic emotions and emotion complexes that are common in psychology. The division between basic and nonbasic emotions is compatible with most of the philosophical theories of emotions I have discussed in the previous chapter. Considering these categories here will shed light on the issue of whether or not there is an innate set of emotional responses that is common in all humans, and on the ways in which these pre-set responses may be influenced by culture. I argue that once again romantic love cannot be considered either a basic or a nonbasic emotion. I begin part I by introducing the category of basic emotion in section I.1. The notion of basic emotion provides grounds for exploring the connection between emotions and nature. I show why romantic love is not a basic emotion. In section II.1 I do the same with respect to nonbasic emotions. These categories allow me to introduce the role of culture into the discussion of emotions. In Part II of this chapter I examine the role of culture in detail, and address the speculation that romantic love is nothing but a social construction. I conclude by showing that the nature-nurture distinction with respect to emotions and romantic love is a false dichotomy, and that the two categories are both necessary to understand the human psyche and its various manifestations. I will show that romantic love is

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23 This chapter contains some passages and sentences that also appear in an article I've co-written with Jesse Prinz called 'Is love and emotion?' forthcoming in C. Grau & A. Smuts (Eds) The Oxford handbook of philosophy of love. New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press.
highly influenced by culture but like all other sorts of mental phenomena has necessary biological underpinnings.

**Part I. Basic emotions and the role of nature in romantic love**

I.1. Basic emotions

Basic emotions are said to be basic in at least two senses: they are basic in a biological sense, in so far as they are biologically prepared responses, and they are basic in a psychological sense, in so far as they are not themselves comprised of other emotions (Ortony & Turner, 1990). Although all emotions are complex physio-psychological processes, the contrast between basic and nonbasic emotions can be illustrated by the difference between fear and nostalgia. Fear has been considered a basic emotion because it is present in human infants and nonhuman animals as an involuntary bodily response, also often characterized as innate, whereas nostalgia seems to require cognitive development, and may also be said to be comprised of more basic emotions like joy and sadness directed at the past. 24 In Part I of this chapter I mainly concentrate on the question of the biological basicness of emotions. In Part II I speak to both biological and psychological basicness of emotions.

Although there is a number of researchers who study the category of basic emotions, and describe it in different ways, which often results in different lists of different basic emotions 25, the systematic research on the universality of the facial expressions among humans and animals was first started by Charles Darwin in his *The Expression Of The Emotions In Man And Animals*. Darwin argued that the facial expressions of emotions in humans are homologous with facial

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24 For an in-depth overview and criticism of different accounts of basic emotions see Prinz *Gut reactions*, especially chapter 4.
25 For a detailed overview and analysis see Ortony & Turner, 1990.
expressions in nonhuman animals. He discusses in detail similarities and variations of facial expressions among nonhuman animals and humans and holds that

[W]ith mankind some expressions, such as the bristling of the hair under the influence of extreme terror, or the uncovering of the teeth under that of furious rage, can hardly be understood, except in the belief that man once existed in a much lower and animal-like condition. The community of certain expressions in distinct though allied species as in the movements of the same facial muscles during laughter by man and by various monkeys, is rendered somewhat more intelligible, if we believe in their descent from a common progenitor (1872/1965:12).

Darwin thought that the facial expressions pertaining to some emotions have an adaptive function. For example, when an animal bears its teeth, it shows off its arsenal of weapons to the enemy. At the same time, many other facial expressions of emotions are arbitrary. For instance, there is nothing obviously advantageous or functional about drawing one’s brows together in anger or curving one’s mouth downward in sadness. The apparent universality of these arbitrary expressions, which are also observed in human infants and even infants who are blind and deaf from birth, suggests that they share an evolutionary origin (Griffiths, 1997:58). Darwin thought that facial expressions of emotions have acquired a secondary function of communicating the internal state of the creature to its fellow creatures, rather than simply being an expression of it (Griffiths, 1997:44-5).26

Darwin has pioneered the ‘component analysis’ which was the project of identifying all the facial muscles involved in producing a given emotional expression, and a ‘judgment test’ in which Darwin used Duchenne’s photographs as samples to be identified by the viewers as expressing a particular emotion. Darwin had sought to show that the emotional facial expressions are innate by collecting evidence for their universality from different cultures.

26 I will not be restating Darwin’s own speculations about the origin of the trait here. For an analysis see Prinz 2004 chapter 5 and Griffiths 1997, chapter 3.
In recent decades the notion of basic emotion has mainly been developed by Paul Ekman (1982), who, in much similar vein, tried to show that some emotions are universal and can be traced across cultures. Using a modified and enhanced version of the judgment test, he came up with a list of six universal emotions: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise that are supposed to have a universal manifestation in facial expressions. However, he later expanded the list to fifteen: amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, sadness, satisfaction, sensory pleasure, and shame (Ekman 1999). Do all fifteen of these emotions have a unique facial expression? Ekman seems to have abandoned the idea that a unique facial expression is necessary to characterize a basic emotion and instead holds that it could also be a specific vocalization, or a distinct set of the bodily movement (Ekman, 2003).

The universality of basic emotions is also confirmed by tracing their evolutionary origins as 'affect programs' that have developed in humans and other species to cope with various aspects of the environment and help the survival of the species (Ekman, 1982; Griffiths, 1997; Deonna & Teroni, 2012; Prinz, 2004; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Plutchik, 1980; Lazarus, 1991; Izard, 1992). For example, fear is thought to be a basic emotion because it serves the evolutionary function of setting the organism into fight or flight mode. Anger can be thought of as a basic emotion because it prepares the organism to respond with force to the unwanted stimulus, while disgust is a response of aversion and withdrawal from a potentially harmful stimulus. Plutchik, who defends the idea of the evolutionary function of emotions, (1962, 1980)

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has argued that fear is related to protection, sadness to reintegration behavior, and joy to reproduction.

Affect programs are also characterized by a felt episode that lasts a short while, accompanied by changes in facial expression, posture, nervous system, hormonal system, and vocal changes. Defender of affect programs argue that the system responsible for these changes is modular because the responses are quick, automatic, specific to a restricted domain of stimuli, and cognitively impenetrable (Fodor, 1983; Griffiths, 1997).

Furthermore, the universality of these affect programs is also supported by identifying neural pathways special to every basic emotion (Panksepp, 1998). Panksepp has his own list which is composed of expectancy, fear, rage, and panic (1982). This is because Panksepp first claimed to have identified unique neural pathways for these four emotions.

In addition, basic emotions are also said to be characterized by action tendencies as well as the idea that nonhuman animals can experience them (Frijda, 1986; Frijda, Kuipers & Schure, 1989; Lazarus, 1991; Oatley & Jenkins, 1996; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). For example, Frijda (1986) thinks that anger is a basic emotion because it is characterized by a unique action tendency to remove an obstacle which cannot be broken down into more basic action tendencies.

I.1.1. Romantic love as a basic emotion

The idea that romantic love is a basic emotion has a long history. Love can be found among Hobbes’ ‘seven simple passions’, and Descartes’ list of six (Hobbes, 1650/1994; Descartes, 1649/1984). To assess this conjecture, let’s see whether love can satisfy the requirements set out in contemporary basic emotion research. An expression of romantic love would have to be
universal, produce a particular kind of action tendency, manifests itself in a love feeling, be present among nonhuman animals, would have a particular sort of facial expression or some other unique feature, serve a unique evolutionary function, and be identified with a unique neural pathway.

Helen Fisher’s account of romantic love can be construed as a basic emotion (1992, Fisher et al., 2002).

She believes that it is universal, innate, and adaptive often running these characteristics together. In the following section I show why these characteristics should be distinguished from one another. But for now, let us look at her arguments. To support the claim that romantic love is a universal phenomenon, she and many others cite an anthropological study by William Jankowiak and Edward Fischer (1992) in which 88.5 percent of the sampled cultures indicate the presence of romantic love. In the study of 166 societies, 147 societies were judged to have romantic love, which was defined as “any intense attraction that involves the idealization of the other, within an erotic context, with the expectation of enduring for some time into the future” (Jankowiak & Fischer, 1992:150). Jankowiak and Fischer point out that romantic love defined in this way is not to be confused with either the ‘companionship’ stage of love that is often associated with the progression of romantic love state and is also called attachment, or be confused with lust or sexual desire.

Jankowiak and Fischer based their study on the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) conducted by Murdock and White (1969). From this sample and other sources Jankowiak and Fischer looked at the studies specifically designed to test for the presence of romantic love. If the

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28 Fisher, Aron, and Bown (2006), following Aron & Aron 1991 and Aron et al. 1995, argue that romantic love is best categorized as a drive rather than a basic emotion because they identify it with a motivational neural system. I dismiss this claim as a non-starter since paradigmatic examples of drives such as sexual drive, hunger, and thirst can be satisfied, whereas romantic love cannot be in the same way. Furthermore, as will become evident, I think drives are too simple to adequately characterize the complex phenomenon of romantic love.
evidence was not directly available, they have looked at folklore and other cultural practices.

Fisher sums up Jankowiak’s and Fischer’s findings by saying:

People sang love songs, composed romantic verse, performed love magic, carried love charms, and/or brewed love potions. Some eloped. Some committed suicide or homicide because of unrequited love. And in many of these cultures, myths and fables portrayed romantic involvements. No negative evidence appeared. In the balance of these societies (19 cultures), field scientists had simply failed to examine this aspect of daily living (Fisher et al. 2002:415).

Jankowiak and Fischer’s study concludes that romantic love, if not a universal, is a near-universal. In 19 cultures examined (11.5% of the sample), evidence for the presence of romantic love is absent. However, in only one of these 19 cultural studies, an ethnographer explicitly denies the existence of romantic love after distinguishing it from lust. In the other 18 cultures, the ethnographers have not made this conceptual distinction, and for this reason Jankowiak and Fischer were forced to interpret the results in this way. However, they speculate, as does Fisher, that the apparent lack of romantic love in those cultures is most likely due to the carelessness of the ethnographers rather than its actual absence (Jankowiak & Fischer, 1992:153). Jankowiak and Fischer also note that not everyone experiences romantic love even in ‘romantic cultures’ such as our own. Indeed, in our own culture there is a class of individuals identified as aromantics, who seem to not be able to experience falling in love. They are sometimes associated with asexuality, though the two characteristics need not co-occur (see Decker, 2014; Tennov, 1979/1999; Bogaert, 2012). Jankowiak and Fischer also point out that there may be cultural variables that mute or repress manifestations of romantic love.

If romantic love is a universal or a near-universal, it is reasonable to speculate that it is homologous with experiences of nonhuman animals. One feature that is supposed to support this connection is the facial expression of romantic love. Helen Fisher argues that there is a unique facial expression of love – a special gaze with googly eyes transfixed upon the object of one’s
love, which can also be recognized among nonhuman animals. She refers to it as a ‘copulatory gaze’ which is used by our close relatives, chimpanzees and baboons. Pygmy chimpanzees or bonobos stare deeply into each other’s eyes right before coitus as well as while courting (Fisher, 1992:22-3). Fisher also cites a case of a female home-raised gorilla, Toto, who during her periods of heat would become infatuated with human males, and to whom Fisher attributes “unmistakable lovesick eyes” (ibid., 50).

Fisher speculates that the copulatory gaze is traceable in humans as well. Furthermore, according to Darwin, romantic love among humans has a special physiological pattern such as the lovers' "hearts beat quickly, their breathing is hurried, and their faces flash" (Darwin, 1872/1965:83). This bodily pattern may be interpreted as a unique bodily manifestation of romantic love.

Fisher argues that romantic love's evolutionary function is to serve as a link between two other basic emotional systems – lust and attachment. These two are supposed to work together to ensure gene perpetuation in certain species. While lust's function is to fulfill an organism's sexual desire and achieve conception of offspring, attachment between two adults ensures that the offspring receive the care necessary for their survival. Romantic love with its obsessive passionate nature helps to concentrate on a specific individual, attending to them exclusively, and over time forming an emotional bond that would motivate the pair to stay together and care for the young. Indeed, Fisher characterizes these three emotional systems and identifies their neural underpinnings in the following way: lust or sexual desire is characterized by the desire for sexual gratification, is identified with estrogens and androgens, and has evolved to motivate individuals to seek sexual union with any conspecific; romantic love, which is characterized by

29 In her arguing that romantic love is a drive, Fisher denies that romantic love has a unique facial expression (Fisher, Aron, & Brown, 2006).
30 See also Panksepp, 1998.
high energy level, exhilaration, focused attention, intrusive thinking, and the craving of emotional union in humans is associated with catecholamines, such as dopamine and norepinephrine, and, she believes, has evolved to facilitate mate choice based on the preference of the individual; attachment, which is characterized by “territory defense and/or nest building, separation anxiety, shared parental chores, and other affiliative behaviors in mammals, and with feelings of calm, security, social comfort, and emotional union in humans”, is associated with neuropeptides vasopressin and oxytocin, and has evolved to sustain social relations and to complete species-specific parental duties (Fisher, 1998:24-5).

Fisher argues that these three systems over the course of the evolution of human species have become independent of one another and that it is a “neurophysiological artifact that contributes to current patterns of human mating flexibility and the wide range of contemporary human reproductive strategies” (ibid., 27). At the same time she insists that romantic love is the primary reproductive strategy among humans today, arguing that other forms of reproduction that may manifest themselves in different social institutions are scarce. She also thinks that romantic love is tightly associated with the practice of monogamous marriage, and says,

Opportunistic serial monogamy is universal in human societies (Fisher 1992). Opportunistic polygyny occurs in 83% of human cultures (van den Berghe 1979). Opportunistic polyandry occurs in .5% of cultures (van den Berghe 1979). Opportunistic extra-pair attachments occur in all cultures for which data are available (Fisher 1992), and humans exhibit other secondary forms of attachment in association with a range of environmental variables (Lancaster and Kaplan 1994). Mating flexibility is a hallmark of Homo sapiens (Fisher 1998:41).

Fisher seems to think that romantic love as a mating strategy is unique to humans, and that it is the main strategy although not the only strategy that humans use to perpetuate their genes. She insists on this point by speculating that the beginnings of romantic love could be traced back to the humanoid species of Australopithecus afarensis who lived in the African grasslands between
3.5 and 3.8 million years ago (Fisher, 1992:140-1). Around this time our ancestors have left the forests of modern day Ethiopia and have begun to live in the savannah, sharing the space with many predators such as lions, and scavenging the meat left unfinished by them (Fisher 1992:148).

Fisher contends that bipedalism, already present in the Australopithecus afarensis, had started a ‘sexual revolution’. Because these humanoids walked upright, it made it necessary that the females *carry* the babies in their arms as opposed to having them hang on the female who walked on all four limbs. The necessity to carry the infant greatly impeded the ability of the nursing female to participate in hunting and gathering of the food. She needed help to provide for herself and the baby. Thus, fathers began to participate in the caring for the mother and child by protecting them and supplying them with resources, since it is in the fathers’ ‘interests’ that their genes survive (ibid., 148-9).

Fisher notes that a similar trend can be seen in some other species that practice ‘serial monogamy’. For instance, red foxes bear altrical babies, who are completely helpless and require extensive nursing and protection. While the female stays with the infants, father fox brings food for her. The joint nursing of the offspring lasts through the mating season, and after its completion the pair splits, beginning a search for new mates. Fisher believes that romantic love with its four-year expiration date is the mating mechanism selected for by evolution, responsible for the serial monogamy in humans, where the offspring become less dependent on the parents after four years, allowing the parents to then fall in love again and to seek new mates (ibid., 152-4).

Fisher and her colleagues attempt to identify neural pathways that would show love to be a unique basic intrinsic neural system (see Fisher et al., 2006, 2002; Acevedo et al., 2012; Fisher,
1998; see also Hatfield & Rapson, 2009 for an overview). Brogaard discusses the chemistry of love at length, listing adrenaline, noradrenaline, cortisol, and serotonin as the hormones involved in the romantic love experience, and showing the close resemblance of the brain in love to the brain on cocaine (Brogaard, 14-16). These facts are confirmed by Bartels and Zeki (2000) and others (see Ortigue et al., 2010 for meta-analysis). In their widely-cited study, Bartels and Zeki argue that they have identified a unique neural pathway by monitoring neural activity in subjects who were shown pictures of their beloveds as well as their good friends of the same sex and age. The contrast between lovers and friends indentified the neural differences between love and friendship. The experience of romantic love was associated with the activity in the medial insula and the anterior cingulate cortex, and with the caudate nucleus and the putamen which produce euphoria, reward, and motivation (Bartels & Zeki, 2000:3831; Cacioppo et al., 2012). Aron et al. (2005) also confirmed the results of Bartels and Zeki showing the activation of the dopamine-rich subcortical brain areas and deactivation in the amygdala and the drop of the level of serotonin which is responsible for anxiety. The activation of these networks is responsible for producing emotions, somatosensorial integration, as well as sexual desire (Ortigue et al., 2010:3546). Donatella Marazziti and her colleagues have also shown that there are similar levels of serotonin in subjects who are newly in love and the OCD patients, and that their serotonin levels are significantly lower compared to the control subjects (Marazziti et al., 1999, 2004). Marazziti and her colleagues speculate that this phenomenon may explain the neuroticism and obsession in both people in love and the OCD patients.

Since Fisher believes that romantic love has an evolutionary function of ensuring the occurrence of pair-bonding, the action tendency of romantic love must be such that it would propel the enamored party towards forming an attachment. Therefore, the action tendency
identified with romantic love must be seeking proximity and intimacy with the beloved. Indeed, Fisher observes that many animals "pat, nuzzle, coo, and gaze at one another affectionately as they court" thereby laying down the path for attachment (Fisher, 1992:51).

In sum, the profile or romantic love as a basic emotion appears to be as follows: A. romantic love is a universal phenomenon as it is found in most examined cultures; B. some features such as the special gaze and courting behavior are analogous in both humans and other species; this is because C. it shares it evolutionary origin with nonhuman animals as a mating strategy; D. it is selected for by evolution for mate selection and gene perpetuation, and is associated with proximity seeking as its action tendency; E. lastly, it appears to have a unique neural signature associated with certain dopamine networks and a significantly reduced level of serotonin. In the following section I take each of these parameters one by one and show that they do not apply to romantic love.

I.1.2. Why romantic love is not a basic emotion
A. Universality vs. basicness vs. innateness

Fisher makes a strong case for the basicness of romantic love. However, the conclusions she draws are not convincing. Let us look at each point she makes in turn. First, she refers to the study by Jankowiak and Fischer (1992), who say that romantic love is a near-universal, since it is found in most cultures that have been examined. Since there appear to be no other such studies done on the subject, and most of today’s anthropological studies on romantic love tend to examine cultures that have already been influenced by others, it is difficult to evaluate Jankowiak and Fischer’s results and compare them to others. However, one issue with their approach is the definition they give to romantic love. As stated above, they define it as “any
intense attraction that involves the idealization of the other, within an erotic context, with the expectation of enduring for some time into the future” (Jankowiak & Fischer, 1992:150). This definition is vague enough to include cases of sexual desire that the researchers could have mistaken for romantic love. Similarly, the interpretation of legends and ancient texts that are taken to represent romantic love may be inconclusive. For instance, what is known as the oldest love poem in the world, “The Love Song for Shu-Sin”, or the tablet entitled 'Istanbul #2461' written about 2000 BCE for or by the Sumerian King Shu-Sin is very much about sexual intercourse as part of a religious ritual of the sacred marriage of the king to the goddess Innana, and not at all about love:

Bridegroom, let me caress you,
My precious caress is more savory than honey,
In the bedchamber, honey-filled,
Let me enjoy your goodly beauty,
Lion, let me caress you,
My precious caress is more savory than honey (Kramer, 1956: 246-7).

The passages in the “Song of Songs” (c. 971-931 BCE) are more difficult to interpret, as one finds,

I was asleep but my heart was awake.
A voice! My beloved was knocking:
‘Open to me, my sister, my darling,
My dove, my perfect one!... (Song of Solomon 5:2, NIV, 1995).

And also…

“My beloved extended his hand through the opening,
And my feelings were aroused for him.
“I arose to open to my beloved…” (Song of Solomon 5:4, NIV, 1995).

Even with texts by Sappho, it isn’t always clear that she is talking of love rather than lust:

…If I meet
you suddenly, I can't

speak — my tongue is broken;
a thin flame runs under
my skin; seeing nothing,
hearing only my own ears
drumming, I drip with sweat;
trembling shakes my body… (Barnard, 2012:25).

Since these sources are difficult to evaluate, I will not try to verify whether or not it is the case that romantic love is indeed present cross-culturally but I will simply take it for granted that it is. It seems apparent too that most human beings are in principle capable of experiencing romantic love, provided that they are exposed to the right set of stimuli, which suggests that in general human physiology allows for acquiring such disposition. At the same time, as we will see, there are important cultural differences when it comes to the different attitudes held towards romantic love. For instance, in cultures like India and China romantic love is not considered to be a good basis for marriage because it is thought of as unstable and ephemeral (Beach & Tesser, 1988; Branden, 1980; Levine et al., 1995; Rothbaum & Tsang, 1998, Triandis, 1990; Dion & Dion, 1996). For this reason, romantic love in these cultures is not taken seriously and isn’t made into a cult as opposed to the Western cultures (though globalization and other factors are bringing a change to these attitudes in non-Western cultures). Since the attitudes towards romantic love differ, the occurrences of romantic love in some cultures might be a lot less frequent than they are in the Western world. The attitudes held towards it are also likely to influence its phenomenology. For instance, if the attitude is that romantic love is fleeting and whimsical, romantic love may not be experienced as something that will appear to last forever, and the level of idealization of the beloved may also be lower.

Given these considerations, it is important to make a distinction between basicness, innateness, and universality of emotions. It seems that what binds the concept of basic emotions together is the idea that the basic emotions are adaptations that serve a specific function that
promotes the survival of the organism. It is assumed that because affect programs have been selected for, they are homologous with affective dispositions in other species, that they are traceable in human infants, and that they have unique neural circuits that appear to be ‘preset’ in the human brain as one of the more ancient mechanisms.

Fisher, following a common strategy of evolutionary psychologists, observes that a certain trait or emotion is *universal* – that it exists cross-culturally in the majority of humans. Its universality is then used as evidence to argue that the trait is *innate* – it is coded in our DNA rather than acquired through culture. Innate traits are also said to be hard to get rid of once developed, and their presence cannot be explained by an appeal to the organism’s learning from its environment (Prinz: 2004:104). It is then reasoned that the trait or an emotion is *adaptive* – it serves an evolutionary function.

However, these three concepts are distinct from one another. First, it may be that a universal emotion is neither innate nor adaptive. For instance, a higher cognitive emotion like nostalgia may be common to many cultures. Since nostalgia involves cognitive sophistication, it is not considered a basic emotion. There is no obvious way in which it can be *adaptive*, and it isn’t an emotion that is present in newborns, and nonhuman animals, which makes it difficult to show that it is innate. Yet, it might turn out to be a universal emotion.

Second, judging a trait to be universal and innate does not show that it is adaptive. Consider for example the appendix. It exists in all humans and is encoded in our DNA but it serves no adaptive function. Instead it is a vestigial structure left in place most probably after serving an adaptive function in our ancestors. Indeed, the idea that the appendix is universally present and yet is an arbitrary feature that appears to serve no function points to its homology. At the same time, provided that the appendix isn't posing sufficient danger to the human species for
it to be weeded out by natural selection, it gets passed on from generation to generation.

I am not suggesting that romantic love is like an appendix since I doubt that it is an ancient mechanism that has lost its function. I am merely pointing out that Fisher makes a huge leap from saying that romantic love is universal, to saying that it is adaptive. Indeed, I have assumed for the sake of argument that romantic love is a universal pan-cultural phenomenon.

Third, just because a trait is innate is not sufficient to show that it is either universal or adaptive. Consider for instance sickle-cell anemia or cystic fibrosis. Both are innate as both are genetic disorders, however they are not universal or pan-cultural but are specific to a particular population. Furthermore, they are also not adaptive in a strict sense. Although the genes responsible for fighting malaria have been selected for, when two such genes are inherited (one from each parent), it results in the sickle cell anemia (see Sterelny & Kitcher, 1988). Indeed, as the example of the sickle-cell anemia shows, an aspect of the genome may be adaptive in certain circumstances but not in others. If one were to assume that the disposition for romantic love is innate, whether or not it is adaptive will depend on the circumstances of the organism.

B. The Look of Love

Fisher believes that there is a unique and universal facial expression of romantic love – googly eyes. This is supposed to be evidence for romantic love’s innateness. Since there is nothing particularly advantageous with this sort of expression as in the case of anger and sadness, but perhaps unlike surprise (having your eyes open widely in surprise may allow the organism to have a better look at what is happening), it appears that the look of love is homologous with a primordial expression that might have served a function in the past. Fisher attempts to back this up by claiming that an expression can be viewed in other species such as gorillas and bonobos.
However, it is doubtful that the look of love is distinct and universal. If it consists in the googly eyes, it is very similar to awe and admiration, and is easily confused with lust.\footnote{Bolmont et al., 2014 show that shows that the gaze patterns of love and lust differ. However, this study shows that the eye movement pattern differs in one's experience of lust and romantic love. It does not show that there is a unique facial expression of romantic love.} This is probably why love does not end up on Ekman’s list even though he has been searching for basic emotions for fifty years (Ekman, 1999). In their brief discussion of romantic love, Ekman and Cordaro (2011) express skepticism about romantic love being an emotion at all. This is because they believe that love can manifest itself in many different emotions (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011:366).\footnote{I agree with Ekman and Cordaro on this point.}

Fisher says that bonobos stare deeply into each other’s eyes before copulating, which she seems to equate with the look of love. Bonobos seem to be unique in many of their social and sexual practices. For instance, they are the only other primates along with humans who copulate facing each other, and they even have a system of communication to indicate to each other which position they prefer (Nishida & Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, 1987:172-3). Sexual intercourse among the bonobos is a highly social activity – its many functions include defusing conflicts, securing bonds, using sex in exchange for food, etc. It also often takes form of homosexual coupling among both males and females. Although bonobos and chimpanzees are our closest relatives, and differ from us only by 1.6 percent of the DNA, the copulatory gaze is just that – a gaze that expresses a desire to have sex, not a unique expression of romantic love. This is clearly evident since sexual intercourse has so many different social functions. A similar explanation can be made about the anecdotal case of Toto, the gorilla. Although gorillas do stare into each other’s eyes when courting, since Toto would ‘flirt’ with men in her periods of heat, her special look is the look of lust rather than of romantic love.
Similarly, Darwin’s description of the increased heart rate, heavy breathing, and flushed face can be characteristics of fear, anger, and excitement, and for this reason do not show a unique bodily signature that would manifest romantic love specifically. For these reasons, it appears that romantic love does not have a universal facial expression or a unique bodily sign that would serve as evidence for its adaptive nature.

