Privileges for Being Slaves: Christian Missionaries in the Early Qing Court

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PRIVILEGES FOR BEING SLAVES: CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES

IN THE EARLY QING COURT

by

LITIAN SWEN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in History in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
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Litian Swen

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ABSTRACT

Privileges for Being Slaves: Christian Missionaries in the Early Qing Court

By

Litian Swen

Advisor: Richard Lufrano

This dissertation works to elucidate the long-term confusion over the identity of the Christian fathers in the early Qing court. The identity for which this dissertation argues is straightforward: Christian fathers were identified by the Kangxi emperor as his family slaves. The master-slave relationship has long been overlooked because it was overshadowed by an overwhelming focus on the Jesuit Adam Schall, who entered the Manchu court as a Chinese-style minister. Shifting the focus from Schall, this dissertation starts by showing two seldom mentioned Jesuits, Ludovico Buglio and Gabriel de Magalhaens, who entered into Manchu service as slaves. It was, this dissertation shows, not Schall but Buglio, Magalhaens, and the network they built through their slave status that set the foundation for future Jesuits’ successful participation in the Manchu empire. With the master-slave relationship between Kangxi and the Christian fathers established, the fourth and fifth chapters examine Kangxi’s receptions of the two papal legations as family guests instead of as foreign embassies of state.

The identity of the Christian missionaries, this dissertation shows, determined both rise and fall of the Christian mission in the Kangxi and Yongzheng’s reigns.
Foreword/Acknowledgements

To earn a PhD is a long journey. I was first seriously warned about it by late Professor Zhu Weizheng, fifteen years ago, when I asked him for a recommendation. After I told him that I was prepared for it, he told me to do real research instead of just getting a degree. I believe that, in this regard, I have at least tried. Chapter 2 of this dissertation, in particular, benefited from Professor Zhu’s foresight. Among my professors at Fudan University, I also want to thank especially Professor Zhang Xiang and Professor Liao Mei, who recommended me for graduate studies.

Professor Thomas H.C. Lee brought me to New York City. Starting with helping me to find an affordable apartment in Manhattan, Lee has supported me all these years, regardless of whether he was in Taiwan or New York. Professor Joseph Dauben also helped me along every step of my studies at the Graduate Center. After I took several years’ leave, Dauben encouraged me and helped me to readmit to the program. I truly appreciate his faith in me.

Richard Lufrano, my advisor, gave me countless direction and advice. From word-choosing and sentence composing to argument-making, Lufrano taught me every aspect of dissertation writing. I cannot think of a better advisor in the world to pilot me out of the academic maze. He is the most important teacher in my life.

My committee members, Professor David Gordon and Professor William Wooldridge, whom I only got to know at my defense, provided me very valuable advice for revision. As a historian of French History, Gordon helped me to polish my writing, and taught me how to engage a wider audience for my dissertation. Being a scholar of Qing history, Wooldridge wrote me suggestions in dozens of pages telling me how to convert my dissertation into a
for my dissertation. I am sure they will find

Professor Hu Xiangyu of the Institute of Qing History of Renmin University is my consultant in Qing history. I benefited hugely from his erudition. Dr. Wang Chengzhi of the East Asian Library at Columbia University helped me find different kinds of materials. They probably know that I will continue bothering them.

Academia, at many times, is a lonely pursuit. Surrounded by financially comfortable friends working on Wall Street, I often find it difficult to explain what I am doing. Nevertheless, my wife has given me unquestioned support. My parents and close relatives in China, influenced by the thousand-year long tradition of valuing education, have always believed that my pursuit of academia is something noble. My mother, who does not have a full middle school education, keeps proudly telling me that our family history includes several jinshi degree holders from past generations. In her mind, I am following the right family gene when I am writing instead of trading.

Lastly, I wish those who read my dissertation have found me a companion in their academic explorations.
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Introduction

The arrival of Christian missionaries in China in the sixteenth century started a new era of Euro-China communication. Christian missionaries’ endeavors to convert Chinese people were well rewarded by a continuous increase in the Christian population. In 1692, the Kangxi emperor (1654–1722) promulgated the “Edict of Toleration,” which legitimated the propagation of Christianity in the Qing Empire. In 1701, ten years after the edict, the population of both European missionaries and Chinese converts reached its highest point before the late nineteenth century.\(^1\) However, for the Christian missionaries, this situation did not last long. Early in 1724, the first year of his reign, the Yongzheng emperor, the fourth son of Kangxi, issued a prohibition against Christianity and did not allow missionaries to continue their work. The Christians in China thereafter went underground. It was not until 1842, after the Opium Wars, that the missionaries could resume their work.\(^2\)

For those looking back at Church history in China during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, the prohibition, as the linear “end” of the mission, has posed an unavoidable question: Why did the Christian mission eventually fail? Initial attempts in the early twentieth century at explanation suggested the prohibition was a consequence of the xenophobic atmosphere that prevailed in Chinese society.\(^3\) However, in 1932, Chen Yuan found a bundle of

\(^1\) In 1701, there were 140 European missionaries, and 200 thousand converts in China. Standaert, Nicolas, *Handbook of Christianity in China: Volume One, 635-1800* (Brill: Leiden, Boston, Koln, 2001), pp.301-303, p383.
\(^2\) For an example of an underground Christianity community, see Menegon, Eugeni, *Ancestors, Virgins, & Friars: Christianity as a Local Religion in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).
documents in the Forbidden City regarding Kangxi’s audiences with papal legations.\(^4\) This new source shifted scholars’ attention to communication between Kangxi and the Pope, which, from the perspective of European Church history, situated the prohibition within the scope of the Chinese Rites Controversy.\(^5\) Because the second papal legate who had debated Kangxi regarding Chinese rites had left Kangxi’s court in 1721, about two and a half years before Yongzheng’s prohibition, scholars logically and sequentially connected the prohibition to the Chinese Rites Controversy.\(^6\)

Since the late 1970s, however, a series of new studies, triggered by the availability of Chinese sources after China opened to the world, aimed to locate the fall of the Chinese mission in the incompatibility of Christian and Chinese cultures, and not merely the controversies over certain Chinese rites. The best example is Jacques Gernet’s *China and the Christian Impact: A Conflict of Culture* (1982). Different from previous studies focusing at the court level, Gernet shifted his eyes to Chinese intellectuals in society and argued that incompatibilities between the two cultures determined the fall of the mission. Gernet’s cultural comparison was so influential that cultural conflicts involving the Christian mission in China gained wide attention in the 1980s and 1990s.\(^7\) Two events, the Calendar Case of 1664 to 1665, and the Chinese Rites Controversy,


\(^{6}\) More on Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this dissertation. For previous researches to link the prohibition of Christianity to Chinese Rites Controversy, see Chapter 5 of this dissertation.

\(^{7}\) Young, John Dragon, *Confucianism and Christianity: The First Encounter* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University, 1983); Blussé, Leonard and Zurndorfer, Harriet T. ed., *Conflict and Accommodation in Early Modern China: Essays in Honour of Erik Zürcher* (Leiden: Brill,
became hot topics in the field, as both carried clear signs of cultural conflicts.\(^8\) Twice translated into Chinese and published by two Chinese publishers in the 1980s, Gernet’s cultural comparison paradigm influenced emerging Chinese scholarship in the field as well.\(^9\)

Despite its popularity, the shortcomings of the cultural comparison model are apparent, as it cannot explain the initial rise and later fall of the Christian mission at the same time. By looking at history as a model of linear progression, with the prohibition as the end of the Christian mission’s story, scholars of the cultural comparison model emphasized the conflicts while neglecting the compatible elements shared by the two cultures. If the conflicts were so deeply rooted in culture, then how can the good years of the Christian mission in the late seventeenth century be explained? Since the late 1990s, more and more scholars have sought to better answer this question by getting rid of grand narratives and exploring historical details. They have uncovered reciprocal exchanges between Chinese intellectuals and Christian fathers that illustrate the compatibility of the two cultures.\(^10\)

\(^8\) Those two events are discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.

\(^9\) Translated by Yu Suo 于硕, and published in Chinese by Liaoning Renming Publishing (辽宁人民出版社) in 1989; and translated by Geng Shen 耿升 and published by Shanghai Guji Publishing in 1991. See also Li, Tiangang 李天纲, Zhongguo liyi zhizheng 中国礼仪之争 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji, 1998).

In the thirty years since the late 1980s, the single most significant change regarding studies of the Qing dynasty concerns our understanding of Manchu-style rule.\textsuperscript{11} Instead of viewing the Qing dynasty as another Chinese dynasty ruled in traditional Chinese-style rule, scholars have provided a series of observations that show that the Qing was in fact a Manchu-centered empire in which multiple ruling traditions coexisted.\textsuperscript{12} The Chinese system, which was inherited from the Ming dynasty, was just one of many ways to control Chinese territories. Certainly, this new trend in research has influenced the study of the Christian mission in the Qing dynasty. Scholars, with Manchu-style rule in mind, transcended the Christian-China cultural dichotomy that previously prevailed, and added information about Manchu-style governance to the whole picture. Regarding the long sixty-year reign of the Kangxi emperor, which is often considered the “good days” of the Christian mission, the latest research situates Kangxi as a \textit{Manchu} emperor and tries to find out the interests and intentions of Manchus in accommodating the Christian mission. For example, why was Kangxi the only emperor in 


Chinese and Manchu history so interested in Western academic topics? And what did “Kangxi [seek] to achieve” through his relationship with Christian fathers?13 These are questions that the latest research tries to answer. Calling attention to Kangxi’s use of Christian fathers as astronomers, cannon builders, watch and clock makers, mathematics teachers, cartographers, diplomatic negotiators and emperor’s ambassadors,14 some scholars point out that Kangxi used the skills of fathers to expand the Manchu empire. Others argue that Kangxi tried to use Western knowledge to enrich Manchu culture while resisting the overwhelming influence of Chinese culture.15

While current research sheds light on the usefulness of the Christian fathers to Manchu rule, a fundamental question remains unanswered: Why were the Christian fathers trusted to enter into the inner political circle, act in so many roles, and provide their services? Access to the Forbidden City had never been easy and gaining access to the emperor on a daily basis, which

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13 For example, Jami, Catherine, *The Emperor's New Mathematics: Western Learning and Imperial Authority During the Kangxi Reign, 1662-1722* (London: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 4.


the Christian missionaries had achieved, was almost unthinkable.\textsuperscript{16} Today, scholars have assumed that the usefulness of the Christian fathers determined their presence in Kangxi’s court. Still, “usefulness” does not mean “trust,” which was a key element of the imperial circle. How were young Kangxi and his nearby guardians able to begin trusting the Christian fathers, and to ultimately use them on a regular basis?

About 300 years ago, in 1706, Charles-Thomas Maillard de Tournon, the first papal legate coming to Kangxi’s court, was bothered by a similar question: How were the Jesuits able to gain so much trust of a pagan emperor, who only listened to what Jesuits said? de Tournon had assumed that the primary identity of the Jesuits in Beijing was simply as another group of oversea missionaries who, within the orthodox church hierarchy, should be under his control. But de Tournon, after painful experience, found that the identity of those Jesuits in the Qing court was not merely as religious persons or technicians. (see Chapter 4). Sixteen years before de Tournon, Peter the Great and his border negotiation team were equally confused about the identity of Jesuits, who although presumably brothers in Christ, were so tough in defending the rights of the Manchus in the Treaty of Nerchinsk. While using Latin in negotiation, Jesuits showed loyalty to the Manchus far beyond the anticipation of the Russians.\textsuperscript{17} As a result of their confusion about the Jesuits’ identity, Peter the Great even issued a ban on the entire Society of Jesus in his empire.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{16} General descriptions of each part of the Forbidden City and its restriction of access, see Rawski, \textit{The Last Emperors}, pp. 29-34.
\end{flushright}
This dissertation works to elucidate the long-term confusion over the identity of the Christian fathers. The identity for which this dissertation argues is straightforward: Christian fathers, managed by the Imperial Household, were identified by Kangxi as his family slaves. The master-slave relationship was deeply rooted in the Manchu nomad tradition before the Manchus conquered China and was a fundamental relationship in both Manchus' social and military hierarchies.\(^1\) Originally, slaves were war captives given as rewards to soldiers, who normally

\(^{19}\) The term "slave" as used in this dissertation is a translation of nu 奴 in Chinese, which in turn is the translation of aha in Manchu. In Qing political history, booi aha (包衣奴才), which has received a great deal of attention in previous research, is translated in English conventionally as "bondservant." Booi aha was one type of slaves. As pointed out by Meng Sen in 1936, booi in Manchu means “of the house”, so the direct meaning of booi aha is the slaves of the house. Therefore, booi aha / boardservants were those small numbers of slaves whose primary function was to provide direct family services, like cleaning, cooking, and horse feeding, to their masters. After the Manchus conquered China, booi aha became a term exclusively referred to household slaves of emperors and princes. This dissertation does not differentiate whether slaves mentioned were in fact boardservants or not, and it only concerns “slave” as a general social class in Manchu master-slave hierarchy. For the latest comprehensive study about different types of slaves, see Qi, Meiqin 祁美琴, Cui, Chan 崔灿, “Baoyi shenfeng zaibian 包衣身份再辨 (Another debate about the identity of booi)”, Qingshi yanjiu 清史研究, 2013, v.1: 117-128. See also, Meng Sen 孟森, “Baqi zhidu kaoshi 八旗制度考实” (original published in 1936), in Ming Qing shi lunzhu jikan 明清史论著集刊 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1959), pp.260-262. Zheng Tianting 郑天挺, “Qingdai baoyi zhidu yu huanguan 清代包衣制度与宦官”, in Tan wei ji 探微集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980, first published in 1943); Zu, Yunpeng 左云鹏, “Qingdai qixia lupu de diwei ji qi bianhua 清代旗下奴仆的地位及其变化”, in Shanxi Shida xuebao 陕西师范大学报, 1980, v.1. 1980; Fu, Kedong 傅克东, “Cong neizuoling he guanling tandao qingdai xinzheku ren 从内佐领和管领谈到清代辛者库人,” Qingshi Yanjiu tongxun 清史研究通讯 1986, v.3; Du, Jiaji, Baqi yu Qingchao zhengzi lungao 八旗清朝政治论稿 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2008), pp. 435-488; Lu, Zhijun, 鹿智钧, Gen ben yu shi pu : Qing chao qi ren de fa li di wei 根本与世仆：清朝旗人的法律地位 (Taibei Shi : Guo li Taiwan shi fan da xue, 2017), pp. 185-194. In the field studying The Dream of the Red Chamber 红楼梦, there are many studies contributing to the understanding of slaves and their roles inside big families. For one example, Du, Jiaji 杜家骥, Qingdai neiwu faren fuza de qiji ji duozhong shenfen: jiantan Cao Xueqin jiazu de qiji ji shenfen 清代内务府旗人复杂的旗籍及其多种身份——兼谈曹雪芹家族的旗籍及其身份”, in Minzu yanjiu 民族研究, 2011, v.3. Important English-language scholarship includes, Mark Elliott, “Vocabulary Notes from the Manchu Archives 2: On the booi.” Saksaha: A Review of Manchu Studies 3 (1998), pp.18-21; Spence, Jonathan, Ts‘ao Yin and the K‘ang-hsi Emperor; Bondservant and Master (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966); Torbert, Preston
attended wars with their own weapons and provisions. Captives and war booty were equally important to satisfy soldiers’ economic needs. Slaves were properties belonging to their owners no different than things like cows, horses, and cloth. In fact, because slaves could also obtain slaves, the whole Manchu society might, in a certain sense, look like a hierarchical network of masters and slaves.  

To manage and maintain slaves, which were viewed as a valuable economic resource, Manchus emphasized the family connection between masters and slaves so that masters had responsibilities for their slaves’ lives, while slaves showed loyalty to their masters. It was the dream of early Manchu rulers to form a society that “masters love their slaves, and slaves love their masters.” Under the name of families, the master-slave was in fact the third type relationship next to the relationships linked by blood and marriages. In general, slaves cherished the higher social status or positions of their masters, the same as other blood-linked and marriage-linked family members of masters. Being slaves of the khan or of the emperor was the ultimate esteem. After the Manchus conquered China and adopted the Chinese court system, which was framed by the emperor-minister relationship, Manchus continued to find that it was a privilege to identify themselves as the slaves of emperors instead of ministers.

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Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, p. 140.

“奴才爱主子，主子爱奴才”. Nurgaci issued a decree in 1622 to emphasize the importance of the harmonious relationship between masters and slaves. See Zhongguo diyi lishi danganguan, Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan lishi yanjiusuo 中国第一历史档案馆, 中国社会科学院历史研究所, Manwen laodang 满文老档 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990), p.165. MWLD hereafter.
because slave identification indicated a closer family tie with the emperor than self-identifying as a minister of the court.\(^{23}\)

In the field of the Christian mission in the early Qing dynasty, the master-slave relationship has long been overlooked because it was overshadowed by an overwhelming focus on the Jesuit Jonathan Adam Schall von Bell (1591-1666), who entered the Manchu court as a Chinese-style minister.\(^{24}\) With experience serving in the court of the Ming dynasty, later the court of Li Zicheng, and finally in the court of the Qing dynasty, Schall was doomed to gain wide attention from later historians as a legendary figure in the history of the Christian mission in China.\(^{25}\) Speaking and writing in Chinese, Schall began his career as a Chinese minister in the Qing court and was ultimately appointed as Director of the Bureau of Imperial Astronomy. As the first Jesuit serving in the Qing court at the side of the Shunzhi emperor, Schall has been considered by later historians the logical starting point of the Jesuits’ enterprise under Kangxi’s long sixty-year rule. Schall’s experience as a minister of the Shunzhi emperor has also been considered the prototype of the later relationship between Jesuits and the Kangxi emperor.

Shifting the focus from Schall, this dissertation’s first chapter starts by showing two seldom mentioned Jesuits, Ludovico Buglio and Gabriel de Magalhaens, who entered into Manchu service as slaves of Haoge, the elder brother of the Shunzhi emperor (later becoming the

\(^{23}\) For the comprehensive examination of this term, see Chen, Yuan 陈垣, “Lun nucai 论奴才 (Examination of Nucai)” (original published in 1907), in Chen Yuan shixue lunzhu xuan 陈垣史学论著选 (Shanghai, Shanghai renmin, 1981), pp. 603-607. In English, for the meaning of nucai and its use, Elliott, The Manchu Way, p. 438, note 151. Nucai as a word to draw a closer relationship between the master and the slave, see Ibid., p. 164.

\(^{24}\) The Jesuits’ role as court ministers might be established by Rowbotham’s Missionary and Mandarin in 1940s.

slaves of Tong Tulai, the maternal grandfather of the Kangxi emperor). Hostile to Schall because of his position as a courtier, these two Jesuits resided on the other side of Beijing with their own church. Parallel to Schall’s existence in the Manchu court, however, these two fathers also reached the emperor as Shunzhi’s personal servants through the Manchu family network based on their slave status. It was, this dissertation shows, not Schall but Buglio, Magalhaens, and the network they built through their slave status that set the foundation for future Jesuits’ successful participation in the Manchu empire.

The second chapter shows how and when the Jesuits realized that Schall’s route as a court minister would no longer benefit the Christian mission in the Manchu empire. It was after the painstaking trials of the widely studied Calendar Case (1664–1665) that the Jesuits implemented their strategy turn: They shifted their focus from the Chinese literati to the Manchu ruling class. In actual practice, this meant that later Jesuits did not put their primary focus on the court roles but instead followed the strategy set by Buglio and de Magalhaens, which was to provide private service to the Manchu ruling class as slaves of the imperial family.

Being identified and trusted as slaves of Kangxi’s maternal family, Jesuits Ferdinand Verbiest, Buglio, and de Magalhaens participated in teenaged Kangxi’s political campaign to eradicate the regents’ power. These previously untold stories are reported on in the third chapter. After the regents were removed, Kangxi registered the Jesuits to his Imperial Household, the department that took care of Kangxi’s family affairs. Jesuits’ registration to the Imperial Household, as evidenced by the certificates issued to all Christian fathers, was the declaration to the whole empire that the Christian fathers were the family slaves of Kangxi.

With the master-slave relationship between Kangxi and the Christian fathers established, the fourth and fifth chapters examine Kangxi’s receptions of the two papal legations as family
guests instead of as foreign embassies of state. With these two frequently studied legations, the two chapters aim to offer a re-narration of the two events by placing Kangxi in the position of a Manchu family master, and by providing concrete examples of how the two events were shaped by the master-slave relation between Kangxi and the Jesuits. Contrary to the prevailing argument that Kangxi had the intention to prohibit Christianity, those two chapters provide day by day details showing Kangxi’s “intention” was pure bluff.

Chapter Six then answers the historical question of why Yongzheng prohibited Christianity. The chapter begins with a widely neglected historical fact: The missionaries were expelled from the Imperial Household immediately after Yongzheng was enthroned. This meant that Yongzheng, unlike his father Kangxi, did not consider the missionaries as his slaves. This fundamentally changed the identity as well as position in which the Christian fathers stood in the Beijing court. This change also influenced the whole atmosphere in the Qing court surrounding the Christian mission, which eventually led to the decision of the final prohibition.

The identity of the Christian missionaries, this dissertation shows, determined both the rise and fall of the Christian mission in the Kangxi and Yongzheng reigns. It is true that the usefulness of Christian missionaries, as shown by many scholars, was important for the mission, but that usefulness only started to matter when they had the right relations with the emperor and were allowed to be used. The trust generated by their identity as slaves allowed them access to Kangxi; that access then gave the Jesuits a valuable chance to train Kangxi to have knowledge of and interests in Western academic subjects. Such knowledge and interests directed Kangxi to see the “usefulness” of Western skill and technologies. Meanwhile, the Yongzheng emperor, who did not share with his father the same interests and knowledge in Western subjects, saw the “usefulness” of Christian missionaries as no more than providing astronomical observations.
Beyond the Christian mission, knowing the identity of the Christian fathers in Kangxi’s court provides the clues to understand many of the court affairs the missionaries were involved in. For example, in studies of Qing foreign relations it has long been a question as to why there are no official records about the two papal legations that came to Kangxi’s court, whereas the papal legation to Yongzheng’s court was officially recorded (see Chapter 4). The question can only be answered after knowing that the Christian fathers were Kangxi’s slaves. Because of this, and because of the relationship status conferred on the Christian fathers, Kangxi considered the papal legations in terms of a family affair, instead of in terms of an official (or public) affair. Therefore, there are no official court records about these two legations, because court records do not extend to family affairs. Meanwhile, Yongzheng did not consider the legation a family affair and used the court system to receive the third papal legation. Accordingly, the whole event is retained in the full official court record. This is just one instance of the importance of knowing the identity of the Christian fathers. In fact, the Christian fathers as slaves of the Kangxi emperor provides a window into seeing how the Manchu emperors integrated the Manchu-style master-slave system into their rule so as to occasionally bypass the lengthy Chinese-style court system to enforce their autocracy.  

26 Hopefully, the identity of the Christian fathers revealed in this dissertation not only defines the ground upon which the Christian mission stood in the early Qing, but also provides a means with which to view Manchu-style rule at work.

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26 On the desire of early Qing emperors for autocratic power outside the court system, see Bartlett, Beatrice. *Monarchs and Ministers*, pp. 5-7.
Chapter 1: Jesuits’ Entrance as Slaves into the Manchu World

On March 24, 1655, the Jesuits Ludovico Buglio and Gabriel de Magalhaens presented six gifts to the Shunzhi emperor (reign: 1643–1661) to thank him for the protection and accommodation the Manchus had extended to them. Along with the gifts, they presented a memorial written in Chinese to introduce themselves to the Shunzhi emperor:

Li Leisi [Buglio’s Chinese name] and An Wensi [de Magalhaens’s Chinese name], Jesuits of the Western sea, of far away, submit this memorial, We, your humble servants (微臣), appreciate your kindness, and we have not yet had a chance to show our gratitude and respect. We now present local products of Western countries to express our feelings.

We were born in Western countries and left our families when we were young to devote ourselves to our religious calling. We came to China in the Ming dynasty and preached in Sichuan for several years. Unfortunately, we were captured by rioters and were almost persecuted. In the third year of your reign [1646], the King of Su came and pacified the rioters. He kindly released us and brought us to Beijing.

Upon the boon your majesty granted to us, we were nourished by the Board of Rites, the Imperial Kitchen, and the family of the Banner Commander Tong Tulai. With endless appreciation, we have prayed day and night during the last five years for your long life.27

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27 The memorial (奏本) is collected in the archives of the Grand Secretariat (内阁大库档案) which is stored at the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica, Taibei, Taiwan. A photocopy of this memorial is published, and it is in Zhang, Weiren 张伟仁 ed., Ming Qing Dang An 明清档案卷冊 (Taipei: Zhong Yang Yan Jiu Yuan, 1986), A022: 040. The images of the
Buglio, a native of Mineo, Sicily, came to China in 1636, while Gabriel de Magalhaens, a Portuguese, joined Buglio’s mission work in Chengdu, Sichuan in 1640. Since that time, the missionaries worked together in China until de Magalhaens’ death in 1670. The two Jesuits came to China when China was still under the native Ming dynasty (1368–1644).

At the time they submitted their memorial, both Jesuits had been in China for more than a decade. They were by no means novices in China, and in fact the wording of the memorial reflected their sophisticated knowledge of Chinese politics. Buglio and de Magalhaens mentioned in the memorial their gratitude to two people, the King of Su and the Banner Commander Tong Tulai. In between, they also mentioned two institutions: the Board of Rites, and the Imperial Kitchen. In Chinese composition of the time, it was unusual to dedicate appreciation to institutions. However, the reason the two Jesuits did this was to attempt to hide their connection with the person who placed them in those two institutions.

That person was Dorgon, the former regent of the Shunzhi emperor. When the two Jesuits arrived in Beijing in 1648 with a Manchu expedition troop, they were identified as war captives previously serving Zhang Xianzhong (1606–1647), a rebel leader who proclaimed the rule of the Daxi dynasty in Sichuan. Because of their criminal identity, their church brother, the Jesuit Adam Schall, who was then a minister in the Qing court, did not dare communicate with them and refused their request to stay in his church. But Dorgon, the de facto leader of the Beijing memorial are also available online in http://archive.ihp.sinica.edu.tw/mctkm2/index.html; The document number is 038202-001.

28 For information on the two Jesuits’ lives in Zhang Xianzhong’s court see: Zürcher, Erik “In the Yellow Tiger’s Den: Buglio and Magalhães at the Court of Zhang Xianzhong, 1644–1647”, in Monumenta Serica, vol.50 (2002), pp. 355-374.

court at the time, treated the two Jesuits favorably, not only placing them in the lodges of the Board of Rites, which was normally used to host foreign embassies, but also allowing them a considerable amount of freedom in their activities in Beijing.30 As officers who had worked for the rebels, Buglio and de Magalhaens’ initial settling down in Beijing should have been a thank you for Dorgon. However, at the time of submitting the memorial in 1655, Dorgon had been dead for five years and was no longer a politically appropriate figure to mention. His princedom and all honors had been abolished several months after his death due to charges made by his political enemies.31 Certainly, Buglio and de Magalhaens knew of the political situation and carefully worded the memorial to omit their connection with Dorgon in the memorial.

The King of Su and the Banner Commander Tong Tulai, who were mentioned in the memorial, were appropriate political figures to mention. What was the relationship between the two Jesuits and those two Manchu elites? This is in fact the question about how the two Jesuits adjusted themselves from the native Chinese Ming dynasty to the Manchu rule. Between arriving in Beijing in 1648 to the death of de Magalhaen in 1677 and the death of Buglio in 1682, the two worked more than thirty years with Manchus, and served two emperors. As first-generation Jesuits under the Manchus, the two built their own church in Beijing in 1655, which became an important base for new arrivals starting their mission. The two Jesuits’ early years under Manchu rule, and their personal experiences with Manchu elites, largely influenced the strategies later Jesuits used in their mission. In the rest of this chapter, relations with the two Manchus will

30 Váth, Yang (tran.), 1960, p.399. See also, de Magalhaen, Gabriel, A New History of China, Containing a Description of the Most Considerable Particulars of That Vast Empire (London: Printed for Thomas Newborough, at the Golden Ball, in S. Paul's Church-Yard, 1688), p.346.
31 For more on the political fight and factions after the death of Dorgon, see Oxnam, Robert B, Ruling from Horseback: Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency, 1661-1669 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago, 1975), pp. 47-49.
provide the clues to uncover the history of the two Jesuits at the beginning years of the Qing dynasty.

**The King of Su and His Legacy**

The politics relevant to Buglio and de Magalhaens’s memorial shall be dated back to 1643, a year before the Manchus entered Beijing. In that year, Hung Taiji (1592–1643), the successor of Nurgaci and the second emperor of the Qing dynasty, suddenly died, and left no will regarding an heir. This resulted in a succession crisis. The Manchu ruling class divided in two, one side supporting the King of Su, named Haoge, who was the oldest son of Hung Taiji; the other side supporting Dorgon, a younger brother of Hung Taiji. To avoid a possible split inside the Manchus, the two sides compromised on a third choice and chose Fulin, Hung Taiji’s ninth son as the new emperor, then a six-year-old boy, later called the Shunzhi emperor. As a part of this agreement, Dorgon was appointed as one of two regents. Though the succession crisis was resolved, the whole process created hostility between Dorgon and Haoge.

In March 1648, Dorgon arrested Haoge, with the excuse that Haoge had plotted to overthrow the young emperor. Haoge had just come back to Beijing a month before after a victorious Sichuan expedition. Haoge died in jail the same month after being arrested. Almost all historical and anecdotal accounts expressed the belief that Dorgon was responsible.

In February 1651, two months after Dorgon died, the Shunzhi emperor, acting on an accusation by Jirgalang, Dorgon’s former co-regent, removed Dorgon’s titles and demoted

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several of his key followers. Meanwhile Haoge was rehabilitated, and his name became a symbol, in Shunzhi’s court after 1651, of a righteous political faction.

This background helps to contextualize Buglio and de Magalhaens’ mention of Haoge and omission of Dorgon in the 1655 memorial. But Buglio and de Magalhaens’s relationship with Haoge was substantial, far beyond a mere ostensible mention for political reasons. Haoge was the leader of the Manchu troops that fought to extinguish Zhang Xianzhong’s Daxi Kingdom, in which Buglio and de Magalhaen served as officials from 1644 to 1647. Buglio and de Magalhaens encountered Haoge’s troops in the battlefields in September 1647, and their European appearance saved their lives as well as offering them a chance to explain themselves to Haoge in person. Thanks to the previous relationship between Jesuit Schall and Haoge’s translator, Buglio and de Magalhaens, as war captives, were treated well.

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33 Oxnam, *Ruling from Horseback*, pp. 47-49.
34 The details regarding Buglio and de Magalhaen’s trip with Haoge from Sichuan to Beijing come primarily from two sources. One is Buglio’s writing of a short biography, named “An Abridgement of the Life and Death of F. Gabriel Magaillans”, written after de Magalhaen’s death. It was published in London in 1688 and attached to de Magalhaen’s introductory book about the Chinese political system. In the beginning of this biography, Buglio identifies himself as de Magalhaen’s “inseparable companion for six and thirty years; and sent from Pe Kim in the year 1677.” The biography is in de Magalhaen, Gabriel, *A New History of China*, pp.340-352. The other source is *Shen Jiao Ru Chuan Ji* (Mission to Sichuan) published in 1918 in Chinese. Francois Marie Joseph Gourdon of the Society of Foreign Missions of Paris edited and noted this work based on a hand-copy manuscript given to him by a Jesuit in Shanghai. Gourdon was then a missionary working in Chongqing, a city in east Sichuan, so it was in his interest to make the effort to publish Buglio and de Magalhaen’s history of starting the mission in Sichuan. The book contains the content of the manuscript, and Gourdon added the notes about names and places. Gu, Luodong 古洛东 (Chinese name of Francois Marie Joseph Gourdon), *Shen Jiao Ru Chuan Ji* (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1981; original ed. Chongqing 1918).
From their capture in Sichuan to their arrival in Beijing in 1648, Buglio and de Magalhaens lived and ate with Manchu soldiers for one and a half years. They were widely known among Haoge’s troop. At least many of Haoge’s soldiers knew about them and that Haoge looked upon them favorably. In one instance, Haoge ordered a large-scale manhunt for a servant of Buglio and de Magalhaens who was lost in a battle. The Manchu officer who had captured the servant initially refused to give him up, but after hearing that it was Haoge’s wish that the servant be found, the officer himself brought the servant to Haoge’s tent to give him as a gift.

Because of Haoge’s favorable treatment, upon arriving in Xi’an after just five months with the Manchu troops, Buglio and de Magalhaens were treated by Manchu soldiers as one of their own, and the Jesuits were able to play implicit political tricks within the Manchu world. For example, Manchu soldiers, based on their military units, would often temporarily requisition temples, churches, and public spaces for lodging when passing through a city. Buglio and de Magalhaens knew of this way of requisitioning and bluffed incoming Manchu soldiers that the Church they were lodging in had already been levied by another big name in the Manchu troops. The Manchu soldiers took them at their word and withdrew to other places.

Indeed, the two Jesuits had gone through a painstaking process of getting used to the Manchu way of life. Since the first day they encountered Manchu soldiers, the two had learned that Manchus were different from the Chinese they were familiar with. The Manchus were “foreigners”. At a very basic level, their fluent Chinese was no longer useful to communicate

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37 Gu, Shen Jiao Ru Chuan Ji, p.57.
38 Ibid, p.59.
with most Manchus, including Haoge, and they now needed translators. In meals, rice was no longer the primary food, and the two Jesuits had gotten used to eating horsemeat with Manchus in their daily lives. Unlike their previous experience in the Ming state and Daxi, the two were treated not as subjects of the emperors but as slaves and private property of the soldiers who captured them. Initially, Buglio and de Magalhaens belonged to two different masters, and their daily life, such as what to eat and how much to eat, was decided by these masters. Buglio seems to have had a “kind” master, who provided Buglio “enough living needs”, while also allowing him to eat enough food with Manchu soldiers. Unfortunately, de Magalhaens’ master was mean, and de Magalhaens almost starved to death.

The slave-ownerships of Buglio and de Magalhaens were transferred to Haoge sometime during the trip to Beijing (between 1647 and 1648). In the Manchu world, the master-slave relationship was a fundamental relationship by which to manage the social hierarchy in the Manchu banner system (Original Manchu system to manage its people). In Manchu terms, the slave identity referred less to economic status, as is the case for slaves in a Western or Chinese context but referred instead to slaves’ physically belonging to their masters. In the Manchu context, “the owner gives protection and sustenance,” as summarized by Pamela Kyle Crossly, and “in return, the slave gives loyalty and obedience.” In the early Qing period, despite protests from Chinese ministers, Manchus insisted on the primacy of the master-slave relationship in their society. One obvious example was the harsh enforcement of the Fugitive Law, the essence of

39 Ibid, p.52.
40 Ibid, pp.55-56.
43 Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, p.140.
which was to protect the masters’ possession of slaves while prohibiting the harboring of escaped slaves.\textsuperscript{44} This was also one reason why Jesuit Adam Schall decided not to jeopardize himself to accommodate Buglio and de Magalhaens in his Beijing church when he was informed that they had slave status.\textsuperscript{45}

Being a slave in the Manchu social context meant not merely a submissive status to a master; it also implied a family-style relationship in which masters, as family heads, assumed the responsibility of protecting their slaves. Crossley uses the term “fatherly support” to portray the extra layer of responsibility masters extended to slaves in the Manchu context.\textsuperscript{46} For this reason, Manchu ministers were often proud to address themselves as slaves (or \textit{nucai 奴才}) to emperors in both speaking and writing, and they viewed slave identification as an indication of a closer relationship with emperors than if they identified themselves as ministers (or \textit{chen 臣}), as Chinese ministers did. The Manchus also viewed slave identification with emperors as a privilege since Chinese people were not allowed to identify themselves in this way.\textsuperscript{47}

Having had slave status with Haoge, Buglio and de Magalhaens certainly knew that this relationship not only indicated a closer relationship with the Shunzhi emperor (Haoge’s younger brother), but also displayed their political lineage in Manchu society. In any respect, their slave status with Haoge was an asset in the Manchu political environment of 1655.

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\textsuperscript{44} For the Fugitive Law and its reflection of the Manchu tradition see Hu, Xiangyu, “The Juridical System of the Qing Dynasty in Beijing ,1644-1900,” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Minnesota, 2011), pp.192-237.
\textsuperscript{45} Väth, Yang (tran.), 1960, p.397.
\textsuperscript{46} Crossley, Pamela Kyle, \textit{A Translucent Mirror}, p.141.
\textsuperscript{47} For the comprehensive examination of this term, see Chen, “lun lucai”, pp.603-607. In English, for the meaning of \textit{nucai} and its use, Elliott, \textit{The Manchu Way}, p.438, note 151. For \textit{Nucai} as a word to draw a closer relationship between the master and the slave, see Ibid, p.164.
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Tong Tulai and the Legacy of the Tong Clan

After the death of Haoge in 1648, the slave-ownerships of Buglio and de Magalhaens were transferred to Tong Tulai, the other figure Buglio and de Magalhaens mentioned in the memorial. Tong Tulai was the banner commander of the Chinese Plain Blue Banner and a core member of the Tong clan, which, since the early seventeenth century, was very influential in Liaodong, where the Manchus had first risen to major power in East Asia. Nurgaci, posthumously regarded as the first emperor of the Qing dynasty, used Tong as his Chinese surname. His first wife was also from a Tong family. She bore Nurgaci’s first two sons, Cuyen (1580–1615) and Daisan (1583–1648). After the Manchus entered Beijing in 1644, the Tong clan became a very important political power in early Qing politics: The Tong clan was called by its contemporaries “half court Tongs,” flatteringly indicating that the powerful Tong family members occupied half of the positions in the court.

Besides this prestigious status, the most significant trait of the Tong clan in early Qing history was its makeup as a hybrid group with both Chinese and Manchu characteristics. It remains a matter of controversy whether the Tong clan was made of original Manchus who had been Sinicized by learning Chinese culture or was originally a Chinese group that immigrated to the Manchu area. Nevertheless, both arguments confirm that the Tong clan obviously had both

49 Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, p.55
50 Because Kangxi’s mother came from the Tong clan, the controversy over the origin of this clan gained much attention from the Chinese scholars of the early twentieth century. For those who argue that the Tong clan was originally Manchu, see Meng, Sen 孟森, Qingchu sanda yian kaoshi 清初三大疑案考实 (Chengdu, Ba shu shuse, reprint 2002. Original Beijing daxue, 1936), pp. 120-129; Meng, Sen, Ming Yuan Qing xi tong ji 明元清系通纪 (Taipei: guangwen shuju, reprint 1972, original Beijing daxue, 1934), vol.1, p. 190; Chen, Yinke 陈寅恪, Liu Ruishi

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Manchu and Chinese characteristics. In the early seventeenth century, both the Ming and the Manchu powers sought an alliance with the Tong clan when fighting in Liaodong, and both sides viewed the Tong clan as a possible group of their own people. Living in Liaodong, many of the Tong clan showed a high level of Chinese literacy. In 1616, Tong Bonian from the Tong clan gained a jin-shi degree (the court level) in Beijing and became a magistrate for the Ming. Xiong Tingbi (熊廷弼), the highest military general in Liaodong, treated Tong Bonian as a representative of the Tong clan, who, Xiong hoped, could help him to govern the Liaodong area.

On the Manchu side, in 1619, Tong Yangxin and Tong Yangzheng, two key family heads, submitted to Nurgaci, an act treated by the Ming court as indicative of the entire Tong clan’s submission to Manchu power. Nurgaci married a daughter of his own clan to Tong Yangxing and granted Tong Yangxing the title of erfu, meaning son-in-law in Manchu, which was a conventional way for nomad leaders to build family ties with those deemed worthy. Because of the submission of Tong Yangxin and Tong Yangzheng to Nurgaci, members from the Tong clan were prosecuted in Ming territory. Some were said to have hidden in the mountains, while others were said to have relocated or changed their family names. Tong Bonian was

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53 In the family history written by Tong Shisi 佟世思(1652-1692), see Tong, Shisi 佟世思, "Xian gao zengzu sanshi xinglue 先高曾祖三世行略", in Shen, Yu 盛昱 edit, Ba qi wen jing 八旗文经 (Essays from Eight Banners) (Shenyang: Liaoning shu she, 1988, original 1901), pp.408-409.
arrested and interrogated regarding his loyalty to the Ming court, and he died in prison leaving a long note declaring his innocence and expressing his lifelong loyalty to the Ming emperor.\(^{54}\)

The Manchu court recognized the Tong clan’s ties with the Chinese and Chinese culture as an asset for managing Chinese-related issues. Nurgaci and his successors trusted people from the Tong clan and appointed them to several important posts in the Manchu court and army. In the late 1620s, Hung Taiji chose Tong Yangxing to be in charge of “all affairs related to the Chinese,” including those concerning Chinese immigrants, Chinese captives in wars, and local Chinese people.\(^{55}\)

The Banner Commander Tong Tulai, mentioned by Buglio and de Magalhaen, was the second son of Tong Yangzheng and a leading figure of the second generation of the Tong clan’s service to the Manchu court. He was appointed in 1639 as banner commander of the Chinese Plain Blue Banner, which was the highest rank that non-Nurgaci family members could achieve and lower in rank only to the emperor and the banner owner. Militarily, Tong Tulai made significant contributions to the Manchu’s early expansion in Liaodong as well as to the later occupation of China. (He led his army to fight all the way to Guangxi, the southernmost province of continental China). After the occupation of China, the Shunzhi emperor married Tong Tulai’s daughter. In 1654, about a year before Buglio and de Magalhaens submitted the memorial, Tong’s daughter bore the Shunzhi emperor a son who would later become the Kangxi emperor.

As to the question of why Tong Tulai, an eminent minister in Beijing, agreed to receive two Jesuits as his slaves and feed them at his own cost, Jesuit Adam Schall provides a simple answer: because General Tong had a good relationship with Westerners in general and with


\(^{55}\) Zhao, Erxun 赵尔巽, *Qing shi gao 清史稿* (Beijing, Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 1976), 2:34. QSG hereafter.
Schall in particular. But what did Adam Schall mean when he wrote of “a good relationship”? How had it been built? To approach these questions, we need to trace the development of the Tong clan and its closely bonded Chinese Banner under the Manchus.

“Red Barbarian” Cannons and Their Use in the Manchu Army

At the time of the early Manchu expansion into Liaodong, Ming infantry armed with “red barbarian” cannons, European-style cannons, were a serious threat to Manchu cavalry. When the Ming army remained behind city walls equipped with powerful cannons, Manchu cavalry, though formidable in the field, had no effective way to overcome these defenses. Almost all the Manchus’ serious defeats in the 1620s and 1630s were related to the Ming use of artillery. Nurgaci himself was injured by a “red barbarian” cannon in the Battle of Ningyuan in 1626 and died several months later of his injury.57 Hung Taiji, Nurgaci’s eighth son and successor, since his enthronement had been attentive to developing the Manchu capacity for making and using cannons, in part because his attacks on Ningyuan and Jingzhou in his first year of power were negated by the Ming use of “red barbarian” cannons. In the late 1620s, both the Ming and the Manchus had recognized “red barbarian” cannons as a decisive factor in their wars. In May 1626, the Board of Rites of the Ming even held a sacrificial ceremony for the “red barbarian” cannons used in Ningyuan.58 Yuan Chonghuan 袁崇煥, the general who led the Ningyuan

56 Váth. Yang (tran.), 1960, p.468
57 On the Ming frontline report of victory and the use of “red barbarian” cannons, see Ming Shi Lu, Xizong Huang Di 明熹宗實錄 (Taibei: Zhong Yang Yan Jiu Yuan Li Shi Yu Yan Yan Jiu Suo, 1966), 68:1a.
58 Ibid, 70:17b.
defense, summarized the effective strategy for thwarting the Manchu attack as using “big cannons on strong city walls” (凭坚城以用大炮).\textsuperscript{59} Meanwhile, the Manchus, after using “red barbarian” cannons in the siege of Dalinghe, concluded that “red barbarian” cannons should be used in all expeditions.\textsuperscript{60}

In the late 1620s, the Ming did not have the technology to cast good quality “red barbarian” cannons and still relied on the Portuguese in Macao to import cannons as well as to train soldiers to operate them. In 1625, Xu Guangqi (徐光启), a converted Christian Chinese scholar officer, sent two assistants to Macao to inquire about the purchase of “red barbarian” cannons. Both merchants and missionaries in Macao viewed the inquiry as a good opportunity to establish a favorable relationship with the Ming. In 1629, Jesuit Joao Rodrigues, who retreated to Macao in 1614 after an unsuccessful Christian mission in Japan, brought a company of thirty cannon specialists and forty cannons of different sizes from Macao to Beijing. When the company reached Zhuozhou (涿州), a city about sixty kilometers south of Beijing in January 1630, the Manchus were besieging the city. However, the Manchus retreated once they heard the thunder-like sound from the cannons fired by the group.\textsuperscript{61} The group was thereafter received and treated favorably by the Ming court in Beijing, particularly because of its success in Zhuozhou. The court then hired the group with a generous yearly payment package (which was accepted by all but Jesuit Joao Rodrigues, who, as a Christian father, refused any form of reward).\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid, 79:19b.
\textsuperscript{60} Zhang, Tingyu 张廷玉 eds., Huang chao wen xian tong kao 皇朝文献通考, in Jing yin wen yuan ge si ku quan shu 景印文渊阁四库全书 (Taiwan: Shang Wu Yin Shu Guan, 1986), 636:461-462. Si ku quan shu is SKQS hereafter.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid, p.338.
news reached the frontlines, many requests came asking for European cannons, gunners, and trainers. In May, the Ming court sent Rodrigues and several Chinese officials to Macao to buy more cannons and hire more Portuguese. In November 1630, more than 100 Portuguese soldiers and a dozen cannons left Macao. But most of this group went back after reaching Nanchang because of an ongoing quarrel within the Ming court regarding the loyalty of the Portuguese.

On the Manchu side, Tong Yangxing was the key person in charge of Hung Taiji’s cannon initiative. On February 8th, 1631, the Manchus unveiled “red barbarian” cannons they built themselves, the biggest of which was named “The Great Powerful General of Heaven Blessed 天佑助威大将军.” Tong Yangxing’s name was inscribed on the barrel of the cannon with a title of “chief director.” Seven months later, Tong Yangxing successfully used this cannon as well as thirty others built in the same batch, in the prolonged siege of Dalinghe, and Tong’s cannons played a decisive role in the final Manchu victory of this war. In the court historian’s words:

In the same year [of the production of cannons], [we] had besieged Dalinghe City of the Ming for a long time. The success was the merit of the power of the “Great General of Heaven.” Since then, the troop took cannons wherever they went to. The Manchus used cannons in almost all later important battles in conquering Korea and China.

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63 Zhang, Xiaoqing 张小青, “Ming Qing zhiji xiyang huopao de shuru jiqi yingxiang 明清之际西洋火炮的输入及其影响”, Qingshi yanjiu ji 清史研究集 (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin, 1986), vol.4, p.72.
64 Ibid, pp.75-76.
65 Huang, Yilong, Hongyi dapao yu huang taiji chuangli de baqi Hanjun 红夷大炮与皇太极创立的八旗汉军”, Lishi yanjiu 历史研究 (Beijing), v.4 (2004), pp.77-78.
66 For more on the intriguing narration of the battles of Dalinghe and their significance for later Manchu expansion, see, Wakeman, The Great Enterprise, pp.170-194.
67 Zhang, Tingyu 张廷玉 edit, Huang chao wen xian tong kao 皇朝文献通考, in SKQS, 636:461-462.
However, the court historian does not indicate the source of the “red barbarian” cannon technology. What we do know is that, by the beginning of 1630s, the Ming had not yet acquired the technology from which the Manchus could learn to build reliable European-style cannons. It appears that, while the court historian noticed this technology gap, he could not furnish an explanation:

先是连鸟枪尚未造，造炮自此始。

“[We] had not yet made any firearm to shoot birds; Cannon production now started.”

Mou Runsun (牟润孙) suggests that the Manchus learned the technology directly from Westerners, because Tong Yangxing, the director of Manchu’s cannon productions, had had connections with Westerners when he was a merchant. Though this does not offer direct evidence about exactly who helped the Manchu technological breakthrough, the speculation that technology was received from Westerners seems a logical one.

