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TRANSLINGUAL RHETORIC

by

LUCAS CORCORAN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in English in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in English in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

Translingual Rhetoric

by

Lucas Corcoran

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This project looks to understand the linguistic and rhetorical concepts grouped under the labels of “translingualism” and “translanguaging” by situating these ideas within debates within the philosophy of language and social performativity. The goal is to understand what the theoretical implications are of the claim that named national languages do not exist linguistically, and, in turn, to conceptualize how uses of language that exceed—or go beyond—the borders of named national languages function within social and institutional settings. I suggest that linguistic practices that are meaningful and do not cohere to the conventions of named national languages are best understood within their highly contextualized conditions of production and reception. I finally outline a pedagogical theory that aims to ground composition and rhetoric education within a rhetorical framework premised on the development of students’ metacognitive skills.

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Chapter I: Speech Act Theory and Rhetoric

1 Introduction

This chapter moves in two parts. First, I seek to rehearse the analytical roots of Speech Act Theory (SAT). I do this by beginning with Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and moving on to his work in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Then, I read J.L. Austin and John Searle as primarily responding to Wittgenstein's later philosophy. This move establishes what I take as the baseline commitments of analytical versions of SAT: how the later Wittgenstein networks linguistic meaning throughout the total of web of its performative enactment and the ways in which analytical philosophy thereafter attempts to codify this step into a "logics" of performativity.

Although I will contend that a logics of performativity in a strict sense is ultimately misguided, I situate Austin and Searle's respective philosophies as providing a prospective vocabulary for talking about performativity that critical theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu and Judith Butler take up in order to articulate a thoroughly existential reading of performativity and social reality. Second, I will be at pains to develop a working definition of rhetoric, which I believe departs notably the rhetorical tradition. I use SAT as a tool to read Lloyd Bitzer's definition of the rhetorical situation as offering a novel and, perhaps, overlooked possibility for rhetoric. Like SAT, Bitzer defines rhetorical discourse as essentially networked throughout its site of performative enactment. Based on this premise, I argue that rhetoric is always situated and productive discourse: rhetoric is born out of material conditions and it returns to material conditions in order to bring about a concrete change in them. In doing this, I will propose a definitional argument that will carry the burden of my take on rhetoric. This argument will consist of distinguishing between what I call "conventional" exigencies and "rhetorical"

exigencies. As I hope to make clear, it is precisely this difference between these two different types of exigencies that marks, at least provisionally, the boundaries between SAT and rhetorical theory.

SAT and the translingual turn in composition/rhetoric studies and in linguistics run on parallel tracks, since the translingual turn has tacitly traded on the status of linguistics norms and rules. A monolingual approach would have it that the rules are “in” the language itself: conventionalized grammar yields meaning through its logical soundness. On this account, language tout court is simply that which is intelligible without its contextual envelope either pitching in or detracting from its basic meaningful content. As an example, think about the grammar exercises in the back of a Latin textbook: these sentences show the “rules” of Latin insofar that they demonstrate a token of the logical types taught in the preceding chapters. To parse a textbook Latin sentence means to resolve its parts as the sum of some connecting set of pre-given rules.

Turning things on their heads, the translingual turn reverses the paradigm: the linguistic content of language is minimalized and its contextual envelope is maximized. As will be made plain below, this translingual premise readily aligns with SAT’s basic methodological commitment, which routinely argues that linguistic content alone always *underdetermines* an utterance’s understood significance. Like SAT, translingual language and literacy practices demonstrate how speakers need not follow the “rules” putatively internal to named languages in order to pull off a variety of complexly nuanced speech acts. To affirm the translingual doxology: language isn’t what speakers know about language. It’s what they know how to do with it (Lu & Horner, 2016).

However, I believe that this translingualism starting-point tends to kick the methodological can further down the road. To claim--and rightly so--that language is not, at rock bottom, a knowledge but a practice means that, instead of owing us a theory of knowledge, the translingual paradigm owes us a theory of practice. And, thus, the translingual paradigm hops out of the linguistic frying pan and into the theoretical fire, since theorists across disciplines--sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, and economists, to name a few--still hotly argue over what we mean when we talk about practice. But the situation is even worse for the translingual paradigm: to note that language is a practice does not obviate the theoretical commitment of demonstrating whether language is still fundamentally rule-bound or not. To say language is what we do and not what we know does not ipso facto mean that “rules” do not still govern linguistic behavior. In fact, it might very well turn out to be the case that the “language-is-practice” claim endorsed by the translingual paradigm situates language as even more rule-bound than the monolingual account has told the story. As I show below, SAT teaches just how rule-bound ordinary language is by showing how much unremarkable practices such as promising and betting follow highly routinized conventions and scripts. In a word: to take the translingual turn should not imply giving up on rules. It only means that we should locate the rules *differently*.

Taken in isolation, the translingual belief that language is not a knowledge but a practice does not present a novel methodological advance. Austin titled his series of William James Lectures at Harvard in 1955, later published in 1966, as *How to Do Things with Words*. Lots of folk have known for a long time that linguistic knowledge does not necessarily cash out as linguistic competence. This, as far as I can tell, is the founding principle of linguistic pragmatics. However, the translingual turn is perhaps unique in its desire to understand the relationship between linguistic features and the “rules” that govern the effective performative within a speech

act. The relationship between linguistic features and speech acts is a central concern of this project, and I hope to show the the translingual paradigm as uniquely equipped to understand this relationship both in terms of of methodology and in terms of pedagogy. Furthermore, the translingual turn presents an attempt to understand the role that the agency of speakers play in understanding how linguistic features circulate synchronically and how they modify diachronically (cf. Lu & Horner, 2013). From a translingual perspective, language is not bestowed from above but generated from below: speakers do not enact language in the act, but rather, in the act, they create it. Thinking in a translingual key redistributes linguistic authority to all speakers, instead of maintaining within the confines of a centralized linguistic authority.

For my argument, rhetoric is the load bearing bridge that connects up translingual speaker agency with SAT. Understanding the role agency places in language requires understanding speakers as, fundamentally, rhetors. This is one of the main claims of my project. In its analytical iteration, SAT cannot see speakers as agentive rhetors, because it maps the performative as utterly synchronic, both temporally and spatially speaking. Wittgenstein, Austin, and Searle snapshot speech acts and attempt to understand them in terms of this freeze frame. They implicitly deny the diachronic, as de Saussure fatefully did in his inauguration of structural linguistics (1916), and, in so doing, they suffer from the same theoretical consequences. On the one hand, to look at a speech act in slow motion will teach you a lot about the tacit and constitutive norms of the performative. On the other hand, it will not teach you much about how speaker performances actually construct--instead of merely respond to--the necessary and sufficient conditions that dictate the intelligibility of their utterances. My job in this first chapter is to show that rhetoric holds the key to understanding this relationship. Linguistic institutions--both in terms of linguistic content and contextual envelope--persist or change as speakers

respond to a variety of exigencies, some conventional others rhetorical. Understanding these exigencies using SAT and rhetorical theory comprises the majority of my first chapter.

In Chapter II, however, this distinction between conventional and rhetorical exigencies will turn out to be a trapdoor argument. Below, I will initially go to great lengths draw a bright red line between these two exigencies, so that in the subsequent chapter I can claim that this line is chimerical: all speech acts will begin to fit my definition of rhetoric when sufficient pressure is applied to what properly counts as “conventional.” Allow me to foreshadow: I count as rhetorical *any* situated and practical discourse that reaches out beyond its immediate conventions of intelligible realization in order to pull off a yet-to-be-realized possibility in the world in unpredictable ways. Rhetoric here satisfies conventional protocols in order to achieve unconventional ends. Clearly, this formula trades on how one defines “convention.” Below, I tour early SAT in order to establish some of the key terms of debate around concepts such as “rules,” “conventions,” and “institutions,” so that the translingual turn--both as theory and praxis--can be seen initially in light of SAT and, ultimately, in light of rhetoric.

2 Wittgenstein

2.1 Preliminary Remarks

Early Wittgenstein’s work could be seen as the epitome of “monolingualism.” In the *Tractatus*, what makes language tick is locked into a logical grid that is completely removed from this or that practice. The logic of language works, on this account precisely because speakers do not have access to it; this logic is an immutable, monolithic system that is there before speakers arrive on the scene. The monolingual paradigm appears to take a similar view of named languages. “English” and “French,” say, are closed-off systems whose systems extend

beyond this or that speaker or this or that linguistic practice; “English” and “French,” for example, are there before any speaker arrives on the scene.

The Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations*, as I describe in detail below, firmly rejects this “monolingual” picture of language, epitomized in the *Tractatus*. The “logic” of language is no longer internal to it, but rather external to it. The social rituals and cultural activities that were once thought to be ancillary to the logic of language now constitute said logic. This, I take, as the philosophical mirror of the translingual paradigm: that the “rules” are not taken up by speakers *in* practice, instead they are generated by speakers *through* practice is a baseline belief of the translingual paradigm. Although it seems that later Wittgenstein does not endorse explicitly such a lucid picture of speaker agency, he does locate the “rules” of language “in” the linguistic activity itself. Thus, my rehearsal of the progression of Wittgenstein’s thought aims to illustrate the two ways of looking at language contained in monolingualism on the one hand and translingualism on the other.

2.2 Early Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein’s (1922) first major philosophical work, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, epitomizes his idiosyncratic and often enigmatic perspective on “logical atomism,” a philosophical movement spearheaded by his mentor at Cambridge, Bertrand Russell. As a founding philosophical doctrine of 20th Anglo-American analytical philosophy, logical atomism aimed to dissolve traditional problems in metaphysics by showing that such problems stem from being couched in faulty and misleading linguistic structures.

For the logical atomist, types of questions that have needled the Western philosophical tradition for millennia—such as “How do I know if this table is real?” Or: “Am I merely just a brain in a vat?”—actually comprise nonsensical logical formulations speciously articulated in

seemingly sensical propositions. Such head-scratching questions regarding the reality of tables and pickled brains have no truth value, because their referents relate to no real objects. Although some utterances wear their nonsense upon their sleeves for philosophical daws to peck at—imagine the refrains in children's nursery rhymes, tongue twisters, or the magic words of vaudeville magicians—others, according to early Wittgenstein, belong to a more obscure class that do manifest their logical errors in compliment extern.

To illustrate this point, I borrow from Russell's (1919) example. The sentence, "The present king of France is bald" has *no* truth value. That is, it has *no* relation to the world. To assert that it is false would imply that its negation, "The present king of France is *not* bald," must be true. Yet this is clearly absurd. Rather, this sentence belongs to a species of grammatical nonsense, masquerading as a proposition with a possible truth value. This example indeed jumps out to most who have taken a European history course as a clear-cut logical imposter. However, other forms of disguised nonsense go largely undetected according to the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*.

Written in Euclidean proofs a la Spinoza, the *Tractatus* intends to demonstrate that the "world" and the "language" that represents it reduces down to logically perfected forms in which utterly unique facts are comprised of utterly unique nominal objects and singular linguistic utterances *mirror* these facts correctly or falsely. As the legend goes, Wittgenstein began thinking about language this way after reading about a court case in Paris, where model cars depicted the scene of an accident. Wittgenstein believed that the models could picture the actual accident because their spatial relations in some sense *mirrored* the actual spatial relations of the car crash (Stern, 1995). In clarifying early Wittgenstein's position, Pears (1987) describes early Wittgenstein's viewpoint here as essentially realistic: "Any factual sentence can be completely

analyzed into elementary sentences which are logically independent of one another because they name simple objects. At that basic level all languages have the same structure, dictated by the structure of reality” (p. 89). Different languages have different semantics and syntaxes. However, these structures--no matter how they connect up intra se--gain their significant potential from their structural capacity to mirror the constitutive structures that underpin logical reality. And, according to early Wittgenstein, average everyday language often deviates very badly from this logically perfected linguistic substratum.

Following out from this basic Wittgenstein premise, one could say that the subsequent goal of British and American philosophy in the 20th century became one of linguistic analysis. The successful philosopher discovers the logical ground floor of a given vocabulary, what Quine (1948) would describe as its ontological commitment, and then works to locate how all propositions that purport to form a part of this vocabulary follow or violate the rules set out by the vocabulary’s basic concepts (cf. Carnap, 1950). Early Wittgenstein, however, assigns himself a project more radical in scope. The *Tractatus* wants to discover the ground floor of *all* language, not just particular vocabularies. Wittgenstein's work follows the format of a Kantian analytic: he aims to discover the necessary pre-conditions for a language to be intelligible.

To use a metaphor: from an analytical perspective the linguistically-minded philosopher converts into a baseball umpire, calling balls and strikes on what can be meaningfully said with any given theory’s logical strike-zone. Through his work in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein inaugurates a brand of linguistic philosophy dedicated to the search for linguistic structures from which utterances, ranging from those of specialized disciplines such as the natural sciences to average everyday talk gain their significant content. Early in his career, Wittgenstein locates these structures as metaphysical logical sub-structures, buried deeply within, so to speak,

language. Although Wittgenstein in his later work will ferociously attack his former beliefs in the *Tractatus*, his project remains the same throughout his career: the search for and the elucidation of the grounds which make language possible.

2.3 Later Wittgenstein

Later, in ferociously attacking his early work, Wittgenstein lays out an approach In the *Philosophical Investigations* to thinking about language that precipitates what has become known as “ordinary language” philosophy (Laugier, 2013). Ordinary language philosophy assumes primarily a pragmatic claim: language takes root in the most mundane of circumstances--ordering coffee in a deli, making mindless chit-chat in an elevator--in which speakers perform utterances unthinkingly, without any obvious deliberation or selection regarding the forms of their speech.

In these rather dull everyday encounters, speakers do not trouble themselves over what they *really* mean when they announce: “I believe that the F train will be late,” or when they ask: “Do you know if there is a shoe repair shop on 5th avenue?” In both of these examples, no doubt appears to come on the scene concerning the exact valence of the enactive verbs “to believe” or “to know.” In common-talk, it would appear that most words and utterances never pass through a filter of deliberate thematic attention. The verbal situation at hand seems to elicit speech in the same way a pen about to roll off the table elicits a hand to reach out and grab it.

However, unlike unreflective actors in highly normalized situations, philosophers in their armchairs begin to worry about what does it *really* mean “to believe” or “to know.” The fact suddenly becomes shocking that, although most speakers use language routinely and successfully, most folk could not give explicit account of what they “mean” by asserting that they believe something to be true or that they know such-and-such to be the case. Underneath

ordinary usage there seems to lie a vertigo-inducing abyss: speakers use all types of words for which we should desire a concrete and fully theorized definition (“love,” “truth,” “progress,” “evil,” to name a few candidates) yet for which we have zilch.

To paint with very broad strokes: philosophy prior to Wittgenstein’s turn in the mid 20th century preoccupied itself with designing theories that would underpin and prop up such words as naming universal concepts. One could productively view the Socratic dialogues just as this type of endeavor: theory’s attempt to ground ordinary language in a conceptual and moral terrain beyond the everyday roles it plays. As a metalanguage, philosophy fills in the potholes of quotidian linguistic usage through building out the requisite theoretical infrastructure. Early Wittgenstein thought very much in this vein. The *Tractatus* elucidates what the infrastructure of this metalanguage should look like and how it should be built, without making any claims about any particular domain of knowledge or school of philosophical inquiry.

However, the *Philosophical Investigations* in rejecting the logical requisites of the *Tractatus* marks what one might call the beginnings of Wittgenstein's existential period. In his later work, Wittgenstein vigorously denounces his earlier demand for grounding language in a logically secured metalanguage. The most banal of circumstances now in fact ground linguistic meaning instead of obscuring it. It is only from the vantage point of traditional philosophy that language seems to float dangerously, unanchored from any steadfast logical mooring. Taken with a hearty grain of salt, I label the argumentative procedure of the *Philosophical Investigations* as one of “linguistic phenomenology,” a term that Austin (1979) would later use to describe his own methodology largely derived from Wittgenstein’s later work. Writing in aphorisms, Wittgenstein in this work painstakingly observes the vagaries of a variety of hypothetical languages and their social and practical contexts, calling his reader’s attention to

just how well language can run without the need for any rationally articulable rules that might “guide” such linguistic performance before the fact. Wittgenstein situates the web of amorphous yet constitutive operations in which language takes place as the proper level of phenomenal linguistic analysis. Whereas past philosophers, early Wittgenstein included, only looked to the logic embedded in utterances’ semantics and syntax as the sole bearers of significance, later Wittgenstein, and the linguistic philosophy to follow in his wake, connects up utterances’ possible meaning with the lived pragmatic background of its use.

2.3.1 The Sprachspiel

Wittgenstein nominates the entirety of this linguistic phenomenon as “Sprachspiel” or a “language-game,” writing: “I shall call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven the Sprachspiel” (1953, §7). And, elsewhere, he contends: “Here, the term Sprachspiel is meant to bring into prominence the fact that *speaking* of the language is part of an activity and a form of life” (1953, §23). The English translation of Sprachspiel as “language-game” has had the extremely unfortunate impact of connoting something frivolous and trivial that can be productively contrasted with the real and the serious (Gellner, 2005, p. 59). However, this precisely is what Wittgenstein does not mean. Sprachspiele do not distract from the serious business of language, in the same way a game diverts people from the serious business of work. Sprachspiele are constitutive of a language’s entire range of significant possibility, and, therefore, can not be productively contrasted with a realm of linguistic significance “beyond” or “below” or “above” them. Language is Sprachspiele all the way down. Instead, Wittgenstein’s use of a conceptual field invoked by the term “game” emphasizes how speakers perform in a field of action without the need to keep the rules of the game explicitly in front of them, in the

same way that a tennis player can play a match on a tennis-court without having to remind herself constantly that the ball cannot bounce more than once before she can return it.

The concept of Sprachspiele is not intended to obviate the possibility of studying language in terms of its structural and lexical elements. Language, it goes almost without saying, can be isolated as phonemes, morphemes, syntax, etcetera. The argument here is that language is not primarily given as such. The utterances that can be parsed into phonological and morphosyntactic elements are first made available through their original disclosure in Sprachspiele. In order to find the ultimate grounds of language, Wittgenstein hypothesizes the Sprachspiel as the phenomenon that comes an ontological step before the entities traditionally studied by theoretical linguistics.

The Sprachspiel is essential to Wittgenstein's later philosophy, so it is worth the time to pause and flesh it out. Imagine a fantastic scenario: while traveling far off from home, you stumble upon the locals doing something, which, at first blush, looks a lot like playing a game. You can't discern it right away, but the player's action feels like it has a certain sense and directedness to it. It strikes you as intentional instead of random. You pause for a moment, observing the hypothetical game as it unfolds. Two players face each other with hands outstretched. Maintaining eye contact, they recite different sounds in vocal unison. While in sync with the sounds that their mouths make, they clench a fist with the right hand and slap it against the open palm of the left. After three motions, each player's right hand takes on a different shape. You take account of three moves: the fist remains clenched or the palm opens up into a flat hand or the the index and middle fingers jut out--into something that looks a lot like a peace sign. When the players make one of these hand motions, they, at one and the same time, make a new vocal sound. With more painstaking observation, you learn that the clenched fist is always

associated with the sound “rock” and it always beats the flat palm known as “paper.” However, the peace-sign looking gesture, which the players call “scissors,” vanquishes “paper,” and “rock”—you finally realize—has the upper hand against “scissors.” The mouth-sounds and the body-moves clearly operate on the same plane of significance and are of a piece: they both comprise conventional moves in a sense related to the rules and the still-unbeknownst-to-you overarching telos of the game.

Looking at rock-paper-scissors as a Sprachspiel gives us a chance to see how verbal utterances can occupy the same “linguistic” space as gestures. For an observer unfamiliar with the game, rock-paper-scissor language must include the body as much as the voice as well as an inkling of the game’s implicit rules and goals. Without understanding these elements—that which logic and theoretical linguistics would precisely leave out--the game cannot be interpreted in its existential fullness, nor fully understood.

When Wittgenstein coins the term Sprachspiel, one of its payoffs is to plant the following question: What would our alien observer of rock paper scissors already have to understand in order for her to isolate only the mouth-sounds *as* language? In other words, what corporeal and material and telic realities would have to become transparent, so to speak, so that the mouth-sounds appear as that which solely arrays the activity’s significant content? These lines of inquiry point out one of the later Wittgenstein’s central theses: that observers can individuate language as what has been traditionally taken as language only against an often invisible background of shared non-linguistic cultural practices. These practices, at least in the basic example above, necessarily include the body, implicit or explicit teloi, and other folk. The alien observer of the above Sprachspiel of rock-paper-scissors, for instance, would have to relate

propositionally the corporeal gestures of the game to its mouth-sounds in one-and-the-same grammar in hopes of mapping overtly the game's rules and goals.

On the other hand, according to the later Wittgenstein, linguists and logicians, who already have incorporated the rules of Sprachspiele, cannot "see" how language relates essentially to the other non-linguistic moves in the game, because they have become so familiar with the Sprachspiele they play in their respective cultures that certain "rules" are naturalized into oblivion. In order to demonstrate the background of language practices, Wittgenstein's Sprachspiele and the often bizarre examples that he gives throughout the *Philosophical Investigations* operate hermeneutically by incessantly questioning when and where and by what means we can locate "meaning" *solely* in what we have come to call "language." The rhetorical strategy of Wittgenstein here is to dumbfound his readers so that they might catch a glimmer of the whole web of cultural practices that essentially confer on language its meaning, but through endless acculturation, have become, in effect, completely inconspicuous.

The Sprachspiel is important, so I want to try it out once again: take translation as another possible way to understand the Sprachspiel. The utterances "It's raining" or "Está lloviendo" or "Il pleut" ostensibly denote the same basic fact: wet stuff is currently splashing about on the pavement. But just as much as one could announce this fact in "English" or "Spanish" or "French," one could readily imagine a whole set of hypothetical languages that articulate this fact with distinct structural and lexical features. For example: picture a language in which the fact of "rain" or "not-rain" is expressed through flashing a certain sequence of colors on a light-machine that speakers carry around with them (e.g., red-orange-green means "it's raining" and red-orange-purple means "it's *not* raining") or a language in which this fact is expressed when speakers touch certain parts of their body with their hands (e.g., hand-on-head means "it's

raining” hand-on-shoulder means “it’s *not* raining”). And the list of possible “languages” goes on. Generally, it could be said that the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* accounts for the possibility of different utterances in different languages to state what amounts to the same fact by positing a logical substructure that subtends all languages. On this account, the “English,” “Spanish,” and “French” utterances along with the hypothetical color and body utterances mirror the logical fact that *P* is the case. In a minimally Platonic framework, the ideal logical fact that *P* is real and the natural and constructed languages that manifest that *P* are worldly derivatives. The distinct semantics and syntaxes in which the proposition is couched dress up, so to speak, the substantial that *P* in superficial and interchangeable linguistic costumes.