C. Romantic love among nonhuman animals

What of Fisher’s point that romantic love is homologous with the courting behavior in nonhuman animals? Unlike most basic emotions that are found in many other animals, Fisher claims that romantic love is only homologous with animal courtship behavior, which makes romantic love a uniquely human phenomenon. Nonetheless, in her attempt to track the continuity of the trait across species, Fisher says that we find a similarity in the courting behavior of humans and that of nonhuman animals. This is supposed to shed light on the presumed action tendency of romantic love – proximity seeking. It is certainly true that in the mating rituals nonhuman animals seek proximity but it is hardly an indication of its homology with romantic love unless one already assumes that romantic love is homologous with sex and procreation. It is certainly true that human courting behavior is often associated with romantic love since human mating practices are also associated with it. But this is not sufficient to show that romantic love is homologous with sexual desire; only that it is closely associated with it.

D. The role of romantic love in human procreation

To make better sense of this, let us look closely at the adaptationist story Fisher tells. Fisher believes that romantic love serves as a link between lust and attachment and is an ancient
mechanism traceable all the way to the bipedalism of the early humanoids. She believes that it may have become necessary to pair-bond for at least a short while – a few years – to raise the offspring. She compares the monogamy of humans, by which she means an emotionally and sexually exclusive union between two people, to the kind of union that takes place in the fairly short pair-bonding of the red foxes that lasts through their mating periods. However, only 3 percent of mammals engage in what is known as ‘social monogamy’, and no close relatives of ours practice it (gorillas have harems, chimpanzees and bonobos are polygamous and do not pair-bond, while gibbons, the only monogamous apes, have separated from the common ancestral line 22 million years ago, much earlier than chimps and bonobos, who separated sometime between 3 million and 860K years ago). This makes it difficult to trace the homology of romantic love through our ancestral line.

Furthermore, the mating relationship model of many species is often used to explain the correlation with sexual dimorphism – the discrepancy in body size of males and females. Male gorillas are twice the size of their female counterparts. This presumably explains why gorillas have harems – the largest male gorilla has an advantage in competing with other males for all the females. In chimpanzees and bonobos the difference in body size is only 10 to 20 percent, which correlates with their promiscuous nonpair-bonding mating style. The monogamous gibbons are equal in size. It is sometimes argued that the decrease of the sexual dimorphism in human species reaching its current ratio during the time of homo erectus 0.5 to 2 million years ago marks a shift from polygyny in Australopithecus to monogamy in today’s humans (Reichard, 2003).

It is difficult to tell by looking at human fossils which is a male and which is a female. For this reason, the sex of the skeleton is assigned based on the body size, which is part of the
problem of determining what the sexual dimorphism was in the ancient humanoids. Another
difficulty with inferring the mating strategy from sexual dimorphism is that the discrepancy is
not always characteristic of a particular strategy (Frayer & Wolpoff, 1985). Putting that aside,
Australopithecus males are said to have been twice the size of their females counterparts, which
would suggest a harem-type mating arrangements rather a monogamous romantic love driven
unions.

Fisher says that the involvement of the male in child rearing or the male parental
investment was necessary in order to ensure that the offspring is well cared for and protected in
the open plains. However, this relationship model sounds too much like the modern concept of
the nuclear family. Fisher’s example of red foxes illustrates the intense care needed for the
altricial offspring. However, red foxes do not live in packs but instead lead solitary lives. This
was not the case with humans. Humans are thought to be the most social of all species (Dunbar,
1992, 1993). Early humanoids like other great apes lived in small groups and travelled together.
Like chimpanzees and bonobos they have gathered the food, scavenged the abandoned meat, and
hunted together. They are likely to have had strong communal bonds and raised the offspring
together as is often observed in primitive communities still existing today. Therefore, a unique
link between a male and a female that Fisher believes was necessary to secure attachment does
not appear to be necessary at all for child rearing.

Male parental investment is also often linked with jealousy, which, interestingly, most
psychologists working on basic emotions do not view as basic. However, the evolutionary
psychologists claim that jealousy has evolved to allow males and females to pursue their
conflicting agendas: males are interested in securing their paternity, while females are interested
in securing the resources they require for child care. This is why males are said to be more
jealous of sexual infidelity of their female partners, while females are said to care more about emotional infidelity of their male partners (Buss et al., 1992; Symons, 1979; Buss, 2000; Wilson & Daly, 1992; Buunk et al., 1996). There are many issues with these studies which I will not be reviewing here (cf. Harris, 2003; DeSteno & Salovey, 1996; Harris & Christenfeld, 1996). One interesting observation that undermines the claim of the evolutionary function of jealousy and the gender differences that Buss and his colleagues postulate is the high cultural variability of the experience of jealousy. For instance, it was found that between 70 and 80 percent of Chinese, Austrian, Dutch, and German men stated that they are more upset by the emotional infidelity than sexual infidelity (Geary et al., 1995; 2001). Furthermore, when the subjects of the study were adults rather than college students, both men and women in the U.S. reported being more disturbed by the emotional rather than sexual infidelity (Harris, 2002).

Given the cultural variability of jealousy it is hard to judge its evolutionary origins. Furthermore, by looking at the modern day hunter-gatherer societies, we observe that their social arrangements are based on cooperation rather than competition (White & Mullen, 1989). Various tribal communities share infants and are all involved in bringing up the children together (Hrdy, 2009). For this reason, the biggest issue with the adaptationist story about jealousy of this sort is that it presupposes a nuclear family – if the man is the sole provider for his wife and children, taking measures against cuckoldry might make evolutionary sense. However, in prehistoric communities it is unlikely that paternity was an issue because it is unlikely that a given child was viewed as having a particular male as their one and only father. Indeed, the Amazon societies such as the Aché, the Araweté, the Barí, the Canela, the Cashinahua, the Curripaco, the Ese Eja, the Kayapô, the Kulina, the Matis, the Mehinaku, the Piaroa, the Pirahã, the Secoya, the Siona, the Warao, the Yanomami, and the Ye'kwana believe in partible paternity
the idea that many males contribute to the creation of a single offspring (Beckerman & Valentine, 2002). The same belief is found among the Lusi of Papua New Guinea. In these societies paternity is shared and men and women provide care for all the children of the community. The belief that every adult is a parent of every child strengthens the communal bonds instead of creating antagonism (Erikson, 2002; Chernela, 2002; Lea, 2002). The Mosuo (also known as Na) men of the Southwest China consider the children of their sisters to be their paternal obligation because the status as well as property is passed on through the mothers (Hua, 2008). If the Pleistocene societies were anything like the hunter-gatherer societies we see today, the exclusive involvement of fathers in rearing only their own children is unlikely.

Furthermore, the supposition of the monogamous pair-bonding in the prehistoric times appears even more far-fetched when we look at the marriage arrangements throughout human history. Given that polygyny and group marriages have been the two most prevalent forms of marriage in the contemporary hunter-gatherer communities, it is likely that these forms of marriage have been most common throughout human history (Hrdy, 2009). Monogamous unions have existed alongside polygyny since the times of agriculture (about 10K years ago) and today appear to be the most common marriage union across the globe. Agriculture is likely to have popularized monogamy in view of creation of private property and the need to control its flow (Henrich et al., 2012; Fortunato & Archetti, 2010). At the same time, in examining the polygamous marriage trend in present day societies, the absence of the plow has been the most reliable predictor for polygyny together with high male mortality (Goody, 1976; White & Burton, 1988; Ember et al, 2007). Since the early humans were not farmers, it is safe to say that they were unlikely to form monogamous unions even for a short while.

Should we think that the marriage unions whether polygynous or monogamous were
based on romantic love? It seems not as marriage has been predominantly a politico-economic institution that allowed families to build alliances and control the transfer of property. For this reason, most marriages were arranged, with parents deciding for the children who they are going to be married to (Coontz, 2004). The fact that a marriage was arranged and the spouses were not in love with one another did not preclude them from successfully procreating and even frequently forming attachments. Therefore, romantic love is clearly unnecessary for procreation and child rearing, and was not involved in most marriage unions throughout human history.

Marriage based on romantic love is as recent as 18th century and may be associated with the industrialization and the rise of the nuclear family (Brake, 2012). Yet, romantic love was and is still often viewed as a distractive force to these calculated unions, and is condemned, prohibited, and laughed at in many cultures. Stephanie Coontz (2006) believes that the entering of romantic love into marriage began the destabilization of the marriage institution that can be observed in the high divorce rate as well as the drop in the number of marriages themselves. There is no doubt that the marriage institution in the West and around the world is transforming, making romantic love its center and basis. However, this is a new phenomenon and does not in any way reflect the procreation practices of the prehistoric people.

Fisher’s adaptationsist story is a common story in evolutionary psychology. However, upon closer examination, it does not hold up to scrutiny. I have argued that romantic love should not be thought of as being homologous with the courting behavior of nonhuman animals, since none of our close relatives are monogamous, and animal courting behavior is best interpreted as demonstration of genetic fitness rather than amorous affection. I said that sexual dimorphism traced in the Australopithecus does not support the idea of a short-term monogamous pair-bonding in early humans but instead provides evidence for a harem-like arrangement. The male
parental investment explanation and the evolutionary role of jealousy are both questionable given the communal approach of the contemporary hunter-gatherer societies to child rearing. I have also pointed out that romantic love has been largely absent from the household throughout human history until as late as 18th century. In Europe as well as in most other places marriages were arranged. If romantic love was the primary reproductive strategy in humans, as Fisher says, then we should have seen it dominating the reproductive arrangements through the centuries. Instead, we see that the reproductive success of humans seems to be unaffected by the absence of romantic love in their core reproductive institution. Since the adoptionist story does not add up, it is unlikely that romantic love is a basic emotion.

**E. Romantic love and neural networks**

The last aspect of the basicness of love is the unique neural pathway it may be identified with. Although the research on the neural correlates of romantic love is in its infancy, Bartels and Zeki argue that they have identified such a pathway by monitoring neural activity in subjects who were shown pictures of their beloveds as well as their good friends of the same sex and age (Bartles & Zeki, 2000). The contrast between lovers and friends indentified the neural differences between love and friendship. Others including Fisher, have done neural imaging studies trying to identify the special circuits of romantic love. However, Bartles and Zeki acknowledge that romantic love is a complex phenomenon that involves sexual, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral components, and for that reason there are many cognitive systems involved in its realization. They think that romantic love is not an emotion but a sentiment, which I will discuss in the following chapters. The same conclusion is reached by Cacioppo et al., 2012, Diamond, 2003, and Ortigue et al., 2010. The neural imaging of romantic love reveals
its complexity and further supports the view that it is not a basic emotion.

I conclude this section by reiterating that romantic love does not fit the profile of basic emotions. Even when we assume that it is a universal phenomenon, it has no special facial expression, is not homologous with any particular trait in our close relatives. It appears unnecessary for human reproduction, and so is unlikely to be an adaptive trait. It is a complex neural phenomenon as a number of fMRI studies indicate.

There is also a more general worry about the effort to equate love with a basic emotion. As noted, basic emotions are brief. They are states that arise in response to a (real or ideational) stimulus, in order to cope with it here and now. As noted at the outset, love is not a passing state. It can endures for long periods, even when not currently manifest; it is, in this sense, dispositional.

**Part II. Emotions complexes and the role of culture in romantic love**

In this part of the chapter I address the role of culture with respect to emotions. I begin by introducing another psychological category of emotions – nonbasic emotions. The category of nonbasic emotions illustrates one way in which culture can influence our emotional experiences but it presupposes the existence of basic emotions as necessary building blocks. I argue that the category of nonbasic emotions is not the right way of categorizing romantic love. I then discuss the social and psychological constructionism of emotions – traditions that provide a critique of the notion of basic emotions. They reject the idea that emotions can form a natural kind and instead emphasize the role of culture in bringing various cognitive components together thereby forming an emotion against the backdrop of culture as the source of meaning for these affective states. I review a social constructionist account of romantic love offered by James Averill, and
argue that the strong version of social constructionism he offers is not sustainable. Instead, I put forth reasons for thinking that romantic love requires a specific physiological basis since it is an obsessive passionate state. However, I conclude in agreement with Averill that romantic love is best categorized as a syndrome and is a particularly prone to cultural and personal variability.

II.1. Nonbasic emotions

Nonbasic emotions are assumed to be produced by different kinds of modifications of basic emotions. First, they may be produced by a number of basic emotions blending or fusing together into a nonbasic emotion (McDougall, 1926; Tomkins, 1963; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1962). Second, they may be produced the process of calibrating a more basic emotion to new elicitors (Prinz, 2004; cf. Agnoli et al., 1989; Boucher, 1979; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). I discuss each kind of nonbasic emotions in turn.

II.1.1. Emotion blends and romantic love

Blended emotions are emotions comprised of other emotions. For example, despair might be a blend of fear and sadness, whereas contempt may be a blend of anger and disgust (Plutchik, 1980; Arnold, 1960). Some blends may still be achieved through the process of evolution, and in that sense may be innate. On the other hand, some blends have to be acquired through an exposure to culture.

According to Prinz, Plutchik’s approach to nonbasic emotions hasn't been very popular not so much because of the general idea of his view but mainly because of the various details in his account (see Prinz 2004 for overview; but see also Albrecht et al., 2005). Empirical research is needed to show that emotions blend together to compose more complex phenomena. However,
Prinz thinks that it is not in principle impossible that such blending may occur (Prinz 2004). I will raise some doubts about this approach below.

For now, assuming that nonbasic emotions can be produced through blending, might romantic love be conceived of as such a blend? Indeed, in earlier work, Prinz suggests that love is a combination of lust and attachment (Prinz, 2004:123-4). He reasons that neither lust nor attachment by themselves amount to romantic love, but when the two are combined, romantic love may be produced since often though not always romantic love is characterized by sexual desire towards the beloved, and is also accompanied by the feeling of longing when apart, and the feeling of coziness when together. Although Prinz's observations with respect to romantic love's phenomenology are correct, it is not a blend of lust and attachment. As I have argued in chapter 1, romantic love is its own phenomenon separate though often closely associated with lust and attachment. We have also seen evidence for the three systems coming apart on the neural level discussed in Part I of this chapter. Lust is characterized as sexual desire, which can be short-lived, can be satisfied, and the target of lust is fungible. In contrast, romantic love is characterized as an obsessive passionate state with a normal shelf life of about 18 months to four years, and its targets are deemed to be non-fungible. Attachment is characterized by a much calmer kind of state which can last one's lifetime. Interestingly, people who report being in love, often deny that they experience intense sexual desire for the objects of their love. Likewise, people in attachment stages of their relationships often lack sexual desire towards their partners. They also often deny that they are in love with their partners. Rather, they say they simply love them. Therefore, all three of these phenomena can exist separately, even though sometimes they are found to co-occur (Fisher, 1992; Tennov, 1979/1999; Hazan & Shaver, 1987). Furthermore, attachment is something that appears after romantic love comes into existence, provided that it
succeeds in forming a relationship. But of course this isn't always the case. One may be in love, and yet not attached to one's beloved, or one may be attached but not in love. For this reason, it seems odd to say that what the lover is experiencing is indeed attachment if the lover has not sufficiently interacted with their beloved to be able to form a steady relationship. Given all these considerations, it does not seem that romantic love should be categorized as a blend.

There is a further issue with the blend account of nonbasic emotions – it fails to account for the ways in which emotions interact with other cognitive states (Griffiths: 1997:102). For example, emotions like pride, contempt, or Schadenfreude are not just blends of basic emotions; rather, they require certain beliefs to be present as well. In the following section I discuss what Prinz calls ‘calibrated emotions’ and what Griffiths calls ‘higher cognitive emotions’.

II.1.2. Emotion calibrations and romantic love

'Calibrated emotions' is a term coined by Jesse Prinz (2004) to designate emotions that are subject to calibration, a process wherein a more basic emotion comes to be triggered by new elicitors (Prinz, 2004). This happens when an emotion comes under the control of acquired beliefs. Although beliefs are not constitutive parts of emotions, because these emotions are calibrated to arise in the presence of certain beliefs, they are called higher cognitive emotions (Griffiths, 1997). For example, feelings of patriotism may be an extension of pride acquired when people are socialized to believe that their identities are linked to nationality and that their nations have a privileged status. Shame may be self-disgust triggered by the belief that one has failed in some important way. There can also be calibrated blends. For example, jealousy may be anger, sadness, and disgust triggered by the belief that the affections of one’s partner are directed...
at a third party. Both calibration and blending are influenced by culture. For example, cultures inculcate different views about what warrants jealousy and shame.

Could romantic love be a calibrated blend? What sort of beliefs might accompany its triggering? Some possibilities may include, physical attractiveness, good character the person possesses, potentially good parent for one's future offspring. But do any of these beliefs trigger falling in love? It seems not. As a matter of fact, upon recognizing that a given person is physically attractive, possesses good character, and will be a good parent for one's offspring, one may find oneself regretting not feeling love towards them. Love's presence and absence does not seem to be consistently correlated with any such thoughts. One might object that romantic love is characterized by idealization of the beloved. However, this feature of romantic love appears to be a consequence rather than a precondition for romantic love.\(^{33}\)

II.1.3. Problems and remedies for the notion of basic (and nonbasic) emotions

So far I have argued that romantic love does not appear to be either a blended emotion or a calibrated one. My arguments presupposed the existence of basic emotions. However, the category of basic emotions has suffered from the many attacks launched against it. One of the first major ones was made in the paper by Ortony and Turner "What is Basic About Basic Emotions?" (Ortony & Turner, 1990). They argue that basic emotions are not natural kinds and that ‘basic emotion’ does not refer to anything in the world. Since the publication of this article the debate about the theoretical usefulness and plausibility of basic emotions has been ongoing and is unlikely to be settled in the near future. At the moment, it is much more fashionable among psychologists to subscribe to some form of psychological constructionism (see also Barrett, 2006a; Mesquita et al., 2015 for a similar attack, and see Ekman, 2003; Izard, 1992, \(^{33}\) I explore this point further in the next chapter.\)
Ortony and Turner had argued that basic emotions are neither biologically nor psychologically primitive, that postulating them as primitives in either sense does little in aiding research on emotions, and that maintaining that such primitive categories exist is nothing but an article of faith and tradition in psychology. Let us look at these two ways of thinking of the basicness of emotions in turn.

As we have seen, the *biological* primitivism of basic emotions is usually cashed out in terms of their having evolved for the purpose of solving immediate problems faced by an organism in its environment. They are thought of as universal across species and characterized by particular facial expressions, they are hardwired in every normal human brain, they may be phylogenetically continuous with emotions experienced by some nonhuman animals, etc. This list of properties that is supposed to characterize basic emotions makes them out to be a natural kind from both an essentialist point of view if one thinks that every occurrence of a given basic emotion checks off all the boxes for its characteristic properties, and from the point of view of the homeostatic property cluster theory (HPC) developed by Boyd (1999). As Barrett puts it,

...[I]f every instance of anger is caused by a specific neural circuit, or by an “anger program,” then every instance of anger is homologous with every other instance because they all derive from a common cause. Anything that derives from the mechanism for anger is considered an instance of anger, even if it does not include all the prescribed parts (e.g., a facial movement, a physiological reaction, a subjective feeling) (Barrett, 2006a:30).

However, critics of basic emotions argue that there is no one-to-one correlation between a given emotion and its assumed physiological instantiation, the activation of neural circuitry, action tendency, facial expression, and its phenomenology (Scarantino & Griffiths, 2011:448). For example, Ortony and Turner point out that when it comes to neural coordinates of a given
emotion, Panksepp’s research shows that there are four hardwired response systems, which are exploration-curiosity-foraging-expectation-desire, flight-caution-anxiety-fear-horror, offense-irritability-anger-rage-fury, and crying-sadness-sorrow-grief-panic (Panksepp, 1982 quoted in Ortony & Turner, 1990). These different systems are responsible for producing a variety of specific emotions but no specific neural structure can be identified as being responsible for any particular discrete emotion. Looking at the neural correlates of fear, therefore, does not show that it is a biological primitive even though a fear-response can be said to be hardwired (Ortony & Turner, 1990:320).

When it comes to facial expressions, which are supposed to support the universality thesis of basic emotions, Ortony and Turner point out that not every instance of an occurrent emotion will be accompanied by a facial expression, that facial expressions of an emotion can be varied, and that some expressions sometimes occur during an onset of different emotions. For instance, weeping is associated with sadness but weeping may also occur during an experience of pride or relief (ibid., 321). Moreover, Ortony and Turner believe that each facial expression of an emotion is composed of more primitive components that are also present in other emotions. For instance, the furrowed brow in anger is also present in frustration and puzzlement, which are elicited by having one's goal blocked by an obstacle. Anger is considered a basic emotion and commonly has the eliciting conditions of having one’s goal blocked. However, under this analysis it appears that frustration is more basic than anger. Furthermore, Mesquita et al., also raise doubts about Ekman’s results. Even though the recognition of facial expressions across cultures was above chance, it varied between 20 percent and 95 percent, which places into doubt their universality (Mesquita et al., 2015. For a meta-analysis see Elfenbein and Ambady, 2002.)
For other challenges to the emotion expressions see Jack et al., 2012a, b; Gendron et al., 2014 a, b; Levenson et al., 1992; Cacioppo et al., 1993).

If the biological basicness is a characteristic of emotions that are experienced by nonhuman animals, one is still left with a problem of the basic-nonbasic emotion distinction. This is because some emotions like anger may be present in great apes as well as in rats, while emotions like shame and embarrassment may be experienced by chimps but not by rats. What we get here is not the rigid basic-nonbasic emotion characterization but rather a picture of some emotions being more basic than others (Ortony and Turner 1990:321). For these reasons, Ortony and Turner conclude that biological basicness is a vague idea and is not particularly useful in studying emotions.

*Psychological* basicness of basic emotions is a characteristic of emotions that do not contain any other emotions as their parts. If nostalgia is composed of sadness and joy directed at the past then it is not a basic emotion. Ortony and Turner argue that commonly characterized basic emotions are not psychologically primitive because they can be broken down into more basic emotions and other psychological states like pleasure and displeasure. For instance, anger can be said to be a form of distress which makes distress more basic than anger, while "fear is the particular reaction of displeasure about the prospect of … an undesirable event" (ibid., 325). The psychological complexity of the so-called basic emotions is intended to show that the notion of basicness is hard to make sense of.

Furthermore, Ortony and Turner attack the distinction between basic and nonbasic emotions by saying that the kind of blending and fusion proposed by Plutchik presupposes that basic emotions are psychological primitives, and that despite the assumption that each one has its own unique physiological basis, they can be blended to produce a new one. Ortony and Turner
point out that no one has shown what the blending mechanism is and how it works as well as what effects blending might have on the phenomenology and the facial expressions of nonbasic emotions (ibid., 326).

Given the difficulties with maintaining the notion of basic emotions which is presupposed by the notion of the nonbasic ones, Ortony and Turner propose to do away with these distinctions and instead study the components that compose emotions such as appraisals, physiological changes, facial expressions, and action tendencies, as well as the processes by which a given emotion gets formed (ibid., 328).

Two main responses have been given to Ortony and Turner’s criticism. With respect to the biological basicness of some emotions, it has been argued that what is characterized as affect programs, can still be conceived of as natural kinds, if one maintains the HPC theory of natural kinds, and embraces the variability in emotional manifestations (Scarantino & Griffiths, 2011; Izard., 1992, 2007a). One should also avoid using the folk-psychological categories of emotions in conducting research on affect programs. As Scarantino and Griffiths point out, folk-psychological categories of emotions are not suitable categories for scientific investigation (see also Russell, 1991) as indeed all the specified characteristics of basic emotions cannot be applied to all instances of what the folk call "anger" or "fear" (cf. Barrett, 2006a, b). However, if each basic emotion is clearly defined then a number of instances of this emotion can be studied more successfully.

With respect to the psychological basicness of emotions, Ortony and Turner’s main arguments seems to be that basic emotions are not basic because they have other affective components as their parts. But this doesn’t show that basic emotions are not psychologically basic qua emotions since no one is saying that emotions are not complex psychological
processes. Rather, when a number of these processes occur together, an occurrence of an emotion takes place (see also Scarantino & Griffiths, 2011). Ortony and Turner's point about the proper list of basic emotions still stands. As they have illustrated in their example of anger being more complex than distress, perhaps it is true that the permittivity of anger has been taken for granted and that there are more basic emotions like distress that are components of anger. Therefore, the list of basic emotions is yet to be identified (cf. Prinz, 2004).

