Clientelism and Democracy in Turkey and Mexico: 
The Impacts on Regimes of Political Party 
Exploitation of Housing Tenure in Informal Settlements

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CLIENTELISM AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY AND MEXICO: 
THE IMPACTS ON REGIMES OF POLITICAL PARTY EXPLOITATION 
OF HOUSING TENURE IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS

by

DAVID J. HENRY

A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York

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by

David Henry

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies satisfying the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

Clientelism and Democracy in Turkey and Mexico: The Impacts on Regimes of Political Party Exploitation of Housing Tenure in Informal Settlements

by

David J. Henry

Advisor: Mark Ungar

Scholars have identified the abuse of state resources as one of the primary indicators of whether a country will democratize. Clientelist networks are critical to how incumbents exploit state assets to remain in power. When the informal relationships of clientelist parties undermine the formal institutions of the state, the regime is no longer democratic, even where competitive elections take place. Alternately, if a ruling party in such hybrid regimes loses its monopoly on state power, it creates an opening for other parties and social groups to push for democratization. Mexico and Turkey are critical case studies on how clientelist parties function and their effect upon political regimes. In both cases, informal relationships of clientelism have endured even as the economic and political conditions that gave rise to it have changed. Changes in housing policy in Mexico and Turkey illustrate how clientelist parties have used this critical need to exert control over society through different economic conditions. As such, it is crucial to understanding the political regimes of each country. Title formalization is a political process: the extent that this process is independently managed by the state bureaucracy for the benefit of citizens regardless of party affiliation or used for partisan ends to win elections is an indicator of the prevalence of informal practices.
detrimental to democracy. The case studies show, in Mexico, despite the ubiquity of clientelism, a massive program of state housing subsidies remained independent of partisan manipulation. In Turkey, its program of housing subsidies and title formalization were distributed on a partisan basis by a federal agency that was increasingly subsumed by a single party. A comparison shows how the state has become more independent from clientelism in Mexico while in Turkey the housing authority is enmeshed in the clientelist practices of the incumbent party. The case studies show that the independence of the state bureaucracy from clientelist party control is key to democratization.
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INTRODUCTION

In the early morning of August 17, 1999, my wife, then just a young woman in her early twenties, was visiting her aunt at their summerhouse near Erdek, Turkey. She was talking with her cousin when the violent shaking of a 7.6 magnitude earthquake rudely interrupted them. Her cousin darted to the bedrooms to wake his parents and sister. She, unsure of what to do, ran outside to the terrace on the roof; if the house collapsed at least, it would not fall on top of her. They were lucky, the re-bar and cement house her father and grandfather had built held. Across the Sea of Marmara, in Izmit Turkey, a little more than 100 miles away, people at the epicenter of the seism were not as fortunate. In its aftermath, the earthquake left 17,127 dead and 600,000 people homeless. My wife spent the remainder of her trip sleeping outdoors, each aftershock a frightening reminder of how precious and precarious shelter can be.

Other newly industrialized nations have experienced similar disasters and death tolls as a result of poorly planned housing. On 19 September 1985, an 8.0 magnitude earthquake caused 10,000 deaths in Mexico City. It is still unknown exactly how many people lost their homes, but most estimates are around 250,000. The high death toll in both instances is attributable primarily to poorly engineered housing built on unstable land.

As countries across the globe continue to urbanize, the basic problem of housing continues to be a challenge for millions of people. The percentage of the world’s population that is urban increased from 33.61% in 1960 to 54.8% in 2017; a staggering 21.19% increase (The World Bank, 2019). The challenges and opportunities presented by urbanization will be paramount in the next coming decades.
Turkey and Mexico provide a fascinating study in how two countries have grappled with the ramifications of rapid urbanization. Much of the housing stock in both countries is informal. As was common in industrializing countries during the mid-twentieth century, people built their own homes on land without title. This housing stock mostly does not adhere to any building code or planning regulations. Informal housing is inherently political: it is the state that grants ownership and recognizes a title. In a rush to develop, governments tolerated these illegal self-built houses and the resulting unplanned neighborhoods in exchange for cheap labor and malleable political support. This informal construction is an essential factor in the development of Turkey and Mexico and is crucial to understanding the growth and trajectory of the political regimes of each country.

Political considerations help explain the explosive growth of informal housing developments. According to the scholarship reviewed below, permitting substandard informal housing was a deliberate political choice of the elites in both nations. These informal settlements gave rise to informal political institutions that would shape the regimes they inhabited. In each country, following the creation of the respective modern republics in the first decades of the twentieth-century, politics was dominated by populism. Political parties in both countries relied on the mobilization of the urban masses. However, consistent with populism, they maintained elite control of the state and prevented the full political incorporation of either industrial workers or middle classes into decision-making. Politics in the most populous cities centered on party bosses providing resources and protection for the migrants from the countryside in exchange for acquiescence at least, if not loyalty. Mexico City and Istanbul spawned networks of patrons who could protect informal settlements in
exchange for political support. The massive populations of Mexico City and Istanbul meant control of these patronage networks had ramifications for control of the state not just locally but nationally. Protecting informal settlements and other goods and services became a critical way not just for individual politicians but the functioning of political parties. Crucially, successful political leaders vied for support not primarily through promising policy programs but by providing access to goods and services paid for with the selective distribution of state resources. For the people who lived in newly built, informal settlements in Istanbul and Mexico City politics, was about securing the particularistic material benefits for their communities and not policy initiatives that would distribute resources more broadly.

Thus, the urban workers who lived there were mobilized for political support but not incorporated into democratic control of the state. Populist leaders in both countries mobilized the urban constituencies to gain political power but prevented the full incorporation of these groups into political decision-making. Rapid urbanization and the subsequent creation of informal housing in Istanbul and Mexico City left residents vulnerable to political manipulation. Recent migrant household’s lack of legal tenure to the land they occupied exacerbated the inherent inequality of urbanization. It cultivated a type of political linkage known as clientelism that was key to gaining the votes of the masses while maintaining elite control of the state and its resources.

The earthquakes were critical junctures in both Mexico and Turkey. They each revealed corruption and prompted concerted calls for change. However, to whom the population directed its anger and called for reforms have varied in the two different countries. In Mexico, well-organized housing advocacy groups combined with other groups
to push for democratic reforms that led to the distribution of state power to multiple parties. In Turkey, meanwhile, much of the anger went against established parties. It led to the incorporation of a populist Islamist party without a fundamental examination of the clientelist structures as the center of how the state-provided services.

Firstly, the carnage of the earthquakes created a call for housing reform. Political parties have seized upon the formalization process and the subsidies that accompany it to reward party loyalty. Thus, the use of state power for electoral support has remained a crucial facet of the regimes in both Mexico and Turkey. However, in Mexico, this meant the distribution of resources to three parties vying with each other for power, whereas in Turkey, a single party monopolized the political benefits of the formalization process.

Scholars have identified the abuse of state resources as one of the primary indicators of whether a country will democratize. Building on that work, this thesis argues that clientelist networks are critical to how incumbents exploit state assets to remain in power. Though clientelist parties rely on elections, clientelist parties inherently work to undermine democratic control of the state. A clientelist party’s oversight of collective resources and legal enforcement enables it to coerce individuals to the extent that its rule can reach the entirety of society. The central assertion of this paper is that the clientelist distribution of state resources is fundamentally coercive and is contrary to independent democratic control of the state. Alternately, if a single party is no longer able to monopolize the use of state power, it creates an opening for other parties and social groups to push for democratization. The ability of a single party to dominate the state can make a regime authoritarian, even while formal democratic institutions remain in place. In other words, when the informal
institutions of partisan clientelist networks supersede and subvert the formal democratic institutions that determine control of the state, it allows incumbents to abuse state power to the extent that the regime becomes authoritarian.

Toward this end, this thesis will examine the mechanics of how clientelist parties function. It will first review the literature on clientelism. Specifically, it will look at how clientelism is defined, and how clientelist parties in democratic and authoritarian regimes differ from parties in established democratic regimes that offer broad-based programs to citizens regardless of party affiliation. Of particular importance is how clientelist parties are motivated not by ideology but by the goal of holding power and collecting rents for their adherents. Next, it will examine the literature on democratic, authoritarian, and hybrid regimes. It will review the definition of competitive authoritarian regimes, a particular subset of hybrid regimes. In these regimes elections for executive power are contested, but the appropriation of state resources for partisan gains makes the elections so unfair that they cannot be considered democratic. Next, it will turn to how parties abuse state resources in authoritarian regimes, with attention to how clientelism and rent-seeking undergird party cohesion. It will show how clientelist parties usurp the functions of the state and use their power over the levers of the state to control the larger society. In total, the literature review will show how the partisan distribution of state goods through clientelism is fundamental to maintaining competitive authoritarian regimes.

This thesis will use Mexico and Turkey as case studies on how clientelist parties function and their effect upon political regimes. It will review housing policies in Mexico and Turkey to understand how clientelist parties have used this critical need to exert control
over society. It will explore first how informal housing development and clientelism are tied. It will examine, the historical circumstances that gave rise to informal housing, and how this strengthened clientelist practices in Mexico City and Istanbul. It will then turn to how clientelist practices have evolved under different macroeconomic conditions. It will recount how these informal relationships of clientelism have endured even as the economic and political conditions that gave rise to it have changed, showing that clientelist parties can adapt even to dramatic changes to the economic system. Then it will show that clientelist practices remain an essential feature of the political systems of Mexico and Turkey. It will summarize recent changes to housing policy and will review how control of state housing subsidies and the housing formalization process is essential to understanding the political regimes in Mexico and Turkey.

Examining the mechanics of the massive housing programs introduced by the central governments, and their implementation illustrates the importance of partisan control of state resources. It will show that title formalization, and housing subsidies can be tools for clientelist manipulation of state power. The extent that this process is independently managed by the state bureaucracy for the benefit of citizens regardless of party affiliation or used for partisan ends to win elections is an indicator of the prevalence of informal practices detrimental to democracy. The case studies show the differences in how housing subsidies aimed at ending informal housing have been used in the two countries and the importance of the independence of the state bureaucracy from clientelist party control.

This thesis argues that clientelist parties' ability to control housing subsidies has had significant ramifications for the political trajectories of both Mexico and Turkey. In Mexico,
the ruling *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) lost the 2000 presidential election to the
*Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN) and the power of the state was divided between three parties.
Despite the ubiquity of clientelism, a massive program of state housing subsidies introduced
by the PAN party flowed through a federal agency that remained independent of partisan
manipulation. This strengthened electoral contestation and the creation of different policy
programs amongst the parties. In Turkey meanwhile, following the election of the *Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP) in 2002, its program of housing subsidies and title formalization
were distributed on a partisan basis by a federal agency that was increasingly subsumed by
the AKP. It proved a decisive way for them to win elections and consolidate their power and
control over society. In Mexico, a single party’s ability to use clientelist networks to control
state resources broke down, while in Turkey, a single party used clientelist networks to gain
control of state resources. A comparison of housing programs shows how the state has
become more independent from parties in Mexico; where as in Turkey the ruling party has
consolidated their control of the functions of the state. These changes have contributed to a
reduced level of control of society in Mexico and increased partisan ability to coerce citizens
in Turkey.
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature shows informal institutions such as clientelism, help determine if a regime is democratic, authoritarian, or something else. Clientelism is a way of mobilizing collective action and is built on informal relations. It relies on the particularistic distribution of state goods based upon individual loyalty and not other independent criteria. Scholars debate the extent that is inherently undemocratic or if it can act as a source citizen empowerment. The literature shows, it is adaptive in that it can exist in a variety of contexts, including democratic and authoritarian regimes and rural and urban settings. It relies on inequality and benefits those who can capture the resources of the state. In the context of contested elections, it presents a direct challenge to citizen participation in collective decision-making.

The ability parties to use informal mechanisms for social control is a way for them to extend their reach into society and use the state to gain power. The literature shows how the abuse of state resources in combination with electoral politics creates a regime that is neither fully authoritarian nor fully democratic. The presence of clientelist networks alone does not make a regime authoritarian. However, the abuse of state resources in regimes with elections can be so unfair that the regime cannot be considered democratic despite the presence of democratic institutions. Clientelist networks abilities to distribute the resources of the state are vital to parties. The literature shows how rent-seeking and not ideology is the primary motivating factor for clientelist parties. These parties rely on the long-term distribution of state goods to create a "sunk" investment in the party and its continued control of the state. It this way, clientelist parties work against democratic control of the state.
Clientelism

Clientelism is a mechanism leaders use to gain the support of society. In *Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities*, Herbert Kitschelt examines how governments connect to the governed in democratic regimes. He separates these linkages into charismatic, policy, and clientelist types. These types address how politicians enable collective action to solve problems. In order to accomplish their goals, politicians band together in parties and invest in them as an organization. Kitschelt defines parties as "collective vehicles that solve problems of collective action and of collective choice" (Kitschelt, 2000, p. 848). These linkage mechanisms are present to varying degrees in both democratic and authoritarian systems. How they function is a contentious subject of discussion in the literature.

According to Kitschelt, the charismatic type of linkage relies upon the persuasive powers of a leader. He can create links to followers directly. They tend not to address a coherent program of action and to invest little in the organization of the party to resolve problems. Instead, the politicians of this sort tend to reserve discretion over decision-making and hold the party together through personal skill and persuasive power. This type of link between elites and the masses is common in authoritarian regimes but historically has rarely proven important in established democracies.

Programmatic political parties rely on the policy linkage type. It is accomplished through the universalistic distribution of collective goods based on established criteria, regardless of support, and based upon a codified program. According to Kitschelt, political parties looking to gain support based on programmatic linkages offer packages of policies...
that they promise to pursue if elected into office. In such cases, parties must work out policy details and underlying principles and, in that process, make substantial investments in procedures of internal conflict resolution about programmatic disagreements and organizational infrastructure. The policy linkage has become commonplace in established democracies, and it relies almost exclusively on formal relationships. Kitschelt makes it clear that programmatic parties are the most visible form of linkage in democracies, but it is not the only form.

An alternative linkage method is the informal relationship of clientelism. According to Kitschelt, politicians create clientelist linkages when they invest in problem-solving techniques but not in forming a policy program. Instead, clientelism is the particularistic distribution of state resources, where political support is the main criteria. Clientelist linkages have proven flexible existing in established democracies and authoritarian regimes alike. The ethnically segmented big-city political machines that predominated in the early late nineteenth and early twentieth century in the United States, such as Tammany Hall in New York City, are examples of clientelist linkages.