What is known is that Portuguese cannon specialists came to the Manchu army in 1633. In that year, rebelling Ming troops in Shandong province, led by Kong Youde 孔有德, submitted

68 Da qing tai zhong wen huang di shi lu 太宗文皇帝实录, in Da Qing li chao shi lu 大清历朝实录 (Taibei :Hua lian chu ban she 1964), v.8:3-4. TZSL hereafter.
69 Mou, Zhu shi zai cong gao, p.435.
70 For the sudden progress of Manchu casting technology, Huang Yilong argues that the Manchu troops, from the blitz attack, through the Mongolian steppe of Northern China near Beijing in the fall of 1629, captured many skilled Chinese workers, like Ding Qiming, Wang Tianxiang, etc, whose names, following the name of Tong Yangxing, were inscribed on the body of the “The Powerful Great General of Heaven Blessed” cannon. Besides, Huang finds that the Manchu obtained a European-style cannon from a shipwreck. So, Huang argues that the Chinese technicians captured by Manchu created “red barbarian” cannons by copying the one from the sea. However, Huang’s argument downplayed the technological restraints in metallurgy. In fact, Chinese had been trying to mimic European-style cannons since the early 1620s, but they could not produce reliable pieces for battles. So, the Chinese still relied on imports in 1630. Therefore, I think the Manchu ability to successfully mimic the technology in such a short period was very unlikely. See Huang, 2004, p.83.
to Hung Taiji. These troops, with the best firearms and equipment of the Ming army, were originally controlled by Sun Yuanhua, a Chinese Christian who had himself been a cannon specialist in the Ming court.\textsuperscript{71} At the time of the rebellion, Jesuit Rodrigues and a group of Portuguese cannon instructors hired by the Ming court were in Dengzhou and witnessed the siege by rebel soldiers in 1632. Jesuit Rodrigues escaped the besieged city one midnight when the city was covered by heavy snow and reported the situation to the Ming court in Beijing;\textsuperscript{72} Goulcvo Teixeira Correa, the leader of the Portuguese group, and twelve other Portuguese fought to the death in these battles.\textsuperscript{73} Eventually, the rebel troops conquered Dengzhou. The thirteen Portuguese survivors surrendered first to the rebel leader and then to the Manchus who were with the rebel troops.

By taking a sea route, the rebels had been able to bring their heavy cannons and ammunition when submitting to Hung Taiji, who was recorded as being very excited to “go out of ten li [about five kilometers] of the city” to welcome these troops. Well trained, they had at least twenty-seven “red barbarian” cannons (at that time, the Manchus had a total of twelve “red barbarian” cannons) and 12,000 soldiers, among whom were the most skillful cannon crews and gunners of the Ming (some of them had even been trained by the Portuguese).\textsuperscript{74} Because of their strong combat capacity, Hung Taiji treated them differently from other submitted forces: he kept

\textsuperscript{71} Sun’s life related to cannons, see Huang, Yilong, “Tianzhu jiao tu Sun Yuanhua yu Ming mo chuan hua de xiyang huopao” (Christian Sun Yuanhua and Western Style Cannons imported to China in the late Ming), in Zhong yang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan (Central Academy of Social Sciences History Language Research Institute Journal), v.67 (1996), pp.911-959.
\textsuperscript{72} Cooper, Rodrigues the Interpreter, p.350.
\textsuperscript{73} Dong, Shaoxin 董少新, Huang, Yilong 黄一农, “Chongzhen nianjian yuanhua pubing xinkao” (Christian Sun Yuanhua Pubing in the late Ming), in Lishi yanjiu (History Research), vol. 5 (2009), p.78.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid p.79. Huang, 2004, pp.90-91.
these troops as an independent unit and did not integrate them into the Manchu banner system.\footnote{Kong was granted a title of “Gongshun King” (恭順王). MWLD, p. 1446.}

In August 1633, three months after joining Hung Taiji, Kong Youde led his troops to attack Lushun 旅順, a well-equipped, walled city in Liaodong. It was recorded that the Manchus finally took the city after Kong’s troops fired on the city with “red barbarian” cannons for seven days.\footnote{Zhang, 1986, p.86.}

In the later battles that proved critical for the Manchus’ entering Beijing, Kong’s troops famously used cannons to destroy the Ming’s walled- strongholds and clear a route for the Manchu cavalry.\footnote{QSG, 234:9398-9399.} In some sense, these troops not only significantly reinforced the Manchu capacity to use cannons, but also opened a window for the Manchus to witness the power of European-made cannons as well as European-trained gunners in warfare.

**“Red barbarian” Cannons and the Status of Chinese in the Banner System**

After the first use of “red barbarian” cannons in the battle of Dalinghe in 1631, Hung Taiji witnessed their critical role in battle as well as the importance of having Chinese, who were the builders and primary operators of these new advanced weapons, serving with his troops. Under Manchu rule, as under the rule of nomads in East Asia, military merit was the primary factor deciding status in the social hierarchy. Since the 1630s, the power of European cannons helped the Chinese serving the Manchus to establish their merit in war thus also promoting their social status. After the battle of Dalinghe, Hung Taiji decided to organize all Chinese soldiers into an independent Chinese banner, which later became the origin of the Eight Chinese
Banners. Many historians argue that the Manchu use of “red barbarian” cannons broke the military balance between the Manchu-Mongol cavalry and the Ming Chinese infantry after 1631 and was the de-facto reason for the ultimate success of the Manchu in conquering China. At the very least, the increased use of cannons made Chinese soldiers a powerful branch of the Manchu army and raised their status under Manchu rule. In the imperially edited book published in 1744, *Huang Qing Kai Guo Fang Lue (Strategies in Founding the Imperial Qing)*, the Qing court during Qianlong’s reign summarized the causal relation between the uses of “red barbarian” cannons and the creation of the first Chinese Banner, which was first assigned to Tong Yangxing. In the edict to appoint Tong Yangxing to manage “all affairs related to the Chinese,” Hung Taiji foresaw the possible conflicts of interests and/or rights between Tong Yangxing and some traditional Manchu nobles, and warned them to obey the management of Tong Yangxing when Chinese were involved. Compared with those previously serving in different Manchu banners, Chinese soldiers joined together as an independent unit certainly improved their military as well as social status under Manchu rule.

The first Chinese banner formed in 1631. This developed into two in 1637, four in 1639, and eight finally in 1642. Every expansion was related to Manchu victories in capturing a large number of firearms from Ming troops. In March 1637, a Manchu troop, after successfully

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79 For example, Chen, Yinke, *Liu Ruishi Bie Zhuan*, p.158.
80 Liang, Guozhi 梁国治 ed. *Huang Qing Kai Guo Fang Lue 皇清开国方略*, in SKQS, 341:205.
81 For the status change of Chinese, see Li, Gertraude Roth, “The Rise of the Early Manchu State: A Portrait Drawn from Manchu Source to 1636,” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1975), pp. 139-142.
82 For Cannons and the formation of the Chinese Banner, see Roth, “The Manchu-Chinese Relationship”, p.25.
conquering Korea, attacked Pi island (皮岛) in February 1637. Pi island is close to Korea, and the Ming troops stationed there were a huge threat to the Manchu rear in its plans to attack China. Since the 1620s, the Ming troops there were famous for using “red barbarian” cannons. Hung Taiji’s 1631 expedition was defeated by the island firepower and the ships directed by Golclvo Teixeira Correa. The Manchu conquest of Pi island in 1637, after three months of painstaking effort, was finally achieved by Oboi, who led a group of soldiers onto the island. The Manchu troops massacred the Ming soldiers and civilians on the island in revenge for their refusal to surrender. Conquering the island therefore did not bring the Manchus many captives; instead, they gained a large cache of military equipment, including at least ten “red barbarian” cannons (The Manchus had about thirty-eight “red barbarian” cannons before seizing those cannons). In September 1637, six months after the Pi island victory, the Chinese banner divided into two.

In September 1638, Hung Taiji began to attack the Ming from two directions. His troops conquered a wide area of Shandong province, and reached Jinan 济南, where an arsenal had several “red barbarian” cannons in 1639. Shandong was a populous province, and the captives were said to number more than half a million. To manage those newly conquered Chinese and the cannons, the Chinese banners divided into four banners. In 1642, the Chinese banners finally developed into eight after a series of victorious SongJin battles 松锦之战 from which the Manchu troops further reinforced their arsenal of “red barbarian” cannons and the number of Chinese captives. After the Songjin battles, the Manchu had about 100 “red barbarian” cannons

83 For the estimate of Manchu possession of “red barbarian” cannons in different times, see Huang, 2004, p.92.
84 The conquests of Songshan and Jinzhou significantly reinforced Manchu influence in the area near Beijing. The significance of the SongJin battles in the Manchu final conquest of Beijing, see
in total, while the Ming had only ten left to protect Beijing. Facing the swift expansion of the Manchus, Li Yutian 黎玉田, the governor of Liaodong, reported on March 23rd, 1643 (about fifteen months before the Manchus entered Beijing) to the Beijing court with an analysis of the frontline situation:

我之所以制酋者，向惟火器为先，盖因我有而酋无，故足以取胜。后来，酋虽有而我独多，犹足以侥幸也。今据回乡称说酋于锦州造西洋大炮一百位，我之所所有曾不及十分之一。设不幸，卒如回乡所言，酋以大炮百位排设而击，即铁壁铜墙恐亦难保也。

The reason we defeated the barbarians previously was because of our firearms. When we had firearms while they did not, we were assured of victory. Later, they started to have firearms, but we had more than them, so we still had a chance to resist them. Now, according to the informants, there are 100 Western-style cannons in Jinzhou, but what we have is less than one-tenth of that. If, unfortunately, as the informants said, the barbarians fire those one hundred cannons at us, even walls built with steel and copper will not provide protection. 85

This frontline report agreed that the growing power of the Manchus was closely related to their capacity to use cannons. This perhaps was also the reason why the Manchus kept adding Chinese banners in 1630s.

The relationship between the formation of Chinese banners and cannons was also evident in the Manchu name for the Chinese banners. In Manchu, a Chinese banner is called *ujen cooha*. Ujen cooha 乌真超哈 was widely used to refer to the Chinese banners in the Qing dynasty. This name poses a question as to why the Manchu state did not call Chinese banners *nikan cooha* (*nikan* is Chinese in Manchu), instead calling them *ujen cooha*? Ujen means “heavy” in Manchu, an obvious characteristic of cannons. The meaning of “heavy” also indicates “slowness”, which contrasts with the fast movement of the Manchu and Mongol cavalry. In 1631, when creating the first Chinese banner, Hung Taiji ordered:

集诸贝勒大臣----- 其随营红衣炮大将军炮四十位及应用挽车牛骡, 皆令总兵
官佟养性管理.

(In a meeting with all princes and ministers), the forty “red barbarian” and “big
general” cannons and their bull and mule carriages in different camps should now all be
placed under the control and management of general Tong Yangxing.

Cannons transported by bull and mule carriages were certainly something heavy for the Manchu
cavalry. When all the heavy equipment and their carriages were sent to the Chinese banner, the
unburdened Manchu banners could focus on their potential as fast cavalry. Like the division of
labor in economics, the formation of the Chinese banners was also a division of war functions in

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86 *Qing Ding Da Qing Hui Dian Shi Li* 钦定大清会典事例 defines that *wu zhen chao ha* 乌真超哈 equals the Chinese banner 汉军 in Chinese. See *Qing ding da qing hui dian shi li* 钦定大清会典事例 (Shang Hai: Shang Wu Ying Shu Guan, 1909), 1111: 1b
87 In *A Translucent Mirror*, Crossley has the same question after she provides a comprehensive study of the meaning of *nikan*, saying the *ujen cooha’s* “precise meanings are unresolved.” See Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, p.96, Note 20.
89 *TZSL*, v.9.
the Manchu military. In 1633, Hung Taiji met with his generals and asked their advice on attacking China and Korea. Haoge’s suggestion clearly indicated a tactic based on the different functions of the banners. In his proposal, “Manchu and Mongol banners” would attack China from the northern steppe, emphasizing their capacity for quickly crossing a wide area to achieve a “blitz attack”, while “the Chinese Banner carrying Giant Cannons” would attack from the northeast, city by city.\footnote{Huang qing kai guo fang lue, 341:262.} This shows that the Manchus had a division of functions in mind when creating the Chinese banners.

More importantly, the use of the term *ujen*, the function of banners, rather than *nikan*, which referred to ethnic Chinese, avoided possible confusion or even discrimination. Though Chinese banners consisted of primarily ethnic Chinese, they also included many Chinese-speaking people who were not ethnic Chinese. The obvious example was the Khitan people, who were Sinicized Chinese speakers. Shi Tingzhu 石廷柱 one of the first two Chinese banner commanders, was a Khitan whose family, starting with his father, had adopted the Chinese family name Shi.\footnote{QSG, 231:9329.}

**Jesuits and Their Interests in “Red Barbarian” Cannons**

The Jesuits had their own interest in the cannon business and were actively involved in it in order to spread evangelism. After his first successful trip on cannon business with the Ming in 1630, Jesuit Joao Rodrigues managed to hide five Jesuits in the second troop of cannon specialists recruited in Macao and sent to Beijing. Because of the success of the previous troops
from Macao, the new troops and foreign faces were welcomed when they entered cities of inner China.\textsuperscript{92} Though the troops upon the order of the Ming court returned to Macao after reaching Nanchang, all five Jesuits successfully reached their planned destinations inside China.\textsuperscript{93} Jesuit Johann Adam Schall, in addition to serving in his widely known role as minister-astronomer in the Ming and Qing courts, taught cannon technologies as well as directed cannon production for the Ming.\textsuperscript{94} His lectures on cannon production titled \textit{Outlines of Firearms} were edited and published in the late Ming.\textsuperscript{95}

With these European-style cannons in mind, we may have a clue regarding the common ground shared by the Jesuits and Chinese serving the Manchus. Under the Manchus, the Chinese bannermen, because of their familiarity with “red barbarian” cannons, were more apt to accept Westerners. An example is provided by Alvaro Semedo’s rescue. Unlike Schall and other Jesuits who submitted to Manchu rule, Alvaro Semedo (1586–1658), a Portuguese Jesuit and Vice-Provincial of the Jesuit China mission, remained loyal to the Ming after the collapse of the dynasty in the north and rendered his service to the Southern Ming. Semedo was eventually captured by Manchu soldiers in Guangzhou and was bound up for prosecution. It was Kong Yongde who negotiated with Manchu soldiers thus rescuing Semedo.

After accommodating Semedo in his own residence, Kong Yongde was very strategic in sending Semedo as his delegate to negotiate peace, thereby build a relationship with the Portuguese in Macao who had previously sent troops to Guangzhou to help the Ming.\textsuperscript{96} Kong

\textsuperscript{92} Dunne, \textit{Generation of Giants}, p.216.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid, p.217.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid, p.318; Väth, Yang (tran.), \textit{1960}, pp.164-166.
\textsuperscript{95} \textit{火攻挈要} was published in 1643.
\textsuperscript{96} Xiao, Ruose 萧若瑟, \textit{Tianzhujiao chuan xing zhongguo kao} 天主教行传中国考 (Textual Study of Catholicism spread in China) (Shanghai, Shanghai Shudian, 1989, original 1937), p.274.
Yongde, one of the most successful Chinese generals serving the Manchus, was cruel on the battlefield, and was viewed by the Chinese as one of their most notorious traitors. Why would he rescue a previously unknown Jesuit? It was because of the Jesuits’ special knowledge of cannons. When Kong Youde was still a Ming official, he, under his old officer Sun Yuanhua, was involved in importing and learning about cannons from the Portuguese and the Jesuits. After submitting to the Manchus, Kong’s troops were famous in his time for using “red barbarian” cannons and for having the most skillful gunners trained by the Portuguese. In some sense, Semedo’s rescue was the result of Kong Youde’s special tie to “red barbarian” cannons, through which he had acquired a favorable impression of Europeans.  

In fact, most Jesuits who came to China before the Manchu occupation spoke only Chinese; therefore, Chinese serving the Manchus were the Jesuits’ first intuitive choice of possible allies. When the Jesuits Buglio and de Magalhaens encountered Haoge’s troop in Sichuan in 1646, they could neither communicate with the soldiers on the battlefield nor communicate with Haoge in his camp. Their first helper was a translator in Haoge’s troop who was a Chinese bannerman. Coincidently or not, Jesuit Schall had already established a personal relationship with this translator when the translator entered Beijing in 1644.  

This obscure translator’s presence in two different independent scenarios shows that Chinese speaking

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97 Kong Youde valued his experience serving under Sun Yuanhua. Though Sun Yuanhua did not take Kong Youde’s advice to go with Kong to submit to the Manchus, Kong Youde took very good care of Sun Yuanhua’s offspring after Kong became a powerful general of the Manchu army. See, Huang, 1996, p.945.

bannermen were the first group of people with whom the Jesuits could communicate with to seek protection under the new Manchu rulers.  

**The Tong Clan and Jesuits in Early Manchu Rule**

The Tong clan was the most influential Chinese clan under Manchu rule. There is no exact record regarding whether Jesuits began to get in touch with the core members of this clan before the Manchus conquered Beijing. The known fact is that Jesuit Schall was received by Fan Wencheng on the second day after Manchu troops entered the capital on June 7th, 1644. When the Manchu occupied Beijing, they ordered all people in the northern part of the city to evacuate in order to accommodate Manchu troops. Jesuit Schall, among many other residents, went to the Manchu government to request on exemption from the evacuation. Because of his European face, Schall reported, Fan Wencheng read his petition (which was written in Chinese), and eventually allowed him to stay after sending two staff members to inspect the church.

Through family connections, Fan Wencheng had an in-law relationship with a Tong family, as his sister was married to a notable Tong family member. During the time the Tong clan was prosecuted by the Ming government, Fan protected some people from the Tong clan. Fan’s close connections with the clan was narrated at length and with emotion by Tong Shisi

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99 In the study of the placement of local government positions in the early Qing, Jonathan Spence finds that Chinese bannermen were favored, because they were “natural intermediaries” between Manchu and Chinese subjects. See, Spence, *Ts‘ao Yín*, pp.4-5.

100 Váth, Yang (tran.), 1960, pp.221-222; Witek, “Johann Adam Schall von Bell and the Transition from the Ming to the Ch‘ing Dynasty”, p.116.
(1651–1692) in the writing of Tong Shisi’s own family history. After the Manchu occupied China, Fan also helped people from the Tong clan to obtain official positions.

In political life, Fan Wencheng (1597–1666), a Chinese, was a seventeenth-generation descendant of Fan Zhongyan 范仲淹 (989–1052), the famous prime minister and literatus in the Song dynasty. When Fan Wencheng submitted to Nurgaci in Fushun in 1619, the same year as Tong Yangxing and Tong Yangzheng, Nurgaci treasured Fan Wencheng’s noble Chinese origin. During Hung Taiji’s reign, Fan Wencheng became grand secretary, and was the key person to import Chinese-style central government to the Manchu court. When the news came to the Manchu court in 1644 that the peasant leader Li Zicheng had occupied Beijing, it was Fan Wencheng who urged Dorgon to seize this opportunity to conquer China. After entering Beijing with Dorgon, Fan Wencheng was the central figure to ensure that Chinese-style government continued in Beijing.

Because of Fan’s deep understanding of the Chinese political system, Schall’s knowledge of calendar editing (astronomy in scientific terms) was appreciated, as calendar editing was closely connected to the core value of Chinese political culture: the mandate of heaven. On September 1, 1644, a solar eclipse took place exactly at the minute that Schall had predicted, while the Chinese-style prediction erred by a half hour and the Muslim by one hour. Fan knew that an accurate calendar, if correspondent to natural phenomenon, would give Chinese subjects

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101 Tong, Shisi, “Xian gao zengzu sanshi xinglue”, p.408. 
103 QSG, 232:9350. 
105 Witek, “Johann Adam Schall von Bell and the Transition from the Ming to the Ch’ing Dynasty”, p.114. The court report in Huang, Bolu, Zheng jiao feng bao 正教奉褒 (Shanghai: Ci mu tang, 1904), p. 24b.
the psychological hint that the new rule was a mandated by heaven. For this reason, Schall, at the arrangement of Fan, was not only exempted from the levy on his church, but was also granted a court position, the director of the Imperial Astronomic Bureau. In addition, Fan’s relationship with Schall went beyond public matters. Fan contributed money to Schall’s church, and some of his family members, including his daughter, were converted Christians. After Dorgon died, Fan introduced Schall personally to the Shunzhi emperor, who later gave Schall a high level of esteem.\footnote{Ibid, p.116.}

In the first month of Manchus’ conquest of Beijing, the only Manchu imperial family member Schall noted was Daisan (1583-1648), the second son of Nurgaci. Schall proudly recorded that Daisan came to his church several times to chat with him about Manchu history.\footnote{Väth, Yang (tran.), 1960, p.244.} Daisan’s visits certainly deserved Schall’s cheer in his records, as Daisan was probably the most respected Manchu prince in Beijing in 1644. Since 1615 when Cuyen, the oldest son, died, Daisan had been the oldest son of Nurgaci family. Daisan experienced two succession crises; one was Nurgaci’s succession, and the other was Hung Taiji’s. There were no designated heirs both times. Daisan was the one who managed to balance different powers to settle the two crises and avoid a split within the Manchu imperial family. Regarding Daisan’s several visits to Schall’s church, it is unknown who introduced Daisan to Schall. However, the known fact is that Daisan, according to his maternal lineage, was a member of the Tong clan, because his mother, the first wife of Nurgaci, was a daughter of a Tong family.

Outside Beijing, Tong Guoqi 佟国器 was a widely known figure from the Tong clan protecting Christianity in the Jiangnan area during the dynastic transition. Tong Guoqi’s father,
Tong Bonian 佟卜年, had been a magistrate of the Ming government. After Tong Bonian died in prison after an investigation concerning his relationship with the Tong clan and their Manchu connections, his wife and his son, Tong Guoqi, with the help of Tong Bonian’s literati friends, came to reside in Wuchang, and later in Nanjing and Ningbo. Tong Bonian’s wife, coming from a Chen family in Fushun, had married Tong Bonian after he gained the jinshi degree while waiting in Fushun for appointment from Beijing. Tong Bonian’s wife was highly educated; records show that she could use poems to communicate with first-rate literati in the Jiangnan area.108 Tong Guoqi was a literatus himself and left many writings in Chinese. In any respect, Tong Guoqi was from a traditional Chinese style literati family whose parents were both highly educated. However, unlike most of his contemporary literati in the Jiangnan area, Tong Guoqi’s ancestral place was Fushun, and he belonged to the Tong clan there. Soon after the Manchu army led by Tong Tulai brutally conquered Jiaxing 嘉兴 in Zhejiang province in 1645, Tong Guoqi, although a commoner then, was appointed as Intendant of the Jiaxing-Huzhou Circuit 浙江嘉湖道, which started his career under the Manchus.109 Tong Tulai also registered Tong Guoqi as a bannerman in the Chinese Plain Blue Banner, which put him into the Manchus’ banner system.110

As a representative of the Tong clan in the Jiangnan area, Tong Guoqi gained fast promotion. In 1653, he became governor of Fujian, in 1655, governor of Jiangxi, and in 1658, governor of Zhejiang. Tong Guoqi’s wife was a converted Christian whose Christian name was Agathe. Tong Guoqi himself was not baptized until 1674, but his protection of Christianity

110 Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, p.110.
started when he secured his first position as intendant of the Jiaxing-Huzhou Circuit in 1645.

Jesuit Martino Martini’s missionary work in the Jiangnan area was carried out under the protection and support of Tong Guoqi. Tong Guoqi rebuilt churches in Fuzhou, Ganzhou, and Hangzhou while he governed those places.\(^\text{111}\) As a governor, Tong Guoqi also wrote prefaces, as a token of support, for theological works written by Jesuits Manuel Diaz (1574–1659), Jesuit Antonion de Gouvea (1592–1677), and Jesuit Girolamo de Gravina (1603–1662).\(^\text{112}\) Tong Guoqi’s support of Christianity was widely known by his contemporaries, as he was targeted as one of three pro-Christianity officials when the anti-Christian movement emerged in the Beijing court in 1664.\(^\text{113}\)

**Tong Tulai and His Acceptance of Jesuits Buglio and Magalhaens**

Knowing that the “red barbarian” cannons provided an important background to the encounters of Chinese bannermen and the Jesuits, and knowing more about the particular ties between the Jesuits and the Tong clan, we may be better equipped to understand why, after the death of Haoge, the slave-ownerships of Jesuit Buglio and Jesuit Magalhaens were transferred to Tong Tulai, which Schall viewed as a very good outcome for both Jesuits. Within the Manchu banner system, Tong Tulai was the banner commander of the Chinese Plain Blue Banner, which was under the governance of Haoge, the overall owner of the banner.\(^\text{114}\) So the transfer of the slave-ownerships therefore occurred within the Plain Blue Banner.

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\(^\text{112}\) Huang, 1996, p.947.


\(^\text{114}\) Their relation, for example: when Tong Tulai’s sister married a son of Yoto who belonged to
From what we know about what Tong Tulai did for Buglio and Magalhaens at a later time, it is obvious that Tong Tulai looked favorably on the Jesuits and Christianity. Tong Tulai accommodated the two Jesuits in his own house after they became his slaves. During the one and half years living in Tong’s house, the two fathers were allowed to have a picture of St. Mary’s Cathedral for their everyday worship. It was also during this time that the two built a family style close relationship with Tong Tuali’s two sons, Tong Guogang and Tong Guowei, who were said to believe in Christianity, though their political lives prohibited their formal conversions.\(^{115}\) That two Jesuits lived with Tong Tulai in a family style relationship was widely known among later Jesuits. About seventy years’ later, in a letter written in 1723, French Jesuit Dominique Parrenin (1663—1741) told the story of Tong Tulai’s accommodation of the two Jesuits as the token of Jesuits’ long-time relationship with the Tong family.\(^{116}\)

In 1653, Tong Tulai and the government released Buglio and de Magalhaens from their slave status, and allowed them to live independently.\(^{117}\) Just two years later, in 1655, with the

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\(^{115}\) Xiao, Tianzhu jiao, p.274.


\(^{117}\) Váth, Yang (tran.), 1960, pp.468-469. Though Jesuit Schall provided information that the two Jesuits were released from slave status, yet it is not clear which social status the government changed the two Jesuits to. There were several possibilities. If, for an example, the two Jesuits were treated as Chinese, their new status might be “commoners.” (For the social status in traditional Chinese society, Sommer, Matthew *Harvey, Sex, Law, and Society in Late Imperial China*. pp.5-8). If the change was within the Manchu banner system, there was a registration category dedicated to those slaves obtaining the status change. It was called an “open family” (开戶). For a detailed explanation of this category, see Liu, Xiaomeng 刘小萌, “Baqi huji zhong de qixia ren zhu mingcheng kaoshi 八旗户籍中的旗下人诸名称考释”, in *Shehui kexue jikan 社会科学集刊*, 1987, v.3, pp.65-66.
help of the Tong family and the money granted by the Shunzhi emperor, the two built their own church. The release was the best thing that Tong as a master could do for the two Jesuits. In general, only those slaves contributing significantly to the master’s family or gaining important merit in war could have a chance to be released from slave status upon the approval of their masters as well as the government. The status change, for Buglio and Magalhaens, greatly facilitated their mission in Beijing; they could spread the gospel and make contact with possible converts more freely than if they were in slave status. However, in the Manchu world, the status change did not change the political lineage derived from the master-slave relationship. This means that Buglio and Magalhaens, though enjoying the independence they needed for their religious activities, continued to have the social recognition as the family slaves of Tong Tulai. This is also the reason why the two Jesuits, in the memorial quoted in the

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118 The Tong family also introduced the two Jesuits to the Shunzhi emperor; Magalhaens became Shunzhi’s personal manager of his western gadgets and treasures. Buglio, “An Abridgement of the Life and Death of F. Gabriel Magaillans”, p.346.

119 Tong Jie 佟吉, at the order of the Shunzhi emperor, bought a house for the two Jesuits to create their church. See, An, Shuangcheng 安双成, ed., Qing chu xi yang chuan jiao shi Man wen dang an yi ben 清初西洋传教士满文档案译本 (Translation of the Manchu archive regarding Early Qing missionaries) (Zhengzhou: Da xiang chu ban she, 2015), p. 266. QMD hereafter.

120 Whether slaves were satisfied with their status as slaves depended on both the economic status of their masters and how well they were treated by their masters. Therefore, on the one hand, there were unhappy slaves escaping from their master families; on the other hand, there were commoners in economic hardship voluntarily changing into slave status to get benefits from rich Manchu families. For the latest studies of the topic, see, Du, Ba qi yu Qing chao zheng, pp. 435-488; Lu, Gen ben yu shi pu, pp. 185-194..

121 For an example, Cao Yin 曹寅 continued to identify himself as a family slave(家奴) even though his family obtained the status of independent bannermen at least two generations ago. See, Fu, Kedong 傅克东, "Baqi huji zhidu chutan 八旗户籍制度初探", in Minzu yanjiu 民族研究, 1983:6, pp.34-35. As Jonathan Spence demonstrated, a lineage could continue to draw on a symbolic closeness to the emperor long after the formal master-slave relationship had ended. See, Spence, Ts’ao Yin, pp.10-11.
beginning of this chapter, expressed their appreciation of Tong Tulai in order to declare their political lineage.

**Conclusion**

In that same year of 1655 that they submitted their memorial to the Shunzhi emperor, Buglio and de Magalhaens finally completed their church, St. Joseph Church, which still exists in Beijing today and is called *dongtang* (easten church). The establishing of this church was an effort by the two Jesuits to create a base for their mission in Beijing independent of Jesuit Schall and his church (the so-called southern church). After their arrival in Beijing, Buglio and de Magalhaens had become hostile to Schall because the latter had refused to accommodate them in his church. According to Schall’s records, he had been warned by informants in the Beijing court not to interfere by any means in the case of Buglio and de Magalhaens, as they were labeled as officials serving a rebel court as well as being slaves of Manchus. Jesuit Francisco Furtado, Schall’s immediate superior of the northern part of the mission, also ordered non-interference, though, in fact, as Alfons Väth analyzed in Schall’s biography, Schall always privately kept his eye on the two, and offered help indirectly whenever he could. From 1650 on, Buglio and de Magalhaens brought accusations against Schall and sent their charges to Rome regarding his court position as an imperial magistrate, his involvement in Chinese divinations, and his moral standards. Erik Zürcher characterized these accusations as an “incredible mudslinging campaign against Schall.”

Most Jesuits in China were involved in the back and

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123 Zürcher, “In the Yellow Tiger’s Den”, p.372.
forth investigation and testimonies concerning Schall’s case. The case lasted more than a decade, though it was ended with a judgement in Schall’s favor. Buglio and de Magalhaens did not repair their relationship with Schall until the Calendar Case raised in Beijing by Yang Guangxian in 1664, one and a half years before Schall’s death. From 1648 to 1664, there were therefore sixteen years of mutual hostility, resulting in the creation of two parallel paths to establish mission bases in Beijing under the Manchus.

Unlike the widely known stories of Schall’s peaceful adaption to Manchu rule after the collapse of the Ming dynasty, Buglio and de Magalhaens experienced the dynastic change on bloody battle fields, where Buglio was struck by arrows “very deep in flesh” of his thigh, while Magalhaen was struck in his arm. During these life-or-death moments, Manchu soldiers stopped the killing because they had an intuitive sense of the usefulness of “Western looking” people. Buglio and de Magalhaens recorded these critical moments to demonstrate God’s love. But for historians, the question is where did the Manchu soldiers’ sense of the usefulness of Westerners people come from? In the early seventeenth century, the most obviously useful Western tool in the eyes of Manchu soldiers was European-style cannon. In 1633, when Hung Taiji asked for a strategy to attack China, Korea, or Mongol-held territory, Haoge’s suggestion was that troops attack China by using “giant cannons operated by the Han Chinese.” When encountering Buglio and de Magalhaens in Sichuan in 1647, Haoge’s Manchu soldiers were already familiar with European-style cannons and knew their power to affect their wars and lives. In some sense, the cannons were a material medium by which Manchu soldiers got a good

126 Gu, 1918, p.52.
127 *Huang qing kai guo fang lue*, in SKQS, 341:262.
impression of Western people. This eventually saved Buglio and de Magalhaens in critical moments on the battlefield.

After their survival, Buglio and de Magalhaens entered Manchu service as slaves of Haoge. This was different from the case of Schall, who, as a surrendered Ming official, entered the Manchu reign as a minister of the Qing court in traditional Chinese style. After Haoge died, the slave-ownerships of Buglio and de Magalhaens were transferred to Tong Tulai, which was a pure action in the Manchu tradition. Compared with Schall, who joined Manchus’ Beijing court in a Chinese political fashion, Buglio and Magalhaens entered Manchu service by first joining the Manchu banner system as slaves. Buglio and de Magalhaens’ initial relationship with the Manchus, especially the master-slave relationship with Tong Tulai, a grandfather of the Kangxi emperor, has been previously neglected; And yet this relationship, as will be demonstrated in the later chapters, was crucial for the Christian mission during the sixty-one-year reign of the Kangxi emperor.
Chapter 2: The Calendar Case of 1664 and the Beijing Jesuits’ Adjustment of Strategy

During the wars of the Ming-Qing dynastic transition, the population of China decreased by about forty million, about twenty percent of the total population. The Jesuits witnessing the harshness of the wars described the bloody sites as “the last day of judgement.” In such turmoil, the Jesuits did not operate as a uniform religious group and therefore did not all adhere to the same side. While Schall chose to submit to the Manchu court in Beijing, the Jesuits in the south, such as Alvaro Semedo, the Vice-Provincial of the Jesuit China Mission, chose to follow Ming remnants. Meanwhile, Jesuits like Martino Martini, who initially chose to serve the southern Ming court, simply turned his coat and change his hair style to submit to the Manchus when their army came in 1645. In general, the Jesuits in China chose sides based on their own evaluations of the situation and predictions of the future.

Jesuits serving in the south built a close relationship with the surviving Ming imperial family. Michael Boym (1612–1659) and Andreas Xavier Koffler (1612–1652) even converted the Empress Dowager Wang, whose Christian name was Helena. Around 1650, despite being fully aware of the swift advance of the Manchu troops and the high esteem Jesuit Schall had earned in Beijing, Jesuits in the south decided to continue following the southern Ming. In a letter to Europe, Koffler, after reporting his knowledge about Schall in Beijing, wrote that the empress “adopted our Sacred Law with full seriousness,” and expressed “much hope that this queen will be another St. Monica.”

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129 Brockey, Journey to the East, p. 112.
131 The letter was translated by Albert Chan, in Chan, Albert, “A European Document on the Fall
went to Europe with Empress Dowager Wang’s letter in 1651 to request military aid for the southern Ming.

After comparing the two sides, Jesuits in Macao reported to Rome that Schall had a more promising future in Beijing’s Manchu court than the Jesuits serving in the south.132 In 1650, Jesuit Martino Martini was sent back to Europe as a procurator of the Jesuit Mission to China to report on the latest situation. The trip was evidence of the Jesuits’ satisfaction with Manchu rule and their optimism regarding the mission’s future since the recruitment of more young Christian fathers to work in Manchu-occupied China was an important objective of the trip. To prepare for a long-lasting mission enterprise, Martini brought a young Chinese, Chen Ma-no, to Europe to study Christianity. Chen later became the first Chinese priest of the Society of Jesus.133 Martini landed in Norway in 1653 and devoted more than a year to touring European cities advertising the Chinese mission before finally reaching Rome. During his first year back in Europe, Martini published three books about China, one of which was a book introducing the Manchus and their conquest of China. In 1656, when Martini left Lisbon to return to China, ten missionaries joined him.134

Martino Martini’s optimism about the future of the mission in China came partly from his own experience with the Manchus, who treated him with respect and protected him.135 It also came from his experience with the Jesuits in Beijing, who had already made a promising start

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135 For Martini’s favorable experience in Fujian, see Menegon, *Ancestors, Virgins, & Friars*, pp. 94-95.
with the new Manchu dynasty. Schall was a high-ranking minister in the Manchu court and had already started to establish a favorable personal relationship with the Shunzhi emperor. In their letters to Europe, Jesuits often reported the widely celebrated news that the Shunzhi emperor visited Schall’s church several times and called him mafa, meaning “grandpa” in Manchu. At the same time, Jesuits Ludovico Buglio and Gabriel de Magalhaens had settled in Beijing and established a close relationship with bannermen in the Plain Blue banner. They built personal relationships with the Shunzhi emperor as well. The Shunzhi emperor not only granted them land to build their church, which was the second Christian church in Beijing, but also appointed de Magalhaens as the personal manager to take care of the emperor’s Western treasures. As discussed in the previous chapter, the two groups of Jesuits (represented by Schall on one side and Buglio and de Magalhaens on the other) were hostile to one another in the 1650s. Despite that, both groups reached the Shunzhi emperor via their own networks and gained his trust. Compared with the Jesuits’ previous standing in the Ming court and their relationship with the emperors of that dynasty, the Jesuits’ position in the Shunzhi court was much more desirable. For the Jesuits, the Shunzhi emperor’s kindness was real and tangible in many respects, and this was the basis of their optimism about evangelism’s future.

136 Unlike the widely known relationship between Schall and the Shunzhi emperor, de Magalhaens’ close relationship with the Shunzhi emperor has not gained much attention. De Magalhaens, though without an official title, served the Shunzhi emperor privately for making, maintaining, and tuning up Western style mechanical products. Ludovico Buglio listed those services de Magalhaens had performed for the Shunzhi emperor in de Magalhaens’ biography. On the front of de Magalhaens’ gravestone in the graveyard of Eastern church in Beijing was inscribed an edict by the Kangxi emperor written on the second day after the death of de Magalhaens; In Kangxi’s words, “making western products to entertain his father” was de Magalhaens’ important contribution to the Qing imperial family. For images of the gravestone and its inscriptions, see Beijing Xing Zheng Xue Yuan, History Recorded on Stone: The Cemetery of Matteo Ricci and Other Foreign Missionaries during Four Turbulent Centuries (Beijing: Beijing chu ban she, 2011), pp.157-158. See also, Buglio, “An Abridgement of the Life and Death of F. Gabriel Magaillans”, p.346.
Although the Shunzhi emperor had been drawn to Schall’s Christian teaching and de Magalhaens’ Western mechanical gadgets as a teenager, his later interest was the result—not the cause—of his relationships with the Jesuits. The Jesuits’ opportunity to approach the emperor was made possible by the trust and recognition they established with high ranking Chinese bannermen in the Manchu court. Schall was privately introduced to the Shunzhi emperor by Fan Wencheng, while Buglio and de Magalhaens were likely introduced by someone in Tong Tulai’s family. In terms of personal interests and faith, however, the Shunzhi emperor remained a Zen Buddhist. Schall knew that and told the Europeans that the Shunzhi emperor was obsessed with and cheated by Buddhist monks.\(^{137}\) Shunzhi’s belief in Buddhism was widely known in his time, and there was even a rumor that after his reported death Shunzhi had in fact retreated to a Buddhist temple at Mt. Wutai.\(^{138}\) The Shunzhi emperor’s belief was based more on monastic practice than lay Buddhism. In his last years, the Shunzhi emperor cut off all his hair, which is done when a lay believer becomes a practitioner. Eunuchs near the emperor also believed in Buddhism as well. Though Jesuits built a relationship with the Shunzhi emperor, it was a relationship built on the mundane basis of emperor-minister and master-slave. The spiritual and religious sphere of the Shunzhi emperor was reserved for Buddhism.

**The Calendar Case of 1664**

The Beijing Jesuits’ services to the Shunzhi emperor brought peace for the Christian missions in China. This ended in 1664 with a charge that Schall was responsible for the

\(^{137}\) Väth, Yang (tran.), 1960, pp.323-324.  
\(^{138}\) For the Shunzhi emperor’s Buddhist beliefs and the analysis of the rumor that Shunzhi retreated to the Wutai mountain see, Meng, 1935 original, 2002 reprint, pp. 12-57.
premature death of the Shunzhi emperor in 1661 at the age of twenty-three. It claimed that Schall, as the director of the Imperial Astronomical Bureau, had chosen an inauspicious date to bury a son of the Shunzhi emperor, and that this had caused the death of the Shunzhi emperor. The accusation was made by Yang Guangxian (1597–1669) and resulted in the arrest of all the Jesuits in Beijing and an imperial order demanding that local magistrates send all Christian missionaries to the capital. In April 1665, after trials of approximately eight months, a judgement was reached to execute Schall and his Chinese subordinates in the Imperial Astronomical Bureau, and to exile the other Christian missionaries. Soon after the judgement, an earthquake shook Beijing, and it was believed to be a warning from heaven about the unfairness of the judgment. The empress Dowager Xiaozhuang, the mother of the Shunzhi emperor, interceded, and Schall’s death penalty was reduced to house arrest with three other Jesuits in Beijing. However, the execution of Schall’s Chinese subordinates was still carried out in May, 1665.

But while history records the charges and trials as the Calendar Case, the primary question posed by the case remains why it happened. Since the early 1980s, Jacques Gernet’s explanation of the conflicts between Chinese and Christian cultures has prevailed as a model to explain anti-Christian activities in China.\textsuperscript{139} Regarding the Calendar Case, the cultural conflict

model argues that Yang Guangxian, who wrote a series of anti-Christian works attacking Christianity (as well as arguing for the impeachment of Schall), was a representative of an anti-Christian intellectual trend. Therefore, both Yang’s accusations and the Jesuits’ later exculpation become sources showing the conflicts between Chinese and Christian cultures. However, the fundamental problem of this model in explaining the Calendar Case is that it neglects the Manchus and their interests. The cultural conflict model simply assumes that the judgement favoring Yang Guangxian meant the Manchus were defenders of Chinese culture, and undercuts the Manchus’ important and distinctive role in what is too often viewed as a Chinese-Christian dichotomy.

Far from playing a secondary role, the Manchus played a central role in handling the Calendar Case. This is particularly true when we consider that the trials were handled by the Deliberative Council, a Manchu body above the Chinese-style court system.

140 For an example, Young, Confucianism and Christinity, pp. 77-96.
142 The comprehensive study about the origin and functions of this institution, see Du, Ba qí yú Qing chão zheng zhì lùn gào, pp.335-371; see also, Fu, Tsung-mao 傅宗懋, "Qingchu yizheng tizhi yanjiu 清初议政体制之研究" (A Study on the Deliberative Body in Early Ch’ing Dynasty), in Guoli zhengzhi daxue xuebao 国立政治大学学报, v.11 (1965), pp.245-294; Oxnam, Robert
The discussion of the Calendar Case should not ignore these important distinctions between the Manchu and Chinese because the case took place at a time when the Manchu ruling class still insisted on a clear distinction between Manchu and Chinese in order to better represent the interests of the Manchus in China.

The arguments that will be made here will first carefully examine the triangular relationship among the Manchus, the Chinese, and the Christians, and then explain the Manchu interests in this widely studied church history case. Adding the Manchus to the China-Christian dichotomy redefines the relationships that informed the social dynamics of the Calendar Case. In addition to just the Chinese-Christian relationship, there was also the Manchu-Chinese relationship and the Manchu-Christian relationship.

The Political Change from the Shunzhi Emperor to the Oboi Regency

On February 5, 1661, the twenty-three-year-old Shunzhi emperor died of smallpox. He left a will appointing eight-year-old Xuanye, born of the imperial concubine Tong, as his heir, and named four Manchu officials as regents. In this will, he also apologized for not fulfilling his responsibilities to create good government. He summarized fourteen sins. The first one begins in this tone:

Having myself only very limited virtues, I hand on the great inheritance which I held for eighteen years. Since I personally took over the government, I have been unable to imitate the majestic examples of Tai-Zhu [Nurgaci], and Tai-Zong [Hung Taiji] in

making laws and regulations and in choosing men for administrative posts. Because I have procrastinated and have been negligent in my duties, because I have gradually come to practice the customs of the Chinese, the pure and honest old system [of the Manchus] has been changed daily. Because of all this the dynasty’s government has not reached its potential and the peoples’ livelihood has not been improved. This was one of my sins.  

Officially, the Shunzhi emperor reigned for eighteen years, from 1643 to 1661. However, deducting the years Dorgon’s regency (1643–1650), the emperor in fact reigned for only ten years, from the age of thirteen to twenty-three. As the first Manchu emperor ruling China, adolescent Shunzhi faced many issues that his father and grandfather had not faced. Beyond the unrest in south China created by the southern Ming, the primary issue for the Shunzhi emperor had been how to balance the sedentary Chinese tradition and the nomad Manchu and Mongol traditions in ruling the vaste newly conquered territory of China. The historical experience from which the Shunzhi emperor may have learned was that of Kubilai Khan (1215–1294) of the Yuan dynasty, who was the first Mongol emperor to rule China from Beijing. However, the Shunzhi emperor and his court knew even Kublai Khan’s example was not perfect, as the Mongol’s rule lasted only about seventy years after the death of Kublai Khan.  

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143 Translation is from, Oxnam, Ruling from Horseback, p.15.
144 For general accounts about the relationship between Dorgon and Shunzhi, see Lui, Adam. Two Rulers in One Reign: Dorgon and Shun-Chih, 1644-1660 (Australian National University Press, 1989).
145 The Manchu emperors took the Mongol’s occupation of China as an important reference of their rulings. For early Manchu-Mongol relations in establishing the idea of the Qing state, see, Li, Roth Gertraude. “State Building Before 1644”, in Cambridge History of China, v.9, pp.16-20; Elverskog, Johan, Our Great Qing: The Mongols, Buddhism, and the State in Late Imperial China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), pp. 23-27; Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, pp. 138-139.
For the Shunzhi emperor, balancing the two traditions was more of an experimental process, and many policies were open to change. As shown in his will, Shunzhi concluded that his rule borrowed too much from “the customs of the Chinese” while keeping too little of the Manchu “old system.” Because the will was dated on the day the emperor died, doubts have been raised about whether the will was truly left by the Shunzhi emperor or was drafted by his mother, the empress Xiaozhuang, who oversaw the transition of power after her son’s death. Nevertheless, the will reflected the dissatisfaction of the Manchu elites about Shunzhi’s assimilation of Chinese traditions. 146

Practically, the confession of these sins in Shunzhi’s voice paved the way for the political changes planned by the regent government after Shunzhi’s death. In Oxnam’s words, “the regents could not have asked for a better statement of their position,” so that they “could begin hammering out their decisions as proud representatives of the Manchu conquest elite.” 147 This political turn of the regency has been called by Jonathan Spence the “new Manchu nativism”, because the core of the regency’s policies was to remove Chinese influence and enforce Manchu traditions. 148

1664, the year the Calendar Case began, the regency was in its third year. The case therefore began at a time when the regent government was enforcing Manchu traditions while suppressing Chinese ones. Even the Kangxi emperor, who in 1664 was an eleven-year-old boy, could only learn Chinese from eunuchs in secret, as a formal Chinese education was not allowed

146 Oxnam, Ruling from Horseback, p.66.
147 Ibid, p.15.
148 Spence, Jonathan, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), p.44.
by the regent government.\textsuperscript{149} The Manchu-Chinese relationship at the time of the Calendar Case was thus anything but harmonious.

\textbf{Manchu-Christian Relationship}

The Manchus first began to know Christian missionaries not through religion but through mundane things. For the Manchus, the Christian missionaries were a group of people from afar who looked different from East Asian people and who were associated with cannons, mechanical things, and astronomy. As previously mentioned, Manchu society was organized on the basis of war merit and had a generally good impression of Europeans because of their powerful Western-style cannons. In Beijing, Jesuit Schall entered the Manchu court because of his specialty in astronomy, while Jesuit de Magalhaens served the Shunzhi emperor through his skill in making mechanical gadgets.

In regard to religions, the Manchus had a tradition of allowing different cultures and beliefs. This had facilitated the Manchu expansion in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. From Nurgaci’s Jurchen khanship to Hung Taiji’s claim of the Manchu emperorship, the Qing empire became a dominant power in East Asia by including the Mongols, Koreans, Chinese, and many others, all of whom had different cultures and beliefs. As an empire, the Manchu ruling class did not demand a unified religion or culture; instead, it retained the religions and cultures of the conquered people and managed to accommodate them all concurrently.\textsuperscript{150}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{150} Crossley, \textit{A Translucent Mirror}, pp.36-52.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
To Manchu generals, Christianity was certainly foreign, but so were other religions, such as Daoism or Chinese Zen Buddhism. All were significantly different from the Shamanism or Tibetan Buddhism the Manchu military generals were used to. The real concern of the Manchu was not the foreignness of a culture or a religion, but that their own culture and religion might be changed by foreigners. The conflicts between the Manchu and Chinese political traditions discussed above was an example of this kind of concern. However, Christianity, which was represented by four missionaries in Beijing in the 1660s, had such limited influence and seemed so trivial that the Manchu ruling class had little interest in considering it. In this sense, Christianity was just another religion and culture in Manchus’ multicultural and multi-ethnic Qing empire.

**Chinese-Christian Relationship**

In the early Qing period, there were two groups of Chinese intellectual with differing political perspectives. One was made up of Chinese bannerman (who were in the Manchu banner system) serving in the Manchu army; the other was made up of Ming Chinese scholar-officials who surrendered to the Manchus after the fall of the Ming dynasty. As described in the first chapter, the Jesuits had a good relationship with Chinese bannermen, who had introduced them into the Manchu court. Regarding the Ming Chinese intellectuals, the Jesuits had worked diligently to build a network with them since the middle of the 16th century. In the late Ming and early Qing, the Jesuits established their reputation among the Ming Chinese intellectuals through disciplines such as mathematics, firearms, and astronomy.
Jesuit Schall, as a minister in both the late Ming court and the early Qing, was particularly successful in terms of building a network with the Chinese intellectual elites. Besides reviewing many known stories about his connections with Chinese intellectuals, the following pages will show his particular connections about the time of the Calendar Case.