After these brief considerations, many issues still remain unresolved. For instance, what are the components of emotions? Many of them like appraisal and action tendency are also components of other kinds of mental states, like desire. So what makes a mental state an emotion? How does it get formed? As I have mentioned, concerns put forth by Ortony and Turner have started a new wave of psychological constructionism, an approach to emotions that studies the more basic components of emotions. Klaus Scherer is one example of psychological constructionists with his *componential approach* to emotions (Scherer, 1984). Another competing approach is Lisa Feldman Barrett's *Conceptual Act Model*, which is similar to the two-factor theory (Barrett, 2009)\(^3\). I will not be going over these approaches here. It is not clear that these approaches will prove to be more fruitful than the basic emotions approach, although they may be better suited to address different questions about emotions.

**II.2. Emotions and culture**

Psychological constructionists favor their approach to emotions in part because they claim that their models can better account for the emotional flexibility in different cultural contexts (Barrett, 2014, 2012, 2009). Indeed, since psychological constructionists tend to reject basic-

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\(^3\) Given the similarities between Barrett's view and the Schachter-Singer view, similar objections apply. I have outlined them in chapter 2.
nonbasic emotion distinction, they hold that most if not all emotions have cultural elaborations. As Barrett puts it,

Culture is not an independent variable with emotion as the dependent variable—culture does not cause emotion. Instead, emotions are performances of culture, enacted and structured through the conceptual knowledge that is enacted and transmitted as part of socialization and acculturation. Emotions are events that function as bids to structure relationships and interactions (Barrett, 2014:294).

Barrett points out that emotions are constructed out of past experiences gained from situations and contexts provided by culture. The variability in cultural contexts may provide people with culture-specific emotional conceptions and experiences. Barrett takes the role of culture even further when she says that people have to agree (though this need not be done consciously) that a certain bodily state in a particular social context serves a certain function (ibid.). This is how she believes emotions acquire meaning.

One need not subscribe to psychological constructionism to acknowledge the influence of culture on the emotions. Indeed, Paul Ekman, an avid defender of basic emotions, was one of the first people to identify cultural variability with respect to emotional expressions, which he described as variability in display rules. The experiment Ekman conducted with Friesen (1971) using Japanese and American students showed differences in expression of disgust that was prompted by watching a graphic video in the presence of another person. The Japanese students were suppressing their expressions, whereas the American students were not. There seems to also be a cultural variability with respect to the use of facial muscles in facial expressions of emotions. While Europeans tend to use the muscles of the lower part of their faces a lot, people from Asian cultures employ muscles around the eyes to a greater degree (Jack et al., 2012b).

Display rules are likely to be indicative of the difference in experience of a given emotion as well as of the meta-attitudes held towards a given emotion. The Utku Inuit people are said to
rarely express anger – a basic emotion (Briggs, 1970). The Utku condemn anger, which is the likely reason why they do not express it. The same is likely to be true of the many indigenous cultures discussed above in which romantic jealousy is uncommon or frowned upon.

An experiment with Taiwanese and European American preschoolers showed that Taiwanese preschoolers prefer calm smiles, whereas European American preschoolers prefer highly excited smiles. These preferences show the early socialization of the appropriate emotion display and are indicative of each culture’s conception of happiness (Tsai et al., 2007). The American children interpreted the more excited smiles as expressing a greater amount of happiness experienced as opposed to the Taiwanese children. In the Taiwanese culture happiness is thought of as a calm state rather than an excited one; the inverse is true of the American culture. This idea is further connected with the attitude towards oneself and others and is mapped onto the individualist-collectivist cultural orientation. People in East Asian cultures view themselves as part of the collective, which motivates them to seek harmony with others and not to stand out, whereas Westerners are encouraged to be individualistic, independent and autonomous, and are encouraged to change the attitudes and behaviors of others (Morling, et al, 2002; Weisz et al., 1984; Rothbaum, et al., 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Matsumoto et al., 2008).

The difference in the smile preference by the European American and by the Taiwanese children indicates that it is not simply beliefs that are involved in calibrating certain emotions to culture-specific situations but rather illustrates the effects of the early socialization of the children. Consider an experiment by Trommsdorff and Kornadt (2003), who observed the conflict resolution practices between mothers and their children in Germany and Japan. When a child misbehaved, the German mothers attributed blame to their children and became angry with
them, which led to a conflict and disunity between the mother and the child. Japanese mothers, on the other hand, remained friendly and calm, and explained the child's disobedient behavior as the child's being tired or just being a child. They insisted that the child obeyed but did so in a manner that avoided conflict. Trommsdorff and Kornadt conclude that these relationships are indicative of the autonomous culture of the West and the interdependent culture of the East.

Culture also impacts the eliciting conditions of emotions. For example, cultures influenced by Christianity associate shame with the human body and sexuality, and experiencing shame in certain contexts in which nudity and sexuality are involved is considered appropriate and justifiable in those cultures. On the other hand, in cultures in which there are no taboos on human body or sexuality feeling shame would not only be inappropriate but most likely unintelligible.

So far we have seen how culture can influence facial expressions, meta-attitudes, emotion experience, and eliciting conditions of emotions. They also have an impact on the meaning of emotions, providing them with content. Furthermore, an emotion may be more frequent and occupy a more important place in one culture rather than another. As we have seen within the Utku culture anger is rare. In our culture romantic love is one of the most dominant affective phenomena. The great impact of culture on the emotions has led some psychologists to think that emotions are nothing but social constructions, scripts that people learn to enact through socialization into their specific culture. In the next section I explore a brand of social constructionism of emotions and its implications for romantic love.

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35 Although Jankowiak and Fischer said that they have found the occurrence of romantic love in 87% of cultures, no data have been given on how frequently romantic love is evoked in a given culture. Recall that Jankowiak and Fischer concluded that romantic love exists in a given culture despite the fact that there was no word for it.
II.2.1. Social constructionism of emotions

To say that emotions are socially constructed is not to deny that they have concrete physiological underpinnings. However, the emotional potential can only be realized within a social or cultural context the person is raised into. Social constructionists emphasize the crucial role socialization plays in defining a person's emotional repertoire. James Averill, a social constructionist, argues that preverbal human infants only express their biological potential of emotions through fussing, cooling, withdrawal, etc., and become capable of experiencing emotions only after they have been socialized (Averill, 1997). Similarly, nonhuman animals do not experience the same emotions as humans do even if there is a phylogenetic continuity between human emotions and animal affective states.

One of the main reasons why Averill does not wish to equate animal emotions with human emotions is because of the role that language plays in the social constructionist model of emotions. Earlier in this chapter we have seen criticism of basic emotion research that rests on the fact that some researchers employ folk-psychological concepts in their study of emotions which creates the problem of fairly broad and underspecified emotion categories. Indeed, one approach to basic emotions is based on conceptual analysis of emotion words (Rosch, 1973, 1978; Fehr & Russell, 1984). Some psychologists think of the basicness of emotions in terms of how abstract and primitive a given emotion term is and how early it is taught by the parents to their children. However, it is important to keep the scientific study of emotions separate from the study of the folk-psychological categories of emotions. All that the study of folk-psychological concepts can reveal is the use of the emotion words in everyday life. However, these emotion words need not neatly align with the scientific categories of emotions, and may not reflect the
actual emotional life within a particular culture (see Greenwood, 1994; Scarantino & Griffiths, 2011).

Averill is aware of the difference between folk-psychological categories of emotions and the scientific study of emotions. He acknowledges that taxonomy of emotional words and concepts is a linguistic study rather than a study of emotions themselves. However, Averill thinks that there is a crucial link between language and emotions – through language people in different cultures acquire the emotional stock that is specific to their culture (Averill, 1997). This would explain why some emotion words like *amae, amok, song, gezelligheid* are said to be not directly translatable into English. These emotions are presumably unique to specific cultures, and the inability to directly translate them into other languages suggests the absence of these emotions in other cultures.

Averill believes that labeling one’s experience can change the emotional experience one is having. This is because emotion terms are not simply descriptive but are *prescriptive* (Averill, 1997:531; see also Barrett, 2009). He says, “The network of ideas and propositions that lend meaning to our everyday emotional concepts also help constitute and regulate behavior denoted by those concepts” (Averill, 1997:531). He also says, “Emotions do not exist independently of their conceptualizations” (ibid). Thus, Averill insists on a marriage between the folk-psychological categories and the scientific categories of emotions since for him conceptualizations of emotions plays a major role in determining one’s emotional experiences.

Averill conceives of emotions as cultural scripts which he calls *syndromes*. Social rules and norms regulate our emotional experiences by constructing a *prototype* of a given emotion by which an emotional experienced can be measured (Averill, 1980 a, b, 2005, 2012). Averill defines a syndrome as, “an organized set of responses (behavioral, physiological, and/or
cognitive),” and he specifies that, “The specific responses need not be, in-and-of-themselves, emotional” (Averill, 1985:98). For instance, in the case of anger, there are typical behavioral responses none of which is necessary for attributing anger: one may lash out, withdraw, get worked up, or remain calm in anger. There are a number of elements that are part of the emotion syndrome, none of which are essential to it (Averill, 1980a, 1985).

Averill thinks that emotions are cultural scripts because they are manifestations of the social roles that are characterized as “a socially prescribed set of responses to be followed by a person in a given situation” (Averill, 1980:308). The emotions’ meaning, their appropriateness in a given situation, and the 'instructions' for how and when to carry them out are learned through socialization. When a person attributes a given emotion to themselves, they are taking on a social role, following a script that others will recognize them as enacting. Their ‘act’ will be interpreted within a larger context in which they are situated (Averill, 1980a:314-15).

Averill distinguishes between 'playing a role' and 'being in the role'. 'Being in the role' is an authentic role enactment, which requires social recognition and legitimacy, established by the rules of emotions (Averill, 1997:536). Averill also says that emotional syndromes provide certain privileges, restrictions, and obligations. He thinks that the privilege of an emotion syndrome is to allow for behavior that would otherwise be inexcusable. For example, a crime of passion reduces the responsibility of the killer from murder to manslaughter. Similarly, being in love is an excuse for sex (ibid., 535)36. The emotional syndrome of amok or the wild pig syndrome, common among the young men of the Gururumba tribe in New Guinea, which is manifested by their looting the homes of their neighbors, and is followed by a state of amnesia, is an example of stress behavior from the financial difficulties young men sometimes experience after getting

36 There is a better example in Plato's Symposium, when Pausanias says that shameful behavior like pleading with one's beloved in public or sleeping on the doorsteps of the house of the beloved is excused because these actions are done in the context of love (182D-183C).
married. This behavior is understood as a sickness, and is, therefore, excused. Averill believes that emotion syndromes are learned involuntary responses. Their apparent involuntariness is what excuses the behavior that they motivate within the domain that the cultural contexts allow.

II.2.2. Romantic love - a social construction?

Averill believes that romantic love is a paradigm example of an emotion, a hyper-emotion in our culture, since it is so dominant in our music, literature, TV shows, and since we attribute to it a central role in our conception of happiness and a good life. In his article "The Social Construction of Emotion: With Special Reference to Love" (1985), he says that like other emotions, love is a complex syndrome and that there is an ideal of love or a love paradigm by which we judge our own romantic experiences.

Averill believes that romantic love is an invention of Western civilization which took place in the Middle Ages. Indeed, in recent decades this has been a popular view among some historians, philosophers, and sociologists (Griffiths, 1997; Solomon, 2006). Using the tradition of social constructionism of emotions, Averill cites Henry Theophilus Finck in identifying three characteristics of love. First, romantic love consists of a complex varying set of feelings, attitudes, and sentiments. Second, not everyone can love. A person needs to be taught about romantic love to be able to love. (As la Rochefoucauld had said, "People would never fall in love if they hadn’t heard love talked about" (Maxim 136. Moral Maxims and Reflections, 1678/2008)). Third, romantic love was invented in the Middle Ages and dates back to Dante first falling in love in 1274. Furthermore, romantic love's presumed historical origin explains the idealization of the beloved: the female beloved of a knight was representative of the Virgin Mary, while the love between them was extramarital and forbidden.
So far we can say that romantic love is a social construction whose script will vary depending on the place and time. There is a cultural ideal of romantic love. One's culture will provide instructions for when, with whom, and how it is that one should fall in love. For example, it is considered inappropriate to fall in love with somebody who is not yet an adult, someone with whom one has a big age difference, or someone who is nonhuman. For a long time in our culture it has been considered inappropriate to fall in love with somebody of one's own sex.

The idea of romantic love as a script is illustrated in Robert Nozick's account of romantic love. Although Nozick never puts the point in terms of love being a script, he defines love as a desire to form a "we" – the desire to merge oneself with the other person in such a way that the two people create a super identity in which one cares for the well-being of the beloved as one would for one's own (Nozick, 1990). His 'we' account closely reflects the paradigm ideal of love in our culture.

Nozick describes the way in which romantic relationship progresses first from infatuation in which the lover is attracted to the beloved on the basis of their intrinsic properties, to love that transcends these qualities such that the beloved is loved as an end in themselves and for who they are. The interaction between the lovers is manifested in the division of labor, in caring for one another, and appearing to the world as one unit, a couple, a "we". If all goes well the couple will get married and have children. This is a typical way in which romantic relationships are perceived in our culture – they are supposed to progress from dating to living together, to getting married and having children. Nozick even points out the gender differences in romantic love which demonstrate the culture stereotypes: for men love is one project among many projects they pursue, for women love is everything. That, Averill, would say, is just part of the script.
II.2.3. Why emotions are not scripts

It is impossible to deny the influence that culture has on different aspects of emotions. However, there are a number of issues with Averill’s social constructionism. One is that he insists that emotion words are necessary for emotion experiences. He believes that emotional experiences are reflective and that one interprets one's own emotional state by labeling it with a certain emotion word. However, even though learning emotion words might influence the person's understanding of emotions, it is incorrect to say that labeling one's internal state is sufficient to produce an emotion. I have made a similar criticism in my discussion of the two-factor theory in the previous chapter and will not repeat my arguments here. Furthermore, emotion words have little to do with emotion experiences. As Greenwood puts it,

> It is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of shame or motive of revenge that it is described or represented by the actor or any observer – or social group or collective – as 'shame' or 'motive of revenge.' It is necessary and sufficient that it involves the representation of an action (or failure to act) as degrading and humiliating, or as restitution for a prior injury: that it has the properties attributed by the descriptions 'shame' and 'motive of revenge' (Greenwood, 1994:154).

The intentional content of a given emotion is not determined by the label given to it but rather by the intentionality of internal state of the person in a given situation. The descriptive terms of our mental states are not part of their content. People can experience an emotion without knowing the word for it. It is also very likely that not every emotion has a label.

A rich emotional vocabulary within a given culture may be interpreted by a social constructionist as indicative of a highly rich emotional life of that culture. However, there is no reason to expect that such correlation exists. The richness and diversity of emotional life in a given culture is determined by the richness and diversity of the forms of evaluations of actions.
and situations that are constitutive of emotions, rather than by the abundance of emotion labels in that culture (Greenwood, 1994:163).

Averill is correct to talk about paradigms of emotions and to point out that through socialization one learns the cultural rules of emotions. However, it is incorrect to say that emotions are simply scripts. Emotions may have culturally prescribed behaviors associated with them, but they can often be characterized apart from these behaviors. Some emotions have biological substrates that arise in almost all instances and across all cultures. Furthermore, although behavior and eliciting conditions vary cross-culturally, they are not part of an emotion. Social constructionism is at times negligent in pointing this out. At the same time, it is true that cultural paradigms provide specific emotional content as well as regulations for their intensity.

The variability of emotions along their various dimensions is a legitimate subject for empirical investigation. For instance, as Mesquita, Frijda and Scherer (1997) point out in their detailed meta-analysis of cross-cultural emotional variations, the degree to which there are differences along any dimension of an emotion depends on the level of abstraction in one's explanation. If the explanation is fairly general, then there is lots of overlap. However, when one begins to emphasize one particular feature of an emotional phenomenon, the likelihood of cultural differences increases. As I have pointed out, the emotional experience itself may be impacted by culture in terms of its intensity, phenomenology, and valence.

Despite the high variability of emotions, one way in which they can be unified is by their formal objects. Anger is still about some wrongdoing or injustice, sadness is still about a loss, joy is about the positive state of affairs, etc. (Prinz, 2004:137, 151). This is why even when the anger of Americans is different from the anger of the Japanese, or the sadness of the Utku is different from the sadness of the Westerners, we can recognize their emotion as anger and
sadness by asking what the emotion's particular function is, what it is tracking about the person and the world. Each emotion helps a person deal with a particular life task. These life tasks can be thought of as culture-specific, as when one thinks of the frequency of an emotional occurrence and the kind of emotion that is required (think again about the difference between the European American children and Taiwanese children and their smile preferences, or the anger manifested by the German and the Japanese mothers). They can also be thought of as universal when one thinks of them as functional states that make the interaction between persons and environment possible, (as in 'what does it mean to be happy', 'what does it mean to be responsible', etc.). For this reason, emotions are not simply cultural scripts. Rather, they have cultural scripts (ibid., 138).

II.2.4 Romantic love so far…

Averill also overstates the case for romantic love when he defines it as a script. It is true that romantic love is heavily shaped by culture. For example, cultures differ in the degree to which love is associated with sex and also with marriage (Lindhom, 2006). Likewise, some cultures consider it shameful and other cultures praiseworthy to feel love (Beach & Tesser, 1988; Branden, 1985). But there is no reason to infer that love is nothing more than a script. Some of the emotional dimensions of love are robust cross culturally, and these may have deep biological roots (Neto et al., 2000). This explains why romantic love is characterized as an obsessive passionate state cross-culturally. Although Averill does not deny that biological responses, such as lust, can be dimensions of love, his script metaphor misleadingly implies that love is a mere act that could have taken any form.
As to the claim that romantic love is a product of the clash between Christianity and taboos on sex in the Middle Ages, it is likely that romantic love had existed prior to that period, since the Jankowiak and Fischer study indicates that societies untouched by the Western influence possess the phenomenon of romantic love. As Irving Singer suggest, it is likely that during the Middle Ages romantic love began to acquire a center stage in Europe, and this is why some believe that it is invention of the West.

In the following chapters I argue that romantic love is best characterized as a syndrome though I will provide a somewhat different definition of a syndrome than that of Averill's. Averill believes that all emotions are essentially syndromes. I argue that romantic love is a syndrome but not an emotion. We might begin to get a glimpse as to why that is by looking at Averill's treatment of romantic love. When comparing love to other emotions, Averill identifies targets and formal objects of anger and fear, and takes care to distinguish them from the causes of emotions. However, he fails to do a similar sort of analysis for romantic love. In essence, he fails to say what the formal object of romantic love – lovability – is. But this is essential in characterizing romantic love as an emotion. In the following chapter I argue that romantic love unlike other emotions has no formal object, and provide further arguments for thinking that romantic love is not an emotion.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have argued that romantic love is not a basic emotion. My main argument was that it does not appear to have an adaptive function. I then discussed nonbasic emotions and examined their two variants: blends and calibrations. I have argued that romantic love is neither a blended nor a calibrated emotion. I said that it is not a blended emotion because it is not clear
which emotions would have to blend together to form romantic love. I have said that it is not a calibration because it isn't clear which basic emotion is calibrated to what eliciting conditions or beliefs in romantic love.

I then examined criticism made against the notion of basic emotions and pointed out that despite there being a way of making the category of basic emotions meaningful, the current trend in psychology is that of psychological constructionism. Psychological constructionism and the criticism against the notion of basic emotions are partly based on the evidence of cultural variability of emotions. This leads some people to believe that emotions are social constructions. I have examined the notion of social constructionism and its implications for romantic love. I have argued that emotions are not social constructions because they are not scripts. I have also said that romantic love is not a script even though it is highly susceptible to cultural variability.

The analysis provided in this chapter now allows me to move on to the question of the intentionality of romantic love. In the following chapter I will provide further arguments for thinking that romantic love is not an emotion by showing that unlike other emotions romantic love has no aptness conditions.
CHAPTER 4: INTENTIONALITY, REPRESENTATION, AND REASON: ARATIONALITY OF ROMANTIC LOVE

In the previous chapter I have provided further reasons for thinking that romantic love is not an emotion by showing that it does not fit into the categories of basic and nonbasic emotions. I also rejected the social constructionist approach to emotions pursued by Averill. However, I said that I agree with Averill that romantic love is a syndrome. In this chapter I consider the question of norms of rationality with respect to romantic love, drawing again on the analogy with emotions. I argue that there are no aptness or fittingness conditions that romantic love has, and conclude that although romantic love has content, it does not represent anything, and is, in essence, arational.

In Part I of this chapter I discuss various ways in which rationality of emotions can be understood. I argue that rationality as aptness is the relevant sense of rationality for the discussion of the justification of romantic love. I illustrate what it means for an emotion to be apt. I demonstrate the ways in which the meaning of an emotion is determined and is represented in its formal object. I also show how the notion of aptness is connected to the intelligibility of emotions, yet, at the same time, is distinct from it. In Part II, I argue that romantic love cannot be judged to be either apt or inapt and that it cannot be shown to be warranted in this way. I consider a pro tanto reasons objection and show that it does not succeed in undermining my account of the arationality of romantic love. I consider the question of representation of romantic love and the role the evaluative properties play in its content. I conclude that although romantic love has a phenomenology into which various evaluative properties enter, given the nature of the attitude of romantic love, they cannot be said to represent anything. For this reason, despite romantic love’s evaluative content, it is nonrepresentational. This conclusion leads me to fully
develop my thesis that romantic love is best categorized as a syndrome rather than an emotion – a point which I defend in chapter 5.

Part I: The rationality of emotions

I.1. Rationality of emotions: preliminary remarks

Rationality of emotions can be understood in a variety of ways, although there has also been a longstanding tradition that clams that emotions are inherently irrational (for overview see Solomon, 1993). First, one might claim that emotional responses are either not based on reasons and/or that they are not responsive to reasons. For instance, one might argue that one’s fear of mice is irrational since mice are not dangerous. One might agree that this is so and even sincerely believe that mice are not dangerous. However, upon encountering a mouse, one finds oneself in a state of fear, nonetheless. One might be told again or remind oneself that mice are not dangerous, and yet find that these facts when brought up in one’s occurrent state of fear have little or no impact on that state. One continues to be afraid even in light of these facts. Thus, it might be argued that this case of fear is irrational.

Second, since emotions are tied to motivation, they also often trigger a behavioral response. In the case of fear of the mouse, one might jump on a chair, start screaming, and throw at the mouse whatever objects one might find in the vicinity. It might be pointed out that none of these actions are warranted since they are intended to protect the individual from something that isn’t dangerous in the first place. For this reason, the actions triggered by an emotion are also irrational as they are based on an irrational state that cannot justify them.

Given these considerations, it might be tempting to conclude that emotions are distractions to our practical thinking and that a mastery of our emotional life is in order, where
one would not let emotions get out of control by minimizing the emotional responses or not allowing them to have impact on our thinking (indeed, Michael Brady (2016) thinks that emotions tend to misfire). Therefore, it might be deemed impractical to feel emotions as they tend to interfere with our decision-making and our acting prudently.

However, it is unreasonable to suggest that emotions are inherently impractical or that they always interfere with practical reasoning. Rather, it appears that having emotions gives us a practical advantage. Since emotions are kinds of evaluations, they provide us with information about ourselves and the world (de Sousa, 1987; Tappolet, 2016; Prinz, 2004). Given their quick and automatic onset, the processing and the presentation of the information at hand are in some instances more efficient than, say, making an explicit judgment. As discussed in chapter 2, the function of emotions is to provide us with information in just this manner, as well as to prepare us for a response via the closely-associated action tendencies, and to occasionally indicate a state of our mind to others via our posture and facial expressions. Furthermore, emotions narrow the domain of facts that may be considered relevant in a given situation, thereby highlighting a set of features of the situation as salient. This allows us to concentrate on whatever is presented as important, and makes it possible to make decisions and to act. Therefore, emotions as such do provide us with an indispensable tool for quickly adjusting to our environments (de Sousa, 1987; Goldman, 1986; Jones, 2004, Tappolet, 2016; Deonna & Teroni, 2012).

It is also not the case that our emotional responses are insensitive to reason. Generally, they change in light of new relevant facts. When I realize that I misheard what you said, and what you said was not at all offensive, I cease to be angry with you. Upon realizing that the snake on the floor is a toy-snake, I stop being scared of the snake. Furthermore, our emotional responses are vital for our moral lives, as they provide motivation for our acting
morally. Our emotional dispositions are also often times indicative of our character traits. For this reason, it appears that a cultivation of one’s moral character is possible through cultivating appropriate emotional responses, which in turn, is done through subjecting oneself to scrutiny through a reflective discourse (Ellis, 1962; Haidt, 2001; Morgan, 2003; Teasdale et al., 2002). Although there is a class of recalcitrant emotions, that are more difficult to adjust to a more reasonable response, they tend to be an exception to the rule (see Tappolet, 2012; Brady, 2007, 2009; D'Arms & Jacobson, 2003; Döring, 2015).

Similarly, our emotional responses sometimes serve as justifications for our judgments (Tappolet, 2016; Deonna & Teroni, 2012; for a different view see Brady, 2016). We judge the film to be scary because we were scared watching it. We judge an occasion as a sad one because it has triggered sadness in us. Of course, sometimes emotions may fail to justify a given judgment. Perhaps the occasion was not at all sad despite my feeling sad about it. Perhaps the film was not at all scary even though I felt scared watching it. But the fact that emotions can fail to justify our judgments sometimes, does not show that they can never justify them. Rather, their success or failure of justifying a given judgment might depend on the emotions themselves being warranted. Thus, we need to look at what warrants emotions in a relevant sense to be able to explain how they succeed and fail to justify our judgments.