Painting with broad strokes, I see early Wittgenstein as providing one way into thinking about how interlinguistic translation is possible. The logical fact of that *P* is the ontological ground floor upon which all utterances that pronounce it are built. When I say “It’s raining” in New York or “Está lloviendo” in Madrid or “Il pleut” in Paris, on this account, I see *through* the linguistic utterance towards the logical fact itself. In this manner as well, I could teach a friend a hypothetical language by showing her how the semantics and syntax of that language relate essentially to the facts at hand. Utterances therefore are inter-translatable between languages insofar that they can be located as matching up to the same logical fact. And here comes the crucial step to this argument: the logical existence of that *P* takes ontological priority over any particular form of its utterance in any given language. *The fact that P is the most basic entity that funds all subsequent linguistic meanings that aim to represent it.* I do not mean the phrase “ontological priority” here to suggest a relationship of causality but rather one of figure and ground. The above example utterances make sense *in light of* their relation to the logical fact that *P*. Without this “in-light-of-which” relation to that *P*, utterances might make *linguistic* sense in

terms of their respective semantics and syntaxes, but, at a more fundamental logical level, for early Wittgenstein, utterances that lack this relation are literally nonsense. From this point of view, translation begins to look like cashing out the ideal and *real* proposition in language after language just as a traveler touring different countries can transfer the *real* value of her money from one currency to another.

Later Wittgenstein's use of Sprachspiele in the *Philosophical Investigations* intends to undo dramatically this paradigm and reverse completely the ontological priority between logic and language. In taking up once again the trio of examples "It's raining," "Está lloviendo," and "Il pleut," it is certainly justified to argue that, in a certain sense, the three represent the same logical fact. However, following the tracks set out by later Wittgenstein, their possibility of representing the same logical fact is ontologically predicated in a much more fundamental sense on the role that these utterances play in a particular Sprachspiel. On this account: *the Sprachspiel is the most basic entity that gives significant possibility to the utterances that are performed within them*. It is *not* because all three utterances mirror the same fact that they can be seen as significantly equivalent and thus inter-translatable. Instead, *it is* because of the fact that speakers in New York, Madrid, and Paris all seem to play a similar Sprachspiel that one could call "making statements" and that these Sprachspiele are close enough that a New Yorker can sit in on weather-talk in Madrid or Paris without having to re-learn the rules of the game, *even if* she has to learn new linguistic features to play the game.

In the making-statements Sprachspiel speakers tell each other how things are in the world. Some iterations of this game have highly codified and explicit rules, like the making-statements Sprachspiele that natural scientists play. In other versions, the rules are loose and implicit, like weather-reporting Sprachspiele where speakers tell each other what is happening

outside their windows. Following from this premise, the ontological ground floor that supports, so to speak, the interrelationship between the utterances “It’s raining,” “Está lloviendo,” and “Il pleut,” is not a “in-light-of-which” relationship of different linguistic conventions to the singular fact of that *P*. Rather, it is the “family resemblances” that relate the Sprachspiele of New York, Paris, and Madrid as an amalgam of “complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing” (1953, §66) and traversing them.

2.3.2 Linguistic Networking

A big takeaway of later Wittgenstein’s work is this: whereas the significant content of a language was once taken as primarily an “intra”-linguistic fact, after the *Philosophical Investigations* a language’s meaning is now seen as fundamentally networked throughout “extra”-linguistic circumstances. Or, better yet, the Sprachspiel shows that one cannot easily jot down the boundaries between “intra” and “extra” linguistic phenomena. To understand language ipso facto means to understand the cultural activities into which it has been interwoven, and the dark clouds of profundity, what many would simply call philosophy, arise only when “language goes on holiday” (1953, §38)--when words and phrases take a coffee break from their average everyday jobs and routines.

This move to “existentialize” language is essential for all speech act theories to follow because it establishes the routinized rituals of cultural life as playing a constitutive role in the performance of any and all utterances. The capacity to hail a taxi or to bet twenty bucks comes from one’s tacit socialization into these types of normative social performances and not from any type of ability to master objectively or to articulate theoretically the rules of the game. Elsewhere, Wittgenstein (1967), describing this practical holism, writes: “What determines our judgements, our concepts and reactions, is not what *one* man [*sic*] is doing *now*, an individual

action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action” (§567). Wittgenstein, however, does little to explicate this “hurly-burly” and mostly only gestures at its necessity in order to deflate the arguments of the analytical philosophy with which his later work almost always tacitly locks horns. This is the part of the story where Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), and, down the road, Bourdieu (1990) and Butler (1997) come into the scene, and, subsequently, lay the groundwork for understanding the theory and practice of translingualism. Taking their cue from where later Wittgenstein’s work trails off, each one of these theorists can be seen as attempting to understand explicitly the very *background* that breathes significant life into an utterance as contextualized performance from their own theoretical purviews.

3 The Sprachspiele and Analytical Philosophy

3.1 J.L. Austin

Picture this: one day, instead of going to teach my course, I head down to the Intrepid, a retired aircraft carrier-*cum*-air and space museum, docked on 12th Avenue and 49th Street in Manhattan. Along the way, I pick up a bottle of champagne for good measure, and, in a moment of exuberance, I crack it against the hull of the ship while proclaiming: “I christen thee the Queen Mary!” Although I might have very well risked arrest for lunatic vandalism and startled a few unexpecting tourists, what I certainly have *not* done is christen the ship.

For starters, the Queen Mary already names a famous ocean liner that haunts the waterways of the New York Harbor. But, more importantly, I do not have the vested authority to christen ships, nor is the requisite ceremony, replete with bunting, band, dignitaries and pageantry, in place in order to establish the ritualized conditions in which ship-christening becomes a legitimate meaningful activity. In *How to Do Things with Words*, Austin (1962)

elucidates through such tactile examples the implications of Wittgenstein's Sprachspiel, by analyzing how utterances perform a role in highly routinized cultural conventions, like marriage ceremonies, placing bets at the horse track, or, like the above example, christening a ship.

As Wittgenstein before him sought to do, Austin wants to collapse long-standing metaphysical debates by calling attention to how many "constatives" (statements with a truth value) are actually "performatives": instead of depicting a state-of-affairs veridically or falsely ("The cat is on the mat" or "The cat is *not* on the mat"), a species of utterances function as the culminating act of highly scripted public rituals--even if they often go unrecognized as such. When a judge at the end of a hypothetical trial pronounces the verdict "guilty," she would be finalizing the ritual performance of a trial inasmuch as much as she would be reporting upon a newly-discovered fact about the world.

Departing from Wittgenstein, Austin begins to lay out some of the necessary and sufficient conditions for Sprachspiele or what he would label as "performative" situations. In the same vein as Wittgenstein, Austin's initial description of how the performative conditions of rituals, ceremonies, and institutions contribute essentially to an utterance significant content sets out a rudimentary vocabulary that later analytical philosophy would develop into the "logics" of SAT (Searle, 1969) and critical theory would "existentialize" (Butler, 1990, 1997) into a language of corporeal performativity.

The first move Austin makes in defining the performative remains the most important: "There (i) must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure [is] to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further (ii), the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked" (p. 15). A certain set of

customs must *already* be established before the utterance is spoken and the speaker speaking the utterance must have prior authorization to do so in order for a performative to come off *as* an utterance of that variety at all. A guilty verdict means little outside of a courtroom where a judge and jury are backed up by court officers, just as as a promise to buy my friend dinner means little without enough cash in my pocket to back it up.

3.2 John Searle

Searle's (1969) *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* builds off of Austin's work on the performative in order to discover the logic of what Searle calls "speech acts." Searle's argument trades on this idea of "logic" insofar that Searle believes himself capable of stating the conventional procedures that organize speech acts, such as making promises, as a species of *propositional* knowledge, that is, as field of knowledge amenable to explicit schematization and codification.

Ryle (2009) labels such propositional knowledge "knowledge-*that*" and contrasts it with "knowledge-*how*." Statements in the key of knowledge-*that* are preceded by a "that" in their articulation. For instance, "I know *that* the earth is spherical" and "I know *that* John Wilkes Booth shot Lincoln" are both knowledge-*that* statements because they can in effect be catalogued as explicit records of the facts particular to their respective object domains. In this example, the knowledges of earth science or American history are the sum total of such knowledge-*that* statements. On the other hand, the concept of knowledge-*how* highlights a skill domain. Skills like riding a bicycle or executing the duties of a short-order cook never can get fully cashed out as a series of propositions representing the facts constitutive of such activities. Although one can begin to explain bike-riding or frying an egg in instructional language ("First, you apply downward force to the pedal" or "Make sure the griddle is good and hot"), it feels like

this type of vocabulary fails to express such skills in toto. At a certain point, language qua depiction of the-way-things-are backfires and misdescribes how engaged actors cope within the shifting contours of the situations at hand.

The Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations* would deny the desire to shift Sprachspiele into a form of knowledge-*that*. As noted, this Wittgenstein permits the tracking of the “family resemblances” (1953, §66) of Sprachspiele as a method of examining the overlaps and divergences between how words are used in different contexts. However, he would adamantly reject the possibility of discovering a propositionalizable logic inherent to the Sprachspiel: one can play the game but one cannot write the rulebook while playing it. Searle in line with Austin co-opts Wittgenstein’s later work and brings it back into the fold of analytical philosophy. Sprachspiele give way to a “logics” of the performative that Searle in particular sets out in painstaking detail. In a different work, Searle (1979) explicitly discounts Wittgenstein’s broadly existential claim that Sprachspiele or what we *do* with language are both limitless and largely undefinable. Speech acts are now subject to a taxonomy: “There are not, as Wittgenstein (on one possible interpretation) and many others have claimed an infinite or indefinite number of language games or uses of language [...] There are a rather limited number of basic things we do with language: we tell people how things are, we try to get them to do things, we express our feeling and attitudes and we bring about changes through our utterances” (p. 29). While somewhat reductive, Searle’s move aspires to sharpen the lens of SAT. This hard-headed, borderline schoolmaster, approach deflates some of the linguistic mysticism latent in late Wittgenstein’s work through the development of granular vocabularies. Although I would argue contra Searle that a full-blown logics of the speech act is in some respects merely an analytical fantasy, I would at the same time grant that productive distinctions regarding linguistic

performativity can be made. In a word: we cannot, *pace* Searle, explain completely what we do with words, but we can, *pace* Wittgenstein, certainly talk about it.

3.2.1 $F(p)$

In *Speech Acts*, Searle builds upon Austin's vocabulary. He contends that speech acts can be individuated in terms of their linguistic, propositional, illocutionary content (Searle, 1969, p. 24). The speech act, "I bet twenty bucks that she gets the job," can be analyzed in linguistic terms of semantics and syntax, in propositional terms of predication and reference, and in illocutionary terms of conventional bet-making.

Searle claims that the linguistic and propositional content of a speech act most often *underdetermines* its illocutionary force. Saying, "I'll be there tomorrow!" can equally function as a statement or a promise or a threat. One of Searle's more important contributions to SAT, the idea boils down to the following logical formula: $F(p)$. F here stands for the invoked performative protocol and p for the linguistic and propositional characteristics of the act (p. 31). The two variables must operate in tandem for the speech act to come off as well-performed. A speech act needs to be legible in light of both some linguistic and propositional criteria *and* illocutionary conventions in order for it to be understood. Searle's logical expression evokes strong parallels with Wittgenstein's original use of the Sprachspiel in order to highlight how linguistic meaning is essentially distributed throughout its conventionalized circumstances of use.

Although it is clearly possible and profitable to study only the linguistic features of speech acts, a la de Saussure and Chomsky, or their logical possibilities, a la early Wittgenstein, such approaches remain inadequate for understanding the entire language phenomenon. As Searle reminds us: "A great deal can be said in the study of language without studying speech

acts, but any such purely formal theory is necessarily incomplete. It would be as if baseball were studied only as a formal system of rules and not as a game” (Searle, 1969, p. 17). Understanding language as a game requires understanding how it is played. And this means understanding its rules as well. In the story I’m telling, SAT after Searle largely centers the status of such rules: Do speakers “know” the rules of the game? Do speakers write the rules or solely respond to them? Are there different rules for different speakers? Later critical theorists such as Bourdieu (1982) and Butler (1997) will offer radically different answers to these questions than Searle. However, they remain largely within this initial field of inquiry.

3.2.2 Regulative Rules and Constitutive Rules

Much of the subsequent debate regarding the “rules” can be productively viewed through the lens that Searle sharpens in *Speech Acts*. How the “rules of the game” are to be viewed will play an important role throughout this chapter, especially the Searlean differentiation between “regulative” and “constitutive” rules (Cf. Chapter IV). Thus, I define them in detail.

In a preliminary definitional move: Searle defines rules as either regulative or constitutive. Regulative rules “regulate independently or independently existing forms of behavior.” Constitutive rules, on the other hand, “do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behavior” (Searle, 1969, p. 33). Take escalator etiquette, for example, in a subway station as an example of a regulative rule: the “rule” enjoins those who want to ride the escalator to move to the right and those who want to walk the escalator to move to the left. However, the rule here only constrains the choice of action. I am still playing the escalator-game (although impolitely) if I walk on the right and stand on the left.

Regulative rules tack protocols onto already established possible fields of action. One could say that regulative rules clean up post hoc the behaviors that constitutive rules bring into

existence. They operate from a modal perspective of “could.” I *could* make a right turn on red in Manhattan. I *could* play baseball with a corked bat. Both of these actions illustrate how certain behaviors relate to regulative rules by having success conditions *external* to the rule itself. In the right-turn and corked bats examples, I complete the goals of the game without following certain rules of that game, and both are cases of “cheating” in a certain sense. To illustrate this point one last time: Jean Valjean’s theft of a loaf of bread in Victor Hugo’s *Les Miserables* satisfies a success condition and at the same time breaks a regulative rule external to that success condition. He both provides food for his family and commits a crime in so doing.

To use this same “external”/ “internal” nomenclature, constitutive rules, in contrast, establish behaviors wherein the success conditions of those behaviors are *internal* to the rules themselves. Take chess as an illustrative example of a game in which all the rules are constitutive: the rules that define how rooks move as opposed to bishops or that define check as opposed to the free movement of the king create the very possibility of chess play itself rather than solely limiting it. Since chess has no regulative rules and only constitutive rules, chess players can in no way satisfy a success condition while playing the game external to the sum total of the rules of the game itself. If regulative rules are predicated on a modal “could,” then constitutive rules are predicated on a modal “could not.” I *could not* move a rook diagonally in order to satisfy the goal of capturing my opponent’s queen *nor could* I pass my king through check in order to castle and still be playing conventional chess. In other words, unlike driving in New York or baseball, chess does not admit cheaters.

3.3 Concluding Remarks

Let’s take a brief interlude here. I’ve spent a lot time talking about what I take as analytical philosophy’s attempt to dissolve metaphysics by turning to linguistics: once we carve up

language into constatives and performatives lots of bitterly-fought philosophical battles, so the story goes, turn out to be little more than cases of linguistic shadowboxing. If we understand the *pragmatic* conditions under which an utterance is intelligibly understood, then the requirement to obtain *theoretical* conditions for such understanding is obviated. Because it strikes me as the axis around which SAT, rhetorical theory and translingual paradigm rotate, I articulate it as a thesis: *Once the conditions for pragmatic understanding of an utterance or any type of social performative are sufficiently given in order to describe the action at hand without implying correlative theoretical understanding on the part of the actor, then the requirement to give conditions for theoretical or propositional understanding of utterances or social performativity are greatly diminished if not obviated entirely.* Insisting on theoretical knowledge begins to seem tautological under the auspices of this thesis. In a word, it seems that the rejoinder to this thesis boils down to: there *must* be a theoretical component to social action because social action *must* include a theoretical component. For the moment, let's call the above "Practical Intelligibility Thesis" and position it as the nodal point of contact that organizes all subsequent relationships between these three discourse.

4 Rhetoric

4.1 Bitzer's Rhetorical Situation

Bitzer's (1968) "The Rhetorical Situation" constitutes an essential link between SAT and rhetorical studies. Like the speech act theories of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Searle, Bitzer argues that rhetorical discourse's seemingly "intra"-linguistic meaning is essentially networked throughout its "extra"-linguistic circumstances. The rhetoricity of any given discourse can only be judged against the circumstances in which it takes place. By shifting the level of rhetorical

analysis away from discourse and towards situation, Bitzer establishes the production of rhetorical discourse as a speech act, without using the term “speech act” explicitly.

Like ship-christening, a rhetorical act has to take place in a situation that is recognizable *as* a rhetorical situation. In line with the descriptive work of Austin and Searle, the rhetorician’s task becomes one of accounting for the “rules” of performing a rhetorical act. In other words, in the same manner that Austin and Searle’s work attempts to account for the necessary and sufficient conditions of the speech act, Bitzer’s essay articulates what should count as the necessary and sufficient situational criteria for defining a speech act as rhetorical.

On Bitzer’s account, rhetoric is first and foremost situated practical discourse. Unlike poetic discourse, for example, rhetoric requires a material complex of exigence, audience, and constraint in order for it to count as properly rhetorical. Whereas a poet can write a poem without ever publishing it--as many poets do--a rhetor *must* “publish” her discourse. She cannot create a rhetorical discourse outside of a set of publicly available material conditions that elicit the rhetorical discourse. To spin this metaphor a different way: a novelist who pens a novel and leaves it in her desk drawer has still written a novel. On the other hand, a political activist who composes and prints a batch of pamphlets but still awaits to distribute them on a street corner has yet to perform a rhetorical act.

Yet to define rhetoric only as situational and practical would cast too wide a net. If this were rhetoric’s sole criterion, rhetoric would include all pragmatic speech acts, such as ordering cups of coffee or saying “excuse me” after sneezing in a crowded elevator. The material situations in which both of these mundane examples occur certainly call forth their utterance in the same way that the rhetorical situation calls forth its. Like any other speech act, I cannot order a cup of coffee or excuse myself without the right circumstances in some sense being secured in

advance. However, my project wants to make it explicit that if the sole payoff of Bitzer's introduction of the term "rhetorical situation" into the field of rhetorical theory is to use rhetoric to name a class of discourse that is both situated and practical in the above senses, then rhetoric, as an independent field of study, cannot produce any claims of substantial interest beyond the claims already made by SAT. Rhetoric needs to study something beyond a discursive situatedness, if it hopes to champion for itself an independent disciplinary methodology beyond that which speech act has already articulated with logical precision.

4.1.1 Conventional Exigencies and Rhetorical Exigencies

This is where exigency comes to play because, as I will argue, the difference between conventional and rhetorical exigency is the very thing that makes rhetoric its own field of study. If rhetoric merely names a species of speech acts, it, however, names a vital one: rhetoric is the particular brand of discourse that comes from material conditions in order to act upon material conditions. In contrast to how some utterances participate in the a priori articulated conventions of illocutionary speech acts, a rhetorical performance intends to induce a yet-to-be-realized modification to the world that looks beyond the already-agreed upon conventions.

Bitzer (1968) defines this world-instituting capacity as the discursive response to any exigency that comprises "an imperfection marked by urgency." An exigency, in this sense, is "a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a thing which is other than it should be" (p. 6). Rhetorical discourse and exigency have a dialectical relationship: the latter always triggers the former and the former is rhetorical insofar that it adequately responds to the latter. Exigency, it might seem, as the clinching characteristic of rhetoric perhaps still remains underdetermined. It could be readily argued that even the most mundane speech acts come about by responding to the felt solicitation of the situation, i.e., its exigency. Is it not the case that my mundane lunch order

at the deli counter is precipitated by the situation at hand as much as the intuitively rhetorical ad campaign against climate change is precipitated by its?

Momentarily, this objection can be deflated by pointing out that it conflates two distinct types of exigency. The exigency of the deli counter in a minimal sense might very well constraint in advance my range of possible utterances that are understandable in that scenario. However, the exigency here is completely self-contained. It begins *and* ends at the deli counter. It merely culminates an already established ritual. In contrast, the ad campaign against climate change responds to a different type of exigency. To speak metaphorically: this type of exigency always outruns itself. That is, it does not begin *and* end with the situation that prompts it. Rather, it induces a discourse that aims to have an effect on the material conditions *beyond* those of its immediate production and reception. Thus qualified, *rhetorical* exigencies denote exigencies of the second variety. Clearly, all sorts of situations elicit or prompt or constrict all sorts of actions. An itchy nose is the exigency that causes my scratching of it. But rhetorical exigencies are the ones that affect the world by exceeding their immediate conditions of satisfaction.

To define this point perhaps paradoxically, this account of rhetoric would argue that, despite common sense thinking, a lawyer's average everyday discourse produced in the courtroom is *not* properly rhetorical. Although it might be artfully composed, its exigency begins and ends within the pre-established confines of routinized judicial conventions. No matter the outcome of *that* case, no matter how invested *that* lawyer remains in her particular plea, the exigencies generated by a standard and unremarkable trial produce discourses that have no effect beyond that trial.

However, to further the example, notable court cases such as *Brown vs. the Board of Education* are in fact, under this definition, rhetorical. The exigencies generated and discourses

produced in response to those exigencies *transcended* their immediate conditions of enunciation and reception. Or, better said, the exigency in this particular case was world-instituting instead of merely conventional. The verdict of *Brown vs. the Board of Education* not only conformed to the judicial illocutionary conventions that produced its legibility (what one might call its conventional exigency), it *also* responded to and induced a change in material conditions beyond its immediate discursive confines (what one might call its rhetorical exigency).

4.2 Rhetoric and the Illocution / Perlocution Distinction

My interpretation of rhetoric in light of Bitzer follows a distinction laid out originally by Austin (1962). Beyond just verbalizing words in any old locution, Austin draws a distinction between *illocutionary* and *perlocutionary* performatives. Illocutionary performatives (“in” + locution) accomplish something *in* the speech act itself. Perlocutionary performatives (“per” as in “through or “by means of” + locution) accomplish something *through* or *by means of* the speech act itself (cf. Austin, 1962, p. 83-164).

Let’s return to some running examples in order to understand this point: the ship-christening with all its pomp and circumstance counts as an *in*-locutionary act. With the proper conventions and etiquettes secured in advance, once the champagne bottle cracks against the hull and the right words are announced, the ceremony is, in effect, *terminated*. The utterance “I hereby christen thee the Queen Mary!” culminates the act “in” its performance just as the proclamation “Checkmate!” ends the chess game under appropriate conditions “in” its issuance.