On April 29, 1661, about one year after the death of the Shunzhi emperor, and two years after Yang Guangxian’s first attack on Schall in 1659 and three year before the Calendar Case in 1664, some eminent Chinese scholar-officials in Beijing congratulated Schall on his seventy-first birthday with laudatory essays. In the eyes of Jesuits of the time, those congratulatory essays were a token of their success in mingling with Chinese elites. All the writings received for Schall’s birthday, as well as the writings about other Jesuits written by Chinese literati in the southern provinces, were gathered, printed, and sent back to Europe. 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Credentialing</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jin Zhijun</td>
<td>1619 jinshi degree (of the Ming); Teacher of the Crown Prince; the Chief Examiner of the Metropolitan Exam in 1655 (of the Qing); An exam</td>
<td>Citing the Book of Change, one of six Confucian classics, Jin theorized that Schall’s work on calendars belonged to that of a junzi, an ideal type of Confucian intellectual.</td>
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For Yang Guangxian’s first attack, see Huang, Zheng jiao feng bao, p. 33b.

A copy of Zeng yan he ke 贈言合刻 (The Collection of Words Received) of the 1661 version is collected in the National Library of Austria, and all the pages of this copy are available online on the library’s website. For more about this book, see Ji, Jianxun 纪建勋, “Bei ji zeng yan he ke banben pianmu hujiao 《碑记赠言合刻》版本篇目互校”, in Guoji Hanxue 国际汉学, 2014, v.2, pp.81-97.
reader of the Court Exam in 1646, 1649, and 1655 (of the Qing); Grand Scholar of the Hall of Middle Harmony 中和殿大学士

| Wei Yijie 魏裔介 (1616-1686) | 1646 jinshi degree (of the Qing); Teacher of the Crown Prince; Grand Scholar of the Hall of Supreme Harmony 太和殿大学士 | Beginning with the claim that truly talented people were not necessarily Chinese, Wei remarked that Schall was a saint (圣) according to ancient Chinese standards. Wei also remarked that Schall was “a Confucian student of the western sea and also a prominent Confucian student in China.” 为西海之儒，即中华之大儒\(^\text{154}\)

| Gong Dingzi 龚鼎孳 (1615-1673) | 1634 jinshi degree at age eighteen; was regarded as one of the best three poets of the east Changjiang River area 江左三大家; Member of the Hanlin Academy. | Comparing Schall with eminent ministers in Chinese dynastic history, Gong remarked that Schall’s virtues and skills impressed the whole court.\(^\text{155}\) |


\(^\text{154}\) Ibid, pp. 1369-1371

\(^\text{155}\) Ibid, pp. 1372-1373
| **Hu Shian** (胡世安) | 1628 *jinshi* degree (of the Ming); Grand Scholar of the Hall of Wuyin; Teacher of the Crown Prince | Expressed that it is the “common wish of intellectuals that the court reward Schall.”<sup>156</sup> |
| **Wang Congjian** (王崇简) | 1643 *jinshi* degree (of the Ming); Teacher of the Crown Prince; a renowned poet; a renowned painter; Yiyuan, Wang’s garden-style residence in Beijing was a popular place for the gathering of literati elites in the early Qing. | Praised Schall’s devotion to Christianity, and noted that Schall brought Christianity to “enlighten China” 迪我中华”.<sup>157</sup> |

The background of these scholars indicates they were leaders of Confucian elites during this period. The poems and essays as gifts for Schall on his birthday showed their recognition of Schall as an intellectual equal. Based on the writings of these Chinese elites, it is clear that Schall maintained a favorable relationship and intellectual exchange with the Confucian elites in Beijing after the death of the Shunzhi emperor.

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid, p.1374.  
<sup>157</sup> Ibid, p.1375.
In general, Confucian scholars were not monotheistically minded, but open to other religions and beliefs. In the late Ming and early Qing, the prevailing Confucian standard to evaluate intellectuals was called “unity of knowledge and action” 知行合一. In simple words, it meant that people respect those whose practice reflects a devotion to what they say and believe. For example, there are lots of stories in Confucian literati works teasing and criticizing the Buddhist monks who taught ascetic practices but could not themselves resist temptations. Meanwhile, the truly devoted Buddhist monks—who put their beliefs into practices—were admired and respected by the Confucian literati. This standard held true in the Confucian literati views of other religions, such as Daoism, Tibetan Buddhism, and even Judaism.\(^{158}\) The same standard applied to Schall and Christianity. According to the Confucian literati’s comments, they knew that Schall’s primary identity was a pious priest who came to China to preach his beliefs; they also recognized that Schall used his knowledge of astronomy to facilitate his preaching. To the literati, Schall’s religious and court roles were not problematic because such roles had long been combined by religious figures in China’s history.\(^{159}\) More importantly, Schall, in the eyes of the Confucian literati of his time, fulfilled both roles perfectly. Besides the known story of Schall’s astronomical skill, he was admired and respected because of his austere life that was true to his teaching. The Shunzhi emperor more than once sent secret informants to scrutinize

\(^{158}\) The stone inscription erected in 1663 nearby Kaifeng Jewish synagogue was composed by a non-Jewish Chinese scholar. See, Leslie, Donald, The Survival of the Chinese Jews: The Jewish Community of Kaifeng (Leiden, Brill, 1972), pp.40-41.

\(^{159}\) Jesuits Ferdinand Verbiest, in a memorial, contrasted their court role with Buddhist Monk Yixing (僧一行) of the Tang dynasty, who held a court role in the Astronomic Bureau. See, Xi chao ding an 熙朝定案, in Zhou Yan 周岩 ed., Mingmo qingchu Tian Zhu Jiao Shi Wen Xian Xin Bian 明末清初天主教史文献新编 (Beijing Shi: Guo jia tu shu guan chu ban she, 2013), p. 1394; Huang, Zheng jiao feng bao, p.54b.
Schall’s private life, both during the day and the night. Those informants proved Schall’s moral integrity. For this reason, the literati described Schall as one “on The Way” (得道), which was the highest compliment Confucian scholars could offer to clerics.

Yang Guangxian in the Eyes of His Contemporaries

One may question where Yang Guangxian’s anti-Christian thought and impeachment efforts came from if the intellectual exchange between China and Christianity was as healthy as Schall’s birthday essays suggest. True, Yang’s works, like Bu De Yi, called for the expulsion of Christianity from China based on the alleged incompatibility of Confucianism and Christianity. Previous studies had suggested that Yang’s attacks on Schall indicated the change of attitudes among Chinese intellectual toward Christianity from late Ming “sympathy” to the early Qing’s “hostility.”

Certainly Yang’s work, like every anti-Christian work, was hostile to Christianity. However, the question that previous studies did not ask was whether Yang represented the mainstream Chinese literati of his time, such as those scholars who congratulated Schall on his birthday. If he did, then we may infer his hostility as a social trend. If he did not, then his hostility was just his.

The best way to assess how Yang Guangxian was perceived in his time is simply to read what his contemporaries wrote about him.

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160 Väth, Yang (tran.), 1960, p. 268.
161 Gernet, China and the Christian Impact, pp.15-63.
1. Zhang Zhengchen 章正宸(?-1646), a jinshi degree holder (1631), and a member of Fushe, remarked:

杨光先，草莽甲士，妄干朝事，已属不经；且以不祥之器轻污禁地，滔天之罪，可胜诛耶！盖条陈参劾亦常事耳，何须作此怪诞之为？

Yang Guangxian, a person from a wild place, interfered with court issues. This already violated his social status. Besides, he brought an ominous thing [refers to a coffin] to pollute the forbidden place. This was the serious crime, which deserved a death sentence. Meanwhile, impeachments were common, so why did he need to do something this abnormal? 162

2. Wang Shizheng 王士祯 (1633-1711), a jinshi degree holder (1658), an eminent poet and writer of the early Qing who had been the director of the Board of Criminal Justice in Kangxi’s time, remarked:

杨光先者，新安人，明末居京师，以劾陈启新，妄得敢言名，实市侩之魁也

Yang Guangxian, a local of Xingan, lived in Beijing in the last years of the Ming dynasty. Because of his attack on of Chen Qixin, he gained the fame of brave speech, which he did not deserve. In fact, he was the best model of a vulgar person. 163

The two comments referred to the event concerning Yang’s impeachment of Chen Qixin in the reign of Chongzhen, the last ruler of the Ming dynasty. Yang had become known in Beijing by his efforts to impeach famous political figures, such as Wen Tiren, the then prime minister. The

Chongzhen emperor exiled Yang to Liaoxi after Yang brought a coffin to the court to show his preparation for death while impeaching Chen Qixin. Impeachments of powerful figures were a part of the court culture in the late Ming. Literati tried to establish their fame by attacking or impeaching policies and moral values of powerful figures and/or emperors. It was viewed as an honor if they were killed because of their impeachments. Such an honor equaled the one that generals obtained from fighting to the death on battlefields. Yang Guangxian’s impeachments were examples of this kind of pursuit, and he made them more dramatic by bringing a coffin to the court to show his preparation for death. According to two commenters, Yang did gain fame through impeachments, but it came mostly from his flamboyant (or “abnormal” in Zhang’s words) behavior rather than his argument.

More importantly, both commenters, as prominent jinshi degree holders, referred to Yang as a less educated person. Zhang defined Yang as “a person from a wild place” while Wang called Yang “vulgar”. Using such words to describe a literatus was far beyond mere criticism of an idea nor was it something normally seen in literati writing of the time. The words clearly convey a layer of contempt regarding Yang. In fact, Yang Guangxian was born and grew up in She Xian of Hui Prefecture徽 in Anhui Province, which was one of the most civilized areas of south China. The real reason the two commenters categorized Yang in this way was because Yang did not pass any level of civil service examination and did not have any educational title associated with the Chinese Confucian literati. In the late Ming and early Qing, the Chinese literati network was very exclusive; among many discerning standards the

164 This court culture is vividly shown in Huang, Ray, 1587, The Year of No Significance: the Ming Dynasty in Decline (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981), Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, especially on pp.59-60. For a general discussion of the censorial system of Ming China, see Hucker, Charles. The Censorial System of Ming China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966).
examination title associated with the civil service examination was the fundamental one.\textsuperscript{165}

Without passing even the lowest level exam, Yang, in the eyes of literati like Zhang Zhengchen, was not even “qualified to advise on court issues.” In simple words, neither commenters viewed Yang as their intellectual equal.

Specifically, regarding Yang’s impeachment of Schall, Wang Shizheng commented:

康熙六年，疏言西洋历法之弊，遂发大难逐钦天监监正加通政使汤若望，而夺其位。然光先实于历法毫无所解，所言皆舛谬。--- 光先刻一书，曰：《不得已》。自附于亚圣之辟异端。可谓无忌惮矣。

In the sixth year of the Kangxi reign, [Yang Guangxian] submitted a memorial to list the faults of the Western style calendar. It resulted in the disastrous removal of Tang Ruowang [Schall’s Chinese name], the chief of the Imperial Astronomy Bureau, from his position. Guangxian then took the position. However, Guangxian in fact had no knowledge of calendars, which he argued were all wrong. --- Guangxian published a book, titled Bu De Yi, in which he conceived of himself as the second saint [referring to Mencius] to criticize heterodoxy. This was such shamelessness.\textsuperscript{166}

As Wang’s comment above shows, Yang’s contemporaries knew well that the real purpose of Yang’s impeachment was to gain a position in the Imperial Astronomy Bureau, while his arguments against Christianity were, Wang remarked, “shameless.” In fact, Yang’s shamelessness may have been widely known in literati circles. When Tian Xue Chuan Gai

\textsuperscript{165} Elman, Benjamin, \textit{A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp.421-423. 
\textsuperscript{166} Wang, \textit{Chi bei ou tan}, p.88.
(Introduction to Christianity) was published in 1664, the same year of the Calendar Case, Xu Zhijian, a jinshi degree holder and a scholar-minister active in Beijing’s Chinese literati circles, wrote the preface. Yang privately contacted Xu and offered not to impeach him if he could distance himself from Christianity by declaring that the preface was not written by him. Xu was offended by such an offer, and simply refused the request, claiming that there was no nonsense in Tian Xue Chuan Gai and insisting that it had been his own wish to write the preface.¹⁶⁷

One may argue that Yang’s name might be associated with church history or colonial history (or even with the history of the Western expansion). But, by no means did Yang have a position in Chinese intellectual history. In the eyes of Yang’s contemporaries, Yang simply was not one of them, let alone a representative of dominant intellectual trends.

Yang Guangxian as a Diviner, and His Confrontation with Schall

Rather than being a Confucian scholar, Yang Guangxian at this time was characterized as a “skilled” person (术士). His skill was divination. Yang Guangxian learned divination during his exile in northeast China under the late Ming. Unlike his writings on Confucianism, his expertise in divination was recognized by his contemporaries. Wei Yijie (a Confucian elite who wrote an essay for Schall, see Table 1 of this chapter) quoted Yang Guangxian and his work in the section regarding divination.¹⁶⁸ Jesuit Ferdinand Verbiest, in defense of Schall, identified Yang Guangxian as a diviner and questioned Yang’s credentials in the field of astronomy;
Verbiest also mentioned several divination books Yang published. In the middle of Kangxi’s reign, Yang’s books were listed among the divination books banned by the court.\(^{169}\)

At the court level, divination was provided by the Imperial Astronomy Bureau. Every year the Bureau prescribed the calendars, the most important source for a wide array of Chinese divination methods.\(^{170}\) Yang Guangxian specialized in Purple Star Astrology 紫微斗数, which relied heavily on the calendar as well as on the observation of Chinese constellations. Unlike many secret (or private) divination methods, Purple Star Astrology was open for learning, and the mastery of this method depended on one’s own study. For this reason, this method was popular and used by a large group of practitioners.\(^{171}\)

Professor Huang Yilong has explained in a couple of articles the differences between Schall and Yang on matters related to divination. For example, based on the traditional Chinese twenty-eight lunar mansions, the constellation Shen 参 follows the constellation Zi 觜 in traditional Chinese star maps produced in the fifth century (or earlier). But due to effects of the axial precession of the Earth, the positions of the two constellations, when viewed in China in the seventeenth century, had changed. So Schall changed the positions of the two constellations according to his observations as the director of the Imperial Astronomy Bureau. This change caused confusion for divination protocols. Worse still was that those two constellations were opposite indicators in divinations, which meant the change shattered the basis of many divination

\(^{169}\) Shen zu ren huangdi shilu 圣祖仁皇帝实录, in Da Qing lichao shilu 大清历朝实录 (Taipei: Hualian chubanshe, 1964), KXSL, hereafter v.16, p.235.


\(^{171}\) It is still one of most widely practiced divination methods in Chinese speaking areas today. Computer softwares have been created to carry on the calculation part of this method, while leaving the interpretation part for diviners to show their skills. Softwares are widely available over the internet today, and open for use.
schools. Yang, as a practitioner of divination, fought this directly with Schall and his Bureau, and demanded the order be changed back to the traditional Chinese way.\(^{172}\)

With an attempt to gain support from more Chinese Confucian literati, Yang escalated his charge by claim that Schall’s change offended the traditions of Confucianism and of China. In a certain sense, Yang’s escalation was not without basis, because Confucianism had been tied to Chinese divination since the time of Confucius (551 BC–479 BC). *The Book of Changes*, one of the six Confucian classics, was among other things a classic of Chinese divination. It is a widely known story that Confucius himself studied this book very closely when he was old. It was also very common in Chinese history to find Confucian scholars of different intellectual levels proudly showing their own divination skill or showing esteem for those having good divination skills. In the logic of Confucianism, the skill of divination (or predication) was the way to display one’s mastery of the rhythm of natural changes. With the context of divination and Confucianism in mind, it is easier to understand why Yang reached beyond his profession to attack Schall and Christianity using Confucian terms.\(^{173}\)

**Oboi Regency and its Motivations in the Calendar Case**

With his arguments about the Confucian-Christian conflict, Yang Guangxian’s target audience was the Confucian literati. Though his arguments did not receive much of a positive

\(^{172}\) Huang, Yilong, “Qing qian qi dui Zi Shen liang su xian hou ci xu de zheng zhi”, pp.71-94.

response in Chinese Confucian circles of the time, they did catch the attention of the Manchu regents. Professor Zhu Weizheng has discovered a very important detail: Yang’s impeachment submitted to the Board of Rites was forwarded to the Deliberative Council on the same day it was submitted. Zhu points out that such efficiency can only be explained as a special arrangement by the regent government; otherwise Yang’s impeachment, which was from a commoner, had almost no chance of reaching the Deliberative Council at all, let alone on the same day. The Deliberative Council, which consisted of lieutenant-generals from Manchu and Mongol banners, was a Manchu institution above the Chinese style six-board court system. During the regency, the Deliberative Council was in fact the most powerful institution in the entire government.

It is unlikely that the lieutenant-generals had any interests in cultural quarreling or the astronomical debates related to Yang’s impeachment. Instead, they were interested in the political power the impeachment targeted: Schall and the Imperial Astronomy Bureau. As mentioned previously, the Bureau was not merely an academic institution; rather it was a special power unit within the entire imperial structure. It offered concrete services by providing the

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174 Huang Yilong examined the attitudes of Yang’s contemporaries concerning Yang’s attack of Schall. See, Huang, Yilong, “Kangxi chao hanren shidafu dui liyu de taidu jiqi suo yanshen de chuanshuo. 康熙朝汉人士大夫对「历狱」的态度及其所衍生的传说”, in Hanxue yanjiu 汉学研究, 2000, v.11, pp.137-161.
177 Some members in the Deliberative Council had no interest at all in the Calendar Case. It was recorded that some members just left the meeting when the topics about the case started. See, Väth, Yang (tran.), 1960, p.501.
calendar as well as divinations for the court and the emperor.\textsuperscript{178} Those services gave the Bureau interpretive power over natural happenings in relation to secular affairs.

Technically, the legitimacy of its power relied on a two-step operation: the first was accurate astronomical observation; the second was a convincing interpretation of those observations. Schall, equipped with European astronomical knowledge, publicly proved his expertise in observations. However, the power of those observations came only by mingling them with the second step. This was where Chinese divinations and predictions kicked in and began the process of transforming objective observations into subjective claims.

It is not clear whether Schall truly believed in or learned the methods used in Chinese divination, but it was known that he used them and knew their power in court politics as well as in society. In a well-known example, Schall combined Chinese \textit{feng shui} theory (for selecting the right location for constructions) with an interpretation of astronomical signs, to successfully persuade Dorgon to give up a plan to build a new palace.\textsuperscript{179} Schall’s involvement with Chinese divination was not carried on in secret. Both missionaries in China and the Church in Europe knew of it. Although some were opposed,\textsuperscript{180} Schall was tolerated in Europe.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{178} For the prediction and interpretation, there were many styles of methods involved. Here, I used the term “divination” to loosely describe varying methods Schall and the Imperial Astronomy Bureau used for interpreting their observations, picking out locations, and picking out auspicious days.

\textsuperscript{179} Huang, Yilong, “Yesuhui shi dui Zhongguo chuan tong xing zhan su shu de taidu 耶稣会士对中国传统星占术数的态度” (Jesuits’ attitude toward Traditional Chinese Astrology), in \textit{Jiuzhou xuekan 九州学刊}, v.4:3 (1991), p.20.

\textsuperscript{180} Missionaries in China and Europe knew of Schall’s involvement in divination-related activities. Some of them thought of divination as one kind of superstition, and Schall, as a Christian, should not be involved with it. In 1649, Jesuit Gabriel de Magalhaens wrote a long report to Europe to criticize Schall for his involvement in “superstitions”. See Collani, Claudia von, “Astronomy versus Astrology: Johann Adam Schall von Bell and his "superstitious" Chinese Calendar”, in \textit{Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu 82}, no. 164, p.439.

\textsuperscript{181} Jesuit Martino Martini defended Schall’s involvement when he went to back Europe in the
A typical divination-related memorial by Schall was written in this way,

On the thirteen days yisi of the eleventh month of the tenth year of the Shunzhi reign between 7am to 9am, we have observed that the sun produced a partial parhelion on the right. The guanxiang wanzhan says: “when the sun gives forth a parhelion, it means that the ruler will have an offspring. “It also says: “if there is a parhelion there will be wind; and if the parhelion is in the sun, it means that the ruler honors the secret things of the ladies of the palace. If the sun in the morning has a parhelion, [it means] that the lord of the country is hindered by excessive pleasure. He may not indulge in women. Let him be warned of that. Otherwise there will be sorrow.” Your Minister, Tang Ruowang [Schall’s Chinese name]182

In this memorial, Schall’s words equipped with Chinese divination could extend to the private sphere of the emperor. This was an area that most ministers could hardly reach. More importantly, Schall certainly knew that sun parhelions were normal astronomical signs. So, the true purpose of this memorial was to deliver Schall’s own ideas in the form of astronomical


182 The translation was modified based on Tiziana Lippiello’s. Lippiello, Tiziana, “Astronomy and Astrology: Johann Adam Schall von Bell”, in Malek, Roman, eds., Western Learning in China: The Contribution and Impact of Johann Adam Schall von Bell, S.J. (1592–1666) (Nettetal: Steyler Verlag, 1998), pp. 424-425. It was unclear whether Schall’s memorial provided general advice to the Shunzhi emperor or referred to special women. Antonio Sisto Rosso claimed that the woman was Empress Xiaohuizhang, who was entitled by the Shunzhi emperor as empress in July 1645, about a half year later than the Schall’s memorial (Jan. 1, 1654). For another translation and analysis see Rosso, Apostolic Legations to China, pp. 116-118.
In this instance, parhelions were women. Another time Schall reported that parhelions in the sun were Buddhist Tibetan Lamas.\textsuperscript{184}

Schall’s divinations and influence were not limited to the court and the emperor. According to Jesuit de Magalhaen’s letter to Europe, Schall provided divinations in society. His activities included: compiling horoscopes, palm reading, and dream interpretation.\textsuperscript{185} It was not clear whether the horoscopes Schall compiled were based on European or Chinese systems. The known fact is that the European horoscopes were similar to Chinese Purple Star Astrology in terms of procedure. They both take a person’s birth date (Purple Star Astrology needs a birth time as well) as the base and continue with predictions according to astronomical formulas in their traditions. Although their contents are totally different, from the view of divination customers the two methods produced similar results. Purple Star Astrology was very popular in China, and this was also the method in which Yang Guangxian specialized. Additionally, Chinese style palm reading (手相) and dream interpretation (解梦) were among the most popular divination methods as well. Regarding Schall’s wide involvement in Chinese divination (“superstition” in de Magalhaen’s words), it is likely that de Magalhaen did not exaggerate in the report sent back to Europe. Even the fifth Dalai Lama, who only briefly visited Beijing, remembered Schall for his accurate divination, and mentioned Schall in his autobiography. In the

\textsuperscript{183} In comparison, the Veritable Records of the Shunzhi reign has twenty-two records of parhelions reported by Schall’s Imperial Astronomy Bureau., while the Veritable Records of the Kangxi reign has no parhelion record reported by the Imperial Astronomy Bureau led by Jesuit Verbiest. See in Shi zhu zhang huang di shi lu 世祖章皇帝实录, in Da Qing li chao shi lu 大清历朝实录 (Taipei :Hua lian chu ban she 1964), v.16, p.235, v.5, v12, v.21, v.30, v.35, v.70, v.72, v.75, v.76, v.78, v.79, v.80, v.84, v.86, v.91, v.94, v.98 (two days), v.100, v.118, v.129, v.132. SZSL, hereafter.
\textsuperscript{184} Váth, Yang (tran.), 1960, p.396, p.455.
\textsuperscript{185} Collani, “Astronomy versus Astrology”, p.439.
account by the Dalai Lama, Schall precisely predicted the date of his arrival of Beijing. People were amazed by Schall’s divination skill because the trip was influenced by heavy snow. The fifth Dalai Lama remembered Schall as a skilled “diviner using astrological method.”

In the eyes of Manchus and Mongols, Schall, equipped with Chinese divination, became a powerful court figure. More critically, Schall acted as another Chinese minister in the court. Composed in Chinese and quoting Chinese divination classics, his presentations at the court fit squarely in the Chinese style. Schall’s astronomical reports were used as ammunition by Chinese ministers when arguing court politics. The best-known example concerned the opposition of the Chinese ministers to the Manchu and Mongol ministers’ wish that the Shunzhi emperor leave Beijing to welcome the fifth Dalai Lama. Schall submitted a memorial reporting that Jupiter was so bright that it almost contrasted with the brightness of sun, and that meteors had fallen into the Ziwei Palace (the sky location of the emperor’s heavenly palace). The day after Schall’s report, two Chinese ministers elaborated that the astronomical signs warned about unsafe travel, so they suggested the emperor instead dispatch a high ranking official to welcome the Dalai Lama. Before the suggestion, the emperor, a believer in Buddhism, sided with the Manchu and Mongol ministers, and had already notified the Dalai Lama that he would come. But after the

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186 It was recorded as an anecdote, and the fifth Dalai Lama was just simply surprised by the prediction. No attitude to Schall was expressed in the account. Dalai Lama V 五世达赖喇嘛, translated by Chen, Qingying, Ma, Lianlong, Ma, Lin, Wu shi Dalai Lama zhuan: yun shang 五世达赖喇嘛传: 云裳 (Beijing: Zhongguo Zang xue chu ban she, 1997), p.328. For the English translation, see Karmay, S.G. tran, The Illusive Play: The autobiography of the Fifth Dalai Lama, (Chicago: Serindia Publications, 2014), p.294. 187 Ibid. 188 In the Veritable Records of Qing Shi Zu, the suggestions were summarized in the form of Manchu-Mongol ministers’ suggestions vs Chinese ministers’ suggestions. See, SZSL v.68. 189 Professor Huang Yilong, based on his expertise in astronomy, argues that the two astronomic signs were likely reported to make political arguments. See, Huang, Yilong, “Court divination and Christianity in the K’ang-hsi era.”, in Chinese Science, 10 (1991), pp.9-10.
suggestion, he changed his mind and sent a prince, carrying an apologetic note, to welcome the Dalai Lama. 190

Knowing divination and its power in court politics is a key to understanding why Manchu and Mongol lieutenant-generals in the Deliberative Council were interested in the impeachment raised by Yang Guangxian.191 Technically speaking, Yang Guangxian, as a skilled practitioner of divination, was able to challenge Schall and the Imperial Astronomy Bureau directly about their professional work. According to the investigation at the trial, Yang Guangxian did find technical errors in the Bureau’s selection of a burial date for an infant prince, and those errors were the factual reason for the judgment.192 In comparison, in 1658, eight years before the Calendar Case, a minister in the Imperial Astronomy Bureau used the same burial date to impeach Manchu ministers in the Board of Rites (the immediately department superior to the Imperial Astronomy Bureau), because the Board of Rites set the burial time about four hours later than the time prescribed by the Imperial Astronomy Bureau. The impeachment resulted in the dismissal of the Manchu director of the Board as well as six other ministers (two of them were given the death penalty).193 At that time, no Manchu minister in the Board of Rites had adequate knowledge to argue with the Imperial Astronomy Bureau about their calculation of the burial time. But, in

191 Väth’s writing of Schall’s biography, published in 1933, was the first comprehensive examination of the Calendar Case. Without using Chinese materials, Väth concluded that Schall did only “scientific” astronomical works in the Imperial Astronomy Bureau, and all other divination related works were handled by Schall’s Chinese subordinates. This conclusion shifted the focus of many later researches away from the divination field. Väth, Yang (tran.), 1960, p.503.
193 Huang, "Ze ri zhi zheng yu “Kangxi liyu”, pp. pp.257-258
1644, with Yang Guangxian’s knowledge about divination, the Manchus could challenge Schall and Imperial Astronomy Bureau.

From the point of view of court politics, Schall’s primary identity was not as a missionary representing Christianity, but as a minister with powerful (if not magical) Chinese divination skills. Attacking him was in fact a step towards attacking a Chinese power group. By the time Yang Guangxian impeached Schall in the fall of 1664, the Oboi regency had been in power for three years. Eliminating Chinese political influence while reinforcing Manchu values were major themes in those years. This is also the reason why the Calendar Case aimed not only at Schall but also at all the major Chinese ministers in the Imperial Bureau of Astronomy. In the final judgement, Schall was spared the death penalty, but the death penalty of the Chinese ministers was still enforced. After Schall was removed from his position, Mahu 马祜, a former Manchu minister in the Board of Justice who knew neither astronomy nor divination, was assigned co-directorship of the Bureau with Yang Guangxian. Mahu became the first Manchu director of the Bureau. Therefore, the Calendar Case was not a conflict between Confucianism and Christianity, as a superficial readings of Yang Guangxian’s works and the impeachments might suggest; rather it was simply another case of court politics between the Manchus and Chinese in the early Qing history.

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195 QSG, p.10041. See also the record by a contemporary, Ye, Mengzhu 叶梦珠 (1623--?), Yue shi bian 阅世编 (Beijing, Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 2007), p.10.
196 In fact, the Jesuits knew well the danger of political involvement, and expected the consequences of this kind of political case. In a letter drafted by Jesuit de Magalhaen and signed by ten other Jesuits and sent to Schall on September 13, 1649, Schall was explicitly warned that the management of an imperial institution would inevitably create enemies, and that the mishandling of official work could bring deadly consequence. Väth, Yang (tran.), 1960, p.435.
The trials of the Calendar Case and its implied meaning

The trials in the Calendar Case were not focused on abstract cultural issues but on a technical error. It was the date selected for the burial of Prince Gong (who died in 1658 as a three-month-old) that was deemed inauspicious enough to cause the death of the Shunzhi emperor. Schall’s strategy during the trials was to separate himself from the Chinese ministers, and argue that he had no knowledge of Chinese geomancy and the dates on which he put the seal were in fact selected by his Chinese subordinates. But Schall’s defense was not accepted, and he, as the director of Imperial Astronomy Bureau, was judged responsible for the error.

In the trials, Schall’s defense was presented by Jesuit Ferdinand Verbiest. Schall himself had suffered a stroke and was paralyzed. Verbiest had came to China in 1659 and started to...
assist Schall in 1660. He had a very close relationship with Jesuits Ludovico Buglio and Gabriel de Magalhaens, who had been quarreling with Schall for a decade. Buglio and de Magalhaen opposed Schall for serving in a secular court position while being a Christian father. It was only about the time of the Calendar Case that they put aside their differences and came to Schall’s aid.

Buglio and de Magalhaen’s strategy for their church to survive and grow was to build a network by serving Manchu elites privately. This strategy, as a by-product, helped the final resolution of the Calendar Case. The Tongs, an eminent Manchu clan and the natal family of the Kangxi emperor, intervened in the case (details in the next chapter); Niman, the Manchu director of the Board of Justice, negotiated a pardon for Schall during the trials;201 Prince Xianyi (Fushou), a son of Haoge, argued that the penalty should only be applied to the five Chinese ministers.202 The case ended with Empress Xiaozhuang’s demand for the pardon of Schall’s death penalty.

Some Manchu elites’ support for the missionaries was crucial, especially considering that Schall had powerful Manchu political enemies at court. Because of those interventions, the trials bypassed the court system and were directly presented to the Deliberative Council. More importantly, because of those influential Manchus negotiating for the missionaries, the trials, which lasted about nine months, ended with no causalities among the missionaries. In comparison, three years after the Calendar Case in 1668, the Deliberative Council ended the trials and judgement on Oboi and his clique in only eight days.203

202 Ibid.
For all missionaries in China, the nine-month-long trials were certainly a fearful time. At the beginning, Yang Guangxian had attacked Christianity as a treacherous foreign religion, and all missionaries were summoned to Beijing for investigation. Several fathers were arrested, jailed, and interrogated. To the Christian community, it seemed like another infamous prosecution of Christianity, which reminded them of the ban of Christian missions in Japan in the 1620s. Uncertainty about the future and unfair treatment during the investigation shattered missionaries psychologically and physically. However, the Manchus did not find real issues with the missionaries and Christianity after the investigations, so the final judgement on Schall focused on his role as a minister. After his death sentence was eventually pardoned, Schall and three other Jesuits were placed under house detention. (Because they were free to carry out their daily routine in Beijing, it was more like today’s probation). At the beginning of the Calendar Case, the suggested penalty included destroying Schall’s church, and the church built by Buglio and de Magalhaens. However, at the end of the case, the order was to keep both churches, although all missionaries from provinces were sentenced to exile to Macao. But the sentence was not truly enforced. The missionaries went south to Guangzhou and were favorably accommodated by the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi.

Conclusion

The Calendar Case was one of many court cases under the rule of the regent government aiming at removing Chinese influence. Schall was targeted because of his role as a Chinese

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204 QMD, p.266.
205 For the favorable accommodation, see Brockey, Journey to the East, p.130. Lu Chongjun, a Manchu and the governor of Guangdong and Guangxi, was fully aware of the trial. He assisted the investigation regarding the treacherous activities of Christian fathers. See Deiwiks, “The Secret Manchu Documents”, p.643.
minister instead of as a missionary. Meanwhile, Yang Guangxian’s involvement in the trials of the Calendar Case was not because of his works attacking Christianity but because of his specialty in Chinese divination. As a political event under the regent government, the Calendar Case reflected the power struggle between Chinese and Manchu powers. Christianity as a religion was not a central topic in the Calendar Case from its beginning to the end.

Though the Calendar Case was not caused by the Christian mission, yet it had significant influence in shaping the Christian history after it. Before the case, there were two main Christian Churches in Beijing. One was the Southern Church (南堂), presided over by Schall; the other was the Eastern Church (东堂), presided over by Buglio and de Magalhaens. After the Calendar Case, Schall’s church was occupied by Yang Guangxian, and Schall died one year later, in 1666. Therefore, the true impact of the Calendar Case was on Verbiest, Buglio, and de Magalhaens and their future mission centered on the Eastern Church.

The direct lesson Jesuits learned from the Calendar Case was that Chinese divination was powerful but dangerous. When Verbiest was appointed to a position in the Imperial Astronomical Bureau, Verbiest kept his distance from divination. More importantly, Verbiest, Buglio, de Magalhaens learned by heart a simple fact: China was now under the control of the Manchus. Their prior relation with Chinese elites, which the Jesuits had painstakingly built for a century, was now of little use, if not harmful, for the Christian mission. The real group that could help them in times of danger and facilitate their mission was the Manchus. With such lessons in mind, it is easy to understand why the interactions between Jesuits and Chinese literati elites

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206 According to the trial document, the debates between Yang Guangxian and Schall were on technical issues regarding divination. I have not seen any trial documents showing that they debated regarding Christianity or Confucianism. See QMD, pp. 48-277.
since the late Ming quickly declined after the Calendar Case. It was not, as previous scholars suggested, that Chinese literati were no longer interested in what Jesuits delivered;\textsuperscript{207} rather it was the Jesuits who were no longer interested in mingling with Chinese elites. Their focus, as will be shown in the later chapters, turned to Manchu elites. As an interesting sidelight, de Magalhaens became a technician for the family of Suksaha 苏克萨哈, a regent supporting Yang’s impeachment, within the first year after the case. The records show that de Magalhaens appeared in Suksaha’s house to repair clocks and to build a mechanical device to take out water from a well.\textsuperscript{208}

\textsuperscript{207} Gernet, \textit{China and the Christian Impact}, p.43.
\textsuperscript{208} For Suksaha as a supporter of Yang, see Väth, Yang (tran.), 1960, p.477; de Magalhaens as a family aid of Suksaha, see Jami, \textit{The Emperor's New Mathematics}, p.58
Chapter 3: The Jesuits’ Identity in Kangxi’s Court

尔等惟知朕算术之精，却不知我学算之故。朕幼时钦天监汉官与西洋人不睦，互相参劾，几至大辟。杨光先汤若望于午门外，九卿前，当面赌测日影，奈九卿中无一知其法者，朕思已不知焉能断人之是非因自愤而学焉。

You only know that I am very good at mathematics, but you do not know the reason I learned it. When I was young, Chinese ministers and Westerners in the Imperial Astronomy Bureau were hostile. They indicted each other, nearly causing major issues. By the Wu gate, Yang Guangxian and Tang Ruowang (Schall’s Chinese name) bet on the accuracy of their measurements on the shadows of the sun in front of high-ranking officials. But no official understood the theories of their measurement. I thought, if I did not understand the theories, how can I judge which is right and which wrong? So, I studied mathematics.209

In this excerpt, Kangxi discussed his educational experiences during a family gathering. The discussion was recorded and printed as a piece of family instruction. Kangxi’s learning of Western-style mathematics is well-known in Chinese history because most fundamental terms and concepts of Western-style mathematics in China today were imported and translated under Kangxi’s auspices.210 As a piece of historical evidence, the above excerpt not only provides evidence of Kangxi’s long involvement with Western mathematics, but also pinpoints the time his learning started. It began about the time of the disputes between Yang Guangxian and Schall

209 Qing Shi Zong 清世宗 (the Yongzheng emperor), ed., Shen Zhu Ren Huang Di Ting Xun Ge Yan 圣祖仁皇帝庭训格言, in SKQS, pp.717-650.
210 Kangxi’s learning of mathematics is a topic of many studies. For the latest comprehensive study on this topic see: Jami, The Emperor’s New Mathematics.
in the Calendar Case of 1664-1655.\footnote{Jesuit Bouvet’s biography about Kangxi written in 1690s also mentioned that Kangxi started his study during the time of the Calendar Dispute. Bouvet, \textit{The History of Cang-Hy, the Present Emperor of China} (London: Printed for F. Coggan, 1699), p.52.} The year 1665 was officially the fifth year of reign for the Kangxi emperor, who was twelve years old and had not yet ruled the country himself.

In 1665, the empire was still managed by the regents. As a state matter, Kangxi’s educational curriculum and teachers were selected and decided on by the regents. Based on Manchu tradition, Kangxi’s education focused on nomadic skills such as horse riding, hunting, and archery.\footnote{Spence, “The Kang-hsi Reign”, p. 131.} Contrary to the general impression given by Kangxi’s mastery of Chinese culture during his adult years, the emperor in fact did not have a routine Chinese-style academic education under the regent government. Officials continuously submitted memorials to remind the regents of the importance of starting Kangxi’s academic education.\footnote{Lawrence Kessler provides a list of such kinds of memorials. See, Kessler, Lawrence D., \textit{K’ang-Hsi and The Consolidation of Ch’ing Rule, 1661-1684} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p.188, note 27.} Though the regent government did not refuse these suggestions, the academic education was not formally arranged.\footnote{Ibid, p.57.} The first active response to these suggestions was from Kangxi himself (who was then about fifteen years old), and who on May 18, 1669 ordered the Board of Rites to arrange the matter.\footnote{According to Jesuit records, Kangxi’s Chinese was not so good; Kangxi felt it easier to use Manchu than Chinese to conduct academic communications. See Bouvet, \textit{The History of Cang-Hy}, p.52.} Kangxi’s formal learning of Chinese and the Chinese classics started after he eradicated regent power and ruled the empire himself. In summary, in regard to Kangxi’s education, the regent government emphasized martial skills and did not value academics. Even
Kangxi’s learning of the Manchu script was under private arrangement by Kangxi’s grandmother, who selected one of her maids to teach him. 216

With Kangxi’s educational environment in mind, the question remains how, during the time of the regency, Kangxi could have learned Western mathematics, an academic subject belonging to neither the Manchu nor the Chinese tradition? The subject (which included geometry) required for calculating sun shadows could not be mastered in one or two afternoons. It instead required a considerable amount of time and routine study. How were the Jesuits allowed to reach the teenage Kangxi and teach him on a regular basis?

Accessibility to emperors was a tightly restricted privilege. Living in the inner court of the Forbidden City, emperors could be approached only by a very limited group of people. The bureaucratic court system was known to be inefficient no matter how memorials were presented (in writing or in person); 217 therefore, any channel to access emperors outside of this system was precious. Eunuchs, for example, were political manipulators because of their immediate access to emperors. The Manchus learned this lesson from the decline of the Ming dynasty, and used the Imperial Household to control eunuchs as well as manage the daily lives of emperors in the Forbidden City. 218 The emperor’s security was taken care of by the Imperial Guards, an independent military unit whose members came exclusively from Manchu banners. Both the

216 Zhao, Lian 昭梿, Xiao ting za lu 嘯亭杂录 (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju, 1980), p.476. The author Zhao Lian (1776-1829) was an offspring of Giyesu, who inherited the title of Prince Kang.
218 Spence, Ts’ao Yin, p.33; Rawski, The Last Emperors, p.179; Qi, Meiqin 祁美琴, “Qingchu neiwufu ji qi yu shisan yamen de guanxi 清初内务府及其与十三衙门的关系”, in Qingshi yanjiu 清史研究, 1997, v.1, 28-36.
Imperial Household and the Imperial Guards were native Manchu institutions operated independently from the court system. Because of the close relationship with as well as accessibility to emperors, positions in these two institutions were prestigious and highly sought after. In fact, all four regents, in addition to their positions in the bureaucratic court system, had positions in these two institutions.219

Despite the difficulties gaining access, many Jesuits, during the whole of Kangxi’s sixty-year reign, accessed the Kangxi emperor privately. Previously, this access was attributed to Kangxi’s interests in Western mathematics and science. However, this explanation simply inverts cause and effect. If the Jesuits could not reach Kangxi and participate in his education in his youth, how could Kangxi have become interested in Western academic subjects? No Chinese emperor before or after Kangxi had ever signaled an interest in any Western academic subject. Kangxi’s interests may explain his long commitment to the learning of Western subjects, but the interests were the consequence not the cause of Jesuit access to Kangxi.

To understand the Jesuits’ access to Kangxi, it is necessary to go back to the political environment of Kangxi’s early teens and the immediate problems presented by the machinations of powerful regents. It was against this background that the Jesuits participated in Kangxi’s campaign to eliminate the power of the regents while consolidating his own. This participation started the Jesuits’ golden days in Kangxi’s reign.

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219 For monographs on the Imperial Household, see Torbert, *The Ch’ing Imperial Household Department*; Qi, Meiqin, *Qing dai nei wu fu* 清代内务府 (Beijing: Zhongguo Renmin 1998). For a brief English introduction about the Imperial Guard see, Rawski, *The Last Emperors*, pp.82-87. For a monograph in Chinese about the Imperial Guard see Chang, Jiang 常江; Li, Li 李理, *Qinggong danei shiwei* 清宫大内侍卫 (Imperial Guards in the Qing Palace) (Beijing, Gugong chubanshe, 2013, first published in 1993).
Kangxi and his Political Backbone

On June 14, 1669, fifteen-year-old Kangxi suddenly arrested Oboi, the most powerful regent, by using a group of young wrestlers who normally played in the inner court of the Forbidden City. Kangxi reduced this to imprisonment after considering Oboi’s contributions to the Manchu state. Kangxi’s arrest of Oboi was an important event in early Qing political history, as it signaled the beginning of Kangxi’s own rule. From the time six-year-old Kangxi was enthroned as emperor to the moment he eliminated the regents’ influence as a fifteen-year-old, Kangxi’s ability to handle political issues was dependent on three cliques in the court. One was led by Empress Dowager Xiaozhuang, the mother of the Shunzhi Emperor. The other was the Tong clan, from which Kangxi’s mother came. The third was Kangxi’s first in-law family, the Soni family.

Empress Dowager Xiaozhuang was originally from the royal Borjigin clan of the Khorchin Mongols that claimed descent from Genghis Khan (in fact, it descended from one of Genghis Khan’s brothers). As the first major Mongol group submitting to Nurgaci, the Khorchin Mongols married daughters to almost all of the key figures in the imperial family.

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220 Meng, Zhaoxing 孟昭信, Kangxi da di quanzhuan 康熙大帝全传 (Changchun: Jilin wen shi, 1987), pp.27-28. Meng points out that it is likely that Kangxi was not confident about his control of the Imperial Guards. Therefore, he created the group of wrestlers himself. As a side note, on the day before the arrest of Oboi, Kangxi asked the wrestlers to take an oath of loyalty. See Zhao, Xiao ting za lu, p.5.


222 MWLD, p. 697.
among whom were Nurgaci himself, Hung Taiji, Dorgon, Daisan, and Haoge.\textsuperscript{223} As the Manchus expanded, other Mongol powers submitted to Manchu rule, and Manchu-Mongol marriages became a routine strategy to strengthen ties between the two sides.\textsuperscript{224} In this way, the Khorchin Mongols maintained strong influence in the Manchu court through intermarriages with noble Manchu families.\textsuperscript{225}

From marrying Hung Taiji in 1625 to Kangxi’s enthronement in 1661, Empress Dowager Xiaozhuang witnessed Manchu expansion from a regional power to a mighty empire, and she experienced the court politics of three reigns—Nurgaci’s, Hung Taiji’s, Shunzhi’s—and one regent’s rule, Dorgon. Though not actively involved in court politics, Xiaozhuang was a presence during all the crucial transitions of power after the death of Hung Taiji in 1643. When the Shunzhi emperor was young, Xiaozhuang directed him in his handling of his relationship with Dorgon, a regent and de facto chief of the empire until his death in 1650; in the Shunzhi emperor’s private life, Xiaozhuang managed to enhance the influence of her native Borjigin clan by marrying six women from her clan to Shunzhi. But, to Xiaozhuang’s dismay, no Mongol

\textsuperscript{223} Empress Dowager Xiaozhuang was the second woman of the Borjigin clan of the Khorchin Mongols married to Hung Taiji. The first one, Empress Dowager Xiaoduan, was granted the empress title when Hung Taiji claimed emperorship in 1636, even though she did not bear a son for Hung Taiji. For the seven Hung Taiji consorts with titles, five were from the Borjigin clan of the Khorchin Mongol. The Shunzhi emperor was the only son born by the Borjigin consorts. In some sense, when the different imperial Manchu powers finally reached agreement that the five-year-old Shunzhi would be the new emperor after Hung Taiji’s death, it reflected the Khorchin Mongols women’s dominant power in Hung Taiji’s harem. Du Jiaji 杜家骥 provides a very useful table regarding all Mongol-Manchu intermarriages in the early Qing period. Du, Jiaji, \textit{Qingchao Man Meng lianyin yanjiu} 清朝满蒙联姻硏究 (Studies on the Manchu-Mongol Intermarriages in the Qing Dynasty) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2003), pp.596-624.

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid, pp.4-5. See also, Rawski, Evelyn. “Ch’ing Imperial Marriage and Problems of Rulership”, pp. 177-179

\textsuperscript{225} For the total eighty-five Mongol-Manchu marriages before Manchu entered Beijing in 1644, thirty-three or about forty percent were with the Khorchin Mongol. Ibid, p.12.
woman bore a son for Shunzhi.\textsuperscript{226} When Shunzhi died at the age of twenty-three in 1661, he had six sons; only Kangxi’s mother came from a distinguished Manchu family. As the last to view Shunzhi’s edict regarding the heir before the announcement, Xiaozhuang endorsed the choice of Kangxi.\textsuperscript{227}

Xiaozhuang’s endorsement was crucial for Kangxi. When Kangxi was eight years old, in March 1663, about two years after he was made emperor, his mother died. Kangxi’s education and personal life were thereupon taken care of by Xiaozhuang. In addition to her parenting, the most important support Xiaozhuang gave Kangxi was the Mongol power network. Women from the Khorchin Mongols and their sons were Xiaozhuang’s immediate network in Beijing. In the larger picture, Xiaozhuang had great influence on the Mongol powers located in the north of China. In the 1670s, when Kangxi painstakingly handled the revolts of the Three Feudatories in the south, Xiaozhuang used her networks with different Mongol powers to maintain peace in northern China for Kangxi.\textsuperscript{228} In Beijing, among the sons of Khorchin Mongol women, Giyesu (1645–1697), called Prince Kang in many official records, was Kangxi’s dependable supporter within the imperial clan. Giyesu, nine years older than Kangxi, was a grandson of Daisan and was the second inheritor of Daisan’s first-degree princedom. Giyesu and Kangxi were the same fourth-generation descendants of Nurgaci, and both belonged to the new Manchu generation born after the Manchus occupied Beijing. Giyesu’s mother was from the Borjigin clan of the

\textsuperscript{226} For comprehensive research on Shunzhi and his imperial concubines, see Meng, Sen, “Qing Shizu Dong efei shengsi tesu dianli” 清世祖董鄂妃生死特殊典礼, and “Shizu chujia shishi kao” 世祖出家史实考, in Ming Qing shi lunzhu jikan xubian 明清史论著集刊续编 (Being: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986.), pp.178-184; pp.237-247.
\textsuperscript{228} Spence, “The Kang-hsi Reign”, p.140-141.
Khorchin Mongols, and his second consort came from this clan as well. In terms of political affiliations, Giyesu, by his father’s side, was a direct descendant of Nurgaci, while, according to his mother’s side, he was one of the sons born by the women of the Borjigin clan. With multiple blood ties to Kangxi, Giyesu was Kangxi’s loyal and vigorous voice in the imperial Aisin Gioro clan, as well as on the Deliberative Council.