I.1.1. Norms of rationality of emotions

In what follows, I discuss five norms of rationality applicable to emotions. Two of them are intrinsic – aptness and intelligibility. Three of them are extrinsic – non-epistemic intelligibility, prudence, and morality. I begin by discussing aptness, the most important intrinsic norm of rationality of emotions. I examine the concept of formal objects and show its intricate connection
with aptness. I then discuss two forms of intelligibility, and show the ways in which epistemic and non-epistemic intelligibility are connected to the formal object of emotion. In the reminder of part I, I examine prudential and moral norms of rationality applicable to emotions. I demonstrate the connections between these norms and that of aptness. I conclude part I by illustrating how the conflation of moral and prudential norms with aptness result in moralistic and prudential fallacies.

I.1.1.1. Aptness of emotions

Aptness of emotions is their most fundamental rationality norm. It may be closely paralleled with the notion of truth with respect to beliefs. The function of belief is to track truth. In particular, on the correspondence theory of truth, a belief is true when it correctly represents the state of affairs. Similarly, as I said in chapter 2, a function of an emotion is to track matters of import. However, this is too vague, as practical and moral concerns are things that also matter to us. More specifically, the aptness assessment of an emotion points to the primary function of representation of values by emotions. This primary function of each emotion is defined by its formal object – the value-laden property that the emotion is supposed to represent. For instance, fear represents dangerousness, anger represents the insulting or the offensive, amusement represents the amusing, etc. Indeed, an emotion’s meaning is defined by its formal object. For this reason, aptness is the rational norm that assesses the accuracy of presentation of the relevant aspects of the target of the emotion.

When I ask whether my fear is apt, I ask whether or not the situation presents a real danger to me. When I ask whether my anger is apt, I ask whether or not something was really
insulting, etc. The values that each emotion is supposed to track supervene\(^{37}\) on a set of natural facts of the situation. Thus, in the case of my fear of the dog, dangerousness would supervene on the menacing teeth of the dog, the dog’s attacking posture, and my knowledge that the dog has rabies. In the case of my anger at Dan, the offensiveness would supervene on him saying to me that a woman’s place is in the kitchen. In each case of the occurrence of the emotion we can ask, was the emotional reaction apt? Was it fitting to the situation? In the cases just described, the answer is yes. My fear and my anger are warranted because my emotional responses are apt – they correctly represent the values that supervene on the natural facts in each situation.

I.1.1.2. The nature of formal objects

As I have just outlined, aptness is the rational criterion that is directly related to what is taken to be the primary function of emotions, which is to represent situations and objects as being value-laden with particular values. These values are called *formal objects* of emotions. They provide a unified account for each emotion type in so far as they specify what each emotion type is about. They are the values which each emotion type tracks. For instance, my fear can be directed at a dog, an exam, or a monster in a film. All these different objects at which my instances of fear are directed are *targets*, or particular/proper objects. However, what makes all these instances of my emotion instances of fear is the fact that I *represent* these various targets as dangerous. Thus, formal objects *individuate* emotion-types (Kenny, 1963).

Formal objects shed light on the *intentionality* of emotions. Formal objects are the evaluative properties that each emotion-type is supposed to track. In particular, they explain how emotions present certain features of their targets as *salient*. When I am afraid of the dog, I

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\(^{37}\) I understand the relationship between value properties and natural properties as value properties being irreducible to natural properties. Value properties supervene on natural properties such that the change in the value properties cannot occur unless there is a change in natural properties.
represent the dog as dangerous. What allows for this kind of representation is the fact that an emotion will bring to my attention the attributes of the dog that make it dangerous. Thus, the menacing teeth, the growl, the dog’s readiness to pounce are the features that the emotion of fear shows to be relevant. At the same time, other features of the situation such as it being sunny, the dog’s coat color and texture, its name being Fido, fall in the background as they do not bear on the dangerousness of the situation.

Formal objects are also connected to the aptness conditions of emotions as it is the presence or absence of these evaluative properties that make an occurrence of an emotion fitting or unfitting. If the relevant features of the dog described above are really present, the dog poses a real danger to me. My fear of the dog is apt. If, however, the features that would ground dangerousness are absent, and I experience fear anyway, my fear has misfired. It is inapt.

This triple function of formal objects — their individuating emotions, explaining their intentionality, and making sense of the aptness conditions of emotions — seem to construe the evaluative properties, which emotions pick out, as response-independent. This is because the natural features of the world such as the teeth of the dog, its growling, and it aggressive behavior ground the property of being dangerous, and it appears that evaluative properties are out there in the world. The advantage of this view is that it is fairly easy to make sense of the emotions’ representation and misrepresentation. If the natural features of the world that ground the evaluative properties are absent, the emotion has misfired. From this we get an objective standard of correctness that is special to emotions, and which we can use to make sense of them in their own right. The upshot of this is that “[T]he apprehension of a given value and the actual exemplification of this value must be to some extent independent from one another. The
evaluate properties of the objects in the world cannot be, so to speak, merely in the eye of the beholder” (Deonna & Teroni, 2012:41).

Thus, the primary function of an emotion is to represent. This, of course, means that an emotion may misrepresent its target as having a particular value. This happens when there are no natural properties of the target onto which the misrepresented value supervenes. But how does an emotion represent values? That is, (1) in virtue of what is there a value in a given situation and (2) how is that value being successfully represented by an emotion? Here we must look at the nature of evaluative properties to understand how certain situations can be value-laden. Getting clear on this question will further help us understand the relationship between values, content of emotions, and emotional representation.

I have been assuming that values are response-independent properties that supervene on natural properties in the world but are not reducible to them. Call this view objectivism or naïve realism about values. However, there are two other ways in which values may be understood. They are perceptivism and projectivism (D’Arms & Jacobson, 2007). Projectivism construes values as being projected onto the world via our emotions, taking emotions to be the sole source of their existence (Blackburn, 1980, 1985). Thus, values are projected properties. The in-between position is perceptivism. Like objectivism, it holds that values are real. Like projectivism, it holds that their reality at least in part depends on the emotional responses themselves. Perceptivism construes values as response-dependent properties (McDowell, 1985; Wiggins, 1987).

What are the implications of these different ways of thinking about the nature of values? D’Arms and Jacobson point out that all the sophisticated accounts of objectivism, projectivism, and perceptivism attempt to explicate the relationship between emotions and values in such a
way as to show that the emotional responses can be apt. For this reason, D’Arms and Jacobson think that the question of the ontology of values is not as interesting as the question about the aptness norms of emotions (D’Arms & Jacobson, 2007: 188, 204). In what follows, I sketch the relationship between formal objects and emotions under these three different headings to demonstrate how emotions’ content and representational character can be understood. Since the ontological status of formal objects makes very little difference in the discussion of aptness of emotions, and since the kinds of reasons relevant to aptness of emotions have to do with the natural facts of the situations, I continue to think of formal objects as response-independent properties.

I.1.1.2.1. Formal objects as projected properties

According to a primitive form of projectivism, simple subjectivism, evaluative properties come into existence when a particular emotional occurrence takes place. In this way dangerousness or loss would consist in the occurrence of an emotion of fear or sadness. This would entail that something is dangerous if I am afraid of it; something is a loss because I am sad about it. It would also mean that the evaluative properties arise with respect to a specific subject at a specific moment in time (Deonna & Teroni, 2012:42).

This form of projectivism is extreme as it implies that there cannot be rational and perhaps even intelligible disputes about a given situation or object exemplifying a particular kind of evaluative property, as well as rendering a particular emotional response fitting. It means that emotions do not inform us about how we are faring in the world, and therefore, they do not contribute anything useful to our decision making and acting. It also means that it is not possible to assess a situation as truly dangerous or sad as well as to assess a given emotional response as
being rational and intelligible. This is so because the only available answer to the question, ‘why is the situation dangerous?’ is that I am afraid. This is hopelessly circular. However, these implications are contradicted by the fact that emotions can misfire. This in turn is supported by the fact that emotions contain meaning beyond the projected value suggested here. The everyday practices we engage in when we assess situations as having certain values as well as our emotional responses as being fitting or unfitting suggests that this radical subjectivism takes things too far.

To deal with this worry, some philosophers choose to refer to higher-order attitudes that express a norm which can be used to assess one’s emotional response. Thus, I might subscribe to a norm that says that I should only be sad when there is a loss, and when I find myself sad without there being a loss, I evaluate my sadness as irrational (D’Arms & Jacobson, 2007: 198). However, this attempt to get around the worry of accounting for the fittingness of emotions does not go far enough for it does not specify just what kind of standard of correctness I might have in mind when I assess my emotional responses. D’Arms and Jacobson call it the conflation problem – the ambiguity of the standard of correctness used for the said assessment. For this reason, projectivism needs to get clear on the kind of norms of rationality it is appealing to. It also needs to show that this standard can be applied to different individuals.38

I.1.1.2.2. Formal objects as response-dependent properties

Another possibility is that formal objects are response-dependent properties. Rather than being simply projected onto the world by one’s token emotional responses, values are understood as being produced by emotional responses which are in turn produced by particular sorts of eliciting

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38 For a sophisticated version of projectivism that attempts to address these issues see Blackburn, 1985, 1993.
conditions. There are two kinds of accounts of perceptivism – dispositionalism and sensibility theory. I briefly discuss each one in turn.

Dispositionalism is modeled on Locke’s account of secondary qualities. On this view, evaluative properties are realized in the dispositions to have a particular emotional response in a given situation. Thus, we can explain the correlations of occurrences of particular emotions in particular situations: these sorts of situations produces fears, while these other ones sadness. And we may even decide to think of fittingness in terms of the correlation of an occurrence of an emotion in a given situation with typical cases of such occurrences. If fear usually occurs in this sort of situation, then one’s fear response in this situation is fitting. If it is some other emotion that is not common, it is unfitting. However, saying that a response is simply normal or common does not yet show that it is fitting or apt because it avoids any functional explanation of the disposition of that response. Why does it correlate with these particular eliciting conditions? Why does it take the form that it does? Simply providing a causal explanation does not merit a rational assessment of the disposition and the responses it produces. This is where the analogy between values and colors breaks down.

An alternative view that tries to capture the response-dependency of values while at the same time accounting for the aptness of emotions is called sensibility theory (Darwall, Gibbard, & Railton, 1992). As D’Arms and Jacobson put it,

Sensibility theory aspires to vindicate the phenomenology of valuing as a matter of sensitivity to features of the world, while acknowledging that values are founded on human sentimental responses. This makes values subjective in one sense but objective in another: they are really there to be experienced, not merely figments of the subjective states that purport to be experiences of them. Although values are essentially tied up with patterns of affective concern, nothing about this admitted subjectivity of values requires that we regard evaluative thought as a matter of projecting onto reality something that isn't really there (D’Arms & Jacobson, 2007: 191).
Sensibility theory avoids the problems faced by the dispositional accounts of value by making justification its central issue. Thus, something isn’t admirable simply because it tends to cause admiration. Rather, it is admirable because there are good reasons for perceiving it as admirable. This view coheres well with our everyday practice of evaluating our emotional responses as being rational or irrational (McDowell, 1985). At the same time, just like projectivism, sensibility theory faces the conflation problem – solving the question of which norms of rationality should be employed for emotional assessment and how best to understand fittingness of emotions (D’Arms & Jacobson, 2007: 203-4).

I.1.1.2.3. Formal objects as response-independent properties

The last possibility is to think of formal objects as response-independent properties. These properties supervene on the natural properties of the world, and we access them through our emotional responses. This objectivist view has been defended by Prinz (2004)39, Tappolet (2016), and Deonna and Teroni (2012). I briefly present their views to illustrate the ways in which representation and content of emotions are understood.

All three of these accounts endorse the idea that emotions represent their formal objects, response-independent properties. Prinz argues that the formal object of fear is dangerousness, which supervenes on a set of natural properties. He points out that dangerousness is a response-independent property because something may be dangerous regardless of whether or not I represent it to myself as dangerous (Prinz 2004:63-4). Furthermore, dangerousness is relative, as some things might be dangerous to me but not to others. If, for example, I have a deadly peanut allergy, peanuts are dangerous to me but not to most other people. Similarly, Prinz says that the

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39 Prinz no longer holds this view. He now thinks that formal objects are projected properties and that emotions cannot be assessed for aptness (Shargel & Prinz, 2017).
formal object of sadness is loss of something valued because a loss is a loss regardless of whether or not I actually happen to feel sad about it (ibid.). On his view defended in 2004, emotions track values that are out there in the world, and represent organism-environment relationships.

When it comes to representation, Prinz seems to take the evaluative properties to be the \textit{content} of an emotional occurrence. The situation or the object at which the emotion is directed, and which may have caused the emotion, is represented by a different kind of mental state, a \textit{cognitive basis} of emotion, while the emotion itself is directed at that representation: “If I am sad about the death of a child, I have one mental representation that corresponds to the child's death and another, my sadness, that corresponds to there having been a loss... Together, we can think of these as constituting a complex representation that means the child's death has been a loss to me.” (Prinz, 2004:62). Even though the child’s death is not part of the content of the emotion of sadness, the emotion is directed at that event which is represented by another mental state, perhaps a belief in this case. Thus, together the emotion of sadness directed at the child’s death, represent the child’s death \textit{as a loss} to me.

While this model of representation is plausible, Prinz’s explanation for the mechanism that achieves this representation raises doubts some of which have already been discussed in chapter 2. For, according to this account, the emotion represent their formal objects in virtue of being reliably caused by certain conditions as well as having a function to represent them which is either selected for by evolution or provided in part by cultural norms. In particular, emotions are perceptions of bodily states that signify the changes in the organism-environment relationship by reliably co-occurring with specific kinds of eliciting conditions while carrying out their
functions. Yet, there is nothing about the bodily changes themselves that leads to their representing the formal objects they presumably track. They appear to be accidental.

Another view which takes formal objects to be response-independent properties is defended by Christine Tappolet. Recall from chapter 2 that on her view emotions are perceptions of values unless they misfire. For instance, she thinks that the formal object of fear is *fearsomeness*, “understood not as the property of causing fear, but as that of making fear appropriate” (Tappolet, 2016:50). Thus, emotions have evaluative content. They represent their targets as having specific evaluative properties. She also thinks that evaluative properties are generally nonrelational and fully objective. They exist independently of any observers akin to primary qualities (Tappolet, 2016:116). At the same time, advancing her view of Representational Neo-Sentimentalism, Tappolet argues that evaluative concepts are response-dependent. I have already raised objections to Tappolet’s account of emotional representation, and I will not repeat them here (see section II.2.4. in chapter 2).

Deonna and Teroni also argue that formal objects are response-independent properties (Deonna & Teroni, 2012). Recall that on their attitudinal view, emotions are attitudes taken towards a given target. An emotion is appropriate when the target exemplifies the evaluative property an emotion is supposed to track. While it appears that Prinz’s and Tappolet’s accounts say that the evaluative properties are part of the content of the emotion, Deonna and Teroni deny this. Instead, they argue that the evaluation is provided by the emotional attitude itself, while it may be directed at nonevaluative content. Just like belief, conjecture, desire, stipulation, doubt, etc., can be about the rain falling outside, so can various emotions be directed at the same state of affairs. Thus, one may be sad that it is raining, rejoiced that it is, amused by it, angered, etc. Deonna and Teroni sum up, “[E]motions are about the particular objects that are provided by the

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40 Emphasis added
various psychological states that function as their cognitive bases: they are attitudes that we take towards these objects” (Deonna & Teroni, 2012: 77). When I am afraid of the dog, I represent it to myself as dangerous by taking the evaluative attitude of fear towards it. When an emotional occurrence matches up with the evaluative properties that supervene on the natural properties of the emotion’s target, the emotional occurrence is fitting. This is closely analogous with belief. The function of beliefs is to track truth. When we believe something, we represent it as true. So it appears that truth is not part of the belief’s content but rather part of the mode of information representation. Yet, just because we do represent something as true doesn't mean our beliefs are true. They are only true when the facts they represent are real facts.

Unlike Prinz, who explains representation of emotions by using Dretske’s account of informational semantics, Deonna and Teroni emphasize the phenomenological component of emotions as representing the evaluative property of a given emotion attitude. They say “[T]he emotionally relevant bodily changes are experienced as distinct stances we adopt towards specific objects… [E]motions … [are] distinctive types of bodily awareness, where the subject experiences her body holistically as taking an attitude towards a certain object…” (ibid., 79). This bodily awareness is understood as felt action-readiness directed towards the target, and not one’s body.

Through the accounts of Prinz, Tappolet, and Deonna and Teroni, we can see the ways in which evaluate properties, representation, and content may hang together. While there is disagreement about whether evaluative properties are part of the content of the emotion or whether they are part of the mode of presentation of some content, they all take evaluative properties that are being tracked by emotions as supervening on a set of natural properties, and take their existence to be independent of the emotional occurrences themselves.
More generally, as seen from the discussion of objectivism, projectivism, and perceptivism, regardless of one’s ontological views of value, the persistent theme is the rational assessment of our emotional responses, in particular, their aptness. I adopt the response-independent property view of formal objects because it is least mysterious and easiest to use for aptness assessment. In the following section I say more about aptness as a rationality norm of emotions and show the way it is connected to but is different from emotion’s intelligibility. I also discuss the justification of emotional occurrences.

I.1.1.3. Aptness, intelligibility, and justification

In the previous sections I have outlined three functions formal objects serve. First, they individuate emotions by their types, second, they explain emotions’ intentionality, third, they specify correctness conditions for each emotion type. I will dwell a little longer on the issue of formal objects, exploring their connection with aptness. In this section I discuss the meaning of emotions, and the ways in which their intelligibility conditions and aptness conditions are connected, while being separate.

By shedding light on emotions’ intentionality, formal objects also explain how emotions can be meaningful. Indeed, it is in virtue of their representing their formal objects that they have the meaning that they do. Thus, fear is about danger, sadness is about loss, admiration is about the admirable, amusement is about the amusing. Their meaning is determined by their intentionality, the evaluative properties they represent.

It is important to notice that the evaluative property in question is not identical with the evolutionary function of an emotion. For instance, it is often argued that emotions like shame and guilt have been selected for to facilitate cooperation and group survival (Fessler 2001, 2004;
Frank, 1988; Gibbard, 1990; Gilbert, 2003). However, neither shame nor guilt is about cooperation. Rather, shame is about one’s failure to live up to an ideal, while guilt is about one’s failure to abide by a norm (Roberts, 2003; Deonna & Teroni, 2008). Similarly, if romantic love has a formal object, it is unlikely to be gene perpetuation, were it the case that romantic love is a reproductive mechanism.

The meaningfulness of emotions carried out by their formal objects fits nicely into the bigger picture of which emotions are a part. Emotions are one way in which a set of eliciting conditions and actions are connected. That is, emotions provide a link between a given situation and action by highlighting particular features of the situation as salient, thereby prompting a fitting action to occur. Thus, if a given emotional response is fitting, the action that is directly caused by it is also fitting. In other words, if my fear response is apt when I encounter a tiger on the loose, so is my action to freeze or flee. If my admiring my colleague for their groundbreaking work is fitting, so is my complimenting them on their work. Of course, my action may be mediated by other considerations and may not result in the kind of action an emotion prepares me for. That is, I may be concerned that praising my colleague in front of others may produce excessive envy in others, which will be harmful to my colleague. Therefore, I choose to not compliment them on the spot. But all this shows is that emotions provide pro tanto reasons for action, reasons that can be defeated in light of other considerations. Other things being equal, an emotion may directly produce an action for which it prepares the body.

Similarly, emotional responses are thought to be justified by pro tanto reasons themselves, since they are never rationally required in any given situation. The implication of this characteristic is that the failure to experience a given emotion does not amount to irrationality. Instead, an emotional occurrence is justified just in case it is fitting. Thus, the
failure to be afraid, angered, awed, or ashamed is not a failure in having a required emotional response. At the same time, such failures need to be explained. They are explained by the fact that the potential emotional response is defeated by some other factors.

It may also be the case that a given situation renders a set of emotional responses apt. Suppose that standing on the edge of a cliff, Mark feels fear, while Martha feels thrill. Both emotions are elicited by the same conditions. Danger figures in both of their formal objects, though danger is not sufficient to define the thrilling. Both of these emotional occurrences can be apt in the same situation. This may be explained in part by the relational feature of formal objects. Perhaps Martha is a trained mountain climber and spends lots of time high above the ground, while Mark is not. But it may also be that there is no such difference between them, and that it is apt to feel either fear or thrill while standing on a cliff.

It may be objected that in this example the two emotions considered are close to each other. Perhaps thrill is a kind of fear with a positive valence. If this is so, it may be that a given situation may afford a number of members of the fear family of emotions. Could it be that two very different emotions can be apt in the same situation? For instance, Jack is amused by the dog, while Jody is frightened by it. Can both their responses be apt? On the face of it, it seems not as the situation is underdescribed. What is it about the dog that makes Jody afraid, or that makes Jack amused? What are the features onto which dangerousness and amusingness supervene? Certainly, a given situation has an exhaustive list of facts about it. Thus, the formal objects would need to supervene on some of these features in order to be realized in the situation. If the dog is acting in a hostile manner towards Jack and Jody then the appropriate emotion for both of them to feel is fear. Thus, Jack’s response of amusement is unfitting. But perhaps the dog is acting friendly. In this case, we may resort to the relational quality of formal objects again.
Perhaps Jody has a severe allergy to dogs, and despite dog’s friendliness, it nonetheless poses real danger to Jody.

I have said that formal objects shed light on the meaning of emotions. In this way they also make emotional occurrences intelligible. When making sense of Jack’s reaction of amusement towards a friendly playful dog, we can see that his response is intelligible because it is apt, while it appears that Jody’s response to a friendly dog is inapt and so not intelligible (though perhaps irrational fear of dogs is fairly common, so we might treat it as intelligible). Of course, once we find out that Jody has a severe dog allergy, we realize that her response is indeed both apt and intelligible.

However, aptness and intelligibility come apart. Suppose that Jody does not have a deadly allergy towards dogs but instead her current fear is due to her traumatic childhood experience with a neighbor’s dog. When she was a little girl she was often startled and frightened by a neighbors’ dog, which was big, vicious, and loud. As a young child Jody was afraid of this dog and formed an association that dogs are scary. This association does not allow her to discriminate between small dogs or friendly dogs, and truly intimidating dangerous dogs. As soon as she sees a dog of any sort, she experiences fear. Knowing the background story of Jody’s fear of dogs allows us to make sense of her fear-response towards this friendly poodle puppy, but it does not render her response apt despite her traumatic history with dogs. This is also important with respect to the relational quality of formal objects. Notice that just because Jody had a negative experience with dogs in her early childhood doesn't mean that dogs are fear-warranting in her case, since they do not in actuality pose a threat. While in the earlier example Jody’s fear was apt because of the real danger that her allergic reaction (relational quality) triggered by dogs posed.
Thus, following Fabrice Teroni, we can distinguish between two kinds of intelligibility of emotions: epistemic and non-epistemic (Teroni, 2007). *Epistemic intelligibility* is intelligibility that is based on evidence, i.e., when the formal object which an emotion tracks supervenes on the natural properties of the emotion’s target. *Non-epistemic intelligibility*, on the other hand, is intelligibility achieved by providing a back story for the occurrence of the emotional response or the emotional disposition as is shown in the example of Jody having been traumatized in her early childhood. Consider another example: Franz is afraid of a piece of thread. His fear of the thread is difficult to comprehend because threads are usually not dangerous. His fear of a thread is inapt and unintelligible. If Franz told us that he was conditioned by an evil scientist to be afraid of the thread, we might think his fear-response somewhat intelligible but in no way apt. Hence, non-epistemic intelligibility is not connected with formal objects but is rather accounted for by a *plausible narrative* of the acquisition of the emotional disposition or an emotional occurrence. This kind of intelligibility does not depend on the representational nature of emotions but rather on the *causal story* responsible for the emotion.

The last point to make is the point about *justification* of emotional occurrences. I have said that an emotional occurrence is fitting when the natural properties of the target ground the formal object which an emotion picks out. Emotions are directed at a target, but the information about the target is initially provided by some other mental state. One might see the dog, hear the dog, remember the dog, etc. Since the information about the target is provided by a different mental state — the cognitive basis of an emotion — one must see whether or not the cognitive basis presents its content correctly in order to see whether or not an emotional occurrence directed at that content is justified. Thus, if my perception of the dog’s menacing teeth and its agitated behavior is correct, then my emotion of fear is justified since it correctly represents the dog as
dangerous. The evaluation of the properties provided by the cognitive basis is done by the emotion. It is the emotion that brings forth relevant features among those presented in the cognitive basis and so tracks the evaluative property that supervenes on them. In this way the aptness of emotions is not completely reducible to the correctness conditions of their cognitive bases. To clarify, there are at least two ways in which an emotion can misfire: (1) when it is directed at content presented by its cognitive basis, but the content of the cognitive basis misrepresents the situation at hand; (2) when the cognitive basis presents the situation correctly but the emotion incorrectly picks out certain features as salient from this content thereby attempting to track an evaluative property that isn’t there. In case (1), I got insulted when I thought I heard Dan make a misogynistic remark. But actually he never did. I simply misheard him. In this case, my anger is not justified since the insulting remark at which it was directed was never there in the first place. In case (2), Dan did make a misogynistic remark after all, and I heard him correctly. But upon hearing it, I rejoiced. In this case, my emotion incorrectly attributed to the offensive situation the evaluative property of the joyful, and, therefore, misfired, despite being provided with correct information by its cognitive basis. In this case too my joy is inapt and so is unjustified, as well as unintelligible.