I stress that, on my reading of the illocutionary, conventions both call performative utterances forward and are completely exhausted in their issuance. Highly normalized conventions create internal exigencies that are resolved by the issuance of appropriate speech acts in the same manner that the tensions internal to a melody are ultimately resolved through the

return to the tonic of its key signature. Conversely, perlocutionary acts fulfill illocutionary conventions *in order to* produce an effect beyond the possibilities a priori mapped out by those selfsame illocutionary conventions. For example, I cannot successfully persuade you to help me move into my new apartment this Saturday by merely uttering “I hereby persuade you to help me move!” Clearly, this funky sounding performative does not work in the same way as a “normal,” illocutionary performative, like how a teacher can end a class by merely pronouncing that “Class is hereby dismissed,” for instance.

On the other hand, I can hypothetically persuade you by invoking the illocutionary conventions of promise-making. In saying “I promise to buy you lunch Saturday” I could possibly bring about an effect potent enough that you indeed end up helping me move. In much the same way that an affective sensation is the unpredictable result of a melody’s ultimate resolution, the perlocutionary possibility of persuasion in this example is an unconventional effect pulled off “through” or “by means of” the adequate realization of the illocutionary performative of promising.

The use of “unconventional” here disavows the connotations of something rare or uncommon. Certainly, it might indeed be the case that some folk are routinely persuaded to do things by the promise of free lunch. “Unconventional” here means that there is no *necessary* link between the intended perlocutionary outcome and that of the rehearsed illocutionary convention. B flat has been and always will be the tonic of its respective key signature under the conventions of Western harmony. In contrast, the speech acts that will bring about the perlocutionary “in-order-to” of persuasion in this example negate the possibility of similar conventionalization.

Yet this distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary performatives after a while begins to look like a flimsy one. What about cases where the realization highly-ritualized

performative conventions are in place for the precise reason of bringing about an effect that seems to outlast the bounds of the performative itself? Speaking my lunch selection to a server at a café at one and the same time culminates one performance while initiating an effect both external to it—the arrival of my lunch—yet at one and the same time essentially associated with it. Austin resolves this dilemma with yet another taxonomical move. Perlocutionary performatives subdivide into the realization of “perlocutionary objects” and the production of “perlocutionary sequels” (Sbisà, 2013, p. 36).

A command, for instance, works with a perlocutionary object in its sights. No doubt a command, like any illocutionary performative, must secure ahead of time the right conditions: institutional backing, feasible conditions of realization, implicit threats related to failures to comply--to name a few. However, at least unlike ship-christening and checkmate, the command is both conventional and *beyond* itself. If it can be said that chess and ship-christenings exhaust themselves in their performative realization, then an illocutionary performative like a command seen in conjunction with its perlocutionary object vitalize a distinct effect in virtue of its performative fulfillment. In comparison, perlocutionary sequels classify speech acts like persuasion wherein the task of defining the necessary conventions of performative realization becomes so often murky. A promise or a threat or a bet can cause the effect of persuasion. But to extrapolate a class of abstract rules that depict *how* these performatives essentially relate to such a perlocutionary effect, at least from the aspect of a philosophical *sub specie aeternitatis*, seems fruitless.

4.2.1 Conventional and Rhetorical Exigencies and the Illocution / Perlocution Distinction

4.2.1.1 Perlocutionary objects and Conventional Exigencies

Using the distinction between *in*-illocution and *per*-locution, I want to re-map out the initial distinction I drew between conventional and rhetorical exigencies. I made the perhaps bizarre claim that under this working definition of rhetoric a lawyer's discourse in the courtroom would *not* count as rhetorical. The lawyer's discourse is savvy. The lawyer's discourse is tactical. But, without, an effect that stretches beyond the conventions that generate it, it has yet to become *rhetorical*.

Let's examine this claim in light of Austin's distinction between perlocutionary objects and perlocutionary sequels. A typical day-to-day court case, I assume, is completely conventional: unless its particular ruling has some impact on legal precedent and jurisprudence in general, the case operates within highly ritualized conventions in the same way that ship-christenings, marriage ceremonies, and promise-making do.

That is to say that effects of such conventions are explicitly established before the fact: there are necessary and codified relations between the ritual of the act and the consequences that the act brings about. This idea is clear when lawyers, and the general public by extension, talk about an "open and shut" case. This metaphor signifies that a token is of such a procedural type that its resolution begins and ends completely within the bounds of already secured protocols. Hypothetically, the case is initiated and terminated without creating any effects beyond basic standardized conventions.

However, it is clearly granted that verdicts have very concrete material impacts, such as penal sentences or damages awarded. Yet, to talk like Austin, these would count as *perlocutionary objects* because the performative effects are so closely related to the illocutionary conventions that they essentially form a part of the conventions themselves. Like commands or requests, the culminating illocutionary utterance of "guilty" or "not guilty" along with the

illocutionary pronouncement of sentencing and adjudication of damages is so closely tied with the concrete result that it instantiates that, although the material result perhaps technically goes beyond the verbal realization of the convention, it is the *convention itself* which generates it.

It would follow that if a lawyer's artful and eloquent speech, which under a different account would be considered as the paradigm case of rhetorical discourse, only operates to realize one of the binary options of "guilty" or "not guilty," then the lawyer has *only* played the language game according to its pre-established "rules." Perhaps she has done so artfully and eloquently. Perhaps it has required dexterous skill in argumentation and oratory. But as long as the discourse triggers conventional outcomes it has yet to become properly rhetorical.

Rhetoric, as I want to make clear, always *exceeds* the rules of the game. It is *intended* discourse because it, by my definition, runs outside the bounds of illocutionary procedure. To try out the court case example one last time: this is to say that *if* it is permissible to claim that the effects, no matter how material and real, of an "open and shut" case constitute a perlocutionary object of highly-routinized illocutionary acts, then the lawyer's discourse has only answered to a conventional exigency and, therefore, under this definition, is not, in fact, rhetorical.

4.2.1.2 Perlocutionary Sequels and Rhetorical Exigencies

Rhetorical exigencies, conversely, count as a class of perlocutionary sequels. in contrast with practical ones, I have argued that rhetorical exigencies are always *beyond* themselves. They bring about an effect exterior to that which is initiated and fulfilled completely by particular conventions. Austin's toy case to illustrate a perlocutionary sequel is just that of persuasion: despite my most ardent wishes, I cannot persuade someone by reciting the utterance "I hereby persuade you to..." Such a performance strikes the ear as strange precisely because it is at least implicitly understood that one cannot secure in advance the requisite conventions for persuasion

in the same manner that one can for the illocutionary acts of ship-christenings, marriage ceremonies, and promise-making.

In fact, the baseline semantics of “persuasion” suggest the impossibility of the beforehand attainment of such conventions. If such conventions could be pre-established so that an utterance might cash out directly and always in another’s requisite and corresponding performance, this *prima facie* would count as any number of institutionally vouchsafed commands: jury duty, directives from your boss, a cop’s capacity to pull you over. Rhetoric, conversely, if it is to stand for anything within the discursive field of SAT, names the possible realm of strategic ends to which illocutionary conventions can be put to work but for which speech communities have yet to codify sure-fire conventions.

Rhetoric delineates the borders of what Mason (1994) calls the “perlocutionary field,” the space where speakers must guess and calibrate the effects of their discourse based on inferences instead of institutionalized conventions. The Aristotelian rhetorical maximum can shed light on the difference I am making here. As the discovery of the available means of persuasion on a case by case basis, rhetoric bridges the chasm between the conventional illocutionary performance and the unconventional perlocutionary effect.

Here is where a rhetorical exigency differs from a conventional one. On the one hand, a conventional exigency names the class of exigencies that exist within routinized and highly scripted behaviors. I have used the term in order to show that the context in all types of performatives elicits the *a propos* utterance: court proceedings call forth the verdict, just as marriage ceremonies call forth the exchange of vows, just as the appearance of the server calls forth one’s lunch order. The conventions of the performative circumscribe in advance all possible outcomes that a *conventional* exigency can bring about. A play at home plate is the

conventional exigency for the baseball umpire to call “safe” or “out.” In this example, the effect of her performative here is, so to speak, pre-packaged by the basic conventions of the game of baseball.

On the other hand, rhetorical exigency is always *beyond* itself. By saying this, I mean that a rhetorical exigency, by definition, *intends* an effect that is *not* circumscribed before the fact by the conventions of the realized performative itself. Take persuasion once again as a case in point: I might perform the illocutionary act of promising you lunch *in order to* persuade you to help me move this Saturday. In this example, my intended effect is, by definition, beyond the conventions of the illocutionary performative of promise-making.

A rhetorical exigency names precisely the class of exigencies that cannot be satisfied by the invocation of highly ritualized illocutionary conventions. The conventional exigency of a drafty open window waiting-to-be-closed in a library reading room can be readily dispatched by the illocutionary performative of favor-asking. You turn to your neighbor and say, “Excuse me, would you mind...” However, the constitutive criterion of rhetorical exigency, thus defined, excludes the possibility of conventional satisfaction of that exigency. A rhetorical exigency is precisely that for which no a priori conventions of realization exist. Thus, while risking being overly formulaic, I claim the following thesis: *Rhetoric constitutes the class of discourse that performs any number of illocutionary acts and, in doing so, both satisfies the conventional exigency of the illocutionary performative and intends to answer to an exigency that is simultaneously material and beyond the performatively realized illocutionary acts themselves.*

Rhetoric accordingly operates from a “by which” and in light of a discursive “the goal of” and towards an ultimate “for the sake of.” *By* the act of promising you lunch *the goal of* persuasion is realized *for the sake of* getting you to help me move. *By* the act of stating the

amount of student debt in the United States, *the goal of forewarning is realized for the sake of* getting more public funding for universities.

Allow me to take up chess once more as an example: the game itself presents an array of conventional exigencies that chess players must answer to satisfy the conditions of an “open and shut,” so to speak, chess game. To play chess requires an incredible amount of know-how and strategic thinking in order to satisfy the exigencies engendered by the constitutive rules of the game. There are pawns-to-be-captured, positions-to-be-fortified, pins-to-be-avoided. Responding intelligently to these conventional exigencies comprises the game of chess itself. However, if I intend to beat you in the game of chess *in order to* impress you or if I intend to throw the game *in order to* build your spirits, then chess in these instances includes a rhetorical dimension: I intend to dispatch a conventional exigency internal to the game in response to a rhetorical one external to the rules of the game itself.

The definition of rhetoric that I forward aligns with Rickert’s (2013) detailed account of “ambient rhetoric.” Drawing on diverse sources, Rickert situates rhetoric as that which exceeds the confines of both the linguistic and the human. Broadly speaking, this account uses the notion of “ambience” in order to create rhetoric as a hermeneutic tool for understanding how discourse and language are diffusely networked throughout material and affective ecologies that exist before the emergence of any particular subjective epistemological or linguistic articulation.

The rhetor, far from creating ad hoc significance and transmitting it--hereby deploying the same metaphors of how one writes a letter and then mails it--responds to and channels from before-the-fact meanings and affects laden in the world in order to redirect, so to speak, an audience to yet-to-be-noticed possibilities of existence. Rickert’s formula runs like this: “Rhetoric is a responsive way of revealing the world for others, responding to and put forth

through the affective, symbolic, and material means, so as to (at least potentially) re-attune or otherwise transform how others inhabit the world to an extent that calls for some action” (p. 162). This account hinges on the prefix “re” tacked on the verb “attune.” Rhetoric’s capacity lies in its potential to *re-present*, *re-veal*, *re-place*, *re-frame*, *re-make* and, also, *re-tain* the world. Sympathetic with Kennedy’s (1992) account of rhetoric as energy, the “re-ness” of rhetoric shows that it is generative and directive discourse.

Looking at things with a wide-angle lens, rhetoric does not mirror the world. It makes it. This, however, does not signal that rhetoric is the sum total of statements made by great rhetors—those who have been historically appointed to exert their wills upon the world. Rhetoric responds, reshapes, and redeploys the communally held affective forces always already present: “Rather, rhetoric rests in the fact that persuasion is prior to rhetoric. Worldly affect, modulated in persuasion, itself hollowed out the space for rhetoric’s emergence; it is rhetoric’s condition of possibility” (p. 164).

4.3 Rhetorical Temporality

This account helps support my claim that rhetoric is always beyond itself. To wax poetically: rhetoric is *transcendental*. It pushes out from the singular realization of compositional or illocutionary conventions into a yet-to-be-realized field of possibilities just over the horizon of those conventions. If this holds true, then the study of rhetoric transforms into the study of how rhetoric projects a world, or, better yet, the study of rhetoric becomes a study of possible institutions yet to be conventionalized into the day-to-day performatives that analytic SAT, at least, takes as fundamental and primary.

To understand rhetoric means to understand how conventional tools relate to unconventional purposes—how what has worked in the past might become fitted in the present

to bring about the future. And, in this sense, rhetoric is best understood *temporally* as the realization of codified histories as the basis of new exigencies aimed at intended but uncertain prospects. Discourse analysis that only picks out one of these temporal elements has yet to become rhetorical. Rhetorical theory in contrast names the unique form of analysis that maintains the given phenomenal integrity of this uniquely rhetorical temporality.

I emphasize this uniquely temporal nature of rhetoric to illustrate another productive distinction between SAT and rhetorical theory. SAT is atemporal. The logic that it assumes underpins speech acts also assumes a *static* construction. SAT interprets the rules of its toy cases, the marriage ceremonies and promise makings and ship christenings I have kept rehearsing in these pages, as if they existed outside of time. To borrow language from linguistics, SAT in its early analytic iteration is utterly synchronic. It freeze frames a performative and its rituals so as to explicate its generative conventions as rules amenable to propositional realization. In the same manner that Saussure isolated “langue” by hypothesizing what a language might linguistically look like suspended from the progress of time, so goes SAT: it snapshots a performative in order to individuate a phenomenon that can be studied scientifically. On the other hand, rhetorical theory is utterly diachronic. And, in this sense, it assumes discourse to have an essential ecstatic character. Rhetoric is best understood as how discourse intends to pull off an effect in light of present affordances made available through historically built out conventions. This is a broad claim and the lion share of my work in the next chapter centers on bearing it out.

5 Conclusion

This chapter began by reviewing some of the basic tenets of SAT. I tracked what I take as the paradigm shift between early and late Wittgenstein’s thinking in order to illustrate how SAT in its analytical iterations shifts away from logical substructures and towards the performative as

the preliminary unit of linguistic analysis. By contextualizing and distributing linguistic content, SAT performs a methodological move that runs parallel to the Bitzer's mid 20th century account of the rhetorical situation. Bitzer's theory, like SAT, sees rhetoric as the result of certain pragmatic and real conditions. By establishing a methodological link between SAT and rhetorical theory, I intended to show that rhetoric can be effectively re-described within SAT's vocabulary. Rhetoric is, by definition, perlocutionary because it seeks to constitute the world in a certain way that cannot be wholly predicted in advance. Rhetoric is, thus, unconventional in the light of the valence that SAT gives to "conventional," since effects, upon my account, always run beyond the confines its immediate performative articulation. In this light, rhetoric expresses a particular temporality. As properly perlocutionary, rhetoric pushes forward into the future in a way that strictly illocutionary acts do not. In the remaining chapters of this project, rhetoric's futurity will come into clearer focus, and, as I promised in the introduction to this chapter, I also hope to show that the futurity that *prima facie* seems be a unique property of rhetoric is, in fact, a property of all speech acts.

Chapter II: Types, Tokens, and Performatives

1 Introduction

This chapter begins with a detour. Instead of immediately working through the implications of differentiating between conventional and rhetorical exigencies, I begin by discussing the role that the type / token ontological distinction plays in theoretical linguistics.

In Chapter I, I borrowed heavily from Searle's (1969) formulation in *Speech Acts*, that a speech act can be understood in terms of the formula $F(p)$, with the variable F standing for the illocutionary form of the speech and the variable p standing for the propositional content of the utterance. Again, in Searle's take on things, any speech act can be individuated in terms of its reference and predication, its linguistic structures, or its illocutionary force. Furthermore, the formula hopes to show that the linguistic and propositional "content" of a speech act always underdetermines its performative force. What a speech act does--whether it threatens or rumors or promises--cannot be outright adjudicated through an examination to what the speech acts refers nor by examination of its linguistic structures. What we do with words, viz., their illocutionary force, is the investigative field of SAT, and, as has been shown in Chapter I, this study involves the inclusion of social rituals and institutions that are neither necessarily logically propositional, nor necessarily linguistic in the most normalized sense of the term "linguistic." Rather, they are what one might label "socially positional," in that they invoke a game differentiated by roles, legal moves, strategies, plans, and goals.

In a certain light, Searle's formulation sidesteps the "linguistic" question all together. This more analytical iteration of SAT has little to say regarding language qua linguistics, since it assumes that whatever linguistics says about linguistic structures still holds good: it is just the

case that linguistic structure, once again, underdetermines the intelligible effects of speech acts. Effects of speech acts are always context bound, even if their words do bears some relationship with their linguistic structures (one can't promise in the past tense, for example).

However, a radicalized iteration of SAT, something like what Wittgenstein was after in the *Investigations*, I believe does more than just bypass linguistic questions by solely focusing on the *F* side of Searle's $F(p)$ formula. My reading of the *Sprachspiel* in Chapter I intended to show that the propositional and linguistic "content" cannot be unproblematically disambiguated from the contextualized envelope in which it is delivered. To repeat a catchphrase: language is *Sprachspiele* all the way down. I hope to follow this view of Wittgenstein by arguing that the contents that can be "extracted" from the performative contextualized envelope, at the very least, are ontologically derivative of a holistically unified *Sprachspiel*.

The translingual turn is, in many ways, an attempt to re-think the basic concepts that make up the scientific paradigm of linguistics. Linguistics in all stripes and forms are continually confronted with language practices that seemingly do not fit neatly into theoretical models. As a result, disciplines that study what might be called "communication," are witnessing a proliferation of methodological vocabularies and descriptions that aim to capture with some accuracy the empirically verified practices of translanguaging.

Below, I use Quine's (1961a & 1961b) criterion of ontological commitment to understand what things the translingual turn takes as real and as entities in the world. The attempt to understand translingual practices, I believe, has ushered in a much needed self-reflexivity into the study of language. As will be shown below, talk of translingual practices forces those who study them to articulate with some degree of explicitness precisely what they think that language *is* and what it *is not*. This ontological investigation of language is requisite

for arguments against the reality of named languages. Whatever else the translingual turn might turn out to be, it has guaranteed the field at least one clear-cut premise: named languages do not exist, or, at the very least, they have no linguistic validity. This the case that the translingual paradigm makes against monolingualism, and, as far as I can tell, it can make no other arguments without first securing this premise of named languages' non-existence, at least linguistically speaking.

Hence, the first part of my work below is to review the translingual turn's arguments regarding linguistic ontology, and then contribute to it. The second part of my work is to show how my theory of rhetoric developed in Chapter I offers a novel and productive way for understanding translingual practices. My goal, then, is to show that the translingual paradigm, a la Otheguy et al. (2015) & Otheguy et al. (2018), performs a type of ontological reduction in order to rid their theory of any reference to named languages. I explicate this reduction qua reduction and propose that it be it carried out one step further.

In an attempt to to carry out this reduction, I present an in depth of reading of Butler's (1988) theory of gender performativity. Butler's use of the performative as a way to deflate the sex / gender division offers a model to problematize the division in SAT between illocution and perlocution and the type / token division in normalized linguistics. I argue that Butler's use of performativity, in one sense, describes all illocutionary performative acts as, in fact, perlocutionary. Butler's work hinges on the assumption that "conventional" performative tokens do not merely instantiate an abstract institutional type, but rather each preceding performative token sets the conditions of intelligibility for the subsequent performative tokens that follow it. Performatives, in this sense, are future-tensed *projections* of their institutions as much as they are

instances of them. The pronouncement “I do!” in a marriage ceremony is culpable for extending and maintaining the ritual as much as it terminates, so to speak, one particular instance of it.

This projection of future conditions of intelligibility within the conventional issuance of performatives must be unconventional in order to account for how rituals and institutions diachronically modify, on the one hand, and in order to account for performative agency, on the other. If it turns out that the manner in which putatively conventional performatives set the stage for the subsequent performatives is unpredictable, then, according to the nomenclature of SAT, it would also be the case, *à la* Butler, that all illocutionary performatives are, at rock bottom, perlocutionary: they have effects that cannot be cashed out as a logics prior to their enunciation.

Finally, in this chapter I will suggest that the type of social-institutional temporality that Butler articulates for understanding gender performativity is the same discursive temporality that I described for rhetoric in Chapter I. My hunch is that this view of temporality holds the key for understanding many translingual practices (Cf. Lu & Horner, 2013).

2 The Translingual Paradigm: The Type / Token Distinction & Ontological Commitment

2.1 Types and Tokens

Type-token talk marks an ontological distinction. Types are general classes of things. Tokens are particular instances of those classes. In the two sentences: “All cars have four wheels” and “This car is red,” the former sentence makes a claim about a general car-*type*, whereas the latter makes a claim about a particular car-*token*. This way of carving up the world is further evinced, when language is considered. When Hamlet goads Polonius by responding that he is merely reading “words words words,” is the prince of Denmark muttering three words or one? This, clearly, depends on whether you are talking about types or tokens. In terms of word-types, Hamlet has said but one word; in terms of tokens, three (Cf. Wetzel, 2018).

Distinguishing types and tokens plays a crucial role in establishing linguistics as a science. Using this difference, de Saussure's separation of the *langue* from the *parole* can be re-described as separating out linguistics types (*langue*) from linguistic tokens (*parole*). From the structuralist perspective that de Saussure inaugurated, the science of linguistics is simply the study of types. Or as Lyons (1977) tells us: "Utterances are unique physical events; as such they can be referred to in terms of the observational metalanguage of linguistics. The linguist, however, is not generally concerned with utterances as unique observational entities. He [*sic*] is interested in types, not tokens" (p. 28). In this version of linguistics, then, types are the durable structures that can be extracted out, so to speak, from the contextualized envelope in which actual speakers deliver them.