The formality or informality of the exchange of state resources is an essential difference between programmatic and clientelist linkages. Informality is an open set of practices between partners with flexible roles. Clientelism is inherently informal; the procedural nature of exchange separates clientelist from programmatic linkages. Radnitz (2011) makes the case that formal relations always also involve some set of informal practices to make them function. The two work in tandem with informal arrangements filling in gaps created by formal institutions. From this vantage point, state and society relations cannot be
wholly formalized, and informal interactions affect the formal institutions. Clientelism is a prime example: clientelist linkages are an informal response to the formal institutions of elections and parties. Through the particularistic distribution of state resources, leaders gain the support of the party without investing procedures outside of the transaction.

In the system of clientelism, state power becomes primarily about controlling and distributing resources to supporters. Connections exist directly between patrons and clients. Such systems depend on high levels of inequality. Rent-seeking, broadly defined as the taking wealth without creating new wealth, especially through the privileged use of state power, is an essential component of clientelism. Clientelist parties gain support by combining the interests of rent-seeking elites and voters in economic need. Because the distribution of state resources is not contingent upon broad-based policy goals, but instead on exchange for support, there is less need to invest in party procedures to mediate programmatic disagreements. That said clientelist relationships require extensive investments in administrative infrastructure to distribute resources.

Other scholars offer similar definitions of clientelism that agree on transactional characteristics of clientelism but debate the importance of personal connections in the exchange and the benefits accrued to the client. For Stokes, in a clientelist system "party-voter linkages are based on exchange—namely the distribution of selective benefits to individual voters or groups of voters in exchange for their votes" (Marschall, Aydogan, Bulut, 2015, p.7). Here clientelism is an electoral mobilization strategy where material goods secure electoral support.
Other definitions emphasize the personal relationships of clientelism. Hilgers presses for a narrow definition that illustrates the complex nature of the phenomenon. She draws on Roniger’s work to differentiate clientelism from vote-buying or patronage. By his definition, clientelism is the face-to-face exchange of goods and services between two people of unequal status. It involves norms of obligation and reciprocity and plays out over time across several interactions. It is to mutual benefit, durable, and depends upon benefits accruing to both parties. The definition contains a significant tension. It implicitly involves coercion because of the unequal power status of the entrants. The weaker party is always vulnerable and enters the relationship only because of their weakness, and the higher status member can always get the better end of the bargain. However, there has to be some benefit to the weaker party for the relationship to be maintained. Hilgers emphasizes that clientelism relies on the social framework of mutual obligation, which comes from traditional landlord-peasant links. As migrants have filled cities and taken on new urban identities, the practice has mutated into different forms; still, it retains a component of informal mutual commitment. In her estimation, personal and emotional attachments keep clientelism from only being a rational, interest-maximizing exchange.

Other scholars show it is too narrow to think of clientelism only as a vestige of rural tradition; to them, this view explains only one type of clientelism. Because informal relations are an enduring and necessary trait of any system, clientelist links are best understood not only as traditional but also as a fully modern form of political relationships. Radnitz confronts the presumption that modernization leads inextricably to the formalization of relations and that clientelism is only a vestige of agricultural institutions. In his review of
recent scholarship on informal relations, Radnitz states clientelist networks need not be based upon shared identity, longstanding ties, and repeated interaction instead, "rent-seeking or clientelistic networks can be constructed on the basis of minimal common background or even created from scratch as long as actors share the same goal" (Radnitz, 2011, p.358). Therefore, clientelist relationships can be fluid, and minimal, so long as there are particularistic goods to cement the relationships. Kitschelt writes, "clientelism based on face-to-face relations with normative bonds of deference and loyalty between patron and client represents one end of the continuum of informal political exchanges without legal codification" (Kitschelt, 2000, p.5). At the same time, he clarifies that it can also be modern and impersonal typified by "anonymous machine politics and competition between providers of selective incentives" (Kitschelt, 2000, p.5). In other words, clientelism does not need to rely on established relationships of the village or the tribe.

Therefore, it is imperative to view clientelism as an adaptive phenomenon that mutates in different contexts. For example, Jonathan Fox, in his 1994 article, The Difficult Transition from Clientelism to Citizenship: Lessons from Mexico, differentiates between types of clientelism. Importantly he distinguishes authoritarian clientelism and democratic clientelism. For him, the key to authoritarian clientelism is that it combines both the distribution of state goods but also repression. In what he defines as classic authoritarian clientelism, the patron must know individually how the client votes and be able to punish them if they do not follow through as promised. Fox also adds a definition of what he calls modern semi-clientelism. Its significant attributes are that it emanates from far-reaching social programs and relies less on politicians and their networks than the state bureaucracy.
In his research state resources were distributed in contested electoral districts to gain votes for the party. However, partisan state bureaucrats mostly controlled the distribution of goods, not traditional clientelist bosses. They lacked the connection to local communities to individually repress those who accepted state benefits and then voted for the opposition. In this situation, state goods offered strong incentives, but there were fewer mechanisms for repression. Fox shows that this still falls short of fully programmatic distribution of benefits and autonomous social groupings consistent with democracy even while it worked against the more harsh repression of traditional authoritarian clientelism. Fox’s types of clientelism share the common trait of exchanging of access to goods or services to specific individuals for personal loyalty—something political parties have proven adept at delivering.

At the same time, it is important to not view clientelism solely in a normative manner, but also to understand the benefits it offers to its recipients. Hilgers believes there is an element of accountability in that clientelism results from competition between activist organizations. In order to receive support, patrons must deliver services to clients. She cites Günes-Ayata’s (1994) argument that modernization and democratization atomize individuals rendering them powerless to obtain the resources they need. Clientelism provides access to market resources and community. It is crucial in organizing marginalized members of the urban fabric, mainly recent migrants and squatters, those who illegally occupy unused land. Poor individuals are easy to ignore and only through mobilization in groups are they able to effectively make demands. Leaders step in as brokers between the poor and the state and receive political support in return. Hilgers is therefore adamant that there is an interaction of not only power but trust and community, and that clientelism in rapidly
urbanizing areas is fundamentally different from rural structures and that it can be a source of community building (Hilgers, 2008).

In the end, for this thesis, it is most crucial to recognize that clientelist linkages function differently than programmatic linkages. Importantly, clientelism undermines democratic norms within the political parties themselves and perpetuates authoritarian practices. By corrupting the political sphere, it turns politics into a vehicle for the benefit of the few at the expense of the many. Clientelism makes the provisions of the state, guaranteed to all as benefits of citizenship, dependent upon supporting the party in power. Thus, it "controls citizens’ interests by trading political submission for resources that are provided discretionally although they are legally available to all" (Hilgers, 2005, p.3). Furthermore, "when clientelistic politics becomes the norm, non-policy selective benefits replace policy-based collective benefits, which in turn insulates policymakers from the priorities of the general public" (Marschall et al., 2015, p.7). This is particularly noteworthy in the context of housing policies where clientelism relies on the privation of a basic need for shelter to function. It helps explain the creation of substandard housing that proved so deadly during earthquakes in Turkey and Mexico. Generally, clientelism "inhibits political freedom and participation while perpetuating economic inequality" (Hilgers, 2008, p.126). In an authoritarian regime, the informal bonds of clientelism may provide a defense against the whims of the government and add more accountability; in an electoral democracy it represents a direct challenge to citizen participation in collective decision-making and democratic control of the state.

Regime Types
It will be useful first to revisit the definitions of democracy and authoritarian governments. Much like clientelism, there is a substantial literature and with it a substantial debate on what constitutes democracy and what is authoritarian. In order to examine clientelist parties’ control of state resources role in democratization in Mexico and Turkey is necessary first to define what democracy and authoritarianism are. The literature on clientelism above makes clear the presence of clientelism alone does not make a regime authoritarian (or democratic); it is merely one type of linkage mechanism which exists in a broader set of institutional arrangements. However, it does work against programmatic links common in industrial democracies. In that light, it is worthwhile to examine the institutional arrangements of different regime types and how they interact in combination with clientelist linkages. The purpose of exploring is not to be normative or prescriptive but to understand how the different types of regimes function. The literature below recounts the key institutional arrangements and practices of a democracy and what sets authoritarian regimes apart. Recent literature has also introduced the concept of the hybrid regime in which the use of state resources to create a skewed playing field, even where consequential elections determine who holds power. This type of regime is particularly relevant to Turkey and Mexico.

Authoritarian regimes are difficult to define because there is considerable variation in their institutional makeup. At the most basic, authoritarian governments are those that are not democratic. Levitsky and Way’s definition is the most relevant for this paper. They define it as "a regime in which no viable channels exist for opposition to contest legally for executive power" (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.6-7). In terms of elections, they are non-
competitive when regimes use repression or fraud such that there is no relationship between voter preference and official results. They state that elections are a façade if the executive receives more than 70% of the vote. These elections still play a vital role in authoritarian regimes. In *Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule*, Beatriz Magaloni explains that in authoritarian regimes, multi-party elections are vital to increasing the bargaining power of the ruling coalition against the dictator. They give a viable option to leave the ruling coalition and a peaceful avenue for other elites to challenge the dictator.

Interestingly, "non-competitive electoral institutions may one day become competitive (as occurred in Mexico)" (Levitsky and Way, 2002, p.54). Generally, however, in authoritarian systems, election results are never in doubt and are not a meaningful channel to contest power.

On the other hand, democracy requires more than meaningful elections. Electoral based definitions of democracy ignore important questions of power and control. Ulusoy (2014) asserts a weakness in the literature "related to a shallow approach to democracy." He presses for a much deeper definition, stating "some essential components of a true process of democratization such as the recognition of ethnic/religious identities, autonomous representation of economic interests and other forces of civil society, and restructuring of the state in a way that would respond to the needs of democratic political regime, has generally been left out of the analysis framework" (Ulusoy, 2014, p.198). In short, he is highlighting the importance of individual and organizational autonomy and accountability to them in democratic regimes. Schmitter and Karl offer a definition of democracy that directly addresses the idea of accountability to citizens. They state, "modern political democracy is a
system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (Schmitter and Karl 1991, p.2). Dahl writes democracy is a "political system, one of the characteristics of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens” (1972, p.2). Levitsky and Way define democracy procedurally following Dahl. It must have free and fair competitive elections and full adult suffrage. It requires the broad protection of Civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and association. Finally, there cannot be non-elected bodies that limit the ability of elected officials to govern. Levitsky and Way’s definition carries with it criteria that make elections competitive and meaningful. They highlight that electoral turnover alone does not define democratic regimes. Together, these definitions underscore the importance not only of elections but also citizen control of the state in a democracy.

Levitsky and Way posit the creation of a third regime type, the hybrid authoritarian regime. Their 2010 book, *Competitive Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*, focused on regime’s that were not clearly democratic or authoritarian. Much of the earlier literature assumed that those regimes that were not definitively democratic or authoritarian were in transition. On the other hand, Levitsky and Way found some regimes have formal democratic elements but do not meet the criteria of democracies. Yet they were highly stable. These include regimes that deny suffrage to large segments of the population, or a ban a major party. They also include regimes where nonelected bodies have considerable power and constrain the power of elected officials. The authors emphasize that all of these regime types are distinct from full authoritarian regimes and democracy but also have meaningful
institutional differences from each other. In total, their work makes a strong empirical justification for the creation of this third type of regime where elections are meaningful but where citizens do not have full control over the state.

Levitsky and Way focus on a particular type of hybrid regime, which they classify as a competitive authoritarian regime. These regimes must have some democratic institutions, including elections, but they are not entirely free or fair. They define competitive authoritarianism in the following way: they are a civilian regime in which formal democratic institutions exist and "are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power" but in which "incumbent abuse of the state violates at least one of three defining attributes of democracy 1) free elections 2) broad protection of civil liberties, and 3) a reasonably level playing field" (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.7). Therefore, elections are critical in determining this regime type. Levitsky and Way differentiate competitive authoritarian from other authoritarian regimes by not only if elections exist but also if they are a in a meaningful contest for power. In competitive authoritarian regimes the elections, while filled with abuses of power, determine the executive and must be taken seriously. They are different from full authoritarian regimes in that elections are unfair in a variety of ways including repression and fraud but not so widespread as to render the election meaningless. Competitive authoritarian regimes are different from full authoritarian regimes in that opposition parties can campaign in the open without repressions such as the threat of exile or imprisonment and constitutional measures exist for the opposition to gain executive power. Nonetheless, by their definition, elections can be so unfair as to make a regime undemocratic.
A significant aspect of Levitsky and Way’s work is what differentiates democracies from competitive authoritarian regimes are informal institutions. The authors state: "one characteristic of competitive authoritarianism is the centrality of informal institutions" (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.27). They recognize that informal institutions exist in all regimes. However, "given the disjuncture between formal (i.e., democratic) rules and actual behavior that is inherent to competitive authoritarianism, their role in such regimes may be particularly important (Levitsky and Way, 2008, p.27). What is fascinating is that this regime type allows the formal institutions to remain constant even while informal institutions can entirely change the nature of the regime. Informal institutions aimed at exploiting the state are at the heart of Levitsky and Way’s. For this thesis, it is foremost to emphasize the contradiction that in competitive authoritarian regimes the formal institutions are democratic, but informal practices keep them from functioning as such.

Radnitz and the scholars he reviews also show that informal practices have substantial ramifications for the state. A key theme of his review is informal political relationships’ ability to "weaken, substitute for, or work in parallel with, the state" (Radnitz, 2011, p.352). This conclusion is particularly salient if rent-seeking is the fundamental objective of government and source of resources for clientelism. Radnitz chillingly explains, "even an ostensibly strong and capable state can be undermined by, or become dependent on, informal networks if the state inadvertently provides incentives for collective action on an informal basis" (Radnitz, 2011, p.359). Clientelist parties can make the state depend on them to function. Instead of a unitary force, where clientelist relationships are the norm, the state can be made subservient to the party. Where informal relationships such as clientelism
predominate, individual actors carve up the state and its resources. Radnitz draws three conclusions. First, that ties can be minimal and quickly constructed so long as actors are all motivated by rent-seeking. Second, informal institutions can operate in both stability and transition. Third, if actors incentivize informal actions, they undermine the state.