I.1.1.4. Moral and prudential norms and their respective fallacies

So far I have discussed two intrinsic norms of rationality – aptness and intelligibility, and one extrinsic norm – non-epistemic intelligibility. While the first two norms speak directly to the nature of emotions, to their function and meaning, the third norm provides a way of making sense of an emotional occurrence by tracing its causal origin. There are two additional extrinsic
norms that are often applied to emotions – moral and prudential. They are also used as rational assessments of emotions.

An emotional occurrence is *prudent* when experiencing it will provide a person with a practical advantage. It is imprudent when it impedes one’s advantage. For instance, fearing a snake is a prudent emotional response in the presence of a snake as the snake poses a real danger to the person, while being afraid of flying is not a prudent emotional occurrence or disposition since flying is one of the safest modes of transportation. Feeling angry might be judged to be prudent when anger motivates one to stand up for oneself. However, it may also be that feeling anger is imprudent if nothing can be done about the wrongdoing one has experienced. Instead, forgetting about the insult and moving on may be the practical thing to do, thereby avoiding being tormented by the anger that cannot be channeled into making things better. Consequently, it may be said that it is rational to not feel anger in this situation despite there being a real insult.

An emotional occurrence may also be judged *moral* or immoral. For instance, certain occurrences of fear and anger may be judged to be immoral as they are not in accordance with the virtues of courage or tolerance: one ought not to have been afraid to speak up against injustice; one ought not to have felt anger but should have been more tolerant and forgiving instead. These morally driven concerns show that the way we felt was not morally praiseworthy but perhaps altogether morally wrong. Likewise, not experiencing an emotion may be judged moral or immoral. For instance, failure to feel ashamed of oneself, given one’s actions or attitudes, or failure to feel empathy for the suffering of another person may constitute a moral failure.

At the same time, an emotional occurrence that is justified from a moral standpoint may not be justified from a prudential one. Although I ought to have felt ashamed from the moral
standpoint, from a practical perspective it would have taken such a toll on me that I would have lapsed into a deep depression. Therefore, my not feeling ashamed has enabled me to move on and keep my sanity. One can imagine numerous cases in which an emotional occurrence may be justified from a moral standpoint but not from prudential one and vice versa.

While prudential and moral norms are often invoked in rational assessment of emotions, it is important not to conflate them with aptness. This kind of conflation results in what Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson coined a ‘moralistic fallacy’ or a ‘prudential fallacy’ (D’Arms & Jacobson, 2000a, b). As they put it, “[T]o commit the moralistic fallacy is to infer, from the claim that it would be wrong or vicious to feel an emotion, that it is therefore unfitting” (D’Arms & Jacobson, 2000a:69).

Let’s go back to the example of anger. Suppose that I am angry at Dan because Dan has made an insulting remark. If it was said that my anger was inappropriate because a virtuous person does not get bothered by insults, a moralistic fallacy would have been committed because the aptness of my anger would be conflated with moral norms that are applicable to anger. Just because it may be true that anger in this case is morally wrong, doesn't mean my anger is not apt, since anger is an appropriate response to have with respect to an insult. If the formal object of anger is the offensive, then my anger is apt even if it is not morally praiseworthy.

Similarly, if one were to argue that my anger is inappropriate because it cannot be put to good use, one would be committing the prudential fallacy by conflating aptness with prudential norms. For these reasons, when we evaluate a given emotion as *fitting*, it is important to keep moral and prudential evaluations aside.

It may be objected that occasionally aptness norms coincide with prudential and moral norms. I explore the case of moral emotions in part II of this chapter and address this worry in
section II.1.2.1. But what about aptness and prudence? For instance, fear of snakes is fitting because snakes are dangerous and it is prudent to be afraid of dangerous things. So isn’t it the case that aptness norms are reducible to prudential norms? (see Jones 2004 for a defense of this view). Aptness norms are not reducible to prudential norms because not every instance of fear that is apt is also prudent. As I have tried to show, sometimes it is advantageous to not feel an emotion even if it is fitting. For instance, not experiencing fear of a snake when facing it might be more prudent since this way one might find a way out in a calmly manner, defusing the situation, and not agitating the snake. However, just because it might be prudent not to experience fear at the moment, does not mean that one’s fear response is inapt. Fear when facing the snake is apt because the snake poses real danger to me, and my fear-response correctly represents the situation as dangerous. In this case, the situation is fear-warranting despite one’s fear being unhelpful.

Conclusion

In Part I have discussed four kinds of rationality norms applicable to emotions. I have shown that moral and prudential norms stand separately from the aptness conditions of emotions, and argued that to conflate them is to commit a moralistic or a prudential fallacy. I have discussed three functions of formal objects which are to individuate emotion-types, and to explain their intentionality and aptness. I have distinguished between two kinds of intelligibility of emotions, and emphasized that epistemic intelligibility is tightly connected with the roles of formal objects, while non-epistemic intelligibility relies on a plausible causal narrative to explain why an emotion has occurred.
Part II: The arationality of romantic love

This part of the chapter is devoted to exploring the issues of the rationality of romantic love by using the distinctions of rationality norms applied to emotions in Part I. Once again, the issue of aptness of romantic love is the core rationality norm I will be concerned with in order to attempt to shed light on the potential formal object of romantic love — lovability. I argue that all attempts to account for this formal object such that it can be shown to be a response-independent evaluative property fail, and that there are no aptness conditions that can be outlined for it. I demonstrate that all attempts at specifying the aptness conditions for romantic love result in either moralistic or prudential fallacy, or miss the mark in other ways. I conclude that despite having content, romantic love does not represent anything, and for this reason is arational. These considerations lend further reasons for thinking that romantic love is not an emotion.

II.1. Romantic love and aptness

The issue of aptness of romantic love is an important issue, as it looks straight into the heart of romantic love – is there anything that grounds romantic love? How should this grounding relation be understood? Is there anything for which we love our beloveds? Are we ever justified or unjustified to love whom we love? Indeed, questions like, "What do you love him for?" or "How can you possibly love her?" Insist on an answer that would provide justificatory reasons rather than mere causal explanations for the romantic attitude. Furthermore, what is it that we do when we provide answers to these questions? In what follows, I present a number of accounts of aptness provided by philosophers who attempt to show that romantic love is an emotion, and is grounded in particular kinds of properties. I argue that they are unsatisfactory.
II.1.2. Intrinsic properties

If the aptness of romantic love is to be directly modeled on the emotions, then its formal object – lovability – would supervene on the natural properties of the target of one’s love, the beloved. Specifying these properties and elucidating the nature of lovability will clarify what makes romantic love intelligible, shed light on its content, explain the cases in which romantic love misfires, specify when it is and isn’t justifiable, and outline conditions in which a moralistic or a prudential fallacy is committed in the rational assessment of romantic love. In the following sections I consider two types of intrinsic properties onto which lovability might supervene. They are moral properties and nonmoral properties.

II.1.2.1. Romantic love as a moral emotion

Let’s begin by examining our intuitions with respect to love’s justification. When we are asked, ‘why do you love them?’ We often answer by saying our beloveds are kind, patient, loyal, strong, courageous, etc. These kinds of answers suggest that what we really care for in our beloveds is their moral virtues, their morally good character traits. If this is so, then lovability supervenes on the moral character traits of a person. On the face of it then romantic love is a moral emotion, an emotion the formal object of which is realized by a set of moral properties.

Indeed, emotions like guilt, shame, contempt, indignation, and anger are often cited as examples of moral emotions because they have to do with notions like personal moral failures, moral failures of others, justice, fairness, desert, and harm. When these emotions are directed at moral features of the situation, they are moral emotions. It is likely, however, that not all cases of these emotions are purely moral cases (for discussion see Gibbard, 1990; Prinz 2007). For I may
be feeling angry that the car broke down\textsuperscript{41}, ashamed of my body, guilty of aimlessly browsing on Facebook, instead of writing, contemptuous of my friend’s poor taste in music. Arguably these are not examples of moral failures. If there are purely moral emotions (like indignation), there are very few of them.

What of romantic love? If love is an intrinsically moral phenomenon then it is apt only when someone is loved for their moral character and inapt when the moral character in the beloved is lacking, or the beloved is loved for some nonmoral features. If love is not an intrinsically moral attitude, then it can be apt when it is directed at nonmoral features of the beloved as well. I will examine these two possibilities in turn.

There have been two popular accounts defending the idea that romantic love as a moral emotion: one developed by David Velleman (1999) and another by Kate Abramson and Adam Leite (2011). I begin with Velleman.

In presenting a Kantian account of romantic love, Velleman argues that love is an intrinsically moral emotion by claiming that in love one responds to the intrinsic value of persons, in particular, their rational will and their capacity to value (Velleman, 1999:360, 365). In this way Velleman invites us to re-imagine the partiality of love, which is often taken to arouse a conflict between love and morality. His argument for love's impartiality rests on the idea of the objectivity of the quality for which the beloveds are loved. Indeed, on Velleman's view love is apt whenever it tracks \textit{personhood}. This in turn suggests that each person is \textit{equally lovable} in principle, and that love can be a universally moral phenomenon since it supposedly does not discriminate against anyone.

\footnote{Although the formal object of anger is commonly thought to be the \textit{insulting}, or the \textit{offensive}, recall from the critique of basic emotions by Ortony and Turner (chapter 3, section II.1.3.) that anger is thought to have the eliciting conditions of having one’s goal blocked. Therefore, the formal object of anger might also be construed as the \textit{hindering} or the \textit{impeding}.}
Thus, on Velleman’s view, lovability supervenes on personhood. This means that romantic love is apt when we love the person for their personhood, which is what is represented in the content of romantic love. Romantic love is inapt when we love our beloveds for some other qualities or if the object of our love does not possess personhood.

One may find this view intuitive if one thinks that rational will is the most essential feature of a person's self. For one may think that one is loved for who one truly is. Velleman states, "The desire to be valued in this way is not a desire to be valued on the basis of one's distinctive features. It is rather a desire that one's own rendition of humanity, however distinctive, should succeed in communicating a value that is perfectly universal" (Velleman, 1999:371-2). So every person is lovable for the same thing — the abstract universal property of the rational will. And if lovability is grounded in personhood, then love is inapt when it is a response to objects that lack personhood, or if it is directed at features of persons other than their personhood, such as their good looks or their delicious cooking.

Given Velleman's generosity in attributing being lovable to all persons, it is not clear how one can justify loving only some persons and not others. Why is it that we don't just love all persons? Velleman acknowledges this difficulty. He says that the reason that we love only some and not others is that persons are observable creatures, and our knowledge of their rational will comes from observing their behavior. "Whether someone is lovable depends on how well his value as a person is expressed or symbolized for us by his empirical persona" (ibid., 372). At the same time Velleman says that the empirical persona is not an ideal way to manifest the essence of personhood, nor are we good interpreters of the observable signs of the rational will. Therefore, we often misinterpret and express our nature defectively. But how is it that we interpret someone's expression of their personhood? It is through their characteristics and
behavior. Velleman explicitly denies that expressions of personhood *justify* our loving only some and not others. He denies that persons are lovable in virtue of their distinctive features. But even if his account is supposed to only explain (rather than justify) why we love some and not others, it still is an implication of his view that we come to love on the basis of judging how well the person’s personhood is being expressed. However, it appears that those who express their rational will badly are loved, and among those who express their personhood well, only some are loved. Given this chaotic picture, it is difficult to see any correlation between how well one expresses one’s personhood and whether or not one is loved.

Perhaps one can make this response. Velleman states that given the resources love requires, it is hard to direct attention to all the other lovable persons. There are psychological and circumstantial limitations as to how many people we can love. Therefore, we end up loving only some and not others (ibid.). This point is certainly correct. Love is a matter of luck and circumstances. However, this shows that really there is no justification for love since the reason that we love some and not others is accidental.

Given these considerations, Velleman's account seems to show too much and too little. It shows too much in that since most cases of romantic love involve other persons, love will rarely be inapt. It shows too little, since very few people would cite personhood or rational will as their reason for loving their beloveds. Instead, people are likely to cite a set of properties their beloved has. This last point contradicts Velleman's claim about the impartiality of love, since we are partial to those we love, and while we may love them for who they are, from a phenomenological standpoint, we do not take the abstract property of personhood to be the quality which makes our beloveds lovable for us. Indeed citing this as a reason for love seems to make romantic love unintelligible.
Velleman's account rests on very specific metaphysical conception of persons that is highly philosophical and greatly detached from the commonplace reality of romantic love. In effect, it is guilty of the moralistic fallacy since Velleman’s real reason for picking personhood as the quality onto which lovability supervenes is a moral one: he thinks that if we love for some other qualities, our loves are superficial and are not loves that take our beloveds as ends in themselves. However, just because a given instance of love fails to satisfy the moral ideal proposed by Velleman doesn’t mean it fails as love. Rather, romantic love seems to be quite divorced from morality and it is not an intrinsically moral emotion.

Another attempt to show that love is an intrinsically moral emotion is made by Kate Abramson and Adam Leite (2011). Following Peter Strawson's account of reactive attitudes, they call this love reactive love. They argue that various moral qualities of the beloved ground lovability. It seems intuitive to justify one's love by saying that the beloved is kind, loyal, courageous, and caring, and unintuitive to refer to the size of their feet (Abramson & Leite 2011: 678). Since it is intuitive, intelligible, and commonplace to cite moral qualities of the beloved as justification for our loves, they are the properties that ground lovability. Therefore, romantic love is an intrinsically moral emotion.

Additionally, Abramson and Leite believe that moral traits are the core traits of a person's character, something that a person can actually be held responsible for; and if one loves someone for their good traits of character rather than some accidental or superficial traits, such as their good looks or their bank account, love can also be said to be genuine and morally praiseworthy. On this view love is inapt if the beloved does not possess good moral character for which the lover takes themselves to be loving them, or if the beloved is loved for qualities other than moral.
Does this mean that an ideal beloved is a moral saint? Abramson and Leite point out that in addition to loving persons for their moral qualities, there needs to be an interpersonal connection and interaction between the lovers. One does not love someone in the abstract — if a person spends their life helping the poor and donating large sums of money to charity anonymously, it is not enough for me to love them. Their good qualities must manifest themselves in our interaction. The person has to be good to me, and not just good (ibid.: 685).

Furthermore, Abramson and Leite say that like other emotions, reasons for love never require love; they simply warrant it. That is, if someone is good to me, and exhibits an exceptional level of moral virtue, my failure to love them is not inapt. But if I do love them, my love is apt and justified. One fails to love if the reasons for love are defeated by some other reasons. At the same time, Abramson and Leite maintain that not all failures to love are equally justifiable. If Jane fails to love Jack, a truly lovable person, because Jane has an unhealthy attachment to her mother which prevents her from having other fulfilling relationships, her insensitivity to reasons for love can be morally assessed (ibid.: 687).

Although Abramson and Leite present a plausible account of romantic love, it ultimately fails to show that lovability is grounded in moral character traits. In what follows I offer four objections to their view: (1) eliciting conditions of romantic love do not seem to correlate with moral virtue in paradigm cases of love; (2) the practice of citing positive character traits of the beloved in one’s justification can be explained by the demand to justify love that stems from prudential concerns; (3) the necessary idealization of the beloved undermines the validity of reasons provided by the lover; (4) the frequent inability to articulate one’s reasons for love casts doubt on the role of reasons in love.
What brings about love if it is not reason-motivated? Abramson and Leite acknowledge that love just happens, it is a ‘gift’ (ibid.). Although they insist that love at the same time is justifiable by reasons, it is hard to see how. It is unlikely that ‘love is a gift’ means that one chooses whom to give it to. But if one thought that love is generally a response to moral character traits, then one should generally expect to love only morally good people, since in these cases love would be tracking what it is supposed to. Compare to anger and fear. Generally, there is a correlation between what makes these emotions apt and their *eliciting conditions*. That is, anger generally occurs when someone is wronged. Fear generally occurs when there is danger. Does love generally occur when there is a person with good moral character and who is also good to us? Is love’s function to track moral goodness in others? This is an empirical question but an affirmative answer is problematic for the following reasons.

First, if we are looking for paradigm cases of romantic love, there seems to be no strong correlation between being virtuous and good to someone in particular, and becoming the object of their love. Abramson and Leite's paradigm example of a perfect lover is Edward from *Sense and Sensibility*, whom Marianne loves for his distinguished moral character. But one could also cite Mr. Darcy from *Pride and Prejudice* with whom Elizabeth is in love arguably prior to discovering that he is good after all. Rhett Butler, Eugene Onegin, Don Juan, Heathcliff, Dorian Gray, Carmen, Salome, Nana, Lulu, Hedda Gabler are some other examples of romantic heroes and heroines with questionable or devious characters. Clearly, romantic love is not only inspired by goodness. Rather, it would seem that a romantic hero is often a bad boy or an inconsiderate girl, someone with charisma and character rather than moral virtue. Indeed, exhibiting rudeness and standoffishness as a romantic strategy is more likely to catch attention, while being nice is likely to land one in the friend zone (for discussion see McDaniel 2005).
Second, although when one is asked, ‘What do you love him for?’ or ‘How can you possibly love her?’, the answer provided usually refers to the moral character traits of the beloved. Yet, citing this common practice in support of Abramson and Leite’s arguments is problematic because they put the lover on the defensive. The questions are raised as accusations (usually by the lover’s family and friends – people who are concerned with the lover’s wellbeing) of the beloved having failed in some way, deeming them unworthy of the lover’s love. To win the approval of friends and family, the lover scrambles to point out whatever positive qualities they can find to rectify the beloved’s flaws in the eyes of the accusers. Pointing to these qualities does not justify one’s romantic love from the aptness point of view. Instead, attempting to show that the beloved is a good person evokes prudential norms applicable to love in order to put family and friends at ease, reassuring them that the lover’s wellbeing is not negatively affected by the company of the beloved.

Third, when faced with the demand to justify one’s love, one is already in love. Love makes us idealize our beloveds, attaching positive values to their trivial traits, and underplaying or rationalizing their shortcomings. We inflate the goodness of our partners and of our relationships in comparison to others (Rusbult & Buunk 1993; Martz et al. 1998; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin 1996a, 1996b; Showers & Kevlyn 1999). For this reason, referencing the practice of referring to the positive character traits of the beloved in justifying one’s love is unhelpful, since this practice does not reveal the grounds for one’s love but rather provides rationalizations for its existence. If anything, it might display the qualities that the lover lingers on when thinking about the beloved. Therefore, the justifications we provide are unlikely to be reliable or correct. Consequently, answering the Euthyphro-type question, 'do we love the
beloved because they are good, or do we perceive them as good because we love them?” seems to confirm the latter rather than the former.

Fourth, providing a justification for one’s love is often a difficult task. People in love are frequently at a loss for words when asked for it. Thus, their answers tend to be generic: ‘she really gets me’, ‘he is so caring’, ‘she is the most amazing person I’ve ever met’, or non-answers altogether: ‘I just love her, and that is that.’ These practices are arguably more common than the full-blown clear coherent justifications Abramson and Leite attribute to people in love. This casts further doubt on the contribution of moral qualities to romantic love’s occurrence and justification.

Abramson and Leite commit the moralistic fallacy in taking lovability to be grounded in moral character. It is clear that their project is not to identify lovability as an evaluative property to which we respond in love. Instead, they construct a moral ideal of love in which the lover should love the beloved for their moral virtues. However, since there is no clear correlation between love’s eliciting conditions and the moral character of the beloveds, picking moral virtue as the grounding feature of lovability is arbitrary. Romantic love is not an intrinsically moral emotion. Hence, loving those who lack good moral character does not make love inapt.

II.1.2.2. Romantic love non-moral intrinsic properties

Giving up on moral properties as justifications of romantic love, one may attempt to cash out love's aptness conditions by appealing to other kinds of intrinsic properties. One may, for example, claim that one's beloved is lovable because they are funny, smart, kind, understanding, enjoy the same kinds of films and books, great with kids, etc. Plato famously thought that persons as well as other lovable things are lovable because they possess beauty. The implication
of Plato's view, and generally views claiming that a certain set of intrinsic qualities of the
beloved ground lovability, including Abramson and Leite’s, is that the focal properties that
justify love are generalizable. Therefore, whoever possesses the same properties is just as
lovable. Furthermore, the lovability criterion of this kind provides a scale of comparison since
some people possess a greater number of lovable properties or their lovable properties are of
greater quality than in others. For example, if being funny partly constitutes being lovable then
the funnier the person, the more lovable they are. Since some people are more lovable than
others, the lover should trade up for an object which is more worthy of love.\footnote{See Nozick (1990) on trading up.}

One may first object that one should not trade up to a more lovable beloved since the \textit{pro
tanto} reasons never require love but only justify it in case it happens to appear. Second, one may
point out that these generic characteristics do not do justice to our beloveds. Our reasons for
love, it may be said, are a lot more specific.

To the first point I say that \textit{pro tanto} reasons are supposed to be neither necessary nor
sufficient for having a particular response. Yet, in order for them \textit{not} to produce it, they must be
defeated by some other reasons. The reasons for not trading up may consist in practical or moral
concerns. Yet, that does not change the fact that some people are more lovable than others. The
reasons against trading up are not the ones that ground aptness of love; and so, in a sense, one's
love turns out to be inapt when the reasons for trading up are nonintrinsic. The reasons for
trading up can be \textit{outweighed} by moral and practical concerns but that doesn’t mean that they are
defeated from the aptness standpoint.

The second point may be made by suggesting that a given combination of intrinsic
qualities is so \textit{unique} as to produce the love response in a particular person. These qualities may
not be as generic as presented above. Rather, the lover may appeal to the particularity of the
traits of the beloved: it is the way you wear your hat, the way you sip your tea, etc. that makes you so special. The beloved may be perceived as absolutely unique because of the unique combination and manifestation of their particular properties. This uniqueness is supposed to justify loving them as opposed to anyone else.

This modification, however, does not escape the objection of the generalizability of reasons since these specific qualities can be found in others as well. Furthermore, this in no way addresses the issue of aptness, for it still needs to be explained how this sort of particular combination makes love apt. Otherwise, it turns out to be a 'just so' story. So why does this special cocktail of qualities grounds lovability? What is fitting about my love-response to this uniqueness?

One may return to the point made by Abramson and Leite that the beloved has to be good to me. Indeed, given the practices of marriage, family, and union formation in our culture, it may be suggested that what makes a person lovable is how well they fit together with the lover. Thus, lovability is grounded in interpersonal compatibility of the lover and the beloved. The same point is made by Berit Brogaard. As she puts it,

Your love for a person does not fit the beloved properly (that is, the person is not lovable) if your continued love of the person would be likely to decrease your overall happiness or well-being. Just as it is irrational to fear an innocent teddy bear, so it is irrational to be in love with someone who beats you with a stick every day or to lust for a bloke who moonlights as a serial killer (Brogaard, 2015:74).

Thus, she says that the beloved's lovability is grounded in a set qualities, which may vary in different ways but as long as the person is a decent one and is a good romantic partner for me, my romantic love is fitting and justified.

At first glance, this proposal is very promising, since it takes into consideration the lover’s idiosyncratic preferences. On this view, the reason for love – the compatibility of the
beloved as a life partner – is universalizable but restricted to one particular lover. Thus, love is inappropriate if the beloved isn't actually fit to be one's long-term partner.

The issue with this view is the question of consistency and success of love doing its job – picking out those who would be good life partners for us. However, given the current divorce rates (40-50%) and the fact that in our society love is supposed to be the basis for marriage, it seems that love is doing a very poor job. True, some people do spend their lives together in loving happy unions but these seem more like exception than the rule, which suggests that whether or not one ends up falling in love with a person who would make a good partner for them is a matter of luck. Rather, serial monogamy and social monogamy are a lot more common.

Fear as a mechanism for identifying danger is fairly reliable even though it isn't perfect. But if the success rate of love in picking out good life partners is so low, it is unlikely that lovability is the interpersonal compatibleness of lovers. Here too we must raise the possibility of the prudential fallacy being committed. Companionship is a useful trait to seek if a person intends to spend the rest of their life with the other. But why should we think that aptness is to be understood as tracking something useful? It isn’t reducible to the prudential norms.

It may be objected that romantic love’s purpose is not to insure companionship for life but rather to create a union that would last long enough for reproduction. Helen Fisher argues that the reason why romantic love seems to last only up to four years is because the bond that the couple forms is necessary only for the conception of offspring and for caring for it by two parents during the critical time in the offspring’s life (Fisher, 1992; Frank, 1988). Fisher cites divorce rates that tend to spike after the four-year period. When the spouses realize that they are no longer madly in love with each other, they find their arrangement unsatisfactory and file for divorce. As I have argued in chapter 3, Fisher’s evolutionary story does not seem to add up.
Humankind has successfully procreated and cared for its offspring without relying on the ‘nuclear family’ arrangement. Instead, communal care of children has been the rule, while nuclear family is a new phenomenon. The four-year period also appears to be arbitrary since a human four-year old is not self-sufficient and requires a lot of care for its survival. On the other hand, if one were to think that paternal care is unnecessary, and that male involvement is only required for conception, lust already fulfills that function, and consummation of desire as well as impregnation do not take four years.

One other consideration should be mentioned, which is sexual attraction. People in love tend to be sexually attracted to their beloveds, and often it is claimed that romantic love is the dignified form of sexual attraction. Yet, it is clear that sexual attraction and romantic love are not the same and can exist independently of one another. First, as Tennov shows by interviewing a number of subjects in her studies, many report that sexual desire is not as central as other feelings and desires. Rather it appears that desire for reciprocity in feelings is more important and more concerning for those in love (Tennov, 1979/1999). This shows that the phenomenology of romantic love is not reducible to that of lust. Second, sexual attractiveness is insufficient for being the grounding feature of lovability since people do not always fall in love with those whom they consider most attractive. Other factors play a role as well even though it is difficult to say exactly what they are. I return to this point in the upcoming sections when I attempt to explain the causes of romantic love.