As the phraseology "type *and* tokens" makes clear, type / token linguistics assumes a two-tiered ontology, made up of two distinct kinds of entities. From this ontological premise, a methodological antinomy arises. If the structural paradigm assumes both tokens and types as valid candidates for the descriptor "real," then these entities must be real in different sorts of ways or must form a part of two different realities. As Lyon's claim shows, utterances (tokens) are constituted by a spatial and temporal extension that, *ex hypothesi*, does not constitute linguistic structures (types). Paradoxically, it would seem that if theoretical linguistics is to sustain its two-tiered ontology, it is forced to designate utterances as real because they are, in fact, spatial and temporal, while, at the same time, designating linguistic structures as real precisely because they are neither spatial nor temporal. Structuralist linguistics seems to operate with two pictures of reality--the material world here, the ideal world there--that are equal parts incommensurable with one another and yet equal parts necessary for its methodology: without

the reality of types, linguistics is not quite a science, and, without the reality of tokens, there exists no language to study.

2.2 Quine's Criterion of Ontological Commitment

My above description of theoretical linguistics is founded on what Quine would call ontological commitment (1961a & 1961b). Ontological commitment analyzes the entities that must be taken as real so that the statements generated by a particular theory might be true. Rayo (2007) writes: "To describe a sentence's ontological commitment is to describe some of the demands that the sentence's truth imposes on the world--those demands that concern ontology. Accordingly, for a sentence to carry commitment to Fs is for the sentence's truth to demand of the world that it contain Fs" (p. 428). For example, the above two example sentences "all cars have four wheels" and "this car is red" are both committed to the belief that the world is populated by a certain class of entities called "cars."

Quine (1961b) originally codified the criterion for ontological commitment in the formula: "Entities of a given sort are assumed by a theory if and only if some of them must be counted among the values of the variables in order that the statements affirmed in the theory be true" (p. 103). Thus, the analysis of the ontological commitments of a theory is a sort of inventory-taking of all the things the theory assumes as real in the course of implementing its methodology and in making statements about the world. In this sense, one can also talk about the "ontological costs" of theory: certain theories assume the reality of more entities, and, thus, are ontologically more expensive. Others assume fewer entities, and, thus, are ontologically cheaper. From a Quinean perspective, ontological commitment is like theory bargain-hunting: it ferrets out those theories that yield the most explanatory returns at minimal ontological investment.

Quine's criterion of ontological commitment can be used, on the one hand, as a method to decide between theories. On the other hand, the criterion of ontological commitment can also be used to downsize a theory, by paraphrasing a theory's sentences so that they no longer contain unnecessary ontological commitments. According to Quine (1961b), a theorist relieves herself from certain ontological commitments when "he [*sic*] shows how some particular use which he makes of quantification, involving a *prima facie* commitment to certain objects can be expanded into an idiom innocent of such commitment" (p. 103). And one page over: "In this event the seemingly presupposed objects may justly be said to be been explained away as convenient fictions, manners of speaking" (p. 104).

For Wetzel (2009), Quine would use this method of paraphrasing as an argument against the existence of types all together. From a maximal nominalist position, all talk of types is nothing more than a *façon de parler* that can be explained out of the picture through successive paraphrasings. By sharpening Occam's razor, the criterion of ontological commitment parses a theory's sentences into other, more precise sentences that are not committed to the existence of particular types as a condition so that what they say about the world might be true (p. 28).

2.2.1 The Ontological Costs of Monolingualism and the Translingual Response

I would like to bypass entirely the realist-nominalist debate. Instead, I solely aim to utilize the above discussion of the type-token distinction and the criterion of ontological commitment as a lens to understand the translingual turn in linguistics in a new light. As I outlined above, theoretical linguistics is *prima facie* ontologically committed to the two-tiered ontology of types and tokens. However, as also noted, such a commitment, it seems, quickly gives rise to theoretical-methodological antinomy: if both types and tokens are real, then they cannot be real in the same way, and theoretical linguistics must *ex hypothesis* also assume two

different realities: one that is constituted in the here-and-now, and another that is constituted in abstract “mental” or “ideal” realm. Below, I begin delineating what I take as the ontological commitments of “monolingualism” and how translingual theory seeks to paraphrase away such commitments.

Stated in a preliminary fashion, monolingualism talks *as if named languages (plural) were real*. It makes such statements as “French includes the subjunctive tense” or “Spanish is spoken in Spain, but not in Italy.” It is, therefore, at least for the moment, committed to the belief that “French” and “Spanish” refer to real entities, if the above statements are also to be true. However, the rider “for the moment” is important here. Monolingualism is only properly monolingual, if and only if those who profess it are prepared to defend their statements as referring to *real* entities that are not merely *façons de parler*, which could, hypothetically, be paraphrased away.

I reprise the type-token ontological distinction as a way to take stock of monolingualism ontological commitments. It would seem that monolingualism, at least in certain statements, is committed to the belief that named languages (plural) are also types of which particular utterances are tokens. Statements of linguistic adjudication like “This is an English utterance” or “This is a Spanish utterance” or “This utterance mixes English and Spanish” are committed to the reality of “English” and “Spanish” types in at least some sense, if these example sentences that describe utterances could turn out to be true.

In a monolingual take on things, “English” and “Spanish” in these sentences have to refer to an entity of some sort, if such statements are to be other than literal nonsense or fiction. If theoretical linguistics in general is committed to the two-tiered ontology of types and tokens, then monolingualism, it would seem, is committed to some sort of three-tiered ontology:

linguistic tokens not only manifest types, but, on a monolingual account, abstract types are also tagged with a certain essential language-ness, “English-ness” or “Spanish-ness,” say. Once again: This “English-ness” or “Spanish-ness” has to be, in some sense, real for monolingualism, if the statements that refer to “English” or “Spanish” *are not* merely a short-hand descriptor of some other entity or set of entities that, upon re-description, can be paraphrased away.

The translingual turn, however, is grounded in the belief that “English” and “Spanish” are, in fact, nothing more than *façons de parler* that should be reduced out of linguistics. Otheguy et al. (2015) make the most forceful case for this premise. For these authors, named languages have no ontological validity because they “*cannot* be defined linguistically [...], that is, in grammatical (lexical or structural) terms” (p. 286). If the science of linguistics is dedicated to the study of types and types *alone* (cf. the cited premise of Lyons [1977] above), then not only are tokens to be bracketed out of the picture (as already noted) but languages (plural) or “language-ness” should be bracketed out as well.

Otheguy et al.’s argument against monolingualism is a reminder that theoretical linguistics ought to be methodologically consistent: if it brackets out entities from down-top (tokens), it should also bracket out entities from top-down (named languages) as well in order to isolate fully types and types alone as the inquired-after linguistic phenomena. On the Otheguyean et al. account (2015), then, named-language referents like “English” or “Spanish” do not pick out a real linguistic entity, but instead pick out a real socio-political entity that has nothing to do with the study and theorization of linguistic types (p. 286). I understand this line of argumentation as basically tracking the difference between descriptive and prescriptive approaches to grammar: philologists (translingualists) aim to describe and explain the linguistic phenomena that are encountered. Schoolmasters (monolingualists) try impose how things ought to be linguistically.

However, named languages must refer to something if we can make statements about them and be understood. If in everyday talk a statement like “Sofia doesn’t speak French” is clearly understood and is either true or false, this is because it refers to a social construct that has a particular reality, but not to a linguistic one. The translingual turn is committed to the assumption that the entity “French” in the statement “Sofia doesn’t speak French” is paraphrased—linguistically speaking—out of the picture by the sentence: “Sofia has yet to incorporate many of the linguistic features socially and historically associated under the umbrella term ‘French’.” In the light of Quine’s criterion, then, the translingual paradigm for theoretical linguistics can be seen as unburdening itself from a cumbersome ontological commitment. At the level of structural linguistic analysis—that is, the analysis of linguistic types—named languages serve no explanatory purpose, and are, hence, ontologically-speaking, quite expensive.

At this point in the translingual argument, it seems that a curious shift in semantics comes about. The translingual paradigm, as I have depicted it, is a methodologically consistent approach to theoretical linguistics: it brackets tokens from below and named languages from above. It is ontologically committed to linguistic types and types alone. That is, in the study of linguistic structure qua linguistic structure, the boundaries between named languages simply cannot be found. To sloganize this belief, one could say: languages (plural) do not exist, but language (singular) does. This means that, for the purposes of the translingual paradigm, the linguistic cosmos is only truly populated by linguistic types as that which can be subject to description and analysis. Now, here comes the semantic shift: what is often called monolingualism in the research literature, paradoxically, turns out to be a belief in languages (plural), and, thus, would be more accurately denominated as plurilingualism or multilingualism, and what has been called translingualism turns out to be the belief in language (singular) and

language (singular) alone, and, thus, would be more accurately denominated as monolingualism. Weird, no?

To come full circle, the translingual paradigm is, in fact, a more methodically honest version of theoretical linguistics: it brackets out all things that are not lexical or structural types. The “trans” prefix seems to carry weight when the basic insights of theoretical linguistics need to be translated into the same discursive plane in which the folk belief in named languages is still operative, like pedagogical practices and institutional language policies, for example. However, I repeat for clarity: theoretical linguistics is not now and has never been and, I assume, never will be ontologically committed to named languages or languages in the plural. Like a note on the door to pay the gas bill, the translingual paradigm, from the perspectives of linguistics, serves as a reminder of this fact.

3 The Translingual Reduction 1.0 & 2.0

I want to emphasize this “bracketing” move on the part of the translingual paradigm, by calling in a sort of methodological reduction. This label deliberately borrows from the phenomenological tradition, since I see study of types alone as a suspension of the folk of belief in named languages as operating in a way methodological analogous with phenomenological suspension of the belief in “direct access” to things in order to study phenomena from a so-called first person view. As already stated the translingual paradigm brackets out from above and below in order to i) unburden itself from unnecessary ontological commitments; and ii) to make a polemical argument against the tenacity of the folk belief in named languages to interfere with linguistic inquiry. Let’s call this: the “Translingual Reduction 1.0,” since, as will be shown shortly, I will propose an updated version of this reduction.

Even if the translingual paradigm successfully undermines the folk belief in named languages, it still seems to suffer from the methodological antinomies embedded in the two-tiered ontology of token and type. The translingual paradigm teaches that we can live without talk of named languages, and that, in fact, one is better off only using words like “English” or “Spanish” begrudgingly as shorthand or to refer to *social* realities, but not *linguistic* ones.

However, it does not appear that the translingual paradigm has forwarded a method of theorizing without talking about tokens. The translingual paradigm as such gives ontological pride of place to types without being able to bracket tokens out of the picture fully. For a methodologically consistent version of theoretical linguistics and the translingual paradigm in its current iteration, tokens still populate the linguistic cosmos, however, they do so from a marginal position. Much like a dull guest at a dinner party, the translingual paradigm knows that tokens are *there*, but have nothing to say to them. Named languages, on the other hand, never got the invitation to the party.

I take the main point of translingual paradigm as this: linguistics can generate lots of true statements regarding language, without ever referencing named languages. This ontological non-commitment to named languages does not suggest that this brand of linguistics only chooses to methodologically prioritize one phenomenon over another, in the same way that a cardiologist, say, prioritizes the study of the heart over brains and hearts and lungs, while still remaining (I assume!) ontologically committed to the fact that these organs are real. Instead, it stresses that, for methodologically consistent version of theoretical linguistics, named languages are nowhere to be found. It *is not* merely a question of giving pride of place to types over named languages. For theoretical linguistics, as the translingual paradigm would suggest, languages do not exist. End of story.

I see the complete non-existence of named languages and theoretical-methodological privileging of types over tokens as a move that I have called the “Translingual Reduction 1.0.” It strikes me as the through-line that ties together most if not all of the translingual paradigm from the perspective of theoretical linguistics. This reduction is generative however implicit in García & Li Wei, (2014). These authors are at pains to stress that within a speaker’s linguistic repertoires there are no divisions between languages. Instead, a repertoire is composed of linguistics features syncretically differentiated within unitary linguistic capacity. Or, as, elsewhere, García & Otheguy (2015) put it, a speaker has “a single array of disaggregated [linguistic] features that is always activated” (p. 644). The case of bilingualism illustrates this point. From the perspective of a linguistic theory, which has full ontological commitment to named languages, a bilingual operates with and toggles between two distinct linguistic systems. From a translingual perspective, which has *zero* ontological commitment to named languages, a bilingual operates with and selects from *one* distinct language system, populated by linguistic features traditionally associated with certain geographies and peoples (García & Li Wei, 2014, p. 14). I label this translingual position as “reductive,” in a sense fully restricted to the criterion of ontological commitment: the translingual paradigm markedly downsizes the number of entities in its ontological inventory. Languages—such as “English” or “Spanish”—are permanently bracketed out, and, as a result, the only entities that remain as real in the translingual picture are heteroglossic “linguistic features” and, I assume, the particular idiolects that idiosyncratically organize these linguistic features.

The term “reduction” also looks to stress the kind of theoretical-methodological symmetry that the translingual paradigm brings to the table. By admitting linguistic features and linguistic features alone into its ontological inventory, translingual talk, with one cut of Occam’s

razor, gets rid of all talk of languages, dialectics, registers, (in)correct usages, discursive conventions, slangs, genres, lexicons, idioms, and the like. Within the translingual cosmos, all of these things are off-loaded to the social-institutional realm. For the translingual paradigm the word shines forth as the word. All there is is language.

This theoretical-methodological reduction is also what generates the most consistent critique against the translingual paradigm: such an austere ontological commitment to linguistic features and linguistic features alone means that translingual talk *ex hypothesi* cannot include within its statements any statements that regard language as a social or political construct. Clearly, such a criticism is justified: the translingual paradigm cannot “see” language *qua* cultural artefact, because language *qua* cultural artefact explicitly is not counted in its ontological inventory. However, this critique does little to catch the translingual paradigm off guard. The lead proponents of this view that I here explicate (Cf. Otheguy et al., 2018) routinely acknowledge this difference: languages (plural) have a social-institutional reality, but such a reality has nothing to do with the sorts of linguistics structures (types) that linguistics have habitually studied.

Let’s bring this back a step towards Quine’s use of the criterion of ontological commitment as a methodology of adjudication between theories. The translingual paradigm has a very low ontological buy-in with high descriptive returns: it only assumes the reality of types linguistic features syncretically grouped by idiolects, and, in doing so, it yields a theory with a powerful descriptive capacity that also side-steps lots of inherited methodological antinomies around whether a “code-meshed” sentence includes one “language” or two. Holding fast to the level of types of linguistic features allows researchers and educators to understand linguistic

structure on its own terms without the cumbersome prerequisite of having to resolve structure into categories set out by the methodological a priori of named language.

This, for my money, is no small methodological-theoretical feat. However, as noted, the translingual paradigm can only reach this level of analysis through a perhaps rather severe methodological reduction: it has to bracket pretty much all things that folk off-the-cuff refer to as language in order to derive its singular plane of theoretical symmetry, wherein in all that is accounted for are abstract types of linguistic features and and abstract types of linguistic types alone.

The drive towards symmetry is what I count as the premise fundamental to the translingual paradigm, and it is what has produced what I see as the “Translingual Reduction 1.0.” By postulating total symmetry between any and all linguistic features, named languages are fully bracketed out and are not missed. Instead of a linguistic cosmos populated by discrete languages, we now have a linguistic cosmos populated by discrete features that can circulate freely between all linguistic repertoires. Conceptualizing language thus performs what amounts to a form of methodological symmetry called for both by assemblage theory (DeLanda, 2006) and Actor Network Theory (ANT) (Latour, 2005).

4.1 The Translingual Paradigm and Assemblages

Extrapolating out from Deleuze & Guattari's ontology (1987), assemblage theory enacts a methodological symmetry through conceiving of entities as constituted by external relationships instead of internal ones. This means that an entity has some sort of durable quality that can be separated out from one assemblage in which it takes root currently in order to re-associate with a different one. This way of looking at things stands in sharp contrast with defining things in terms of internal relationships, which sees entities as wholly determined by how a relatively fixed

system defines them (Cf. Chapter III Section 3.2). A thing, internally defined, cannot be separated out from set of relationships and join up with another (cf. Delanda, 2006, p. 10). Superficially, the translingual paradigm appears to track the same ontology of assemblage theory: “linguistic features” are not wholly defined by internal relationships, and, instead, they can break off, so to speak, and reform in any linguistic repertoire at any given time.

Describing his own take on Deleuze and Guattari’s ontology, Latour (1996) conceptualizes this type of methodological symmetry as: “a background / foreground reversal: instead of starting from universal laws--social or natural--and to take local contingencies as so many queer particularities that should be either eliminated or protected, [this method] starts from irreducible, incommensurable, unconnected localities, which then, at a great price, sometimes end into provisionally commensurable connections” (p. 3). Speaking broadly, the goal here is to level the phenomena under review down to a singular ontological plane: instead of starting with “structure,” on the one hand, and “instances” of structure, on the other, this move brackets out all talk of structures and instances of structures and assumes but one class of entities--what Latour would call “actants.”

As Spinuzzi (2014) notes, this methodological starting point can seem radical and austere. If assemblage / ANT talk is ontologically committed to solely one class of entity, then all that which we might call structure--languages, institutions, societies, for example--have be reassembled as assemblages of actants (Latour, 2005). In a maximal version of ANT, there is no ontological difference made between human and non-human actants as a method to avoid embedded antinomies in social theory “by applying the same concepts and vocabularies across the entire actor-network” (Spinuzzi, 2008, p. 41).

I have argued that the translingual paradigm can be understood in two related senses: i) a move to unburden linguistics from any ontological commitment to named languages; and ii) as a result of this motive, a drive towards methodological symmetry, which can be closely associated with the ontologies of assemblage theory and ANT in the above paragraph. However, if one takes complete methodological symmetry as an end goal, then the translingual paradigm could be updated.

That is, although it has reduced down its ontological inventory to that of linguistic features and the idiolects that assemble them, say, it still assumes the two-tiered ontology of token and type. This observation regarding the translingual paradigm imputes that when translingual talk uses the descriptive “linguistic” it, in fact, refers to types and not tokens. This must be the case, if statements like the following from Otheguy et al. (2018) are to be taken at face value: “We[...]use linguistic system to refer to the individual’s practice-based stock of lexical and structural features that in part make possible linguistic communication, and human interaction more broadly” (p. 5). If a speaker’s “linguistic system” is her “stock of lexical and structural features,” this then implies that such a stock is comprised of durable entities that subtends the speaker’s actual utterances, in other words, a collection of linguistic types made manifest daily in actual linguistic tokens. However, I suggest that the translingual paradigm can ontologically downsize one step further. The “Translingual Reduction 2.0,” is as follows: a hypothetical linguistic ontology that brackets out all talk of named languages *and* types. It does away with languages (plural) qua the reality of named languages and language (singular) qua abstract types of linguistic features. As I explain below, it is wholly focused on the performative, and, hypothetically, only assumes the performative as real.

5 Revisiting Rhetoric

SAT makes two enduring theoretical-methodological contributions that I want to highlight as two distinct theses. The first I will call the “linguistic leveling” thesis. Linguistic leveling sharply blurs the boundaries between text and context. With ANT in mind, I call this leveling because it contends that what is linguistic and what is non-linguistic can not be adjudicated before the fact. I also take this as the essential insight of Wittgenstein’s use of the *Sprachspiel*. The coinage of this term assumes that verbal semantic content is of a piece with any other actant involved in the situatedness of the performative, even if verbal content can be isolated and described within the vocabularies of theoretical linguistics.

Methodologically, the *Sprachspiel* “levels” every bit of of the speech act to a self same plane of significance: gestures, mouth sounds, and ceremonial ritual all constitute a singularized “grammatical” field: context is a constitutive and essential part of the productive complex of discourse. This thesis represents one of the main takeaways of Chapter I: what has most often been taken as language’s internal significant content is ontologically equalized with and made of a piece with the pragmatic conditions of language’s average everyday use. This thesis is indicative of Wittgenstein’s now notorious imperative in the *Philosophical Investigations*: to discover the meaning of a phrase or a concept or a word, a philosopher need not theoretically hang it out to dry, but rather *look* towards its success conditions embedded in mundane and highly routinized instances of its issuance (1953, §59). In many ways, this very “looking,” by definition, *levels out* linguistics by assuming no methodological distinction between *langue* and *parole*, as in Saussurean linguistics (1919).

I by no means deny that the linguistic object that theoretical linguistics studies can in fact be individuated as a field of productive theoretical inquiry. I only suggest that this linguistic object, following out from the premise of linguistic leveling, could be productively viewed as

ontologically derived from a lived webbing of average everyday usages. I, thus, view SAT as holding the key to understanding what are the theoretical-methodological possibilities that remain underexplored for the translingual paradigm. SAT provides a way to think through a hypothetical linguistic ontology that would ground translingual talk as a methodological-theoretical reduction fully centered on the performative. The translingual paradigm as it stands denies utterly the existence of named languages by postulating a linguistic ontology that *only* admits “linguistics features” and their idiosyncratic groupings. However, in this stage of methodological-theoretical reduction, the translingual paradigm still assumes the rather static picture of theoretical linguistics: atemporal types and temporal tokens. The reduction that I will suggest, by solely assuming the reality of performatives, brackets out the atemporality of types in order to depict with greater accuracy the temporal repetition of language and in order to develop a fuller picture of speaker agency.

In Chapter I, I made the case that rhetoric, in a certain sense, is just the study of perlocutionary performatives, because rhetoric is a performative that has a practical but yet-to-be-conventionalized intention sighted. It would seem, then, that a complete reduction of the translingual paradigm would need to look towards perlocutionary performatives as the most promising candidate for as a single entity to describe linguistic practice. I say this because it is only in perlocution that a model of performativity can be found that does not ex hypothesi rely on some sort of type / token distinction in order to theorize the conditions of performatives’ intelligibility. As I develop below, perlocutionary or rhetorical performatives can be understood within a singularized plane of temporality. Before articulating this argument, I explore some of the methodological implications generated by linguistic levelling.

5.1 Leveling out

Building out from SAT, I propose a hypothetical linguistic ontology that flattens out the type / token ontological distinction described in the first part of this chapter. Instead of having types *and* tokens, there is now only “tokens” in a flattened-out linguistic paradigm. However, this preceding formulation is misleading on at least two counts: i) talk of tokens without its ontological partner is misleading; and ii) “tokens” still point solely to verbal language. In working through the implications of a second translingual reduction, I postulate a new methodological move for the translingual paradigm that holds fast to the performative as the primary unit of phenomenal analysis, and only arrives at abstract types of linguistic features, much later on in the game.

By and large, I count this as a reversal. The standard picture of the relationship between language and context imagines abstract types of linguistic features as the engine of the car, and speech acts as the trips that the car makes. Theoretical linguists study the engine. The rest of us study the trips. Clearly, this metaphor gives pride of place to abstract types. A car *needs* an engine to be a car, but it does not need to make any particular trip. Abstract types are the essential attributes of this entity called language, while speech acts are accidental attributes of it.