While the rule of law and the media are weighty in Levitsky and Way’s argument, the most relevant aspect of their work for this paper is the use of state resources to capture elections. The concept of a level playing field relates to the distribution of state resources; it hinges upon the privileged use of government controlled material goods by the incumbent party. In a democracy, electoral contests decide the mostly programmatic distribution of benefits, through the rule of law. As cited earlier Kitschelt, Levitsky and Way accept there is an incumbent advantage and some degree of clientelism or patronage in many established democracies. Levitsky and Way add a crucial qualifier: incumbent advantages cannot seriously undermine the opposition’s ability to compete. They set a high stand for what makes competition unfair. They state "we consider the playing field uneven when (1) state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends, (2) incumbents are systematically favored at the expense of the opposition, and (3) the opposition’s ability to organize and compete in elections is seriously handicapped" (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.10). Thus, the area that differentiates competitive authoritarian regimes from democracies is the way "in which incumbents abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage" (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.5). They write, "when incumbent manipulation of state institutions and resources is so excessive and one-sided that it seriously limits political competition, it is incompatible with democracy" (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.6). Exclusive access to state resources or
monopoly privileges allows private sector actors to amass wealth that they then channel back into the party. Thus, the particularistic distribution of benefits through clientelism plays a decisive role in competitive authoritarian regimes. Therefore a defining feature of a competitive authoritarian regime is the partisan use of public resources negates citizen control of the state necessary for a democracy.

Levitsky and Way found the organizational strength of states and their ruling parties was a determining factor in if a competitive authoritarian regime remained in place and what came after it. They believe authoritarian incumbents’ ability to stay in power hinges their organizational power in short "the scope and cohesion of state and governing-party structures" (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.23). Parties are so fundamental to creating organizational capacity that Levitsky and Way found them decisive in maintaining competitive authoritarian regimes. If the party and state organizational capacities were strong incumbents held power. Even when the regime transitioned, if there were few links to western institutions, then strong parties contributed to authoritarian consolidation.

Other authors have also found that the organizational strength of parties is key to regime stability. Barbara Geddes, in What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?, classifies authoritarian regimes by type in order to explain the varying durability of these regimes. She finds single-party regimes last longer, and Geddes identifies the institutional structure of single-party regimes explicitly as a central component to a regime’s longevity. In The Politics of Authoritarian Rule Milan W. Svolik shows how political parties are vital to stability in authoritarian regimes. Svolik also shows organizational strength key in determining regime stability and sites the cost of maintaining a party as the main reason all
authoritarian regimes do not create a political party. In contrast to Geddes, he concludes, "what appears to be key to the survival of authoritarian ruling coalitions is the presence of the strong party, not necessarily a single one" (Svolik, 2012, p. 193). The literature clearly shows that the strong organizational capacities of parties are vital to regime stability.

However, there are different interpretations as to why parties are so useful to regime stability and how they accomplish the task of creating cohesion. Much of the scholarship looks to political parties’ role coalescing elites. In *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization* Jason Brownlee asserts that political parties are substantive because of their role in mediating elite conflicts. Brownlee sees stability as a function of the party’s ability to organize elite politics and regulate competing demands. Brownlee finds parties bind elites together and marginalize the opposition. This cohesion compounds the benefits for members belonging to the party in power. Magaloni asserts that the fundamental relationship of dictatorial regimes is between the dictator and his ruling coalition, and an essential institution for guaranteeing the deal is the political party. Magaloni emphasizes the permanent risk that dictators have of being deposed from within their own ranks by their own supporters. She says, "the dictator’s dilemma can only be solved if the ruler generates incentives for members of the ruling coalition to vest their interest in the survival of the dictatorship, and this requires establishing some credible limits the dictatorial abuses" (Magaloni, 2008, p.720). In order to establish a credible power-sharing agreement, the dictator must give up some control "to a parallel political organization such as a political party" (Magaloni, 2008, p.716). In this way, political parties serve to solve the commitment problem between dictators and their coalitions. Both Brownlee and Magaloni believe parties
mediate elites to have a longer-term view, which facilitates coordination. Therefore, political parties play an essential part in mediating elite conflict and preventing elite defections to the opposition and thus promote regime stability.

Other scholars also look at political parties' vital role in uniting elites to the masses. In *Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats*, Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski look at how authoritarian leaders build coalitions that promote regime survival. In their view, they find repression alone is not explanation enough of regime durability; instead, leaders need cooperation from the masses. They gain this cooperation by using institutions to form linkages with the larger society. The absence of mass support boosts political opponents' chances to gain power by forming a rival political organization. Levitsky and Way show parties are how authoritarian regimes in mobilize people and retain power. So long as parties maintain mass support elite defections mean little. Accordingly, it is beneficial for party-based dictatorships to mobilize citizens, especially where there are multiple political parties. In Magaloni’s view, the primary mechanism of mobilization is through the distribution of state goods. Political parties are the vehicles through which elites form links with and mobilize mass support.

Parties can maintain themselves through programmatic or clientelistic linkages between elites and the masses. As described earlier, these types of linkages can exist in both authoritarian and democratic regimes, but change how parties function. Programmatic parties are inherently ideological. Policy outcomes serve ideological goals. Therefore programmatic parties must work to work to establish policy and democratically resolve disagreements. On the other hand, the function of clientelist parties is to distribute goods in
a particularistic fashion and invest in structures to distribute goods. Spoils achieve party cohesion differently than policy concessions and ideology. The means parties use to create mass linkages reflects on the fundamental goal and operations of the party.

One of the central debates in the literature is the importance ideology as opposed to resource transfers in how to parties maintain cohesiveness and gain allegiance. Levitsky and Way find that patronage is not enough to create a stable party. They find a shared ethnic, ideological, or ties of shared struggle are noteworthy sources of cohesion. Similarly, Gandhi and Przeworski assert that "on-the-spot" resource transfers are not enough to build a durable regime. Brownlee too argues against looking at regime duration as only a function of material benefits mostly because the scholarship on clientelism minimizes the ways that parties create power and set an agenda that goes beyond material distribution. He says, "the coalition-maintaining aspect of ruling parties, rather than their operation as patronage networks, explain elite cohesion within the regime and electoral control at the polls" (Brownlee 2007, p.215). Magaloni believes ideology is rarely the primary motivating factor in coalescing authoritarian regimes. She identifies rent-seeking as the primary motivation for all dictatorships, regardless of type or ideology. She says, "in my account, all dictators are presumed to be motivated by the same goal-survive in office while maximizing rents" (Magaloni, 2008, p. 717). Levitsky and Way also assume that the goal of incumbents is to retain power. Svolik shows the role of ideology in lessening costs of cooptation and recruiting party adherents. It is easier for a party to recruit members with similar ideologies or little ideological motivation. Magaloni offers a fascinating insight in this respect: for her, the most
pertinent aspect of ideology is that strong and highly polarized opponents make it harder to consolidate stable party dictatorships—a problem she sees most often solved through purges.

In authoritarian regimes parties function to provide a following for the dictator and are the organ through which they control the state. Gandhi and Przeworski write that for dictators "to rule the country, to supervise the state bureaucracy, they must rely on a political party" (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007, p.1283). Domination of the state bureaucracy by the party allows it to gain control over resources to use to co-optation the larger society.

Magaloni shows how parties can use the control of the state to create a following. She states, "by making the distribution of benefits—subsidies, cash transfers, public goods, irrigation projects, housing, health services, and the like—contingent on citizens support, the dictator is able to induce loyalty" (Magaloni, 2008, p. 729). Levitsky and Way, identify institutional corruption as a way to bind elite actors to incumbent parties. In this way, parties are key for rent-seeking elites to dominate the state and society.

Many scholars find it is the temporal and conditional distribution of benefits, which is crucial to party and regime stability. Magaloni’s scholarship shows how political parties work to distribute rewards to supporters over time, thereby solving the commitment problem between the dictator and his supporters. She explains how the distribution of rents binds the masses to the party: "citizens will remain loyal to the dictator in part because of the benefits they received and in part because of the fear of being expelled from the party’s spoils system" (Magaloni, 2008, p.729). Magaloni asserts that the long-term distribution of rents is the primary function of authoritarian parties. By delegating authority to the parties, the "the dictator can more credibly guarantee to share power and the spoils of office over the long run
to those who invest in existing institutions rather than subversive coalitions” (Magaloni, 2008, p.716). Svolik concludes that the political party’s ability to extract costly service from party members in exchange for future rents is why parties are so effective at gaining long-term allegiance from party members. He explains, "what makes co-optation via a party so effective is not the distribution of benefits itself—those could be easily distributed without a party. Rather, it is the conditioning of those benefits, prior costly service" (Svolik, 2012, p.164). This conditioning of benefits on service adds a long-term time horizon in which party members must invest in the maintenance of the party and regime. Magaloni shows potential rivals in autocratic institutions will remain loyal so long as the value of remaining loyal is larger than the payoffs for conspiracy. For these reasons, the clientelist linkages in authoritarian regimes are much more than "on the spot" transfers but instead are made up of a set of informal obligations that mean party members benefit only if the regime is maintained. These internal incentive structures induce the service that maintains the party’s organizational strength. The institutional architecture of the ruling coalition rests upon clientelist linkages through political parties that condition loyalty and provides regime stability. Svolik and Magaloni show the institutional mechanism that makes party-based regimes more durable is the temporal distribution of benefits based upon costly service to the party. The work shows that the distribution of rents over time is particularly significant in why parties help authoritarian regimes survive.

The temporal distribution of benefits depends on the ability of the party to control political positions and that its members expect it to survive. Svolik identifies how parties use state power to gain influence. He writes, "policies established state control over a wide range
of careers—ranging from outright expropriation of key industries to heavy regulation” (2012, p.182). Thus, party-based service facilitates control over all major organized sectors of the state and society. Control of the state allows party elites to co-opt citizens by offering access to state resources or to repress opponents by denying these benefits. It allows the party to exert extensive political control over society. The benefits for party members are many, including employment, prospects for promotion, and educational opportunities. Barbara Geddes finds that regime stability rests on its "control over the allocation of educational opportunities, jobs, and positions in government" (Geddes, 1999). Gandhi and Przeworski write, "the party offers individuals willing to collaborate with the regime a vehicle for advancing their careers within a stable system of patronage" (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007, p.1283). The hierarchical nature of parties and the delayed rewards to party members take advantage of natural career aspirations to co-op the most productive and ideologically agreeable segments of the population. Through this control, they can gain the adherence of the most talented members of society and in particular those from marginal urban backgrounds who otherwise would have few prospects for upward mobility. The system is flexible and can operate in times of both economic growth and contraction. When better job prospects are available outside the party, it is obliged to loosen constraints on party members; however, when they are weak, they can require more stringent party membership. It is effective at co-opting both the masses and the elites. Therefore, clientelist parties in authoritarian regimes rely on control of the state bureaucracy reward party membership.

Besides the temporal distribution of benefits, the hierarchical nature of clientelist parties in authoritarian regimes helps exert control over the state and society. According to
Svolik, the hierarchical assignment of service and benefits associated with clientelist parties’
leads to a much more enduring stake in the regime’s survival. There are different benefits
associated with the levels of the party hierarchy. The party benefits from the immediate
outcomes of members’ service while delaying the benefits accrued to them. Magaloni
highlights this is useful in co-opting a large number of weaker players "the rank-and-file and
mid-level party officials—who expect to be able to progressively gain more powerful political
positions" (Magaloni, 2008, p.724). The benefits to the regime include electoral
mobilization, intimidation, and voter fraud in multiparty regimes. Svolik distinguishes not
only the importance of exchange within the party but the sunken political investment by
their members. For the system to work the share of the spoils should increase as time goes on
to lower-level members. Higher members reap most of the benefits; while lower-ranking
members put in the work to maintain the party’s rule. That is, one of the advantages of
institutional parties is that the investment in the party becomes "sunk" and nontransferable
across political coalitions. So long as this is "the only game in town," it presents strong
incentives to join the ruling party and remain loyal. Party members become captive to their
own career success with a vested interest in regime stability. In all the hierarchical structure
of parties and temporal distribution of benefits gained from holding power are crucial to
regime stability.

Altogether this shows clientelist parties are a key component of authoritarian and
competitive authoritarian regimes. Clientelist linkages build parties that are primarily
motivated by rent-seeking and not ideology. As such, this type of organization is resource-
intensive and relies on access to rents obtained from controlling the state. By dominating
appointments to the positions within the state bureaucracy the party is able to co-opt the
provision of state resources. The temporal distribution of benefits and hierarchical
organization of the party prompts followers to invest in the long-term stability of the regime.
In this way clientelist parties are able to use state resources to build strong parties. Thus,
clientelism plays an essential role in maintaining authoritarian and competitive authoritarian
regimes.
CASE STUDIES

Mexico and Turkey are excellent examples of the concepts from the literature at work. They are two cases of hybrid regimes that are moving in different directions. Clientelist parties’ ability to capture the state is a significant cause of this divergence. The next section of this thesis will first identify why Mexico and Turkey are representative cases of hybrid regimes. It will then recap this history of both countries to understand the creation of clientelist parties and informal housing. It will review their importance in securing land tenure for residents. Next, it will look at the period after 1982 to understand the disruption of the 20th century systems that occurred with a change to the economic system. It will highlight the formation of the regime and party apparatus in the 1990s, so to identify the movement toward democracy in both Mexico and Turkey. Finally, it will look at their divergent trajectories following the 2000 and 2002 elections, respectively, that monitors widely regarded as free and fair. It will focus on the housing policies enacted after those elections as a window on how the clientelist parties have controlled the functions and resources of the state. Both countries had high percentages of informal housing and have launched large housing programs. In Mexico, the state has become more independent and transparent, while in Turkey, the ruling party has made housing allocations increasingly opaque and linked to party loyalty.

Case Selection

Mexico and Turkey are good cases for comparison of clientelist practices and their effect on political regimes. Because they are in different regions, there are noteworthy
historic, geographic and cultural differences between Mexico and Turkey. One of the most important is the role of religion. Mexico is a predominantly Catholic Christian country, while Turkey is predominantly Sunni Muslim. Religion has played a considerable role in the populist rhetoric of different parties. However, as shown in the literature above, clientelism is fundamentally about capturing state power and exploiting rent-seeking opportunities and not ideology. Cultural issues were relevant in the case studies below mostly as a means to manipulate urban workers. Similarly, both Turkey and Mexico have strong links to the established industrial democracies. They share borders and enjoy strong trading relationships with the European Union and the United States, respectively. They are both members of the OECD. Turkey is a NATO member. They have similar links to other democratic nations. Links to the west did not play a leading role the different regime trajectories of the two cases. Therefore cultural and regional explanations are insufficient to explain the different regime trajectories. Their geographic and cultural distance highlights the importance of political and economic factors and not cultural differences in democratization in both countries.