Beyond her own network, Xiaozhuang arranged Kangxi’s first marriage in October 1665, in which the eleven-year-old Kangxi married a granddaughter of Soni, one of the regents. As a political strategy, this marriage not only ensured the loyalty of the Soni family, but also broke the power balance among the four regents in the government. At least two of the four, Oboi and Ebilun, understood the marriage’s political message and submitted memorials against it. Little is known about why Xiaozhuang chose to build a marital relationship with the Soni family, or if the marriage was suggested by Kangxi’s maternal family, the Tongs. Nevertheless, what is known is that this marriage was different from Xiaozhuang’s marital arrangements for her own son, Shunzhi, where she worked to enhance Mongol influence by choosing women from her native Khorchin Mongols. The Soni family belonged to the Manchu Heresi clan and had started to serve the Manchu state during Nurgaci’s time. Starting his career as an imperial guard for Nurgaci, Soni established considerable military merit as the Manchu expanded their power. Compared to the other three regents, who also achieved military merit, Soni was set apart by his cultural contribution to the Manchu state. Soni, Soni’s father, and Soni’s brother were among the first of a small group of people to create the Manchu written language. When the Literary

\[229\] For the importance of marriages in the early Manchu politics, see Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, pp.221-222.
Office, the first specialized civil institution of the Manchu state, was established in 1629, Soni and his brother Hife were both appointed to it.\textsuperscript{232}

The Soni family valued education, and many of its family members knew Manchu and Chinese as well as Mongol languages. After Soni died, the Qing court granted him the posthumous name Wen Zhong (文忠, literary and loyal). For people who know Chinese history, the name Wen Zhong was the second-best mark the state could give to glorify someone’s cultural contribution.\textsuperscript{233} From this prospective, the Soni family matched the Tong family (the natal family of Kangxi’s mother) because they were both educated Manchu families open to the academics of the sedentary culture. The educational traditions of the two families very likely shaped Kangxi’s attitude toward education during the time of his intellectual formation, and influenced his life by ensuring his dedication to a wide range of academic subjects. Kangxi’s first two trusted ministers, Mingju 明珠 and Songgotu 索额图, who had once been Imperial Guards, were also highly educated.\textsuperscript{234} They were both granted titles of Grand Scholar late in their careers. Thus, the cultural atmosphere extended by the Soni marriage to Kangxi created an inviting ground for Jesuits. As scholar priests, they by nature welcomed an education-friendly environment. Had Kangxi, like many Manchu and Mongol princes of the time, been raised to

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{233} Wenzheng 文正 was the best posthumous name for literati, which was granted twice in the first four reigns of the Qing dynasty (1644-1795). Meanwhile, Soni’s Wenzhong was granted once. Song, Bingren 宋秉仁, "Cong wenchen sihao kan Ming Qing sifa lilun 从文臣谥号看明清谥法理论 (The Posthumous Names of Civilian Officials and the Posthumous Titles Theory in the Ming-Ch‘ing Period)", in Baisha renwen shehui xuebao 白沙人文社会学报, 2002, v.1, p.255.

\textsuperscript{234} According to Joachim Bouvet, Mingzhu and Songotu supported Christianity. Bouvet, The History of Cang-Hy, p. 97.
enjoy only nomadic skills, the Jesuits would likely have little chance to make their metaphysical knowledge useful in the palace.

If the cultural affiliation sounds amorphous in Manchu court politics, the Soni family’s presence in the Imperial Guards was substantial and tangible. Originating from tribal politics, the Imperial Guards had a paramount position in the Manchu military. Like the Kheshig (or Imperial Guards) for Genghis Khan, the Imperial Guards, by serving emperors or khans at close quarters day and night, were their rulers’ most loyal and capable soldiers. During Shunzhi’s reign, Soni, who was a Chamberlain of the Imperial Guards as well as Director of the Imperial Household, was entrusted by the Shunzhi emperor with the management of daily affairs within the Forbidden City. During the regency, four of Soni’s five sons served in the Imperial Guards. Gabula, the oldest son and father of Kangxi’s first wife, was also a Chamberlain of the Imperial Guards. Songgotu, called “Sosan” by the Jesuits (a nickname meaning “the third son of Soni”), served as a first-class imperial guard during the regent rule.

The Imperial Guards was a crucial unit in Manchu politics due to its easy access to emperors. There were about 570 imperial guards. The unit was divided according to their distance from the emperor. The outer circle was responsible for the outer circle of the Forbidden City; the middle circle was responsible for the Qianqing gate, and the inner circle was responsible for the emperor. The closest circle of Imperial Guards included about sixty men. Because the Imperial Guards was so close to the center of power, almost every court faction inserted its people into it. For example, after the arrest of Oboi, several guards were deemed Oboi’s accomplices (among them Bambursan, a Chamberlain of the Imperial Guards).

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235 Chang; Li, *Qing gong da nei shi wei*, p.134.
236 Ibid, p. 128.
Xiaozhuang certainly knew the importance for young Kangxi to have trusted people in the Imperial Guards. That was one of reasons she insisted on the marriage between Kangxi and Soni’s granddaughter, despite the protests by two regents. After Oboi’s arrest, Kangxi replaced the Manchu directors of all six Boards of the government, the Court of Colonial Affairs, and the Censor-in-Chief: six of the eight new officials were from his trusted guards.238

The enhanced control over the Imperial Guards was also reflected in the arrangement of Kangxi’s two uncles from the Tong family. Empress Dowager Xiaokangzhang, Kangxi’s mother, was a daughter of Tong Tulai. Tong Tulai’s family was a leading family of the Tong clan. About the time Empress Dowager Xiaokangzhang died in 1663, her two brothers (she had only two), Tong Guowei and Tong Guogang, were appointed to the Imperial Guards to protect Kangxi, their nephew.239 Thanks to their company, Kangxi, although he regretted not having family time with his own parents,240 enjoyed a familial feeling with his two uncles during his adolescence.

According to the Jesuit accounts, Kangxi called them “chiu-chiu” (maternal uncles) in both private and public settings,241 and the two uncles were proud to treat chiu-chiu as the most important identity of their life.242

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238 Ibid, pp.149-150.
239 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p.795
240 In front of ministers who had come to congratulate him on the sixtieth year of his reign, Kangxi stated emotionally that “the regrettable thing in his passing sixty years was that he did not enjoy one day with parents 父母膝下未得一日承欢, 此朕六十年来抱歉之处.” see, Shenzu ren Huangdi shen xun 圣祖仁皇帝圣训, in SKQS,411-169.
241 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p.794
242 Beyond being called chiu-chiu, they marked chiu-chiu as a formal credential in front of their names, where people normally put official titles or education titles. See the epitaph Tong Guowei inscribed for one of his consorts. Beijing tu shu guan 北京图书馆, Beijing tu shu guan cang Zhongguo li dai shi ke ta ben hui bian 北京图书馆藏中国历代石刻拓本汇编 (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou gu ji, 1989-1991), v.65, p.107.
Jesuit Participation in Kangxi’s Campaign of Eradicate Oboi’s Clique

The writings about the campaign to eliminate Oboi’s clique focus on the two people who led the two parts of the actions. In the first part, the arrest, Songgotu, the third son of Soni, played the main role, as he led the group of young wrestlers to arrest Oboi after he stepped in the Qianqing gate on June 14, 1669. The second part, the trials, was led by Giyesu. He managed to find Oboi guilty and probe the whole Oboi clique. As the campaign was so important for the start of the Kangxi reign, it was narrated in detail from different perspectives. However, the Jesuits’ participation in the campaign was seldom mentioned.

The Jesuits’ participation could be clearly seen in the Calendar Dispute of 1669. After Verbiest submitted a memorial in December 1668 to point out mistakes in the calendar published by the Imperial Astronomical Bureau, Kangxi ordered the Deliberative Council to set up observations to verify the predications. With twenty high-level ministers as witness, the observation proved Verbiest’s theory right and the theory Yang Guangxian supported wrong. For Kangxi, the Calendar Dispute of 1669 was not merely a verification of astronomical right and wrong; rather, it was set up by Kangxi to attack the Oboi regency. Kangxi’s intention was clearly evident in his response to the memorial submitted by the Deliberative Council, which reported that the observation on February 26, 1669 confirmed the theory of the Jesuits. Kangxi returned the memorial and demanded an explanation as to why the Council chose Yang Guangxian’s explanation while “saying no” to Schall’s four years ago? Though the response

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243 The memorial is collected in Xi chao ding an, pp.1389-1390.
244 For the contents of the dispute and the full story, see, The Emperor’s New Mathematics, pp.58-65.
245 KXSL, p.386
was turned back as a question demanding further investigation, it is certain that Kangxi already knew the answer because Verbiest, Giyesu, and his two uncles were participants in the previous dispute. In response, Kangxi even provided a list of participants (including Verbiest) to the Deliberative Council, pointing out that they were the people who knew what had happened. In this sense, the response was not designed to find the answer; instead, it aimed at escalating the case while tying the disputes to the Oboi clique, the hidden power supporting Yang Guangxian. To Kangxi’s dismay, the re-investigation did not connect the previous dispute in 1665 to Oboi. The Deliberative Council presented another memorial attributing all the faults of the Calendar Case to Yang Guangxian and other Chinese staff members, and suggesting sending them to the Board of Justice for harsh punishment.246 Though Kangxi could not push the case any further, he did not take the suggestion to conclude the case by harshly punishing Yang. Kangxi just removed Yang from his position.

The handling of the Calendar Dispute of 1669 was the first time the emperor had dealt with a dispute in front of the whole court; he was then fifteen years old. In Verbiest’s words, Kangxi was “still under age.”247 In fact, Kangxi had officially began his rule on August 25, 1667 after a court ceremony to announce his maturity as an emperor. But the regents were retained in the name of providing continuing assistance to the then thirteen-year-old Kangxi. The Calendar Dispute of 1669 thus provided a perfect case for Kangxi to start his rule. First, the result of the dispute was fully predictable and manageable. Second, the objective results of observation were provable and thus authoritative: the dispute could therefore be concluded without dissenting

opinions. Although Kangxi could not drive the case further to relate it to the Oboi clique, Kangxi’s handling of the dispute nevertheless successfully showed the whole court his capacity for decision-making as a fifteen-year-old emperor.248

Within a month of Oboi’s arrest (on June 14, 1669), Buglio, on behalf of all three Jesuits in Beijing, submitted a memorial asking for the revocation of the previous rulings that resulted from the Calendar Dispute of 1665. The reasoning in the memorial was that, as “the schemer of power” was uncovered, the injustice (of the previous rulings) had become obvious.249 Buglio’s memorial tried to avoid using Oboi’s name by using the broad expression, “the schemer of power”; meanwhile, his chief aim was to recover Schall’s church, house, and cemetery, which had been confiscated. In August, Jesuit Verbiest pursued the dispute again by impeaching Yang Guangxian as a member of the Oboi clique. At the time, the court was busy handling the case of Bambursan, who had been a Chamberlain of the Imperial Guards and a crucial figure in the Oboi clique. On August 27, 1669, the Imperial Clan Court submitted its findings and suggestions for the punishment of Bambursan and his family.250 Nine days later, on September 5th, 1669, an investigation team led by Giyesu reported to Kangxi regarding Verbiest’s accusation against Yang Guangxian.251 First, Giyesu confirmed Yang as a member of the Oboi clique. Second, he suggested repealing all the rulings that had resulted from the 1665 calendar case. As for Schall, who died in 1666 after long struggling from the after effects of a stroke, Giyesu suggested reestablishing his titles, giving back the church to the Jesuits, and paying Schall’s pension according to his titles. He also suggested that the families of those who had been sentenced

249 “今权奸败露之日，正奇冤暴白之时”, in Huang, Zheng jiao feng bao, p.58.
250 KXSL, p.416.
should be given compensation, that those who had been exiled should be called back, and that those who had been demoted should be restored to their positions. Giyesu even suggested bringing back all twenty-five missionaries who had been expelled to Guangzhou. Kangxi approved all the suggestions except the one to bring back the missionaries.\footnote{Ibid.} Fifteen days later, the court officially reestablished Schall’s titles and announced that a memorial service for Schall would in the future be held according to his titles.\footnote{Ibid, p.418.} On December 9\textsuperscript{th}, 1669, Kangxi wrote an epitaph for Schall, which was inscribed on his tombstone.\footnote{The epitaph was inscribed on Schall’s gravestone, which can be seen today in Beijing’s Administrative College. Väth, Yang (tran.), 1960, p.220.}
Figure 1. *Inscriptions on Schall’s Gravestone*, from Beijing Xing Zheng Xue Yuan, *History Recorded on Stone: The Cemetery of Matteo Ricci and Other Foreign Missionaries during Four Turbulent Centuries*, p.155.
Timing is the key to understanding the Calendar Dispute of 1669. Its beginning and end perfectly coincide with the beginning and the end of Kangxi’s campaign to remove the Oboi clique.

Table 2: The Arrest and Oboi and The Calendar Dispute of 1669

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Kangxi’s arrest of Oboi</th>
<th>Calendar Dispute of 1669</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beginning</strong></td>
<td>In Oct. 1668, Kangxi created a company of young wrestlers in the court, who later arrested Oboi.</td>
<td>In Dec. 1668, Verbiest pointed out the mistakes of the calendar, and started the Calendar Dispute of 1669.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>End</strong></td>
<td>In June 1669, Oboi was arrested; In July-September, the whole Oboi clique was eradicated</td>
<td>In August 1669, Verbiest censored Yang as one of the Oboi clique.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This cannot be seen as simply a coincidence. When Verbiest, after a three-year wait, publicly raised the dispute again in the court, he must have at least had some endorsement from the court, if not from Kangxi. Otherwise, Verbiest could not have afforded to jeopardize the already restricted condition of the Christian mission in another court dispute. In fact, Verbiest had tried his whole life to avoid court disputes. When he was in one, he was normally on the defensive side. Even in the memorial submitted to initiate the Calendar Dispute of 1669, Verbiest wrote in the conclusion that, “being a priest since my youth, [ I ] normally do not talk about others’ right
The Calendar Dispute of 1669 was the only time, according to my reading, when Verbiest actively worked to impeach others.

Verbiest knew very clearly that the essence of calendar disputes was about politics not academics. In the account Verbiest wrote in Latin for European readers, he states clearly that the regents were the real power behind Yang Guangxian. Verbiest also understood the tension between young Kangxi and the regents regarding the control of the empire. Verbiest even released a historical detail not found in Chinese sources: the reason Kangxi chose to use the Deliberative Council to deliberate the dispute was that the pro-Kangxi princes there had enough seats to bargain with the regent cohort. More importantly, Verbiest knew that the young Kangxi of that time had “advisors” for “secret” “consulting”, and Kangxi had enforced his ideas through his “closest confidents” in the Council. These confidential details Verbiest wrote down for his European readers reveal a simple fact: Verbiest was not a pure astronomical professional; rather he was an insider of Kangxi’s power group.

For Kangxi, the Calendar Dispute served as one of many events in the campaign to eradicate Oboi power. Although it alone did not directly strike at Oboi, it nevertheless tested the political affiliation of the members of the Deliberative Council through their responses toward the objective astronomic observations. This was a valuable information for mapping the whole Oboi clique three months later. As a side note, Kangxi exempted Yang Guangxian from

255 “自幼学道，口不言人之长短”, in Xi chao ding an, p. 1390.
256 AEFV, p. 61.
257 Ibid, p. 66.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid.
all penalties and simply ordered him to go back to his hometown, though the suggested penalties were death for Yang and exile for his wife. In this sense, Yang truly was not the target of the dispute, at least in the eyes of Kangxi.262

The Basis for Jesuit Participation in Court Politics

In the early stage of the Jesuits’ participation in Kangxi’s court, the remaining three Jesuits in Beijing—Buglio, Magalhaens, and Verbiest—worked as a team,263 even though Verbiest, as Schall’s previous assistant who knew astronomy, appeared to be the central figure. In the open observations to verify the astronomical theory in front of high-ranking ministers, Buglio, Magalhaens, and Verbiest came as a group.264 As a versatile craftsman, Magalhaens constructed a gnomon overnight for Verbiest’s observations.265 Besides the memorials regarding technical arguments about astronomy, which were normally submitted by Verbiest, the Jesuits submitted two others requesting the revocation of the previous rulings from 1665. Both were submitted in the name of the three Jesuits, with Buglio’s name listed first, de Magalhaens’s second, and Verbiest’s third. The first memorial was submitted sometime between the middle of July and the middle of August in 1669, a month or two after the arrest of Oboi.266 In this memorial, before requesting the recovery of Schall’s titles and properties, Buglio first asked for rehabilitation of the name of Tong Guoqi, the key representative of the Tong clan in the Jiangnan

262 KXSL, p. 417.
263 AEFV., p. 63.
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid, p.64.
266 Huang, Zheng jiao feng bao, pp.57a-58b.
area who was implicated in the dispute of 1665. Tong Guoqi, having been governor of several provinces in the 1650s, had been summoned to Beijing for the investigation in 1665. Tong Guoqi’s network in Beijing saved him; the court accepted his statement that he had no connection with Christian missionaries other than a donation of a small amount of money. Thus, Tong Guoqi did not receive any punishment. When Buglio mentioned Tong Guoqi as a victim, the purpose was not to ask for any tangible amendment but to draw attention to how the previous rulings damaged the Tong clan, the political faction to which the Jesuits belonged. The other memorial, which the three Jesuits submitted in December of 1670, asked that the exiled missionaries in Guangzhou be allowed to return to the local places where they had previously preached. The requests of both memorials were approved after Kangxi forwarded them to the Board of Rites.

Yet, this brings us back to the question asked at the beginning of this chapter: how were three Jesuits able to access Kangxi and participate in the formation of Kangxi’s construction of power? First, the fundamental condition for the Jesuits’ access to Kangxi was the preexisting relationship between the Jesuits and Kangxi’s maternal Tong family. As indicated in Chapter 1, Ludovico Buglio and Gabriel de Magalhaens had been slaves of Haoge after being captured in Sichuan, and their status had been transferred to Tong Tulai after the death of Haoge. The two Jesuits lived and ate in Tong Tulai’s house for about one and half years until they built their own

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268 Väth, Yang (tran.), 1960, p.493.
269 Tong refused, in the interrogation, his connections with Christian mission while only recognizing the donation of a small amount money to Christian missionaries. Schall, Buglio, and de Magalhaens changed their statements regarding Tong Guoqi’s connection with the Christian mission by saying their previous words about Tong Guoqi were hearsay. QMD, pp.179-180.
270 Huang, Zheng jiao feng bao, pp.65a-65b.
church. It was during this time that the two Jesuits talked about Christianity with Tong Tulai’s two sons, Tong Guowei and Tong Guogang (Kangxi’s maternal uncles). Simply speaking, being in a master-slave relationship with the Tong family, and then Kangxi’s family, Buglio and de Magalhaens in fact created a lineage for later missionaries’ participation in Kangxi’s court life. The Tong family remained a base for the later missionaries regardless of their church orders. More than a half century later, after Kangxi died in December 1722, Father Matteo Ripa and Francisian Angelo still benefited from the relationship with the Tong family, as they lived with the Tong family as Buglio and de Magalhaens once did.

When Kangxi became the emperor, his maternal family was automatically treated as a part of his own family, and likewise, their slaves were viewed as his. In the Eight Banner system, emperors directly controlled three banners, usually called the “upper-three” banners, whose members enjoyed higher prestige and more privileges than those in the “lower-five” banners. The privileges included better residential locations, better lands to use, and better chances to be promoted. Therefore, it was considered as a status upgrade if those belonging to the “lower-five” were transferred to the “upper-three”. Taiqi (抬旗) (lifting-up banners) was the term to portray such an upgrade. Because of the direct blood connection with Kangxi, the Tong family was entitled to the upgrade and was in fact the most famous example of such change in the Qing

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271 Later missionaries also clearly knew the stories of the two Jesuits and the Tong family. In 1724, Jesuit Parrenin continues to mention this relationship in a letter sending back to Europe. Du Halde ed., Lettres, v.11, pp.43-44 ; Chinese translation, v.3, p.27
272 Missionaries’ stories about the Tong family are widely seen in the writings left by the missionaries. Usually, the Tong family was identified as the family of the emperor’s uncle in the writings left by missionaries.
273 Ripa, Matteo, translated by Fortunando Prandi, Memoirs of Father Ripa During Thirteen Years’ Residence at the Court of Peking in the Service of the Emperor of China (London: John Murray, 1855), p.60; p.63; p.119. Father Francisian Angelo was a watch clock maker; see, Pagani, ”Eastern Magnificence & European Ingenuity”, p.51.
Nevertheless, the missionaries took a free ride on the status upgrade of the Tong family, and gained a master-slave tie with Kangxi. This tie later became the basis for missionaries to be included in Kangxi’s Imperial Household.

Second, Schall left political credit that created a pro-Jesuits atmosphere in Kangxi’s inner political circle. When the twenty-three-year-old Shunzhi struggled with smallpox on his deathbed and hesitated in choosing an heir, Schall visited Shunzhi two days before his death, and recommended Kangxi as the heir because Kangxi had already survived smallpox; he had immunity from the disease and would ensure a long-lasting reign. Though no record exists of how much Schall’s words weighed in Shunzhi’s final decision to choose Kangxi, Schall’s recommendation itself was a huge contribution to his friendly relationship with the Tong family. In Chinese dynastic history, recommending an heir to the throne was a high-risk activity, since it would inevitably offend other candidates and the powers supporting them. In general, ministers avoided being involved in such recommendations because they believed the choice of an heir was a family affair. For this reason, Gong Dingzi, a poet and a leading figure in Chinese

274 It was a widely known anecdote that Tong Guogang and Tong Guowei, Kangxi’s two uncles, requested Kangxi to officially change the banner registration of the extended Tong family (was in plain blue banner) to Kangxi’s Bordered Yellow Banner. Due to complication related to the change, which involved land and property relocation, Kangxi agreed to the change of registration but asked them to keep all other material conditions unchanged. See Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, pp.112-114.
275 Huang, Zheng jiao feng bao, pp. 33b-34a.
literati circles, extolled Schall in a poem for his seventy-first birthday, writing that his suggestion was “what the whole court dared not suggest.” However, for Schall, to have an emperor from a Christian-friendly family was a major gain for the whole mission. Indeed, Schall risked, and gained: Kangxi became the heir. For the Tong family and for Kangxi, Schall’s recommendation was the ultimate contribution to their existing relationship. As a historical norm, the person who supported the emperor before his ascension to the throne was considered among the most trustworthy.

Third, Jesuits’ return to the court became possible because of Verbiest’s willingness to participate in court politics. As a witness to the decade-long debate among Jesuits regarding Schall’s role in the court, Verbiest knew very well the opposing opinion that missionaries should not take a court position or participate in politics. This opposing opinion was strongly held by the other two Jesuit fathers, Ludovico Buglio and Gabriel de Magalhaens, who lived with Verbiest in Beijing. Practically speaking, Verbiest had gone through the Calendar Case of 1665 and had first-hand experience with the dangers of court politics. Therefore, Verbiest’s return to court politics was not a passing whim but a well-thought-out decision. In fact, his return came after much hesitation. Following the astronomic observation in February 1669, which confirmed Verbiest’s theory, the court assigned him the position of Associate Director of the Imperial Astronomic Bureau. Verbiest sent a long memorial declining the appointment based on his primary identity as a priest. But Kangxi insisted that Verbiest take the position. He then

279 Schall personally also had a friendly relationship with the Tong family. Väth, Yang (tran.), 1960, p.468.
280 Xi chao ding an, p.1394.
submitted another longer memorial requesting that Kangxi support his wish as a priest while promising to render the same service without the court title. Verbiest’s request was this time forwarded from Kangxi to the Board of Rites for discussion. The Board assented to Verbiest’s request, but insisted that Verbiest should receive the salary related to the title. Nevertheless, the question of the distance a priest should keep from the emperor and politics lingered in Verbiest’s mind throughout his life. In 1682, six years before his death, Verbiest still mentioned this question when he wrote about travelling with Kangxi in northeast China.

Kangxi and his exclusive power network trusted Jesuits, because of the preexisting master-slave relationship as well as on the Jesuits’ previous performance. The trust brought the valuable chance for the Jesuits to access Kangxi and then served him on a daily basis. How critical was the access to Kangxi for the Jesuits? A vivid example offers a picture. In September 1673, Verbiest submitted a memorial directly to Kangxi requesting help with what Verbiest defined as “a very minor issue.” It was to allow Jesuit Jean-Dominique Gabiani (1623–1696), who preached in Yangzhou, Jiangsu province, to relocate to a church in X’ian, Shanxi province, which had previously been occupied by another Jesuit who had died. Upon receiving the memorial, Kangxi forwarded it to the Board of Rites. It was approved the next day. In contrast, the Jesuits, trying not to bother Kangxi, had submitted the same request to the Board of Rites about three months later. Verbiest in a letter to Europe wrote about the difficulty of getting approval from the emperor to allow him to work without the title. See, Walle, Willy Vande, “Ferdinand Verbiest and the Chinese Bureaucracy”, in ed, Witek, John, Ferdinand Verbiest (1623-1688) Jesuit Missionary, Scientist, Engineer and Diplomat (Nettetal, Germany: Steyler, 1994), p. 501.

281 Ibid, p.1395. The second memorial was submitted about three months later. Verbiest in a letter to Europe wrote about the difficulty of getting approval from the emperor to allow him to work without the title. See, Walle, Willy Vande, “Ferdinand Verbiest and the Chinese Bureaucracy”, in ed, Witek, John, Ferdinand Verbiest (1623-1688) Jesuit Missionary, Scientist, Engineer and Diplomat (Nettetal, Germany: Steyler, 1994), p. 501.
283 Ibid, p.74b.
284 Ibid, p. 75a.
Rites six months previously. No response was received until Verbiest wrote to Kangxi. A lack of efficiency, negligence, or intentional mistreatment were all possible reasons for not handling the original request (all of which were a regular part of the court system). By 1673, Verbiest had been at Kangxi’s side for five years, and still the Jesuits’ request could be neglected within the court system. Going back to 1668, without the Jesuits’ preexisting family tie with the Tong family, it is hard to imagine that the Jesuits would have had a chance to win the Calendar Dispute.

After the Calendar Dispute of 1669, Buglio and de Magalhaens, due to their long-hold belief in avoiding politics, kept their distance from the court. Verbiest remained at the side of Kangxi as his teacher while holding a court position in the Imperial Astronomical Bureau. Verbiest knew the importance of proximity in serving the emperor. In Verbiest’s words, the “access to him is extremely exceptional.” Verbiest also confessed that access to Kangxi was at the foundation of all his teaching: “if this favorable situation had not occurred, I would have never been able to introduce nor to explain all these things” to Kangxi. “The favorable situation” to which Verbiest referred was that he sat next to Kangxi and had a “Manchu drink” handed to him. It was in such kinds of favorable situations that Verbiest started to provide his two-decade long service to Kangxi.

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285 Ibid.
286 AEFV, p.99.
Verbiest’s Service and His Strategy in the Kangxi Reign

Verbiest’s service to Kangxi revived the moribund missionary presence at the Qing court after the death of Schall in 1666. Verbiest’s loyal and diligent service gained Kangxi’s trust, while gaining Verbiest valuable opportunities to serve Kangxi during his teens and early twenties and to influence the maturation of his political and intellectual mind. After removing the regents’ influence in 1669, fifteen-year-old Kangxi started his formal study of Chinese and the Chinese classics inside the palace. All Verbiest’s instruction of Western subjects ran parallel to the Chinese lessons. During the critical time of the southern rebellions in the 1670s, Kangxi continued to learn about Western science. According to Kangxi’s curriculum, Verbiest taught geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music. These subjects were the quadrivium of mathematical arts and part of the liberal arts of Boethius, which was quite popular with the Jesuit order. In this sense, Kangxi did not just happen to have interests in these subjects; rather, it was the Jesuits, led by Verbiest, who directed Kangxi’s intellectual interests to them. Being teachers, the Jesuits were very successful in terms of igniting young Kangxi’s curiosity in probing the unknown scientific spheres. After Verbiest, later Jesuits continued to teach Kangxi. Thomas Pereira, Antonius Thomas, Joannes Franciscus Gerbillon, and Joachim Bouvet all left copious records about Kangxi’s enthusiasm in learning these subjects.

289 For Verbiest’s teaching during this period, see Jami, The Emperor’s New Mathematics. pp.73-78.
290 For a comprehensive study regarding Kangxi’s schedule on Western studies, see Landry-Deron, Isabell, “The Kangxi Emperor’s Lessons in Western Sciences as Recounted by the Jesuit Fathers J. Bouvet and J.-F. Gerbillon”, Macau Ricci Institute ed., Acta Pekinensis: Western Historical Sources for the Kangxi Reign: International Symposium Organised by the Macau Ricci Institute, Macao, 5th-7th October 2010 (Macao: Macau Ricci Institute, 2013), pp. 257-
By and large, Verbiest continued the strategy Schall had laid out, which was based on the belief that service in Beijing might benefit the whole Christian mission in China. However, Verbiest modified Schall’s strategy by focusing on his role as a servant of the emperor rather than as a mandarin in the court system. In 1682, six years before his death, Verbiest remarked why his personal service was necessary for the success of the whole mission:

Some may here be disposed to ask; what advantage or profit could be derived for our mission from this expedition? To which I reply. First, that I could do no other than obey the emperor’s express command that I should accompany him, for on the emperor’s good will (humanly speaking), depends entirely the success and utility of our mission.291

Kangxi’s determining role, as shown by Verbiest’s experience, was agreed on by the new Jesuits in China, who continued to see the success of the future mission relying on private services to the ruler. Jesuit Claudio Filippo Grimaldi (1638–1712), arriving in Beijing in 1671, was a painter in addition to being Verbiest’s astronomical assistant, and Jesuit Tomas Pereira (1646–1708), who arrived in Beijing in 1674, was a musician as well as a clock maker.

Verbiest served Kangxi for twenty more years, from Kangxi’s early teens to his middle thirties. Beyond serving as a long-time teacher and intellectual companion, Verbiest was a participant in the campaign to remove regent influence. During the critical time of the southern rebellions in the 1670s, Verbiest was in charge of cannon and firearm production in addition to his regular appointment in the Imperial Astronomic Bureau.292 Verbiest left a very trustworthy

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291 Verbiest, “Journeys into Tartary”, P.110.
292 For the contributions on cannons. see, Shu, Liguang 舒理广, “Nan huairen yu Zhongguo Qingdai zhu zao de dapao 南怀仁与中国清代铸造的大炮”, in Gugong bowuyuan yuankan 故宫博物院院刊, 1989, v. 1; Shu, Liguang, “Ferdinand Verbiest and the Casting of Cannons in the Qing Dynasty”, in ed. Witek, John, Ferdinand Verbiest (1623-1688) Jesuit Missionary, Scientist,
and loyal impression not only in the mind of Kangxi, but also in the minds of Kangxi’s core
group. After Verbiest’s death, the court granted him a posthumous name, Qinmin 勤敏 (diligent
and astute) as a final remark. According to Qing rules, posthumous names were only granted to
ministers whose merits and contributions were widely accepted by the whole court. Practically
speaking, only ministers with a rank of 1a ((the highest rank) were eligible for a posthumous
name upon the approval of the emperor. Verbiest never had a rank of 1a, so it was Kangxi’s
personal wish to grant him one. In comparison, Kangxi did not grant Songgotu, Mingzhu, and his
two maternal uncles (Tong Guowei and Tong Guogang) posthumous names, because the
posthumous name required a lifetime of service without major errors.293 Receiving a posthumous
name conferred a very high level of recognition in the Qing dynasty. Even more meaningfully,
Verbiest’s posthumous name Qinmin was at the same rank as Qinxiang (勤襄 diligent and
assistance), the name given to Tong Tulai, Kangxi’s maternal grandfather and a banner leader
who conquered half of China for the Qing.294 In addition, Verbiest’s epitaph was inscribed in
both Manchu and Chinese. The use of Manchu indicated that Kangxi viewed Verbiest as one of
his own people. Extending these honors to Verbiest after his death made it clear that Verbiest
was highly regarded not only by the Jesuits in China, but also by Kangxi and those close to him.

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293 Tong Guowei had a posthumous name. But it was granted by the Yongzheng emperor, not the
Kangxi emperor. Kangxi was not happy with his uncle in his late years because his uncle was so
involved in the politics of choosing the heir to the throne. The Yongzheng emperor granted Tong
Guowei the posthumous name, because Longkeduo 隆科多, the most supportive military general
of Yongzheng’s enthronement, was a son of Tong Guowei. Granting a posthumous name to one’s
father was a substantial reward for one’s contribution according to Chinese political rules.
294 For Tong Tulai’s biography, see Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period. p.796. The first
character of the posthumous name determines the category of posthumous names, while the
second character indicates the ranks within the category that the first character defined.
Four years after Verbiest’s death, his strategy fully paid off when the long-term goal of the Christian mission in China was reached: legalization. In 1692, with Songgotu’s mediation, the Board of Rites finally agreed that the Christian mission could legally preach in China, and Kangxi issued the “Edict of Toleration.” This was an example, according to the Jesuits, of the “rewards” for their private services to the emperor and ministers. According to French Jesuit de Fontaney, Kangxi had the intention to allow the Christian mission, and he told Jesuit Thomas Pereira and Antoine Thomas privately that they could submit a memorial requesting tolerance. After the two Jesuits publicly submitted the memorial during some court hours, Kangxi pretended that he had never known of their request, simply mixed it with the other memorials, and then forwarded it to the Board of Rites.295 But the Board suggested not changing the policy towards Christianity. de Fontaney explained that the emperor could not simply refuse the suggestion, as the ministers had the right to their opinion. At this moment, the task of lobbying the ministers there fell to Songgotu, who had promised to help the Jesuits after the Jesuits had helped him to sign the Treaty of Nerchinsk three years earlier.296 Eventually, with the help of Songgotu and other ministers, Gu Badai, the Director of the Board of Rites, submitted a memorial on March 20, 1692 suggesting tolerance:

臣等会议得，查得西洋人仰慕圣化，由万里航海而来。现今治理历法，用兵之际，力造军器火炮；差往阿罗素，诚心效力，克成其事，劳绩甚多。各省居住西洋人，并无为恶乱行之处。又并非左道惑众，异端生事。喇嘛僧道等寺庙尚容人烧

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Westerners residing in different provinces have not committed any crimes or done anything abnormal; they are not a false sect that confuses people or makes trouble. As the temples of Lamas, Buddhists, and Daosits are allowed to have people come and burn incense, it is inappropriate to prohibit people to come to the Westerners, especially considering the Westerners have not violated any rule or law.

Christian churches in different places should be kept as they are. People shall be allowed to go to churches to burn incense and worship. Do not prohibit them. Upon the approval of these directions, let them be carried out in all provinces. 297

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297 The Edit of Toleration itself has not yet been found in any imperial archive. There is one handwritten copy of a memorial of Thomas Pereira, which includes the full body of the Edit of Toleration. The copy has no date indicating when it was copied, and it is stored as a piece of document in the archive of The Council of State (军机处). The copy was very likely made early in the Yongzheng reign, when the court was discussing the prohibition of Christianity. (In a letter regarding Yongzheng’s prohibition of Christianity, Jesuits told that they had bribed a clerk to have the documents regarding Kangxi’s tolerations copied. See Du Halde ed., Lettres, v.10, p.505; Chinese translation, v.2, p.324.) The copy is now in the Archives of the Grand Secretariat in Taiwan, and its image is available online in
http://archive.ihp.sinica.edu.tw/mctkm2/index.html; The document number is 048450.
Besides this, another early version I have seen is an inscription rubbing from the back side of the tombstone of Jesuit Thomas Pereira (1645-1708). According to the content of the stele, it was
It was clear that Jesuits’ contributions were the starting point for the consideration of tolerance. Three contributions were mentioned: calendars, cannons, and communication with Russia. The first two were exactly the contributions that Kangxi had inscribed on the epitaph for Verbiest, which was widely known. As for the communication with Russia, it was Verbiest who laid the foundation for the 1689 Nerchinsk agreement, one year after his death.298

The logic for the tolerance was that Christianity should be treated the same as other religions. The tolerance was payback for the Jesuits’ efforts to build favorable relationships with both the emperor and key ministers at court. It was an example of how Jesuit work in Beijing could bring blanket benefits for Christian missions in other parts of China. Kangxi approved the memorial three days after its submission. The news of the edict was soon sent back to Europe, which ignited new zeal for missionary work in China. In 1701, ten years after the edict, the

inscribed in 1692, the same year the Edict of Toleration was issued. It is also possible it was inscribed after the death of Jesuit Pereira in 1708. The rubbing of the inscription was produced in 1914, and the rubbing is 184cm high and 87cm wide. The rubbing is in Beijing National Library. The Edit of Toleration was the last part of the inscription, while the earlier part is about the Jesuits’ contributions since Schall to the Kangxi’s court. (due to the damage of the stele, the first part of the rubbing was not fully legible). As far as I know, the stele itself was lost sometime after 1949. An image of the reduced sized rubbing is published in: Beijing tu shu guan, Beijing tu shu guan cang Zhongguo li dai shi ke ta ben hui bian 北京图书馆藏中国历代石刻拓本汇编 (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou gu ji, 1989-1991), v.65, p.3. For the textual examinations of different versions of the Edit of Toleration, see Standaert, Nicolas, “The Edict of Tolerance: A Textual History and Reading”, in Wardega and de Saldanhapp ed., In the Light and Shadow of an Emperor: Tomás Pereira, SJ (1645–1708), the Kangxi Emperor and the Jesuit Mission in China (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2012), pp.308-358. 298 Since receiving the Russian Embassy 1676, led by Nikolai Gorvilovich Milescu Spathary, Verbiest was active in pushing peaceful relations between the Qing and Russia, as such relations also met with his interest in creating a land route for European missionaries coming to China via Russia. Verbiest participated in almost all negotiations with Russia before the Treaty of Nerchinsk 1689. See Sebes, The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), pp. 88-102; Miasnikov, “Ferdinand Verbiest and His Role in the Formation of Sino-Russian Diplomatic Relations”, pp.273-279. For a summary of the Jesuits’ effort to create a land route, see Lach, Donald, The Preface to Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica: Commentary, Translation, Text (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1957), pp. 5-20.
number of both European missionaries and Chinese converts in China reached its highest point for the period, the seventeenth to the early nineteenth centuries.299

The Jesuits’ Role in the Kangxi Court

Through the preexisting tie between the Jesuits and Kangxi’s maternal Tong family, Verbiest had a chance throughout his life to access Kangxi and eventually became a teacher as well as an intellectual companion serving at Kangxi’s side. It has been a longstanding question: how to define Verbiest and the other Jesuits’ roles in the palace when they came to teach Kangxi on a daily basis? The Chinese teachers who taught Kangxi at different times of the day all carried certain court titles, such as Teacher to the Emperor, and were managed by the Board of Rites. In comparison, even though Verbiest had a position in the Imperial Astronomical Bureau, this did not grant him the privilege of access to Kangxi on a daily basis. Many later Jesuits who served at the side of Kangxi did not carry any court position at all. How can their presence in the inner court of the palace be understood?

This question in fact asks how Kangxi and the court viewed or identified the Jesuits at Kangxi’s side. The answer lies with how Buglio, de Magalhaens, and Verbiest initially emerged in Kangxi’s court. They were identified as Kangxi’s family slaves. The obvious evidence to confirm this identity is the department Kangxi assigned to manage missionaries. It was the Imperial Household.

299 In 1701, there were 140 European missionaries, and 200 thousand converts in China. Standahert, *Handbook*, pp.301-303, 383.
From the institutional perspective, the Imperial Household was not a part of the imperial bureaucracy—it was the emperor’s private agency through which he managed his family and belongings. Running parallel to the imperial bureaucracy, the Imperial Household not only directed daily routines within the palace, but also had a network extending throughout the whole empire. For managing the emperor’s private coffers, which included income from real estate, the ginseng and copper trades, and commercial taxes from certain local places, the Imperial Household had their own people in the local places to take care of the economic tasks. The emperor’s private coffers were separate from the treasury of the empire managed by the Board of Revenue. Regarding human resources, the Imperial Household had its own rules for appointing, rewarding, and punishing its people, with which neither the Board of Personnel or the Board of Justice could interfere. The Imperial Household could also invite or receive embassies from foreign countries, which otherwise would be handled by the Board of Rites or the Office of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. Working as the emperor’s “personal bureaucracy,” or “personal government”, the multifunctionality of the Imperial Household enabled it to handle issues concerning missionaries without engaging other bureaus.

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300 For the detailed analysis of organization and operation of the Imperial Household from the institutional perspective, see Chen, Guodong 陈国栋, “Qingdai neiwufu baoyi sanqi renyuan ji qi qixia zhuzhi: jianlun yixie youguan baoyi de wenti 清代内务府包衣三旗人人员及其旗下组织——兼论一些有关包衣的问题”, in Shihuo yuekan 食货月刊, 1989, v.10. pp. 325-343.
301 Jonathan Spence provides an in-depth study of the emperor’s private economic network managed by the Imperial Household. See, Spence, Jonathan, Ts‘ao Yin, pp.82-123.
304 For “personal bureaucracy”, see Wu, Silas, “Foreword”, in Torbert, The Ch‘ing Imperial Household Department, P. Vii. For “personal government” see Spence, Ts‘ao Yin, p. 134.
After Verbiest, later Jesuits inherited the status as Kangxi’s family slaves. According to Bouvet’s records written in Europe in 1690s, the Imperial Household took care of all the daily routines of the French Jesuits Joachim Bouvet and Jean-Francois Gerbillon, who arrived in Beijing ten days after the death of Verbiest. Every morning, they were “carried to the palace”, Bouvet proudly told, by Kangxi’s “own servants and horses.” During the day, they were assisted by Kangxi’s servants from the Imperial Household to prepare teaching materials. They ate food prepared by Kangxi’s kitchen while being carried back at night to the apartment belonging to Kangxi’s Imperial Household. Though they lived and worked in the palace, yet their presence was totally considered as a part of Kangxi’s family affairs and independent from the bureaucratic court system. In contrast, Kangxi’s Chinese classic education was arranged by the Board of Rites, a part of the bureaucratic court system; Chinese education then was an official part of the court activities. So, dedicated court clerks recorded conversations between Kangxi and his Chinese classic teachers and left many vivid records in the Kangxi Daily Transcripts (康熙起居注). Meanwhile, no Jesuit teaching activities were seen in any court records, because those activities, arranged by Kangxi’s own Imperial Household, were not considered a part of court affairs.

The missionaries’ identity as the emperor’s slaves was limited to the Kangxi reign. In Shunzhi’s reign, the missionaries, without a special tie to the family of the emperor, were identified as priests. Correspondingly, they were managed by the Board of Rites. After Kangxi, the Yongzheng emperor, within the first year of his rule, ordered the director of the Imperial

Household to tell the missionaries that they no longer belonged to the Imperial Household.

Yongzheng had his own household, and did not treat missionaries as his slaves. Therefore, missionaries were again managed by the Board of Rites.

The best evidence to show the missionaries’ position in Kangxi’s Imperial Household was the certificates Kangxi issued to them. In 1706, Kangxi demanded that missionaries obtain a piao, a legal certificate to preach after having been offended by Charles Maigrot, the Vicar Apostolic of Fujian. (more on this in Chapter 4). Kangxi required missionaries to promise to follow the rule of Matteo Ricci, which allowed the practice of Chinese rites, and to promise to live in China permanently, in order to get the certificates. As for the requirements of the certificates, it was nothing new in China, as clerics of other religions had been required to hold certificates for centuries. The real difference was that Kangxi ordered the Imperial Household, instead of the Board of Rites which issued the certificates of other religions, to regulate and manage those for the Christian missionaries. When their certificates were registered to the Imperial Household, it signaled an unprecedented open declaration of the status of Christian missionaries: they were in the status as the emperor’s slaves.

Certainly, managing clergy was not a specialty of the Imperial Household. The certificates it issued soon encountered bureaucratic problems in some places. In 1707, the second year the certificates were issued, Jesuit Claudio Filippo Grimaldi (1639–1712), who was the

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307 Ripa, Memoirs of Father Ripa, p.124.
308 For the privileges of their certificates being issued by the Imperial Household, Jesuit Stumpf explained clearly with comparison of the certificates issued to Buddhist monks: “The bonzes are controlled by one of the tribunals and the local mandarins. But because of their permits the Europeans are not subject to any tribunal. Nor, as Henkama rightly says, is there any mandarin who, on seeing them, will not show them respect. They are permits directly issued by the Emperor, those called long piao, the sign of dragon, bearing the seal of the Master of the Imperial Household.” AP2, p.275.
successor to Verbiest’s court role after Verbiest died in 1688, requested that Kangxi declare the legitimacy of the certificates. The local magistrates did not know of the existence of such certificates, so they sent inquiries about them to the Board of Rites, which replied that it had no dossier on such certificates. Upon seeing this technical problem, Kangxi did not simply transfer the management of the certificates to the Board of Rites; instead Kangxi ordered the Imperial Household to disclose the roster to the Board of Rites while ordering the Board of Rites to advertise the certificate to the whole empire through its bureaucratic channels to local places. 309

After the Board of Rites instructed local places about the certificates issued by the Imperial Household, the whole bureaucratic system then knew clearly missionaries’ identity as slaves of Kangxi’s family. When local officials needed to verify the background of certain missionaries in their jurisdiction, they then sent their requests to the Imperial Household. 310 When the missionaries felt unfairly treated in legal cases, they talked to the head of Imperial Household, who then wrote to the Board of Justice directly to appeal for them 311

An interesting incident demonstrates how well the Jesuits understood their position and rights in the Imperial Household. In 1694, one year after Kangxi rewarded French Jesuits with a house near the palace, they noticed empty land near their house that belonged to the Imperial Household. They submitted an application for the land before the eunuchs, who also planned to build a residence there. After consideration within the Imperial Household, Kangxi decided to give each group half the land. 312

309 QMD, pp.317-318.
310 QMD, p.312; pp.313-316; p.321; p.324.
311 Ibid, p.323.
312 Du Halde ed., Lettres, v.9, p.457; Chinese Translation, v.1, p.294. Nevertheless, it seems that missionaries kept a friendly relationship with eunuchs, as many times they needed eunuchs to welcome and take care of newly arrived missionaries. See, Ripa, Memoirs of Father Ripa, pp.47-
Kangxi used the Imperial Household to take care of the missionaries’ daily needs in a way that a family head would take care of its family members. Kangxi for example gave Jesuits money on many occasions, helped them to build churches, and sent them Chinese medical doctors when they were sick. The lending of money to Jesuits was especially significant. In November 1704, Kangxi told the head of Imperial Household to lend one hundred thousand taels of silver,\(^{313}\) free of interest, to Jesuits from his private coffer, because he heard that the church for Domingo Fernández Navarrete, Thomas Pereira, and Antoine Thomas showed cracks and that they did not have the money to repair it. Kangxi briefly explained to the head of Imperial Household his reason for lending such a large amount of money: “They are people from Western countries. Here, except for me, who would take care of them?”\(^{314}\)

**The Mission After Verbiest**

After Verbiest died in Beijing on January 28, 1688, two Jesuits, Thomas Pereira and Antonius Thomas continued to serve Kangxi. Verbiest’s position in the Imperial Astronomical Bureau was given to Verbiest’s long-time assistant Claudio Filippo Grimaldi, who was then back in Europe reporting on the China mission and who came back to Beijing in 1694. In addition, five French Jesuits, Jean de Fontaney, Joachim Bouvet (1656–1730), Jean-Francois Gerbillon (1654–1707), Louis Lecomte (1655–1728), and Claude de Visdelou (1656–1737) arrived in

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\(^{313}\) This was a large amount of money. It was 1,000 times the yearly payment to Verbiest’s position in the Imperial Astronomical Bureau. Verbiest’s yearly payment was one hundred taels of silver. *Xi chao ding an* 熙朝定案, p.1395.