Such pride of ontological place that theoretical linguistic gives to abstract types over speech acts is consistent with its methodological reduction and the ontological commitments of its scientific paradigm. To impute that the theories of the Chomskys and the Saussures of the world are insufficient because they exclude pragmatic conditions of speech is to lose sight of the fact that such linguists never claimed to be studying such conditions; as theorists they arrived at their object of study through a series of lucid methodological decisions in order to isolate a particular entity for investigation and a particular metalanguage that describes the attributes of this entity.

However, such linguistics are open to the charge of smuggling in an entity methodologically derived from linguistic phenomena as generative or constitutive of this phenomena. Bourdieu consistently argues this point: those who discourse over sociolinguistic phenomena are in the habit of mistaking the vocabularies of description that are opposed top-down by a theorist as the structures that generate the phenomena down-top. To correct for this tendency, Bourdieu (1990) proposes that “it would be a considerable step forward if all would-be scientific discourse on the social world were preceded by a sign meaning ‘everything takes place as if...’ which, functioning in the same as quantifiers in logic, would constantly recall the epistemological status of such discourse” (p. 29). Such a sign would show structural vocabularies generated through the description of the social world always depends on a hypothetical a priori chosen by the observer in the development of this or that methodology. Thus, I continue to call my description of a one-tiered linguistic ontology hypothetical. I look to challenge the ontological pride of place of abstract types, without reifying my postulated methodological a priori as generative of phenomena I describe.

As opposed to types *and* tokens, I want to accent that this is a one-tiered ontology that has been completely singularized. To talk only about performatives is not merely to prioritize methodically them over linguistic structure or types. Such a move seemingly would do no little more than redefine the field of linguistic pragmatics. Instead a hypothetical one-tiered linguistic ontology would only admit one class of entities. Accordingly, It would account for all linguistic phenomena without recourse to hypothesizing another class of entities. Leveling, hence, is paradoxically extremely austere and flexible at one and the same time. It is austere because it only allows for one kind of entity, and it is flexible because the reality of this entity expands and

contracts so that its existential criteria can fully cover the diversity of the phenomena under investigation.

For example, type-token linguistics is apt to capture the durability of linguistic structure because it posits as real the separate entity of type which, by methodological definition, is durable across sites of enunciation in ways that tokens are not. As a methodological move, this entails the creation of new a methodological-semantic category within a theory's vocabulary, which thereby expands its ontology to include as real the entity referred to by said category. This way of doing things, however, is lamentably hydra-headed: soon, the world, at least methodologically speaking, is populated by as many things as there are possible descriptions of them.

This work of levelling is already underway. For instance, Agha's (2003) concept of linguistic "indexicality" suggests that, in place of viewing semantic content as a fixed value "internal" to linguistic features, meaning gravitates to linguistic features by virtue of speakers enacting similar linguistic features in similar performative contexts. The meaning of a linguistic feature is not an abstract and isomorphic type metaphysically tied to so many actual tokens. Instead, what we off-the-cuff call the meaning of linguistic features indexes how structurally similar performatives circulate in overlapping contexts. In his own way, Freire (2000) epitomizes this position when he reminds us that reading the word is always reading the world and vice versa. Agha's indexing claim understands semantics in a way that runs parallel to what I mean by linguistic levelling. And these concepts in turn run parallel to central tenet of Wittgenstein's later philosophy: that what is often taken as languages stabilized and isomorphic semantic content turns out to be something more like a highlight reel of its daily commute through "a complicated network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing" (1953, §66).

Linguistic leveling does not merely reverse Saussure's favoring of *langue* over *parole* by championing the putatively accidental over the putatively essential. Instead, linguistic leveling claims that what is accidental and what is essential *cannot* be adjudicated outright before the fact. Such arbitration--language goes *here*, context goes *there*--is funded by rather obvious tautologies that surreptitiously project arbitrary--"arbitrary" in the sense that definitional lines could be drawn otherwise--methodological assumptions regarding language *as* the generative principle of the theoretical object of study itself. Becker (1991) summarizes this idea well: "Structuralism [...] seems to confuse [...] the map and the territory, to assume that because you can describe something as a structure, that structure is somehow 'in' the phenomenon, innate, apart from the observer or the observer's language" (p, 34). By virtue of these lines of critique, theoretical linguistics might owe us an argument as to why we should *prima facie* think that language is, well, "language," in other words, why we should assume that language *ex vi termini* is abstract types of linguistic features.

Conversely, linguistic leveling mines into the uncritical linguistic / non-linguistic sorting by flattening out all discernible variables of speech acts down into a single semantic and syntactic plane. Provisionally, within this frame, mouth-sounds and jotted-marks are not only of a piece with gesture and corporeal expression, but they are also of a piece with "concrete" material objects--chairs, chalk boards, the Empire State Building—and with immaterial institutional roles and scripts—teachers and students, doctors and patients, pedestrians and drivers, politicians and citizens.

It could be said that theoretical linguists are *minimalists* when it comes to what to include under the theoretical umbrella concept that we call "language": they want to isolate out a system of meaningful types seen as a linguistic species of a more fundamental genius of logic. Taking

up the obverse position, those who profess linguistic levelling are *maximalists*: they want to de-privilege the concept “language” by distributing it across an axis of practical actions and ideological orientations and socio-political institutions until what folk call “language” dissipates utterly in the network of these terms. However, both the minimalists and the maximalists have to face down a methodological problem inherent in the side of the coin they take up. Structuralism not only has to justify its *exclusions* but it also must check itself from arriving an abstracted linguistic object completely removed from practical use, just as linguistic levelling not only has to justify its *inclusions*, but also must check itself from including the entirety of the cosmos as actively impinging on the intelligibility of a singular speech act. In a word: each camp bears its own unique burden of proof as to why their frame of analysis is justified.

In this hypothetical one-tiered linguistic ontology, the a priori theoretical work remains of defining the parameters of this entity, and what exactly statements that talk about performatives are ontologically committed to. A definitional argument for the performative started up in Chapter I in the process of developing a definitional argument for rhetoric. In describing classes of exigencies, I concluded that rhetorical performatives are future-looking in the way that conventional performatives are not, with the rider that such a demarcation will turn out to be a trap door. In pulling the level on this trap door in the next section, the goal is to show that temporality and temporality alone can not make the difference between rhetoric and non-rhetoric. In fact, the definition of rhetoric articulated in Chapter I will end up fitting all performatives, and, thus, I hope, delivering a definition of the performative that is completely *singular* and, hence, one-tiered.

5.2 One Tiered Ontology and Performatives

To start up this work, I begin by reading Butler's (1988) early work on the sex / gender binary part through the lens forwarded in Chapter I regarding conventional and rhetorical exigencies. In the introduction to this chapter, I wrote that the initial distinction proposed between conventional and rhetorical exigencies will turn out to be a trap door argument once sufficient pressure is applied to the term "conventional." What I meant by this is that analytical SAT assumes that a logic of speech acts is attainable because it also assumes methodologically that "conventional" denotes a *type*. Or, at the very least, in order to theorize the conventions of speech acts, SAT takes a synchronic snapshot of them: a move that methodologically talks as if conventions were abstract types. In this sense, the illocutionary performative could be said to be a token that instantiates its standardized conventions in a manner analogous to how the inscribed word-token "in" instantiates the word-type *in* at the beginning of this sentence.

Although analytical SAT shifts focus to the performative it often brings along with it the same methodological ontologies of linguistics. If one is after an illocutionary logic (cf. Searle & Vanderveken, 1985), then it would appear to follow that one is to study *types* or something that is ontologically type-like. Analytical SAT is clearly ontologically committed to types of speech acts, because it constantly quantifies over them. For instance, Searle's (1969) meticulous analysis of promise-making, I assume, is theorizing over a type of speech act and not any old token, just as Austin's (1962) analysis of marriage ceremonies and ship christenings, I assume, account for types and tokens. In chapter I, I, too, am at least provisionally committed to types of speech acts, as the analysis of this chapter continually quantifies over types of exigencies and performatives and not tokens of them.

Hence, a shift to performatives does not necessarily involve the methodological-ontological reduction that my argument calls for. One can talk about performatives as if they

were types with particular tokens that instantiate them, and this is often exactly what analytical SAT does. However, such a two-tiered ontology in the social realm of performativity can present jarring antinomies, since to theorize social conventions as if they were abstract types is, effectively, to erase all consideration of agency from one's theoretical-methodological vocabulary.

Once again, how the term “conventional” is defined set the stage for dividing up illocution and perlocution, and, in turn, helped to establish in my argument the difference between rhetorical and non-rhetorical performatives. An illocutionary performative terminates or exhausts fully a conventionalized speech act in which the ritualized conditions that establish the speech act success conditions can be wholly and completely secured in advance. On the other hand, a perlocutionary speech act attempts to pull off an effect for which there are no a priori guaranteed success conditions. For example, the speech act of “checkmate!” has explicitly articulated rules--the opponent's king is check and cannot move out of it—that determines the speaker's pronouncement of “checkmate!” as intelligible. The perlocutionary speech act of “Hey, I'll buy you lunch!” performed with the intention of getting a friend to help you move this Saturday has no set of before-the-fact codified “rules” that approach the level of explicit articulation that the rules of chess do. To summarize: checkmate is *conventional* and persuading your friend to help you move is *unconventional*. However, these examples are clearly cherry-picked: the task is now to question whether the line between the conventional and the unconventional, the illocutionary and the perlocutionary, is really so bright.

Rhetoric, I have argued, is a uniquely temporalized performative: it makes use of already established conventions for the sake of presently articulated affordances in the light of future goals. Rhetorical performatives thus map onto familiar linguistic tense patterns by virtue of

analogy: rhetoric makes use of what has been (perfect tense) for the sake of what is now available (present tense) in light of what is to come (future tense). In a word: rhetoric is a *tensed* performative.

Allow for one more cartographical move: rhetoric's tensed temporality also maps onto how the conventional-illocutionary and unconventional-perlocutionary pairings are divided. So far, the difference between rhetoric and non-rhetoric hinges on how many of the tripartite tenses--perfect / present / future--a given performative makes manifest. A conventional-illocutionary performative, viz., non-rhetoric for the nonce, *only* needs to fulfill the perfect and present tense criteria in order to be considered performatively successful. "Check mate!" relies on the perfect-tensed rules of chess to answer to a set of present-tense affordances. However, *without* any future-tensed "in-light-of-which" the proclamation "checkmate!" has yet to become rhetorical. On the other hand, an unconventional-perlocutionary performative, viz., rhetoric, is out to pull off the temporal hat-trick: it needs to fulfill the past, present, and future tensed criteria in order to be considered performatively successful. "Hey, I'll buy you lunch!" qua persuasion is made possible by perfect-tensed conventions in light for present-tense affordances *and* a future-tensed "in-light-of-which" projection of teloi. This definition establishes a premise from which a definitional conclusion follows: rhetoric is essentially marked out by its futurity. This, so far, is its clenching characteristic and what sets it apart from all other species of possible performatives. Or, to reprise a slogan from the previous chapter, rhetoric is *transcendental* since it is always *runs ahead of itself*.

I have claimed that the conventional-illocutionary performative lacks futurity, because, in a certain sense, this brand of speech act *prima facie* terminates or exhausts the ritualized conventions that establish the speech act as significant. Fulfilling this criteria is what makes it

illocutionary: once it is said, it is done. With no ulterior motive, a game of chess is totally terminated once one player performs the speech act of “checkmate!” within the appropriate circumstances.

Here comes the kicker: it may readily be objected that such a view of the conventional-illocutionary presupposes that the conventions that lend illocutionary speech acts their force exist outside of any sort of temporality. To draw the line between the conventional and the unconventional on the basis of futurity is to assume, and I shall soon argue erroneously, that illocutionary speech act conventions are a species of abstract *types* upon which *tokens* of actual illocutionary acts are patterned.

Let’s take a step back. I claimed that the difference between rhetoric and non-rhetoric is the presence of a future-tensed “in-light-of-which” projection of *telois*. On this account, all performatives share the perfect-tense and present-tense aspects. I tried to argue that it is only when a performative can be said to have non-codifiable future-looking effect sighted can it also be said to be properly rhetorical. However, this definitional argument smuggles in the assumption that the successful invocation of convention is not, at one and the same time, the successful *re*-invocation of past performatives. The belief that normalized convention lacks futurity posits the idea that the conventional type and actual token have no causal-dialectical relationship with each other.

However, In reading Rickert’s (2013) notion of “ambient” rhetoric, I claimed that rhetoric’s futurity is based on its power to *re*-present, *re*-direct, *re*-veal, *re*-move etcetera. Rhetoric is defined by its capacity to “re” the world around us; rhetoric is the “re-ness” of discourse. However, what happens if invocation is always already *re*-invocation? Hard upon the heels of this premise does it not follow that *all* speech acts turn out to be, in fact, rhetorical?

I began my argument by tacitly implying that burden of proof lies upon illocutionary acts to show if and when their effects supercede the conventional. Now, I want to take up the opposing horn of the argument and claim the obverse: if conventional invocation is always already *re*-invocation, then the burden of proof also shifts: now it is essential that an illocutionary act *does not* exceed itself, that its issuance is not always *re*-instating its conventional possibilities for future realizations. This reversal of methodological emphasis suggests different way to temporize illocutionary speech acts so that they include a future-tense aspect even within performances that merely seem to terminate a priori established conventions.

5. 3 Butler's Performative

Here, I am still operating on large-scale theoretical level. To drill down into the substratum of the point I aim to get across, let's now finally turn to Butler. Butler's articles (1986 & 1988) on Simone de Beauvoir and phenomenology demonstrate a clear but perhaps tacit affinity with SAT and its use of the performative as a way into understanding social ritual and convention.

Butler's work on performativity, I also claim, evinces within a different discourse what the one-tiered ontology of linguistic leveling might begin to look like. This is the case because Butler's work on gender performativity needs to prove that i) that the token of gender performativity is not and never was a manifestation of an abstract gender type; that ii) tokens of gender performatives can reproduce sufficiently durability in order to produce the *impression* of an abstract gender type; and iii) since no abstract gender type, in fact, exists, gender performatives can always be *re*-directed and *re*-appropriated. Hence, I read Butler as a gesture towards a singularized ontological field of performatives, that can both account for durability and rapid fire change.

Let's begin with the opening lines of Butler's (1988) argument. In the strawman account, "biological" sex (note the scare quotes here) is pre-figured as the brute fact upon which the cultural institution of gender is built: the factual body remains outside of the temporal plane of actual performatives, waiting to be taken up, as it were, by interpretations that run across an axis of differentiation in accordance with particular historical epochs and cultures. Thus, sex, putatively, *patterns* gender in the same way that the "English" word-type *gender*, putatively, *patterns* English word-token "gender," herein inscribed in this sentence.

The grammar of the transitive verb "to pattern" is instructive here. If "to pattern" is taken to signify the process by which something is organized and made intelligible, then the assumptions of the uncritical belief that sex *patterns* gender come into brighter light. Once again in the strawman account, sex *patterns* gender because as an a priori epistemological category funded by a factive-biological ontology of the body, *sex*—and *not* gender—establishes the pre-discursive criteria for the discursively intelligible articulation of genders. In a word, sex is a concrete datum "outside" of language. Gender is what culture makes out of it.

The above account is the thesis. The following account is the antithesis. Butler (1988) challenges the belief that sex *patterns* gender by reversing it: gender, as it turns out, now *patterns* sex. There are a lot of implications here, so I want to move through this antithesis step by step. To zoom out a level, I take Butler to be arguing that types do not *pattern* tokens. Instead, tokens *pattern* types. This idea, I hope, rings familiar with Agha's (2003) "semantic indexicality" and Wittgenstein's (1959) "family resemblances," both of which claim that what is often taken as the isomorphic semantic content of the word is, in fact, the *effect* of its diverse pragmatic deployments (and not the *cause* of it).

To perform this reversal of patterning is also to make an ontological claim about abstract types that evokes a hypothetical one-tiered ontology akin to the concept of linguistic levelling. The premise that “tokens *pattern* types” (and not vice versa) de-privileges abstract types qua an a priori epistemological category existent prior to the performative by leveling types down to the selfsame ontological plane as actual tokens. Returning back to Butler’s schema, “biological” sex (scare quotes still operative here) qua type is reduced to the selfsame ontological plane that the performative token gender has always occupied.

From this premise, there lies a yet-to-be-fleshed-out temporal element of this discussion. Types, if they are to be given ontological pride of place, also receive a temporal privilege. Types are exempted from temporality (and spatiality) in a way that tokens are not. Still thinking along with Butler, the putative type of sex along with the putative word-type “sex”—as brute datum and abstract object respectively—are ontologically designated as entities beyond the immediate confines of diachronic revision. To level down types into the same ontological plane as tokens is ipso facto to situate them within the same temporal sequence: it is to suggest that what is off-the-cuff understood as the immutable substance identity of types is the stabilized mimetic effect yielded through repeated temporal performance of tokens.

Butler (1988) markedly suggests this conception of temporality, when she writes: “Gender is instituted through the stylization of the body, and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self. This formulation moves the conception of gender off the ground of a substantial model of identity to one that requires a conception of a constituted *social temporality*” (p. 519). In the standard type-token two-tiered ontology, along with the strawman account of sex and gender, one would understand what Butler calls here “bodily gestures,”

“movements,” and “enactments of various kinds” as token manifestations patterned after or patterned by a prototypical sex or naturalized gender.

Going back to linguistics briefly helps to illustrate this point. In the two-tiered ontology of type and token, a word-token can be pronounced or inscribed in a multitude of ways—just imagine the amount of linguistic accents and written fonts that exist—but in order to be intelligible as a valid token of a particular type, the token must invoke a certain degree of structural similarity, whether by virtue of homology or analogy, that matches up with the supposed structural integrity of the abstract type.

Butler’s main argumentative line aims to level the type down to the same ontological and temporal plane as the token, a move, by virtue of Occam’s razor, would eliminate, seemingly, talk of types altogether. It would also unburden Butler from including types in her ontological inventory. In this seemingly one-tiered ontology, instead of temporal tokens invoking atemporal types, tokens *re*-invoke the memory—for lack of a better word—of past performances and set out the expectations for future ones. Butler (1988) once again:

Significantly, if gender is instituted through acts, which are internally discontinuous, then the *appearance of substance* is precisely that, a constructed identity, a performative accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, come to belief and perform in the mode of belief. If the ground of gender identity is the stylized repetition of acts through time, and not a seemingly seamless identity, then the possibilities of gender transformation are to be found at the arbitrary relation between such acts, in the possibility of a different sort of repeating, in the breaking or subversive repetition of that style. (p. 520)

If the two-tiered ontology of types and tokens maintains that the type is the static ontological ground that underpins the enactment of temporalized types, then Butler's one-tiered ontology problematizes this relationship. For Butler, performative tokens do not signify in relation to types. Types do not set the conditions of intelligibility for the performance of tokens. Instead, performative tokens only mean in relation to another in a temporalized sequence. The performatives that come before, no matter how conventional, pushes forward in order to establish the conventions for the performatives that come after. Hence, instead of a performative token's *temporalized* structure in some sense mirroring the *atemporal* structure of the abstract type, a performative token *only* gains its significance by mirroring the structure of the temporalized structure of the performative token that came at the time step before it. Each preceding token's structure sets the conditions of intelligibility for the next. And so on.

This is what I take Butler to mean when she talks about the "possibility of a different sort of repeating." If a performatives token's significant structure is only significant in light of the expectations set out by structure of the token that came before it, then the composition of said structure is inherently open to temporal modification and contestation, both by the processes of aleatoric iteration and deliberate "mis"-invocations.

5.3.1 Rhetorical Temporality and One-Tiered Ontology

I have suggested that rhetoric is tensed discourse that is primarily defined by its futurity. In stage-one of my argument in Chapter I, I drew the line between convention-illocution and un-convention-perlocution based on the criterion of futurity. Still in stage-one, convention-illucution, viz., non-rhetoric, maps onto only the perfect and present tense aspects: the realization of the appropriate utterance terminates or exhausts the normalized conditions that fund its

intelligibility. I also depicted that unconviction-perlocution, viz., rhetoric proper, includes the future-tense aspect that non-rhetoric, by definition, excludes.

However, in reading Butler through the lens of type and token, I hope now to illustrate what Butler's theory of performativity contributes to my working theory of rhetoric, and how, my theory of rhetoric, in turn, can develop further a hypothetical levelled-out linguistic ontology. As noted above, analytical SAT is open to the critique that it naturalizes social convention by offloading its roles and scripts to the realm of the synchronic (Cf. Bourdieu, 1990 & Butler, 1997). SAT gains a logics of the speech act qua a knowledge-*that* (Ryle, 2009) by performing a *temporal* bifurcation of the speech act into a conventional type and a performance token of that self same type. In other words, to derive the logical schemas for performatives, one must assume two different yet parallel temporal planes: the static, logically-bound plane of the type and the temporal plane of manifest performative token.

Here comes stage-two of the argument: If, à la Butler, the structure of a performative token does not bear any structural relation to a universal type, but rather only bears a structural similitude to the implied expectations of the structure of the performative token that temporarily preceded it, then all performative tokens, by the same hand, include a future-tense aspect as well, no matter if they are conventional-illocutionary or unconventional-perlocutionary. If performative tokens, and not abstract types, are that which pattern the conditions that mark out the conditions of intelligibility for other performative tokens, then all performatives, even if they are in their stage-one guise are classed as conventional-illocutionary or unconventional-perlocutionary, are, in fact, properly rhetorical.

Hence, stage-two of this argument is where the trap door lets out. In Chapter I, I was at pains to show that a meaningful distinction should be made between what I called conventional

and rhetorical exigencies. To rehearse: i) a conventional exigency is the class of exigencies that is precipitated by and is wholly exhausted within its conventional (viz., illocutionary) conditions of use; and ii) a rhetorical exigency is the class of exigencies that is precipitated by a need that is both exterior to and is not wholly exhausted by conventional conditions of use. Moves of chess that are properly strategic answer to the internal exigencies constituted by its conventions, whereas my motives for winning (or throwing) a game of chess answer to an exigency that is not a priori contained by the game's conventions. Prima facie, the point of this definitional argument was to carve disciplinary space for the study of rhetoric. I wanted to argue that if "rhetoric" were solely to stand for the study of situated, pragmatic speech, then SAT already described this field of study. However, if rhetoric is to stand a particular class of speech acts that are temporalized in way that I claim is unique to rhetoric, then the term, in turn, also cordons off a unique area of study.