While they are culturally and geographically distinct Mexico and Turkey have much in common that makes them good cases for comparison. They have notable political and economic similarities. These similarities include factors that contribute to clientelism such as a history of authoritarianism, state interventions in their economic systems, rapid urbanization, high levels of inequality, and large developments of informal housing. Mexico and Turkey’s clientelist political structures evolved from authoritarian regimes early in the formation of their republics. They both took their modern republican forms in the 1920s. In both cases, regimes came to power in the aftermath of the violent creation of their respective
nation-states. Populist leaders mobilized urban workers as a primary base of support and used corporatist structures to manage social conflicts. In Mexico, the PRI used clientelist practices to cement its rule for most of the latter half of the twentieth century. In Turkey, after moving from a single-party system after World War II, the country held competitive elections, but ideological differentiation was often truncated by coups that kept a narrow political elite in power. In both cases elites retained control of the state and did not trust the masses with political power.

Clientelism has a long history in both Mexico and Turkey. It existed in colonial Mexico before independence, and it formed a part of the Ottoman political tradition were people regarded the state as a protector and the provider. Both Turkey and Mexico’s political systems became dependent upon clientelist networks in the twentieth century reinforced by nationalist economic policies. Clientelism played an integral part in the process of urbanization and the incorporation of the masses into politics. Controlling tenure rights to informal housing has historically been crucial to clientelist control of the urban masses. In both situations, elections further entrenched clientelist practices. Thus, clientelist linkages to the masses became the norm in both Turkey and Mexico, making them excellent cases for a comparison of the outcomes of such informal practices.

Both Turkey and Mexico experienced an economic crisis in the early 1980s that upset the status quo. As a result both changed their primary economic system from Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) to neoliberalism in the period that followed. As predicted by the literature, the withdrawal of the state from the economy reduced resources available
for political manipulation. However, while the shift to neoliberalism changed the state and society in both countries, it is has not necessarily not resulted in democratization.

Both countries are also examples of hybrid regimes. Mexico was one Levitsky and Way’s prime examples of competitive authoritarianism, where the regime has some democratic institutions, including elections, but they are not entirely free or fair, because of the PRI’s extensive use of state resources and outright fraud to sway elections. Levitsky and Way did not classify Turkey as a competitive authoritarian regime but they did consider it a hybrid regime. The unelected leaders of the military held a considerable control over the state until at least 2002. Furthermore, the military and ruling parties excluded Kurdish and religious parties from full participation in elections in Turkey through the 1990s. What is material for this paper is that both regimes held competitive elections, but fell short of full democracy.

By 2002 both Turkey and Mexico had democratic elections that were mostly free and fair. In the 2000 election in Mexico, new institutional arrangements allowed for independent oversight of elections and the PRI was peacefully removed from power. In the 2002 election in Turkey, the historically Islamist AKP was allowed to participate, and Kurdish supporters were an essential part of the AKP electoral coalition. Over the next several years, the AKP systematically dismantled the military’s control over the state. Thus the two countries had important democratic institutions; fairly contested and honestly counted elections with significant public participation. They both appeared on a clear path towards democracy if they were not considered democratic already.
However, as the literature above makes clear, democracy requires much more than elections. Elections must deliver the citizen accountability and control called for by Schmitter, Karl, and Dahl necessary for democracy. Instead, they both remain hybrid regimes. Despite the formal apparatus of competitive elections, the abuse of public resources to manipulate elections remains a significant issue in both Turkey and Mexico (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni, 2013; Aydin-Düzgit and Gürsoy, 2013; Ulusoy, 2014). Yet, since 2002, Mexico has become increasingly democratic, while Turkey has become more authoritarian. For this paper, what is significant is that both countries have formally democratic institutions, but the informal practices of clientelism shape the true nature of the regime. The formal constitutions of the two countries did not change between 1983 and 2016, the same formal political institutions remained in place, however, and radical changes in informal practices altered the nature of the Mexican and Turkish regimes. Above all, the divergent paths of Turkey and Mexico show the importance and tension between informal institutions of democracy and informal arrangements that can undermine it.

In Turkey and Mexico, clientelist parties’ control of state resources, particularly access to housing, has allowed them to function in a variety of economic systems. Both countries relied on policies of Import Substitution Industrialization and permitted massive informal housing developments in the mid-twentieth century. They similarly transitioned to a neoliberal economic system near the turn of the century. The literature failed to predict how entrenched clientelist parties were and how they would adapt. Even amid the economic upheaval, clientelist parties retained their strength and remain a fundamental part of the political system despite the systemic economic change.
Since 2002 both countries have embarked upon massive housing programs to build a more formal housing market. These programs highlight important changes in the informal institutions. The following section reviews the history of urbanization and informal housing development in Mexico and Turkey and how it reinforced a clientelist political system. Next, it recounts the shift in economic policy and the efforts to create more formal markets in Mexico and Turkey. Clientelist parties’ involvement in housing formalization is a venue to examine how the different trajectories of the political systems of Turkey and Mexico. The toleration of informal settlements is a component of the story. While there are similarities in the political history and economic policies of Mexico and Turkey, by the first decade of the twenty-first century there were significant differences in the extent to which clientelist parties in each country were able to monopolize the resources of the state.

**Clientelism and Urbanization**

Both Mexico and Turkey took their present forms after a violent upheaval followed by a period of state formation in the 1920s. Modernization and urbanization began in the late 19th century. However, the inability of existing regimes to accommodate social changes led to their demise and upended the existing political and social structures of Turkey and Mexico. Industrialization accelerated rapidly in the twentieth century. Urbanization in Mexico and Turkey corresponded with the period of state-led economic development in the global economy. After the great depression, countries circumscribed the movement of people and goods across borders. Nation-states became much more self-contained, and the state took a more active role in the economy. Populist leaders and their parties implemented policies that led to mass urbanization and the concentration of industry near centers of
power. Both countries developed through state-led policies known as Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). Mexico City and Istanbul were the centers of economic and population growth in Mexico and Turkey, respectively. Because of their size and economic power, these cities and their citizens became important nationally. Each grew to over 10 million people ranking them among the largest cities in the world. They continue to be the political and economic locus of their countries.

Industrial development and nationalist economic policies of ISI reinforced clientelist linkages. Industries with close ties to the state became sources of patronage. While ISI drove overwhelming growth the principal cities, there were costs in the quality of housing for citizens. The new states were unable to provide adequate housing to the newly formed working classes. Clientelist linkages became the primary base of support for political parties, as the dearth of housing led neighborhood groups to organize for the provision of goods and services. As a result, political parties developed to be more transactional than policy focused. These linkages that took advantage of urbanization would prove difficult to dislodge. Thus, Mexico and Turkey’s development gave rise to economic and political relationships that relied on using the resources of the state to gain political support. The following section will detail these conditions that gave rise to clientelist networks in Mexico and Turkey in the mid-twentieth century.

The leaders who emerged in the new republics were determined to continue the process of agrarian reform, urbanization, and industrialization that began in the first decades of the twentieth century. In Mexico, under the populist leadership of President Lazár Cárdenas, between 1934 and 1940 the Mexican state redistributed 20 million hectares of
land. This change and the mechanization of agriculture freed rural peasants from the debt bondage that tied them to plantation agriculture (Stern, 1982; Chasteen, 2016). These factors, combined with high birthrates and improvements in healthcare, increased the population and made the Mexican countryside the source of massive outmigration for the next century. Similarly, in Turkey, following World War II, the Marshall plan brought $53 billion in aid from the United States. The government chose to focus these resources on mechanizing agriculture and industrializing the country in order to enter the world market through manufacturing and agriculture exports. Policies included direct state subsidies to industry and purchasing large numbers of tractors and other farm equipment. The result was millions of displaced rural workers flocking to the city in search of factory jobs (Öztürk and Çiraci, 2010). In short, the combination of political and technological changes led to rapid urbanization in both Turkey and Mexico.

An essential aspect of Mexico’s and Turkey’s development was the economic policy of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). As summarized by Lomnitz (1977) and Stern (1982), practiced in Mexico and Turkey from roughly the 1940s until the early 1980s, it was an attempt to foster domestic consumption by putting high tariffs on imports from abroad in order to develop local industrial production. ISI, in effect, works as a subsidy for firms. It moves the costs of industrial development onto consumers through higher prices for goods.

In Import Substitution Industrialization economies, the state plays a chief role in decision-making. State involvement in the economy concentrated growth in areas near state power. Therefore, these policies concentrated urbanization in Mexico and Turkey towards major cities connected to the state. The population of Istanbul exploded from 1.5 million
people in 1950 to more than 11 million people in Istanbul proper and more than 16 million in the Istanbul metropolitan region by 2008 (OECD, 2008). Beginning with less than half a million people in 1900 and still only 1.5 million in 1940, Mexico City housed more than 8.3 million in 1970. By 1970, the metropolitan area of Mexico City, with 17% of the population, concentrated close to 50% of the value of industrial production of the country. By 2008 the population of the Federal District of Mexico City had reached 8.8 million, and the Mexico City Metropolitan region counted more than 21 million people. As a result of state-led economic development and massive migration, Mexico City and Istanbul became loci of urbanization and industrialization (Stern, 1982; Lomnitz, 1977; Yalcintan and Erbas, 2003; Baker, 2012).

As Turkey and Mexico pursued economic policies of Import Substitution Industrialization, the governments passed the costs of national development onto the citizens. State subsidies for industry concentrating industrial development in Mexico City and Istanbul put enormous strain on the usage demands of urban land and infrastructure. Under ISI state policies provided insufficient resources for housing to accommodate the recently arrived migrants. In response to the lack of housing, the governments tolerated the creation of massive informal settlements. This toleration allowed factories to keep wages low and fueled further growth. Thus in both Mexico and Turkey state policy favored manufacturing over formalizing property rights as national development policies trumped local development decision-making.

Mexico’s government chose to allow informal settlements in the form of squatter settlements and shantytowns, as well as the illegal subdivision and sale of communally held
agricultural land. Private property rights and their abrogation by the revolutionary state are fundamental to the Mexican Constitution (Cueva, 1987). Land invasions and squatter settlements were one of the primary forms of access to land in the 1930s and 1940s. Eventually, the illegal subdivision of communally held agrarian lands became the principal source of land for informal development. These lands include *tierras comunales*, held by indigenous communities from "time immemorial," and *ejidos*. The state created *ejidos* as a way to turn landless peasants into small farmers after the revolution. In the 1930s under President Cardenas, it redistributed an enormous amount of Mexico’s land for communal agriculture. He turned more than half of the land around Mexico City into *ejidos*. With the 1973 Agrarian Reform act, the Mexican government established a process for the regularization of communal *ejido* lands. The 1973 act required the unilateral expropriation from the *ejido* by the president for it to become legally urban land. The process involved a dedicated agency to negotiate the process. Regularization went through a federal agency, the Commission for the Regularization of Land Tenure (CORETT), and followed agrarian laws. The law sets the level of compensation that communal ownership corporations will receive. Only once the process is complete is the "agricultural" nature of the land removed. However, it is a clearly defined process, and therefore provides a more secure form of tenure, even though only a small fraction of developments were ever formalized. The fact that there is a single agency with considerable power within the corporatist machinery of the state responsible tenure arrangements made *ejido* land the preferred type of land for informal settlement in Mexico, which still accounts for the majority of housing production. The arrangements provided housing and reasonably secure tenure for millions of Mexicans but it
created a legal grey area of implicitly approved though not outwardly legal tenure (Varley 2002).

Informal housing also proliferated in Turkey during the mid-twentieth century. In 1956, there were 31,914 illegal squatter houses in Istanbul. By 2002 there were an estimated 1,250,000 illegal buildings and 575,000 shanty style houses (Öztürk and Çiraci 2010, p.5). Informal housing was so crucial to Istanbul’s development that the government tolerated it. Self-built homes even developed a name, gecekondu, which refers to this tacit approval. The word means “one-night house” alluding to the to the initial arrangement whereby authorities ignored untitled buildings so long as they were built overnight. Additionally, the use of an informal development model known as the appurtenance system, in which small builders would assemble technically illegal joint ownership in small multi-unit buildings was so widespread that it "was adopted throughout the country within two or three decades as the dominant form of housing provision and mode of urban living" (Balamir, 1999, p.392). In the 1970s and 1980s through various amnesty laws, the government institutionalized an ad hoc system of de facto legalization of squatter and appurtenance housing.

Clientelism thrives during urbanization. There is an important reason; as illustrated in the literature review above, clientelism relies on unequal social relationships. Clientelist parties gain support by combining the interests of rent-seeking elites and voters in economic need. Such systems depend on high levels of inequality. Economist Simon Kuznets theorized that urbanization inherently leads to higher levels of inequality. His work showed that as people move from the countryside to the city, they at first lack skills and receive low wages. As a result, inequality jumps rapidly at the beginning of the process of industrialization and
urbanization. Therefore the process of urbanization creates conditions of inequality favorable to clientelism.

Informal settlements add to this inequality. The inherent illegality of informal settlements creates fertile ground for coercion. As a result, there is deep-rooted involvement of politicians, political parties in the informal settlements. These include sanctioning land invasions and protecting informal subdivisions. Such activities indicate that the implementation of policies and application of regulations in “land and housing are intrinsically tied to, and a result of, the interplay between different political and economic interest groups which is often manifested in the form of clientelism and political mediation” (Keivani and Werna, 2001). As a result, informal settlements are an essential base for clientelist political parties.

In both Mexico City and Istanbul, the result of policies tolerating informal housing was a citizenry with few formal tenure rights susceptible to clientelist coercion. Various scholars described Mexico City and Istanbul as nearly unmanageable mega-cities with massive informal developments composed of low-quality housing and few basic services. However, other scholars advise against normatively looking at housing only as a dual system in which formal housing as good and informal housing is bad. Whether it is formal or informal makes little difference in the quality of housing available to citizens (Varley, 2002). Self-built homes without title may have services and pay taxes, while those built by the formal sector may lack them (Herbert, Belsky and DuBroff, 2012). Instead, they point to the importance of security of tenure and not just formal land rights as the issue of principal importance for the urban poor (Payne, 2004). From this frame of reference, informal
housing with secure tenure can address the needs of many. Because informal settlements lacked formal titles and did not provide secure tenure, they left residents vulnerable to coercion. Informal settlements created a dense network of potential voters in need of state resources pliable to clientelist practices from powerful patrons who could provide tenure security and other urban services.

In Turkey and Mexico, clientelism rooted in informal housing settlements was the bedrock of populist political movements that shaped state and regime formation in both countries. Steve Stein, in his writing on populism, highlights the break down of the nineteenth-century political system in the face of "massification" as a result of urban growth. He posits populism harnessed new demands brought by middle and working classes and needs to be understood as primarily urban and conservative in that it mostly did not seek to disrupt the status quo. Populist leaders and policies played an important role in national integration and bringing the masses into the political fold, though in a dependent relationship. By using patronage and clientelism, populism directed the energies of the working and middle classes towards electing a charismatic leader in exchange for material goods. In general, new groups made political demands for more material benefits but were denied actual political incorporation through policymaking. Thus clientelist parties in both countries were an outgrowth of populist mobilization the urban masses without participation in decision-making. It maintained elite control and prevented the full political incorporation of the masses, leaving the decision making to party elites instead.