For now, I sum up by saying that intrinsic properties whether moral or not do not systematically explain when lovability is present or absent, and what exactly it consists in. So, it is difficult to grasp just what it is that makes a person lovable, and in what cases love fails to represent its target accurately by appealing to character traits.
II.1.3. Extrinsic properties

Niko Kolodny (2003) argues that it is the *extrinsic properties*, particularly the established relationship and history of the lover and beloved that justify love rather than a collection of intrinsic ones. He believes there is a parallel between romantic love and familial love. Familial love can be explained and justified by saying that I love my mother because she's my mother (Kolodny, 2003:136). Similarly, I can say (and be right about it) that I love my romantic partner because she is my romantic partner. The established relationship is what provides reasons for loving a particular person. It seems that lovability would supervene on the loving relationship in which I stand with my beloved. On this view, my love is apt if I indeed am in that sort of relationship, while my love is inapt if it is directed towards someone with whom I am not in a loving relationship. Love is made intelligible by appealing to the relationship – I love them because they are my romantic partner.

One issue with this view is to get clear on what counts as a relationship. Kolodny says that it has to be (1) ongoing, (2) between particular people, (3) historical (ibid., 148). But these conditions are too vague. For my relationship with my crush is ongoing – I talk to them all the time. It is between me and them, and it's historical – we share jokes, ideas, and likes on Facebook. Is this sort of relationship sufficient to show that my love is apt? Kolodny thinks not, as my crush is not reciprocating my feelings. So the relationship must be a loving relationship, where all the parties involved *reciprocate* each other's feelings. This means too that Kolodny thinks that unrequited love is never apt (ibid., 171). This seems too strong for anyone who wants to establish that romantic love can be apt, since it means that it is only fitting to love those who love you back. In a scenario where one begins to love another, and the other falls in love with
them at a later time, the initial unrequited love was inapt and it has become apt once reciprocity was established. Furthermore, it seems that the initial inapt love is crucial to make the love of both people apt. This makes the view even stranger as it suggests that romantic love's initial function is to misfire provided that people do not fall with one another at the exact same moment.

Kolodny also thinks that unrequited love is irrational because it is an unhappy love and it isn’t worth the while. He says of our friends whose love is not reciprocated, “Either our friends are in the grip of emotions that they themselves can no longer see the point of, or they have lost touch with the reality of their situation” (ibid.). But if this is the reason then this is a prudential concern rather than that of aptness. Furthermore, one may be in a dysfunctional abusive but, nonetheless, loving relationship. It would mean that despite the content of the relationship, love is apt simply because it is reciprocated. While Kolodny raises prudential concerns with respect to unrequited love, he seems to neglect them with respect to reciprocated love.

Most importantly, the attempt to justify one's love by saying that one's beloved is lovable because one stands in a loving relationship with them begs the question. For all it is saying is that one is lovable because one is loved. I agree with this claim and I defend it in the next section but the crucial point here is that one cannot show that love is apt simply by stating that it is reciprocated, nor can one justify it in this way. As I have argued above, the inapt love on this view becomes a necessary pre-condition for the apt one, and so must misfire at first, unless we assume that whenever people fall in love they do so simultaneously.

It appears that the appeal to shared history and pre-existing loving relationship does not shed any light on lovability and its aptness conditions. Indeed, they make love even more mysterious. In the following section I defend the view that romantic love has no aptness
conditions and for this reason should be thought of as arational. In this way I clear up the confusion that accounts that insist on romantic love's aptness face.

II.2. Projected property

Harry Frankfurt (1999, 2009), Irving Singer (2009a), Lawrence Thomas (1991), and Aaron Smuts (2014) argue that the right answer to the Euthyphro-type question about love is that one is lovable because one is loved. I think endorsing simple subjectivism with respect to love is correct. But this means that there is nothing to which one can appeal in order to show that love is fitting, as the evaluative property of love is projected. However, I think it is an advantage rather than a disadvantage of my view. In this section I unpack these implications and show that they provide the right picture of romantic love.

So far I have argued that the accounts that hold that lovability supervenes on a set of intrinsic or extrinsic properties do not hold up to scrutiny. Given their shortcomings, it seems most plausible to hold that romantic love does not have a formal object in the way that emotions do. This lends further support to the hypothesis I have been defending throughout the dissertation that romantic love is not an emotion. I provide a positive account on romantic love by showing that it is a syndrome in the next chapter.

If lovability is not the formal object of romantic love and is instead a projected property, lovability is projected onto the world, specifically onto those we love. This means too that romantic love is not tracking anything out there in the world, and thus cannot succeed or fail in being apt. This doesn’t mean, however, that we cannot assess romantic love from a moral or a prudential point of view. Indeed, as we have seen, we do it all the time. Yet, the common mistake it to substitute these assessments for aptness. What we cannot do, however, is to show
that romantic love represents anything. Since it isn’t tracking anything in the world, it cannot misfire. Thus, it also lacks representational content.

One objection to this picture is that it is clearly the case that romantic love is intentional since it is always directed at someone in particular. One is always in love with a specific individual. Granted, romantic love is always directed at some particular individual, but the ways in which romantic love makes us see the beloved is not something that can be objectively justified. It presents the beloved in a particular light as especially interesting, captivating, and wholly wondrous and amazing. One may not be able to articulate just what it is about them that one finds really striking but one's attention is concentrated on this person. One is drawn to them, perhaps feeling a kind of connection as well as fascination.

Given this phenomenology that is paradigmatic to romantic love, it is clear that the beloved is idealized. In love we see our beloveds as particularly special and unique, incomparable to others. We also tend to attribute a lot of positive value to seemingly unimportant traits like their quirky taste in choosing nail polish or their braying laughter. These seem to be particularly endearing and important to us when we are in love. But our lingering on particular character traits and our attributing the quality of amazing to the whole individual is not something that we can objectively establish. If anything, the choice in nail polish is weird, and the laughter off-putting. This is why Singer says that romantic love is best characterized as a bestowal of value rather than an appraisal (Singer, 2009a). Thus, although romantic love has a target is does not represent it. It simply presents it as lovable, where the positive value is projected onto the beloved.

Another objection is to say that from this view it seems to follow that romantic love is essentially an illusion, and for this reason is inherently irrational. I think this conclusion is hasty
for two reasons. Idealization is not the same as delusion though it treads on the border with it. Undoubtedly, there is some delusion in romantic love but idealization means that the value of some positive qualities is significantly amplified, while neutral and negative traits might also acquire a positive value. If the positive quality is really there then it does ground positive value, which romantic love simply magnifies. Yes, it does take it out of proportion from an objective point of view, but this is what romantic love does. Furthermore, if I am right about romantic love's lack of aptness conditions then it cannot be irrational, since it cannot be rational either. Romantic love is outside of the domain of fittingness assessment, and should instead be thought of as *arational*.

Does this mean that romantic love is a kind of epiphenomenal or emergent state, which, because it is non-representational, has no content? Again, I think this conclusion is unnecessary. Since romantic love is clearly directed towards the beloved, and since it presents the beloved as an idealized individual, it has content. But because it is not the function or romantic love to *correctly* represent someone as lovable, its content is non-representational. Yet, it is important because this strong projection of positive value onto the beloved often serves as a motivation to act whether it is seeking intimacy with them, courting them, or acting on their behalf. It also sometimes makes us adjust our lives, when we decide where to live or what to have for dinner together. The non-representational content of romantic love is not trivial.

The next worry is with love's *intelligibility*. If romantic love cannot represent and has no formal object, then how can it be meaningful or intelligible? Indeed, it is paradoxical to think that love has no meaning, as it is so commonly thought of as the ultimate source of meaning in our lives. I think that romantic love is meaningful and intelligible but in a special way, different from emotions. Romantic love is meaningful in that it creates a new meaning by presenting the
beloved in this heavily value-laden way. The beloved acquires a special significance and worth, and this is what love means. To love is to present another as having a unique and extraordinary significance.

Although, as Abramson and Leite suggest, lovers point to positive character traits of their beloveds when justifying romantic love, the answers provided tend to be very general and thus superficial. As I said earlier, romantic love is also intelligible when the lover cannot provide an answer to this question and says "I just do." This answer is neither strange nor uncommon. Indeed, when the lover says that they love despite being unable to articulate why, or even despite being aware of the beloved's terrible flaws, we still can understand because we know that romantic love requires a 'leap of faith', that in love we may not be completely deluded by the badness of our beloveds but nonetheless project lovability onto them. This is how love works. This may also be evident from the reports by aromantics, who do not fall in love, and so do not understand what others are talking about (Decker, 2014; Tennov, 1979/1999).

It is true that if one said, "I love her because she has 10-size feet," we might think the answer unintelligible. But if we ask to elaborate, perhaps there could be a plausible narrative concocted to show who 10-size feet may be particularly endearing. Of course, citing the beloved's foot size as a lovable property is likely to be the effect of love rather than its precursor, but if it somehow played a significant role in one's falling in love, and we can be shown that through a narrative, we would have non-epistemic intelligibility which does not relate to intentionality. The same is true of objectophiles and zoophiles, though admittedly, their cases of love are more difficult to comprehend. But interestingly, Erika Eiffel, the woman who married the Eiffel Tower, Eija-Riitta Berliner-Mauer, the woman who married the Berlin Wall, or the
numerous men who marry their horses and sheep, all attribute personhood and autonomy to their beloveds, thus making their loves similar to those commonly experienced.

What then is going on when people say ‘I deserve someone better’ or ‘She is not worthy of your love’? Is it an appeal to aptness? I think not. Rather, given that the beloved is a bad person or is bad for us, we consider moral and prudential reasons to be relevant. We realize that we do not have to settle for this person simply because we love them if they do not make enough money, if our parents do not approve, if they are abusive, or if they are less accomplished, etc. That is, if the love we have for them does not fit comfortably into our lives. We appeal to prudential and moral concerns in hopes of shifting the focus of the lover onto negative qualities of the beloved, so that they realize being in love or in this relationship is not good for them.

Romantic love is an attitude that creates the value of lovability and bestows it onto the beloved, attributing to them uniqueness and importance. Love is neither apt nor inapt even though it is often subjected to moral and prudential assessments. It is arational since one can neither be wrong nor right in loving someone. It has non-representational content, and is meaningful because of the kind of value it creates and projects. It is intelligible if one understands its arational nature.

II.2.1. Causes of romantic love

Why do people fall in love with whom they do? Answering this question is important, as my picture of romantic love so far may seem very mysterious. I have denied that it has an obvious evolutionary function, rejected that it can be rationally assessed, and argued against it being an emotion. So what produces it? What are its eliciting conditions?
The research that attempts to outline the causal mechanisms for falling in love is still in its infancy. Here I provide a brief overview. Helen Fisher (2005) lists a number of contributing factors. First, she says that it is about timing: it can happen when you want it but it can also happen randomly when you least expect (Fisher, 2005:100). It can also happen when there have been changes in your life or when you are ready to start a family:

…[I]f you just entered college or moved to a new city by yourself, recently recovered from an unsatisfactory love affair, began to make enough money to raise a family, are lonely or suffering through a difficult experience, or have too much spare time, you are ripe to fall in love (ibid.).

This isn’t a very helpful answer as there is no systematic way to characterize these situations. They appear to be random. She also says that if you are experiencing high arousal emotions such as fear, sadness, anxiety, or joy, you are also more likely to fall in love. In the famous experiment by Dutton and Aron (1974), men who crossed a suspension bridge and so experienced fear, were more likely to call a very attractive confederate than those who did not experience high arousal in the control group. However, all we are getting here is a potential factor for sexual attraction, not necessarily for romantic love.

Second, proximity plays a role in people's falling in love. If one lives close to the other, there is a greater chance of them falling in love with one another, as potential lovers are more likely to interact and do so on a regular basis (Fisher, 2005; Pines, 2005; Brogaard, 2017; Aron et al, 1989). This point seems obvious – one falls in love with those to whom one has access. However, it doesn’t explain why we fall in love with this particular individual, assuming that there are a number of people in our proximity.

Third, finding the other person mysterious can serve as an attraction factor. Finding the other to be a riddle will move one to want to solve it (Fisher, 2005). While familiarity tends to
kill the potential romance, as children who grew up together, tend to not develop romantic relationships with each other despite their proximity later on in life (ibid.).

Fourth, similarity in socioeconomic background, interests, goals, beliefs and character traits, levels of attractiveness, and intelligence are found among loving couples (Fisher, 2005; Brogaard, 2017). This is known as "positive assertive mating" or "fitness matching" (Fisher, 2005:103). However, these factors can be explained by proximity in which lovers are likely to find themselves.

Fisher also points out that partners who are genetically similar are less likely to have natural abortions. At the same time, too much similarity is also bad since most people appear to have a natural reaction of disgust towards incest. Rather, we seem to be attracted to those who are different from us in the Major Histamine Complex (MHC). In the famous study done by Claus Wedekind and his colleagues, women had to smell six t-shirts that were worn by men for the period of two nights. It was found that women rated the scent to be more pleasant if the MHC was more different from their own (Wedekind et al., 1995). Now there is even a service called Smell Dating where participants wear t-shirts, send them off to the lab, and receive a number of potentially compatible t-shirts. If the t-shirt wearers mark each other's smells as very pleasant, they are provided with each other's contact information. Again, this may explain sexual attraction which is a contributing factor but it doesn't go far enough in explaining how falling in love occurs.

The fifth feature is symmetry of the body. People seem to be most attracted to those with symmetrical features. From the evolutionary perspective it is supposed to signal genetic fitness. At the same time, it is clear that attractiveness varies (though presumably not greatly) from time and place as evident from the depiction of beauty in works of art through history. Furthermore, in
African cultures, full-bodied women are considered to be more attractive than slim-bodied ones (Cunningham et al., 1995).

The sixth feature is what Fisher calls love maps, which are highly idiosyncratic psychological charts influenced by the environments in which we grew up. She says,

Some people seek a partner who will agree with what they say; others like a spirited debate. Some love a prank; others want predictability, order, or flamboyance. Some want to be amused; others wish to be intellectually excited. Many need a partner who will support their causes, quell their fears, or share their goals. And some choose a partner for the lifestyle they wish to lead (Fisher, 2005:188).

All these preferences can be explained by the particular histories of each individual. These include their attachment styles and the ways in which they may construe attractiveness as being based on their parent of the opposite sex (Pines, 2005; Hendrix, 1992).

Most of these mechanisms operate on the unconscious level. Given the complexity of the features that influence our falling in love and the idiosyncrasies pertaining to each lover's special situation, it is difficult to come up with a general causal story for romantic love. This is why I think that lovability should be understood as a nonshared dispositional property that is lover-specific. A lot more work needs to be done to explain how all these features interact with one another and contribute to people falling in love. At the moment, it seems there is no unified causal story about the mechanisms of falling in love.

It may be objected that there are certain people with whom many others fall in love. It would make it seem that they possess a special set of features that makes them more lovable than others. No doubt, Justin Bieber and Selena Gomez receive thousands of confessions and proclamations of love. Falling in love with celebrities is very common among teenagers. Why does it happen? I speculate that music idols are perceived as heroes, which makes it is easy to idealize them further. The pop songs are intended to be relatable, and often make the listener the
target of the lyrics. Paul McCartney says that when The Beatles were writing their early songs, they have intended to engage the listeners in this way: "If there's anything that you want/If there's anything I can do/Just call on me and I'll send it along/With love, from me to you" (McCartney, 2015). Given the dominance of popular culture in the lives of most teenagers, the songs, the sex appeal of the band members, and the fact that they are a common topic of conversation among their peers, all further drive their concentration of attention, idealization, and fantasies, making them fall in love.

Some might find my handling of this case unsatisfactory, and insist that despite not being a celebrity, sometimes one person is a recipient of romantic affection from a number of people. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are people with whom everyone falls in love, even if there is nothing particularly special about them. Apparently, the phrase ‘everyone falls in love with me’ is sometimes true. Must we conclude that they possess a special set of intrinsic qualities that make them lovable by all? I think not. I propose three possible explanations that are in line with my claim that lovability is a nonshared dispositional lover-specific property. First, just as in the celebrity case, there may be something about the loved person that makes them especially attractive to everyone: being the most popular girl/guy in school. Teenage love is often defined by trends. So there may exist a consensus among the high school seniors that Ginny is the pretties and coolest girl. Her remarkable good looks and her prestige status make her very desirable. Since all the guys are talking about her, looking at her, desiring her, it is not difficult to imagine that they also fall in love with her, projecting onto her the value of lovability. Second, the sexual overperception bias is well-known to be common in men (Abbey, 1982; Henningsen, Kartch, Orr, & Brown, 2009; Koeppel, Montagne-Miller, O’Hair, & Cody, 1993; Levesque, Nave, & Lowe, 2006; Major & Heslin, 1982; Morr & Mongeau, 2004; Mongeau & Johnson, 2004).

43 Emphasis added
Men tend to overestimate sexual interest women have for them in everyday encounters. Women, on the other hand, tend to underestimate men’s sexual interest in committed long-term relationships. This is called commitment skepticism (Haselton & Buss, 2000; Henningsen & Henningsen, 2010). The overconfidence in men about their sexual desirability might explain some cases of men claiming that all women fall in love with them. Third, even if we take the claim ‘everyone always falls in love with me’ seriously, and assume that the subject is sincere, does not have a celebrity status, does not suffer from the sexual overperception bias or its romantic love equivalent, and lacks remarkably good looks, it is compatible with my claim that lovability is projected nonshared lover-specific property. As should be clear from the overview of causes of romantic love, factors that bring love about are idiosyncratic. If there is a set of properties that make a given person attractive for a number of people, their attractiveness is likely to be a part of the causal story of those falling in love with them. Otherwise, there may be a number of circumstantial factors contributing to a number of people falling in love with the same person.

One last point from popular culture I will consider is the New York Times article "To Fall in Love With Anyone, Do This" by Mandy Len Catron (2015), which has made a lot of noise with its provocative title and content. In it the author claims that she has fallen in love with her romantic partner because they have decided to ask each other thirty six questions borrowed from the study on intimacy conducted by Aron et al. (1997) that become more and more intimate with progression. After that, they have stared deeply into each other's eyes for four minutes, and fell in love.

Is this the ultimate recipe for falling in love? Catron gladly mentions that after a similar study by Aron et al. (1991), one couple got married. But she fails to mention that the results were
generally ambiguous. Intimacy was supposed to be created through self-disclosure (Aron et al., 1997). The participants were matched in accordance with their attachment styles, and their ideal romantic partner qualities preferences. After going through the questions, they answered a questionnaire in which they had to rate the closeness they have achieved with their matched partner. The results were that after 45 minutes of interaction, thirty percent of students rated their new relationship as being closer than the closest relationship in their lives. However, Aron et al. say that it is possible that the participants interpreted the scale differently in the experimental context than in real life. When they were comparing this new relationship with all other relationships they had, they might have thought of the midpoint in the scale as representing average closeness (Aron et al., 1997:371).

Furthermore, intimacy is one aspect of a romantic relationship but it is not enough to differentiate it from friendship. Did the participants begin to experience violent feelings of passion? Intrusive thoughts? Desire for closeness? Did they start dating? The experiment did not cover that. Seven weeks after the experiment, out of 58 pairs, 57% had at least one subsequent conversation with their partner, 35% had done something together, and 37% sat together in class. There are many competing explanations for these results, and the fame that the study acquired was blown out of proportion by Catron. The most reasonable conclusion is that intimacy is a potential contributing factor to falling in love but by itself, it is by far insufficient to provide the whole picture.

It should be clear by now that there is no coherent causal story told about the coming into existence of romantic love. Timing, proximity, mystery, similarity, physical attractiveness, fame, and intimacy might all contribute something to some cases of romantic love. However, all these parameters are rather vaguely defined, and, upon clarification, admit of counter-examples.
Can they inform us about lovability? I have been using the example of fear to show that dangerousness, its formal object, supervenes on the target such that the features of the target ground dangerousness and can be used to justify one’s case of fear. Similarly, the insulting, the formal object of anger is grounded in the features of the target at whom (or at which) the anger is directed. These grounding features are real features that are a part of the eliciting conditions of the apt cases of these emotions. However, the same cannot be said about romantic love since proximity and timing are not the kinds of reasons that can show love to be apt (‘I love you because you live nearby’, or ‘I love you because we have similar socioeconomic backgrounds’ can hardly count as justifications of love). Furthermore, Fisher’s point about love maps drastically complicates the causal story of each particular love occurrence, making it impossible to provide a clear generalizable explanation of why people fall in love with whom they do.

**Conclusion**

I have discussed rationality of emotions, distinguishing between different norms of rationality, and shown why aptness is the core notion for the rational assessment of emotions. I discussed the ways in which emotions represent, and how they can misfire. I have explored the notion of formal object, outlining its multiple functions, and arguing that it is best construed as a response-independent property.

Using the model of rationality of emotions, I have argued that romantic love is *arational* because it lacks a formal object. I have said that neither intrinsic nor extrinsic properties do an adequate job in grounding lovability. Due to their failure to do so, I proposed that lovability is a response-dependent property – a property that is *projected* onto the beloved rather than tracked. I
have argued that these arguments lend further support to the idea that romantic love is not an emotion.

I then have considered a series of objections that posed potential problems to my view. I have argued that romantic love has no aptness conditions, but despite its lack of representational power, it still has content. I have also explained how on my view romantic love can be intelligible.

I have then examined the literature that discusses the causal mechanisms involved in falling in love. I have pointed out that the variables involved in the process are numerous, and that, at the moment, they do not provide a complete and comprehensive picture of how individuals fall in love. More research needs to be done to elucidate this process.

I conclude that romantic love is not an emotion and that it is arational. One is never either wrong or right to love whomever one loves from the aptness point of view. In the following chapter, I provide a positive account of romantic love. I argue that it is a syndrome. I also outline implications of my view for different romantic relationship models.
I have been arguing that romantic love is not an emotion. In chapter 2, I have outlined a number of features attributed to emotions, and have shown that romantic love has very few of them. I have also considered a handful of different theories of emotions in philosophy, and shown that romantic love does not fit into any of them. In chapter 3, using the categories of basic and nonbasic emotions, I have examined the potential evolutionary origins of romantic love, as well as cultural influences applicable to emotions and to romantic love. I have argued that romantic love cannot be categorized as either basic or a nonbasic emotion, and have argued that it should not be thought of as simply a social construction. In chapter 4, I have provided my last argument against the idea that romantic love is an emotion by showing that romantic love, unlike emotions, does not have aptness conditions, and for this reason is arational. In this last chapter I provide a positive account of romantic love, arguing that it is a syndrome. In Part I, I consider another potential category of mental phenomenon that romantic love may be – sentiment. I show that, despite sentiment being a better fit for describing romantic love, it still comes short of adequately doing so. In Part II, I explain what syndromes are, and show why they are the best category for describing romantic love. In particular, I consider how different norms of rationality might apply to syndromes. In the Coda, I consider normative implications of categorizing romantic love as a syndrome. Since there is no intrinsic rationality similar to that of aptness of emotions, the norms that we impose onto romantic love are extrinsic. If this is right then it can shed light onto the practices of polyamorists and ethical nonmonogamists. In particular, classifying romantic love as

a syndrome explains the variability and flexibility of the symptoms of romantic love. It also sheds light on the ideologies surrounding it. I conclude that since the ideology commonly attributed to romantic love is not intrinsic to it, it is up to the lovers to negotiate the rules of the game.

**Part I: Sentiments and romantic love**

I. Sentiments: introduction

When considering the phenomenology of romantic love, it seems to be unlimited and highly varied. For it feels thrilling in an anticipation of a reunion, cozy when snuggling on the couch with popcorn and Netflix, deeply intimate when making love, being engrossed in a conversation, or facing adversities together. But it also feels painful and devastating if it is unrequited, agonizing when betrayed, perhaps even shameful when it is directed at someone whom the lover herself deems unworthy. Since I have been arguing that romantic love is not an emotion, what could explain this obsessive passionate state’s rich phenomenology?

I think romantic love owes its richness to the fact that romantic love does not manifest itself in any one given emotion but can be manifested through a number of different emotions: one is happy when the beloved arrives, sad having to separate, afraid of their disapproval, jealous when they give inordinate attention to someone else. All these emotions are *instances* of love. They are tied together into a complex whole. This suggests that romantic love is a pattern comprising countless disparate emotions. Is there a cap on their number? Are there emotions that are incompatible with being emotions of love? Below I argue that there isn’t and that virtually any emotion can be a manifestation of love.
Given the variability of emotions that may serve as manifestations of romantic love, and the fact that romantic love can last longer than any given emotional occurrence, one way of characterizing romantic love is to say that it is a sentiment.

‘Sentiment’ is a term of the trade, and there are some subtle differences in the ways in which it is used. In defining sentiments Deonna and Teroni suggest that they are dispositions directed at specific individual things\(^\text{45}\) rather than simply values as in the case of character traits (Deonna & Teroni, 2012). They say, “Sentiments are often traceable to repeated emotional interactions with their objects, an ebb and flow of episodes, which through a process of sedimentation settle into distinctive longstanding affective orientations towards them” (Deonna & Teroni, 2012:108). Sentiments explain the importance one assigns to a particular object, and serve as motivational states with respect to that object.

Bennett Helm’s example of hopefulness illustrates the structure of a sentiment, “Thus, if you are hopeful that some end can be achieved, then you normally ought also to be afraid when its accomplishment is threatened, relieved when the threat does not materialize, angry at those who intentionally obstruct progress toward it, and satisfied when you finally achieve it (or disappointed when you fail); moreover it would be inconsistent with these emotions to be afraid of achieving the goal, grateful toward those who sabotage it, and so on” (Helm, 2010:59). Hence, sentiments represent a particular kind of import of a given object, and provide a rational structure to the possible emotions produced by the triggering of this sentiment.