By pulling the lever on the trap door, I double back and now seek to reclaim for rhetoric the ground that I originally ceded to SAT. By virtue of the type-token argument that is starting up above what is at first-blush seen as a brand of conventional-illocutionary collapses into the unconventional-perlocutionary. SAT in its analytical iteration fails to account for the unconventionality of conventionality, and, in doing so, mistakenly privileges the illocution as the paradigmatic speech act over perlocution.

Perhaps all speech acts are rhetorical. This would not be due the fact that all speech acts are always situated. Instead, this would be due to the fact that all speech acts, even those that seem rigidly conventional, fulfill the temporal hat trick—perfect, present, future—which I have claimed as the constitutive criterion of a rhetorical performative. if the abstract type is levelled down to the temporal plane of the temporal token, then all performatives make use of already

established conventions for the sake of present affordances in the light of future goals. All performatives are future-tensed, not just rhetorical ones, because, as I aimed to show above, each realized performative token sets the stage, i.e., temporally composes the conditions of intelligibility, for the next. In a very loose Derridean framework, what I claim evokes the concept of “citationality.” Old text becomes the next context for new text.

6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the translingual paradigm is methodologically reductive in a sense strictly limited to Quine ontological commitment: whereas monolingualism is committed to include named languages in its ontological inventory, translingualism has no such commitments. In a sense, then, translingual theory is reductive: since it assumes fewer entities that need to be real so that its theoretical statements might be true. This, once again, I take as an explicitly articulated version of an assumption that has long been critical to theoretical linguistics, that types and types alone are the study of linguistics proper.

Translingual talk’s low-cost ontology lights up the world as containing linguistic features that freely circulate between the repertoires of speakers. In a sense, it assumes an ontology very much in line with those of assemblage theory (DeLanda, 2006) and ANT (Latour, 2005). Both of these ontologies, I have argued, furthermore represent a drive towards methodological symmetry: they aim to assume one entity and one entity alone in their ontological inventory, that which is often referred to by a term of utmost generality, the “actant.”

I have tried to show that, although translingual theory is reductive in a drive towards methodological symmetry, it is not reductive enough. Translingual theory is still, by and large, committed to types *and* tokens, a two-tiered ontology that preserves the theoretical-methodological antinomies embedded in the basic scientific paradigm of structural linguistics.

Hence, my goal in this chapter has been to begin to elucidate a completely unified and singularized linguistic ontology, one that is completely “levelled off” and makes no a priori distinction between the linguistic and the non-linguistic, nor between types and tokens.

In this move towards a completely symmetrical ontology, I have relied heavily on my reading Wittgenstein’s (1959) notion of the *Sprachspiel* and Butler’s (1988) theory of gender performativity. Both of these philosophers provide a path for me to claim that the distinction that I was at pains to make in Chapter I between the conventional-illocutionary and the unconventional-perlocutionary is, ultimately, incoherent. This is due to the fact that, without recourse to abstract types, a steadfast division between the conventional and the unconventional cannot be maintained. I hope to have shown, at least provisionally, that all performatives evince the type of temporality that I originally claimed to be the clinching characteristic of rhetoric. If all performatives are continually setting the stage--constituting the conditions of intelligibility--for the the performatives that come next, then all performatives are also properly future tensed.

The point of all this to define a singular entity that will constitute the singular ontological commitment of what I see as the “Translingual Reduction 2.0” and a completely ontologically symmetrical methodology. This fully temporalized performative I see as the beginnings as a way out of the cul-de-sac of antinomies in linguistics in which structure and agency, type and token, theory and pragmatics go round and round and round. The work of Chapter III will be just this: an attempt to i) flesh out more what a fully temporalized performative might look like; and ii) to consider in a detailed fashion what the ramifications area of a theoretical-methodological vocabulary that really does just assume one entity.

Chapter III: Duplication and Incommensurability

1 Introduction

A translingual approach to language and linguistics is founded on the claim that languages do not exist as discrete linguistic systems that can be referenced by words like “English” and “Spanish,” for example. This is the big takeaway of Chapter II. If there *are* languages in the plural, then a translingual view of language and linguistics cannot even get out of the conceptual starting blocks. A la Otheguy et al. (2015 & 2018), on a purely “linguistic” level languages just aren’t there: all that is to be found are linguistic features that circulate freely without any necessary membership in bounded and self-contained linguistic systems of named languages. A translingual paradigm bears zero ontological commitment to named languages. It is only ontological committed to “linguistic features,” idiosyncratically organized by the idiolects of unique speakers.

It goes without saying that how this claim is to be ultimately cashed out ultimately hinges on what the terms of the claim are taken to signify. At the very least, the proposition, “languages do not exist,” should be read as two-fold, both in terms of i) the direct argumentative content of the claim; and ii) in a self-reflective sense regarding what is meant by “language” and what is meant by “exist.”

This chapter’s first goal is to make sense of this claim by attempting to disambiguate and define the multiple senses that are packed into the common use of the word “language.” Then, I move on by elucidating what types of existence might be proper to an entity like “language.” Finally, I discuss the valence of “to exist” is to be worked out, if the claim that language exist but languages do not is to subtend all subsequent arguments within the translingual paradigm. In

thinking through these questions, I present a detailed reading of Frege's theory of sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung). I also once again rely heavily on the later philosophy of Wittgenstein as both a method to think through what entities are taken as existent within discourses about language and through Wittgenstein-esque examples and thought experiments based on what I take as later Wittgenstein's linguistic ontology.

Even if it is has yet to be formally codified as such, the translingual turn raises what is fundamentally an ontological question regarding language and languages. How language (singular) is to be defined as to what it *is* and what it *is not* will ultimately set the stage for whether there *are* languages (plural) or there *are not*. Below, I will show that "language" (singular) should be disambiguated into at least two senses: what I will provisionally call language a) and language b). In a bit of foreshadowing: language a) will refer to the Sprachspiel (Cf. Chapter I; Glock, 1996, p. 193; Hintikka & Hintikka, 2007) and the capacity of speakers to play them. It will also refer to the logical structure of the "moves" generated by the constitutive rules of Sprachspiele, their overlap inter se, and their "family resemblances" (Wittgenstein, 1953, §67). Next, language b) will refer to the linguistic "packing" of such logical structure, that is, how this structure can be expressed in manifold ways . In the exegesis that proceeds below, I move in reverse order. First, I define language b). Then, I go on to language a). The distinction that I make between language a) and language b) is not value-free. Sprachspiele, on my account, constitute what is off-the-cuff taken as language and not vice versa. The labels a) and b) are meant to assign priority: Sprachspiele are the ground floor of "language." However, I move in reverse order and describe language b) first, because I take this definition as the standard view of what language is and languages are. From explicating the standard first, I hope my arguments regarding the constitutive nature of Sprachspiele will be made clearer.

Both of these senses, I believe, pick out a particular type of human activity or understanding, which more often than not, are all crowded in under the umbrella term “language.” This chapter wagers that each sense of language, although perhaps interrelated, has its own *distinctive* ontological properties. These linguistic properties, in turn, will rest on whether “language” in these different senses is made up of internal or external relations (cf. section 3.2 below). One of the big takeaways of this chapter is the conclusion that language a) is defined by and large by an *incommensurability* that obtains inter se Sprachspiele. Whereas language b) is defined by and large by an *arbitrariness* and the possibility of what I will term *linguistic duplication*. If these disambiguations of the term “language” end up bearing weight, the pay-off will be that perhaps most of the methodological ambiguity circulating around “language” will be shown to be a product of using one theoretical-methodological vocabulary derived from one sense of language in order to talk about another. My hope in displaying these different senses, once again in an analytical move a la Wittgenstein, is not to solve the antinomies embedded in translingual paradigm for language and linguistics, but rather *dissolve* them, that is, show them to be the result of statements that are, at rock bottom, theoretically inconsistent.

2 Language b)

2.1 Preliminary Problems

Imagine this: I am crossing the street in Madrid; not paying complete attention, I stumble upon what I take to be a two way stop, with no traffic light. I come to a full stop cautiously at the curb before crossing. I look in both directions before stepping foot the street. That’s when I notice it: a red octagon hung from a pole about two meters high on two opposing sides of the intersection. “A stop-sign,” I tell myself, coding the the picked-out item within terms with which I am already familiarized. I realize I don’t know the word for “stop-sign” in “Spanish,” so I take

out my phone and look it up: “señal de stop,” “señal de pare,” “el stop.” None of which feel satisfactory. I’ll have to ask someone. But, sure enough, cars do in fact come to a halt upon seeing the sign, and, thus, my initial hypothesis is verified: it is, in fact, a two-way stop, like the ones we have back home in New York. But, following hard upon this realization, I notice the smallest difference: within the red octagon, it reads “pare” instead of reading “stop.” Well, I’m in Spain, after all, right? They speak “Spanish,” here, right? And “English” is a different “language” than “Spanish,” isn’t it? So it logically follows that here they say “pare” instead of saying “stop” just as in New York they say “stop” instead of “pare.” What’s the big deal?

A red octagon in an intersection plays a role in a particular form of life. Without the automotive industry, petroleum drilling, and places to be, there would be no such entities as stop signs; it is a node in a network of cultural-historical significance that only makes sense in and through that network. Dice, for example, in Backgammon tell its players how many spaces a piece can move in a turn. The coin toss at the beginning of a football game (soccer or American) tells us who will possess the ball first. And, like these examples, a stop sign is a function of a rule of the legal-driving game. A skilled driver who only speaks “English” will stop at the red octagon that reads “pare” in Madrid, just as much as the skilled driver who only speaks “Spanish” will do the same at an intersection in New York. It would seem, then, that what is most often isolated off-the-cuff as ‘language’--the linguistic features “pare” and “stop”--are significantly the least important prop upon the stage.

As a counter-example picture this: in an alien culture that is neither Madrid nor New York, there are a folk who play the legal-driving game, too. Just like our game, there are roads and lanes and rules and fines. However, in this folk’s version of the game, at two-way stops where a stop sign would be placed, they represent the “rule of stop” with a purple triangle instead

of a red octagon. In this version of game, it would befall both the “English”-only speaking driver and the “Spanish”-only speaking driver to perform a genuine act of translation this time around. Perhaps both would think to themselves: “For this folk, purple triangle means red octagon which means ‘Stop!’ or ‘¡Pare!’” Let’s complicate this hypothetical situation one step further: suppose that in this game of stop-and-go that uses purple triangles instead of red octagons turns out to be a “bilingual” one. All signs are written in “English” and “Spanish”: every purple triangle that functions as a stop sign contains the words “stop” *and* “pare.” However, would it not still be the case that the New Yorke driver would find it easier to drive in Madrid and our Madrid driver find easier to drive in New York, while *both* of them would find it hard to drive in this culture, even if our drivers do not speak the “language” of New York or Madrid respectively?

The above is a rather trivial example that I hope to use to illustrate a less trivial point. Much like the illustration of rock-paper-scissors qua Sprachspiel in Chapter I, the example aims to provoke the question: what is the “language” really being spoken here? In the Sprachspiel of legal-driving it would seem that the “real” language in play is that of shapes and colors, *not* the linguistic features tied to the named languages of “Spanish” and “English.” If a driver has incorporated how these shapes and colors are related to the rules of the game, she now “speaks” the language of the legal-driving Sprachspiel. In this restricted example, the verbal languages of “English” and “Spanish” are profoundly demoted: they play an ancillary role, at best, to the more fundamental legal-driving language of shapes and colors.

In this practical context, the words “pare” and “stop” seem to turn out to be utter *linguistic duplicates*. It would take a highly sophisticated argument in order to claim that the *sense* or *perception* or *one’s take* on the situation is in anyway changed or modified or altered by painting the word “stop” in the red octagon instead of “pare” or vice versa. Nothing is here lost

in “translation.” I defend this conclusion taken out one step further: replacing a red octagon for a purple triangle and vice versa also affects no loss in the drivers’ feel for the game. Once the new sign is slotted into the game-role-to-be-played and its web of constitutive rules, gameplay takes once again over and resumes its normality, so to speak.

The point that the legal-driving Sprachspiele example illustrates is what I take to be one of the basic intuitions packed into the term “language”: Languages (plural) are *different* systems of signification or representation that are used to describe the *same* thing.

Let’s formulate this ideas as the “different word / same thing” thesis. This thesis codifies the assumption that languages are discovered when *it can be coherently maintained that two different signs refer to the exact same thing and they do so in the exact same way* (for a clarification of what I mean “by in the exact same way” cf. the discussion of Frege’s notion of sense and referent in section 2.2 below). Within the conceptual confines of this thesis, I *know* that I am in the presence of *two* languages when I encounter a pair of linguistic duplicates that pick out the *same* entity in the *same* way. Whether you call it a “martillo” or call it a “hammer,” for example, I can only locate a “linguistic” difference here; I struggle to find a conceptual one.

Based on this thesis, multiple languages thus mean multiple signs for a single referent. Or perhaps it is better said the other way around: multiple signs for a single referent leads to the belief that multiple languages must exist, too. However, I show below that translingual thinking proves this to be a fallacy. There can be multiple signs for a single referent without an ipso facto methodological-ontological commitment to multiple languages.

The “different word / same thing” thesis leads one to think that inter-language translation is made possible by virtue of there being a tall ontological brick wall between words and things. (On the side of the world, there are things and facts about things, what Wittgenstein of the

Tractatus would label as “all that is the case” [1921, §1]). On the side of language, there reside the linguistic systems composed from the shattered pieces of the Tower of Babel—the so many “languages” speakers use to refer themselves to the world. Translation, then, would be the act of inter-correlating the respective features of respective linguistic systems by lining up the identical referential relationships that obtain to the same things inter-languages (cf. Chapter I’s discussion on translation). “Pare” and “Stop” and a red octagon and a purple triangle all *refer to* the same element in the legal-driving Sprachspiel. Perhaps they do so in unique ways, but, superficially, the referential relationship appears identical or isomorphic throughout.

Without yet defending or critiquing this picture of a language, I continue illustrating it. Languages in this sense are defined by a form of linguistic duplication that could be called *inter-language identity*. To demonstrate this point, let’s assume that α , β , φ and δ are all signs that refer to the same thing X . If these signs all refer to the *exact same* aspect of the *exact same* X in the *exact same* way, then all these signs are also, linguistically at least, identical to one another. Therefore, the statement $\alpha = \beta$ is identical to the statement $\beta = \varphi$ just as much as the statement $\varphi = \delta$ is identical to $\delta = \alpha$ and just as much as *all* four listed statements are identical with one another or any other possible permutation.

In contrast, in a logically perfect language, precisely that which early Wittgenstein was after in the *Tractatus*, each unique object would also have its own unique name. In this linguistic-logical utopia, it would also follow that there would be no languages in the restricted sense of the terms sketched out above, since *no* linguistic duplication would occur.

Again, the “different word / same thing” thesis appears to capture a basic intuition regarding what language is in general and what *a* language is in particular. This account tracks a basic premise in the philosophy of language: a sentence, an utterance, and a proposition are

three distinct linguistic elements. Based on this premise, the proposition is the logical structure that represents a state-of-affairs; the sentence is the combination of linguistic features that package the proposition; and the utterance is the actual physical event of linguistic performance. This provides a picture of language wherein the component parts are nested together like Russian dolls: the proposition gets packed into the sentence and the sentence gets backed into the performative verbal / written utterance (cf. Searle, 1969). McGinn (2015) illustrates well this common starting point for the philosophy of language. Taking the apparent propositional identity “French” and “English” sentences “la neige est blanche” and “the snow is white” for granted, he then concludes: “Despite the fact that these two different sentences are made up of different words in two distinct languages, they still have the same meaning, and thus express the same proposition” (p. 2). McGinn’s view here is emblematic of the “different word / same thing” thesis. *Prima facie*, these two sentences are clearly different *linguistically* but an extremely sophistic argument would be required to argue that they express something different *factually*. In this sense, then, a clear-cut case of “linguistic duplication” is presented: these sentences have an identical “meaning” but are couched in the two distinct linguistic systems of “French” and “English.”

This intuition regarding language makes sentences and the elements that compose them more or less arbitrary: if and only if identical propositional meaning can be said to obtain between different sentences, then how the proposition is linguistically packaged is a matter of second order importance. If a speaker understands “French” and “English,” then the choice between “la neige est blanche” and “the snow is white” becomes a matter of taste or social propriety instead of a matter of logical or expressive necessity.

However, let's test out some sophistic lines of argument and see what counterexamples begin to crop up. One could argue that, at least, the nouns and the adjectives in this examples might refer to the same things, but they, in fact, have different senses. Perhaps, in the collective French and English way of thing "neige" and "snow" and "blanche" and "white" evoke a different affective response or pick out slightly different entities in ways that remain embedded in the respective linguistic systems of "French" and "English." An "English" person fundamentally formed by "English" can map "snow" and "white" onto "neige" and "blanche" but he will not incorporate all the associations and connections built into these "French" words. And, vice versa, the same goes for the "French" person learning "English." Or it could be even worse. Perhaps it is the case that each individual speaker has her own set of associations build into words like "snow" and "niege" and "white" and "blanche," even if when they utter propositions under the right circumstances they refer to the same logical state-of-affairs. A Texan has a different relationship to "snow" than a New Yorker. "blanche" means something different to a Parisian art student than it does to truck driver in Burgundy.

It seems like this sophistic argument is beginning to become, well, less sophisticated. If these maximal accounts of linguistic difference are accepted, then all possible content in the "different word / same thing" thesis seems to be evacuated. All words, even the "same" words in the "same" languages are denied identity inter se, and are, thereby, converted into webs of approximate synonyms.

"Snow" and "neige" and "white" and "blanche" are not the same for me as they are for you, even if we easily use such words between each other to pick out and refer to actual things and events. This maximal account seems to be from where such slogans as "all communication is translation" comes. Speaker A is always "translating" her affective relationship with language to

Speaker B, since, by definition, each individual has a stock idiosyncratic relations that link up with a common set of words.

However, let's take this line of thought out one step further. The above account would argue that perhaps there is *no* linguistic duplication between “snow” and “neige” and “white” and “blanche,” because i) particular cultures are deposited in the respective linguistic systems of “English” and “French”; or ii) each speaker has her own idiosyncratic relationship with linguistics features, and, thus, these example words mean different things for different speakers, even if they refer to the same phenomenon.

In both cases, none of these above example words would demonstrate sufficient evidence for the presence of distinct languages, if exact linguistic duplication is the clinching criterion for having two languages (or three or four, etcetera). Once again, instead of being duplications, they are converted into synonyms: “white” is to “blanche” what “purple” is to “mauve”; “snow” is to “neige” what “blizzard” is to “nor'easter.”

Yet this line of argumentation, too, quickly trips over bumps in the road. Even if the premise is granted that classes of linguistic features like nouns and adjectives never really pick out the *exact same* aspect of the *exact same* thing in the exact same way, it seems nearly impossible to sustain a similar belief when it comes to linguistic features that express logical operations. Both the sentence “la neige est blanche” and the sentence “the snow is white” make use of prediction by virtue of the copulative verbs “être” and “to be.” “est” and “is” are clearly different linguistic features, but they seem to express the exact same logical function, and are thereby clear candidates for linguistic duplication. What holds true for prediction, seems to hold doubly true for other logical operations: “and / or” in “English” seems to express the same singular logical functions that “et / ou” in “French.” Thus, in the case of these logical operations,

at least, it would appear that neither a putative linguistic system like “French” or “English” nor the idiosyncratic linguistic system of individual speakers can contain different conceptions or beliefs about “and-ness” or “or-ness.” These are, in fact, linguistic duplicates.

The goal of the next section is to deepen and perhaps clarify some of the questions raised above. In order to achieve this, I now turn to Frege’s theory of sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung). This move is two-fold: i) it seeks to give formal names to the above ways of looking at language and at “different” languages; and ii) it aims to explicate formally what language *is* or *must be* for translingual approaches to theoretical linguistics.

2.2 Frege

2.2.1 Sense and Reference

In his canonical text “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” Frege (1948) systematically addresses some of the basic problems adumbrated above. In this work, Frege is initially concerned with understanding how different signs can refer to the same thing. Using my language from above, Frege wants to know when it can be said that signs are mere linguistic duplicates and when it can be said that signs, although they refer to the same thing, disclose a different aspect of it. For example, it could be maintained that the propositions “ $3+4$ ” and “ $24\div 2$ ” before refer to the same logical item of 12, but they clearly disclose this item in different ways. Thus, they are no exact duplicates, but rather “synonyms” for one another. The difference in their linguistic features maps onto their different expressive properties. Both lead the mind to 7 but they take different routes to get there (Cf. Morris, 2006, pg. 33).

The problem of possible linguistic duplications ratchet up a notch when propositions of the type $a=a$ and $a=b$ are considered. The proposition $a=a$ is, clearly, tautological. Furthermore, as a tautology, it can also be considered an a priori truth. Following Kant, Frege labels this type

of proposition as analytic, it needs no empirical content to validate its truth value. On the other hand, Frege wants to maintain that the proposition $a=b$ has the possibility of expressing synthetic or a posteriori truth about the world (Frege, 1948, p. 209). Thus, $a=b$ cannot not be merely a proposition that demonstrates the relationships between linguistic features, since such a relationship could be asserted as an a priori fact.

Frege (1948) opens up this problem by examining what it would if $a=b$ were just a statement about the relations between linguistic features: “What is intended to be said by $a=b$ seems to be that the signs a and b designate the same thing, so that the signs themselves would be under discussion; a relation between them would be asserted” (p. 209). On this quasi-strawman account, what is asserted by $a=b$ is a just linguistic relationship; it does not report or record any new information about the world. Frege, then, draws the conclusion that such linguistic relationships are, in fact, arbitrary and need not be verified by empirical content: “Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for something” (ibid.). The cultural trope of coded messages--depicted often in spy movies--brings this point home. When spy A cracks spy B’s code what is discovered is a purely linguistic information: the linguistic features of a secret “language” are successfully correlated with linguistic features that are publicly known.