In Turkey, the residents of informal settlements increasingly saw politics as a vehicle involved in obtaining benefits for themselves, their families, and communities and not
creating broad-based policies. Karpat (1976) found, for squatters, those who are illegally occupying land to which they have no claim, the need to defend their land motivated political activity. Formal associations established by squatter settlers functioned as liaisons between dwellers and political parties to conduct bargains with the city and national politicians. Leaders had to demonstrate the ability to defend the interests of the squatter settlement. In this context, politics became highly transactional (Ulusoy, 2014). Gecekondu residents were pragmatic voters who voted less on ideology and more on their own needs. Karpat says, "voting, therefore is a way of transforming the communal opinion into a political will and into a political vehicle for updating material benefits" (Karpat, 1976, p.205). Other scholars come to similar conclusions, "politics was understood and defined as a strategy to build and sustain power by distributing material benefits generated by the state through clientelist channels of interest mediation" (Marschall et al., 2015, p.14). The contest for votes of recently arrived migrants—and the electoral power that came with them—between the established secular elites in both the Conservative and Social Democratic parties incentivized ad hoc legalization of informal settlements. The retroactive extension of ownership rights to the occupiers by granting illegal buildings amnesties helped cement the populist coalition between industrialists, secular political parties vying for loyalty and urbanites (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.5). Again, Karpat explains, the full impact this had on the political system:

In the case of the Turkish Squatters, the demand making transformed the traditional and mythical devlet baba (father state), an aloof, authoritarian semi-deity, into a living government—into a human organization that could
be manipulated to do or undo certain acts, especially with regard to

*gecekondus.* (Karpat, 1976, p.198)

Thus, during the period of state-led economic development, clientelism and patronage became the norm for all political parties (Sayar 2011). Clientelist networks were how the urban masses engaged in Turkish politics, during the era of ISI.

Similarly, the authoritarian government of PRI entrenched clientelism as the primary practice of politics. As posited by Hilgers earlier, individually, urban poor are easy to ignore and only through mobilization in groups are they able to effectively make demands. Leaders step in as brokers between the poor and the state and receive political support in return. For example, squatters who illegally claimed and occupied land without consent in the 1930s and 1940s, were subject to the threat of eviction and relied on the political protection of patrons. Moreover, the taking of land usually only applied to the first wave of settlers, all subsequent residents must pay those with de facto control. According to Cueva (1987), the PRI institutionalized the leadership of squatter settlements by creating "settlement improvement associations." An unwritten requirement was membership in PRI. Once the party established this organization, the authorities would hear demands for services and adhere to a tacit non-eviction pact. These leaders gained land-rent in exchange for providing protection. This arrangement "contributed to the disciplined incorporation of the new urban masses into the PRI" (Cueva, 1987, p.529). Similarly, the PRI was able to coopt the leadership of *ejido* settlements. The PRI kept the property rights of *ejidatarios* vague in order to permit it to intervene. Patrons, who were able to negotiate the corporatist machinery of the state, were key to maintaining housing tenure for those who occupied illegally subdivided
agricultural lands. The control of communal lands involves a corporatist system of representation linked to agrarian authorities and the PRI. Cueva (1987) makes clear the ejido leadership did not protect peasants’ interests but instead mostly obtained rents from the urban masses settled there. Thus PRI controlled clientelist networks became a central feature of informal settlements in Mexico.

In Mexico the expectation for settlement leaders was also to secure resources and protection and not democratization. Hellman explains, "the goals of old organizations were straightforward: to establish themselves as a force with which to be reckoned on the local and, eventually, the national scene, and thus to wrest concessions from the state" (Hellman, 2008, p.67). Different corporatist groups within the party pledged loyalty to powerful party factions in exchange for rewards from the state-controlled by the PRI. Social movements were subsumed within the party through these structures and had little or no independence. Thus, contrary to Hilgers' assertion earlier that clientelism promotes organizing and accountability, Hellman (2008) emphasizes this is a highly effective form of social control. Opposition movements faced a devil’s bargain between material concessions their supporters desperately needed or continued future independence and the ability to critique the regime. She explains, "independent, opposition organizations sow the seeds for change through years of determined struggle, while quiescent PRI-affiliated peasants or urban poor reap the rewards" (p.67). Thus the essential relationship between the government, political parties, and social movements in Mexico for more than a half-century was one of supplication through clientelism at the expense of independent parties and social movements essential to democracy.
Thus, clientelist linkages to the masses through patronage became the norm in both Turkey and Mexico during ISI. The political parties in both Turkey and Mexico focused on the delivery of clientelist goods and the protection of land tenure but not programmatic policy solutions. There were elections but this system failed to create differentiated policy options and left little political power for the masses. Instead of promoting the organizing efforts of marginalized groups, clientelism coopted independent social organizations. Accountability of the state was subsumed by demands for subservience to receive public resources.

**Regime Change in Turkey and Mexico**

The previous section outlined how clientelism became the predominant linkage strategy in Turkey and Mexico during their rapid industrialization. However, by the late 1970s, the economic system of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) was no longer sustainable. Following political and economic crises, the policy of ISI was replaced by policies that reduced the role of the state in the economy. This change theoretically should reduce the number of patronage resources available to clientelist parties and change the political dynamics of the country. However, in both Turkey and Mexico, clientelist linkages proved difficult to dislodge. The section below will detail how the economic and political regimes in Turkey and Mexico transformed in the 1980s and 1990s but also how clientelism remained fundamental feature of politics and remained important in securing housing tenure.

Starting in the late 1970s, the structure of the global economy began to change radically. New information technologies expanded the reach of international commerce and
finance far beyond national borders. Changes in shipping and communications technology allowed corporations to become multinational. This shift went part and parcel with the opening of national economies and the expansion of global markets. State subsidies for industry and employment were expensive and became increasingly difficult to sustain, prompting debt and inflation. Globally, "state regulation and management, and the rapid expansion of government employment shifted from being part of the solution to be seen as part of the problem" (Soja, Morales and Wolff, 1983). Through policies known collectively as neoliberalism, national economies became much more open with fewer restrictions on the movement of goods, and capital between nations. In the end, the emphasis on industrial development was superseded by the importance of cultivating international investment, especially in finance, insurance, and real estate.

Ideologically, neoliberalism rests in part on modernization theory, which posits democratization is about economic development: once a country reaches a certain level of development, it will democratize. Large state sectors work against democratization because they slow development, support clientelism, and lead to authoritarianism. According to the tenets of neoliberalism, it is therefore imperative for democratization to increase international trade and reduce state intervention in the economy. In the literature on the third wave of democratization during the 1990’s, there is substantial evidence that lessening of materials resources of authoritarian regimes played a role in increasing the number of democratic regimes as patronage resources dried up. Levitsky and Way, find after the Cold War changes in the global economy and economic crisis led to a shrinking of patronage resources and a lessening of the coercive apparatus (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p.17). Geddes, in her study of
democratization, found that the lessening of resources was instrumental in the fall of many patrimonial regimes. She writes that in the late 1980s, a series of economic crises and subsequent reforms forced on authoritarian regimes by international lenders slashed the resources available to distribute to the masses, especially in countries that practiced ISI which created disproportionately large state-controlled sectors of the economy. She writes this "reduced benefits to regime supporters at the same time that the crisis itself reduced acquiescence among ordinary citizens" (Geddes, 1999, p.139). The diminished resources available weakened the clientelist networks that supported many personalist and military regimes and "without these material inducements, allies and supporters deserted their leaders" (Geddes, 1999, p.139). Therefore, the expectation was that as countries reduced their state sectors it would diminish clientelism and aid in democratization.

However, there is also significant evidence that economic development alone will not lessen clientelism and encourage democratization. Levitsky and Way point out increased societal wealth and modernization were not factors in democratization in Latin America, Africa, or communist Eurasia. Geddes, and Gandhi and Przeworski also found single party regimes were resilient even when the state sectors shrank. Mexico and Turkey are pivotal cases in this argument because as G20 and OECD countries, they are now highly developed, but not fully democratic. The cases show that the change from ISI to neoliberalism did profoundly effect the formal political and economic institutions of Mexico and Turkey, but that informal institutions of clientelism in both countries proved adaptive and resilient.

Economic instability led both Mexico and Turkey to abandon policies of ISI. Balance of payments deficits led Turkey to default on its debt in 1978; Mexico defaulted in
Mexico and Turkey both had to deregulate their economies to conform to a neoliberal model and appease lenders. Financial reforms included: fiscal austerity, privatization of state-owned companies, reductions in trade barriers, industrial deregulation, and foreign investment liberalization. The changes exposed companies that had formerly enjoyed tariff protection under the policy of Import Substitution Industrialization to completion on the global market (Rabobank, 2013).

Economic instability brought political instability and economic reform in Turkey. Parliamentary deadlock and violence resulted in a military coup in 1980 and the subsequent ban on political parties and imprisonment of several leaders. The modern era of Turkish politics begins with the restoration of civilian rule in 1983. The new electoral system was more majoritarian and instituted a much more stable and effective government (Ulusoy, 2014). The new government moved definitively away from policies of ISI and planned the economic reforms carried out over the next two decades. Turgut Özal, as prime minister until 1989, instituted a series of neoliberal economic policies and reduced the role of the state by selling off remaining state-owned industrial firms. These changes aimed to stabilize the currency, diversify the economy, and open up Turkey to global investment. The government had embarked upon a process of political and economic liberalization.

Meanwhile, state-led economic expansion that had financed PRI rule in Mexico for decades was also faltering. Subsequently, the regime faced a crisis as its economic program of ISI, which provided the state resources for its clientelist networks, became untenable. In response, the PRI adopted neoliberal economic policies that reduced the role of the state in the economy. This lessoned the bundle available for clientelism. Under the government of
Miguel de la Madrid, the directive was to ignore or repress urban social movements completely. However, the 1985 earthquake made this approach untenable. Almost overnight, new social movements organized against the dismal response by the PRI and the failure of the state to deliver services to poor Mexicans. Housing, in particular, was a catalyst for action as the government evicted squatters from illegal settlements. The era of Import Substitution Industrialization was definitively over.

In response, the PRI began to splinter between Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, son of the former president, who favored a continued state-led economy and Carlos Salinas who championed privatizing state firms and other neoliberal economic reforms. Salinas emerged with the backing of the PRI as the designated successor to the presidency. Cárdenas led a coalition of leftists and reformers to challenge Salinas in the 1988 presidential election. However, massive fraud guaranteed the election of Salinas and continued PRI control. According to Levitsky and Way, this election was critical in that the decision to allow fraud in the 1988 election caused a regime crisis in Mexico. Salinas proceeded with neoliberal economic reforms now using the profits from privatizing state resources to provide clientelist-housing subsidies to the poor, however, the seeds of mass discontent were already sown (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni, 2013).

The 1990s witnessed significant increases in the number and power of political parties in both Turkey and Mexico. In the absence of flush patronage networks, traditional parties were not as effective at suppressing popular demands. Previously marginalized social movements were able to organize and advocate for more diverse representation. The new political parties formed and presented themselves as challengers to the status quo. By the end
of the decade, they were able to take control of the local governments in both Istanbul and Mexico City the largest and most important cities of each country landing a decisive blow to the old political elite.

The return to elections made the political system of Turkey democratic in the sense that it was more inclusive; in particular, it began the admittance and then ascent of Islamist parties in Turkey. Populist economic policies had brought instability and crisis. The Islamist parties, on the other hand, projected an image of competence and rectitude. The religious nature of the parties allowed them to present themselves as outsiders to traditional politics and wear a mantle of moral authority. Thus "introducing a universal Islamist morality, it developed a convincing message for the poor as the alternative to secular parties associated with corruption, conspicuous consumption and ideological ambiguity" (Ulusoy, 2014, p.193). At the same time, the country was in flux, "liberalizing the economy, modernizing infrastructure and expanding communication technology brought significant social transformation and deepened existing secular-religious divide" (Ulusoy, 2014, p.193). The Islamist parties stepped into this void with programs rooted in pro-business and social welfare policies. By campaigning against the perceived corruption of the traditional political establishment, while building clientelist networks of their own, the Islamist parties were well positioned to take advantage of the economic crisis and return of electoral democracy.

The previously banned Islamist movement became a political and social force. The Refah Partisi (RP), or Welfare Party, dominated local elections in 1994 and instituted a program built on the promise of capable governance. They pursued a pragmatic approach to Islamist objectives by concentrating on organizational efficiency and service delivery. Led by
Istanbul mayor Recap Erdoğan, it was notably effective in responding to popular needs. Crucially, electoral victory in Istanbul meant the party had control of the local levers of the state in the most populous and economically important city in the country. Control of local government and its place political structures of the country would help shape the trajectory of the regime.

In Mexico, various civil society and political groups mobilized in opposition to the PRI. Cárdenas harnessed the anger of these diverse opposition movements and actors into a single party, the PRD in 1989, to oppose what he viewed as the illegitimate Salinas government. Throughout the 1990s the new social movements, the PRD, and other opposition parties mounted a sustained challenge to PRI. Civil society groups mobilized around making elections fair, while the PRD recruited patrons from the PRI to increase the new party’s power. The opposition was able to exact concessions including the establishment of an electoral commission in 1994 and resulting fair multi-party elections in 1997. In the first elections to locally govern Mexico City’s Federal District since the revolution, the PRD took control, campaigning against neoliberal reforms. Elections became the institutional mediator in the inter-elite split. While the PRD focused on taking power, democratization was the clear goal of civil society groups outside of the political parties and their combined efforts were highly effective and would have important repercussions on the trajectory of the regime.

In Turkey, however, widespread popular anger led to the rejection of all existing political parties in the wake of the catastrophic 1999 earthquake and economic stagnation. In 2001 Erdoğan led a pro-business, center-right faction of the Islamist movement in Turkey to
create the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP) or Justice and Development Party. The AKP’s organizing tactics and structure are rooted in its origins in the *Milli Görüş* or National Outlook Movement and the *Milli Nizam Partisi* or National Order Party founded in 1970. Like its predecessor, the party had its roots in squatter settlements and drew significant support from the urban poor. The AKP used Islamist rhetoric to mobilize the masses that form its base while pursuing neoliberal policies similar to the anti-clerical PRI in Mexico. Because of its previous exclusion from the political system, the AKP was able to present itself as an agent of change, even as it relied on the same clientelist practices voters, which had led to popular dissatisfaction.