\(^{314}\) QMD, p. 283.
Beijing on February 7th, ten days after Verbiest’s death.\textsuperscript{315} Immediately upon their arrival in China in July 1687 in Ningbo, the French Jesuits witnessed the benefits of Verbiest’s influence. To avoid the Portuguese’s monopoly of the Macao-Guangzhou route, in which all foreign groups took to enter China, the French Jesuits entered China from Ningbo, which immediately violated Qing’s rules.\textsuperscript{316} The governor reported their unexpected presence to the Board of Rites, and asked for direction on how to handle them. With Verbiest’s mediation in Beijing, Kangxi forgave their intrusion and invited them to the palace. After hearing Kangxi’s instruction, local magistrates, de Fontaney recorded, visited the French Jesuits and congratulated them on receiving the invitation from the emperor. Being guests of the emperor, the new French Jesuits were treated nicely in every town they passed through during their 1,200-kilometer journey to Beijing.\textsuperscript{317}

In addition to responding to Verbiest’s call for more missionaries,\textsuperscript{318} the French Jesuits, under the auspices of the French king, came to China with another task: to collect scientific data in China for “the perfection of science and the arts.”\textsuperscript{319} For this reason, the French Jesuits were preselected and trained, and all were highly competent intellectuals. Jean de Fontaney, the leader of the group, was a professor of mathematics at the Jesuit College in France, who routinely shared his research with scholars in the Academie Royal des Sciences. Jean-Francois Gerbillon

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{315} For details about the coming of French Jesuits, see Jami, \textit{The Emperor’s New Mathematics}, pp.102-119.
\item \textsuperscript{316} For different European maritime powers and their influences in incoming Christian missionaries to China, see Sebes, \textit{The Jesuits and the Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689)}, pp.83-94.
\item \textsuperscript{318} Verbiest sent back to Europe a well circulated letter in August 1678 to request more missionaries for China. See, Witek, John W., \textit{Controversial Ideas in China and in Europe: a Biography of Jean-François Foucquet, S.J., (1665-1741)} (Roma: Institutum Historicum S.I., 1982), pp.21-22.
\item \textsuperscript{319} Jami, \textit{The Emperor’s New Mathematics}, p. 105.
\end{itemize}
had taught mathematics at the college level. The other three had been trained by the *Academie Royal des Sciences* to meet its academic standards. Their intellectual excellence greatly facilitated their enterprise in China. Joachim Bouvet and Jean-François Gerbillon, who were selected to remain Beijing as Kangxi’s teachers, learned both Manchu and Chinese very quickly. After just one year in Beijing, Jean Francois Gerbillon won the trust of Kangxi and joined the team negotiating with Russia, which eventually signed the treaty of Nercinsk in 1689. A letter written by Bouvet on February 12th, 1690 makes it clear that Gerbillon and Bouvet were able to write and explain to Kangxi in Manchu about matters such as the digestion of food, the circulation of blood, and basic knowledge of nutrition, even though Kangxi complained about their accents.\(^320\) In the winter of 1693, de Fontaney, Claude de Visdelou, and Gerbillon rescued Kangxi from a high fever that no Chinese medical doctor could treat. The French Jesuits used French medicines and cinchona bark obtained from India. After recovery, Kangxi rewarded them with a house next to the palace in the northern part of Beijing, which became the center for all future French Jesuits.\(^321\)

In the 1690s, after they had settled in China, the French Jesuits enthusiastically advertised the potential of the China mission and called for more missionaries. Le Comte went back to Europe in 1691 and Bouvet in 1696. The letters and books published by the two after their return created a stir among academics as well as in religious circles. Adding the news of the Edict of Toleration, there was a rapid increase in recruitment. In France alone, by 1703, more than thirty French missionaries were dispatched to China.\(^322\) As a comparison, before Verbiest’s letter of

\(^{320}\) Witek, “Understanding the Chinese”, p.80.


1678 to Europe to request missionaries, only seven Jesuits of any nationality had entered China between 1668 and 1678.\textsuperscript{323}

By the time Bouvet returned to China in 1699, there were eleven missionaries on board his ship alone. Kangxi dispatched a Manchu from the Imperial Clan to welcome the missionaries in Guangzhou and ordered an exemption from taxes for the French ship that had brought them. When these missionaries left Guangzhou to meet Kangxi, local civil and military officials came to bid them farewell. All new missionaries met Kangxi in his boat when Kangxi was on a trip to tour the southern provinces.\textsuperscript{324} After the meeting, Kangxi ordered Bouvet to select five of the missionaries to serve in the palace. At the same time, the new missionaries also met Jean-Francois Gerbillon, one of the first five French Jesuits who had been at Kangxi’s side since 1688. After service of more than a decade, in 1699, Gerbillon had already built a relationship of trust with Kangxi, who brought Gerbillon with him on almost every military expedition and tour outside Beijing. The new missionaries knew that the welcoming environment upon their arrival, as well as at the beginning of their mission in the provinces, were dependent on those, who, like Gerbillon, worked near the emperor.

Before going to local places, the new missionaries were trained to maintain a friendly relationship with local magistrates and had a list of many basic to-dos and not-dos according to Chinese customs. Still, issues sometimes rose unexpectedly, and this was the time when Jesuits in Beijing stood out as problem solvers. Jesuit Jean Charles de Broissia, for example, came to Ningbo, in Zhejiang province, and tried to build a church. Upon his arrival, he managed to establish a favorable relationship with three local magistrates before beginning the project.

\textsuperscript{323} Witek, “Understanding the Chinese”, p.72.
Halfway through, however, all three were relocated to other places. The Jesuits explained to the new magistrate that other places had allowed the construction of new churches. Still the new magistrate directly reported his concerns about the new construction to the Board of Rites and asked, as the previous Edict of the Toleration only directed the maintaining of existing churches, whether new construction should be allowed. Upon realizing that the inquiry was sent to the Board of Rites, Jesuit Gerbillon and other Jesuits in Beijing worried that an unfavorable response would become a new rule to mandate all future church construction. Gerbillon networked in Beijing and visited the director of the Board of Rites privately, who, fortunately, agreed to give a favorable response. The reply issued several days later confirmed that the new church was allowed, reasoning that, as the construction of new Buddhist temples in the local place was permitted, so should the construction of Christian churches.\(^{325}\) Though the case had a good ending, the Jesuits in Beijing notified the local Jesuits to try their best to avoid raising issues that required a judgement from the central government. They saw the possibility of inverting the otherwise promising atmosphere towards Christianity by problems raised in localities outside of Beijing.\(^{326}\)

Because of this direction, Jesuit de Fontaney gave up the plan to build a new church in Huangzhou, Hubei province after the governor said that he could not approve the new construction without the approval of the Board of Rites. De Fontaney had wished for a better outcome because he had traveled 200 kilometers to visit the governor with gifts of Western gadgets. According to him, the governor was polite but kept his distance by not accepting any gifts. Still, he found the governor better and easier to deal with than the local magistrates in

\(^{325}\) Ibid., v.9, pp.483-436; Chinese translation, v.1, pp. 313-315.

\(^{326}\) Ibid., v.9, p.488; Chinese translation, v.1, p.316.
Huangzhou, who tolerated protests and riots led by Daoist monks outside the place where the Jesuits planned to build the new church. After visiting the governor, de Fontaney exhausted his options for building the church, so he reported his situation to Francois Gerbillon. After probing his network in Beijing, Gerbillon found the oldest son of the governor, who then was a student at the Imperial College in Beijing. Though it is unknown how Gerbillon approached the son, it is known that the son wrote a recommendation letter for the Jesuits and privately contacted his father. Soon, the governor invited Jesuits for a meeting, which Jesuit Simon Beyard attended. Although the governor and Beyard in the meeting talked mostly about academic topics, such as how to learn Chinese and the doctrines of Christianity, the problem of building the church was soon resolved after the meeting. The governor wrote a letter to the local magistrate with the Edict of Toleration attached. After receiving the letter, the local magistrate not only approved the building of the new church, but also changed his attitude towards Jesuits. He visited the Jesuits in person with gifts. After the visit, he also dispatched a staff member to post a notice outside the Jesuit residence showing the protection of the local government.327

The above examples make it obvious that the Jesuits, by the 1700s, had already become very sophisticated in tackling problems with different solutions. Part of the significance of the two cases is that Gerbillon managed to handle them without asking for the help of Kangxi. Compared to Verbiest’s early political life in 1673, when even a minor issue like the relocation of a Jesuit needed the involvement of Kangxi, the Jesuits by the early 1700s had made substantial progress in establishing a network in Beijing. However, this expanded network inevitably entangled Jesuits in other issues, which eventually led the Christian enterprise in the other direction. This will be a topic of chapter six.

Conclusion

The power structure in China was like a pyramid, with the emperor at the top. When the Jesuits could access the emperor and key ministers at the top of the power structure, they were in a very good position to handle issues raised below them. This was the reason that Verbiest went back to engage in Kangxi’s life and politics after the Calendar Case of 1665, when all missionaries were kicked out of the court. The idea of spreading the mission from the top and mingling with elites was deemed an effective way by which so few hands could multitask a mission in the huge country. It was not, however, a new idea, as it had been applied since the late Ming dynasty. The Jesuit Adam Schall continued the same role in the Manchu court that he played in the Ming dynasty. The real originality of Verbiest was to adjust the Jesuits’ emphasis from serving as mandarins in the court system to serving as personal servants of the emperor. The adjustment was a result of fully understanding the political structure of Manchu rule, in which the Chinese-style court system adopted from the Ming dynasty was just for the purpose of governing Chinese territory while parallel with it was the Manchu style of master-slave ties that had been inherited from the Manchu’s previous khanship.

In the Manchu political structure, a slave of the emperor was much closer to the emperor than a minister, and slave status indicated a family tie to a master. Like the blood tie and the marriage tie, the slave-master tie was a very important relationship in Manchu society as well as in court connections. For those without the blood tie and the marriage tie to emperors, the slave tie was the closet relationship one might establish with an emperor. For this reason, the preexisting slave status with the Tong family and then with Kangxi was critical for the Jesuits, as it established a base for the Jesuits’ involvement in Kangxi’s early family as well as court lives.
Meanwhile, it was the Manchu tradition that the slave’s status was hereditary. Later missionaries inherited the master-slave relationship in the same way they inherited tangible properties, such as churches, money, and land. Verbiest was the first inheritor of Buglio and de Magalhaens’s slave status. He was also the one who enhanced that status through his lifetime of loyal service.

All newly arrived Jesuits working in Beijing focused on serving Kangxi as his personal servants. Later, when Kangxi became old, the Jesuits’ personal services extended to Kangxi’s sons, as will be shown in the following chapters. The Jesuits’ success as Kangxi’s trusted servants was not the result of mere effort, it was contingent on the objective conditions of the time. As explained above, Kangxi’s original political base was exclusively limited to the Empress Dowager, Kangxi’s maternal Tong family, and Kangxi’s in-law Soni family. Without the preexisting relationship with the Tong family, especially Kangxi’s two maternal uncles, the Jesuits would have had little, if any, chance to access Kangxi, no matter how willingly they sought to render their services. Coincidently or not, Kangxi’s first marriage was to the Soni family, which was one of a few highly educated Manchu families. Together with his maternal Tong family, another highly educated Manchu family, Kangxi lived in an education-oriented atmosphere. It was in this atmosphere that Verbiest and other Jesuits had the chance to teach Kangxi academic subjects and eventually arouse Kangxi’s lifelong curiosity and interest in these subjects. Kangxi, therefore, did not become interested in these subjects on his own; instead he was trained, in the right environment, to foster those interests. For the Jesuits, it was a blessing

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328 Jonathan Spence, in *Ts’ao Yin*, discussed the hereditary of this status and its effect in length. Similar to Buglio and de Magalhaens’s experience, Chao Yin’s great grandfather was captured in a war, and became a slave in 1621. The slave status was later inherited by Chao Yin, and it affected “Chao Yin’s whole life and career”. See, Spence, *Ts’ao Yin*, pp.9-11.
that all the objective conditions surrounding Kangxi created an environment friendly to their knowledge. As will be shown in Chapter 6, similar conditions did not exist in later reigns. The Yongzheng emperor, for example, who grow up near a Buddhist temple, had different intellectual pursuits, which eventually became an important factor in determining his attitude towards missionaries and Christianity.

Verbiest’s two decades of service for Kangxi laid down a solid foundation for future missionaries in China. This was the reason that the French Jesuits who came to Beijing ten days after Verbiest’s death so quickly and smoothly gained the trust of Kangxi and his advisers. Upon their arrival, Bouvet and Gerbillon, who had not yet learned Chinese and Manchu, were allowed to remain in Beijing to serve Kangxi while learning these languages. They had no court positions, but, as private servants in Kangxi’s family, their routines were managed by Kangxi’s Imperial Household. After just one year, Gerbillon was seen in the embassy with the core members of Kangxi’s political team that negotiated with Russia. Verbiest’s strategy to be useful through his private service to the emperor was carried on and further enhanced by the later Jesuits. Beyond academic subjects such as mathematics and astronomy, later Jesuits entertained Kangxi with Western music, painting, high-quality astronomical equipment, medicine, cartography, and red wine. Kangxi tried to introduce these interesting subjects to his sons, as fathers frequently do. Kangxi had twenty-four sons, and at least nine of them were of the center of political power. Kangxi’s efforts therefore connected the Jesuits to a much wider network, which furthered the Jesuits’ capacity to solve problems.

In the eyes of Kangxi, the Jesuits’ primary identity was as his family slaves rather than ministers or priests. Therefore, he used his private Imperial Household to manage their daily lives. For the Jesuits, their court position was secondary while their position in the Imperial
Household was primary.\textsuperscript{329} For the Kangxi emperor, the beauty of the Imperial Household was unrestricted power, or “increasing autocracy” as some scholars suggest.\textsuperscript{330} This meant that Kangxi could usually regulate and handle Christian issues directly without bothering with the bureaucratic process of the court system. The process of issuing the Edit of Toleration was such an example of the trouble going through the court system, which both Kangxi and the Jesuits tried to avoid. The Manchu style master-slave relationship with Kangxi was thus fundamental to the Jesuits’ presence in Kangxi’s reign. Whether they were teachers, transmitters of scientific knowledge, court ministers, or priests, Jesuits behaved and fulfilled their roles and tasks under the rubric of this special relationship. Only with this in mind can all of the important events regarding Christianity during Kangxi’s reign be properly understood.

\textsuperscript{329} When Verbiest served in the Imperial Astronomic Bureau, he received provisions from the Board of Rites. During the time of the southern rebellions in the 1670s, Verbiest was appointed the chief in charge of cannon production, where he had positions from the Board of Works as well as the Board of Wars. All Verbiest’s court appointments coexisted with his role as Kangxi’s private servant.

\textsuperscript{330} Torbert, \textit{The Ch’ing Imperial Household Department}, pp.178-179.
Chapter 4: Kangxi, the Jesuits, and the First Papal Legation to China (1705–1706)

On November 20, 1704, pope Clement XI, after more than half a century of debates in Europe, signed a decree forbidding Chinese converts from participating in many traditional rites. Historically called the Chinese Rites Controversy, these debates were primarily held in Europe and did not concern China until the coming to China of Charles-Thomas Maillard de Tournon as a papal legate in 1705–1706. The Jesuits were the primary group affected by the decree, as it aimed at adjudicating practices in their jurisdictions. Knowing of the coming of the legate, they believed it was a valuable chance to make their arguments about China heard on the ground in China. They hoped that the pope’s decision could be amended, because they, as experts on Chinese affairs, sincerely believed that the pope’s decree relied on false arguments. To their dismay, however, the legate de Tournon, who knew very well how controversial the topic of Chinese rites was, tried to avoid any in-depth discussion with the Jesuits regarding Chinese rites. He knew that he did not have the ability or knowledge to discuss such controversial issues with the Jesuits.

Kangxi was not completely ignorant of the ongoing debates in Europe regarding Chinese rites, but what he knew was no more than some scattered information given to him by Jesuits close to him. Upon learning of the arrival of the legate, Kangxi’s first response was that the

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331 On October 31, 1705, about one month before the legate’s arrival, all Beijing Jesuits held a meeting to discuss the proper way to receive the legate. The Chinese Rites Controversy was the central topic of the meeting. Among the many decisions made was, for example, that no one would discuss Chinese rites with the legate privately. See Collani, Claudia von, “Kilian Stumpf and his ‘Acta Pekinensia’: Life, Context and Purpose of a Manuscript”, in The Macau Ricci Institute ed., Acta Pekinensia : Western Historical Sources for the Kangxi Reign: International Symposium (Macao: The Macao Ricci Institute, 2013), p. 65.

332 Jesuits in China were active in collecting materials and evidence to support their arguments that Chinese rites were civil activities not contradicted by Christianity. In 1700, they wrote an
legate was coming because of long-lasting conflicts between the Portuguese and French Jesuits in China, something Kangxi had long tried to resolve. The Chinese Rites Controversy was not even in Kangxi’s mind until the Jesuits brought the topic to him on the last day of a farewell audience, as they hoped that Kangxi could help them push de Tournon to discuss the Chinese rites. Then, ideally, de Tournon would bring their arguments back to Rome. As a proud emperor, Kangxi immediately took it as his obligation to change Rome’s “wrong” views once the Jesuits introduced him to the controversy over Chinese rites.

As de Tournon came to realize, Kangxi firmly stood behind the Jesuits because Kangxi and the Jesuits maintained a Manchu-style master-servant relationship. This relationship determined the progress of the exchange between Kangxi and de Tournon during de Tournon’s eight-month stay in Beijing. This chapter explores the historical details of how the Jesuits relied on their particular relationship with Kangxi to influence Kangxi’s treatment of de Tournon.

**Kangxi before 1705**

In 1705, Kangxi was fifty-one years old. Since the arrest of Oboi, he had ruled the empire for thirty-seven years. As the second Manchu emperor ruling in Beijing, Kangxi first experienced the decade-long southern rebellion of the three feudatories. Painstaking though this was, the final success gave Kangxi solid direct control over the populous southern Chinese territory. From 1684, one year after the suppression of the rebellion, to 1705 Kangxi finished five explanation of Chinese rites, which was presented to Kangxi in person and asked for his approval. Kangxi praised and approved the explanation, which was then sent back to Europe as a document endorsed by the Emperor of China. For details of this process, see Rosso, *Apostolic Legations*, pp. 136–146.
southern tours in some of the richest Chinese areas. During these tours, Kangxi conducted culturally meaningful activities such as pilgrimages to the Confucius temple in Qufu, to the summit of Tai mountain—a cultural symbol of emperorship, — and to the mausoleum of King Yu, the first leader in Chinese myth. It was through activities such as these tours that Kangxi delivered messages to his Chinese subjects that he was an emperor who valued their culture. At the same time, Kangxi, through those tours, gained firsthand experience regarding the prosperity of the Chinese areas under his rule. 333

After consolidating his control of southern China, Kangxi shifted his attention to the northwest—the central Asia area. In addition to the decade-long negotiations with Russia in the 1680s, which culminated in the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, Kangxi’s primary focus was on Dzungar, the Mongol Khanate in the wide area of central Asia. Erdeniin Galdan (1644–1697), the Khan of Dzungar, had been educated in Tibetan temples for more than twenty years, and was a promising candidate for managing the Mongol area in the eyes of the Tibetan lamas. 334 In the late 1680s, Galdan’s expansion into the area traditionally belonging to the Khalkha Mongol directly confronted Manchu rule in the nearby Mongol territory. For the Manchus, Galdan—with the support of Tibetan lamas—posed a threat if he could create a united Mongol power in the north. This situation recalled the history of the Manchus’ ancestors, the Jurchen people, whose Jin dynasty (1115–1234) had been crushed by Genghis Khan after he united the Mongol tribes. For the Kangxi emperor, Galdan’s expansion and refusal to submit were a challenge to his role as the Khan of Khans in the Mongol area. However, for the Galdan Khan, the vast steppe,

333 For comprehensive research about Kangxi’s southern tour and its cultural meaning. See, Chang, Michael, A Court on Horseback: Imperial Touring & the Construction of Qing Rule, 1680-1785 (Cambridge: Harvard Asia Center, 2007).
deserts, and everchanging weather conditions were all on his side, and protected him from the reach of the Manchus. Galdan knew that his cavalry could always swiftly retreat and disappear into the west whenever Manchu troops approached. Despite this and the opposition of his ministers, Kangxi overcame natural obstacles as well as costly logistics to lead three expeditions (1690, 1696, 1697) in person to fight Galdan. In the second expedition of 1696, the Qing empire sent three armies from three directions to surround Galdan. Kangxi, eating and drinking with his soldiers while crossing the Gobi Desert, led the central troops to travel more than 1,000 kilometers to attack Galdan’s main force. Galdan retreated after noticing Kangxi’s troops but was ambushed by the Manchus’ left wing. Galdan escaped with only a few dozen soldiers and died the next year in 1697 after another defeat by Kangxi’s expedition.335 The Jesuits accompanied Kangxi during these expeditions, and they observed stars and did many experiments with Kangxi on clear desert nights. The Jesuits kept abundant diary-style records, which remain one of the most valuable records about these adventures.336 Combining military success in both the Chinese and Mongol areas, Kangxi was unparalleled in East and Central Asia as the emperor of China as well as the Khan of Khans of the Mongol world.

In his family life, Kangxi had fifteen sons by 1705. Nine of them were adults, and all were educated and trained to hold military and political positions. Yinren, the second son, was appointed as the heir apparent in 1675. When, for example, Kangxi went with six of his sons to chase Galdan in 1696, Yinren took care of the daily affairs of the empire in the Beijing court.

Because of the stable family atmosphere, Kangxi could leave the Beijing court for long periods of time for imperial tours without much concern about the whole court’s routine operations.

Culturally, Kangxi supported different kinds of cultures under his rule. For Chinese subjects, Kangxi initiated the project of writing the History of the Ming dynasty and supported several encyclopedia projects to systematically collect and organize Chinese books. Those imperial-sponsored projects attracted many highly esteemed Chinese scholars to the Qing court. In the eyes of the Mongols, Kangxi acted as a protector of Tibetan Buddhism. Due to the Mongolian connections with his family, Kangxi actually grew up surrounded by the presence of Tibetan Buddhism. Empress Xiaozhuang, Kangxi’s grandmother, was a pious believer in Tibetan Buddhism. Suma, Xiaozhuang’s maid who taught and took care of Kangxi when he was young, was a lifelong practitioner of Tibetan Buddhism. Kangxi visited the Wutai mountains—about 400 kilometers away from Beijing—five times to show his respect for Tibetan Buddhism. The Tibetan Buddhist sutras were printed twice in 1692 and 1700 under imperial auspices. Kangxi accepted the Tibetan lamas’ spiritual claim that he was an incarnation of the Manjusuri Bodhisattva. At the same time, Kangxi enjoyed learning Western academic subjects and attentively introduced Western learning to the Manchus. In short, whether they were Chinese, Mongols, or Europeans, each person thought that Kangxi supported their culture.

By the end of 1705, Kangxi was at the summit of his life as the monarch of a multi-culture empire as well as the head of a big family. He established his name as a mighty warrior in

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the nomad world through war after war. At the same time, in the minds of intellectuals, Kangxi acted as an educated leader who valued sedentary cultures. On the one hand, Kangxi was known as a tough emperor who insisted on his decisions, even in the face of major opposing voices from his trusted cabinet. On the other hand, Kangxi did negotiate and cunningly used all the tricks needed to reach agreements. The decade-long negotiations with Russia is an example. Kangxi negotiated with Tibet, too, after he realized that Tibet, not Russia, was the real supporter of Galdan. Knowing Kangxi’s multiple sides is essential to truly understand Kangxi’s words and actions in his negotiations with foreign groups.

The Nature of the Papal Legation in 1705 in the Eyes of the Kangxi Emperor

Previously, Maillard de Tournon’s legation of 1705 was viewed as the first diplomatic event between the Holy See and the Qing empire. However, in the eyes of the Kangxi Emperor, it was just a private meeting with a devout religious person (修道之人). Accordingly, the audience was arranged as such. As the Jesuits were private servants belonging to Kangxi’s Imperial Household, so the papal legate was viewed as a similar religious person. The whole event of receiving the legate was therefore managed by the Imperial Household and never routed through the court system as a diplomatic activity.

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340 Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet, p. 47.
Kangxi was first told by the Jesuits of the coming of de Tournon in June 1705 after de Tournon had reached Guangzhou and his party had already entered China by paying taxes as a regular merchant group. At the direction of de Tournon, the Beijing Jesuits announced de Tournon as an apostolic visitor whose mission was to determine whether the practices of missionaries in China were in accordance with the rules of Rome. Kangxi did not have any interest in receiving de Tournon, as he thought that de Tournon’s mission was “none of his business” because it was an inspection within a religion. Kangxi finally agreed to receive de Tournon after several Beijing Jesuits knelt down to beg for an audience for de Tournon.

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342 Research for this chapter largely relied on inter-reading between *Acta Pekinensia*, the records edited by Jesuit participants and the Qing court documents (see the next note). When similar information was found in both sources, the notes provide references to both. *Acta Pekinensia* was edited by Jesuit Kilian Stumpf (1655–1720) with the signatures of the majority of Beijing Jesuits who participated in receiving the legate. It was written in Latin for European readers and sent back to Europe right after the departure of the legate. It is in the Jesuit Roman Archive and remained unpublished until 2015, when the first batch (covering the period to August 1706) was translated into English and published. The full title of *Acta Pekinensia* in English is “The Peking Acts or Historical Records of What Happened in Peking, Day-to-Day, from December 4th of the Year 1705 When There Arrived the Most Illustrious, Most Reverend and Most Excellent Lord Charles Thomas Maillard de Tournon, Patriarch of Antioch, Visitor Apostolic with powers of a Personal Legate.” For an introduction to this record and its translation project, see Paul Rule, ’The Acta Pekinensia Project’, in *Sino-Western Cultural Relations Journal*, 30 (2008), 17–29.


343 The Manchu court documents used for this chapter came from two sources: 1. Zhongguo diyi lishi danganguan 中国第一历史档案馆, *Kangxi chao manwen zhupi zouzhe quanyi* 康熙朝满文朱批奏折全译 (A complete translation of the Manchu language memorials with vermillion endorsements of the Kangxi period), (Beijing: Zhongguo shenhui kexue, 1996); referred to as KMZ hereafter. 2. An, Shuangcheng, ed., *Qing chu xi yang chuan jiao shi Man wen dang an yi ben* 清初西洋传教士满文档案译本 (Translation of the Manchu archive regarding Early Qing missionaries), referred to as QMD; QMD., p. 299. AP, p. 146.

344 QMD, p. 284; AP, p. 92; AP2, p.36.
Kangxi’s words, the receiving of de Tournon was in consideration of the “long time kindness and accommodation” already extended to the Beijing fathers.345

Still, before officially sending the invitation to de Tournon, Kangxi, while on his summer hunting trip, asked on July 23, 1705 if all Jesuits in Beijing agreed to the reception of de Tournon in Beijing.346 Kangxi first asked why an apostolic visitor was coming now, as such a post had never been heard of in the 200-year history of the Church in China. Now, as the apostolic visitor was suddenly in China, Kangxi asked if it meant that the Jesuits in China had recently done something improper? In short, Kangxi wanted to figure out the reason for the coming of such a legation.

Kangxi’s first instinct was to suspect that de Tournon’s arrival was related to the long-lasting conflicts among the Beijing Jesuits, and that de Tournon was coming to sort out the rights and wrongs. Kangxi knew that the Jesuits, primarily divided by their adherence to their Portuguese and French orders, did not get along well.347 However, Kangxi viewed their conflicts as similar to minor squabbles within a big family: they are trivial but complicated to tackle.348 In Kangxi’s mind, if de Tournon was coming to investigate the Jesuits’ rights and wrongs, the

345 QMD, p.285; AP. p.16.
346 Kangxi might have noticed that some Jesuits did not welcome the coming of de Tournon. In fact, the Portuguese Jesuit Pereira did not initially support the idea of receiving de Tournon, while French Jesuit Gerbillon supported it. However, they reached an agreement and proposed to announce the coming of de Tournon together. See Rosso, Apostolic Legations, p.156.
347 Since the coming of French Jesuits in 1688, the conflicts between the French- and Portuguese-sponsored Jesuits were apparent. The French Jesuits built their own church. However, despite their conflicts, Jesuits in Beijing could coordinate as a united group in front of Kangxi when something important came up. Therefore, Kangxi viewed their conflicts as more like squabbles among a family, which were universal and hard to totally avoid. Kangxi in a decree dated April 30, 1702 said that it would not be good if he “investigated every squabble” among the Jesuits. The decree in Chinese was found in Vatican City and copied and translated by Antonio Sisto Rosso. See, Rosso, Apostolic Legations, p.112–116.
348 QMD, p.284.
investigation might open a can of worms that would only worsen their relations. That is why he asked if all the Beijing Jesuits welcomed the audience. The question also served as a warning to all Beijing Jesuits to reconcile their conflicts if they all wished for the coming of de Tournon.

On July 23, 1705, Henkama (赫世亨), one of Kangxi’s servants who handled communications with Europeans, gathered all the Beijing Jesuits in the court and read Kangxi’s decree. He asked the Jesuits for their answers to Kangxi’s questions regarding receiving de Tournon. In addition to expressing their appreciation and gratitude for asking, the Beijing Jesuits first explained the functions of apostolic visitors in detail and then offered that the primary purpose of de Tournon’s visit was to show gratitude for Kangxi’s accommodation of Christianity. Second, they confirmed that they all welcomed de Tournon’s coming. Third, they promised that their conflicts had already been settled. Finally, they described de Tournon as a pious priest who entered the priesthood at a young age.349

After receiving these answers, Kangxi commented that the Beijing Jesuits’ explanation differed somewhat from that provided by the Jesuit Antonio de Barros, who accompanied Kangxi on his summer hunting trip. Nevertheless, Kangxi decided to receive de Tournon based on the fact that de Tournon was a pious religious person. Then Kangxi moved on to ask the Beijing Jesuits about how to receive de Tournon’s group and how the group would like to dress for the reception (which would provide a hint about de Tournon’s status and purpose in China).350 The Beijing Jesuits answered that they would like to follow whatever arrangements were ordered by Kangxi. As for dress, the Beijing Jesuits explained what they knew about how

349 Ibid.
350 QMD, p. 285; AP, p. 15.
such a group dressed in Europe, but they told Kangxi that they thought the group would wear whatever Kangxi wanted.

After receiving these answers, Kangxi concluded that the legation was not a diplomatic group, because:

As a religious person coming to work within his religion, de Tournon was different from the ambassadors sent by European kings.\(^{351}\)

This meant that Kangxi decided to treat the members of the legation as religious persons instead of foreign ambassadors. Because they were not foreign ambassadors, Kangxi thought they should not wear foreign clothes to show their foreignness; instead, Kangxi ordered de Tournon and his staff to wear “local Chinese dress” when they headed north to Beijing. Considerately, Kangxi asked Henkama to first show his decisions to the Beijing Jesuits for a final review before sending them for implementation. The Beijing Jesuits welcomed Kangxi’s decisions, and only requested that boat travel be arranged for the group when possible, as Europeans were not as used to riding horses for long-distances like the Manchus.\(^{352}\) After meeting with the Jesuits, Henkama contacted local magistrates to prepare for de Tournon’s reception.

**The First Audience on December 31, 1705**

Due to de Tournon’s bad health, the audience was held on December 31, 1705 after several postponements. As planned initially, the whole group was received as a religious group by the protocols Kangxi used for his private guests. The audience was held in a hall by a garden

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\(^{351}\) QMD, p. 289.

\(^{352}\) Ibid; The clothes were paid by the governor of Guangdong. AP2, p.37.
called Golden Mountain on the west side of the Forbidden City at 2 pm. Without inviting any court officials, Kangxi sat cross-legged on a rug to receive de Tournon in Manchu fashion. To make the atmosphere more comfortable, Kangxi told de Tournon to talk freely as “only your own people” (meaning Jesuits) are here. After a while, Kangxi asked servants to provide light refreshments and Manchu drinks—tea with milk. Jesuit Gerbillon, then the primary translator, told de Tournon that the meeting with the refreshments and drinks indicated special favor; similar meetings were reserved only for Kangxi’s family members.

Conversation between Kangxi and de Tournon were friendly, as de Tournon focused on expressing his gratitude to Kangxi. After tasting several dishes, the atmosphere became cozy, and Kangxi asked de Tournon if he had some tasks to carry out on behalf of the pope. The question of the legation’s purpose still lingered in Kangxi’s mind, ever since he heard about the coming of de Tournon. Several days before the audience, Kangxi had dispatched his servants to ask de Tournon if he had something to submit in writing. After receiving de Tournon’s written response, which said that he came to express gratitude, Kangxi told his servants that the response was a “joke”, since de Tournon must carry something important; otherwise the pope would not dispatch such a group to travel such a great distance. Therefore, Kangxi again asked de Tournon the same question during their meeting. In addition to expressing gratitude, de Tournon

353 The exact location is unknown, but it is certain that the place was not one of the main halls in the Forbidden City where foreign embassies were received. The name Golden Mountain was very likely a temporary name used during Kangxi’s time only. But it was somewhere in the west side of the Forbidden City according to the route Jesuits recorded. AP, p. 82.
355 Ibid, p. 86.
356 Ibid.
357 Ibid, p. 88.
358 Ibid, p. 63.
said that his other task was to request the opening of a communication channel between the pope and Kangxi, which, de Tournon added, might also benefit commerce between the European countries and the empire. Kangxi did not reject the idea of communication with the pope, but he made it clear that the communication would be strictly restricted to religious matters.

Then, the talks ran into a disagreement. De Tournon suggested having a new person, rather than a Beijing Jesuit, handle communications. Kangxi supported the Beijing Jesuits and spoke highly about their ability. When Kangxi found that de Tournon did not trust the Beijing Jesuits, he simply dropped the topic and stated that the Jesuits since Matteo Ricci were all “irreproachable” in his eyes, and asked de Tournon to bring this comment back to the pope. The audience ended with de Tournon’s request that Kangxi continue to protect Christian missionaries, to which Kangxi answered positively but added that he would only do so as long as the missionaries continued to abide by the law.

After the meeting, Kangxi summoned Antoine Thomas, Pereira, and Gerbillon to share his feeling about the audience. These three were Kangxi’s oldest servants and teachers. (Antoine Thomas had served Kangxi for twenty years, since 1685; Pereira, thirty-two years, since 1673; Gerbillon, sixteen years, since 1689). Kangxi told them directly that he felt that de Tournon did not trust them because de Tournon insisted on using a new person to handle communications

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359 Ibid, p. 88; Creating a communication channel with the Qing empire was an important task for de Tournon; before coming to Beijing, de Tournon had already purchased a house in Guangzhou to use as a station to transfer the messages from China. See Menegon, Eugenio. "Interlopers at the Fringes of Empire: The Procurators of the Propaganda Fide Papal Congregation in Canton and Macao, 1700-1823", in Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review, V.7 (2018), pp.36-37.

360 Ibid.

361 Ibid, p. 89.

362 Ibid, p. 90.
with the pope. The Beijing Jesuits in fact knew of de Tournon’s distrust, as they had already held several meetings with de Tournon, which had ended with harsh quarrels. Still, Antoine Thomas tried to patch it up, and said that de Tournon in fact praised the society of Jesus as the most religiously observant group. Kangxi could not believe that, and even asked if de Tournon had truly said it. The other two Jesuits confirmed the praise. At that moment, Kangxi added that the only reason he had received de Tournon was because of his respect for and support to the Beijing Jesuits. Therefore, he was comfortable as long as the Beijing Jesuits were comfortable with de Tournon.\textsuperscript{363}

**The Chinese Rites Controversy During de Tournon’s Stay in Beijing**

Contrary to the anticipation of the Beijing Jesuits, de Tournon did not voluntarily bring up any issue related to the Chinese Rites Controversy during his eight-month stay in Beijing. In fact, it was the Beijing Jesuits who actively asked de Tournon for his opinions regarding rites. After several unsuccessful attempts to solicit his opinions, Jesuit Kilian Stumpf presented de Tournon with a request in writing on January 22, 1706 to ask for a discussion of the controversy.\textsuperscript{364} On February 19, 1706, Jesuits Stumpf and Jean-Baptiste Regis (1667–1738) provided de Tournon with a bundle of ninety documents regarding Chinese rites. Those documents were prepared by the Beijing Jesuits in 1700 for the ongoing debates in Europe. The bundle included Jesuits’ explanations, Kangxi’s comments on them, statements from first-rate Chinese scholars, testimonies from different people from different perspectives, and matters such

\textsuperscript{363} Ibid, p. 92.
\textsuperscript{364} Ibid, p. 122.
as how Kaifeng Jews, who resided in China for more than 500 years, understood Chinese rites.\textsuperscript{365}

Though de Tournon accepted the bundle and agreed to review the documents, he never gave his remarks on them, even after several requests by the Beijing Jesuits.\textsuperscript{366}

De Tournon knew very well that he had no capability at all to handle the controversy. He was surrounded by Jesuits whom he did not trust; Ludovico Appiani (1663–1732), de Tournon’s interpreter, was not capable of translation, and de Tournon could not rely on him to effectively communicate with Kangxi. Therefore, he tried his best to avoid the questions regarding Chinese rites. De Tournon had at one point said clearly that he did not “want to enter into a dispute with the emperor.”\textsuperscript{367} In de Tournon’s mind, the best possible outcome was that the Jesuits in China could “fix quietly” their practices towards Chinese rites little by little.\textsuperscript{368} In this way, the pope’s decree could be obeyed, while the changes took place peacefully.\textsuperscript{369}

Unlike de Tournon, the Beijing Jesuits hoped to amend, rather than obey, the pope’s decree, which they believed was based on a misunderstanding. Their attempts to amend the decree might be closely related to their past experiences with the Chinese Rites Controversy. The first decree opposing the practice of Chinese rites was issued by Pope Innocent X in 1645. However, after Jesuit Martino Martini went back to Europe to explain the ideas and situations in China, Pope Alexander VII issued another decree in 1656, that sided with Martini, who, in general, defined the practice of Chinese rites as civil activities. Those two contradictory decrees issued by two different popes were the background for the Beijing Jesuits when they faced a

\textsuperscript{365} Ibid, pp. 157–170.
\textsuperscript{366} Ibid, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{367} Ibid, p. 100.
\textsuperscript{368} Ibid, p. 94.
third decree issued in 1704 by a third pope.\textsuperscript{370} In a practical way, the Beijing Jesuits saw the coming of a papal legate as a chance to make their own voices heard. Therefore, the Beijing Jesuits acted energetically to open a discussion with de Tournon on Chinese rites.

The Controversy was not initially in the mind of Kangxi. Though he probably had heard something about it, he did not at first relate it to the coming of de Tournon. This is evident in the back-and-forth communications between Kangxi and the Beijing Jesuits during the preparation stage for receiving de Tournon, in which Kangxi did not mention Chinese rites at all. After de Tournon arrived in Beijing, he avoided discussing Chinese rites directly with Kangxi, so they were not a topic between Kangxi and de Tournon during most of de Tournon’s eight-month stay in Beijing. It was only in the last farewell audience that de Tournon answered Kangxi’s inquiry related to the Chinese Rites Controversy, which, surprisingly, did not end with controversy.

**Kangxi’s Farewell Audiences for de Tournon**

Several days before Kangxi left Beijing for a summer trip, Kangxi granted de Tournon a farewell audience on June 29, 1706. Since arriving in Beijing, de Tournon had lived more than half a year in Beijing. Though de Tournon was not on good terms with the Beijing Jesuits, de Tournon had a respectful relationship with Kangxi, who treated de Tournon favorably. When de Tournon’s doctor prescribed wolf intestines to treat his abdominal pain, Kangxi ordered one

\textsuperscript{370} For a summary of the historical background, see Minamiki, George. *The Chinese Rites Controversy from Its Beginning to Modern Times* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1985), pp. 25–42.
caught in the imperial hunting area for de Tournon’s use. For the benefit of de Tournon’s recovery, Kangxi also allowed de Tournon to make a trip to the springs near Beijing.

Like the first audience, the farewell audience was held as a family-style gathering, and no court ministers participated. All the Jesuits were invited, and several of Kangxi’s sons joined the meeting as well. De Tournon entered the palace through the west entrance, which was normally used by members of the Imperial Household. The audience was held in the Yangxin Dian, where Jesuits stood on the west side with the members of the Imperial Household. Starting with salutations and greetings, the conversation between Kangxi and de Tournon was mostly about setting the date for de Tournon’s return to Europe. Besides setting the date, the communications were greetings and did not engage any real issues.

In this farewell audience, de Tournon probably thought his legation had been successful, as he requested that Kangxi write a letter for him to bring back to the pope. This letter, as de Tournon explained, would bring him “a great honor” when going back to Europe. To this unexpected request, Kangxi, after “brief” consideration as recorded by the Jesuits, told de Tournon that he needed some time to think about it, and asked de Tournon to come back the next day. Then the audience ended. After the audience, Kangxi allowed de Tournon and his group to tour the three main halls of the Forbidden City where state and diplomatic activities were normally held. The Jesuits guided the tour.

371 QMD, p. 294.
372 AP, p. 285. The Manchus regarded the spring waters nearby Beijing as very precious natural resources. It was a special favor to allow de Tournon to use it. The spring waters were controlled by Kangxi’s Imperial Household. See, Lei, Zhang, "One City with Two Waters: Drinking Water in Beijing, 1644–1900", in Water History, 2017, Issue 9, pp.483-484.
373 Ibid, pp. 407-408.
A very important historical detail, recorded by the Beijing Jesuits, is worth special attention. While on tour, one of Kangxi’s eunuchs of the bed-chamber came to de Tournon to tell him that Kangxi would see him again tomorrow either in the same place or in another garden. More importantly, the eunuch also mentioned that the emperor did not at this point have any thoughts regarding what to address to the pope.376 This detail confirmed an important fact that even at the very last minute of the arranged farewell audience, the Chinese Rites controversy was still not an issue in Kangxi’s mind.

Jesuit records say nothing about who Kangxi consulted for composing the letter to the pope; However, Beijing Jesuits were the only logical candidates for such a task. Suddenly, Kangxi, on the meeting the next day on June 30, focused on the issues of Chinese Rites Controversy. In the meeting, Kangxi first told de Tournon that he did not have anything to write as “the decrees given so far are sufficient.”377 Then, Kangxi followed, “there is one thing I will say to you.” This one thing was Kangxi’s statement on the Chinese Rites Controversy, which Kangxi asked de Tournon to bring to the attention of the pope. Kangxi’s statement was straightforward: Chinese rites based on Confucianism were what they were. If Christianity found the rites compatible, then Christian missionaries could preach in China; otherwise they could not continue. Kangxi emphasized:

I am not investigating whether it is compatible or incompatible. But I make this declaration to you.378

Take it or leave it was Kangxi’s logic on the possible controversy over the Chinese rites. Kangxi demanded that de Tournon bring his words back to Europe. Then softening a bit, Kangxi also

376 Ibid, p.408.
added that, according to his understanding of both Christianity and Chinese rites, he believed they were compatible, so he allowed and protected Christianity in his empire. De Tournon certainly did not expect that his request for a letter would bring Kangxi to Chinese Rites Controversy. Nevertheless, de Tournon kept calm, and answered that he did not know Chinese, and he was not qualified to render any response over Chinese rites, to which he had only heard some opinions. It seemed that de Tournon’s answer surprised Kangxi as well, since Kangxi expected de Tournon would respond to his statement in a certain way. So, Kangxi did not end the discussion when de Tournon tried to avoid it and pursued the topic in a different way. Kangxi asked de Tournon if he could raise even one example regarding the incompatibility of the two cultures. Again, after asking Kangxi repeatedly to excuse his ignorance of Chinese culture, de Tournon gave an example about vengeance. He quoted a Chinese classic book that Confucianism allowed sons to avenge the death of their fathers. Meanwhile, Christianity, de Tournon explained, prohibited vengeance, even in the context of son-for-father.

Kangxi respected the comparison de Tournon used and patiently analyzed in-depth the situations about the concept of revenge in the Confucian classics. The talk ended with de Tournon’s praise of Kangxi’s analysis, with which Kangxi was satisfied. Kangxi’s satisfaction was reflected in the arrangements made after the meeting. Kangxi allowed de Tournon to take his boat to tour the beautiful sights of the palace. de Tournon was even allowed to sit in the best spot of the boat, normally reserved for Kangxi himself. After the boat tour, de Tournon was also

379 Ibid.
380 Ibid.
381 Ibid, pp. 412.
382 Jesuit Kilian Stumpf, who recorded the conversation, did not (or was unable to) record the exact chapters of the Confucian classics discussed by Kangxi, so the records about Kangxi’s analysis were not clear. See AP, p. 412.
invited by the Heir Apparent to visit his private garden. It was a happy visit where de Tournon viewed a few exclusive beautiful sites. On the way to the garden, Kangxi sent his eldest son to de Tournon, asking de Tournon to choose some more valuable gifts for the pope. de Tournon chose yellow porcelain dishes. 383

After the audience (June 31st), Kangxi sent a written brief to de Tournon to summarize his statement in the audience, but it came in a softer tone than what Kangxi had spoke during the day. It writes:

The 20th of the 5th month [of the lunar calendar of the Kangxi’s reign]. The emperor says this to Monsignor the Patriarch: Yesterday, you asked me if I had any instruction to give you. Afterwards I thought about it, but I have no instructions to give you, except that you should tell the Supreme Pontiff that here in China, for 2,000 years we have been faithful to the teaching of Confucius. That in the 200 years since the time of Father Ricci, and especially during the forty years and more that I have reigned, the Europeans have enjoyed complete peace without incurring any blame. But if anything should occur which is contrary to the above-mentioned teaching, it will be difficult for the Europeans to remain in China. 384

de Tournon did not by any means, as recorded by the Beijing Jesuits, overreact to the brief. According to Manchu materials, Kangxi and de Tournon maintained the friendly exchange after the last audience. This was evident in Kangxi’s note dated on July 2, 1706, three days after the audience, in which Kangxi asked de Tournon if he had more chocolate to share with him before he left Beijing. 385 Several Manchu records from July indicate that Kangxi sent food prepared by

383 Ibid, p.414.
385 KMZ, p.418; QMD, p.297.
his imperial kitchen to de Tournon. Meanwhile, on July 10th, de Tournon submitted a memorial to thank Kangxi for the delicious food received.

The Role of the Jesuits during the Legate’s Visit

Jesuits played a pivotal role in Kangxi’s reception of de Tournon’s legation. Without them and their close connection with Kangxi, de Tournon would not have even had a chance to go to Beijing. Kangxi received de Tournon according to the master-slave family style relationship he shared with the Jesuits. Therefore, de Tournon was received as a family guest, not as an ambassador of a foreign country.

De Tournon became fully aware of the family-style relationship between Kangxi and the Beijing Jesuits during the preparation for an embassy to send Kangxi’s gifts to the pope. After the first happy exchange with de Tournon at the initial audience, Kangxi decided to send gifts to the pope in the hope of establishing a communication channel with Europe. Initially, Kangxi chose one of his family servants (in the slave status) to carry out this task. But the servant told Kangxi that he could not speak any European language and was afraid that he could not fulfill the mission. Then, Kangxi picked French Jesuit Joachim Bouvet, who had been his legate to France in 1693. de Tournon was excited about Kangxi’s wish to send gifts to the pope and decided to dispatch father Sabino Mariani to go with Bouvet. For the two Christian fathers, de Tournon intuitively thought that he, as the legate of the pope, had the power to arrange their journey. de

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387 KMZ, doc. 873, p. 421.
388 AP, pp.101-102.
Tournon appointed Mariani as the group leader while Bouvet was designated as “the companion.” Upon learning of de Tournon’s arrangement, Kangxi said:

Bai Jin (Bouvet’s Chinese name) is a religious man, like the rest. But on account of services rendered over many years, one who is rightly to be considered among my inner household circle, one of those closely attending my royal person. I entrust nothing else to him except that he delivers my gifts to the Pontiff.

It seems that de Tournon did not fully grasp Kangxi’s meaning, and de Tournon still appointed Mariani as the leader of the whole group, who hold the keys of the boxes carrying the gifts to the pope. Bouvet and Martini ran into trouble in June 1706 regarding who was the leader of the group while they waited in Guangzhou for a ship to Europe. News of their trouble was sent back to Beijing, and de Tournon sent a letter to Kangxi asking for arbitration and clarification. Kangxi and his sons were angry about the question, because they took it for granted that Bouvet was their representative and should be the leader of the group in delivering their gifts. Kangxi’s eldest son remarked openly to the Jesuits:

Is someone going to deny that Bai Jin (Bouvet) is really our ambassador? He has been in the court for twenty years; he knows Chinese and Tartar; he has been in my Father’s service. And in comparison, to him, who is that Sha Guoan (Mariani’s Chinese name)? Kangxi’s response was similar to that of his son and confirmed that Bouvet was his ambassador. After hearing these comments from different angles, de Tournon understood Bouvet’s real status in China. In the letter written to Mariani, de Tournon asked Mariani not to “dispute precedence” with Bouvet, saying:

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389 AP, p. 111; p. 116.
390 AP, p. 112.
391 AP, p. 378.
I am obliged here to draw to your attention that the said father (Bouvet) having the honor of being an actual Servant of His Majesty cannot be given too much respect and courtesy.\textsuperscript{392}
de Tournon now knew that Bouvet was not a servant to the emperor in a general sense, but “actual Servant” of Kangxi’s family. Therefore, Bouvet deserved “respect and courtesy.” \textsuperscript{393}

As a legate of the pope, de Tournon had assumed a dominant position in handling relations with the Beijing Jesuits. Ideally, he hoped to settle religious matters, such as those related to Chinese rites, within the church. At the same time, he had expected to establish a communication channel with Kangxi.\textsuperscript{394} However, the Jesuits, though trying to appear obedient, relied in fact on Kangxi to negotiate with de Tournon. de Tournon knew several days after he arrived Beijing that the Jesuits were hiding behind Kangxi. So, he did not trust them and even tried to avoid using them as translators.