Nico Frijda thinks that sentiments are affective dispositions that explain people’s propensities to react affectively in different situations (Frijda, 1994). Frijda suggests that sentiments can capture individual idiosyncrasies of these responses. He points out that most

\(^{45}\) Deonna and Teroni do not give an argument as to why sentiments necessarily must be directed at specific individual things. They make a useful contrast between sentiments and character traits. But it seems that sentiments can be directed at types of things and not just specific individual things: I love dark chocolate, I hate Nazis.
sentiments are acquired through experiences and social learning, but some, like disliking blood or unstable surfaces, may be innate (Frijda, 1994:64).

Frijda proposes two ways in which sentiments may be understood. First, they can be thought of as cognitive schemas whose content produces an appraisal when triggered by a given object. The schemas can also be activated by being reminded of the object, and not necessarily encountering it. Second, sentiments are dispositions that produce emotions, which constitute action readiness with respect to a given object. They are “latent motivations” that get realized in the emotions produced. For example, the sentiment of hate can trigger the desire to hurt the hated or feel happy upon discovering the suffering of the hated produced by something else.

For Prinz, sentiments are dispositions that manifest themselves in different occurrent emotions. Sentiments differ from what Prinz calls 'nonoccurrent attitudinal emotions', which are long-term emotional dispositions, since these nonoccurrent attitudinal emotions can become occurrent. For instance, I may be angry with my brother for years (nonoccurrent attitudinal emotion). If I encounter him, or am reminded of him, I will enter an occurrent state of anger. On the other hand, there is no particular emotion that directly corresponds to a sentiment in this way. Paradigm cases are liking and disliking as well as love and hate. Prinz says that one cannot simply enter a state of dislike: "If you dislike someone, you may experience anger, disgust, or contempt in her presence. You may even experience Schadenfreude when she falls victim to misfortune" (Prinz, 2004:189). Sentiments such as dislike are manifested in a number of different occurrent emotions.

Sentiments are kinds of emotional complexes that are directed at particular objects or types of objects, and manifested through a set of emotional responses. Importantly, following Frijda, Prinz points out that we sometimes use terms like 'love', 'like', 'dislike', and 'hate' to label
an occurrent state we are in. Frijda says that this is because an emotion by the same name is a manifestation of that sentiment (Frijda, 1994:64). Prinz stresses that even if this is the case, in any given sentiment, there is a number of different emotional dispositions involved. Since I have been arguing that romantic love is not an emotion, on my view, if romantic love is a sentiment, then it manifests itself in other emotions, which we would call 'love emotions' or 'emotions of love' but none of them in particular would be specific to love.

Prinz also points out that since emotional occurrences themselves are likely to be produced by the triggering of the dispositions to have these emotions, sentiments can also be thought of as dispositions to have a set of dispositions, or second-order dispositions. For instance, "Liking someone can be a disposition to take dispositional pleasure in her presence" (Prinz, 2004:190).

To summarize, sentiments are a comprised of a set of emotional dispositions directed at a particular object or a type of object. They are manifested by occurrent emotions. Three further issues need to be elucidated with respect to sentiments: (1) why is it that a specific set of emotional dispositions constitutes a given sentiment? (2) How do emotional dispositions that are grouped together into a sentiment relate to one another? (3) What impact, if any, do emotional dispositions in a given sentiment have on the rationality of the corresponding emotional occurrences? Answering these three questions will elucidate the internal structure of sentiments.

Frijda says that most sentiments are acquired through social learning, even though some may be innate (Frijda, 1994:64). Since he believes that sentiments are capable of explaining individual differences in emotional manifestations, it would seem that he believes that the emotional dispositions that compose a given sentiment, are in part determined by one's culture and upbringing, and are likely to be individual-specific. Consequently, the internal structure of a
given sentiment is in part accidental, and the emotional dispositions within a given sentiment can be explained by providing a genealogical account.

Explaining the relationship between emotional dispositions and sentiments, Frijda says that a sentiment may arise as a consequence of a number of particular emotions cooccurring. Whereas a given set of occurrent emotions might take place if the dispositions that exist as part of a given sentiment are triggered. For instance, my sentiment of hatred for Donald may come into existence as a result of my feeling dismayed, upset, angered, revolted, and indignant with Donald. At a later time, seeing Donald may unleash these very same emotions (or some of them), whose occurrence is now explained by appealing to the pre-existing sentiment of hatred I have developed towards him.

Even though for any given individual, the emotional dispositions constituting a sentiment may vary to a degree, it seems that the way in which these emotions are grouped together into a sentiment is not completely random. If we think of sentiments as kinds of general attitudes of likes and dislikes directed at particular objects, it wouldn't make sense to say that since I like listening to jazz, I am now delighted that all the jazz radio stations have disappeared. Or if I hate commercialism, it would be unintelligible for me to feel distressed if all the advertisement on TV was cancelled. It seems then that there is a kind of internal logical structure to a sentiment after all (Frijda, 2007:137). That is, it seems that certain emotional dispositions cannot be a part of the same sentiment if they conflict with one another. As I will show, an internal logical conflict within a sentiment is possible. Such a conflict indicates a violation of the coherence criterion, and renders the sentiment internally irrational.

I.1. Internal structure of sentiments
Sentiments are characterized as attitudes or a set of dispositions directed at a particular object, type of object, or a situation. As we have seen, typical examples of sentiments are taken to include very general attitudes such as ‘likes’ and ‘dislikes’, and more specific attitudes of love and hate. Both the general and the specific attitudes can be manifested in a variety of emotions. Given that each occurrent emotion is supposed to represent an organism-environment relationship, and given that sentiments provide a kind of general evaluation of its target, emotional dispositions within a sentiment are supposed to be coherent representations of the evaluation that the sentiment itself represents. For instance, since hate is an attitude that confers a negative value onto its target, the *Schadenfreude* one feels towards Lisa, when misfortunes befall her is an emotion of hate that accurately represents my position and stance with respect to Lisa. Since I hate Lisa, it makes sense that I delight in her misfortune. My joy at her downfall is my expression of my hatred towards Lisa. But if I hate Lisa, could I really be happy for her sake?

**I.1.1. Incompatibility and inconsistency of emotions**

Just what sort of conflict might arise between emotions such that they could not or are less likely to be a part of the same sentiment? On the face of it, there are at least two possible ways: (1) they might be incompatible, or (2) they might be inconsistent (de Sousa, 2011). Emotions are incompatible when they cannot coexist (de Sousa, 2011:70). This impossibility may be understood as an impossibility (a) for two given emotions to cooccur, (b) for two emotional dispositions to coexist, (c) for two actions to be produced by the cooccurrence of these emotions, (d) for one to hold two values that each emotion represents, (e) phenomenologically – for one to feel that the two emotions cannot coexist. On the other hand, emotions are inconsistent if a
subject’s being in both states at once is necessarily irrational. Therefore, inconsistency, on the face of it, implies psychological compatibility (de Sousa, 2011:77).

Taking on incompatibility first, since each emotion-type is individuated by the value it is supposed to track, each emotion represents its target under a specific description. If one were to be angry at Jane and content with Jane, the two evaluative properties – the offensive and the contentable – are likely to supervene on different sets of properties of Jane. On the face of it then there is no incompatibility of these two emotions with regards to Jane as the two emotions can co-exist in their dispositional states. It is less clear that they can occur simultaneously. Given that they are in a sense ‘opposite’, one appraises Jane in a positive and the other in negative light, and given that anger would seem to have a greater intensity than contentment, undergoing both emotions at the same time would be psychologically burdensome. In this way they may be less compatible. Were both to occur at the same time, the actions motivated by each one would be impossible to pursue simultaneously. The question is, can both of them be a part of the same sentiment? If Jane is my daughter, I can be content with the success she has achieved, and angry that she does not appreciate the success she has. So it seems that both anger and contentment can be part of the same sentiment – familial love.

On the other hand, if I admire my colleague, Irene (sentiment), I can feel admiration (emotion), envy, and perhaps even fear and antagonism towards her as part of my admiration sentiment, but, it seems, I cannot hold her in contempt. Contempt seems to require that we take the person to be beneath us in some respect but admiration seems to require that we praise the agency of the admired person (Bell, 2013). Though one might insist that one admires Irene’s particular achievements or qualities and holds her other aspects in contempt, these emotions are more difficult to tie into the same sentiment, as the general attitude of admiration prevents
contempt to be an expression of admiration. For keep in mind that a sentiment explains why a certain emotion has occurred if it is a manifestation of the sentiment in question. Contempt cannot be a manifestation of one's admiration because contempt and admiration are inconsistent in meaning – contempt is about the unworthiness of a person, while admiration is about their high worth related to their agency. It is impossible that one values the other person's agency highly when one takes them to have failed as an agent.

It may seem that one can both admire someone and hold them in contempt at the same time but for both emotions to be apt, the values that they pick out would need to supervene on a different set of properties of the target. It may be objected that one can admire and hold someone in contempt for the very same thing. Perhaps, I admire Katie for her ability to be a successful businesswoman in a big corporation but I also hold her in contempt for that. One way of addressing this objection might be to say that in fact my contempt and admiration supervene on different sets of properties because each attitude is relational, and so different relational properties play a part in making both admiration and contempt towards Katie apt. Thus, my attitude of admiration is apt because Katie is a successful businesswoman in a man's world, which is quite an achievement. Besides, she makes lots of money, and is more than self-sufficient and independent. I respect achievement, independence, and self-reliance. Therefore, given that I endorse these values, my admiration towards Katie is apt. On the other hand, my attitude of contempt might be apt if I take Katie to believe that success and achievement is measured in money, and that by being successful in the corporate arena, Katie is just playing into the hands of big corporations, and the culture of greed. Since I regard moneymaking as a lowly kind of activity, I hold Katie in contempt for not seeing that it is so.
This response is unsatisfactory because relational properties are unnecessary to show that both contempt and admiration may be apt in this case. While the fact that I hold the values described above might explain why I in particular experience both contempt and admiration towards Katie, one might speak generally as to what sort of attitudes might be apt with respect to Katie, the businesswoman. It appears that the formal object of contempt and admiration can supervene on the same exact set of properties, even though these properties are made salient in different ways by these emotions. This is a notorious problem in philosophy identified by David Hume as the Naturalistic Fallacy, and referred to by G.E. Moore in his Open Question Argument (Moore, 1903/1922). The problem is that appealing to natural properties can never completely settle the question about values. Therefore, the same set of facts might render different emotions fitting.46

I.1.2. The rationality of sentiments

At the same time I do not think that all is lost in addressing the question of inconsistency and incompatibility of values in a sentiment, for in a sentiment the values represented by emotions that manifest that sentiment are logically related to the formal object of the sentiment itself. In order to explain which emotions can or cannot be manifestations of a given sentiment, we must look at the meaning of emotions, their formal objects. The formal objects of sentiments are background values that figure in the aptness of their emotional manifestations. They introduce a relational feature into the aptness conditions of the emotions of the sentiment. If the meaning of a given emotion is incompatible with the meaning of the sentiment, it is inconsistent with that sentiment. This also means that sentiments themselves have aptness conditions. Whether my sentiment of admiration, grief, or hate is fitting depends on whether the target at which they are

46 I have made this point in Chapter 4.
directed can ground the valuation the sentiment represents. If the sentiment is unfitting the emotions that manifest it are unfitting too even thought they are intelligible as manifestations of the sentiment.

For example, my sentiment of admiration towards Irene may be inapt if Irene’s achievements or qualities do not warrant admiration. Perhaps I admire her because my mother always told me that she is an incredible person. I might not realize it and make up reasons for admiring her. As my sentiment of admiration accumulates more and more emotional diversity, I find it easier to rationalize my admiration. Yet, there is nothing about Irene that could ground my admiration. Therefore, the joy I feel when being in her company is made intelligible by my admiration but is inapt.

On the other hand, consider the sentiment of grief directed at the loss of a loved one. Its formal object is irreversible loss. Emotions that might manifest grief are anger, despair, sadness, anxiety, shame, guilt, longing, pity, regret, remorse, nostalgia, etc. The aptness conditions of these emotions are in part spelled out by the formal object of grief. My despair, sadness, and anxiety are apt as they express the irreversibility of this loss, the hopelessness of getting this person back, and the dread of being without them for the rest of my life. The shame I feel is apt when I recount the opportunities I missed for being a better partner and a better person with them. While grieving, I might also feel content with the fact that the death was quick, and they did not suffer.

It may be objected that some emotions that are typical of grief are not apt but are only intelligible. For instance, anger is a typical emotion of grief, where one is angry at the unfairness and meaninglessness of death. At the same time, anger is not apt, since life is not fair, and death by accident cannot be considered an injustice. Similarly, while grieving, one often feels
survivor's guilt for not preventing the death even though in reality one could not have done anything to prevent it. Indeed, it may be that the sentiment of grief creates an excuse for these seemingly inapt emotions for it makes them intelligible.

I agree. Not all of the typical emotional manifestations of a sentiment may be apt. Although anger and guilt may not be apt, they are intelligible. Since they are inapt but intelligible, it would seem that their intelligibility is non-epistemic. However, the underlying causes of anger and guilt in grief seem to be quite different from the causal stories of Jody, who is afraid of all dogs due to her traumatic childhood experience, and Franz's fears of a thread, who was conditioned to be afraid of it by an evil scientist (see chapter 4 section I.1.1.3.). The interesting difference is not in the fact that Jody’s and Franz's responses are conditioned, while anger and guilt in grief are probably not. Rather, they are much more intelligible than Jody’s and Franz's fears because we find much more meaning in them. While Jody’s and Franz's fears are pathological, anger and guilt in grief need not be. One might be angry at the situation as a whole, the unfairness of it. Since in grief, one is often moved to attribute blame to someone or something, one might be angry at God, fate, or random chance, taken to be responsible for the death of one’s beloved. One might be angry at oneself for the inability to correct the situation (Nussbaum, 2001). Anger is retributive, since it motivates us to correct the perceived injustice, and so is all the more frustrating in grief, since there is no possibility to correct it. But it suggests a struggle to cope with one’s loss, being unable to accept that it is irrevocable for a while. If we think that the situation is either not anger-warranting, or that feeling anger is pointless, since it cannot be utilized in any useful way, or both, we might judge it to be irrational, and so revise our emotional repertoire, learning not to be angry.
Similarly, guilt in grief seems to speak to the unfairness of death, as the guilt is directed as one’s own survival. ‘Why wasn’t I the one who died?’ ‘It should have been me!’ are the kinds of thoughts the grieving person might have. Indeed, there but for the grace of God go I. It could have been me but it wasn’t.

Given that some emotions in a sentiment may be inapt but at the same time not just intelligible because of their causal mechanism but rather because they are a part of a sentiment, I would like to introduce a new term to designate emotions that are inapt, and so not epistemically intelligible, but are at the same time more than non-epistemically intelligible. They have Verstehen-intelligibility, that is, they are understandable, meaningful, or relatable. Guilt and anger as manifestations of grief have Verstehen-intelligibility because, while inapt, we understand them to be manifesting grief because they are typical grief emotions, and because they express the pain of the loss that grief is about. Indeed, these emotions would not be understandable or relatable if they were not expressions of grief when faced with the death of a loved one.

It is also conceivable that an emotion that is inconsistent with the formal object of the sentiment, nonetheless takes place while one is experiencing other emotions of that sentiment. Delight is inconsistent with grief when it is directed at the death of a loved one. It is incoherent for me to be delighted in the death of my loved one as part of my mourning the loss of their life. Again, I might be glad that they did not suffer in death but my joy is directed at a particular aspect of their death, and not at their death as such. However, we might imagine an evil scientist who has manipulated by brain such that whenever I experience a significant loss, I am caused to

47 Verstehen is a term used in sociology to designate the 'understanding the meaning of action from the actor's point of view' or to enter 'into the shoes of the other' when studying a social practice (Online Dictionary of the Social Sciences). I do not mean to embrace every use of this term in sociology but to use it as it comes very close to what I mean by Verstehen-intelligibility.
feel delight. If such a scenario is possible then delight is in principle compatible with grief. However, it is inconsistent with grief because the delight I feel does not correctly represent my loss. One might say that the delight is non-epistemically intelligible in so far as one can see why I feel the way I do. But the delight I feel carries no meaning because it does not represent the loss as a loss to me. For this reason too, it lacks Verstehen-intelligibility.

The mark of a sentiment is that it is a complex emotional scheme, the rational structure of which is determined by the relationship between its formal object and the formal objects of the emotions that manifest it. A sentiment is not a random collection of emotional dispositions but a structure that can be more or less coherent. While the compatibility of emotions within a sentiment may be explained causally, its coherence depends on the relationship between the intentionality of the sentiment and its components.

1.2. Why romantic love is not a sentiment

The fact that romantic love can be manifested in a number of emotions makes the category of sentiments a plausible contender for classifying romantic love. For example, rather than saying love is a blend of lust and attachment, one can say that these are among the various states toward which love can dispose us. These different manifestations may come and go in context-sensitive ways. Dorothy Tennov has collected numerous accounts of people being in love, which commonly share reports of intense longing, desire for unity and reciprocation from the beloved, extreme elation upon seeing the beloved person, anxiety from being uncertain about the feelings of the beloved, deep depression upon realization of never being able to see them again or be with them (Tennov, 1979/1999).
Although it is clear that romantic love manifests itself in numerous emotions, characterizing it as a sentiment is inaccurate for three reasons. First, it is too narrow. At their core, sentiments are emotional dispositions. The dispositions that constitute love go beyond emotions to include thought patterns and behaviors as well. People in love tend to think obsessively about their partners, they are motivated to engage in courtship behaviors, and even to form long-term plans, such as the decision to cohabitate. If someone reported that she never thought about her partner when they were not together, we would doubt that she was in love.

Second, I have argued in the previous section that sentiments have formal objects of their own together with aptness conditions. In chapter 4, I have shown that romantic love lacks both. Therefore, romantic love is not a sentiment.

The third reason further elucidates reason two: the lack of the formal object explains why romantic love has a much wider range of its emotional manifestations than any sentiment. As I have explained in the section above, what determines the number of emotional manifestations of a given sentiment is the consistency of the formal object of the emotion and the formal object of the sentiment. I have argued that this consistency is understood in terms of epistemic intelligibility and Verstehen-intelligibility. Emotions that manifest romantic love can only be Verstehen-intelligible and non-epistemically intelligible because romantic love as complex schema of emotions and other mental states and behaviors is arational since it can neither be apt nor inapt. However, the intelligibility that it affords to its numerous manifestations is very wide. The projected quality of lovability is particularly malleable and flexible in being consistent with different emotions. To demonstrate this idea, let us compare and contrast love and hate.

I.2.1. On love and hate
Love and hate are often thought to be ‘opposites’ as they evaluate their targets in extremely positive and negative light, respectively. As I have said in the previous chapters, romantic love is characterized by idealization of the beloved, attributing extremely positive value to seemingly trivial traits, as well as amplifying the positive ones, and downplaying the negatives. Hatred, on the other hand, portrays the target as loathsome, vile, and degenerate. The formal object of hate is the hateful. The hateful is a value property that represents an extreme badness or evilness of the target. Hatred makes the negative characteristics of the target salient. While romantic love is always directed at particular individuals, hate can be directed at individuals, groups, and features of social situations or actions. For instance, one might hate Donald Trump, an individual, white supremacists, a group of people, or injustice, a feature of a situation. While love is always directed at the entire person, and not just their parts or specific aspects, hatred can be directed at the whole target or at its parts. For the sake of simplicity in drawing a parallel between love and hate, I will discuss hate as being directed at an entire individual person.

Some characteristic emotions of hate are anger, disgust, loathing, resentment, Schadenfreude, and fear. These emotions can successfully manifest hate since their formal objects are consistent with the formal object of hatred. For instance, I am angry that Donald Trump successfully passes his destructive legislation, I am disgusted by his actions and everything he represents, I feel Schadenfreude thinking that he will pay for all his wrongdoings, I fear the damage he can cause. I might also feel proud standing up to him, excited at the prospect of his impeachment, hopeful that the impeachment will come rather soon, etc. Both negative and positive emotions can be manifestations of hate. The existence of the hate sentiment explains why I experience these emotions. It also makes them intelligible by contributing to their aptness conditions.
A given emotion can be a manifestation of hate in so far as it represents Trump as evil. Thus, my sadness is a hate emotion when I am sad that Trump gets away with his misogynistic behavior. However, my sadness that Trump has low approval ratings is not a manifestation of my hate as it expresses dissatisfaction with Trump’s being viewed as bad president. The sadness that Trump has low approval ratings contradicts my viewing Trump as evil. Of course, one could come up with a story as to how my sadness that Trump has low approval ratings is coherent with my hate attitude. For instance, I might believe that only when Trump has high approval ratings will the FBI consider the situation too dangerous for the American democracy, and will do everything in their legal power to terminate his presidency. In this case the meaning of my sadness is elaborated by this story I believe in. However, it shows that I am not really sad about Trump’s low approval ratings because I think that Trump is a good president and should be recognized for it. This misguided recognition is viewed as instrumental only to his downfall. Sadness that is directed at valuing Trump’s success is incompatible with my hatred for him. It seems, therefore, that emotions that would represent my caring for Trump’s success for its own sake are inconsistent with my sentiment of hatred, and so cannot be manifestations of my hate.

There are, perhaps, emotions that are ‘controversial’ as manifestations of hatred. For instance, admiration seems to be often evoked in the context of discussing one’s enemies. Nietzsche says, “We do not hate what we accord little value, but only what we consider equal or superior” (Nietzsche, 2001:73). If Nietzsche is right then attitudes such as respect and admiration are not only compatible but perhaps even required by hate. At the same time, contempt cannot be an emotion of hate since it presupposes an attitude of superiority with respect to the target. Hate’s manifestation through fear suggests that the target is taken to pose a serious risk.
Although admiration can coexist with hate, it itself cannot be a manifestation of hate because hatred appraises the evilness of the target negatively. If admiration were also to be directed at the evilness of the target, it would appraise it positively, which is inconsistent with the negative appraisal of hate. For example, one might hate Hitler for all the heinous crimes he has committed. That is, one might despise Hitler, be outraged by the ease with which he has signed those orders, disgusted by his cruelty, and distraught by his successes. At the same time, one might also admire his efficiency, bravery, and intelligence. It is conceivable that hate and admiration can coexist in a person’s mind, yet admiration cannot be an emotion of hate because the nature of its appraisal is contrary to that of hatred.

One might object that hatred is the cause of one’s admiration. One cannot help but admire that which one despises so much. One cannot help but recognize the genius and the power of the thing that triggers such violent negative emotions of one’s hatred. The sheer power of the emotional impact of the target speaks to its greatness, and the target is experienced as sublime or God-like, producing perhaps not only admiration but awe. Would it not make admiration and awe manifestations of hatred? No, because, as I have explained, admiration and hatred are inconsistent in meaning. While it is possible for one to produce the other, it is not the case that one can be a manifestation of the other, as each one apprehends the target as having an ‘opposite’ kind of value.

The fact that a certain sentiment can cause an emotion that is not part of that sentiment helps us define the boundaries of that sentiment. These boundaries are set by the coherence criterion of the formal object of the sentiment and the formal objects of emotions. While certain emotions can be caused by a sentiment, they need not be its manifestations.

48 I myself do not find admirable or admire that which I hate.
What about love? Sentiments have formal objects and adhere to aptness conditions, unlike romantic love. Lovability, a response-dependent property, is the value property much like the formal object of sentiments, around which its emotional manifestations are organized. While it itself cannot be grounded in any given set of natural properties, could it be that the internal structure of romantic love resembles that of a sentiment and is subject to the same standard of coherence?

I think not because with a very small number of obvious exceptions, virtually any emotion can be a manifestation of romantic love. How can I back up this bold claim especially if not every single emotion is nameable? I think that I can show this by dividing emotions into rough categories such as positive and negative, and self-directed and other-directed. Positive emotions that are other-directed are good contenders for love emotions because in love we tend to idealize our beloveds and care for them. These emotions might either be directed at the beloved, or at the situation with the beloved. Emotions like joy, contentment, excitement, amusement, relief, sympathy, admiration, awe, wonder, lust, and pride can all be emotions of love since they seem to cohere with lovability, the projected property of the amazing, wonderful, and perfect. Thus, because I love them, I am overjoyed by seeing them and spending time with them, content with them as a person, excited at the prospect of sharing experiences, amused at their silly jokes and quirks, relieved that they got home safe, sympathetic to their suffering, admire their achievements and character, in awe with their talents, feel wonder at the mystery of their person, lustful after them, feel pride at their newly achieved success. My love can also be manifested by emotions that are directed at the situation: I might feel grateful to my lucky stars, fate, or God for having met this person.
Positive emotions that are self-directed are likely to be expressions of satisfaction and happiness in the case of reciprocated love. I might be proud that I am with them, or humbled if I think I don’t deserve them. I might feel glad that loving them makes me a better person. Negative emotions that are self-directed can also successfully manifest my love: I might feel guilty for eating all of my beloved’s favorite chocolate, lying to them, or cheating on them because I love them. I might feel ashamed of my ineptitudes because their positive opinion of me matters a lot to me. I might feel anxious and insecure revealing to my beloved my imperfections.