The party structure of the AKP was built not on popular participation or programmatic democracy but clientelist coercion. It used an organizational structure that "featured a highly centralized and authoritarian decision-making apparatus, several intermediary levels of party cadres, and a lower-tier of foot-soldiers who were rooted in villages and neighborhoods" (Marschall et al., 2015, p.11). High-ranking party leaders within the AKP exercise control throughout the organization. There is little democracy within the party itself, instead, "local party activists are subordinate to decisions made by party leaders in candidate selection and policy formulation processes even if these decisions are contrary to their interests" (Ayan, 2010, p.14). This structure facilitates clientelist relationships, "indeed, the AKPs organizational structure and strong stores of cultural and religious capital made it ideally suited for patron-client linkages" (Marschall et al., 2015). It used patronage to secure party discipline, "a number of positive incentives (material, solidary, purposive) given to the local party members helped consolidate authoritarianism within the
party” (Ayan, 2010, p.12). These incentives only grew with the AKP’s rise to power. It was highly effective at mobilizing and rewarding party supporters and "state resources, created a new network of clientelism, which played a major role in AKP’s success” (Marschall et al. 2015, p. 15). Therefore clientelism and not democracy is the foundation of the AKPs organization and rule.

The close social bonds unique to clientelism are critical to how the Justice and Development party mobilizes its support. The religious parties the AKP sprang from were particularly skillful at engaging voters on a personal level; "unlike other parties in Turkey, the National Outlook-affiliated parties engaged in face-to-face interactions with local residents, canvassing apartment buildings and neighborhoods year-round" (Marschall et al., 2015, p.11). The AKP’s clientelist networks relied on religiously affiliated social service agencies under their direction. Fewer restrictions on religious parties in Turkey "enabled religious orders to get involved in the patron-client networks characteristic of Turkey's politics" (Ulusoy, 2014, p.198). Thus the AKP took advantage of its social services affiliates frequent face-to-face interaction between mostly female party workers and their neighbors. In total, "the new networks of clientelism established by the AKP have proved to be a potent formula for electoral success among the urban poor" (Sayari 2011, p. 94). Therefore cultivating dense personal connections among the urban poor and clientelist linkages through social service organizations is a vital strategy for the AKP.

Similarly, the liberalization of the economy and the establishment of electoral democracy were not enough to dislodge clientelist practices in Mexico. During the transition to multiparty rule, clientelism remained an important linkage mechanism. When PAN or
PRD gained the control of states, both parties continued to us clientelist linkage methods. In Mexico City, the progressive PRD government was rooted in clientelist practices. Tina Hilgers explains the PRD is for the most part organized around clientelist structures similar to the PRI. In her 2005 study, she shows decisions are made at the top by the leader and carried out by personally loyal followers. Leaders can punish workers lower down the hierarchy by removing them from their position. Patronage positions are imperative in cultivating middle rung workers, and access to government programs, especially housing, fuels allegiance. From the outset, the PRD centered on the leadership of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, "and the primacy of his political strategy set the party on a path of personalistic factions and centralized power" (Hilgers, 2008). Ideological factions coalesced around a central strongman or caudillo. The various strongmen maneuvered and allied to access power and redistribute resources to their supporters. The alliances were more often pragmatic than ideological (Hilgers, 2005). Andrés Manuel López Obrador later emerged as the central figure of the party. He supported former PRI politicians and right-wing businessmen who brought robust clientelist networks with them. Unfortunately, many also brought undemocratic and repressive practices as well. The PRD’s structure facilitated the long-term distribution of benefits through costly service described by Svolik and Magaloni above. Therefore, "much of the party’s current mobilization and electoral power is based on clientelist relations with citizens" (Hilgers, 2005, p.42). In Mexico, "clientelism has become institutional and does not belong to one specific party" (Romero, 2017). Thus while the PRD espoused democratic ideals, they remained ensnared within their own authoritarian party structure.
In the case of Mexico, the fissures within the PRI were decisive because they weakened party control of the state. The formation of the PRD shows the importance of clientelism in inter-elite splits. The founding of the PRD and its ability to take elite patrons from the PRI and their mass following of clients gave it power quickly. Also consistent with Levitsky and Way’s findings, it is an opposition challenge resourced by the defection of elites with access to state resources. The break within the PRI follows with Levitsky and Way’s observation that opposition resources often come from defecting elites and Brownlee’s contention that inter elite splits are pivotal to understanding why incumbents fall. The PRD was able to take existing PRI networks and their followers away from the ruling party. A result of the splintering of the PRI is the party lost its monopoly over the resources of the state. The PRD was able to offer up its clientelist goods and access to state resources because it held power in the Distrito Federal at the center of the capital city. It was able to use clientelism to capture state power at a lower level of government, ending the PRI’s total control of the most important city in the country. Subsequently, the PRI could not use the resources of the state exclusively to its advantage. They were able to use these networks, and the need for housing subsidies to build their base, however, their inability to capture higher office limited their own ability to capture state resources beyond the Distrito Federal of Mexico City. The formation of the PRD shows that clientelism can be useful in dislodging incumbent parties. In this case, clientelist networks proved decisive, in how they could help remove singular partisan control over the state.

Therefore, throughout the 1990s, the political systems of both Mexico and Turkey became more inclusive. Neoliberal economic policies reduced the role of the state in the
economy and civil society groups advocated for more a more responsive political system. Reforms resulted in the creation and inclusion of two noteworthy political parties: the PRD in Mexico and the AKP in Turkey. Despite these significant changes, clientelist linkages remained the primary way of connecting party leaders with their mass following. Despite the change from Import Substitution Industrialization to neoliberalism, the political systems of both countries still relied heavily on the transactional exchange of goods and services to poor urban dwellers occupying informal housing for political support. Instead, in the case of both, clientelist linkages continued to form the core of how the parties organized themselves. The cases validate that clientelist control of state resources can in both scarcity and abundance (Svolik, 2012). The cases underscore that changes in a country’s economic policies alone cannot dislodge clientelism as the primary type of political linkage mechanism, especially where clientelist parties are able to control state resources.

The new parties of Turkey and Mexico were able to use clientelist linkages to cement party organization and rest control of state resources away from traditional parties. Their control of state resources made it more difficult for existing parties to use the resources of the state to create the un-level playing field discussed by Levitsky and Way. As Levitsky and Way make clear, an incumbent’s loss of power does not result in a transition to democracy. The ability of the new parties to use the informal systems of clientelism to capture the state resources for their own ends would prove decisive in the following decade.

**Political Transformation Since 2000: Divergent Paths**

By the end of 2002 both Mexico and Turkey had democratically elected leaders. However, since that time, the countries have moved in different directions. In Mexico
elections have been meaningful contests to determine state power and that power has been divided between multiple parties. The PRD continued to hold power in Mexico City, while the PAN held power nationally until 2012 when the PRI returned to power. The Presidency in Mexico has passed from the PRI to the PAN to back to the PRI and now to MORENA. There are other areas including freedom of the press, which limit citizen control of the state. Nonetheless, the country Mexico still appears to be on a trajectory towards democracy. On the other hand, in Turkey, the country has turned increasingly authoritarian. The AKP held power continuously from 2002-2015 when it lost power briefly in June only to return to power with new elections that November. Since the 2002 election, the Justice and Development Party marginalized nearly all other political parties. It has been the dominant force in Turkish politics for the past decade (Ulusoy, 2014). Following a coup attempt in July 2016, the AKP has harshly dealt with its political rivals, jailing journalists and opposition party members. Finally, is has now changed to a presidential system firmly placing power within Erdoğan’s hands. While both countries sought to reduce state involvement in the economy, little was done to address the inequality at the heart of clientelism. As such politics remained highly transactional. In Mexico there was a more fundamental push for democratization especially by civil society groups outside of political parties focused on guaranteeing the fairness of elections and creating transparency in government. In Turkey reform centered around the inclusion of formerly excluded political parties and the control of the state through elections. The power necessary to secure tenure remained a critical issue for the masses. Differences in the use of state power in the housing
formalization process are an important reason for the different regime trajectories of the two countries.

Theoretically, the change to a neoliberal economic policy should have reduced opportunities for patronage and clientelism in housing. However, there were negative effects of neoliberalism that impacted the security of tenure for the occupants of informal settlements. Without state subsidies to industry there was no longer a need for workers or a reason to tolerate massive informal settlements. It incentivized formalizing property titles in urban areas as governments moved to make land available as a commodity on the international market. The commodification of land increased the incentives for speculative investments raising the price of housing even further. Neoliberalism also deepened already high levels of inequality; the spoils of renewed economic growth went disproportionately to elites. The changes increased price pressure as the urban poor competed for scarce urban space. (Keivani and Werna, 2001). Therefore, the neoliberal policies increased the vulnerability of the urban poor and increased the stakes of housing policy decisions.

Instead of reducing the importance of clientelism in informal settlements economic change has given governments a new tool for clientelist coercion. Generally, as countries grow prosperous, the cost of clientelist goods grows higher; with less privation, clients can demand more. Patrons are required to provide more expensive items like housing. This has made housing subsidies a vital pathway to perpetuate clientelist networks. As such, housing subsidies became an important area of manipulation in clientelist systems such as Turkey and Mexico. Title regularization is a way clientelist parties can coerce citizens without a large state controlled industrial sector. The formalization casts into doubt once informal but
secure tenure arrangements. Crucially housing formalization requires few resources besides the state’s power to confer title. In short, the change to neoliberal policies did not remove the power relations implicit in land regularization. Moreover, the formalization process creates revenues, which can be channeled back into state subsidies for housing. The formalization of land titles allows regimes to create an uneven playing field in neoliberal economic systems. Even though there is less state intervention in the economy and hence fewer opportunities for direct distribution of rents, the reliance on the state to create legal recognition property rights gives ample opportunities for abuse. The singular role of the state in formalizing title makes this a critical area for political manipulation in countries with high proportions of informal settlements. Because land titling is a government function, controlling the formalization process is an inexpensive way for clientelist parties to coerce citizens.

In the context of clientelism, title regularization is not so much a solution to the problems created by rapid urbanization and subsequent creation of informal housing, as it is an expression of political power. Cueva (1987) emphasizes that laws are not a force unto themselves; they must be carried out by society and in concrete political and economic situations. Therefore, he introduces the necessity that individual agency and larger structural forces will vary the circumstances of informal settlements. The legal system is not something separate from society; it is an expression of power, primarily political and economic power. It permits an individual to assert a right to the land on which settlers depend on for legitimacy. Therefore "the forms of legitimation are thus a compromise between the actual power of the social agents who control the urbanization process, on the one hand, and the legal rules of the form of ownership involved" (Cueva, 1987, p.524). Thus he concludes the law shapes
illegal settlements. The case sections below will detail the different legal responses to informal housing by the Mexican and Turkish governments. However, Cueva makes and important that regulation is an act of state agency. Regularization of land tenure comes through an intervention by the state and turns possession into a property. In the process reconciling the de facto and the de jure. A key difference is the formalization processes in Turkey and Mexico is extent that informal or formal institutions controlled it. Neoliberalism did not remove the power relations involved. Land title is an extension of state power, and in clientelist systems, it is delivered as a result of political loyalty to powerful patrons.

Differences in the use of state power in the housing formalization process are an important reason for the different regime trajectories of the two countries. Mexico has left much of the existing informal housing arrangements relatively unchanged and made the process of formalization more transparent and non-partisan. The AKP party in Turkey has pursued policies that on their surface work against older forms of clientelism but in practice have given more control over state resources and regulatory control to the party. By controlling process, the AKP has taken advantage of housing formalization as a vehicle for the particularistic dispersal of state goods and found new opportunities for clientelist inducement and coercion.

In Turkey the housing formalization process became an import method of AKP control over society. Importantly, the AKP drew their electoral support from the growth of the informal settlements (Yalcintan and Erbas, 2003). Previously, "despite the rent potential, no political party dared to terminate such a vibrant channel for vote-seeking and wealth distribution" (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.6). On its face, regularization runs counter to the
economic interests of the very people who form the core electoral base of the party. There are several drawbacks to regularization for the residents of informal neighborhoods. Primarily, regularization leads to displacement. It destabilizes existing neighborhoods and forces vulnerable populations to compete for space in a now globalized market. The regularization regime "suffers from a total lack of social projects and economic programs for inhabitants creating a serious risk of displacement, dispossession and geographical relocation of poverty" (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.12). As the literature reviewed earlier shows, in a clientelist system, privation does not run counter to the ruling party’s interest. Instead, it makes the particularistic distribution of state benefits more powerful. The AKP was able to turn regularization into a tool for clientelist coercion successfully. The process of regularization became a way to reward supporters and to punish political enemies.

The election gave full control of both the central and local government to the AKP in 2002. The AKP converted housing title regularization into a clientelist vehicle for coercion. Regularization of the housing market was a fundamental component of their economic plan. Once in power, they followed standard neoliberal policies and worked to restructure the housing finance sector and create a credit market for housing. Combined with currency stabilizations, these changes invited foreign investment in real estate, further necessitating the regularization of the housing market. More importantly, AKP acted aggressively to end any new informal settlement definitively. In 2004 a reform of the Criminal code, law no. 5237, made gecekondu construction, for the first time, a criminal offence to be punished by five years in prison (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.6).
The AKP also acted decisively to deal with existing informal settlements. In Murat Balamir’s study on the appurtenance system of shared informal multi-unit buildings, he posits “an exit from such relations possible only in three ways: public acquisition, unanimous decision of all shareholders, or the total demolition of the building” (Balamir, 1999, p.395). Law No. 3183 of the 1982 Constitution is the basis of current urban land arrangements in Turkey. It makes expropriation by the state the primary mechanism for the redevelopment of informal housing. In 2005, the AKP passed law No. 5393, which authorized local municipalities to implement transformation projects of “derelict, obsolescent, and unsafe (due to natural disasters) parts of cities” (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p7). The law opened up the possibility of the state to expropriate and redevelop informal settlements as almost all of housing stock of the country was at risk for earthquakes. The new law cast into doubt the security of tenure of almost every home in Turkey.

Crucially the AKP has moved to put much of the decision making over housing policy directly under partisan control. Legal reforms have consolidated power under the Municipal Housing Authority (MHA). The legal reforms made it the sole agency responsible for zoning Istanbul, gave it the ability to expropriate land, and provided a mandate to become the largest developer of housing in the country (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.7). The MHA oversees Turkey’s Mass Housing Administration (*Toplu Konut İdaresi*, or TOKİ), which provides affordable housing at subsidized rates. TOKİ directly controls the construction of social housing and has considerable discretion over the projects. It is massive in scale: by 2015, the total number of TOKİ housing units was 432,079, and the total cost was $11,114,000,000. TOKİ now directly provides between five and ten percent of all of the
housing in Turkey. Therefore, it has considerable and singular oversight of housing policy in Turkey.