In a certain sense, it is the Beijing Jesuits who dragged Kangxi into the Chinese Rites Controversy, as they had hoped that with the involvement of the emperor, Rome would take their side in the argument. The Jesuits’ accounts sent to Europe, such as the Acta Pekinensis, tried to downplay or even omit their role in involving Kangxi, the secular power, in this religious dispute. However, juxtaposing the Jesuits’ accounts with other court documents makes the Beijing Jesuits’ role very clear. For example, the Acta Pekinensis retains details about the Beijing Jesuits’ earnest

\textsuperscript{392} AP. p. 398.
\textsuperscript{393} Kangxi also sent his servants privately to warn Bouvet not to disrespect Mariani. Bouvet promised not to argue with Mariani regarding precedence. Bouvet also sent a letter to Gerbillon, the superior-general of the French Jesuit mission, to apologize that he should not quarrel with Mariani. See KMZ, pp. 448-449. The translator of the document may not know that Bouvet’s Chinese name was 白晋，so it is translated as 博津 from Manchu documents.
\textsuperscript{394} de Tournon even requested Kangxi that allow him to buy a residence in Beijing for use as the embassy for the Holy See. Kangxi rejected the request.
requests that Kangxi receive de Tournon. A full translation of the request submitted by Claudio Grimaldi was provided. However, Kangxi’s long decree responding to their requests, which showed Kangxi’s initial guess that the legation had come to reconcile conflicts among the Beijing Jesuits, was omitted. Interestingly, the Acta Pekinensis has in minute details regarding how the Beijing Jesuits knelt down to receive this decree, but omits its major content. In comparing the level of detail that the Acta Pekinensis provides for many trivial matters, it is obvious that the omission of this important decree was intentional. This decree, among other decrees, provides the evidence that the Chinese Rites Controversy was not in Kangxi’s mind during the preparation stage to receive de Tournon. This is just one example of many strategic omissions. It seems that the Acta Pekinensis sought to direct readers to think that Kangxi happened to notice the Chinese Rites Controversy on his own. In this regard, the Beijing Jesuits should be considered successful, as later readers were convinced by the Jesuits’ account, and thought that de Tournon, portrayed as bad tempered and arrogant, was the reason for Kangxi’s involvement. However, Qing court documents reveal that Kangxi involved in the topics concerning Chinese rites about the time de Tournon was about to leave. Even according to the Jesuits’ own records, Kangxi did not raise any issue related to Chinese Rites Controversy in the arranged farewell audience. It was only in the

396 This decree was originally written in Manchu, and its Chinese translation is published. See QMD, document no. 33.
398 It is certain that the Beijing Jesuits saw this decree, because a part of the decree was translated and recorded. AP, p. 15.
399 QMD, documents No. 33;34,35,36,37,38.
added audience that Kangxi started to mention it. Again, the Beijing Jesuits omitted a record of
the very important afternoon and evening after the first farewell audience, during which Kangxi
considered what other things to bring to the pope. The Beijing Jesuits were the only logical and
possible consultants that afternoon for Kangxi to discuss the matters addressing to the pope.
Nevertheless, the known fact was that, during the time of de Tournon’s stay in Beijing, the Beijing
Jesuits were the only people interested in discussing the Chinese Rites Controversy, and that they
had tried for more than six months to initiate a discussion about it with de Tournon, but de Tournon
avoided discussing it with them. Kangxi became the the Jesuits’ last resort to force de Tournon
into discussion.401 This was the reason why Kangxi suddenly paid the attention to the Chinese
Rites Controversy after a night.

With the privilege of close relations with Kangxi’s family, the Beijing Jesuits not only
successfully directed Kangxi’s attention to Chinese rites, but also that of other family members,
who otherwise were not known to have interests in intellectual topics of any kind.402 Meanwhile,
in comparison, other issues, such as real estate deeds and lease contracts used in China, led to
serious debates between the Beijing Jesuits and de Tournon, where de Tournon disagreed with the
Beijing Jesuits about whether those documents were compatible with Christianity, and did not
allow the Jesuits to continue to use them in China. Surprisingly, these issues, which were truly
argued between Jesuits and de Tournon and which contributed to the considerable length of the

401 De Tournon told Jesuit Antoine Thomas in a letter written about six months after the audience
that Kangxi’s involvement was made by Jesuits. He wrote: “[you will ] understand how alien to
what is due to my office are those requests which were made to me at Beijing with regard to the
controversies, and how much more wisely the Jesuits would have acted by trusting in and acting
according to my advice.” (de Tournon’s advice was to ask Jesuits to change their practice little by
little.). AP2, p.316.
402 According to Jesuit accounts, Herkama and Kangxi’s eldest son asked de Tournon in person
about his opinions on Chinese rites.
Jesuits’ records sent to Europe, were never brought to Kangxi’s attention. This means that the issues brought to Kangxi were brought at the discretion of the Beijing Jesuits.

According to Manchu documents, Kangxi himself did not dislike de Tournon in general. In addition to several requests to ask de Tournon for Western medicines and Western gadgets, the token of a friendly exchange, one of Kangxi’s decrees issued to his Manchu servants around the time of de Tournon’s leaving perhaps reveals Kangxi’s real feeling towards de Tournon,

After reading de Tournon’s memorial written in Chinese, (I think) it seems that there was not anything significantly improper in it. You guys tried too hard to pick holes in it. He would think that you guys have sided with Westerners in the court [referring to the Beijing Jesuits].

“you guys” were Kangxi’s servants handling affairs involving Westerners. Kangxi knew very well that the Beijing Jesuits had their attitude towards de Tournon, so he warned his servants, who had a long relationship with the Beijing Jesuits, not to be capacious in finding fault with de Tournon.

Regardless of the reasons, Kangxi was always on the side of the Beijing Jesuits, some of whom had accompanied him on a daily basis for more than two decades. Because of the existing master-slave family-style relation with Kangxi, the Beijing Jesuits had chances to access and influence Kangxi, and they made Kangxi negotiate on their behalf with de Tournon and Rome. As a result of receiving the legation, Kangxi sent two Jesuits on his behalf to Rome to further negotiate

403 The whole document was undated. According to its content, it was written around the time when de Tournon was reluctant to accept Kangxi’s decree after Kangxi interviewed Maigrot. (see, AP., pp.583-586). So, the document shall be dated sometime in August of 1706. de Tournon’s memorial, to which Kangxi said, “there was not anything significantly improper”, was included in the document. This, de Tournon’s memorial, was likely de Tournon’s last formal correspondence with Kangxi, as it was written as a conclusion for the legation. In this memorial, de Tournon attributed all unhappy exchanges to his ignorance of languages and misunderstandings. KMZ, pp. 1577-1578.
the terms of Chinese rites. In the eyes of the Beijing Jesuits, Kangxi truly did the best he could to help them.

The Rites Controversy After the Audiences with de Tournon

Kangxi started to look seriously into the Controversy only after the last audience involving de Tournon, when Kangxi was told of the coming of the French missionary Charles Maigrot, the Titular Bishop of Conana and Vicar Apostolic of Fujian, who had preached in Fujian province for more than twenty years beginning in 1681. De Tournon remarked that Maigrot was an expert in Chinese and Chinese culture and directed Kangxi to Maigrot for all issues regarding the Chinese Rites Controversy. de Tournon, since arriving in Beijing, was so troubled by the controversy that he viewed the coming of Maigrot to Beijing as a chance to relieve his burden. Because Maigrot was the instigator of the Chinese Rites Controversy, there was no better person in the world than Maigrot to represent the ideas behind the pope’s ban, which was developed from the arguments of Maigrot.404

On August 1, 1706, Kangxi’s meeting with Maigrot turned out to be a disaster. As a priest in China for more than twenty years, Maigrot showed in the meeting his grasp of Chinese and Chinese culture was so poor that Kangxi was offended. Before the meeting, in the middle of July, Kangxi managed to read Maigrot’s arguments regarding Chinese rites. Though Kangxi described the arguments as “superficial” in a secret decree to his servant,405 Kangxi still

405 KMZ, doc. 876, p. 422; QMD, p. 300.
expected Maigrot’s command of Chinese to be on the same level as that of the Beijing Jesuits, like French Jesuits Gerbillon and Bouvet, who came to China eight years after Maigrot. In the meeting, Maigrot had difficulty speaking with Kangxi in Chinese, even though Kangxi had already slowed down to accommodate Maigrot as a foreigner. After only three simple questions, Maigrot needed translations from the Jesuits. The primary translator was French Jesuit Dominique Parrenin, who, by way of comparison, had come to China in 1698, seventeen years later than Maigrot.  

Maigrot could also only recognize one of four Chinese characters (华岩云阁) on the wood carving hanging in the hall. Those Chinese characters were considered basic characters and were included in books for children. Kangxi had expected some true conversation or even an intellectual debate with Maigrot. But Maigrot’s level of Chinese was far below Kangxi’s anticipation. Kangxi complained directly to Maigrot:

> In what way can I deal with you now? You neither write nor read (Chinese). What am I to write; in fact, what can I even say to you, since you do not understand when someone is speaking to you.\(^\text{407}\)

Maigrot certainly felt he embarrassed himself during the meeting. To Kangxi, the real offense was the ridiculous fact that Rome and de Tournon viewed Maigrot as an expert on China and had made decisions on Chinese rites based on Maigrot’s arguments.

> After this meeting, Kangxi believed that the Western world was deceived by so-called Chinese experts such as Maigrot, and he felt obliged to make his voice known in Europe. Kangxi therefore issued two decrees. One was to Maigrot and the other to de Tournon. The one to Maigrot started with a brief of the meeting, which showed Maigrot’s incapability with the

\(^{406}\) AP, p. 690.  
\(^{407}\) Ibid, p. 691.
Chinese language. Then Kangxi argued that Chinese rites regarding tablets, tombs and the like were to show respect not to pray, which indicated that these rites did not contradict Christianity.\textsuperscript{408} The decree to de Tournon, which started by describing Maigrot’s ignorance, was to warn de Tournon to not “pertinaciously hold things are as he [Maigrot] says.” In this decree, in order to avoid unexpected troubles like the meeting with Maigrot, Kangxi prohibited de Tournon from touring the provinces during his return to Europe. Kangxi told de Tournon that if he wanted to see priests in local places, he should gather them in a certain southern city and see them all at once. In addition, Kangxi told de Tournon to inform the pope his new decision—that future priests in the provinces would be carefully investigated to make sure that people like Maigrot were not allowed.\textsuperscript{409} Kangxi enforced this new decision in the form of a piao or certificate about three months later.

de Tournon was very reluctant to accept the decree, as he did not want to bring it back to the pope. Appiani, de Tournon’s translator, even comforted de Tournon by saying that, even if the pope did not like the decree, the pope shall not blame his representative who brought the message back.\textsuperscript{410} Kangxi’s messenger reported to Kangxi on de Tournon’s hesitation in accepting the decree.\textsuperscript{411} This cast doubt in Kangxi’s mind as to whether de Tournon would honestly deliver all that he had ordered.\textsuperscript{412} This doubt very likely found echoes among the Beijing Jesuits. In the “To the Reader” part of \textit{Acta Pekinensia}, the records about de Tournon’s actions were noted.

\textsuperscript{408} Ibid, pp. 578–579.
\textsuperscript{409} Ibid, pp. 581–583; KMZ, doc.914, p.435.
\textsuperscript{410} Ibid, p. 586.
\textsuperscript{411} Ibid, pp. 583–586.
\textsuperscript{412} Kangxi’s servant suggested: “if he (de Tournon) dares not to report all things to the pope, then we must send the letters directly to the pope.”; KMZ, doc. 913, p.435.
legation in Beijing, Jesuit Killan Stumpf explained why he, as a participant, had put so much painstaking effort into recording and writing the whole event for European readers:

I know many accounts of these events will be produced in Europe, but I will not wait for them to appear. For my part, I give my word that I am ready to provide legal proof of whatever I write.  

*Acta Pekinensia*, though edited by Stumpf, was read and signed by other Beijing Jesuits to guarantee its credibility. They worried that de Tournon and his entourage would create their own versions of events when they got back to Europe. Therefore, the Jesuits provided their records with attachments of the original documents.

Kangxi’s doubt triggered at least two orders immediately after de Tournon’s departure on August 28, 1706. One was to call back the embassy led by Bouvet and Sabino Mariani to Rome, which had left Beijing at the end of January 1706 and was waiting in Guangzhou for travel to Europe. The embassy had been the result of Kangxi’s satisfaction with his first audience of de Tournon on December 31, 1705, and it carried Kangxi’s gifts and letters to the pope. Certainly, the letters written in January could no longer reflect Kangxi’s thoughts and feelings after all that had happened in July and August. In the meantime, Kangxi assembled another embassy, carried by the Portuguese Jesuit Antonio de Barros and the French Jesuit Antoine Beauvollier, to make sure that his view and version of the whole event were delivered to Europe. According to Beauvollier’s thank-you note to Kangxi on his appointment, the purpose of the embassy was not limited to delivering the messages to the Holy See, but to make the whole event widely known in Europe.  

The two Jesuits left Beijing on October 17, 1706, but the selections and translations

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413 AP, p. 4.
414 QMD, p. 308.
of documents had already started on September 4, 1706, one week after de Tournon’s departure.\textsuperscript{415} The Beijing Jesuits, as observed by Kangxi’s messengers, were “very happy” upon learning of Kangxi’s decision to send a new embassy to deliver the latest news.\textsuperscript{416} Besides the documents Kangxi prepared for the new embassy, the two Jesuits also brought to Europe Stumpf’s \textit{Acta Pekinensia}, the Jesuits’ version of the whole event.\textsuperscript{417}

The above two orders were bundled together and announced to all Beijing Jesuits in one decree.\textsuperscript{418} It seems that the two orders were carefully planned by Kangxi. The selection of one Portuguese and one French Jesuit aimed to show Europe a united front in Beijing among Jesuits regardless of their nationality. Meanwhile, to make the recall of Bouvet’s embassy seem reasonable, Kangxi explained that he could not verify that de Tournon was a true legate from the Holy See. So, he needed to wait for a message from his new embassy to confirm de Tournon’s credentials.\textsuperscript{419} Though the Beijing Jesuits confirmed de Tournon’s legitimacy, Kangxi still used the excuse of verification, which was a diplomatic trick widely used in both nomad and Chinese history, as an excuse to halt existing action while leaving open all possibilities for the future.

\textsuperscript{415} AP, p. 5, note 7.
\textsuperscript{416} KMZ, doc. 990, p. 462. According to Stumpf, Jesuits had requested not to stop sending the gifts to Rome. AP2, pp.129-130.
\textsuperscript{417} In the “To the Reader” part, Stumpf proudly announced that a copy of \textit{Acta Pekinensia} was brought to Europe by the two Jesuits. See AP, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{418} QMD, p.308; AP2, pp.124-125.
\textsuperscript{419} QMD, p.308; AP2, pp. 126-127.
Certificates to Preach and Their Meaning

The interview with Maigrot also triggered Kangxi’s concerns regarding the management of Christian missionaries. Kangxi did not know Maigrot at all before the interview, but Maigrot had preached in China for more than two decades already and had made quite a stir in Europe regarding Chinese rites. In Jesuit Stumpf’s words, Kangxi worried about “more Europeans” like Maigrot in the provinces.\(^2\) This made Kangxi aware of the necessity of managing Christian missionaries. Several days after the interview with Maigrot, Kangxi told de Tournon in a letter that he would check future Christian priests coming to China. Kangxi provided his reason:

(Old Westerners) have not created any problems for many years. They lived peacefully, so I accommodated them kindly. I have never checked any Christian from the Western places. Now, because you guys came and created so many issues, I had no choice but to check everyone. You caused that.\(^3\)

Because Maigrot had been introduced to Kangxi by de Tournon as an expert on China. Kangxi therefore attributed Maigrot’s faults to de Tournon. About three months later, in December 1706, Kangxi decided to manage Christian missionaries in a manner similar to the way the empire managed priests of other religions: by issuing certificates. To obtain one, Christian missionaries had to first agree to follow the rules established by Matteo Ricci to allow the practice of Chinese rites, and second, to promise to live in China permanently.

Previously, certificates have been widely viewed by scholars as a reflection of Kangxi’s intention to restrict the Christian mission in his empire, or even as the turning point in Kangxi’s

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\(^2\) AP2, p.269.
\(^3\) KMZ, doc. 914, p.435.
attitude towards Christianity, which ultimately ended in Christianity’s prohibition. Indeed, the requirement of certificates was an added burden and was seen as a restriction from the perspective of the Church. However, it does not in fact mean that Kangxi intended to restrict the mission. In reality, Kangxi had grown up with Jesuits and had taken their ideas, like the rules of Matteo Ricci, and the compatibility between Confucianism and Christianity, as common sense. Suddenly, in his fifties, as a proud monarch with unchallenged power, Kangxi realized that not all Christian missionaries thought and acted in the same way as the Jesuits he knew. New voices challenged common sense. It was at this point that Kangxi demanded certificates. For this reason, both requirements — following the rule of Matteo Ricci and living in China permanently — of obtaining certificates were what the Jesuits nearby Kangxi had done ever since they came to China. Basically, Kangxi’s purpose in demanding certificates was not to change Christian priesthood, but to bring the priesthood back to the conditions he was used to.

Kangxi in fact encouraged missionaries to apply for the certificates, and even persuaded them that the certificate, when used as a piece of official documentation, might help their evangelism. In a meeting with Beijing Jesuits in the winter of 1706, Kangxi said,

朕念你们，欲给尔等敕文，尔等得有凭据，地方官晓得你们的来历，百姓自然喜欢进教。

In famous 1992 symposium on the Chinese Rites Controversy, the whole symposium was agreed on the idea that Chinese Rites Controversy was the cause of the decline of the Christian mission in China. See, Mungello ed., The Chinese Rites Controversy. For an example, Edward J Malatesta’s paper studying this legation begins with the remarks that “it is well known that the papal legate de Tournon condemned the Chinese Rites in 1707 with disastrous effects for the Catholic Church in China.” See Malatesta, Edward. “A Fatal Clash of Wills: The Condemnation of the Chinese Rites by the Papal Legate Carlo Tommaso Maillard de Tournon”, in Mungello ed., The Chinese Rites Controversy, p. 211.
For your consideration, I am going to issue you a written certificate of pardon. After you obtain the certificates, local officers can know your background, and local people will then be happy to join your religion.\footnote{Zheng jiao feng bao, p. 364. Similar words are also seen in QMD, p. 311.}

One may argue that Kangxi’s real intention in requiring certificates may not be found in the above words. But Kangxi’s attempts at persuasion at least showed that Kangxi wished that missionaries would obtain the certificates. Practically speaking, Kangxi prepared one thousand certificates for missionaries.\footnote{QMD, p.314.} At that time, there were fewer than 100 missionaries, so this generous number showed nothing but preparation for a long-lasting mission.

In fact, immediately after Kangxi required the certificates, the Beijing Jesuits did not take the requirement negatively. Instead, they saw benefits within obtaining the certificates; they understood that their certificates were different from the certificates issued to other religions, as their certificates were issued not by any bureaucratic department of the court but directly by Kangxi through his own Imperial Household, which, in Jesuits’ words, “indicates a singular privilege”.\footnote{AP2, p.275.} According to Jesuits’ records, the immediate concern of the new certificates was in fact the practical issue about how to let so many missionaries in provinces come to Beijing to get the certificates in person.\footnote{About the mandate, see Ibid, pp.283-284; About the “danger”, p.319.}

The certificates became, in Jesuits’ words, “the most serious danger” after de Tournon issued a mandate in January 1707 to regulate how missionaries in China should answer the emperor’s questions related to Chinese rites.\footnote{For historical details about this mandate, see Malatesta, “A Fatal Clash of Wills”, p. 211.}
if they would follow the rules of Matteo Ricci.\textsuperscript{428} de Tournon declared that the pope had already issued a decree adjudicating the issues, which was in general against the practices following the rules of Matteo Ricci.\textsuperscript{429} Jesuit Vice-Provincial Monteyro and four other missionaries refused to take the certificates in order to obey Tournon’s mandate, even though they told Kangxi that they personally supported the rules of Matteo Ricci. Kangxi twice sent one of his sons to persuade these fathers, but the fathers would not change their minds. Kangxi, instead of expelling them from China, sent them to Guangzhou to wait for new messages that his embassy to Rome might bring back.\textsuperscript{430}

Kangxi knew and understood the dilemma missionaries faced. Kangxi promised in a meeting with nine missionaries in March 1707 that he, as a ruler, would protect them and negotiate with the pope for their interests. Kangxi concluded his speech in this way:

你们领过票的就如中国人一样，尔等放心，不要害怕领票。

You will be the same as the people of this middle Kingdom after you take the certificates.

Do not worry, and do not be afraid to take them.\textsuperscript{431}

While encouraging missionaries to take the certificates, Kangxi ordered Claudio Filippo Grimaldi to warn de Tournon to leave China quickly and quietly, and not to make more trouble. Grimaldi’s

\textsuperscript{428} The Mandate was translated into English. See Sure, Donald St, Noll, Ray Robert and Malatesta Edward ed., \textit{100 Roman Documents Concerning the Chinese Rites Controversy (1645–1941)} (San Francisco: Ricci Institute, 1992), document 8. See also AP2, p.305.

\textsuperscript{429} de Tournon knew the general ideas of the pope’s decree to ban the practice of Chinese rites, but he did not have the exact copy as he left Europe before its publication. In a letter to the pope, de Tournon complained that he had never received a copy of the decree as he believed that the decree sent to him was intercepted by the Portuguese in Macao. See, Malatesta, “A Fatal Clash of Wills”, p.225.

\textsuperscript{430} Ibid, p. 174.

letter to de Tournon was first submitted to Kangxi for review, and Kangxi made a couple of vocabulary changes. One of the interesting changes was that Kangxi crossed out “annoyance” 恼 and replaced it with “wrath” 怒, to describe his feeling upon reading de Tournon’s mandate. 432

Despite the mandate, the majority of missionaries in China chose to obtain the certificates.433 According to a roster the Imperial Household forwarded to the Board of Rites in May 1707, forty-eight missionaries obtained a certificate, while thirteen refused to do so and were expelled from China. Five were recorded as “case pending;” they lived in Guangzhou to await new messages from Rome.434 To make the certificates useful in the provinces, Kangxi ordered the Board of Rites to notify local officials through its bureaucratic channel about the issuance of such certificates.435 Those who obtained certificates soon found that the certificates actually were useful legal documents. Now they had something to show whenever they had trouble with the local government, as the certificates, issued by the Imperial Household, provided the direct protection of the emperor, which, Jesuits said, indicated “a singular privilege.”436 “Licensed/certified Westerner” (有票西洋人) soon became a new title in official communications, which was used to address missionaries’ legal standing in the empire.437 Both from the perspectives of Kangxi’s

433 Friar Bernardino Della Chiesa (not a Jesuit), the Bioshop of Beijing, was the central figure in uniting missionaries in China to apply for the certificates. Theoretically, he listed nineteen reasons why the missionaries might not follow the mandate of de Tournon. He took the certificate himself and gave out his answers to Kangxi’s questions as a sample to encourage the missionaries in China to apply for the certificates. AP2, pp.377-380; pp.395-397.
434 The full list is seen in QMD, pp. 318–320. In addition to the thirteen expelled, about another twenty-five missionaries not in the list provided by the Imperial Household, left China quietly on their own. The statistics are based on European sources, See, Brockey, Journey to the East, p. 190.
435 QMD, pp. 317
436 AP2, p.275.
437 For example, a 1715 decree was issued by Kangxi to a local governor. Kangxi emphasized “licensed Westerners”(有票西洋人) to address their legal status. See, Nei ge da ku dang an, No.
intention as well as in real practice, the requiring of certificates was merely like a process of licensure. Its aim was not to limit but to regulate the practices of the Christian priesthood.

**Conclusion**

In 1941, John Fairbank, in his pioneering article regarding Qing foreign relations, “On the Ch’ing Tributary System”, noticed that the two papal legations to Kangxi’s court in 1705 and 1720 were not seen in the Qing’s official records. More surprisingly, the third papal legation of 1725, which was received by the Yongzheng Emperor, is in all major official Qing records. Fairbank did not provide an explanation why there were no official records about the first two papal legations, even though he mentioned them in his study by referring them to European sources. After reconstructing the whole process of the reception of de Tournon, it becomes clear that the reason for no Qing official records is more straightforward: It was simply because Kangxi treated the reception of legates from Rome as part of his family activities, and he did not consider them official activities. Even though the protocols of Kangxi’s audiences appeared formal and full of esteem in the eyes of the legates and members of the legations, who glorified and recorded the audiences as diplomatic activities, the nature of the audiences was determined in fact by how Kangxi viewed the legations, which is evidenced by how Kangxi decided to arrange the protocol. As Kangxi used the Imperial Household as the primary agency to arrange receptions, not all activities were routed through the court system. Therefore, the official records, which were designed to record court

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401000971. Besides, local officials also sent requests to Beijing asking for verification of the license. QMD, p.312; pp.313-316; p.321; p.324.

activities, contained no trace of them. For the same reason, when Yongzheng, who had no private relationship with the Jesuits and their religion, chose to use the court system to receive the third papal legation of 1725, the event was therefore seen in all official historical records.

The family-style relationship between the Jesuits and Kangxi is the key to understanding the whole event. At the very beginning, Kangxi decided to receive the legate as a guest of his own family. As a family head, Kangxi defended the interests of Jesuits, who were his family servants. This was a tradition deeply rooted in Manchu society. For this reason, de Tournon was hopeless in many moments because the relationship between the Beijing Jesuits and Kangxi was so close that any requests or comments he submitted to Kangxi would eventually be screened and interpreted by the Jesuits. In de Tournon’s words, “it is that Jesuits group behind the Throne that manipulates the emperor for their own selfish designs.” 439 After the departure of de Tournon, Kangxi sent two Jesuits as his legates to report the events regarding de Tournon, and to negotiate terms regarding the Chinese rites. This was exactly what the Beijing Jesuits wanted. Kangxi’s trust in the Jesuits is worth noting. French Jesuit Beauvollier, one of the two legates, had not served a day in the court, but he was picked based on the recommendations of other Beijing Jesuits.440 Beauvollier was even surprised at the appointment, and thanked Kangxi for his trust.

The issuance of certificates might have come as a surprise to the Jesuits, as it was a by-product of Kangxi’s interview with Maigrrot. However, the requirements for getting the certificates

did not pose a challenge, as the two requirements were just what they already supported and practiced. The real pressure came from de Tournon’s mandate, which forbade missionaries from satisfying the requirements. However, Kangxi undermined de Tournon’s mandate by challenging his credentials as a true papal legate. Nevertheless, it was not Kangxi’s wish to use the certificates to restrict the Christian mission, because he and his sons even tried to persuade missionaries to get them by listing the possible benefits. In actual practice, the majority of Jesuits not only applied for Kangxi’s certificates, but also made good use of them as new documents to confirm their legal status in China.

By and large, Kangxi’s attitude toward Christianity was based on his close relationship with the Jesuits. As long as his relationship with them remained the same, his attitude to Christianity also remained unchanged. For de Tournon, the legation might be categorized as unsuccessful, as he did not achieve anything for his long journey. But for Kangxi or the Beijing Jesuits, the meeting with de Tournon was not an end; instead it was just a beginning of negotiations with the Holy See. The two Jesuits carrying a large volume of documents were on the road to Rome, and they left Kangxi and the Beijing Jesuits with great expectations for the future.
Surprising missionaries in China, de Tournon issued a decree on February 7, 1707 in Nanjing to openly challenge Kangxi’s requirements to obtain certificates. With the hope of damage control, missionaries in China sent letters to the Beijing Jesuits asking for a solution to assuage Kangxi’s “anger”. This put great pressure on the Beijing Jesuits, especially on those who were close to Kangxi and had personal access to him. Coincidently or not, Pereira, the leader of the Portuguese Jesuits in Beijing and Kangxi’s musician for thirty-four years (since 1673), had been tortured by headaches in February and March, and had pessimistically confessed to other missionaries that the headaches were due to his inability to fix the problem created by de Tournon. Antoine Thomas was ill during this time as well. Meanwhile, Gerbillon, the leader of the French Jesuits and Kangxi’s trusted servant since 1689, became ill and, rather surprisingly, died on March 27, 1707.

441 Malatesta, “A Fatal Clash of Wills”, pp. 219-225. See also, AP2, pp.304-308.
442 AP2, p.321.
443 AP2, p.374.
444 Pereira’s letter to southern missionaries was translated by Edward Malatesta, see Ibid, pp. 242–245. See also Pereira’s letter to de Tournon, AP2, pp.331-333.
445 In a letter dated on March 9, 1707, Antonie Thomas wrote “because of illness I cannot write more.” Ibid, p. 240. See also, AP2, pp.333-334.
446 Among all the Beijing Jesuits, Gerbillon maintained the best relationship with de Tournon. This might be the reason that Gerbillon was under the greatest pressure. From the very beginning, Gerbillon was the one who had supported the idea of receiving de Tournon in Beijing. After de Tournon left Beijing, Gerbillon cleaned up the mess left by the legation. Gerbillon took care of Maigrot after the disastrous interview with Kangxi, and gave him money to go back to Europe after he was expelled from China. Gerbillon also took care of Appiani, de Tournon’s translator, who was found by the Qing court having unresolved legal cases in Sichuan province. On December 22, 1706, Gerbillon wrote a letter to de Tournon, and this letter might be the first message de Tournon received regarding Kangxi’s requirements for the certificates. This letter shows what Gerbillon had done for de Tournon after he left Beijing. The letter was translated into English, see Ibid, pp. 234–239; see also, AP2, pp.268-269. For an analysis of Gerbillon’s death, see Collani, Claudia von. “From the Earthly Court to the Heavenly Court”, in Wardega
Fortunately, in April, Jesuit Claudio Filippo Grimaldi, the successor to Ferdinand Verbiest’s court position who avoided receiving de Tournon when he was in Beijing with the excuse of illness, finally found a strategy to hedge against the negativity left by de Tournon. It was to differentiate de Tournon from the pope and attribute all “bad” ideas to de Tournon. In a memorial dated on April 27, Grimaldi told Kangxi,

I tried to persuade de Tournon several times. But he did not listen. Instead, he said that he found something in our letters and will report them to the pope. This is his attempt to make trouble. In the future, do not send letters (to de Tournon). Whatever the matter, just send letters to the pope directly. Besides, when the pope sends people to other countries, the pope always instructs them not to change others’ rituals.

very good (Kangxi’s comment with vermillion ink) 447

Before submitting this memorial, Grimaldi sent a letter to de Tournon to ask him to please leave China quickly and quietly so as to avoid more damage to the mission. The letter was written in a suggestive and friendly manner. However, it seems that de Tournon did not listen. Therefore, Grimaldi complained to one of Kangxi’s servants, saying: “when I write the letters in a friendly tone, de Tournon thinks that I am afraid of him. It is not worth communicating with him. let us contact the pope directly.” 448 Those complaints might have purposely delivered a message to Kangxi that they, the Jesuits, could not persuade de Tournon, and that they preferred to communicate with the pope directly in the future. Strategy-wise, the Jesuits relieved the burdens added by de Tournon to the China mission by portraying de Tournon’s behavior as a violation of the pope’s instructions. Therefore, the Jesuits’ suggestion to Kangxi was to bypass de Tournon.

and de Saldanhappe ed., In the Light and Shadow of an Emperor, pp. 128-130.

447 KMZ, p. 497.

448 Ibid.
Kangxi welcomed such an idea because he, as a monarch, also intended to communicate with the pope, the head of Catholicism, directly. After Grimaldi’s suggestion, Kangxi turned the page and focused on communication with the Holy See. As for de Tournon, Kangxi no longer tried to persuade him, and simply sent him to Macao under house-arrest, letting him wait for the return of Kangxi’s envoys to Rome.\footnote{KMZ, p. 544. For de Tournon’s life in Macao, see Rosso: \textit{Apostolic Legations}, pp. 181–186.}

Neither Kangxi nor the Jesuits expected to wait more than a decade for a response from Rome. The second papal legation, led by Patriarch Carlo Ambrogio Mezzabarba, came to Beijing in December 1720, more than fourteen years after the departure of Kangxi’s envoy of Antonio de Barros and Antoine Beauvollier in late 1706. Many of the Beijing Jesuits participating in Kangxi’s early life died during this fourteen-year period. Besides Gerbillon, who died in 1707, Pereira died in 1708, Antoine Thomas in 1709, and Grimaldi in 1712. Even de Tournon died in Macao in 1710.\footnote{Besides Kangxi’s order to detain de Tournon in Macao, de Tournon did not get along well with Christians in Macao and the bishops of nearby places. In the words of the pope, “he was imprisoned not by pagans, but by Christian officials and ministers.” See Sure, Noll, and Malatesta ed., \textit{100 Roman Documents}, p. 36.}

The period between 1706, when the first legation left, and 1721, when the second legation left, is widely viewed as a time when Kangxi lost patience with and interest in Christianity. Adding Yongzheng’s prohibition of Christianity in 1724 to this time period, the Christian mission is depicted as in decline during these years. Yongzheng’s prohibition was considered a reflection of Kangxi’s will towards Christianity. Therefore, it is widely accepted that during the Kangxi reign, the Rites Controversy—by the means of the coming of two papal legations in Beijing in 1706 and
1721—led the mission to a dead end; Yongzheng’s prohibition was just the logical extension of Kangxi’s policies.\footnote{Arnold Rowbotham, in his pioneer research published in 1941, Missionary and Mandarin: The Jesuits at the Court of China, argues that Kangxi’s favorable attitude towards Christianity “was gradually and almost completely alienated by the quarrels involved in the Chinese Rites Controversy so that, by the end of the Kangxi reign, the foreign priests had lost, or almost lost, the only effective guarantee of their continued stay in the empire.” (p. 176). Sixty years later, Nicolas Standaert, in his encyclopedic work, Handbook of Christianity in China: 635 –1800 (2001), endorsed Rowbotham’s argument, describing how the papal “legation left the Kangxi emperor utterly disgusted with Christianity. His conclusion was clear and devastating.” In Standaert’s eyes, the prohibition actually took place in the Kangxi reign, and Yongzheng just legalized the prohibition, and formally “ordered the final prohibition of Christianity.” (pp. 498–499) Ad Dudink shares a similar view when he summarizes the previous studies regarding “opponents” of Christianity in the Ming-Qing period. He says, “In January 1721, Kangxi emperor expressed the wish to proscribe Christianity, which was implemented only after his death, in January 1724” (p.519). In Journey to the East: The Jesuit Mission to China 1579–1724, the latest survey of the Christian mission in China, Kangxi was pictured as “becoming increasingly frustrated” with Christianity after the 1706 legation, and Yongzheng’s prohibition was depicted as the action begun from where “his father had left off” (p. 199). Chen Qingsong, in “关于康熙朝查禁天主教史料的重新认识” (Reexamination of historical document regarding the prohibition of Christianity, 2010), writes in the first paragraph that “In Kangxi’s late years, because of the arrogance of the Rome church during the Chinese Rites Controversy, Kangxi triggered the prohibition. This has already been an accepted argument among scholars of the field” (in 历史档案 Li Shi Dang An, 2010, v.2, p.35). In 2014, Po-Chia Hsia summarizes: “without exaggeration, we can say that the Chinese Rites Controversy overturned the achievements of the Jesuit mission and caused the decline of Christianity in China.” Hsia, R. Po-Chia. "Imperial China and Jesuit Mission", in Ribeiro, Roberto and O'Malley, John ed. Jesuit Mapmaking in China (Philadelphia: Saint Joseph's University Press, 2014), p.44. In The Oxford Handbook of the Jesuits published in 2018, Claudia von Collani concludes: “the Roman condemnations of the rites led to the prohibition of Christianity and to the banishment of most missionaries to Canton (1724) and later to Macau (1732)”.

This chapter closely examines the documents left by the Qing court to show that Kangxi’s involvement in the Rites Controversy in fact reflected his interest in and concern for the Beijing missionaries. More specifically, by reconstructing the exchange between Kangxi and the second legate day by day, it shows that Kangxi was satisfied with the result of receiving the second papal legation, and Kangxi did not leave a legacy to restrict the Christian mission, which Yongzheng
would inherit. Yongzheng’s prohibition of Christianity was in fact an abdication from, not a continuation of Kangxi’s policies.

**Waiting for a Response from Rome**

As highlight events in Europe-China communications, the two papal legations to China during the Kangxi’s reign draw attentions from both participants and later historians. Yet, largely neglected is the fourteen years between the two legations, during which Kangxi demonstrated unusual patience in waiting for messages from Europe. The second legation was in fact a formal response from the pope to Kangxi’s inquires. Therefore, an understanding of Kangxi’s actions in receiving the second legation has to begin with an understanding of Kangxi’s fourteen-year wait.

Kangxi’s first embassy, made up of Portuguese Jesuit Antonio de Barros and French Jesuit Antoine Beauvollier, left Beijing on October 17, 1706. In January 1707, Beauvollier sent a last letter to Grimaldi before his ship left China. In this letter, Beauvollier told Grimaldi not to worry about him and de Barros, as they had boarded a big reliable ship and the crew treated them well. Grimaldi forwarded this message to Kangxi. It was also the last message Kangxi received from his envoys. De Barros and Beauvollier took a route through the Pacific. They reached Brazil, and wrote a letter on August 7, 1707 to Michelangelo Tamburini, the Superior General of the Society of Jesus, saying that they would first go to their own countries to raise money before going on to Rome. As a precaution, de Barros and Beauvollier boarded two different ships on

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their way to Europe. However, both ships were wrecked in the same storm near the coast of Portugal in January 1708. 453

Kangxi had expected to receive some news about the embassy from Europe by the fall of 1707. On October 13, 1707, Kangxi ordered his servants to ask the Jesuits if there had been any news about the envoy. Grimaldi answered that they had not received any word.454 Instead of continuing to wait, Kangxi sent a second embassy, represented by Francesco Giuseppe Provana and Jose Raimundo de Arxo, to Rome, with sixty-nine official documents translated from Manchu into Latin. They left Beijing on October 27, 1707 and embarked at Macao on a Portuguese ship on January 14, 1708. On this trip, Provana brought along a Chinese follower, Fan Shouyi, who left valuable accounts of the journey. 455

Provana’s group reached Lisbon in September 1708. The Portuguese king, João V, received them. Provana arrived in Rome in February 1709 and gained a chance to meet with the pope in person to express the viewpoints of the Jesuits in China. However, the pope insisted on his previous decision to prohibit Chinese rites practiced among Chinese converts. Besides, he did not allow Provana to leave Europe and go back to China.

Although Kangxi did not know where his two embassies were, both were on his mind. In August 1708, during the period when European ships came to China by riding the monsoon current, Kangxi asked his servants why no Jesuits had reported anything for such a long time,
and he ordered his servants to investigate. Grimaldi answered that he should have reported to Kangxi, but he had planned to report when he could include some news about the envoys. Grimaldi further explained that because European ships were coming now, he hoped he would receive something from his European friends soon, though he was not sure if he would receive messages from the two envoys.\textsuperscript{456} Grimaldi’s answer shows that Kangxi’s expectation of messages put pressure on Grimaldi, who even tried to avoid contact with Kangxi when he could not provide any updates. About one month later, on September 23, 1708, Grimaldi told Kangxi that he still had not received any news, after also reporting that Bouvet had fallen while riding a horse.\textsuperscript{457}

After two years of waiting without any news, Kangxi decided to add channels to collect information from his end. In April 1709, Kangxi sent decrees to the governors of Jiangxi, Fujian, and the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi. The decrees, which contained similar content, ordered the governors to forward letters and packages received from European countries to the court as soon as possible. These decrees, written in Chinese, were sent to the governors via the court channel.\textsuperscript{458} It appears that the local governors did not know what Kangxi was truly looking for; however, using their best guess, they responded to Kangxi with Western wines that they had collected from Westerners.\textsuperscript{459} In August, Kangxi still did not have any news, so he

\textsuperscript{456} KMZ, doc. 1323, p. 586.
\textsuperscript{457} KMZ, doc. 1336, p. 594.
dispatched his servants to ask the Beijing Jesuits. However, the Beijing Jesuits replied that there was no news.\footnote{KMZ, doc. 1454, p. 633; p. 634; p. 650.}

In 1710, as early as March, Kangxi ordered the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi to prepare to report promptly during the summer season when Western ships came in.\footnote{KHW, v.2, p. 761.} In August, the governor reported the death of de Tournon.\footnote{Ibid, v.3, p. 5.} To this report, Kangxi ordered the governor to keep his eyes on Western ships to see if there were any letters or messages from Europe.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 6–11.} In 1711, in July and August, Kangxi asked the Beijing Jesuits if there were any news, but to no avail.\footnote{KMZ, p. 735; p. 741.}

In August 1712, about six years after the departure of his first envoy in late 1706, Kangxi finally received news when his servants inquired of the Beijing Jesuits. Jesuit José Soares reported, knowing from a private letter, that Giuseppe Provana was still in Rome while the pope awaited a message from de Tournon. In this report, Soares also explained that he had just received this message because the Portuguese ship carrying his letter was delayed. Soares mentioned this because Kangxi had sent his servants to ask the Beijing Jesuits about twenty-days before, but at that time Soares had replied that there was no news. Still, after reading the report, Kangxi marked on the report that “they must have known this message some time ago, and they hid this information from me.”\footnote{KMZ, doc. 1977, p. 804.} Fortunately for the Beijing Jesuits, Kangxi received a report from a governor two days later, which also mentioned the delay of the same ship Soares referred to.\footnote{KMZ, pp. 804–805.}

In a memorial dated on October 1, 1712, Soares said that a letter from a ship coming from

\footnotesize{\begin{thebibliography}{9}
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\bibitem{460}KMZ, doc. 1454, p. 633; p. 634; p. 650.
\bibitem{461}KHW, v.2, p. 761.
\bibitem{462}Ibid, v.3, p. 5.
\bibitem{463}Ibid, pp. 6–11.
\bibitem{464}KMZ, p. 735; p. 741.
\bibitem{465}KMZ, doc. 1977, p. 804.
\bibitem{466}KMZ, pp. 804–805.
\end{thebibliography}}
the Pacific route was received on September 28; the letter again confirmed that Provana was in Rome. Soares also said that according to the letter the Portuguese king was involved in the event, as he had dispatched his ambassador to persuade the pope that de Tournon’s words could not be trusted.467

After knowing that Provana had reached the pope, Kangxi started to look forward to his return. Before getting information about Provana, Kangxi received a memorial in 1710 from Fan Shichong, the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, reporting that the two Jesuits of the first embassy had both died in shipwrecks. Fan added that he obtained the information from Macao, and asked Kangxi about the handling of the missionaries under house-arrest in Guangzhou. At the beginning of the house-arrest, Kangxi had ordered that their treatment should await messages carried back by the first embassy. The first envoys, however, had already died on the road. Kangxi ordered him to do nothing but wait for messages from the second embassy.468 It seems that Kangxi had doubts about the accuracy of the information concerning the envoys’ deaths and ordered coastal governors to investigate. According to a memorial submitted in 1718, another governor reported that he was told by Westerners that the two Jesuits had truly died, and those words, the governor told Kangxi, “verified the information previously reported by Fan Shichong.” 469

As a byproduct of Kangxi’s longing for messages, reporting on incoming Westerners and Western ships, since 1712, became routine for the governors of the coastal provinces.470 For example, the coming of Jesuit Giuseppe Castiglione (1688–1766), who had served three Qing

467 KMZ, p. 818.
468 Nei ge da ku, Doc. No. 401001362.
469 KHW, v.8, p.198.
emperors and had significant influence on Chinese painting and art, was reported in the memorial submitted by the governor of Guangdong in 1715. These reports were in the form of official memorials and were submitted through the court channel.

To stop further discussions of Chinese rites, the pope restated his 1704 decree in “a most solemn form as an apostolic constitution,” and published it on March 19, 1715. An English captain brought copies to China in August 1716. Kangxi, through the Beijing Jesuits, viewed the pope’s new statement. After ten years of waiting, Kangxi refused to accept the message through an unofficial channel. Rather than continue to passively wait for his own envoys, Kangxi decided to write an open letter to Europe to inquire. Called the “Red Manifesto,” the letter was written in Manchu, Chinese, and Latin, and was printed in red. The published copies were given to all Westerners coming to China by sea routes and land routes through Russia. The content of the letter is as follows:

In the 45th year of the reign of the Kangxi Emperor, the Westerners Long Anguo [de Barros] and Bo Xiaoshi [Beauvollier] were appointed as envoys; in the 47th year, the Westerners Ai Ruose [Provana] and Lu Ruose [de Arxo] were appointed as envoys, who, having received the Imperial Order, actually went to the West.

For these many years, up to the present time, not only has there not been any response come from them, but besides, confusing messages have arrived. Therefore, another letter was sent by way of the Russians, which presumably reached its destination.

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471 KHW, v.6, p. 439.
472 For an analysis of this instruction and its meaning in the Christian world, see Minamiki, The Chinese Rites Controversy, pp. 58–62.
473 Rosso, Apostolic Legations, p. 192.
It is certain that, only after the men we commissioned have returned and everything is cleared up, credence can be placed in anything. Should the men we commissioned not return, authentic evidence will still be lacking, and no matter what letters may be had, credence positively cannot be given to them.

Therefore, for fear that a letter would not reach its destination, the manifesto, with a Western version appended, has been printed and stamped with the seal of the governor of the province of Guangzhou. It is to be left open and many copies are to be distributed among all the Westerners who arrive, that they may carry them back with them.

Given on the 17th day of the 9th Month of the 55th year of Kangxi. [October 31, 1716] 474

The essence of Kangxi’s letter was to ask for the return of his envoys. At this time, Kangxi already knew that three of four of his ambassadors were dead, so mentioning all four was likely Kangxi’s strategy to ask for the return (or even rescue) of Provana while obtaining an official response from the pope. 475 In terms of diplomatic norms, it was an embarrassment to hold envoys of other countries. 476 In Europe, it had been widely known that Provana was back to Europe and had reported to the pope. Now Kangxi’s open letter revealed officially that Provana was in fact an envoy of Kangxi. In the eyes of Europeans, the open letter put the pope in a morally difficult position as he banned the return of an envoy. Therefore, once receiving the

474 The translation, with the adjustment to the pinyin system regarding Chinese names, is fully from Rosso, Apostolic Legations, p. 309. The book also has a photocopy of the letter. 475 The reason to view it as a strategy is because Kangxi used a similar trick when he negotiated with Tibet. Upon Kangxi finding out from a war captive in the Mongol area that Sangye Gyatso concealed the death of the fifth Dalai Lama, Kangxi taught his ambassador to Tibet that a smart strategy was to ask for an in-person meeting with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa rather than pointing out or asking about his death. See Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet, p. 48. 476 Rosso, Apostolic Legations to China, pp. 203.
letter in 1717, the pope decided to let Provana go back to Beijing. He summoned Provana and ordered him to use the excuse of poor health to cover his detention.\textsuperscript{477} Provana embarked several months later. Following the departure of Provana, the pope dispatched the second legation with a long letter to Kangxi to explain why his envoys did not return. Despite the diplomatic greetings and official wordings, the letter dedicated more than half its contents to explaining the outcomes of Kangxi’s four ambassadors.\textsuperscript{478}

For Kangxi, his Red Manifesto worked as he had hoped: Provana was allowed to return, and the pope sent a second legation to China. Provana, unfortunately, died on route back to China. Fan Souyi, Provana’s Chinese disciple who accompanied him, came back with Provana’s coffin in July 1719. The governor-general of Guangdong reported about Fan’s arrival to Kangxi.\textsuperscript{479} Kangxi then ordered the governor to thoroughly investigate Fan, as Kangxi suspected that Provana was murdered.\textsuperscript{480} But it seems that the governor did not find any evidence to support Kangxi’s suspicions. It was against this background that Carlo Ambrogio Mezzabarba, the second papal legate, came to China in December 1720.

**Kangxi’s Unusual Patience: Why?**

In any respect, Kangxi showed unusual, decade-long patience in communicating with the pope. As a proud monarch, Kangxi had the power to enforce whatever he wanted in the matter of

\textsuperscript{477} Ibid, p. 199.
\textsuperscript{478} The English translation of this letter is in 100 Roman Documents, pp. 42–46.
\textsuperscript{479} KHW, v.7, pp. 701–702.
\textsuperscript{480} Kangxi complained in his exchange with the second legate: “中国所使之人一字不回都暗害杀死（Not one word sent back from envoys of China; all were secretly murdered”), KYL, doc. 13; For English translation of the whole document, see Rosso, Apostolic Legations, p. 367.
Chinese rites; he could even have simply neglected or forgotten about the issue. His patience was considered unusual in the eyes of his contemporaries. On November 19, 1720, a Russian embassy sent by Peter the Great arrived in Beijing twenty-five days before the arrival of the papal legation in Beijing on December 15. Those two embassies knew each other, and both used the Beijing missionaries as interpreters. They had even once been received at the same time by Kangxi in the Qing court. John Bell, a Scottish doctor in the Russian group, left some records about the papal legation in his diary. Regarding the purpose of the legation in resolving the matters regarding Chinese rites, Bell commented:

> At any rate, it must be acknowledged an instance of uncommon condescension for a heathen Emperor to interest himself so much in the peace of a Christian church.  