Let’s hypothesize a Wittgenstein-esque Sprachspiel to illustrate further Frege’s first point and develop that notion that I have called “linguistic duplication.” Let’s set up a simple Sprachspiel, much like the builders that make a cameo appearance early on in the *Investigations* (§6-9). In this scenario two workers are at a construction site. Worker A issues one word commands to Worker B, so that worker B brings worker A the correct materials. However, unlike Wittgenstein’s example where each one word order “Slab!” “Block!” “Pillar!” correspond

exactly with one thing—slabs, blocks, and pillars—in this Sprachspiel each object has multiple names. In this game, Worker A can use any of the first four letters of the Greek alphabet for *slab*; any of the first four letters of the roman alphabet for *block*; and any number 1-4 for *pillar*. Sometimes worker A shouts “1!” instead of “4!”. But a pillar arrives on a cue each and every time. Within the confines of this simple Sprachspiel, identity statements like $\varphi = \beta$ or $A = C$ or $2 = 3$ would, a la Frege, express only a linguistic fact. Or, in my terminology, they would indeed be true linguistic duplicates. If someone unaware of the rules of the Sprachspiel were to find to herself confused as to why different signs resulted in the same object, the above identity statements would greatly clarify things for me: “Aha! $\varphi = \beta$!” would be a moment of linguistic revelation.

However, learning that $\varphi = \beta$ clearly does not generate new knowledge about the slab itself. If the language / world division holds its ground, then a statement like $\varphi = \beta$ in this Sprachspiel only reports upon a fact on *this* side of language and not on *that* side of world. Frege, though, is quick to point out that identity statements can, in fact, do more than show linguistic relations. His now classical example is the proposition: “the morning star = the evening star.” Both “the morning star” and “the evening star” pick out or refer to the same object, that of Venus. However, like the mathematical equations above, even though these names refer to the same object, they do so in different ways. Thus, they demonstrate or reveal different aspects of the same object.

In this case, the proposition “the morning star = the evening star” provides genuine knowledge about the world since it joins together two significant aspects of the same object. Outside of the limiting case of the simple Sprachspiel above, it would seem that different names contain different means of expression that, although they ostensibly stand for the same thing,

function as manifold ways to demonstrate different aspects of that object. To clarify this point with another example, take for example the nom de plume of any given author: Samuel Clemens and Mark Twain have the same ostensible referent but the former reveals or points to the biographical person whereas as the latter reveals or points to the literary persona (Zalta, 2016). Unlike the spy code example cited above, to learn the proposition “Mark Twain's = Samuel Clemens” is to connect up significant facts about the world.

Frege accounts for this by claiming that every sign or name has both a sense (Sinn) *and* a referent (Bedeutung). For example, in the simple Sprachspiel above it could be said that each sign not only has the *exact same referent* but each sign also discloses this referent *in the exact same way*. The only thing that differs between these signs is *linguistic element* that expresses the sign, since their sense and referent are identical throughout. However, in the second set of examples--those of the morning star and the evening star and those of Samuel Clemens and Mark Twain--these signs or names have a *different* sense but the *same* referent. They pick out what is ostensibly the exact same object but they do so in very different ways. Frege argues that there is “connected with a sign (name, combination of words, letter), besides that to which a sign refers, which be called the referent of the sign, what I would like to call the *sense* of the sign, wherein in the mode of presentation is contained” (1948, p. 210). A sign’s sense is its “mode of presentation,” which is the “how” of its referential disclosure. For example, the propositions “Juan is a father,” “Juan is a sociolinguist” and “Juan is a registered Democrat,” if true, all have the identical referent of Juan, but the *sense* or “mode of presentation” show very different aspects of Juan.

By reading Frege, I build out criterion for how linguistic duplication emerges. If two signs or names can be proven to refer to the *exact same* same object in the exact same way (like

the above Sprachspiel), then they are linguistic duplicates. If it is the case that one could claim that named languages are existent by lining up enough linguistic duplicates, then things like “French” and “English” are taken as real entities because they seemingly refer to the same world of things with different but equivalent linguistic features. However, such grounds seem to only bear weight when the words of “French” and “English” are true linguistic duplicates. If they *do* not refer the same aspect of the same thing in the same way, then all linguistic features are synonymous with one another in the same “alcohol,” “booze,” and “liquor” are synonymous within one another in “English.” “Alcohol,” “booze,” and “liquor,” even if they have the same referent, are not grouped into different languages because the *sense* in each case is different.

A productive strategy, then, for the translingual paradigm to undermine the reality of named languages rests on this difference between linguistic duplication and linguistic approximation, i.e., synonyms. On a translingual account, linguistic approximation is par for the course: linguistic features have the same referent but their sense, in nearly all cases, is at least slightly different. On a monolingual account, linguistic duplication is par for the course: linguistic features have the same referent and the same sense in a good deal of cases.

To come full circle: it would be incumbent that an account like McGinn’s (2015)—if it is to maintain that “la neige est blanche” and “the snow is white” come from two different languages and express an identical meaning—to prove that each sentence here has both the same referent *and* sense. Thus, coining the “different word / same thing” thesis above aimed to codify what seems like a basic intuition regarding languages: the presence of what appear to be linguistic duplicates are most often explained away by collating the duplicates into two or more distinct linguistic systems often associated with named languages.

The big picture is this: if the “different word / same thing” thesis is a clinching criterion for maintaining that the world is populated by distinct linguistic systems, it thus needs to be proven that these apparent linguistic systems are more or less sets of linguistic features that are identical both in possible sense and possible referent inter languages. If this cannot be shown, then the belief in distinct language systems begins to fall apart. All linguistic features are converted into *webs of synonyms* that might very well have the same possible referents, but possess distinct senses.

However, the opposing horn of this argument could also be readily taken up. Languages, from being defined by linguistic duplication, are rather defined by the *impossibility* of linguistic duplication. In other words, *a* language is a self-enclosed system that has its own particular form of picking out the items in the world. “Spanish” has a different way of seeing the world than “English” does, just as “Mandarin” has a different way of seeing the world than “Arabic” does.

If such “languages” relate to an identical world, then the only facet that can be said to be different are the senses, the methods of disclosure. this counter-argument, though, does little to establish the existence of independent linguistic systems. Instead, it corroborates the belief that without an identical sense and referent, all signs and words that relate to the same thing are converted into synonyms. “Blanche” is not equal to “white” but synonymous with it. Thus, in the list: “ivory, egg shell, beige, blanche” there are not three “English” terms and single “French” one. *Instead, there four signs with four senses that might pick out the same referent. Linguistic features, on a monolingual account, can be translated inter se, and, on a translingual account, can be approximated inter se.* However, this still assumes that linguistic features bespeak a set of elements that is the common denominator between linguistic features. As I plan to show below with my discussion regarding language a), neither translation nor approximation is possible when

one considers the Sprachspiele that subtend linguistic features (Section 3). Language, in this sense, is, in fact, defined by incommensurability.

2.2.2 Conception

It is important to note that, for Frege, a sign's sense and its referent are wholly objective. Frege points out the public nature of a sign's sense with the tantalizing cryptic remark: "The sense of a proper name is grasped by everyone who is sufficiently familiar with the language or totality of designations to which it belongs" (1948, p. 210). A sign's mode of presentation discloses its referent in a way that hold for all folk who make correct use of the sign. However, as outlined above, clearly it is also possible that each individual speaker possesses her own affective and significant relationship with words: an upper-middle class teenager from an affluent suburb has a very different relationship with the word "school," then does a working-class student from an impoverished neighborhood. Frege accounts for such idiosyncratic differences by introducing the term "conception." Whereas as a sign's sense and its referent are wholly public, a speaker's conception of a sign is wholly private; it is how the sign fits into her conceptual and affective repertoire: "If the referent of a sign is an object perceivable by the senses, my conception of it is an internal image, arising from the memories of sense impression which I have had and activities, both internal and external, which I have performed" (1948, p. 212). The Fregean use of "concept" helps illustrate the second point regarding the "variety / singularity" thesis, outlined in the introduction of this section. Not only might linguistic duplication not obtain inter language, but it might also not obtain *intra* language. That is, even if a word's sense and referent are public-facing my personal take on signs will always be different than yours. When the affluent students says "school" she does not "mean" the same thing that working class student does.

Thus, in this Fregean picture, a sign is tripartite: sense, referent, and conception. Frege illustrates this relationship through analogy with observing the moon through a telescope. In this case, the moon is the referent, the concrete object that exists independent of its observation or notation in language. The telescope is the sense, because it is an objective mode of presentation that discloses the referent of the moon under a certain aspect, which can be used by several different observers. Finally, the conception is the retinal image as it is projected onto the eye of each individual observer (1948, p. 213). Extrapolating from this example, it would seem that signs are like two-sided coins. On the public side, there is sense and referent, and on the private side there is the speaker's personalized conception of the sign.

2.2.3 Linguistic Expression

Both Frege himself in “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” and his commentators seem to pay little attention between the distinction sign *and* language or signs and their possible linguistic expression. However, I contend that it is precisely this distinction that holds the key to understanding the central translingual claim, that languages (plural) do not exist, but language (singular) does.

Without keeping this distinction on the front burner, the terms like “word” and “sign” easily get conflated. However, it would seem that for Frege signs and linguistic expression are two very different things. The Fregean account of a sign holds that that a sign corresponds to a definite sense, which, in turn, corresponds to a singular referent. Conversely, a referent can have *any number* of signs (1948, p. 211). This means that each sign has a singular sense that, in turn, picks out a singular object in a singular way. There is a one-to-one relationship between sign, sense, and referent. A sign cannot have two senses, nor can a sense have two referents. However, a referent can be picked out or disclosed by a perhaps infinite variety of signs. “The Morning

Star,” “The Evening Star,” “Venus,” “The second planet from the sun,” are all signs whose unique senses show the *same* object in a variety of ways. Really, it could be said that sign and sense are identical with one another: a sign just is its sense, and vice versa, since in Frege’s system it is impossible that a single sign has multiple senses.

However, a sign is not identical with its linguistic expression. A sign can express but one sense, but multiple linguistic features can express one sign. Almost in passing, Frege remarks: “The same sense has different expressions in different languages or even in the same language” (ibid.). The relationship between a sign and its sense and sense and its referent cannot be separated out. Again, a sign just is its sense and its sense solely picks out a unique referent. However, the insoluble package of relations that make up a sign *can*, in fact, be disambiguated from its linguistic expression.

This slight distinction provides a good deal of argumentative leverage to the translingual paradigm. It is important because it isolates and thematizes languages as the expression of signs and sense, instead of being the systems of signs and senses themselves. It also, in a certain light, makes language (but not signs and sense) utterly arbitrary. A sense, by necessity, is its sign, but a sign is not necessarily its linguistic expression. To highlight this idea, take the following three examples “ $3+5=8$,” “three plus five equals eight,” and “tres más cinco son ocho.” Here, the same sign with same sense picking out the same logical referent is displayed with *three* different sets of linguistic features. Whereas “the morning star,” “the evening star,” “Venus” and “the second planet from the sun” are different signs for the same referent, *these* three example sentences are assorted linguistic packagings for what I take to be the same sign, sense, and referent. It follows that if this sharp delineation between sense and linguistic expression holds,

then “language” in a restricted sense of the term is “downgraded” to a type of a delivery system or some sort of “packaging.”

2.3 Translingualism and Linguistic Expression

In Chapter II, I labored to show that translingual theory as al Otheguy et al. (2015 & 2018) is ontologically committed to linguistic types and linguistic types alone. To reiterate: in the Otheguyean et al. picture languages qua self-inclosed linguistic systems just are not there. This approach to theoretical linguistics does not account for them in their ontological stock of things and furthermore utterly refuses to quantify over them. This is the bedrock sine qua non ontological claim of “translanguaging.” It is not that language practitioners contribute to the rules and conventions of languages (Lu & Horner, 2014); it is rather that at a “psycholinguistic” level languages literally do not exist. To paraphrase once more what I heard Ofelia García in a graduate seminar once remark: language exists, but languages do not.

This basic concept of the translingual paradigm, I believe, can be further elucidated by my above discussion of Frege’s theory of sense of reference and its concomitant separation of a sign from its linguistic expression. Again, if a single sign can be couched in a variety of linguistic expressions— $3+5=8$ can be depicted in “English,” “Spanish”—or with groupings of apples and pears, like the examples in children’s books—then linguistic expression is also arbitrary. The word “arbitrary” often has a pejorative ring to it, suggesting something whimsical or haphazard. However, this is not the intended connotation here. By “arbitrary,” I only claim that the relationship between a sign and its linguistic expression is not a necessary one. Different linguistic expressions can be slotted in to represent the same sign, *without* change in its sense *nor* in its referent. I make this point regarding linguistic expression from a theoretical-linguistic perspective. From a practical-linguistic perspective, the selection of linguistic features is

anything but arbitrary, and, in fact, composes a fundamental role the the playing of the language game. I take up this difference in detail in Chapter IV.

To illustrate this point, I turn to a real-life example taken from the writing of one of my students. Describing daily types of bilingualism, the author writes: “So when I speak to my parents they say ‘Tu tienes dinero,’ ‘I say si yo tengo five dollars’.” I have only modified the punctuation here in order to fit conventions of quotations within quotations. All other orthographical and typographical decisions are those of the student. Notice that there are no italics here to be found—the author seemingly makes no distinction between the “English” and “Spanish” words. In fact, the sentence hangs together so smoothly and reads so naturally that I had to re-read it a few times to figure out where the “Spanish” begins and the “English” ends. The linguistic expression “Yo tengo five dollars” represents a *particular* fact about the world in a *particular* way, i.e., it has a *sense* and a *referent*, which, in turn, can turn out to be true or false. Such quotidian expressions routinely uttered across the five boroughs show that language qua linguistic expression does not need to be the expressions of a named language as well in order for such expressions to mean. If such a linguistic expression can demonstrate successfully an intended sign with its singular sense and referent, then, clearly, “communication” comes off without a hitch, no matter how it is linguistically packaged. The clear-cut legibility of this sentence provides a clue that linguistic expression is underpinned by structures or systems or schemas that have nothing to do with named languages.

Such a “code-meshed” linguistic expression seems to beg the question as to whether the sense would change if the proposition were linguistically expressed wholly in “English,” wholly in “Spanish,” whether it were couched in a different permutation of “English” and “Spanish,” or whether it were in a different “language” all together (“French,” “Urdu,” “Mandarin,” etcetera) or

if the author simply were to show the five dollars to the parents. I am prepared to accept that the referent would be identical throughout all of these hypothetical linguistic expressions, but a think-cramp sets in when I am forced to decide if the *sense* would change or remain constant throughout. Jarringly, it seems that *both* the belief that the sense does *not* change in such an example *and* that the sense *does* in fact change, even if it does so ever so slightly, seem to carry weight. What horn of the argument you take up seems here to be a matter of preference.

The example of “yo tengo five dollars,” I believe, once again, illustrates that linguistic expression is arbitrary—in the non-pejorative sense—if the sense and referent of the sign is made evident in that linguistic expression. And, again, as quoted above, the Fregean account takes this as an obvious point: “nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrary producible event or object as a sign for something” (1948, p. 209). Extrapolating from this idea, it can be said that “language” in *this* sense is the set or sets of linguistic features that can be used by speakers to package and express signs. Thinking of language like this stands in sharp contrast with other common ways of using the term. We talk about the language of law, the language of medicine, the language of love, the language of particle physics, the language of baseball, and, in doing so, we aim to signify a particular *world* of values, rules, concepts, commitments, beliefs, values, *telois*, methods, data, and the like. If the translingual paradigm is committed to the non-existence of languages or closed language systems, then it must also be using the term “language” to talk about arbitrary linguistic expression. Exempting the case of metaphorical talk, it seems obvious that the concepts internal to language of baseball cannot be translated to the language of law and vice versa. These “linguistic” systems certainly appear to be closed off (I will discuss this in greater detail below).

concept of “translanguaging” is committed to a unitary view language. This view maintains that from a “psycholinguistic” point of view, *all* speakers—“monolinguals” or “bilinguals”—have a single linguistic repertoire that, by no means, is subdivided into distinct linguistic systems that map onto terms like “English” and “Spanish,” for example (Cf. García & Li Wei, 2014; Otheguy et al. 2015 & 2018; Gracia & Otheguy, 2015). I take this claim to mean that a linguistic feature need not have any membership in a linguistic system that is independent of an individual speaker. The only system of linguistic expression that matters is that which is constituted by the idiolect of the individual speaker. Juan, for example, does not speak “English” and “Spanish.” Instead Juan speaks “Juan.” And Sofia speaks “Sofia.” And so on. If the translingual paradigm wants to hold onto the idiolect as the lynchpin of its theory, it must also make language arbitrary and at least implicitly demarcate the tripartite of sign-sense-referent from its linguistic expression. If Juan speaks “Juan” and Sofia speaks “Sofia,” then these idiolectal collations of linguistic features are arbitrary or idiosyncratic. However, there remains a theoretical elephant in the room: it is unclear if translingual theory’s claim that language qua “psycholinguistic” entity is ultimately idiolectal and thereby utterly unique to every single speaker (cf. Otheguy et al., 2015) is also committed to the belief that such idiosyncratic collations of linguistic are tied to a collection of *common and public signs and significations and designations* or if each individual speaker also has her own utterly unique stock of signs (with their own senses and referents) as well. Below I will argue that the translingual paradigm is theoretically coherent if and only if it takes language as the idiosyncratic linguistic expression of sets of signs that are largely independent of individual speakers.

3 Language a)

3.1 Preliminary Questions

In section 2 of this chapter, I intended to show through my reading of Frege's theory of sense and reference that language in at least one sense is an arbitrary system of expression that "packages" signs. Signs, on the other hand, have an isomorphic relationship with their sense and referent. Although referents can be referred to by multiple senses—multiple methods of disclosure—every sense has but one sign and every sign but one sense. I claim this as the unwritten yet basic premise of the translanguing paradigm, if this approach to linguistics is to maintain the idiolect as its conceptual centerpiece.

However, it seems like the translanguing slogan: "languages does not exist (as at a purely "linguistic" or at a "psycholinguistic" level)" provokes lots of knee-jerk reactions and criticisms. I take this to be the case because, seemingly, one of the most handy uses of the term "language" is precisely to signify closed-off and independent conceptual systems. While I defined "language" in section 2 in a sense strictly limited to linguistic duplication and linguistic arbitrariness, the goal of section 3 is to define language in a sense strictly limited to incommensurability. Languages, in this sense and this sense alone, are in fact closed off conceptual systems, something like a Kuhnian paradigm (1962), which, by definition, would not allow for translation inter "languages." In section 3, I relied heavily on Frege's philosophy of language. I once again turn to Wittgenstein's later philosophy in order illustrate how language and languages could be defined in a sense strictly limited to incommensurability.

3.2 Games and Incommensurability

Both chess and checkers are played on the same game board: sixty-four squares with alternating colors in each column and row. It goes without saying, however, that chess and checkers are different games. In fact, not only are they different games, they are also incommensurable with one another. Each respective game has its respective rules, goals, pieces,

strategies, values, moves, objectives, possibilities, and so on. Both fall under the umbrella heading, “boardgame,” but beyond this common denominator the games are worlds apart. Thus, one might be tempted to say that chess and checkers are two different languages as well. This possible claim is founded in the intuition that languages are logical totalities within which the entities and concepts are wholly defined by internal relationships, interior to the language itself. This picture of language stands in sharp contrast with the picture of language demanded by the translingual paradigm that I sketched out in section 2, in which linguistic features circulate rather freely among speakers as they continually incorporate them into idiosyncratic linguistic repertoires.

Whereas languages qua incommensurability are defined by internal relationships, it would seem, then, that languages in the section 2 are thus defined by external relationships. Both of these senses *prima facie* look justifiable: language, on the one hand, feels like a closed-off logical system independent of other closed-off logical systems, and it also is empirically evident that speakers mix and match features which are putatively members of “different” languages, on the other. If both senses carry weight, then it is imperative to theorize how these sets of internal external relationships work together within the generalized entity that is often taken as “language.”

The prior paragraph relied heavily on the distinction between internal and external relations. The distinction that I want to make between these two senses of language hinges on these two classes of relationships. Therefore, I pause here to illustrate them more clearly. Internal relationships are a type of relations wherein the relata of the relationships are *wholly* defined by these relationships. Conversely, external relations a type of relations that *do not* wholly define the relata that these relations relate: “A relation is *internal* if it is unthinkable that

its terms should not possess it, and it is *external* otherwise” (Mácha, p.i, 2015). A billiard ball, for example, might be said to be simultaneously involved in both webs of internal and external relationships. The very existence of the 9 ball as a spherical object with a certain shape and weight, painted and with two yellow stripes and the number 9 stamped on it, only is due to the fact that such physical parameters are inscribed in the rules of billiards. The 9 ball is its size and weight and color due to the place it holds with the internal relations generated by the constitutive rules of the game. In this aspect of its being, a 9 ball is *wholly* defined by relations *internal* to the rules of billiards. Hypothetically, one could use a 9 ball as a paperweight or a projectile, but then it would not “be” a 9 ball anymore.

Conversely, the spatial relations that obtain between billiard balls during any given billiard game are accidental. A 9 ball continually changes its spatial relations with other billiard balls during any given game, but it cannot be a 9 ball outside of the game of billiards. Hence, it might be said that the spatial relations between billiard balls in a particular game are *external*. The proposition “The 9 ball is 15 centimeters from the cue ball” bespeaks a relation between these two entities, but is clearly not essential to either of these entities that this relation always be the case. Hence, the above proposition express an external relation. Alternatively, the proposition “All billiard balls have a diameter of 57.2 mm and weigh between 160-170g” expresses an internal relation, since these properties of a billiard ball only obtain by virtue of how the billiard ball is necessarily related with other essential game equipment (billiard tables, cues, racks, etcetera) and the constitutive rules of the game (Cf. Delanda, 2006).

This distinction looks crucial for the ontological question that the translingual turn plants in linguistics: Is a linguistic feature *internally* related to *a* language—a linguistic system of a named language like “French” or “Arabic” or “Mandarin”—or are linguistic features by and

large stable and independent entities that are *externally* related in a highly contingent fashion? Clearly, a linguist who finds herself committed to the belief that named languages have no “psycholinguistic” reality, by the same hand, finds herself committed to belief that language in general is composed of self-sufficient linguistic features that are externally related to other self-sufficient linguistic features.

However, this translingual belief runs afoul of one of the basic intuitions regarding the uses of the term “language,” namely to represent systems of internal relations that define completely the relata within these systems. This apparent tension can be resolved by making a sharp semantic delineation between these two institutions of language. Language b), as I outlined in section 2, is the arbitrary linguistic packaging of different possible signs. Language a), as I outline here in section 3, is the underlying system or scheme by virtue of which signs show up as meaningful. The conclusion that I ultimately want to draw is that language in this first sense uses stabilized linguistic features *externally related* to one another in order to represent or disclose the meaningful elements *internally related* to one another in systems or schemas that are often off-the-cuff called “languages.” To illustrate this dialectic between the internal relationship of Sprachspiele and the external relations of linguistic features, I return to the example of chess and checkers.