The AKP was able to use selective enforcement of the law to its advantage. With this power the party could simultaneously reward supporters and disperse its rivals. The process of redevelopment in the TOKİ program gives considerable leverage to the state in formalizing the housing market and determining the tenure rights of existing residents. TOKİ housing addresses the appurtenance system by allowing for independent, shared, or condominium ownership only in new construction. Significantly, it does not confer recognition on existing appurtenance ownership arrangements, which remain illegal (Cagdas, Demir and Gur, 2002, p.8). Thus the state carried out regularization primarily through demolishing old buildings of the informal era and creating new buildings in their place. Between 2004-2008, the AKP government demolished a record number of properties. In the fall, 2012 news reports of simultaneous demolitions around Turkey rolled out a program pledging 400 billion in redevelopment funds (Güneş, 2012). The squatter settlements and appurtenance households were tolerated only out of necessity until new plans could create a tabla rasa on which to confer a more explicit title.

AKP functionaries decide who wins and who loses in the process. TOKİ projects are public/private partnerships, and focused on transferring the "rightful owners" but not tenants into the new public housing projects (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.7). In the redevelopment process, the state compensates some owners with "nearby" land while others receive a directed payment. In most cases, the state compensates these owners, who most often have de facto title, with approximately one quarter the market value of their homes.
The state gives owners the option to purchase flats from the new developments with state-subsidized credit, while they exclude tenants from the process. Deciding the rightful owners of cooperatively built shared units leaves citizens at the mercy of state officials during the redevelopment process.

Furthermore, law No. 3183 allows for the rearrangement of ownership boundaries. The law allows for up to 35% of any parcel to be used as general utility areas such as "road, square, and parks, auto-garage, kids garden, green area, mosque, and police office, which are prior necessities of the arrangement region" (Cagdas et al., 2002, p.8). The law gives the government wide latitude in redrawing urban boundaries. It eradicates previous measures to tolerate squatter and appurtenance housing solutions (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010, p.7). It significantly weakens existing informal land tenure and gives significant discretion and subsequent room for coercion in the hands of AKP officials.

The AKP increased the power and autonomy of TOKİ and consolidated the party's control over it by moving it directly under the authority of the Prime Ministry. It also reduced transparency on how its massive budget gets spent by amending the Public Management and Control Law (No.5018) to exempt TOKİ from the internal auditing conducted by the Turkish Court of Accounts. Siting decisions for where to distribute these housing subsidies are political: "factors other than those associated housing need and demand play a significant role in TOKİ housing investments. This pattern is more consistent with clientelism than government responsiveness" (Marschall et al., 2015, p. 29). Party support seems to be the significant factor, "as a group, AKP winning districts receive significantly higher TOKİ investments—a pattern that is consistent with clientelistic linkages" (Marschall
et al., 2015, p. 29). From the literature above, in clientelism, state power becomes primarily about controlling and distributing resources to supporters. Therefore, through the central government’s wide discretion over the program, the AKP has powerful tool through which to wield the state’s authority and maintain its power.

The large-scale formalization of housing under the TOKİ program has transformed clientelist linkages in Istanbul. Marschall, Aydogan, and Bulut posit that by concentrating on housing formalization the AKP has overcome the constraints on state resources imposed by neoliberal economics and created a new form of clientelism: “housing projects sponsored by Turkey’s Mass Housing Administration (TOKİ), not only solved the resource problem but also allowed it to achieve efficiency gains in its clientelistic efforts” (Marschall et al., 2015, p.2) They show with rigorous quantitative analysis that the clientelism associated formalizing settlements by replacing informal housing with TOKİ housing projects has had a significant impact on the electoral success and continued rule of the AKP party. It is worth noting that these links between the housing bureaucracy overseen by the AKP and poor citizens fall short of the definition of authoritarian clientelism put forward by Fox (1994). It is consistent with what Fox calls semi-clientelism. On the other had Marschall et al., assert much of the existing writings on electoral politics in Turkey overlook the effects that these policies had on transforming the urban landscape and in turn, patron-client linkages. Specifically, the commodification of land drove out the less productive and lower value land uses—squatter settlements, irregular housing, vacant land, and green space—in favor of higher-value, capital intensive commercial and residential developments. For this thesis, what is paramount is the privileged use of state power and resources in a particularistic way to tilt the electoral system
in favor of the AKP. The partisan distribution of housing subsidies shows how clientelism can take a modern and bureaucratic form quite distant from norms of obligation and reciprocity derived from the traditional landlord-peasant relationship. It does not have the face-to-face contact of traditional forms of clientelism, and this makes repression more difficult. However, it is consistent with the privileged use of state resources to create the skewed playing field in electoral decisions described by Levitsky and Way. The main point is that the distribution of state resources changed the electoral landscape in Turkey in favor of the incumbent party. The AKP capitalized on the opportunity created housing formalization using the dispensation of benefits to supporters to secure its electoral dominance.

TOKı provided a new avenue of patronage and created a new and tool for clientelism among the urban poor in Istanbul. By controlling both municipal and central government the AKP has near total control over the regularization process. It is also worth noting that there is considerable corruption in who benefits from development as construction contracts are rewarded to party loyalists. Despite the AKP’s claims on Islamic morality, the AKP’s practices strengthen the claims made earlier in the literature review that ideology can aid elite cohesion, but in practice, ideological goals are secondary to rent-seeking by party elites. Clientelist housing subsidies have been indispensable to maintaining the AKP electoral success in Istanbul and nationally. Even controlling for traditional forms of clientelism and other contextual variables, TOKı housing is significant in explaining the durability of the AKP’s electoral success.

Through housing formalization, the AKP has increased its organizational capacity by increasing its use of state resources and state power. Levitsky and Way show that
organizational capacity is significant in the maintenance of competitive authoritarian regimes. The law provides considerable room for abuse by unevenly applying the law. The use of regularization laws to reward party loyalists or coerce political adversaries allows the AKP to skew the electoral playing field. Moreover, it is essential to how the AKP has made the process less transparent and more fully under partisan control. In total, the AKP’s use of housing subsidies to manipulate elections is so excessive and one-sided that it severely limits political competition. Despite the change in economic policy, secure for many Turks housing tenure still requires the protections afforded by party loyalty.

The situation is quite different in Mexico. One of the principal differences between Mexico and Turkey is no party has attempted to definitively end informal development in Mexico. Instead, the housing program has mostly work in parallel and not in opposition to formal settlements. There have been important changes to the laws governing the various type of informal development, but the changes have not disrupted housing tenure, and provided various routes to secure title outside of demolition. There has been no expansion of the powers of the federal housing bureaucracy instead it remains constrained by a mandate that all planning takes place at a local level. As such the major agencies are mostly independent of partisan influence. Older forms of clientelism are still prevalent but mostly at a local level and there are important efforts to curtail it by the federal bureaucracy. Therefore, no one party is able to abuse the resources of the state in Mexico’s housing programs.

The most crucial of these differences is the countries approach to formalizing existing settlements. As discussed earlier, informal settlements present numerous problems for title formalization. In Mexico, there remain are several routes to formalization of existing
settlements depending on which type of land the informal settlement occupies. There are several different types of informal housing, and the type of land the housing is on has a far-reaching effect on the regularization process. Cueva (1987) explains the three main types of ownership that host illegal settlements in Mexico: state property, private property, and communal agrarian property. Different institutional arrangements regulate formalization depending on the type and therefore give rise to unique forms of informality. Land invasions have not been frequent since 1971, and squatter settlements on private property are currently only a minor form of informal housing in Mexico City. Ann Varley, in a 2002 paper, shows ejido settlements and private settlements are much different. Owners who purchase their land without title and in violation of planning laws often receive infrastructure and services before they receive legal title through programs of tenure regularization. For squatters on private land, possession is secondary to ownership and the liberal market system of private property is maintained. In Mexico, local authorities usually tolerate illegal subdivisions and in the end foot the bill for establishing infrastructure and services. Title formalization can be further complicated by of overlapping illegalities; multiple government agencies regulate different violations of the law. There are other vagaries, such as multiple sales of the same property, which can complicate formalization efforts. The differentiation of roles of various state agencies also makes the tenure regularization process multifaceted in Mexico. The local government plays an important role, and negotiations involve multiple parties. It can be a long and fruitless process. Often the law is unable to resolve such disputes, and they become political. The "regularization of irregular settlements remains a long and cumbersome bureaucratic process, but the nature of the process and governmental responsibility vary
depending on the mode of appropriation of land and ‘on allegiance to leaders who are able to negotiate satisfactory with the authorities’ (Connolly, 2003, p.32 as cited in Gilbert and Jong, 2015, p.527). In this respect, there is still a role for clientelist networks to play in regularizing existing settlements. In general though despite neoliberal reforms there has been little impetus in Mexico to disrupt the tenure status of residents. Thus a crucial difference between Turkey and Mexico is their approach to informal settlements.

The most significant effort at formalizing existing informal settlements is the 1992 constitutional change amending Article 27 of the constitution. A neoliberal reform passed by President Salinas, allowed the privatization and sale of communal agricultural land. The two types communal farms, tierras comunales and ejidos, function under the same legal rules and are both a common source of land for development in Mexico City. The law converted this communal farmland previously unavailable to formal development, but often the site of informal development, into land available for urban development. It established PROCEDE, the Program for the Certification of Ejido Land Rights and the Titling of Urban Housing Plots. The process began by first mapped and drawing boundaries for existing settlements. However, after that, the reforms allowed for the privatization and sale of communal land only if the full ejido assembly approved of it by significant majorities. Thus an important differentiation, is in Mexico the decision to formalize title is in the hands of the ejido dwellers and not the state. The vast majority of communal holdings voted to keep lands communal. The exception was peri-urban areas where the city had already encroached on farming. Even after the reforms, few ejidatarios were able to fully comply with municipal planning regulations that necessitate minimum frontages, building codes and necessary
services. The new regulations made selling *ejido* land legal, but subdividing it remained illegal still. Yet, illegally selling land, and then going through the formalization process proved much more profitable than farming the land. Together these changes this initiated a period of rapid development around the periphery Mexico City, particularly in the state of Mexico outside of the District Federal (Gilbert and Jong, 2015).

At the same time there have also been significant changes to Mexico’s formal housing market. In contrast to Turkey, the formal housing market in Mexico exist in parallel to the informal market. The most significant changes took place with the 1992 restructuring of the housing finance system. The laws established The National Housing Fund for Private Sector Workers (*Instituto del Fondo National de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores*, or INFONAVIT) and Federal Mortgage Society (*Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal*, or SHF). INFONAVIT is "entirely funded by the country’s Retirement Savings System (*Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro*, or SAR)" (Hsu, 2008, p.34). Workers can use this money for a down payment on a house. They grant loans at below-market interest rates directly to workers. INFONAVIT was responsible for more than 50 percent of all domestic mortgages in 2006 (Hsu, 2008). The SHF, meanwhile, provides liquidity to the mortgage market through a 25% loan guarantee. In the secondary market, it also guarantees timely payment of principal and interest. These were neoliberal attempts to formalize housing in Mexico. It led to a boom in mortgages and large subdivision development. Two government agencies account for the bulk of housing funding in Mexico. Thus the housing finance system in Mexico is almost entirely dependent on the state. However, an important difference from Turkey, is
the government agencies in charge of housing operate largely independently from partisan influence and do not build housing directly.

Despite the heavy involvement of the state, the national housing programs implemented in Mexico appear to be mostly programmatic and less particularistic than in Turkey. Jenny Schuetz in her wonderfully titled 2008 study, *Are Mortgage Loans the New Toasters? The Roles of Housing Demand and Political Patronage in Mexican Housing Finance* concludes that political motivation played a relatively small role in the allocation of loans in the elections she studied in the 1990s. She found that the distribution of housing mortgages mostly followed the criteria created by the professional administration. Schuetz does not find rampant use of housing funds to cement clientelist networks in Mexican housing policy. She states "the governance structure of the lending agencies, particularly the involvement of private-sector employers and large national developers, may have constrained the ability of the PRI to manipulate federal lending for political gain" (Schuetz, 2008, p.2). The multiplicity of actors is an important difference from the housing program in Turkey where sites are developed directly by the government. Instead in Mexico, many of the institutions responsible for housing subsidies are able to operate independent of partisan influence.

At the same time, in contrast to Turkey, efforts to develop a formal housing market have been unsuccessful and informal housing has remained in place. Mortgages finance only 6% of homes in Mexico versus 67% in the United States (Hsu, 2008). Instead, banks lend only to the wealthy (Herbert et al., 2012, p.12). Because of its links to the social security system INFONOVIT the most extensive program targets mostly middle-income workers employed in the formal sector. However, it relies on formal employment and the social
security system. Hence, "the share of workers in 2010 that were unaffiliated with the social
security system that would make them ineligible to borrow through these organizations was
55 percent, which …still left a majority of workers outside of the system" (Herbert et al.,
2012). None the less, Hsu reports there is a need for an additional 6 million homes
nationally, which is a massive amount considering the formal market only produces 750,000
units per year. Mexico is estimated to need about 500,000 new units a year to meet
household growth (Herbert et al., 2012; Hsu, 2008; Gilbert and Jong, 2015). Again this
shows the formal housing market functions only in conjunction with the informal housing
development.

The parties have displayed significant programmatic differences in their approaches
to housing. After the PRI lost control of Mexico City in its first direct mayoral election since
the revolution in 1997 and the presidency in 2000 it has opened the way for the growth of
programmatic policy solutions. The result has been a diversity of approaches to housing. The
PAN worked to strengthen the mortgage market and subsidized large-scale suburban
building programs. Mortgage lending through the government increased exponentially after
the election of Vincent Fox in 2000. Thus, "the Fox administration (2000–06) and the
Calderon administration (2007–12)—both Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) governments—
provided 2.3 million and 7 million homes respectively across Mexico (Gilbert and Jong,
2015, p.524). At the same time Bando Dos, pursued by the PRD, sought to create more
density and rehabilitate the Distrito Federal in Mexico City. It resulted in considerable
investments in the central city and a corresponding rise in prices. Then again, the return of
the PRI to the presidency in 2012 prompted a significant change in policy away from large-
scale suburban development in favor of channeling development more towards vertical housing in central areas near transit (Gilbert and Jong, 2015). Thus there are significant programmatic differences in housing policy between the PAN, PRI, and PRD.