In Bell's eyes, the Chinese Rites Controversy, which Bell categorized as a controversy between the Jesuits and Dominicans, belonged to Roman Catholicism. Therefore, Bell was surprised that Kangxi had "interest" in the affair. Jonathan Spence, a major contemporary scholar of Kangxi’s life, echoed Bell’s observation and also found Kangxi’s involvement unusual. Spence spoke in a meeting dedicated to the study of the Chinese Rites Controversy:

> In short, Kangxi could have dismissed this whole question of the Rites Controversy as nonsense, and we would not be here today [to have this meeting]. Or he could have simply acted very decisively on one side or the other. He had the power to do that. He could have simply expelled one body of churchmen. Instead, he agonized, argued, cajoled, engaged actively in the matter.

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481 Bell, John, *Travels from St. Petersburg, in Russia, to diverse parts of Asia* (Glasgow, 1763) v.2, p. 47.
Spence sensed the unusualness of Kangxi’s engagement because Kangxi could have found easier alternatives for handling the issues. This unusualness poses a question: why did Kangxi choose to engage in the matter in this way?

Regarding Kangxi’s involvement, the prevailing argument portrays him as a defender or protector of Chinese culture. The argument is not merely the result of modern scholars’ misreadings. In fact, it was the Beijing Jesuits who intentionally created this portrait in their writings to Europe. In so doing, the Beijing Jesuits hoped that Rome would yield to the secular power in exchange for spreading the Gospel. In the context of European history, the Beijing Jesuits’ portrait of Kangxi as determined to defend his ideas met the general European conception of wise monarchs in the Far East. Therefore, it was easily accepted without much questioning. Father Pedrini, however, wrote that Kangxi was not the type of emperor the Jesuits described, and suggested that Kangxi might accept the pope’s ruling. In fact, de Tournon had made a similar observation before Pedrini, according to his in-person talks with Kangxi. de Tournon believed that Kangxi could accept different opinions about Chinese rites, and that it was the Beijing Jesuits who misdirected Kangxi to reject alternatives to the Jesuits’ claim. Unfortunately, de Tournon’s observation appeared emotional and subjective in the eyes of later historians. Pedrini’s writings and letters, too, could not compete with those written by the

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486 For an example, see Rouleau, “Maillard de Tournon”.
Jesuits, whose documents appeared so interconnected and authoritative, especially since they were accompanied by different kinds of carefully prepared original sources and proofs. 487

Nevertheless, a secret Chinese memorial submitted to Kangxi in 1715 by Father Pedrini directly confirms Kangxi’s capacity for listening to different ideas about Chinese rites. Upon submission, Father Pedrini requested that Kangxi keep it secret because, as Pedrini claimed, all of Kangxi’s close servants who handled missionary issues were on the side of the Beijing Jesuits. 488 This memorial answered Kangxi’s inquiry about why he had received no response from his embassies to Europe for such a long time. Pedrini argued that the delay was due to the Beijing Jesuits hiding and blocking all messages. Pedrini explained the pope’s decision in detail and told Kangxi that the decision was widely accepted and obeyed by different Christian church orders. Even the Superior General of the Society of Jesus in Rome, Pedrini said, declared that the whole Society of Jesus should follow the decree. Pedrini said that some Jesuits in China received messages from their society, but that the Beijing Jesuits, particularly Kilian Stumpf, threatened others not to spread those messages. This explained to Kangxi why no one reported the pope’s decisions to him even though “all Westerners in China had already known them.” 489 Pedrini also reminded Kangxi of the example of Luo Ruode, a European in Macao (only known by his Chinese name), who in 1712 submitted to the court a letter written by the pope and addressed to

487 AP, p. 4.
489 Ibid.
de Tournon. Luo Ruode, according to Pedrini, was forced by the Jesuits to embark at night on a boat leaving Macao. Pedrini used this case to show how aggressive the Jesuits were in monopolizing communications coming from Europe.

Indeed, Pedrini’s many complaints about the Jesuits were unverifiable, but the particular case of Luo Ruode was supported by a court document. On October 11, 1712, Man Pi, the Manchu governor of Guangdong province, submitted a memorial to Kangxi after receiving a letter from Luo Ruode. Man Pi went the extra mile to bring the letter to several Europeans in Guangzhou, who verified that this letter had in fact come from the pope. Beyond blocking the messages sent to Beijing, the Beijing Jesuits had also, Pedrini reported, sent a letter to Europe saying that Kangxi would “expel those coming with the decisions of the Pope.” Pedrini said that this letter was signed by Henkema, Kangxi’s closest servant in handling Western affairs, to make it look authoritative. Kangxi would certainly have not trusted all of Pedrini’s words and would have taken them very likely with a grain of salt. The significance of Pedrini’s memorial lies not in how many stories it revealed about the Jesuits, but in the fact that Kangxi could listen to alternative explanations regarding Chinese rites. After Kangxi read Pedrini’s memorial, Kangxi forwarded it to two of his sons to read.

Specifically, Kangxi did not necessarily believe the idea that he had acted to defend—that Confucian teachings were compatible with Christianity. His private talks with the Jesuits showed

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490 KMZ, pp. 823–824. The letter was sent by the pope to confirm de Tournon’s credentials and to request Kangxi to accommodate him kindly. Kangxi ordered Bouvet, Pedrini, and Ripa to translate the letter. A copy of their Chinese translation is found in Rome. For the photocopy of the translation and its background see Han, Qi 韩琦, “Shan shan laichi de ‘xiyang xiaoxi’—1709 nian jiaohuang zhi Kangxi xin daoda gongting shimo 姗姗来迟的《西洋消息》—1709 年教皇致康熙信到达宫廷始末.”, in Wenhua zazhi 文化杂志 15, pp.1-14.
that he knew very well that there were incompatible aspects between the two. So his arguments were less a reflection of his intellectual recognition and more a reflection of his negotiating skills. In June 1711, while Kangxi was waiting for news about his envoys to Rome, the French Jesuit Bouvet finished his book about *The Book of Changes*, one of the six fundamental Confucian classics. He submitted it to Kangxi for review. *The Book of Changes*, with its figurative symbols, might be read as a philosophy book, but it is by nature a divination book. Upon reading some of Bouvet’s interpretations, Kangxi made the following remarks to all the Beijing Jesuits:

> I scanned the preface. It is verbose and long. If people like Yan Dang (Maigrot’s Chinese name) and Liu Ying (the Chinese name of Jesuit Claude de Visdelou, who supported the ban of Chinese rites) appeared, they would certainly challenge the content item by item. If from now on you are not very careful about your writings, even I will be unable to explain them. You Westerners shall discuss these matters, and not take them lightly. 492

Kangxi’s response shows his worry about a book, which was a rare worry in his proud life. In fact, his response was not about the book itself, but about potential problems that would arise if it was read by those who argued for the incompatibility of Chinese rites and Christianity. His worry shows that Kangxi knew very well the incompatible aspects of the two cultures. He warned the Beijing Jesuits that if their opponents were armed with books like *The Book of Changes*, he would be unable to furnish a logical explanation to insist on compatibility. 493

Kangxi’s recognition of incompatibilities had been awakened in part by his experience of being

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492 QMD, p. 331. For Visdelou’s argument about Chinese Rites, see AP2, pp.45-46.  
493 See also, QMD, p. 332.
intellectually challenged by de Tournon’s example regarding different attitudes toward vengeance.(see the Chapter four) Though Kangxi provided an argument with a long explanation, which de Tournon praised, Kangxi understood the difficulties of forming an argument that insisted on compatibilities. For The Book of Changes, the most important classic of Chinese divination, Kangxi knew much better than the Jesuits that it would be catastrophic for their argument if the other side found ammunition in it. For this reason, he worried about it, and sharply drew the attention of the Beijing Jesuits, emphasizing to them that they “not take the matter lightly.”

Then why did Kangxi persist in expecting messages from Europe? The simple answer was because he needed Europeans and their skills. These needs were real and practical. After being introduced by the Jesuits to many aspects of European civilization, Kangxi had several personal interests as well as imperial projects that relied on well-educated Europeans. Kangxi notified the coastal governors several times to keep their eyes on incoming Europeans in order to find those with true skills, such as mathematics, astronomy, and medicine. In the 1710s, governors developed ways of finding Europeans. Father Pedrini, who was a musician, and Father Ripa, who was good at painting, were tested first by the Guangdong governor before being sent to Kangxi. In certain areas, Kangxi and his sons had reached the frontline of the field, so they awaited new discoveries or methods coming from Europe. When the Jesuit Ignaz Kogler, who had taught math in European universities, came to China in 1717, he was first examined by

494 Kangxi introduced math and related subjects to his own family and the children of the Manchu elite in the 1710s, see Jami, The Emperor’s New Mathematics, pp. 260-283.
495 For Pedrini’s music contribution, see Lindorff, Joyce. “Missionaries, Keyboards and Musical Exchange”, pp.405-414.
Kangxi’s third son about his knowledge. Before the examination, Kangxi told the third son to check if Kogler knew some new methods to get square roots or cube roots more easily. Kangxi’s curiosity about finding a better or easier way to get square roots and or cube roots was a pure metaphysical interest without much practical use.

Practical projects such as mapping the whole empire badly needed experienced Europeans. After the death of Gerbillon and several other Jesuits in the latter half of the 1700s, Bouvet, who was at the time obsessed with his research on the *Book of Changes*, was pushed to the front of projects like this. In 1708, Bouvet came back to Beijing from the field on the pretext of having fallen from a horse. Kangxi angrily pointed out that it was Bouvet’s excuse to avoid work. A drama like this vividly shows that Kangxi lacked hands for these kinds of projects. In the 1710s, Kangxi demanded more skilled Europeans than in his early years, because the more European skills he witnessed the more his interest grew. In 1721, when Jesuit Joao Mourao advised the Portuguese king on preparing gifts for Kangxi’s seventieth birthday, Mourao recommended bringing good European cooks, as Kangxi had kept Mourao’s cook in the Imperial Kitchen.

Kangxi’s demands meant that he did not want to simply cut off discussion with the pope after patiently waiting for so long. Kangxi knew very clearly only two kinds of Europeans came to China: merchants and missionaries. His need for European technicians and scholars could only

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497 KMZ, doc. 2912, p. 1158; doc. 2918, p.1160.
498 Cams, Mario. *Companions in Geography*.
be filled by missionaries; therefore, it was in his best interest to maintain a reciprocal relationship with the pope. This is also the reason that Kangxi did not make any argument regarding the Chinese rites in the Red Manifesto, the open letter sent to Europe in 1716; instead, he only declared the fact that he had sent two envoys to Europe and asked for a formal response from the pope. This shows that Kangxi’s manifesto, unlike the pope’s decree, focused on further communication rather than on the statement of principles. With Kangxi’s motives during the waiting period in mind, one can properly understand Kangxi’s actions and words during his receipt of the second papal legation.

Kangxi’s Reception of the Second Papal Legation in 1720–1721

Upon learning that the legate Mezzabarba was in China and on his way to Beijing, Kangxi start to prepare for negotiations with the legate. Kangxi knew missionaries in different church orders had their own views regarding Chinese rites, and he had shown his flexibility in accommodating their differences. But, with tough negotiations ahead, Kangxi decided that he had to create a united front on his side. A week before the coming of the legate, on December 17, 1720, Kangxi organized a meeting with all Beijing missionaries. First, Kangxi stated clearly to all missionaries that he had “never changed his mind” regarding the Chinese rites. Second, Kangxi demanded that all missionaries answer Mezzabarba that they followed “the practice of Matteo Ricci.” Third, if they had any opinion, they should submit it to him and not render their “private opinion” to Mezzabarba.501

501 KYL, doc. 12.
Seven days later, on December 24, 1720, Kangxi sent his servants to meet Mezzabarba in Doudian, a small place about fifty kilometers away from Beijing. Kangxi’s servants asked Mezzabarba about the real purpose of the legation. Upon entering China, Mezzabarba had submitted that the purpose of the legation was to thank Kangxi for his accommodation of Westerners. Kangxi certainly knew that it was much more than that. Therefore, Kangxi sent his servants to ask for the real reason for the legate’s arrival. Kangxi’s servants also informed Mezzabarba that an embassy of Peter the Great was currently in Beijing, and that it would be an embarrassment if a legation such as his willfully hid the real purpose of the mission. Mezzabarba had prepared to raise the controversial issues related to Chinese rites only when he saw Kangxi, but now, faced with Kangxi’s inquiry, Mezzabarba reported the next day (December 25) that he had two purposes for the trip: the first was to request that Kangxi allow him to supervise all Christian missionaries in China, and the second was to ask Kangxi to allow the pope’s decree to be obeyed among Christians in China.  

Kangxi responded to Mezzabarba on December 26 saying that the plan for an audience on December 27 was cancelled because of Mezzabarba’s two requests. Kangxi ordered Mezzabarba to live outside the city. As for Mezzabarba’s two requests, Kangxi sarcastically responded that he would allow both, on condition that Mezzabarba bring all missionaries back to Europe to obey the pope’s decree. As for those with special skills who chose to remain in China, Kangxi added, they could privately practice their religion and follow whatever the pope directed. After receiving Kangxi’s response, Mezzabarba submitted the pope’s letter and other official documents to Kangxi and requested that Kangxi review them. On December 27, Kangxi told

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Mezzabarba that he would order all Westerners in Beijing to see Mezzabarba, and that he could then go back with those missionaries to Europe. Kangxi’s response put great pressure on Mezzabarba, as his mission might end with the worst result: all missionaries were expelled from China with him not even being able to meet Kangxi.  

To get more time in Beijing, Mezzabarba asked for Kangxi to be merciful and allow him to rest in China because he was already exhausted from his long journey. It was at this moment that Kangxi sent a message to Mezzabarba, on December 28, to show his views of the Chinese Rites Controversy. Kangxi remarked:

The reason for the controversy was due to the disputes between people of the Congregation of the Propaganda like Maigrot and Pedrini and those in the Society of Jesus. Those disputes caused all the problems.

Kangxi was very clear that the essence of the controversy lay within Christianity. But to support the Jesuits, Kangxi complained that the pope handled the controversy unfairly because he was always on the side of the Congregation of the Propaganda. As Mezzabarba belonged to the Congregation of the Propaganda, Kangxi argued that the choice of “another” legate from the Congregation of the Propaganda was direct proof of the pope’s unfairness in handling the controversy. (de Tournon, the first legate, was from the Congregation of the Propaganda as well.) Therefore, Kangxi questioned: “where was the fairness? (公道何在？).” Strategy-wise, Kangxi first recognized that the whole issue belonged to Christianity; he then tried to disqualify

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503 Ibid; For the English translation, see Rosso, *Apostolic Legations*, pp. 344–346.
504 Ibid; For the English translation, see Rosso, *Apostolic Legations*, p. 347.
505 Ibid; the English translation quoted above is translated with a reference to the translation in Rosso, *Apostolic Legations*, p. 348.
Mezzabarba’s credential to “fairly” judge the case as yet “another” representative from the Congregation of the Propaganda.

After receiving Kangxi’s message, Mezzabarba responded on the same day asking if Kangxi could advise him as to how Kangxi wanted the terms to fit China. If he could, based on his power, amend certain conditions in a way to satisfy Kangxi, he would do that. If he could not amend certain items, he would pass Kangxi’s opinions to the pope, and let him decide. Mezzabarba requested that Kangxi understand his position as an envoy for the pope.  

Mezzabarba’s promise to change, Kangxi immediately sensed the possibilities of amending the pope’s decree. Kangxi confidently sent his guess to Mezzabarba on December 29:

Upon reading the message, it seems that your pope must have given you two sets of documents and ordered you to present a particular set according to the different situations you encountered.  

Kangxi certainly welcomed Mezzabarba’s hint of the possibility of change, as he immediately ordered an audience for Mezzabarba two days later.

On December 31, Kangxi met with Mezzabarba in a hall of his private garden (Chang Chuan Yuan) in a suburb of Beijing. The audience went smoothly and primarily focused on the reception of official documents. It seems that Kangxi hoped the Christian fathers in Beijing could themselves reach an agreement with Mezzabarba regarding Chinese rites, since he had already paved the way. For the first two weeks in January of 1721, Kangxi and Mezzabarba

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506 Ibid; For the English translation, see Rosso, *Apostolic Legations*, p. 349.
508 Ibid; For the English translation, see Rosso, *Apostolic Legations*, pp. 356–357.
exchanged gifts, and Kangxi periodically sent Mezzabarba food and drink prepared by his kitchen, tokens of Kangxi’s concern for his guests.

But the Beijing fathers themselves could not reach agreement. Father Pedrini and Father Ripa, who belonged to the Congregation of the Propaganda, advised Mezzabarba that the pope’s decree could be enforced in China as it was. No change was needed. On the other side, the Beijing Jesuits worked hard to push to change the pope’s decree. Kangxi noticed the different voices among the Beijing fathers, and told Mezzabarba on January 17:

When you were in my presence the day before yesterday, you should have noticed that Westerners [indicating the Christian fathers] had different opinions and contradicted each other. Everyone has his own private thoughts; therefore, my words could not be delivered to you completely. (Kangxi thought that the missionaries had not faithfully translated his words) 509

To Kangxi’s surprise, his noninterference was interpreted by Father Pedrini and Father Ripa as a sign that Kangxi tacitly consented to the pope’s decree. The two fathers had even “congratulated” Mezzabarba on successfully completing the mission. 510 As the Beijing fathers could not reach agreement, Kangxi decided to negotiate terms with Mezzabarba directly. Therefore, he instructed Mezzabarba to listen neither to the fathers from the Society of Jesus nor to those from the Congregation of the Propaganda. 511

Against this background, Mezzabarba submitted the full version of the pope’s decree while asking for comments. Mezzabarba requested that Kangxi approve the items he deemed fit for China; for the items not fit for China, Mezzabarba would report them to the pope. Kangxi

509 Ibid; For the English translation, see Rosso, Apostolic Legations, p. 362.
510 Ibid; For the English translation, see Rosso, Apostolic Legations, pp. 361–362.
511 Ibid; For the English translation, see Rosso, Apostolic Legations, p. 362.
gave a whole paragraph’s worth of remarks with red vermillion ink on January 18, 1721 (see attached picture). The remark, in summary, criticized the decree as a work totally ignorant of the Chinese culture. At the end of the remark, Kangxi wrote:

似此乱言者，莫过如此。此后不必西洋人在中国行教，禁止可也，免得多事。

There is nothing greater than nonsense such as this. so do not let the Westerners preach in China any more. To avoid the hassles, banning them is okay.\textsuperscript{512}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{kangxi-note.png}
\caption{Kangxi’s Note to Threat the Prohibition of Christinity, from Chen, Yuan ed, \textit{Kangxi yu Luoma shi jie guan xi wen shu ying yin ben}, doc. 14.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{512} Ibid, doc. 14.
The above remark has been widely quoted by previous studies as a hard evidence that Kangxi was going to start the prohibition. It is true that the face value of this remark gestured to the prohibition. However, with the historical context in mind, it is obvious that this remark was a political strategy to probe Mezzabarba’s bottom line. As Kangxi had predicted that Mezzabarba carried two sets of documents, Kangxi knew that Mezzabarba, as an ambassador, would not submit the “good set” without some pressure. Accompanying his remark, Kangxi added that he would not grant any audience to Mezzabarba; all future replies shall be in written form. Besides, Kangxi mentioned again that the Russian embassy was now in Beijing. He would send his remarks in the form of an open letter through the Russians to Europe.

In accordance with Kangxi’s expectation, Mezzabarba was recorded as being “very upset” after seeing Kangxi’s vermilion comment, and replied the same day (January 18, 1721):

嘉乐来时，教王还付与臣条约解说一张，已经奏过，仍求皇上再赐全览。臣能遵旨行者，即遵旨行。臣量力不能改正者，求皇上命臣回西洋去传与教王。臣必亲身作速回来复命。

In addition, because Kangxi died twenty-three months after this comment (Dec. 20, 1722), Yongzheng’s decree of the formal prohibition in January 1724 was consequently viewed as the logical extension of Kangxi’s proposition. For example, in Standaert’s Handbook, he used this comment as the evidence to prove that Kangxi was the real one initiating the prohibition. Standaert views this note as the conclusion of Mezzabarba’s legation. Standaert’s translation of the note: “It is the acme of unlawful nonsense, henceforward Westerners must not be allowed to practice their religion in China. We may as well prohibit it, so as to avoid a lot of troubles.” See Standaert, Handbook, pp. 498–499. In the same book, Ad Dudink shares the same point by providing this comment, p. 519. See also a full translation and quote of this decree in Gernet, China and the Christian Impact, p.186.

KYL, doc. 13, for the English translation, see Rosso, Apostolic Legations, p. 365.

Ibid.
When I left, the Sovereign Pontiff issued me an explanation of the decree, which was presented. I request that Your Majesty read it in its entirety. What I can do in compliance with the order of my majesty, I shall do; as to what I am not empowered to modify, I request Your Majesty to dispatch me to return to the West and refer it to the Sovereign Pontiff. I certainly would come back myself as soon as possible to report on the result.  

The explanation was later called the “eight permissions,” which was declared as an amendment to the pope’s decree allowing some practice of the controversial Chinese rites. Kangxi appreciated the compromises reflected in Mezzabarba’s permissions. Though Kangxi continued to ask Mezzabarba to take his views back to the pope, Kangxi stepped down to end the whole argument by accepting the permissions. Therefore, three days later, his “anger” subsided as quickly and dramatically as it had come. On January 21, Kangxi met all of the Beijing missionaries and Mezzabarba again. In the eyes of Kangxi, this was the last meeting to handle issues related to the Chinese Rites Controversy, because the records of Mandarin’s Diary (Jia le ri ji), Kangxi’s version of records of the whole event, ended with this meeting. At the end of the audience, Kangxi spoke to Mezzabarba in a very friendly manner. He said,

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516 Ibid, the English translation quoted above is translated with a reference to the translation in Rosso, Apostolic Legations, p. 366.
517 For details about those permissions, see Minamiki, The Chinese Rites Controversy, pp. 64–65. Mezzabarba received those permissions while he was in Lisbon. See, Witek, Controversial Ideas in China and in Europe, p.6.
518 Mandarin’s Diary was created at Kangxi’s direction to record all his communications with Mezzabarba. Kangxi prepared such records to reflect his view of the whole event. To add credibility, all Beijing missionaries except Pedrini signed the diary. This diary was translated into Latin and was sent to Europe by sea routes to Rome as well as carried to Rome by the Russian Ambassador in Beijing. Mezzabarba read the diary while he was in Beijing in February. There is also a record that the King of Portugal read the diary. For the full English translation of the Mandarin Diary, see Rosso, Apostolic Legations, pp. 342–381.
The new year [Chinese New Year] is coming, and you can decide your returning date in the next year. Now everything is clear, and you understand all my points. You know, since you are an ambassador, I had to speak to you very directly without reservation. Since you have given up arguing, I will continue to host you as favorably as before. I always treat Chinese and non-Chinese equally and never differentiate among them. You can have a good rest in these days, and you can live in any Beijing church you like.\footnote{KYL, doc. 13; for the English translation, see Rosso, \textit{Apostolic Legations}, p. 373.}

Obviously, Kangxi’s attitudes and his wording had changed dramatically from those in the vermilion comment he sent out four days previously on January 18. Kangxi even (in the third sentence of the above excerpt) politely explained to Mezzabarba why he had to speak so “directly” in the previous communication. It was for the purpose of conveying his argument: he had to be that “strong.” Kangxi actually confessed that his previous “strong responses” were just instruments of negotiation. At this audience, it is obvious that Kangxi had “softened” his pose and language, as he kindly offered Mezzabarba to rest comfortably in any Beijing church he liked.

Interestingly, a noteworthy detail connotes Kangxi’s sophistication in negotiation. On the same day Kangxi threatened to prohibit the mission in the vermilion comment (January 18, 1721), he ordered Longkeduo, the Military General of Beijing and the key figure of the fourth generation of the Tong family, to arrest Giovanni Laureati, the General of the Society of Jesus in China, who had secretly come to Beijing and hidden himself in the cemetery of the Beijing missionaries. The next day (January 19), Longkeduo reported to Kangxi that Laureati had been arrested. Kangxi then ordered him to bring Laureati to Mezzabarba’s place to interrogate
Laureati on his motive for hiding.\textsuperscript{520} Hence, we can imagine how much pressure Mezzabarba was under on January 18, when he received the prohibition comment while at the same time hearing of the public search for the General of the Society of Jesus. In fact, Kangxi knew that Laureati was in Beijing; why exactly did he order his arrest on the same day he conveyed the vermillion comment? The only explanation is that the arrest along with the vermillion comment were maneuvers that Kangxi used for negotiation. For the same reason, Kangxi set Laureati free two days after he received Mezzabarba’s explanation of the pope’s decree.

That February was “spent in a polite exchange of gifts and pleasant amenities,” as summarized by Antonio Sisto Rosso.\textsuperscript{521} January 28 was the Chinese New Year of 1721, so Mezzabarba was invited to party after party and show after show. On February 11, the fifteenth of the first month of the lunar year, Kangxi invited Mezzabarba to dine until the evening’s fireworks. On February 18, Kangxi gave Mezzabarba the gifts that he had prepared for the pope and the king of Portugal.\textsuperscript{522} On March 1, 1721, Kangxi gave Mezzabarba a high-level farewell audience.\textsuperscript{523} According to both Kangxi’s words and deeds, the legation had ended, at least in Kangxi’s eyes, happily and successfully.

This happy ending was evident as well in the records written down after the legation. Kangxi died on December 20, 1722, about eighteen months after Mezzabarba left Guangdong.

\textsuperscript{520} Ibid; for the English translation, see Rosso, \textit{Apostolic Legations}, pp. 370–371.
\textsuperscript{522} The parties and shows Mezzabarba was invited to in February were recorded in an unpublished Chinese court document. A copy of this document was found by Antonio Sisto Rosso in the Vatican. Rosso translated the whole document into English, see Rosso, \textit{Apostolic Legations}, pp. 383–387.
\textsuperscript{523} Minamiki, \textit{The Chinese Rites Controversy}, p. 72.
province in June 1721.\textsuperscript{524} In August 1722, as usual, the governor of Guangdong reported to Kangxi about the coming of Western ships and personnel with special skills.\textsuperscript{525}

**Conclusion**

Kangxi knew very well that the controversies over Chinese rites were problems within Christianity. As a monarch in China and vast nearby areas, he certainly understood that religious guidelines did not necessarily meet with the customs and usual practices of Confucianism. Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism, and Daoism all had tenets and practices that were different from and contradictory to Chinese rites and customs. As specified in Chapter Four, Kangxi stepped into the Chinese Rites Controversy to support the Beijing Jesuits who were his servants. His support was the responsibility of a master for his servants. It was a Manchu tradition that the master had to protect and defend his servants. This support is no different from Kangxi’s involvement in the Jesuits’ legal cases. When the Jesuits had legal trouble pending in the legal system, Kangxi’s Imperial Household sent a letter to the Board of Justice to support them.\textsuperscript{526}

Kangxi might have truly tired of the “hassles” involved in supporting the Jesuits in a dispute within their religion. When Mezzabarba brought out the eight permissions, Kangxi immediately took the deal despite the fact that the Beijing Jesuits were still not fully satisfied with the terms of the permissions.\textsuperscript{527} According to Father Ripa, Kangxi even gave a promise to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{524} The governor of Guangdong province reported to Kangxi Mezzabarba’s departure. KHZ, v.8, p. 766.
\item \textsuperscript{525} For example, the arrival of French Jesuit Antoine Gaubil (1689–1759), who contributed significantly to the European understanding of Chinese history and culture and lived in China for the rest of life, was reported at this time to Kangxi. KHZ, v.8, pp. 905–906.
\item \textsuperscript{526} QMD, p.323.
\item \textsuperscript{527} Rosso, *Apostolic Legations*, p. 209.
\end{itemize}
Mezzabarba that he would never again be involved in religious affairs. Because of this happy ending, Mezzabarba stayed in Beijing comfortably the whole month of February without any further arguments. Both Kangxi and Mezzabarba looked forward to a better relationship in the future. One year later, Kangxi received the official documents from the new pope, Innocent XIII, who announced to Kangxi his pontificate that began in May 1721. This was a token of the Vatican’s interest in continuing connections with Kangxi as well.

Why then do previous researches regard the second legation as a failure? There are probably two reasons. The first one is Eurocentrism. Mezzabarba’s legation did not enforce the pope’s decree in full from a European point-of-view. Thus the legation was viewed as bending to a non-European power. In this sense, it was a failure. Antonio Sisto Rosso’s *Apostolic Legations to China*, for example, is the most comprehensive study of the legations, and it used and referred to European as well as major Chinese sources. The book gives a clear picture that the second legation ended peacefully with mutual understanding, but Rosso still labeled Mezzabarba’s efforts as “the second unsuccessful legation,” because Mezzabarba did not successfully enforce the full terms of the pope’s decree.

The second reason for misunderstanding the second legation is reading Chinese sources without looking at the historical context. The widely quoted words of Kangxi regarding the prohibition is an example. Looking at the days immediately after the words of prohibition, one cannot take the words at face value. Taking the historical context of Kangxi’s patient, fourteen-year wait into account, it is obvious that Kangxi’s words of prohibition were just a tactic for the purpose of negotiations.

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528 Ibid.
529 KHZ, v.8, p. 912.
530 Rosso, *Apostolic Legations*, p. 211.
Controversies over Chinese rites were hot topics in Europe ever since the requests asking for arbitration reached Rome in the seventeenth century. However, the place for all those debates was primarily in Europe. Kangxi added his own perspective to the whole controversy, but he kept his views in the personal sphere. Kangxi did not extend them to a wider audience in China, and this is the reason why there were almost no major Confucian intellectuals or court ministers involved in the debate. Though it is not accurate to say that the Chinese Rites Controversy had no influence in China, it is certainly an overestimation to argue that the Chinese Rites Controversy determined the destiny of the Christian mission in China, especially the final one: prohibition, the topic of the next chapter.
Chapter 6: Yongzheng’s Prohibition of Christianity in 1724

On May 24, 1727, the Yongzheng emperor received the official documents submitted by the embassy of Portugal on its way to Beijing. Because the day, Yongzheng pointed out, happened to be the birthday of the Buddha Shakyamuni, Yongzheng made a comment on Christianity and compared it to Buddhism. Yongzheng said:

I suspect, when the Western religion was founded, someone had been respected as the sky. However, if he called himself the lord of the sky, it is absurd. The Buddha treated calmness and inaction as the essence, and the aim of the faith is discovering the unattained heart. Therefore, there is no better teaching for self-practice and self-perfection than Buddhism.531

About three years earlier, in January 1724, within the first year of his ruling, Yongzheng prohibited the preaching of Christianity in China. Since that time, missionaries in China had used all possible means to influence, lobby, and request Yongzheng and his associates to reverse the decision and restore its former status, as it had been during the time of Kangxi. Yongzheng knew that the embassy from Portugal would present another request on behalf of Christianity. In 1725, about two years before the Portuguese embassy, Yongzheng had already rejected a request from the papal embassy.532 This time, he made a comment on Christianity publicly during court hours and demanded that the “meaning” of his comment be made known to the embassy from Portugal in advance.

For Christian missionaries residing in Beijing, the depressing environment was not limited to this kind of open humiliation of their religion as something “absurd”; more critically,

531 Yongzheng qiju zhu, 2:1175-1176.
532 Rosso, Apostolic Legations, pp.216-219.
they did not see any hope to change it, because their position at court had totally collapsed after Kangxi died. Within three months of his enthronement, Yongzheng refused to inherit the Beijing missionaries as personal servants from his father’s Imperial Household. He simply ordered the director of the Imperial Household to tell Beijing missionaries that they no longer belonged to the Imperial Household, and that their privilege to access the inner part of the Forbidden City was revoked.\footnote{Ripa, Memoirs of Father Ripa, p. 124.} In Kangxi’s early years, Jesuit Ferdinand Verbiest, Ludovico Buglio, and Gabriel de Magalhaens’s loyal services earned the trust of Kangxi and his inner circle; consequently Kangxi put them in the Imperial Household as his personal slaves. Later missionaries inherited the status and its implied privilege of closely accessing Kangxi. To the missionaries’ dismay, Yongzheng did not even give the Beijing missionaries a chance to serve him, and simply expelled them out of his Imperial Household. Without the position as emperors’ servants, missionaries became mere technicians, such as astrologers and painters, of the court.

To the Christian fathers, Yongzheng’s prohibition, which came nine months after evicting them from the Imperial Household, was not a surprise. They had felt vividly the atmosphere change of the whole court toward them since Yongzheng made his attitude clear through the eviction. In a certain sense, if the Imperial Household eviction was the first public statement of Yongzheng’s none-interest in the Christian missionaries, the prohibition was an upgraded form of the eviction, which aimed to drive Christian fathers out of wider areas.

Yongzheng was forty-five years old when he became the emperor. Unlike his father Kangxi who was enthroned at the age of seven and was trained by Jesuits, Yongzheng’s spiritual and intellectual interests had been dedicated to Buddhism since he was young. Yongzheng had neither interest in Christianity as a religion nor in the Western academic subjects and
technologies that Christian missionaries taught.\textsuperscript{534} More importantly, Yongzheng was not a normal Buddhist believer, but one of the most accomplished Buddhist practitioners in the Qing dynasty, which determined that Yongzheng and the Christian missionaries could not form a close and trusting relationship. The prohibition reflected the relationship between Yongzheng and missionaries just as Kangxi’s toleration reflected his relationship with missionaries.

**Kangxi’s Late Years and the Missionaries’ Bet on the Future Emperor**

Kangxi was deeply troubled by the succession crisis in the last decade of his life (1712–1721). Because all those involved were his sons and relatives, Kangxi was emotionally and psychologically tortured in handling them “properly.” According to Manchu tradition, heir apparents were not established. In the past, upon the sudden deaths of Nurgaci and Hung Taiji, this had caused succession crises. To ensure the certainty of imperial succession, Kangxi took the advice of Chinese ministers to adopt the Chinese tradition and establish an heir apparent. In 1675, when Kangxi was twenty-one years old, he appointed his two-year-old second son as the heir apparent. But problems arose when the heir apparent had to wait more than thirty years for the throne. In 1708, Kangxi deposed the heir apparent as he detected that the heir apparent intended to kill him.\textsuperscript{535} Kangxi soon realized that the deposition hurt more than helped the situation because the deposition ignited his other sons’ desires for the throne and exacerbated the

\textsuperscript{534} Yongzheng once even said “China has all good things whatever Westerners have”. See Du, Wenkai 杜文凯, *Qing dai xi ren jian wen lu* 清代西人见闻录 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue press, 1985, p.145

\textsuperscript{535} For stories about them, see, Wu, Silas H.L. *Passage to Power: K’ang-hsi and His Heir Apparent, 1661-1772*, (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1979), pp.123-131.
contention among them. The eldest son, for example, took the deposition of the heir apparent as his chance, and he even offered to kill the unworthy heir apparent, his younger brother, if Kangxi could not bear to do it as his father. Meanwhile, Tong Guowei, Kangxi’s long trusted uncle, supported the eighth son of Kangxi. They quarreled about the choice, and at one time, Tong Guowei even challenged Kangxi, and asked Kangxi to kill him as a solution to end their dispute. Kangxi later regretted the deposition, partly because he found out that the original heir apparent had been set up by the eldest son, who had invited Tibetan lamas to cast black magic around the heir apparent. Kangxi re-established the heir apparent in 1709. However, Kangxi dismissed the heir apparent once more in 1712.\(^{536}\) From that time on, Kangxi refused any suggestion to appoint a new heir apparent before his death. The uncertainty as well as the possibility of becoming the next emperor intensified competition as well as hostility among Kangxi’s sons.

Back in 1675, when the second son was appointed the heir apparent at the age of two, the Beijing missionaries actively participated in the early life of the future emperor because of their good relationship with Songgotu, the core of the second son’s maternal family. In their writings sent back to Europe, the Beijing missionaries wrote highly of the heir apparent, and were optimistic that this future emperor would treat Christianity well.\(^{537}\) In 1706, after Kangxi gave his farewell audience to de Tournon, the heir apparent gave his own farewell audience. de Tournon was excited to see the future emperor as a person friendly to Christianity.\(^{538}\) At any rate, the deposition of the heir apparent in 1712 was a loss from the perspective of the Beijing missionaries because it meant that their efforts to establish a relationship with the heir apparent

\(^{536}\) Ibid, pp.147-155.  
\(^{538}\) AP, pp.415-416.
over the course of more than three decades were wasted. They needed again to guess the future heir and arrange their new efforts accordingly.

By and large, the Beijing missionaries had established personal relationships with all of Kangxi’s adult sons through the many occasions when Kangxi had assigned them to teach Western subjects. Kangxi’s sons were roughly divided into four cliques: The first clique formed around the deposed heir apparent, who had many followers waiting for his re-establishment as heir. The second clique centered on the third son, an erudite scholar in charge of Kangxi’s imperial academic projects who was supported by many scholar ministers. The third clique was organized around the fourth son, who later became the emperor. The thirteenth son was a core member of this group. The central figure of the fourth clique was Kangxi’s eighth son, who was supported by Kangxi’s ninth, tenth, and fourteenth sons.

Besides their well-established relationship with the deposed heir apparent, the Beijing missionaries had a long relationship with Kangxi’s third son (of the second clique) because the third son, in addition to serving as the head of the Mathematics Office, was Kangxi’s manager in charge of academic projects regarding Western subjects. Regarding the fourth clique, Joao Mourao, a leading figure of the Beijing Jesuits in the last years of Kangxi’s reign, established a loyal master-servant style relationship with Kangxi’s ninth son, and had therefore established a solid network within his clique. This relationship later cost Mourao’s life, when the whole fourth clique was purged after Yongzheng became emperor. Unfortunately for the Beijing missionaries, they had little connection with the third clique, which eventually won the succession war.

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539 Pei Huang showed the third son had a good chance to become the next emperor. See, Huang, Pei, *Autocracy At Work: A Study of the Yung-cheng Period: 1723-1735* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), pp.71-75.

Yongzheng’s Enthronement

Kangxi died during a hunting trip in the fall of 1722. He seemed healthy when he left Beijing, but became suddenly ill and worsened quickly. The succession process, as recorded in the official history, took place on the deathbed of Kangxi, where he orally appointed his fourth son as heir because the fourth son shared “similar characteristics” with him. According to the official records, several of Kangxi’s sons and Longkedo, then the commandant of the Beijing Gendarmerie, were present during Kangxi’s oral assignment. But whether Yongzheng, the fourth son, was present at the assignment is unclear because the official records, written and edited by Yongzheng’s scholars, differ in this detail.\(^{541}\)

Regardless of what is in the official records, Yongzheng’s claim to the throne was questioned, and he was considered a usurper. The doubt lingers in the modern era even after all the court archives have been made public. The primary reason for the doubt is the fact that Yongzheng organized first-rate scholars of his time to systematically screen and delete official records from the Kangxi reign.\(^{542}\) In the famous anti-Manchu plot led by Zeng Jing in 1728,\(^{543}\) Zeng Jing and his followers listed the sins of Yongzheng, one of which was that Yongzheng was a usurper and had caused his mother’s suicide. After Zeng was arrested, Yongzheng wrote a long statement to refute the charges. Yongzheng’s refutation then included his version of the last days of Kangxi and his subsequent enthronement. With a wish to clear himself, Yongzheng published

\(^{541}\) On the analysis of the statement and its discrepancies regarding details of the last days of Kangxi, See, Meng, “Qing Shizong ru cheng da tong kao shi”, pp. 519-572.

\(^{542}\) On the analysis of the deletion of the official records, see Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 917.

\(^{543}\) For a general account and stories of the whole case, see Spence, Jonathan, Treason by the Book (New York: Viking, 2001).
and circulated the statement in *Da yi jue mi lu* 大义觉迷录, a book of collected essays refuting Zeng Jing’s charges. To the dismay of Yongzheng, the details he articulated in the statement only provoked more questions about Kangxi’s last days, as there were so many discrepancies between his account and other sources. Upon his enthronement in 1735, Qianlong, Yongzheng’s son, retrieved and destroyed *Da yi jue mi lu* with the hope of ending the discussion about his father’s succession. Nevertheless, some copies survived, and became the primary source for people to learn of the rumors and doubts about Yongzheng’s enthronement that had circulated at the time of his rule. Because of this, the legitimacy of Yongzheng’s enthronement became an unavoidable topic in studying Yongzheng and his early rule.

Understanding the doubts over the succession is important in order to comprehend the missionaries’ actions before and after Yongzheng’s enthronement. First, the doubts showed that many courtiers did not anticipate that Yongzheng would be picked to assume the throne. This included the Beijing missionaries. Their lack of foresight explained why the Beijing missionaries had not put much effort into building a better relationship with Yongzheng and his circle. It is evident that the Beijing Jesuits had in fact paid special attention to analyzing who Kangxi’s choice of the heir would be. However, their analysis did not direct them to Yongzheng. John Bell, the Russian embassy doctor, revealed in his diary that he had heard that the fourteenth son would be the heir. This view matched the mainstream guess of the time. Bell was in Beijing in

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544 Meng, “Qing Shizong ru cheng da tong kao shi”, pp. 519-572.
545 Certainly, there are scholars who argue that Yongzheng was not a usurper, but they cannot avoid the question of usurpation before they discuss other aspects of Yongzheng’s life. For examples of scholars arguing for Yongzheng as a legitimate successor, see Wu, *Passage to Power*, pp.179-186; Zelin, Madeleine, “Yung-Cheng Reign”, in *The Cambridge History of China: The Ch’ing Empire to 1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2002), vol. 9, pp. 183-189.
546 Wu, *Passage to Power*, p. 158.
the spring of 1721, about eighteen months before the death of Kangxi. Very likely, Bell obtained this information from the Beijing missionaries, who were his translators and primary hosts. In Kangxi’s late years, the Beijing Jesuits truly put special efforts into building a relationship with the clique of the fourteenth son, who was later dispatched to the northwest for military tasks. While not in Beijing, the fourteenth son’s primary Beijing informant about court affairs was the ninth son, whom Jesuit Joao Mourao loyally served. According to the depositions Mourao provided in the interrogation regarding his special relationship with the ninth son, Mourao was deeply involved in the activities of this clique in Kangxi’s late years. For example, Mourao went so far as to bribe general Nian Gengyao, who was Yongzheng’s brother-in-law and Yongzheng’s most trusted follower, to change his loyalty to Kangxi’s ninth son. In short, the Beijing missionaries participated in the politics of the succession based on their analysis of the situation, but, unfortunately, their analysis was not right.

Second, due to doubts about the enthronement, Yongzheng had the needs to rearrange the big family Kangxi left. He could only use those whom he trusted, while he distanced and even prosecuted those whom he did not. Evicting Beijing missionaries from the Imperial Household was just one of many such kind of re-arrangements. After assuming the throne in November 1722, Yongzheng in 1723 exiled the third son of Kangxi to guard the tomb of Kangxi. The third son was a scholar in charge of all of Kangxi’s academic projects. Yongzheng removed his name from all academic projects, among which, for example, was the *Gujin Tushu Jicheng* (Complete

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548 Records of Mourao’s interrogation were published in the early twentieth century as a part of the document for studying Yongzheng’s prosecutions of his brothers. “Mourao’s Interrogation,” in *Wen xian cong bian*, v.1, pp. 1-4a. Another packet of Mourao’s interrogation records in Chinese was found by Antonio Sisto Rosso in the Vatican. Published and translated in Rosso, *Apostolic Legations*, pp.407-418.

549 “Mourao’s Interrogation”, pp. 2a-2b.
Collection of Illustrations and Writings from the Earliest to Current Times), one of the best encyclopedia collections in Chinese history. Kangxi’s ninth son was exiled to Xining in the spring of 1723. Kangxi’s tenth son was exiled to Mongolia. The fourteenth son, who was in the northwest handling Manchu relations with Tibet, eventually came back to Beijing several months after Kangxi’s death.\(^{550}\) The fourteenth son was said to be arrogant with strange actions and words. Yongzheng then moved him and his house outside Beijing city. Yongzheng also downgraded the role that the fourteenth son played in managing Manchu control in Tibet.\(^{551}\) In fact, the fourteenth son and Yongzheng were brothers from the same mother. In the norms of the imperial harem, brothers of the same mother always had the best relationship due to their blood connection. Yet, neither the fourteenth son nor his mother, Yongzheng’s two closest relationships by blood, celebrated Yongzheng’s enthronement. In fact, to protest Yongzheng’s actions, his mother was said to have committed suicide by smashing her head against a pillar after hearing about Yongzheng’s treatment of her younger son.\(^{552}\)

The ninth son, the tenth son, and the fourteenth son were connected and belonged to the same clique, which was the most powerful group in Kangxi’s late years. Upon enthronement, Yongzheng spent his first three years of his reign trying to eliminate its influence. Little by little, both Kangxi’s sons and their supporters were demoted, exiled, and prosecuted.\(^{553}\)

\(^{550}\) Yinti, the fourteenth son of Kangxi, was widely rumored to be the next emperor in many Chinese records. He just missed the opportunity by not being physically in Beijing at the time of Kangxi’s death. On Yinti’s successful campaign in Tibet, see, Perdue, \textit{China Marches West}, pp. 232-240. For an analysis of Yinti’s chances in the succession struggle, see Huang, \textit{Autocracy At Work}, pp. 77-80; Hummel, \textit{Eminent Chinese}, p.927.

\(^{551}\) Peter Perdue, after analyzing different sources, wrote highly of the contribution the fourteenth son made to the Manchus’ expansion in the northwest. Perdue also indicates that the fourteenth son might be the real heir in Kangxi’s mind. See Perdue, \textit{China Marches West}, p.240.

\(^{552}\) See also, Huang, \textit{Autocracy at Work}, p.75.

\(^{553}\) For the list of supporters being targeted by Yongzheng see Wang, Zhonghan 王钟翰, “Qing
Missionaries’ Efforts

Yongzheng’s prohibition of Christianity started with a suggestion by the governor of Fujian province in the form of a court memorial in October 1723. Its content, like other anti-Christian documents, argued that the teachings of Christianity contradicted traditional Chinese customs and suggested that missionaries be prohibited from living outside of Beijing but be allowed to stay in Beijing as technicians only. When the Beijing Jesuits traced the source of the anti-Christian sentiment to Fujian, they found it was due to two new Spanish missionaries who did not take seriously the Chinese taboo regarding women’s participation in public activities and who had, among other things, allowed men and women to sit together in churches for mass. The Beijing Jesuits viewed such arrangements as an example of ignorance of Chinese customs, and felt it was very unfair that the improper conduct of two unknown fathers should eventually lead to an empire-wide prohibition.

After receiving the memorial, Yongzheng forwarded it to the Board of Rites, which supported it. In January 1724, Yongzheng approved the deliberation and issued the edict of prohibition. From the very beginning of the whole event, when it was first raised by the Fujian governor, the Beijing missionaries worked very hard under the table to find a solution to resolve the issues. The Manchu director of the Bureau of Imperial Astronomy, who was a close friend of the governor of Fujian, wrote a letter to the governor on behalf of the Beijing missionaries. A

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Shizong duo di kao shi 清世宗夺嫡考实” (The evidential examination of Yongzheng’s scramble for the throne), in Qing shi za kao 清史杂考 (Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 1963), pp.147-193.

554 Menegon’s in depth study of Fujian Christian community argues that the suggestion of the prohibition by the governor of Fujian was a reflection more of Beijing politics than local disorders. See, Menegon, Ancestors, Virgins, & Friars, pp. 116-124.

missionary in Guangzhou made three visits to the governor of Guangdong, who, although not wanting to get involved in the case, finally sent a letter to the governor of Fujian asking him to reconsider. All these private requests received the same answer from the governor of Fujian: the issue was out of his control, as it had already been reported to the emperor.\textsuperscript{556}

Beijing missionaries then worked at the court by using the network they had established during more than a half century’s worth of service to the Kangxi emperor. On December 29, 1723, a friend privately informed Jesuit Parrenin of the proposed resolution that Yongzheng planned to enforce: Beijing churches and missionaries were to be kept unchanged but no churches and missionaries were to be allowed in the provinces.\textsuperscript{557} Parrenin knew of Yongzheng’s decision even before it was discussed by the Board of Rites. This information gave the Beijing missionaries a very important signal that the prohibition was the emperor’s, and that the resolution had already been secretly decided by the emperor and his ministers. The discussion in the Board of Rites was just a formality. After receiving this information, Parrenin reached out to one of his old friends in the Imperial Household who was responsible for delivering Yongzheng’s edict. Parrenin’s friend told Parrenin that the case had just been forwarded to the Board of Rites.\textsuperscript{558}

Nevertheless, the Beijing missionaries tried to influence the discussion in the Board of Rites. They bribed a secretary in the Board of Rites, with a “large amount of money,” to find and hand-copy the exact edicts in the archive regarding Kangxi’s toleration of Christianity, which, the missionaries had hoped, might help their standing.\textsuperscript{559} Kangxi’s twelfth son, a Manchu official

\textsuperscript{558} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{559} Ibid, v.10, p.505; Chinese translation, v.2, p.324.
in charge of the Board of Rites, and two other members agreed to help the missionaries after looking into the matter. In the first meeting on January 3, 1724 to discuss the memorial submitted by the governor of Fujian, a lower ranking minister provided a draft of the resolution, which was to endorse the prohibition. Those agreeing to help the missionaries challenged the draft and questioned why the edicts previously issued by the Kangxi emperor were not considered at all. They requested another draft for discussion. To the surprise of all members, the lower ranking officer provided the exact same draft the next day, and very arrogantly refused any change to the draft. The members, Jesuit de Mailla reported, “sensed the unusual arrogance” as a signal that the lower ranking officer was supported by the emperor. Therefore, all members, except for the Chinese Director of the Board and a member on friendly terms with Jesuit Parrenin, signed the draft. The two who had refused to sign felt intense pressure and eventually signed the draft several days later.  