Negative emotions that are other-directed can be further subdivided into negative emotions reflecting the lover’s care for the beloved’s wellbeing, and those that reflect malice or ill will towards the beloved. My anger, sadness, indignation, and resentment are emotions that express concern for the wellbeing of my beloved when I am angered that someone wronged them or that they have failed to do something that is good for them. My anger is a love emotion when I am angry that my beloved wasn’t treated fairly at work, and when my beloved has not quit smoking even though they said they would.

What about emotions that express ill will towards the beloved? I might resent my beloved for their betraying me, feel jealous when seeing them with someone else, hold them in contempt for some inadequacy. Although romantic love is characterized by idealization, it does not prevent our perceiving the beloveds in negative light. Sometimes doing so is disturbing as it conflicts with the generally positive perception of the beloved. For this reason, these negative aspects are either downplayed or, on the contrary, intensified by this discrepancy. Whether or not an emotion that constitutes ill will is an emotion of love will depend on the context. Jealousy is an emotion of love as it expresses the wish to be valued in a way that is undermined when someone else is valued in that way by my beloved (Farrell, 1980). If I wish to be the only or the most
sexually desirable person for my beloved, I might feel jealous when they become sexually attracted to someone else. Jealousy is a negative emotion – it does not feel good, and its action tendency is to aggress towards the beloved and the rival. Often it is a tool by which the lover guilts and shames the beloved into not straying or not directing their sexual or emotional attention to others. Despite jealousy being a hostile emotion directed at the beloved and the rival, it is a love emotion because it is consistent with lovability – since I love you, and, therefore, perceive you as amazing, I want not to lose you to anyone else.

The case of jealousy is a plausible case of a hostile emotion that is nonetheless a love emotion because the formal object of jealousy, the jealousy-worthy, seems to be consistent with the projected property of lovability. What about my resentment towards the beloved upon finding out they have betrayed me, or that they voted Republican, or that they don’t like dogs? Resentment may seem to not be a love emotion because it presents the beloved in negative light, potentially withdrawing the value of perfection attributed to them. However, resentment is an emotion of love when it is produced by the disappointment of the lover by the beloved’s failure or shortcoming that contradicts the lover’s attribution of high value and idealization of the beloved. ‘I resent you because I love you’ means ‘since I love you I expect more from you. Now that you have mistreated me, I am disappointed’. This way the formal object of resentment coheres with the formal object of love. The power of love might move the lover to rationalize and explain away the beloveds’ failures, or to amplify them. Since resentment is a species of anger, and since anger can be a love emotion, resentment can also be a love emotion.

Hostile emotions like anger and resentment can be emotions of love. Furthermore, my claim that almost any emotion can be an emotion of love can be supported by the fact that the way we love has to do with the kind of people we are, and the way we have internalized the
model of romantic love (what Helen Fisher calls love maps). It has to do with our character, attachments styles and the model of love we have been brought up on through our cultures. Gender roles further complicate the picture. Below I provide a rough sketch of how these features interact with one another, and affect the way we love.

1.2.1.1. Why we love the way we do

First, one’s attachment style influences the way in which one experiences love. John Bowlby in 1960’s has identified three attachment styles: secure, anxious-ambivalent, and avoidant (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980). He argued that each person develops an attachment style in the early infancy – first few years of a person’s life – through interaction with their primary caregiver, usually, the mother. In particular, the attachment style is determined by the presence of the caregiver whenever the infant desires contact with them, and, more importantly, in situations the infant finds threatening because the caregivers serves as a secure base for the infant, calming and reassuring them when they need it.

A secure attachment style is acquired when the mother is consistently present, enabling the infant to confidently explore its environment, and be comforted when the infant is afraid or otherwise is in need of attention. Infants with secure attachment styles are not afraid to venture out into their environment, knowing that the mother will be there to reassure them if necessary. An anxious-ambivalent attachment style is developed when the caregiver’s presence and responses are inconsistent when responding to the infant’s needs. These infants are less likely to explore their environment even in the presence of their caregiver, cry and express anger more often, and are generally more anxious. An avoidant attachment style is formed when the mother does not respond to the needs of the infant when it is seeking contact with her. The avoidant
infants tend to exhibit detachment, apparently lacking the desire for interpersonal contact (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978). Lastly, the *disorganized/disoriented* attachment style is a style attributed to children whose behavior is difficult to categorize in terms of the three aforementioned styles because they do not exhibit a coherent strategy of dealing with separation and reunion with their primary caregivers (Main & Solomon, 1986, 1990; Main & Cassidy, 1988; Main & Hesse, 1990; Alexander, 1992).

The attachment styles reflect the internal models infants build when interacting with their primary caregivers. They are also an important part of the individual’s personality (Shaver & Brennan, 1992; Feeney & Noller, 1994; Buunk, 1997). The attachment style one forms through the interaction with the primary caregiver underlies one’s romantic experience, in particular, the way in which one relates to one’s beloved (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan, 1992; Feeney, Noller, & Callan, 1994; Kirkpatrick & Davis, 1994). Cindy Hazan and Phillip Shaver found that people with secure attachment styles are likely to be happy, trusting, and fulfilled in their love relationships. Anxious-ambivalent lovers are obsessive, feel intense desire for reciprocation, experience high emotional volatility, and extreme sexual attraction and jealousy. The avoidant lovers fear intimacy, experience a lot of emotional volatility, and are also prone to intense jealousy (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). Lovers with secure attachment scored much higher on the dimensions of happiness, friendship, trust, and intimacy compared to anxious-ambivalent and avoidant lovers. They also reported to be most satisfied with their romantic relationships that on average last longer than those of people with other attachment styles.

More recently, Donatella Marazziti and colleagues (2006) confirmed that anxious-ambivalent lovers are higher on obsessiveness, and experience extreme fear of loss. Additionally, Marazziti and colleagues distinguish between two types of avoidant styles: *fearful-avoidant...*
lovers are high on anxiety and avoidance, and dismissing lovers are low on anxiety and high on avoidance (Marazziti et al., 2006). Fearful-avoidant lovers experience intense fear of loss; they long for intimacy but avoid it. Dismissing lovers avoid intimacy and are distrustful of others.

Although John Bowlby’s characterization of attachment styles has been empirically confirmed by numerous studies, his classification of the ‘secure’ attachment style has been criticized for assuming that the mother is the main and the only caregiver whose relationship with the infant really determines the infant’s attachment style, and that the ‘right’ way to attach is the way afforded by constant attention from the mother (Lewis, 2010; Vicedo, 2013). Indeed, since children are often reared by a number of adults and with the help of older siblings, Bowlby’s model looks suspicious in taking for granted the nuclear family model and insisting on the mother’s primary role in childrearing.

Cross-cultural studies of attachment styles confirm the general set of categories developed by Bowlby and Ainsworth but show that the attachment style distribution is different in different cultures. For instance, in the U.S. about 60% of people are categorized as secure, about 25% as avoidant, and 15% anxious-ambivalent (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Mickelson, Kessler & Shaver, 1997). In Japanese samples 68% of infants were categorized as secure and the rest as anxious-ambivalent. Avoidant style was not identified (Miyake, Chen & Campos, 1985; Takahashi, 1986). In Germany the prevalent attachment style was found to be avoidant (49%), followed by secure (33%), and anxious-ambivalent (12%) (Grossmann et al., 1981). A study of the Israeli kibbutzim showed anxious-ambivalent at 50%, secure at 37.5%, and avoidant at 12.5% (Sagi et al., 1985). Researchers in these studies have argued that the childrearing arrangements in the studied cultures explain these patterns of distribution, and in no way suggest that the non-American children are ill-adjusted to having intimate relationships and fulfilling
lives in those cultures. Furthermore, the meta-analyses of these and similar studies show high intracultural variations of attachment styles (IJzendoorn & Kroonenberg, 1988; Mesman, IJzendoorn & Sagi-Schwartz, 2016).

Different attachment styles in part explain why people experience romantic love differently. The person’s comfort with intimacy and their level of anxiety over the relationship is a good predictor of their attitudes towards beloveds and themselves. In particular, they are good predictors of the degree of possessiveness and withdrawal of the lover. These can manifest themselves in aggression toward the beloved as well as coldness.

Second, one’s moral character will also dictate the way in which one treats the beloved. Romantic love has a notoriously complicated relationship with morality, and while some philosophers insist that romantic love is an inherently moral phenomenon, in chapter 4 I have argued that it is not. Love not only can motivate us to lie, cheat, steal, and murder on our beloved’s behalf, but also do these very same things to the beloved. One might lie to protect their feelings, or lie because one does not want to lose their respect and commitment. One might kill them in the fit of rage or because of the conviction that no one else should have them. ‘I wish you were dead because I love you’ or ‘I wish you to suffer because I love you’ are perfectly intelligible utterances love might motivate. Indeed, ‘I did it because I love you’ is used as a common excuse for harmful actions (Ben Ze’ev & Goussinsky, 2008). While it has little merit, it is evoked enough to render the expression and the pattern of behavior intelligible, and to some, even excusable. Anger, rage, Schadenfreude, contempt, resentment, and disgust directed at the beloved can all be part of one’s romantic love’s repertoire. Whether or not one treats the beloved
well and the kinds of emotions one experiences is determined by the kind of internal model of
love one has. For some, all is fair in love and war.\textsuperscript{49}

Third, our cultures largely define the content of our gender norms, as well as our attitudes
towards them. In romantic relationships gender norms can become particularly pronounced.
People often find masculinity and femininity in their partners very attractive. People act out
gender roles in their domestic arrangements – the man brings home the bacon, while the woman
cooks, cleans, and takes care of the children. It is conceivable that in cultures in which there is a
large gender inequality, the power dynamic between romantic partners is one of the central
features of their relationships. The woman submits to the man, the man controls the woman. In
such a context the man might have all the freedom to express his emotions, where his love might
manifest itself in possessiveness and dominance. He might also feel disgust, contempt, and
resentment towards his female lover for what her gender represents to him – an inferior being.
He might even feel contempt and resentment towards himself because of falling for such an
unworthy object.\textsuperscript{50} If ‘to love’ means ‘to resent’, ‘hold in contempt’, and ‘be disgusted by’, it is
evident that the projected quality of lovability is likely to be infused with culture-specific or
simply misogynistic features.

In most cultures, it seems, there are conflicting attitudes towards the gendered object of
love. In the Western culture that conflict is between the symbolic significance of the woman as
Virgin Mary and Mary Magdalene, and between the conqueror and the protector for men.
Furthermore, femininity has been associated with emotionality in the West, and it is the women
that may be allowed wild unrestrained emotional outbursts as part of their ‘nature’. Since

\textsuperscript{49} Obviously, one’s explicit opinions about what love is or should be, and what kind of lover one is need not
correspond to how one experiences love and acts in love in reality.

\textsuperscript{50} In Plato’s \textit{Symposium} every speech praises love between men as most superior since it does not involve
women.
stereotypes dictate that men are more emotionally reserved, their emotional expressions are checked by that stereotype, and the emotions they experience in love might differ from those of women in being more restrained (Schmitt et al., 2003).

Lastly, our cultural scripts often links love with violence. Historically, ‘crimes of passion’ have been excusable in the American court of law (Stearns, 2010), and even though they are no longer as excusable, we are well familiar with stories of O.J. Simpson, Lisa Nowak, Tina and Ike Turner, and, more recently, Rihanna and Chris Brown, and Johnny Depp and Amber Heard.51 ‘If he doesn’t hit you, he doesn’t love you’ has been a common attitude among the Scottish, Russian, Latinx, and many other women. Causing physical or emotional pain may well be ways of loving for some. For this reason, it is clear that any emotion can be a manifestation of love.

As we have seen, when one is in love, not all the emotions related to love or the loved one are love emotions. Resentment I feel towards my beloved can be a love emotion if part of my love model is that ‘to love’ is to ‘resent’. But if resentment is not my love emotion, it can be caused by it when I discover that my beloved has betrayed me and made me a laughing stock. In a different scenario if I resent my beloved for their flaws such as voting Republican, that resentment is not a love emotion. Rather, this resentment can either be amplified or subdued by my love. So I might be either more resentful towards my beloved since I value them so much or I might make excuses for them because I love them. To distinguish between love- and non-love emotions, it is necessary to identify a given emotion’s intentionality. Is my resentment about you being valued as my beloved, where the emotion’s occurrence is also explained by my love for you? Or is it about something else?

51 Over half of all murdered women in the U.S. are killed by their romantic partners (CDC, 2017).
All the factors that I have presented do not imply that emotional manifestations of romantic love are only non-epistemically intelligible. It is not their causal story that makes us see how they can be manifestations of love. Rather they are Verstehen-intelligible – we can easily slip into the state of mind of the lover to see how a given emotion can be a love emotion. The only exception I could think of is boredom. Boredom can hardly be a manifestation of a passionate obsessive state. ‘You bore me because I love you’ doesn’t really make sense. One the other hand, ‘you bore me because I hate you’ is somewhat intelligible, though ‘I hate you because I bore you’ makes more sense but that is because ‘hate’ is used colloquially in this context. All in all, the intelligibility of hate is a lot narrower than that of romantic love. This is my last argument for showing that romantic love is not a sentiment.

Part II. The syndrome of romantic love

In chapters 2 through 4, I have argued that love is not an emotion. In this chapter I have shown that love is not a sentiment. What is it then? I think the best description of romantic love is that it is a syndrome. I have discussed James Averill’s view of love as a syndrome in chapter 3. Although Averill’s account of love gets many things right, the main reason why I reject it is because Averill thinks that all emotions are syndromes. This is because he thinks that emotions are social constructions, and, in developing that proposal, he shifts from talk of syndromes to talk of scripts. As I have argued, emotions are not scripts, rather, they have scripts. Neither are they syndromes, as I make clear below. In doing so, I, once again, demonstrate that romantic love is not an emotion.
II.1. Romantic love as a syndrome

The idea that love is a syndrome has been picked up by other authors, who place less emphasis on the script metaphor. One of its most eloquent defenders is Ronald de Sousa, who says that love is, “a syndrome: not a kind of feeling, but an intricate pattern of potential thoughts, behaviors, and emotions that tend to ‘run together’” (de Sousa, 2015:4). De Sousa presents a balanced view of both cultural and biological aspects of love. I think this approach is right, and will elaborate on it, with special reference to the objections I have been raising against emotion theories.

The notion of a syndrome comes with clinical associations, as the term is often used to describe mental disorders. Both Averill and de Sousa embrace this, as do I. While I do not think that the syndrome of romantic love is necessarily pathological and needs to be treated, it shares many characteristics with other syndromes. I hope to show this by way of comparing romantic love to depression.

What are the criteria used to diagnose depression? Such criteria have several features that deserve attention. First, they are disjunctive, and thus two people with the same diagnosis can have very different symptoms. Second, these include emotions, thoughts, and behaviors, such as low mood, negative self-regard, and loss of appetite. Third, these symptoms can be context sensitive: Some lose weight when depressed, while others gain weight, and children’s symptoms differ from adults. Fourth, syndromes like this are not believed to have formal objects: low mood is not a symptom of depression if it is the result of bereavement, for example, so depression need not track anything in the world. Fifth, for this reason, syndromes like depression can be

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52 De Sousa’s emphasis
53 Brian Earp and Julian Savulescu have been arguing for creating potential ‘cures’ for unwanted bad love, as well as for ‘love potions’ in cases where it might need a boost. See (Earp, 2012; Earp, Wudarczyk, Sandberg & Savulescu, 2014; Savulescu & Earp, 2014; Earp, Sandberg, & Savulescu, 2014; Earp, Sandberg, & Savulescu, 2015; Earp & Savulescu, 2018).
described as arational, rather than rational or irrational. Clinical depression is insensitive to reason, so it cannot be described as a mistaken state of mind. Sixth, syndromes can manifest themselves in symptoms in ways that are decoupled from the environment; depression can have its effects even when no depressing stimulus is present. Finally, though depression is not a mere cultural script, it can be culturally influenced. For example, in some cultures bodily discomfort is more often reported than low mood. In some cases, the components of a syndrome co-occur because of some underlying pathology, but they can also be bound together by cultural norms. For example, the excessive guilt that often accompanies depression might arise because of cultural expectations that people be cheerful and productive.

If we take these seven aspects of clinical syndromes as a model, we can see that the syndrome theory of love has great advantages over theories that identify love as an emotion or a sentiment. Let us review the objections I have raised in classifying love as an emotion and a sentiment, and see how they can be circumvented by the syndrome theory. When applied to love, the categories of emotions and sentiments commit, implausibly, to the thesis that love has a formal object. Syndromes, such as depression, do not. The categories of emotions and sentiments also entail that love has aptness conditions. I argued against this, noting that love is often associated with quirky traits, which vary from one person to the next. Syndromes, too, lack aptness conditions. Bodily theories of emotion could not extend to love, because love is not associated with any single bodily state. This is also true of syndromes; for example, a depressed individual can feel sleepy or incapable of sleep. I argued that love is not a basic emotion on the grounds that it is not innate, and not limited to brief episodes. The same can be said of syndromes. They show signs of learning, as with learned-helplessness theories of depression, and they can last for years. Against the view that love is an emotion blend, I noted that love lacks
fixed components. Syndromes, too, can be instantiated in different ways. Love is also unlike calibrated emotions, which operate under control of beliefs in response to specific elicitors. Syndromes such as depression are, similarly, not governed by specific beliefs or elicitors.

I said that love is not a sentiment because its dispositional structure includes beliefs and behaviors as well as feelings. This is a defining attribute of syndromes. Lastly, they also do not have an internal rational structure that limits the number of symptoms a syndrome can have. Depression can manifest itself in bursts of joy and calmness, and, as we have seen, romantic love can manifest itself through virtually any emotion. Some of the symptoms of syndromes have non-epistemic intelligibility, some Verstehen-intelligibility, depending on the cultural narrative and personal experience. Thus, whether or not one can make sense of cultural syndromes like amae, amok, or gezelligheid, will depend on the degree to which one is able to place oneself into the context for this experience.

All this argues for the thesis that love is a syndrome. The features of syndromes that I identified correspond to some of the main differences between syndromes and emotions, and those differences align with some of my main reasons for rejecting the thesis that love is an emotion. The parallels between love and paradigm cases of syndromes are remarkable. It also accounts for the fact that love is often compared to psychiatric disorder. We can attribute love by saying someone is “crazy” about her lover, and we describe people as “madly in love.”

The analogy gets a further boost from the final feature of syndromes that I mentioned in my analysis: Syndromes can be culturally inflected. Love is associated with somewhat different dispositions in different cultures as well. This, in fact, is precisely what motivated Averill’s proposal that love is a syndrome. At the same time, I resist his claim that love is merely a script. Here too, ironically, the syndrome account helps. A syndrome such as depression can vary across
cultures, but many of its components have deep biological roots. Depression affects core biological systems, such as appetite and sleep, and we see depressive symptoms in nonhuman animals. The caged tiger that paces incessantly and refuses to eat is not simply acting out a script. The syndrome view allows us to accommodate that plasticity of love—its sensitivity to culture and context—without assuming that it is just a role that was written for us by our culture in the recent past.

It is important to note that the analogy between romantic love and depression is useful in bringing out the features of syndromes but there are also important disanalogies between romantic love and depression. Depression is a mood disorder. Moods are characterized by not being object-focused. They are generally thought to lack targets. In case of depression, one isn’t depressed about anything in particular. One is simply depressed (Frijda, 1994; For a different view, see Prinz, 2004). At the same time, the state of depression colors one’s perception of everything else. For this reason, some researchers say that moods are directed at everything (Goldie, 2000; Price, 2006). As we have seen, romantic love necessarily has a target even though that target might be purely fictional. Another difference between depression and romantic love is that it might be that the syndrome of depression has fewer emotional manifestations that are mostly confined to negative emotions, compared to love. Even though there are these differences between romantic love and depression, they have many important structural similarities. This is why depression is a useful example in thinking of romantic love as a syndrome.

One might ask, if romantic love’s symptoms are so varied, how can one determine whether or not one is in love, or whether a given set of symptoms is sufficient to constitute romantic love. Here I return to my discussion of limerence in chapter 1 (section II.1.3.). I think that the concept of limerence proposed by Dorothy Tennov is the closest to the correct
characterization of romantic love. Described by a number of symptoms, romantic love is manifested by intrusive feelings, thoughts, daydreaming, desire for reciprocity, and idealizing the beloved such that they become the center of one’s mental life. It is what is known as being in love, rather than simply loving, and this is why it is called romantic love. It is different from companionate love because of its obsessionalness and idealization. Recall Marazziti’s findings regarding the similarity between romantic love and OCD in the level of serotonin (Marazziti et al., 1999). OCD is a result of a specific neurological condition. It is defined by obsession – a persistent preoccupation with some feeling, idea, or task, and compulsion – recurring, unwanted urge to perform an act (DSM V:235). The similarity of the brain chemistry involved in OCD and romantic love suggests an explanation of intrusive thinking, fantasizing, and concentrating one’s attention on a particular person. Marazziti and her colleagues also think that this similarity can explain idealization in love. I take these symptoms to be some of the core symptoms of romantic love. These features set it apart from familial love and companionate love. As with other syndromes, romantic love’s symptoms vary from lover to lover depending on their upbringing, cultural background, personality traits, and many other factors. But the main characterization of romantic love is its obsessional intense idealization and fixation on another.

I conclude that love is a syndrome. In making this case, I drew on an analogy between love and psychiatric disorders. The comparison helps to underscore the ways in which love differs from emotions. I do not want to imply that love is pathological or problematic. But I do think love is both idiosyncratic and interestingly insensitive to reason in ways that can be lost if we classify it as an emotion. Love is not a detector of properties; it is a way of being in the world.

\[54\] I think she is wrong about the necessity of romantic love’s being emotionally exclusive. It is possible to be in love with more than one person at a time.
Coda: What Follows

The view of romantic love that I have been advocating paints the following picture: (1) romantic love is not an emotion or a sentiment, (2) it has no aptness conditions and no formal object, (3) it is arational, (4) the quality of lovability is projected onto the lover rather than grounded in any set of natural properties, (5) the multitudinous causes of romantic love are difficult to generalize, (6) it was not selected for by evolution to serve as a link between lust and attachment, (7) it is subject to cultural variation but is not a scrip or a social construction, (8) it is not inherently moral or practical, (9) it has no internal rational structure, (10) it can have numerous mental and behavioral symptoms, which are made intelligible by the cultural and personal narratives (Verstehen-intelligibility), (11) the projected quality of lovability explains romantic love’s compatibility with virtually any emotional manifestation, (12) the underlying constant of love is its obsessive passionate quality.

The virtue of my view is that it can account for any form romantic love might take. It can explain unrequited love, immoral love, reciprocated love, unhappy love, love for multiple persons, homosexual love, objectophilia, zoophilia, love for a fictional being, etc., without disqualifying them from being ‘love’. On my view, love is grounded in the lover, and not in the relationship between the lover and the beloved, or in the beloved. Although love is always directed at some particular individual, their reciprocity or even existence is not necessary. At the same time, my account can accommodate all the standard cases of love between two individuals.

The lover’s state of being in love is determined by a number of underlying causes such as sexual attraction, desire to fall in love, similar socioeconomic backgrounds, etc. Their experience will be determined by their attachment style, their character, and their internal romantic love model or love map. Their symptoms will vary in accordance with these factors, and will also be
affected by the situation at hand – the possibilities of realizing love goals (whatever they might be), the beloved’s response, the norms in one’s society pertaining to love, etc.

One important objection my account avoids is overmoralizing romantic love by avoiding the moralistic fallacy. Immoral or nonmoral love is still love. Same is true of the practical considerations. However, my account can explain why and how moral and prudential norms are applied to love. Although these norms are not intrinsic to love, they might be significant for the lover, and since romantic love is part of our everyday lives, moral and prudential considerations enter into our assessments romantic love. We might find that being in love with this particular person or at this point in our lives is very inconvenient. Or we might find that the way we are loving them is not morally praiseworthy. These considerations can influence our course of action: we might try to stop loving when the occurrence of love does not fit well with our current life plans. Or we might take a leap, throw caution away, and follow the heart. Likewise, we might think that our beloveds should be treated better by us, and modify the hostile symptoms like jealousy and possessiveness through reflection and therapy.

The important point is that love itself does not dictate how one ought to love. Rather, the ideologies we apply to love come from elsewhere. In particular, one learns the appropriate expressions and feelings of love through one’s upbringing, culture, and religion. The norms one inherits through this process are often treated as if they were written in stone, viewed as either being biologically determined (you should only love people of the opposite sex because that’s what mother nature intended), or have otherwise been vetted by the development of society (you should only love or be with one person at a time because that is what is decent or practical). Because these norms are often treated as absolute, the deviation from them is considered to be
either sick, or dirty, or immoral. History is rich with cases of oppression and discrimination because of the universality and rigidity attributed to these norms.

Given that the norms of love are extrinsic to it, and given that the norms of sexual morality have been under scrutiny and renegotiation, heteronormativity and monogamy are also up for reexamination. Indeed, the Marriage Equality Act has been criticized for promoting heterosexual norms of monogamy among the homosexual community without there being an argument for the superiority and desirability of this kind of romantic arrangement. Furthermore, in response to the frequent failure of serial monogamy due to the dissatisfaction romantic partners experience with their relationships, which often resulted in having affairs, and eventual breakups, many today opt out for ethical nonmonogamy – a nonmonogamous relationship arrangement that the partners negotiate and consent to. A familiar concept of an open relationship can mean having a ‘don’t ask don’t tell’ policy, swinging, or openly having multiple sexual and romantic relationships with consent from all those involved.

Moral and prudential considerations can guide one’s reflection of what love is, what society dictates it should be, and what one wants it to be. In the end, to the extent that the symptoms of love are malleable and elastic, and given love’s cross-cultural and interpersonal variation it seems to be highly so, it is up to the lovers to decide how they will love and what love will be for them.

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