Further complicating the situation, the housing built by the formal sector was of low quality and poorly planned. During the incumbency of the PAN in the presidency and PRD in Mexico City land and housing prices in the central boroughs of the Distrito Federal rose by 30-50%. The rise in land prices made centrally located land too expensive for most developers and buyers in the INFONOVIT program. Only by developing cheap land on the periphery could they keep the housing affordable. Ortega-Alcazar (2006) expounds, "thus, a large sector of the population which is unable both to afford rising prices in the centre and to find housing in the rest of the Federal District, has been expelled to the neighbouring State of Mexico, where commercial builders are developing massive subdivisions of low-quality affordable housing" (para. 4). However, the greater distances meant sprawl. This increased distances from existing infrastructure made it harder to provide services, which raised the cost for transportation, electricity, wastewater treatment, and water systems. The poor quality and lack of services in new housing developments led to high vacancy rates in new developments in peripheral areas, sometimes reaching 45% (Gilbert and Jong 2015). Thus, "a 2010 INFONAVIT study estimated that two out of every ten homes purchased with financing from the agency were uninhabited" (Herbert et al., 2012, p.18). Thus, the formal housing market in Mexico remained unable to meet the needs of most Mexicans.

In Mexico, self-built housing remained the predominant mode of housing production. Despite significant state investment formal housing production was not able to
meet demand. In 2005, irregular settlements represented 60% of housing construction (Connolly, 2009). As of 2006, "60% of the total population in the metropolitan area live in ‘popular’ settlements – former squatter settlements characterised by a precarious legal status and service provision" (Ortega-Alcazar, 2006, para. 5). In Mexico City, according to Rosenthal, "whilst there is increasing deterioration and loss of housing in the working-class districts in the centre, where the capacity for more profitable uses of the land is growing, the low-income population is increasing significantly, a population that is turning to the unofficial market in order to meet its housing needs" (Rosenthal, 2006, para. 5). In 2010 near the end of the PAN administration, the situation had not fundamentally changed. The census that year "found that a third of the housing stock was built by the current owner and more than 60 percent was produced outside of the formal sector" (Herbert et al., 2012, p.18). Cost is a significant determinant; the upfront costs of informal housing acquisition are five to eight times lower than for formal housing (Herbert et al., 2012). Often informal housing has better access to transportation and other services. Thus, in Mexico, unlike Turkey, no party has committed itself to the end of informal housing. Instead, the regularization process lends itself to the decentralized clientelism that has taken hold of Mexico in now that multiple parties hold state power.

The different levels of government divide power over housing production in Mexico. The division of power between local and federal governments remains a check on a single party taking full control of the state and reaping the benefits of the formalization process. The bulk of resources, both human and financial, are in the federal government. However, unlike Turkey, the constitution mandates that planning take place at the local level (Gilbert
and Jong, 2015). The alternation of power at the federal government has pushed Clientelism, patronage, and other forms of corruption to the municipal level.

There is an important diffusion of power between the professional staff in place at the federal level and local officials from various parties. The division of power between the PRD's control of Mexico City and the alternation of power between multiple parties at a Federal level in Mexico has led to a less ability of a single party to capture the state, and as a result, housing tenure has become more independent from political manipulation.

It is worthwhile to examine how the diffusion of local control impacts clientelism. The Distrito Federal, which entails the central business district and adjacent neighborhoods, and the State of Mexico that oversees the surrounding communities, create a fragmented form of government. There is little coordination between the two. Alfonso Xavier Iracheta Cenecorta in Mexico City: Governing the Mega City (2006) explains that the metropolitan region of Mexico City "involves 79 executive bodies in 3 areas of government; they legislate for 63 legislative zones and at least 80 territorial plans and programmes exist, for 'planning'" (para. 1). Of the 19.5 million Mexicans who inhabit the area, 56% live in the 59 suburban districts of the State of Mexico the remaining 44% in the 16 neighborhoods of the Federal District. Mexico City's growth has leveled off, but the suburban districts State of Mexico are expanding at a rate of 1.6% per year. Another 10 million people live in the sub-cities bordering the state of Mexico. There is a lack of effective coordination among all of these governing bodies. As a result "legislation, planning and urban taxation (tax on property), barely have any common ground, since neither body considers the other in its institutional, governing and public policy decisions" (Iracheta Cenecorta, 2006, para. 2). In a multi-party
state, this creates considerable problems for resource management, transportation, and especially housing, in the region. The federal bureaucrats professionally administer housing programs. It has to distribute funds across several jurisdictions that include multiple different parties.

Mexico has made advances in creating a more transparent housing market. Since 2004 it has made progress, including measuring housing prices, tracking development, and assessing the quality of the housing stock. Fox (1994) puts forward the idea that in order to move from a clientelist system, where the distribution of particularistic distribution of goods is fundamentally coercive, towards the distribution of goods based on citizenship it requires both autonomous social movements and reformist state managers. There is significant evidence that reformist state managers are claiming more independence for state agencies in Mexico in the federal housing bureaucracy, even as clientelist practices remain entrenched at a local level. One effort, The Index of Municipal Competitiveness in Housing (INCOMUV) rates the 402 most significant municipalities in 78 areas to determine the capacity of the local government to plan and manage housing development (Herbert et al., 2012). INFONOVIT collaborates with SEDESOL and the National Institute for Federalism and Municipal Development (INAFED) to help municipalities create a formal housing market. It does so through efforts to improve housing conditions, strengthen the local bureaucracy, and increase investor and developer confidence. Another, program, Municipal Competitiveness in Housing (PCMV) is a voluntary effort to boost local capacity and increase transparency led by INFONOVIT. The program grades municipalities on habitability, competitiveness, good governance, and municipal solvency. However, the
PCMV does not have widespread participation. Of 2,400 municipalities, only 67 participated, and of these, a paltry 22 received a positive grade (Herbert et al., 2012). Those areas with the most opaque land use regulations are the least likely to participate. Because "the PCMV could reveal a de facto permit-granting arrangement in which local authorities permit development based on their interests rather than compliance with any publicly available plan" (Herbert et al., 2012, p.26). Therefore the federal bureaucracy is working to create a transparent housing finance system; however, clientelism at a municipal level continues to impede those efforts.

In conclusion, the PRI, PAN, and PRD governments in Mexico implemented a more decentralized and democratic housing program in Mexico. The different formal institutions, in particular, federalism in land use planning decisions and the varied routes to formalization mean it has been difficult to end the production of informal housing in Mexico. It also means the informal practices of clientelism and housing in Mexico have remained localized, and not at the same scale as the AKP created in Turkey through the TOKI program. The existence of federal programs to improve transparency suggests a state apparatus working for independence from political parties. In all this shows efforts by reformist state managers to make housing more regular and transparent at the expense of clientelist party control. Overall, it is a far cry from the AKP’s successful efforts to put land use and housing decisions under party control. Thus, a significant development in Mexico is that the Federal bureaucracy has remained independent and professional, while clientelism in housing development is constrained to the local level by the diffusion of land use planning decision-making.
CONCLUSION

This thesis looked at clientelism, the informal distribution of state resources for political support, as critical to regime type. Scholars of clientelism explain it is ubiquitous, found in both democratic, hybrid, and authoritarian regimes. In total, the literature shows that clientelist parties function in a fundamentally different manner than programmatic parties. Where programmatic parties provide society a choice of policy for the distribution of resources, clientelist parties exist to gain power through the particularistic distribution of state resources to followers. Clientelism is key to maintaining party cohesion and the stability of authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Control over the distribution of state resources shapes and an incumbent government’s ability to withstand economic crisis and political challenges. A key to regime durability is the combination of the formal party apparatus with informal clientelist relationships.

Clientelism is particularly crucial to understanding hybrid regimes; those cases were the formal institutions rely on elections, but the use of state resources prevents electoral contests from being genuinely fair and democratic. In these regimes the informal relations of clientelism can overtake the formal democratic apparatus when the use of state resources shapes the outcome of elections. In these cases, the party has captured the state for its use. Recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of informal institutions and how partisan capture can erode the effectiveness of the state. The literature shows the particularistic distribution of state resources over a prolonged period through the party, in short, clientelist linkages, are fundamental to competitive authoritarian regimes. In authoritarian regimes, clientelist linkages also play a vital role. Parties allow dictators to control the state and
society. Through control of the state bureaucracy, they are able to distribute rents and patronage positions to followers. Through the temporal distribution of goods and hierarchical structure of benefits, parties are able to extract a sunk investment in maintain the regime. Thus the incentive structures of clientelist parties based on rent-seeking are counter run counter to citizen control of state resources. Partisan abuse of state resources through clientelist structures can make elections to determine who holds power unfair to the extent that they can change a regime from democratic to competitive authoritarian even without changing its other formal institutions.

The case studies examining clientelism in Turkey and Mexico show how clientelist parties’ have historically used housing to coerce party loyalty. The creation of clientelist networks played an important role in building the state in the first decades of the republics. Clientelist parties in both countries were part of populist mobilizations of the urban masses and their incorporation into an electoral system. By taking advantage of the inequality inherent in urbanization, parties established clientelist linkages to citizens. Consistent with populism elsewhere, through clientelism elites were able to maintain control and prevent the full political incorporation of the masses into the political system. Instead, party bosses gained agency at the expense of citizen control of the state. In both Mexico and Turkey systems of party-based clientelism were entrenched over the latter half of the twentieth century.

There have been important changes in the political systems of Mexico and Turkey, but coercive systems remain. The earthquakes provided a critical juncture in both countries that combined with the global push for neoliberal political and economic reform that
encourage a process of title formalization. However, the push against populist institutions had different results in Turkey and Mexico. Reforms made elections more broad-based and consequential. The electoral systems of Mexico and Turkey temporarily transformed with the election of the PRD, PAN and the AKP parties. Still, the parties did not necessarily as a result become programmatic. The clientelist distribution of goods remained an essential factor in how these parties functioned and how they distributed the resources of the state. The importance of rent-seeking and the accumulation of power for the party have remained significant.

Informal housing in both Turkey and Mexico has also continued to be an important locus of clientelist practices. Housing is a window into how parties use the resources of the state to control elections. The case studies show how clientelist structures find new opportunities even amidst political and economic transition. Even after these countries moved away from ISI economic policies, land tenure formalization provided ample new ground for coercion and clientelism. Power over land tenure is key component of both historic and modern clientelism. As formalization is purview to the state, controlling the formalization process is an impactful and inexpensive way for clientelist parties that control the process to coerce citizens. Recently, both countries have launched sizable housing programs to increase formal housing. The use of housing subsidies to gain electoral support is an example the using state resources to create a skewed playing field in elections. The results show that in Mexico, the PRI was not able to convert housing subsidies into votes while the AKP has created a new semi-clientelist system that is highly effective in mobilizing support and suppressing dissent.
The cases show the ability to gain, or failure to maintain control of state resources is critical a clientelist party’s ability to maintain power. Fissures within the ruling party and the migration of powerful clientelist bosses to opposition parties weakened the PRI’s control over housing resources. Instead, the PRI lost its control over critical levers of power. The split within the party allowed the PRD to emerge and use similar clientelist tactics to gain power in Mexico City. Clientelist leaders were able to deliver an instant opposition and when effectively contest the PRI for state power. The efforts by civil society groups made election fraud more difficult. The combined efforts of these groups made a powerful and lasting push for democratization. The breakdown of clientelist networks under its control and the subsequent loss of its monopoly on the resources of the state checked PRI power in Mexico. While the PRI lost singular control of the state, in Turkey, the AKP has placed more state resources under its control. Its massive housing subsidies have become less and less independently controlled by the state bureaucracy, and are instead increasingly under the purview of the AKP itself. It has used this power to create a skewed electoral playing field to keep power. A notable difference in Mexico’s democratization and Turkey’s authoritarian turn is the PRI lost its ability to monopolize the resources of the state while the AKP has been able to exert such control. In all, it shows clientelist parties’ capture of the state can determine if regimes are democratic or authoritarian.

The level of control of the state has had important effects on how Mexico and Turkey have implemented housing policies aimed at regularizing the title of informal settlements. The Mexican case also shows the state bureaucracy itself is an agent in the process. The federal housing bureaucracy in Mexico has become more independent and put
systems of transparency to prevent clientelism in place. Under PAN, the Fox and Calderon administrations, state agencies acted independently of the ruling party. The localization of administrative control over land use planning has kept power distributed among multiple parties. In Turkey, the AKP was able to move many functions of the federal agency in charge of housing under party control. Because land-use planning is under the central government, it has been easier to consolidate regularization into a vehicle for coercion. Thus, clientelist parties’ ability to control the distribution of state housing subsidies and guarantee tenure has shaped the different political trajectories of Mexico and Turkey.

The case studies suggest that the control of the functions and resources of the state by parties is key to evaluating regimes. More empirical research on the mechanics of partisan capture of the state and its consequences would help evaluate how informal systems work and affect state strength and service provision. The case studies suggest that in order for a country to democratize, the state must be sufficiently independent to prevent the control of state resources from swinging the election. Further research should be done to explore how partisan capture of state resources affects democratization in these cases. State capture effects on regimes would be a new and compelling variable in future work to understand authoritarian and democratic regimes.

In all this thesis has shown independent of ideology, clientelist networks prevent democratic participation by the masses and coercively maintain control of society. Clientelism forces the masses that see politics as a vehicle involved in obtaining benefits and not creating broad-based policies. One reason for clientelism’s appeal to party leaders is that it gives them power without accountability. A key point, which comes out of the literature
on clientelism, is that the system thrives on privation. It capitalizes on society not producing enough of a particular good. It is intrinsic to rapid urbanization, and the shortage of housing and other services it creates. In systems that rely on clientelist linkages, political parties are incentivized to continue to manipulate access to goods in order to gain allegiance. The global rise in inequality means studies of clientelism will continue to be relevant to understanding political systems. The shift to neoliberal economic policies alone will not create democracies. Democratization requires a committed effort to create citizen control of the state.

The difficulty in obtaining housing remains a major political issue globally. Housing is particularly vital in other developing countries where rapid urbanization continues. Allowing informal housing is still a common solution. The cases show the importance of tenure security over title formalization. In Turkey, the AKP’s ban on informal housing made tenure insecure. In Mexico, reforms to the constitution made the land rights on *ejido* dwellers more secure and placed decision of tenure in under citizen control. The AKP has effectively used housing formalization to reward supports and cement their grip on power. Understanding how clientelist parties use housing is useful for understanding their political systems. It will also affect the quality of life for citizens. Housing will remain an acute need and source of political manipulation. The extent to which housing remains a clientelist good or an objective of policy programs will have a significant and enduring effect on the political systems both inside and outside of Mexico and Turkey.
REFERENCES