At this stage, the Beijing missionaries analyzed the political situation in the court and found that Kangxi’s thirteenth son was the key person in Yongzheng’s new court. Jesuit painter Giuseppe Castiglione was chosen as one of three Jesuits to visit the thirteenth son, because Castiglione’s painting had previously gained favor with the prince. The thirteenth son sympathized with the missionaries, and agreed that the memorial of the Fujian governor was unreasonable because a local affair should not be magnified to attack all the missionaries in the empire. However, the thirteenth son, after talking with Yongzheng several times, could not alter Yongzheng’s decision.

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As the ban became unavoidable, the Beijing missionaries wanted to propose that the missionaries in the local provinces be allowed to go and live in Guangzhou rather than in Macao. Kangxi’s thirteenth and sixteenth sons very patiently helped the Beijing missionaries with this task. The thirteenth son taught the Beijing missionaries that the best strategy in writing such a request was to beg the emperor for mercy instead of arguing with him regarding policy. After the draft was finished, the thirteenth son read it and gave suggestions for changes. Additionally, the thirteenth son told the Beijing missionaries about the two possible channels to submit their request to the emperor, one of which was controlled by the thirteenth son himself.\(^{562}\)

The final copy submitted to Yongzheng, as found in the court archive, truly followed the suggestions of Kangxi’s thirteenth son.\(^{563}\) It first calmly accepted the prohibition in the local provinces without any argument. Then it begged Yongzheng to consider a practical issue that Guangzhou had more ships coming from different European countries than did Macao. Therefore, missionaries choosing to go back to their own countries could more easily take ships from Guangzhou. Additionally, it asked Yongzheng to consider the old age of the missionaries in the local places and requested that Yongzheng allow more time for them to prepare for all the changes.\(^{564}\)

It seems that the missionaries’ emotional petition truly touched Yongzheng, who immediately allowed the request and had the written response delivered to the three missionaries.


\(^{564}\) For missionaries exiled to Guangzhou, see Tang Kaijian 汤开建, “Yongzheng jiaonan qijian quzhu chuanjiaooshi zhi Guangzhou shijian shimo kao 雍正教难期间驱逐传教士至广州事件始末考”, in Qingshi yanjiu 清史研究, 2014, 0(2), pp.1-33.
who were still waiting in the palace. After receiving Yongzheng’s response, Jesuit Parrenin, the primary Jesuit who knew the Manchu language after serving Kangxi for about two decades and who was very skillful in court politics, replied with some very appropriate words (the actual words are unknown) concerning Yongzheng’s mercy. The servant delivering Yongzheng’s response immediately reported Parrenin’s words to Yongzheng, who then happily granted an audience to the missionaries. Unlike in the time of Kangxi’s reign, when missionaries could access the emperor on a daily basis, Yongzheng’s audience was the first chance the Beijing missionaries had to meet the emperor in person since the case of the prohibition had been raised a half a year previously. Yongzheng spent about fifteen minutes with the three missionaries and gave his reasons for endorsing the prohibitions. The three missionaries did not argue with Yongzheng, but just thanked Yongzheng for his mercy in allowing the missionaries to stay in Guangzhou. The meeting ended by Yongzheng giving each missionary a small gift.  

**Why Did Yongzheng Prohibit Christianity?**

Why Yongzheng prohibited Christianity is an unavoidable question in the Church’s history in China. Due to the timing, with Yongzheng issuing the prohibition within his first year of rule, a time in which nothing significant happened related to the churches in China, the search for reasons logically extended back in to the Kangxi period. Indeed, many scholars claimed that the causes of the prohibition, forming in Kangxi’s reign, were the consequences of some “grand” events, such as disputes over Chinese rites and boarder concerns over the European countries’

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colonial expansions in nearby countries. Yongzheng’s prohibition is thus portrayed as a reaction to certain social realities congregated in a long period of time; Yongzheng just finished the final step in issuing the prohibition. For these explanations, the question becomes why Christianity was prohibited in China, instead of why it was prohibited in particular by Yongzheng. Yongzheng’s role then is downplayed, and he becomes just one actor in the whole process.

In general, however, Yongzheng cannot be treated as simply another emperor of the Qing dynasty. His reign had in fact its own characteristics. Unlike the emperors in the Ming dynasty, whose personal influences were limited by the whole bureaucratic system, the early Qing emperors, equipped with the Manchu-style master-servant power structure, enjoyed autocratic power outside the Chinese bureaucratic system. Research shows that Yongzheng in particular was interested in enforcing his own power.

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566 European countries’ military expansions in south Asia and their threat to Qing were reported to Beijing by Chen Mao 陈昴 in 1717. Chen Mao’s report was discussed in the court and led to unfavorable deliberations regarding Western people (including missionaries). Beijing missionaries asked Kangxi for re-consideration of these deliberations. Kangxi told the missionaries that, as long as the missionaries had their certificates, they could do the same thing as before; In considering the idea regarding missionaries being treacherous and their threat to national security, Kangxi explained with a smile that “the impeachment about treachery was a court culture”. Though discussed and deliberated in the Beijing court, Chen Mao’s report did not change anything about missionaries’ standing in Kangxi court, and did not get many echoes in his time as well. More about stories related to Chen Mao’s charge, see Rosso, *Apostolic Legations*, pp.193-199.

567 The prevailing argument is to argue that the prohibition was the result of the two papal legations regarding Chinese Rites Controversy. (See chapter 5 for my refutation to this argument). See, Standahert, *Handbook*; p.519; Brockey, *Journey to the East*, p.199. Li Tiangang, *Zhongguo Li Yi Zhi Zheng* (Shanghai, Shanghai Guji, 1998), Chen, Qingsong, “Guan yu Kangxi”, v.2, p.35.

568 Huang, *1587, The Year of No Significance*.

569 Bartlet, *Monarchs and Ministers*; Huang, *Autocracy at Work*; Wu, Silas *Communication and Imperial Control in China*. 
Historical details, such as those revealed in this chapter, also confirm that it was Yongzheng’s personal wish, instead of any “grand” social trends that led to the prohibition. Upon learning of the memorial by the governor of Fujian, three sons of Kangxi (the twelfth, thirteenth, and sixteenth) thought they could help the Beijing missionaries. Though these three eventually gave up when they discovered that the case was in fact supported by the emperor, their first response to the Beijing missionaries clearly shows that they sensed neither prevailing social realities nor persuasive logic in the memorial of the Fujian governor that led to the prohibition of Christianity. Therefore, they had agreed to help. At the very least, they viewed the situation of Christianity in the empire differently from Yongzheng. These three brothers were in Yongzheng’s political alliance and did not have a special relationship with the missionaries. Princes who truly had a good relationship with the Beijing missionaries, like Kangxi’s third and ninth son, had already been exiled. The thirteenth son of Kangxi, who had the best personal relationship with Yongzheng, even pointed out that it was unreasonable that the governor of Fujian asked for an empire-wide ban based on his experience with a local event. At the meeting of the Board of Rites, both Manchu and Chinese directors of the Board were initially against the prohibition even though they eventually yielded to the personal will of the emperor. That is to say there were no agreed-upon social conditions or reasons to prohibit Christianity even among Yongzheng’s trusted brothers and high-ranking ministers. Prohibiting them or not was contingent on who viewed the case. For this reason, the search for the reasoning behind Yongzheng’s prohibition must focus on Yongzheng and his personal predilections.

I. Yongzheng’s own explanations on the prohibition

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Yongzheng had provided a written reply to the petition submitted by the Jesuits in 1724 to request that missionaries be allowed to stay in Guangzhou. This was the first written response to the missionaries regarding the prohibition. Yongzheng wrote,

朕自即位以来，诸政悉遵圣祖皇帝宪章旧典，与天下兴利除弊。今令尔等往住澳门一事，皆有福建省住居西洋人在地方生事惑众。朕因封疆大臣之请，庭议之奏，施行政者，公事也。朕岂可以私恩惠尔等，以废国家之舆论乎？今尔等既哀恳乞求，朕亦只可谕广东督抚暂不催逼，令地方大吏确议再定

Since my enthronement, all my policies followed the rules and guidance established by the Kangxi emperor. The purpose is to encourage whatever provides benefit to all-under-heaven [in the meaning of the Chinese context] while eliminating whatever is considered harmful.

Regarding ordering you to go to Macao, this was due to the Westerners who lived in the Fujian province who caused trouble and fooled the people there. Upon receiving the memorial of the minister protecting the local area, the case was deliberated in the court. The order now enforced is a decision in the public interest. How can I grant you private favor when it will damage the public interest and the state?

Now as you are begging so miserably, I can only order that ministers in Guangdong province not press the enforcement of the deliberation harshly. [meaning, do not push those missionaries in Guangzhou to go to Macao.]. Let the local officers discuss the matter, and then make a decision. ⁵⁷¹

⁵⁷¹ QZQ, v.1, p.59.
This written response was not a private message to the Beijing missionaries; instead, it was an open document to officially answer the petition in the court system. After the reply was carried out from Yongzheng’s working chamber, it was first read by the ministers in charge of petitions. After they found it appropriate, they passed it to the three missionaries who had just submitted the petition. With this background in mind, it might be easier to understand the bureaucratic tone of the reply. After stating that he was working for “all-under-heaven”, Yongzheng explained the prohibition as a collective decision of the court system and suggested that he was just a monitor in the process. Only at the end of the passage did Yongzheng indirectly approve the requests in the petition.

Yongzheng also explained the reason for the prohibition to Kong Yuxun, the governor general of Guangdong and Guangxi. Kong was appointed to the post about three months after Yongzheng endorsed the prohibition in January 1724. Yang Lin, the previous governor appointed by Kangxi who had been friendly with the missionaries, had been removed from the post without receiving any new appointment. After reaching the new post, Kong had submitted a memorial to report his observations regarding Christian missionaries. First, he confirmed that missionaries did not violate laws in his jurisdiction. Then, without knowing the real intention of Yongzheng’s prohibition, he provided an argument similar to the deliberation of the Board of Rites, which was: Keep missionaries with skills in Beijing and exile those just spreading the mission. Yongzheng then issued a reply to the memorial,

朕不甚恶西洋之教，但与中国无甚益处，不过从众议耳。你酌量，如果无害，外国人一切从宽为好。恐你不达朕意，过严，则又不是矣。

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573 QZQ, v.1, p.59.
I do not particularly dislike Western religions, but they do not have any benefit for the empire. I therefore simply followed the deliberation that prevailed.

You may balance [how to handle the missionaries].

If not harmful, it is better to handle all foreigners leniently.

I am afraid that you might not fully understand my point. If you are treating them too strictly, you are wrong.\textsuperscript{574}

Before instructing Kong to treat missionaries leniently in Guangzhou, Yongzheng again emphasized that the prohibition just followed the decision of the court and indicated that the prohibition was not due to his personal dislike of Christianity. Putting this together with Yongzheng’s explanations of the prohibition to his ministers, it seems that Yongzheng felt obliged to state that the prohibition was not due to his personal insistence rather than to make an argument in favor of prohibition. It was unusual for an emperor to attempt to strike a distance from a decision he endorsed. Why did Yongzheng do that? The simple reason was that there were no “solid” persuasive reasons for the prohibition, and the whole court thought that it was merely Yongzheng’s personal wish. Therefore, Yongzheng needed to keep saying that the prohibition was not his personal desire.

\textbf{II. What did other participants say?}

Despite Yongzheng’s own words, those closely involved in the case pointed out that the prohibition was the result of his personal wishes. Jesuit Moyriac de Maillia in a long letter of

\textsuperscript{574} The translation was referred to Fu, Lo-shu. \textit{Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644-1820)} (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1966), p.139.
October 16, 1724 provided a complete account of the affair. Because this letter discussed the experience of other Jesuits in detail and was referred to or mentioned by other Beijing Jesuits at the time, it may be considered a work of the collective efforts of the Beijing Jesuits. It contains an analysis of the changed attitude toward missionaries, which was considered the cause of the prohibition. It says:

Now, the current emperor has almost not [personally] used any European, as he has no interest in science and foreign treasures. His attitude has made some of our friends keep their distance from us. Some of them will no longer help us; some of them dare not have contact with foreigners.

Compared to Kangxi, Yongzheng had a different array of personal interests, which determined not only the emperor’s attitude, but also changed the whole atmosphere surrounding missionaries in the court. In the eyes of the Jesuits, the governor of the Fujian province bringing a local case to the court level was a reflection of such an atmosphere change.

As the middle man between Yongzheng and the Beijing missionaries, Kangxi’s thirteenth son had a similar view. The only difference was that the thirteenth son pinned the interests specifically on Yongzheng’s faith in Buddhism. In a private meeting with missionaries asking for help, the thirteenth son said:

As you know, the current emperor greatly liked Buddhist and Daoist monks when he was the fourth prince. But at that time, he was not an emperor yet. My father liked you very much, and granted you favor after favor. As you know, his protection and favors were often discussed privately by literati.

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575 For more interpretation of this letter, See Marinescu, “Defending Christianity in China”.
This was explained when Kangxi’s thirteenth son persuaded the Beijing missionaries to forget about the favors Kangxi had extended to them. At that time, Kangxi, said the thirteenth son, “liked you” (the missionaries). However, now, according to Kangxi’s thirteenth son, the fundamental situation had changed: The new emperor liked “Buddhist and Daoist monks.” Before providing his speculation, the thirteenth son emphasized that this was his personal opinion regarding the change in attitude towards them. Juxtaposing the analysis of the thirteenth son with that of the Beijing Jesuits, it shows that they both, as participants in the whole event, attributed the policy change to the emperor’s personal interests.

III. Buddhism: the Basis of Yongzheng’s Intellectual and Spiritual Mind

Yongzheng’s belief in Buddhism is not news in the studies of Yongzheng. What truly matters to history is Yongzheng’s level in Buddhism. Yongzheng, unlike ordinary temple-going Buddhist believers, was an avid Buddhist practitioner, and his meditation reached levels of enlightenment. To put it simply, the difference between general Buddhist believers and Yongzheng was no less drastic than the difference between pickup game basketball players and the best NBA players.

For a long time, Yongzheng was regarded in the same light as other Qing emperors, who used Buddhism as a political tool to facilitate their rules. David Farquhar, in a widely quoted study, “Emperor as Bodhisattva in the Governance of the Ch’ing Empire”, analyzed the Qing’s

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All major works on Yongzheng mention his belief in Buddhism. So far, the most comprehensive study about Yongzheng’s Buddhism is Wu, Jiang, Enlightenment in Dispute: The Reinvention of Chan Buddhism in Seventeenth Century China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Chapter 7.
political use of Buddhism to facilitate the Qing’s control of Mongolia and Tibet. True, Buddhism was used as a tool of governance as Farquhar argues, but Farquhar’s view somehow locked all understanding of the emperor’s involvement with Buddhism in the political arena. Regarding the Qianlong emperor’s remark about his father Yongzheng’s enlightenment through Chan Buddhism practice, Farquhar called it a “fulsome example of Buddhist hyperbole” and considered it as another type of political use of Buddhism.\(^{579}\) Besides, historians in China have also argued that Yongzheng used Buddhist practices to hide his ambition when competing for the throne.\(^{580}\) It is true that many emperors were named as incarnations of bodhisattvas and were considered to be enlightened for political purposes. However, Yongzheng was a rare genuine exception in this regard. His Buddhist practice and enlightenment were his personal pursuit, which influenced his way of thinking.

Yongzheng became a devoted Buddhist practitioner in his late teens or early twenties. The princely mansion that Yongzheng was granted in 1702 happened to be close to the famous Bailing Chan temple, just about 300 meters away. The convenience of the location allowed Yongzheng to study Chinese Chan Buddhism with the temple’s monks. Yongzheng described


some of his experiences at the Bailing temple in the epitaph he wrote for Duchao, the abbot of the temple. He wrote,

In the 41st year of Kangxi’s reign [1702], my house was granted in the east of the city (Beijing), which was close to the Bailing temple. At that time, Duchao supervised there, and we discussed the sutras and shared many common ideas.  

In 1702, Yongzheng had already shared many common ideas with Duchao, a first-rate Chan master of the time. This meant that Yongzheng had studied Buddhism for quite some time already.

According to Yongzheng’s own account, he reached the first milestone in meditation in 1712, ten years before he became emperor. Yongzheng wrote:

---In February 1712, I had prepared two days to conduct meditation with the monks, who would normally do similar meditation for seven or twenty or twenty-one days. In just the time that five joss sticks were chain-burnt, I had reached benlai. I finally know that benlai is a practical stage. However, I knew that I had not reached the ultimate truth. I consulted Lcang skya, one of the best Tibetan lamas, about my experience. Lcang skya told me: “Your Excellency, what you experienced is like seeing the sky from a hole in a piece of paper pierced by a needle. You could say that you saw the sky from it, but the actual sky is much bigger. Even so, would you say that what you saw through the hole is not sky? Therefore, the truth of Buddhism is like the boundless sky, and you are encouraged to reach far for it”

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582 Yongzheng (ed.): Yu xuan yu lu (Beijing, Tushu Wenxian,1993), pp.854-855.
This Lcang skya lama referred to by Yongzheng was the first Lcang skya lama in the incarnation lineage, living from 1642–1714. According to Yongzheng’s records, he was very proud that he swiftly reached the meditation level *benlai* in the short period of time of burning five joss sticks. Meanwhile, Lcang skya’s remarks confirmed that Yongzheng was headed in the right direction but that there was much more to explore. Yongzheng recorded another two milestones in this way:

In March, again we were together in Jiyun Hall and mediated earnestly. On the evening of the 6th, sweat poured out from my whole body. The feeling of release is similar to that of someone holding a bucket of water, and the bottom of the bucket suddenly falling off. At this time, I realized that there really was a second-stage (*重关*) in meditation.

On March 2, 1713, during meditation, I suddenly entered the last-gate, which made all my senses one, and broke down all boundaries between subjects and objects. I was so excited about my experience, and I then visited Lcang skya. Lcang skya congratulated me upon seeing me. He said, “Your Excellency, you have reached the endless freedom.”

Yongzheng gave these detailed portraits of his subjective experience in meditation in the postscript to *Yu Xuan Yu Lu*, the book Yongzheng edited to collect the important instructions of Chinese monks. The target audience of this book is high-level Buddhist

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584 Ibid.
practitioners. Therefore, in a certain sense, Yongzheng used these detailed accounts of his 
meditation to demonstrate his qualifications to edit such a book for other practitioners.

For historians, it is difficult, especially for research purposes, to evaluate Yongzheng’s 
mediation through his subjective descriptions. A reasonable method to evaluate his level is to 
consider both Yongzheng’s self-evaluation and those of his peers.\textsuperscript{585} First, Yongzheng provided 
an evaluation of himself:

The key to reaching the three gates is to practice step by step. Only rarely have 
they been described in writing. Throughout history, most eminent monks have only 
discussed the first gate and have not directly disclosed their views about the second gate 
in writing because written accounts might misdirect later practitioners who attempt to 
reach it (the second gate) through [logical] comprehension rather than practice. The 
monks therefore did not write it down, and just left it for practitioners to explore 
themselves. In fact, in history only a very few practitioners had ever reached and gone 
through the second gate, and in recent years, the cases have been especially rare. So, my 
current intention is to help guide new practitioners, among whom there may be a few who 
will arrive at the second gate.\textsuperscript{586}

In Yongzheng’s evaluation, “only a very few” practitioners in history went through the 
“second gate,” let alone the “third gate” that Yongzheng had reached. In short, Yongzheng 
viewed himself, in the context of the thousand-year long history of Chinese Buddhism, as a 
practitioner who had achieved a remarkably high level.

\textsuperscript{585} For Yongzheng’s practice in Buddhism, see Ven. Shen Kong 圣空法师, “Qing Shizong yu 
fojiao 清世宗与佛教” (MA Thesis: The Chung Hwa Institute of Buddhist studies, 2000.)
\textsuperscript{586} “Qing shizong Guanyu Foxue Zhi Yu Zhi 清世宗关于佛学之谕旨”, in Wen xian cong bian, 
4:8b~9a.
Second, in the twentieth century, well after the collapse of the Qing dynasty, Buddhist practitioners, without any need to do so, continued to speak highly of Yongzheng’s level of Buddhist practice. They shall be considered as trustworthy peer reviewers regarding Yongzheng’s level. Xuyun 虚云 (1840–1959), perhaps the best-known Chinese Buddhist master in modern history, discussed Yongzheng in a meditation gathering of high-level Buddhist monks in the Shanghai Yufo temple in 1953, when China was already under the control of the Communist Party. Because the meditation method the gathering used was similar to what Yongzheng had used, Xuyun remarked, “Yongzheng’s meditation was very good. More than ten practitioners received enlightenment under Yongzheng’s direction.”

Yinguang 印光 (1862-1940), another renowned Chinese Buddhist master in the twentieth century, wrote a preface for one of Yongzheng’s reprinted Buddhist books. Yinguang stated that Yongzheng had reached the state of Nirvana, and he marked Yongzheng as a reincarnation of one of the bodhisattvas. On the more objective side, several of Yongzheng’s works on Buddhism were collected in the Chinese Tripitaka. Yongzheng’s Yu Xuan Yu lu was reprinted in 1879 by the Jing Lin Buddhist printing house. In the twentieth century, Yongzheng’s Buddhist books were printed by publishers in both Taiwan and mainland China for religious purposes.

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587 Xuyun mentioned Yongzheng because Xuyun and his monks used the similar meditation method as Yongzheng did. Xuyun, “Shanghai Yufosi chanqi kaishi 上海玉佛寺禅七开示,” in Xuyun, Xuyun fashi jiangyan lu 虚云法师讲演录 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2018).
588 Ven. Yinguang, “Jianmo bianyilu shiyin xu 拣魔辨异录石印序”, in Yinguang fashi wenchao 印光法师文钞 (Beijing: Zongjiao chu ban she, 2000), v.3.
IV. Buddhism and its Influence on Yongzheng

Yongzheng’s Buddhist practice started long before he became emperor in 1722. In 1712 and 1713, a decade before his enthronement, when Yongzheng reached enlightenment in Buddhism, there was almost no sign that he would become the next emperor, and Yongzheng was not even actively involved in politics at that time. Chronologically, Yongzheng was first an enlightened Buddhist practitioner, and then an emperor. How did Yongzheng’s Buddhist practice influence his intellectual and spiritual life? First, Buddhist enlightenment brought him unusual confidence in the intellectual and spiritual world. In Buddhism, one reaching enlightenment through practice is considered to have a higher spiritual level than those obtaining their Buddhist knowledge through reading and logical comprehension. For this reason, after his enlightenment was verified by Lcang skya, Yongzheng considered himself an authority on Chinese Chan Buddhism. Not only did he directly supervise the practice of Buddhist monks, but also engaged in debates inside Chinese Chan Buddhism. Second, it is a tradition in Buddhism that those considered to have reached enlightenment enjoy the authority to interpret the spiritual realm in a way they deem appropriate. Under this tradition, Yongzheng was used to having “autocratic” power in the spiritual sphere that emperors generally do not have.

Kangxi, for example, as a proud emperor who conquered a wide area through military force, did not view himself as an authority on any religion. In the negotiations with the papal legate, he respected the power of the pope to explain Christian doctrines (see Chapter five). In contrast, Yongzheng felt that he was in a position to comment on Christianity. As seen in the

589 Huang, Autocracy At Work.
590 Wu, Enlightenment in Dispute, pp.178-183.
excerpt quoted at the beginning of this chapter, Yongzheng challenged the credibility of stories in Christianity, and deemed them as “absurd” tales. Yongzheng made such remarks before he had received the Portuguese embassy. When he met the embassy in person with the Christian fathers present, Yongzheng said:

So what is the use for your teaching in China? You criticized other sects. Perhaps because one is bad, the other is good? Quite the contrary: all sects in the end are the same and all have something good. Yet within each of these teachings, from those of the literati and those of others to your own Christianity, very few fully understand their own doctrine. You first have to know your heart, and then you will grasp your own doctrine.\(^{591}\)

In this speech, Yongzheng again located himself in a high position that enabled him to comment on all religions. Yongzheng felt confident to say that “in the end” all religions are the same, because he took it for granted that he, as an enlightened Buddhist practitioner, knew “the end” that other people did not know. Therefore, he considered himself capable of denying that the Christian fathers knew their own religion and tried to teach those fathers the right way to “grasp” their own doctrine.

The significance of these comments, regardless of the reasoning in them, is that they show Yongzheng maintained a feeling that he was a spiritual authority. With a proper understanding of Yongzheng’s position in Buddhism, one can see that such kinds of remarks were not arrogance, but an example of the influence of Buddhism on Yongzheng.

Yongzheng’s Buddhism and the Prohibition of Christianity

Yongzheng’s Buddhist beliefs did not strain the relationship between the Beijing missionaries and Yongzheng during Kangxi’s reign. But the two sides stayed aloof from each other. The fundamental intellectual and spiritual differences between Yongzheng and the Beijing missionaries meant that neither of them opted to build a closer relation with the other. In general, Christian missionaries could reconcile their relationships with Confucian scholars because Confucianism was not a religion per se. However, as monotheists, Christian missionaries could not build a friendly relationship with Buddhist monks, who were always portrayed negatively in missionaries’ writings. From the perspective of Beijing missionaries, Yongzheng, as a prince, was not a likely candidate to be the future emperor; moreover, he was a hardcore Buddhist practitioner. Therefore, in the logic of the Christian fathers, why bother to create a closer relationship with Yongzheng, if he was only one of so many princes. In this sense, Yongzheng’s Buddhist faith determined that Beijing missionaries had stayed away from Yongzheng during the long years waiting for the result of the future emperor. Because there was no existing relationship of trust, immediately after Yongzheng came to the throne, Yongzheng expelled the Beijing missionaries from his Imperial Family Household.592

592 The Imperial Household eviction was a regular practice after the enthronement of new emperors. It forced those not trusted out of the household while recruiting those who were trusted. Zhao Chang, Kangxi’s loyal servant mentioned in many of Kangxi’s edicts, was removed from the Imperial Household by Yongzheng. His miserable life after the eviction was widely recorded. Jin, Guoping. “‘Amicissimos’ Tomas Pereira and Zhao Chang”, in In the Light and Shadow of an Emperor: Tomás Pereira, SJ (1645–1708), the Kangxi Emperor and the Jesuit Mission in China, p.228; Chen, Guodong 陈国栋, “Kangxi xiaochen yangxindian zongjianzhao Zao Chang shengping xiaokao 康熙小臣养心殿总监造赵昌生平小考” in Feng, Mingzhu 冯明珠 ed., Shengqing shehui yu Yangzhou yanjiu 盛清社会与扬州研究 (Taipei: Yuanliu 2014), pp.209-309.
As an interesting historical detail, the only missionary who had a friendly relationship with Yongzheng was Father Pedrini, who had been Yongzheng’s music teacher. Pedrini, sent by the Congregation of the Propaganda, was hostile to all Beijing Jesuits. Kangxi put Pedrini under house-arrest after Pedrini intervened in the negotiation between Kangxi and the second legate. Kangxi hated Pedrini so much that Kangxi even used his vermilion brush to write a whole page listing Pedrini’s vices.\(^{593}\) Yongzheng released Pedrini after he was enthroned and used him as the primary court missionary to help receive all Western embassies coming to the Qing court. It was during the first year of Yongzheng’s rule in 1723 that Pedrini finally realized the long-time dream of the fathers of Congregation of the Propaganda---to build their own church in Beijing independent from churches of Jesuits.\(^{594}\) Pedrini’s experience connoted that a private existing-relation with an emperor before the enthronement was important. But, unfortunately, for most Beijing missionaries, this was something they did not have.

Yongzheng’s Buddhism did not make Yongzheng “hate” the Christian missionaries. In other words, Yongzheng’s faith did not create religious exclusivism in Yongzheng’s mind; rather it shaped the way Yongzheng viewed the missionaries and their position in China. As a high-level Buddhist practitioner, Yongzheng had no interest in the metaphysical and scientific discourses in which his father had been so interested.

To be fair, Yongzheng had tried to be objective or at least indifferent to the Christian missionaries and Christianity at the very beginning of his reign. He had accepted the rich gifts Jesuit Mourrao brought from Guangzhou to congratulate him on his enthronement, which was a good sign for possible accommodation. However, unlike other religious groups, the Beijing

\(^{593}\) For the translation of Kangxi’s comment, see Rosso, *Apostolic Legations*, pp.389-390.

missionaries, after several decades at the Beijing court, had unavoidably gotten entangled in court politics. In April 1723, about five months after his enthronement, Yongzheng warned the Beijing missionaries to keep their distance from politics and advised them to not mind affairs other than their own.595 Yongzheng issued such a warning after he exiled Jesuit Mourao to Xining because Mourao continued to be very loyal to the ninth son of Kangxi, who was the first major political enemy on whom Yongzheng focused.

Unfortunately, it seems that the missionaries did not take Yongzheng’s warning seriously. The Beijing missionaries were excited about the conversion of the Sunu family, a high-ranking Manchu family whose members were the direct descendants of Nurgaci.596 Sunu had ten sons, and several of them had been interested in Christianity since the late years of Kangxi’s reign. Politically, the whole Sunu family belonged to the clique of the eighth, ninth, and fourteenth sons. In April 1723, Yongzheng exiled two of Sunu’s sons to Xining along with Kangxi’s ninth son. To the surprise of local officials, Jesuit Mourao dared to baptize those two exiled sons of Sunu in Xining on Christmas day of 1723. All of Mourao’s actions in Xining were secretly reported to Yongzheng.597 In Beijing, though knowing the Sunu family was a political enemy of Yongzheng, the Beijing missionaries still secretly contacted with the Sunu family. Their contact was also known by Yongzheng and the members of his inner circle. Longkeduo, the most trusted supporter of Yongzheng’s enthronement, had secretly informed Jesuit Parrenin

595 Rosso, *Apostolic Legations*, p. 214
that their relationship with the Sunu family was known by the emperor, and warned them to stay away from the Sunu family. Longkedio was a son of Tong Guowei, one of Kangxi’s two maternal uncles. In Parrenin’s words, Longkedio informed him based on the “long time friendly relationship” between the missionaries and the Tong family.\textsuperscript{598} From the perspective of the Beijing missionaries, they did not think that they were involved in the political struggles between the Sunu’s family and Yongzheng. As clerics, they could not reject providing religious services to those who needed the love of God.

However, court politics were much more subtle than the missionaries realized. Parrenin provided a glimpse into this when writing about Longkedio’s warning. When Longkedio saw some ministers walking in their direction, he stopped talking. This was an indication of the political environment of the time. Many ministers with special connections to Yongzheng’s political adversaries were removed from their posts or even persecuted, charged with committing certain “public” crimes. This was the norm of court politics: the ministers understood the implied meaning of “crimes,” and knew that, many times, the meaning was not evident on the surface. Nian Gengyao, for example, was removed from his post for disrespecting the emperor by using disrespectful words in memorials. Nian was then found guilty of crimes worthy of death ninety-two times and committed suicide in the fourth year of Yongzheng’s reign. The real reason for Nian’s loss of favor, beyond the crimes publicized, became a topic of debate among historians from the moment of his death. One of many guesses was that he secretly contacted the ninth son of Kangxi, the connection to whom had also cost the life of Jesuit Mourao, the only Christian

\textsuperscript{598} Ibid, v.11, p.43; Chinese translation, v.3, p.26. See chapter 1 and 2 about the relationship between the Tong family and the missionaries.
missionary to have died due to politics in China during early modern times. In short, the court politics were bigger in scope and more complicated in detail than what was recorded.

It is hard to evaluate precisely how much court politics influenced Yongzheng when he decided on the prohibition of Christianity because Yongzheng would not put such a “private” reason on the table and let it be recorded for posterity. However, it is certain that the politics were important, otherwise Longkeduo would not put himself at risk by informing the Beijing missionaries about the danger. Yongzheng’s insistence on killing Mourao may also shed light on the reality that politics truly mattered. Yongzheng knew well that the killing of the priest could have damaged his name, but he still could not forgive Mourao. Reading Mourao’s interrogation records, it is obvious that he did not commit any crime. The only “bad” thing he was guilty of was his loyalty to and real feeling for the ninth son of Kangxi. But it was the wrong loyalty at the wrong time, and it cost the life of Mourao and others in the early years of Yongzheng’s reign.

It might have been the wish of Yongzheng that the Beijing missionaries would simply disappear from the court politics after they had been expelled from the Forbidden City. Unfortunately, Beijing missionaries’ long involvement in court affairs meant that they kept popping-up on the scenes where Yongzheng handled his other political enemies. Missionaries’ appearances in politics then became the fuse to lead Yongzheng to issue the prohibition.

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599 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp.589-590.
600 “Mourao’s Interrogation”, pp. 1-4a.
Both the Manchu ruling class and the Beijing missionaries fully understood that the policies to tolerate or to prohibit Christianity were not something significant to the empire as a whole. In China, at the height of Christianity in the first two decades of the eighteenth century, there were about 140 Christian missionaries in the whole country. Even at their zenith, their number was tiny for an empire of more than 200 million people.\textsuperscript{601} In the same period, there were approximately 110,000 Buddhist monks and 9,000 Buddhist nuns in China.\textsuperscript{602} This simple comparison may shed some light on the reality of the Christian presence in China. It was less than just a minority. It was barely a presence at all. In Yongzheng’s words, Christian missionaries were “a group [of] not more than several dozen people.”\textsuperscript{603} Views like this regarding the overall weight of the Christian mission confirm that toleration as well as prohibition could be largely contingent on the personal interest of the emperors. For emperors like Yongzheng, personal will was, in many situations, crucial to history. Shifting the focus from “grand” social realities to Yongzheng himself is the key to truly understanding the policies in Yongzheng’s early years.

Historical evidence in fact confirms that there was no general feeling in the court against Christianity at the time Yongzheng issued the prohibition. When the prohibition was discussed in

\textsuperscript{601} The population of the early Qing is not exactly known. According to the latest research in Cao Shuji’s \textit{Zhongguo Renkoushi-Qingdai Juan}, the population of China in 1678 was around 160 million. Furthermore, the population in the south increased every year at the rate of 5\%, in the north by 7\%. Cao, Shuji, \textit{Zhongguo Renkoushi-Qingdai Juan} (Shanghai: Fudan University, 2001), p. 51.


\textsuperscript{603} Du, Wenkai, \textit{Qing dai xi ren jian wen lu}, p.145.
the Board of Rites, both Manchu and Chinese directors, in addition to other members, of the Board, were against the prohibition. This clearly means that there was no widely accepted objective conditions to support prohibition. Those ministers simply yielded to the personal wishes of Yongzheng when they signed the final bill. In comparison, during the time the prohibition of Christianity was discussed (October 1723-January 1724), the whole court was busy painstakingly handling the rebellion of Lobjang Danjin (August 1723 to early 1724), which involved a vast area of Northwest China. The Buddhist lamas, more than ten thousand in number and known as “warrior Lamas,” sided with Lobjang Danjin and took weapons and horses to fight directly on the battlefield with the Qing troops. Regarding these lamas, Yongzheng told Nian Gengyao, the general of the Manchu troop, not to “destroy temples,” and not to “disturb those quiet lamas.” At the end of 1723, a general doubt even developed in the court that Buddhism influenced in Yongzheng’s decision making as an emperor. It was obvious that protecting those Buddhist lamas was Yongzheng’s personal wish, which was against the military tradition of the Manchus. Certainly, the soldiers in the battle field did not have the same personal feeling about Buddhist lamas as their emperor, so they just did what they usually did to their enemies: They “brutally” destroyed the temples in the areas, and massacred the lamas, at one

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606 “勿拆毁庐舍祠宇，勿扰害庙内番僧”. See Shi zong xian huang di shi lu 世宗宪皇帝实录, in Da Qing li chao shi lu 大清历代实录 (Taipei :Hua lian chu ban she 1964), v.3. YZSL hereafter.
607 Yongzheng himself sensed the doubt and explained openly in court that he talked about Buddhist sutras with Buddhist monks only during his spare time, and he never took any advice from them on worldly matters. Yongzheng Qi Ju Zhu, 1:466.
time more than six thousand, as they advanced.\textsuperscript{608} Weaving these things together, it is at least safe to say that Yongzheng’s personal wishes played a key role in his decisions handling the protection of Buddhist lamas and the prohibition of Christianity.

For the Beijing missionaries, Yongzheng’s personal interests and Buddhist faith, which had been up to that time almost irrelevant to their mission, suddenly upon Kangxi’s death and Yongzheng’s subsequent enthronement became a determining factor. Even worse, they could not do anything to change the situation. The best they could pray for was the mercy of Yongzheng, who, the Beijing missionaries had hoped, would treat them the same way he treated other religions. For this reason, the Beijing missionaries kept emphasizing that they were a group of law-abiding priests. This logic suggested that they be tolerated and accommodated just like any other law-abiding religious group.

However, the Beijing missionaries forgot the reality that there were no other religious groups as mixed up in court politics as they were. As servants in Kangxi’s Imperial Household, they had unavoidably become entangled in many imperial family affairs. Therefore, their destiny was in a certain sense bound up with the result of the succession and how the new emperor read their presence in the family. Unfortunately, Yongzheng, as an enlightened Buddhist practitioner, read it negatively.

\textsuperscript{608} Perdue, \textit{China Marches West}, p. 245.
Conclusion

Looking back at history, modern scholars know that the court missionaries did not overturn the prohibition. They have formulated different reasons for this, but they generally agree that the Christian mission under the early Qing was a failed attempt. They typically explain this by emphasizing the Chinese Rites Controversy, the conflicts between Christian and Chinese cultures, and the inner contentions among missionaries of different church orders and nationalities. In this way, historians often narrate the Christian mission in China as doomed to failure.

The missionaries, however, as participants in history, did not know their future. They therefore had no notion of the mission’s foretold failure. In their eyes, the prohibition of 1724 was a hurdle, but they awaited a chance to lift it, and to return to their heyday. These kinds of ups and downs, in their minds, were just a part of rhythm of the universe. Even after the prohibition, the Beijing Jesuits still had a solid network in the circle of the Beijing Manchu elites; meanwhile, the missionaries sent by the Congregation of the Propaganda had, as recently as 1723, built the first church of their own in Beijing. They all worked diligently with the hope that they would grasp another chance to revive the mission as Jesuit Verbiest once did in Kangxi’s early reign. In 1735, eleven years after the prohibition, Yongzheng died. French Jesuit Parennin took the death as an opportunity to revive the mission. Parennin managed to use the network he had established in Kangxi’s time to try to overturn the prohibition in the court of the new Qianlong emperor. His proposal, according to Parennin himself, was viewed and supported by the Grand Secretary of the time as well as the twelfth son of Kangxi. 609 Though the proposal

did not ultimately reach Qianlong, it nevertheless reflected Parennin’s hopes.\footnote{About Jesuits’ hopes for reviving the mission after Yongzheng’s death, see Krahl, Joseph. \textit{China Missions in Crisis: Bishop Laimbeckhoven and his Times 1738–1787} (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1964), pp. 9-10.} Even after Qianlong declared in 1737 that Manchus should not become Christians and expelled all missionaries in Guangzhou to Macao, the missionaries still did not lose hope. They, in fact, planned their mission’s future. Some predicted that their chance might come with the next emperor. Some thought that their future was in the hands of the Beijing missionaries who might be able to change the situation.\footnote{Ibid, v.12, p.122; Chinese translation, v. 4, p.90.}

Facing restrictions, the Christian fathers decided to wait and prepare for the future. Parennin, for example, personally requested that Qianlong allow the coming of two young French fathers to Beijing with the excuse that, as an old man, he needed servants. Qianlong allowed the request.\footnote{It seems that Qianlong, like his grandfather Kangxi, used his Imperial Household to handle affairs related to missiononaires. At the time of European suppression of Jesuits in 1770s, there were disputes among Jesuits in China on how to properly dissolve the society of Jesus while handling the properites and money belonging to the society. When the Jesuits could not reach agreements themselves, they brought their disputes to the Imperial Household and asked for arbitrations. The Imperial Household’s involvement in Jesuits’ inner disputes was a clear sign that Jesuits were under the management of the Imperial Household in the Qianlong’s reign. See, Hsia, R. Po-chia, “Jesuit Survival and Restoration in China,” in Robert A. Maryks and Jonathan Wright (eds.), \textit{Jesuit Survival and Restoration: A Global History, 1773-1900} (Leiden: Brill,2014), pp. 251-256.} Those two young fathers were in fact part of Parennin’s plan for his successors in the China mission (Parennin died in 1741).\footnote{Ibid, v.12, p. 165; Chinese translation, v. 4. p. 121.} In yet another example, French Jesuit Antoine Gaubil (1689-1759), coming to China in 1722, about one and half years before Yongzheng’s prohibition, continued the tradition of the French Jesuits serving as missionaries spreading the gospel as well as information providers to Europeans about China.\footnote{For the French Jesuits’ role in providing datum to Europe, see Jami, \textit{The Emperor’s New Mathematics}, pp.102-119.} Thanks to his
command of the Manchu language, Gaubil was responsible for Manchu converts in Beijing; he had one time in 1741 optimistically estimated that the converts in Beijing would reach 100 thousand in a few years.\footnote{Du Halde ed., \textit{Lettres}, v.12, p.340; Chinese translation, v.4, p.252.} As an information provider, Gaubil provided scientific datum and researches to Europe, and he was even selected as a member of the Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences while he was in China.\footnote{Bayuk, Dimitri, “Father Antoine Gaubil, S. J. (1689-1759) and his election to the Saint Petersburg Academy of Sciences”, 2018, in \url{https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324953517}.} To reach an even wider audience in Europe, Gaubil introduced Chinese history including a biography of Genghis Khan (published in France in 1737) based on Chinese sources.\footnote{Aigle, Denise, \textit{The Mongol Empire between Myth and Reality: Studies in Anthropological History} (Leiden: Brill, 2014), p.142.}

Jesuit Giuseppe Castiglione, the painter who had started his service during Kangxi’s last years, kept to the strategy established by Verbiest—meaning, he sought to exchange private service for imperial favor for the mission.\footnote{Musillo, Marco, \textit{Bridging Europe and China: The Professional life of Giuseppe Castiglione (1688-1766)} (Ph.D. Dissertation: University of East Anglia, 2006), pp.165-167.} He relied on his wonderful skills to maintain close connections with the imperial family.\footnote{Naquin, Susan. “Giuseppe Castiglione/Lang Shining: A Review Essay.” in \textit{T’oung Pao}, Second Series, 95, no. 4/5 (2009), p. 395. See also, Krah, \textit{China Missions in Crisis}, pp. 11-13.} In Qianlong’s reign, it was Qianlong’s mother who insisted that Qianlong grant Castiglione a court title with salary for Castiglione’s work.\footnote{Musillo, Marco, “The Jesuit Memoir of Giuseppe Castiglione Lay Brother and Qing Imperial Painter.” \textit{Eighteenth-Century Studies} 42, no. 1 (2008), p.55.} Castiglione died in 1766 in Beijing at the age of seventy-eight. He worked for the Chinese mission for more than four decades after the prohibition of 1724, even though his late years in 1760s were difficult because he did not receive enough support from Europe (Many European countries suppressed the Society of Jesus in 1767).\footnote{For the Jesuits in China at the time of European suppression of Jesuits, see Hsia, R. Po-chia, “Jesuit Survival and Restoration in China”; Hsia, R. Po-chia, “The End of the Jesuit Mission in
to remain in China and bide their time, there were others who chose to leave. Yet some of them, too, remained full of hope. Father Matteo Ripa, a Dominican, left Beijing in the middle of the prohibition crisis in December 1723. He zealously advertised the Chinese mission after he came back to Europe, and even established a Chinese College in his hometown of Naples for preparing more priests to travel to China. Regardless of their church orders, whether they left or remained, the missionaries still had high hopes for spreading the gospel in China. The prohibition, for most of them, was just an obstacle they had to overcome.

Modern scholars have thought otherwise. Most write pessimistically about the missionaries’ outreach in China. Why did the Christian mission fail is the fundamental question they felt they had to answer? In this way, the history of the Christian mission in the early Qing has become the history of the decline of the Christian mission. Scholars have therefore chosen to focus on conflicts with Christianity in China, as these fit their theme of failure. It is not surprising then that the single Chinese figure of the early Qing who typically receives the most attention is Yang Guangxian, an anti-Christian scholar. Meanwhile, those who supported the Christian mission or were friends of the missionaries barely receive any attention. As asked in chapter two, why do scholars seem to favor the anti-Christian arguments of Yang Guangxian, who was not by any means a leading scholar of his time, while neglecting those leading Confucian literati and Manchu elites in Beijing who supported the Christian mission?

The reason is the preoccupation with the failure of the mission and the attempts to justify the failure in a chronological and therefore logical way. However, those attempts have intrinsic

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problems at least on two different levels. First is the very concept of the mission’s failure: Did the Christian mission of the early Qing really fail? It is true that the mission after 1850 was different from the earlier in many respects. For one thing the new missionaries had the protection of several European powers. However, it is difficult to deny any connection at all between the post-1850 situation and the earlier one. When new missionaries came back to China in the second half of the nineteenth century, they already had Christian books in Chinese that had been prepared by missionaries from previous centuries, and many churches were already in place for the mission to reopen. The earlier mission had therefore laid down a solid base for later religious celebration and proselytizing. Now, with an even greater twenty-first century perspective, one can see that Christianity has become one of the major religions in both mainland China and Taiwan. Considering the mission from the sixteenth century to today as a whole, the early mission must therefore be considered as a part of a very successful effort to preach the gospel to the Chinese population. Seen from this perspective, the mission was able to transcend the eighteenth-century transient conflicts and incompatibilities emphasized by current scholarship.

Second, even if the early Qing mission is viewed as one period, and the prohibition is viewed as the hallmark of the failed Christian mission in China, that does not mean that there was a certain social trend leading the mission to its end. As Chapter six reveals, there were no agreed-upon conditions among the Manchu elites regarding the prohibition of Christianity. Even among Kangxi’s nine sons, each had their own thoughts about Christianity. This meant that the prohibition was not a linear end of any particular trend but more of a coincidence contingent on the subjective consideration of the new emperor. Had another of Kangxi’s sons come to the throne, instead of Yongzheng, there might have been a totally different route for the Christian mission to continue on in China.
Indeed, the prohibition of the Christian mission was a historical occurrence. What is important now is to fully recognize that the prohibition was one of many possible occurrences at the time of the power transition between the two emperors. Its occurrence was contingent on many historical incidents that happened randomly. For example, Kangxi’s unexpected death and the new enthronement of Yongzheng were no different than a sudden earthquake, which would have been considered in those days an act of God. It just happened. But randomness and uncertainty of events should be given full consideration.

The role of the individual in history is equally problematic. It is commonplace that historians seek to explain the past with trends, models, and theories that overlook the uniqueness and unpredictability of individual lives. As this dissertation suggests, both Kangxi’s interests in Western subjects and Yongzheng’s passionate embrace of Buddhism contributed to a very different kind of historical understanding. The varying condition of the Christian mission in the early Qing was closely connected with the personal predilections of two emperors. Jesuit participation in Kangxi’s life was initially the result of the random capture of Ludovico Buglio and Gabriel de Magalhaens, who were thus able to enter the Manchu world as two imperial household slaves. Both thanked God for surviving the battlefield and regarded their capture as a crucial moment in their lives. In this they were right. Beyond all expectations, about twenty years after that capture, their lowly status became the means by which they could influence Kangxi’s life, and profoundly advance Christian proselytization. They could never have done this if they had had the status of government ministers, and had not been the emperor’s personal property. This kind of relationship was entirely Manchu, and had nothing to do with Chinese tradition. As in every individual’s life, coincidences sometimes have profound effects. Only by accepting the importance of random events, instead of believing in the pre-ordained social
certainty of both Kangxi’s toleration and Yongzheng’s prohibition, can scholars be liberated from attempts to look to models or trends to explain the remarkable oscillations of the fortunes of the Christian mission in China. This was a tale involving unique historical individuals, whose lives were full of both predictable and unpredictable choices.
Primary sources:

Primary sources in abbreviation

AEFV:

AP:

AP2:

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