In chess, a knight moves in a “L.” And, in a certain light, the proposition “In chess, a knight moves in a “L” shape” is tautological, since a chess piece *just is* the role it plays in the game of chess. A knight, like a billiard ball, is what it is entirely in virtue of the place it holds within the web of internal relationships that make up the game of chess. To state the obvious: a knight is not a bishop. Nor is it a pawn nor a rook nor a king nor a queen. The very instant that a knight moves on a diagonal or on a straight line, it ceases to be a knight. And this goes for all the

chess pieces and rules of the chess game. You cannot checkmate a queen. Nor can you castle through check. All the pieces and all the plays are precisely what they are by virtue of the internal relations that obtain within the game. A chess piece, in a certain sense, is ‘locked in’ to its definition.

However, even if a knight can never cease to move in a “L” and still *be* a knight, an infinite variety of material and immaterial things can be used to depict the chess knight. Imagine, for instance, that two players sit down for a game to realize that the white knight has gone missing. One of the players rummages in her pocket and pulls out a penny, places it on the board, and baptizes it with the statement: “This is now the white knight!” The game comes off without a hitch: whether the white knight is represented by an actual chess piece or a penny is arbitrary. However, what is precisely *not* arbitrary is that the penny that replaced the white knight still moves in an “L” shape.

Chess can be played with all different types of pieces. In a pinch, one could rip up a sheet of paper into 32 pieces and write the name of the pieces and their color on the shreds of paper. Chess can be played on a computer digitally represented by binary code or it can be played on a lawn with life sized pieces. In cases of desperation and ingenuity, chess can be played with an adhoc mixture of sundry goods found around the house: bottle caps, playing cards, cutlery, nails and bolts. It would seem that the only criterion for what can count as a chess piece under the right circumstance is that i) *sufficient structural differentiation obtains between the pieces so that they can depict or stand in for the different pieces*; and ii) *that the parties of game agree, tacitly or explicitly, the conventions of the linguistic expression*.

Linguistic expression can depict the anterior system of significance or schema of the game, if and only if the structural differentiation that obtains between the linguistic features is

sufficient enough to distinguish the meaning elements in the underlying system or schema. For instance, I can imagine playing chess with a motley admixture of all sorts of different elements that are not standardized chess pieces, but I cannot imagine playing chess with with an unmodified set of checker pieces. This is because the checker pieces do not possess sufficient structural differentiation inter se in order to depict the different roles that chess pieces play. Hypothetically, chess players could play chess with checker pieces but it would require such a feat of memory that it would essentially be a game of blindfold chess, and thus the checker pieces would not truly be performing the linguistic work. Conversely, I can easily imagine playing a game of checkers with chess pieces. This is because chess pieces qua simple game pieces possesses sufficient structural differentiation inter se to depict the different roles that checker pieces play.

These claims to a certain extent limit and justify the arbitrariness of “language” as described in section 2. The hypothetical set of linguistic features that could hypothetically slot in in order to depict the meaningful elements of an anterior system or schema of significance—like chess or checkers—is circumscribed by the requisite structural differentiation necessary to represent these meaningful elements. However, any linguistic feature is a candidate to be included in this hypothetical set, if it satisfies the criteria set out in advance by the requisite structural differentiation mandated by the system or schema. *The hypothetical external relationships that might obtain between linguistic elements in order to generate meaningful linguistic expressions regarding certain anterior systems or schema of significance are necessarily limited and justified by the internal relations generated by the constitutive rules of those selfsame systems or schema.*

If this is the case, then the argument begins to take shape that a “translanguaging” approach to theoretical linguistics qua the study of lexical and structural features (Otheguy et al. 2015 & 2018) is not the study of the internal relationships and the meaningful elements that are the relata of these relationships contained in a system or schema, but rather it is the study of structural differentiation of the external relationships that must needs obtain between linguistic features of linguistic expression in order that said features can efficiently and successfully depict the meaningful elements of the underlying system or schema. This premise, I believe, provides a sharpened polemical ax to cut through the entrenched belief in named languages qua closed-off and independent linguistic systems: The belief that “French” funds the significant content of the linguistic feature “niege” is analogous to the belief that chess pieces gain their significance by virtue of the carvings and colors that relate together the material pieces instead of their depiction or representation of the roles and rules of the game of chess for which they stand.

Thinking through the possibilities of linguistic translation helps illustrate the distinctions that I hope to sketch out above. “Languages,” it would seem, are only translatable inter se the level of the arbitrary linguistic expression, and not at the level of incommensurable anterior schemas or systems of significance. The respective rules of chess and the rules of checkers enable respective types of gameplay and strategies. Not only can a player not play the Queen’s Gambit in checkers, nor can a player “king” a piece upon reaching the back file in a game of chess, such “translations” are literally nonsensical. To speak of the Queen’s Gambit beyond metaphorical depiction within the system or schema of checkers is akin to speaking of a square circle. It is at this level of paradigmatic incommensurability where translation is not merely difficult but impossible. It could be said that only within these respective anterior systems or schemas of signification is translation possible: chess theory, for instance, can be translated to

“French,” “Spanish,” “German,” “Arabic,” and so on, but chess theory cannot be translated to the theory of checkers. To illustrate this point with a different example: the philosophical works of Descartes can be translated into any given “language” but Descartes cannot be “translated” into Spinoza. Just as much as Spinoza can be “translated” to any “language” but cannot be translated into Descartes. Jurisprudence cannot be translated into ornithology. Entomology cannot be translated into the philosophy of language.

“Translation” at the level of arbitrary linguistic expression is thought to be possible because language *as* such picks out or refers to a common world inter languages. As I hoped to argue in detail above, it might very well be the case that in “natural languages” linguistic duplication never really occurs. Thus, translation, in this sense is always a process of interchanging approximate synonyms in lieu of re-coding the exact same sign within an alternative linguistic packaging. Again, even if all named languages, say, are collapsed into webs upon webs of approximate synonyms--signs whose senses discloses referents in ways just slightly differently--these signs still, putatively, refer to the same things. However, language, in this section 3 sense, does not mark out different sense for the same things. Instead, language here picks out different entities all together. Propositions regarding chess refer to a different world of entities than propositions regarding checkers do. The proposition “Bishops are worth more than pawns” picks out entities that simply do not exist in checkers (and, it would seem, could never exist). Thus, a general thesis begins to cohere: “translation,” it would appear, is possible between signs with approximate sense for the same entities. However, “translation,” it would appear, is impossible between propositions that pick out wholly different entities. “Translation” is always expressive, never ontological.

I take incommensurability to also be one of the defining properties of Sprachspiele, albeit that the incommensurability that obtains between respective Sprachspiele comes about in ways much less clear-cut than the above examples of chess and checkers and various scientific paradigms.

Imagine, for example, that at a dinner party I lean over to you and whisper in a hushed voice: “Did you know that the French Revolution began in 1789?” While I might have successfully *stated a fact* unknown to you, but what I have not successfully done is spread a rumor. Fact-stating and rumor-spreading are, by and large, Sprachspiele that are incommensurable with one another. The “logics” of each game are of such kind that the pieces and moves and strategies within each game cannot be “translated” to other. However, much like the examples above, I can state facts in in any of named national languages or possible admixture of linguistic features that cohere with the “rules” of fact-stating and rumor-spreading.

Sprachspiele, thus, are the requisite backdrop against which arrangements of linguistic features gain their significance. This claim, I believe, sharply rebukes approaches to theoretical linguistics that maps linguistic features onto to the closed logical systems of named languages. It is indeed the case that “language” in the section 2 sense coheres within system or schema in order to be meaningful. But these systems are not what are commonly associated with words like “French,” “English,” and “Spanish.” Instead, *it is the anterior systems or schemas of significance of highly variegated and heterogeneous Sprachspiele that allow for linguistic features to signify and not name languages.*

4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I aimed to disambiguate the term language into two different senses. Language b) is the largely arbitrary linguistic expression or “packaging” that represents or

depicts the meaningful elements of the systems or schemas of language a). Language a), on the other hand, are closed off Sprachspiele that, although they might bear a structural resemblance to other Sprachspiele, are incommensurable inter se. In this endeavor, I sought to show that language b) is composed of stabilized linguistic features that are connected with one another through external relationships. Like the examples of different chess pieces, given the right circumstances, any linguistic feature can be slotted into to represent a meaningful element of the underlying Sprachspiel.

Conversely, the webs Sprachspiele that make up language a) are composed of internal relationships. The moves, strategies, plays, pieces, outcomes, objectives, and the like are wholly defined by relations internal to these respective games. I concluded that language a) and b) work together dialectically to make up what is often just called “language,” though might be thought of as a derivative relationship: language in sense a) sets the parameters for what linguistic features of language b) can be used to represent the meaning elements of language a). Language b) must demonstrate enough structural differentiation so that it can efficiently represent or depict the structural differentiation that occurs between the meaningful elements in language a). Hence, language b) is not *wholly* arbitrary, since expressive linguistic features are delimited in advance by the “logical” parameters of underlying Sprachspiel.

This account of language that I have offered in this chapter suffers on two counts: i) at points it is painfully realist: in my discussion of Frege, I talk as if the only Sprachspiel that is ever played is the statement-making game; and ii) very much in light with possible critiques of later Wittgenstein and Speech Act Theory in general, my discussion of the incommensurability of Sprachspiele often imputes a fixity to Sprachspiele that denies both agency within the game

itself and diachronic revision of Sprachspiele through successive iteration. In Chapter IV, I hope to address both this possible critiques by picking up once again Chapter I's emphasis on rhetoric. To claim that Sprachspiele are incommensurable inter se and that linguistic expression is by and large arbitrary sketches out a bland picture: it leaves little room for questions of performance, temporality, power, and ludic alteration. "Translingual" or "code-meshed" sentences like the student example cited above point to the possibility that the intelligibility of language has *nothing to do* with named languages. Going forward, the goal of this project is to investigate further what funds intelligible linguistic expression, once named national languages are fully bracketed out of the picture. Chapter IV will wager that rhetoric, as defined in chapters I & II, is what funds language, and not vice versa. Thus, in the following chapter, by using claims offered here in Chapter III, I intend to show the Sprachspiel of language a) come before, so to speak, the linguistic expression of language b). Thus, it will turn out that Sprachspiele are, perhaps paradoxically, *pre-linguistic*. And this property is what funds the intelligibility of linguistic expression.

Chapter IV: Rules Rhetoric Language

1 Introduction

Chapter III presented a static picture of language. Whatever victories that this chapter won for the translingual approach to theoretical linguistics came at a cost: in order to show that linguistic systems qua named languages do not generate linguistic meaning, I postulated a web of Sprachspiele, which, although they might demonstrate family resemblances inter se, are, at rock bottom, incommensurable inter se.

The aim here was to account for intuition that language qua linguistic expression must signify *in light of* something. In other words, if the “Spanish” sentence “Está lloviendo” does not “mean” by virtue of its adherence to the rules and conventions of “Spanish,” then it must “mean” by virtue of its ability to represent a particular move in a particular game, for example the Sprachspiel of weather-talk that I described in Chapter I. In other words, “languages” do in fact exist, but they exist as the meaning-giving social rituals and contexts in which they occur, not as the putative entities that are picked out by titles of named national languages. At the risk of sounding overly generic, hierarchies of different context are the ultimate background against which speech is made intelligible.

Linguistic performance gains significant traction not by being the product of a putative linguistic system such as “Spanish” or “English” or what have you, but rather linguistic significance--at rock bottom--is the outcome of the legal plays of the social game. Those who know how to play weather-talk or conduct marriage ceremonies or make a promise or place a bet can be taught what words of a “different language” signify because such words map onto a game already understood: in the same that the way that the chess players of Chapter III can

substitute certain pieces for others—buttons, trinkets, bottle caps for knights, pawns, and rooks—because they already know the rules of the chess game. This, of course, is not to say that one cannot learn *new* language-games to the same extent that one can learn how to use new linguistic pieces to play the ones they already know. However, it is to say, like the examples given in the last chapter, that, whereas one can mix linguistic features inter-games to play and describe different Sprachspiele, the conventionalized games themselves are incommensurate with one another. A chess player can describe a successful gambit as “homerun,” but she could never *really* hit a home run in chess. A baseball manager might play a “gambit,” when she puts in a left-handed reliever in the top of the 7th, but this is not, in fact, a chess gambit.

Such rule talk of games, however, without qualification, runs the risk of marking rules with the privileged ontological status that named languages once occupied: instead of the synchronic grammar of named languages funding the meaning of legible utterances, it is now the synchronic rules of Sprachspiele that power them. It seems like my argument in Chapter III merely exchanged the fixed systems of named languages for the fixed systems of Sprachspiele, installing language-in-context as the ultimate arbiter of meaning instead of linguistics.

Hence, the goal of Chapter IV is to revisit my findings in Chapter I regarding rhetoric as a method in order to understand the rules of the game in ways that does not off-load them into a decontextualized and static ontological realm. While in Chapter I focused heavily on the study of speech acts in the analytical tradition (Austin, 1962; Searle 1969, 1979), in Chapter IV I will take up a more “continental” approach to speech acts (Bourdieu, 1990; Butler, 1997; Taylor, 1993; Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1993). This move can be generally described as a paradigm shift from a static structural approach to understanding language towards a contextual and performative lens.

The goal here is to locate the rules of speech acts within the same temporal plane as the act itself (Cf. my discussion of Butler in Chapter II). By doing this, two claims will be advanced: i) that the constitutive rules of speech acts cannot be completely represented *verbally*: the players of Sprachspiele, more or less, just have a “feel” for the game—like a skilled driver who shifts gears and works the clutch without much to do about it--which has been internalized by an existential pedagogy of the “rules”; and that ii) rules, once temporalized to the same plane as the act instead, are subject to rapid-fire aleatory change and active agentive contestation.

Claim i) leads to a rather paradoxical ancillary claim: if the constitutive rules of Sprachspiele are the background in light of which possible linguistic practices makes sense, and if such rules cannot be cashed out as explicit representations—imagine IKEA-like instructions for telling a tactful joke!—then, it would seem, that the basis of linguistic expression and practice becomes *pre-linguistic* after a certain level of acculturation. What can be said is based on what cannot be said.

On the other hand, the temporalization of rules that claim ii) represents is requisite for understanding the role that agency plays in such rules. *Prima facie*, “Agency” feels like a loaded term: within the modern epoch it feels unsalvageably burdened down with methodological individualism. Without maximal qualification, “agency” shows up as the amalgam of choices made by an independent actor in reaction to the imposition of societal norms. However, below, I offer a detailed reading of Butler’s (1997) Speech Act Theory as a polemical rebuke of unsituated agency. The rules of the game, for Butler, are the necessary grounds for the realization of agency instead of being its antithesis.

Chapters II & III aimed at developing what I again take as the bedrock *sine qua non* claim of the translingual turn: the non-existence of named languages. However, following hard

upon this are the claims that the “translanguaging” and “translingualism” seek to make about agency (cf. Lu & Horner 2013 & 2016). The lines of thought united under these coats of arms share the common goal of understanding the speaker as an equal member of the *pas de deux* which makes up the dialectic between rules and realization, convention and change. These arguments for agency ultimately pay off in the study of education and the practical application of pedagogy (cf. Chapter V). Clearly, how speakers are granted agency in light of conventions and how conventions are seen in light of agency will ultimately determine what it means to teach someone about language and literacy.

In working through the lines of inquiry embedded in speaker agency, I will, once again, lean heavily on the definition of rhetoric that I developed in Chapter I and refined in Chapter II. Specifically, in Chapter I, I was at pains to show that rhetoric is the realization of a conventional speech act for the purpose of realizing unconventional ends. However, as I discussed Chapter II, such a definition depends on a sharp demarcation between the conventional and the unconventional. Below, I develop this line of thought in greater detail in relationship to my discussion of agency.

Finally in this chapter, I hope to justify the title of this project, *Translingual Rhetoric*, by illustrating how rhetoric is the foundation of translingual practices. Rhetoric’s “transcendental” nature (cf. Chapter I) of pushing forward towards unrealized goals in light of present affordances built out from past practices captures the essential aspect of what it means *to translanguage*. Rhetorical temporality, I argue, best represents the “trans” prefix of “translanguaging,” in the sense of *pushing across* or *moving beyond* or *crossing through*. In this way, I depart markedly from Otheguy et al.’s (2015) definition of “translanguaging” as the uninhibited use of a speaker’s idiolect without mindful adherence to established political, ideological, and social norms.

2 Linguistic Practice and Pre-linguistic Foundations

In the opening of this chapter, I allowed myself to sloganize, writing: what can be said is based in what cannot be said. This slogan is meant to be polemical. It has targeted in its sights the analytical strand of SAT and its two most notable protagonists, Austin (1962) and Searle (1969). The analytical interpretation of Sprachspiele (as noted in chapter I) aims to explicate the rules of the game into codified and repeatable procedures. For philosophers in this tradition, the rules of linguistic practice are themselves, in a certain sense, linguistic, in so far that one could map out thematically the rules of the game. Let's take chess once again as a paradigm example in order to explain this. In chess—and really any other board game—all the rules can be made explicit. That is, I can easily tell you about the rules in language: “the knight moves in an ‘L’ shape” “pawns move vertically but only take on the diagonal,” etcetera. But not only this: what makes *good* chess is wholly amenable to language. I can talk in toto about the Queen's Gambit and the Sicilian Defense; I can argue you with about the pro's and con's of hypermodernism; I can explain to a beginner why moving the rook's pawn as an opening is foolish. It is precisely this “linguistic” amenability or set of non-negotiable rules of chess that makes computers so good at it: everything related to this game can be expressed and cataloged *as* propositions that represent logical states-of-affairs, sets of options, and forms of algorithmic processing. In fact, computers are *so* good at playing chess that human players—including the world's top grandmasters—do not stand the slightest chance against computer “players” nowadays, to the point where the top chess programs only play once against one another in computer only leagues (cf. Baraniuk, 2015).

Everything about chess is effable. Chess can be said. If chess were not utterly effable, then, it could be assumed that at some point the world's most advanced chess players would still

have a competitive edge over computers. Yet, as a counter-example, consider that even if intelligent robots are quickly replacing human cooks in restaurants throughout the world (Cf. Oppenheimer, 2019), it is still difficult to imagine a robot excelling as a world-class French chef. Being an expert cook requires an intuition for what a “dash” of salt is and a sixth-sense for just how hot a copper-based pan needs to be: that visceral feel for an activity that experts build up over time through successive engagements with the activity. This type of knowledge-*how* has been shown to be extremely difficult to express in the types of representational linguistic codes that computers process (Cf. Dreyfus, 1992).

With this distinction in sight, the rules of chess plus the theory internal to it are very easily laid out as *language* in a more traditional sense of term wherein language is a representational means to picture logical states-of-affairs (Cf. my discussion of early Wittgenstein in Chapter I). Chess, thus, serves well as a paradigm case of a game. Thinking through *this* game with its linguistic-propositional clarity shining forth provides a method to think through the relations between rules, moves, pieces, strategies, values, goals, objectives, and the like. It is precisely these properties of games--and precisely not their connotation of frivolity or triviality (Cf. Chapter I)—that make the concept of game so useful for theorizing speech acts. Games have “legal” and “illegal” moves in the same way that a speaker can make a conventionalized promise in the future tense but not in the past tense. However, a paradigmatic example like chess can turn out to be a bright red herring. It misleads speech act theorists to postulate that due to the game like nature of speech acts *all* the “rules” of speech acts are ipso facto amenable to propositional representation (Cf. Searle’s [1969] charts of promise-making).

The qualifications I want to make here rely on the difference between knowledge-*that* and knowledge-*how* (cf. Ryle [2009]; Chapter I). Everything about chess is a species of

knowledge-*that* instead of a knowledge-*how*. I take this to be the case, since even the odd-sounding locution “I know how to move the knight” reduces in toto in the locution “I know that the knight moves in a ‘L’ shape.” Such knowledge is ultimately propositional since it can be expressed in declarative sentences, which, in turn, a la my claims in Chapter III, could be couched in any number of a variety of linguistic features. The propositional knowledge of chess can be spoken about aloud, written down with pencil and paper, or coded digitally: the propositional knowledge is the same throughout. What changes in these cases is the linguistic packaging.

However, there are lots of games and game-like activities that do not have the potential to be cashed out without remainder as strings of propositions expressed by declarative sentences. These types of games look more like a species of knowledge-*how*. For example, the basic steps of kicking a soccer ball, at least, can be readily expressed propositionally and couched linguistically in a variety of ways: instructions from a teacher, printed visual diagrams, animated computer graphics, etcetera. However, clearly such propositions cannot capture in toto what it is to play the game of soccer beyond its basic features. In this sense, skilled soccer players possess a knowledge-*how*. That is, they have a knack, a “feel” for the game, an intuitive understanding, what in Aristotelian terms would be called *phronesis* (φρόνησις).

In this picture I am sketching, past a very preliminary stage, soccer players cannot *talk* about what they are doing. Soccer-playing as an activity—from wide-angle lens what I would call a “game”—is pretty much *pre-linguistic*, since its play runs on circuits that circumvent thematic representation. Of course, one could talk about the “corporeal language of movement,” “muscle-memory,” “incorporated knowledge” or the like, metaphorically locating the game of soccer within language-talk. However, within my definition of terms, this would refer to

“language” of the game--those systems of activity and social rituals that are incommensurate inter se—and not the “language” of linguistic expression (cf. my discussion of language b) and language a) in Chapter III). As a side note, however, it strikes me as unnecessary to label any structured activity a “language,” just because said activity exhibits rules and patterns like “a language” does. Part of the systematic confusion often packed into methodologies of linguistic study is due the fact that these two senses of language are often not adequately disambiguated. A language, in one sense, is the background paradigm against which significances first come upon the scene. Language, in a different sense, are the signs that serve to represent those significances. The game of soccer is language in the first sense, but it is—on my account—decidedly not language in the second sense: that which is significant in the game of soccer cannot be represented without ultimately distorting its basic structures.

Once again, the game analogy embedded in the term *Sprachspiel* intends to show that linguistic utterances and actions are “woven together” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §7) and that “speaking a language is part of activity, or of a form of life” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §23). The question, though, remains as to whether such activities and forms of life that make up the fabric of *Sprachspiele* are examples of knowledge-*that*, like chess, or examples of knowledge-*how*, like playing soccer

If it is believed that *Sprachspiele* are of a piece with games like chess, then linguistic practice is also linguistic in and of itself, since the game runs on tracks amenable to propositional representation and linguistic packaging. What we do with words, it would turn out, can be talked about with words, what is often referred to as meta-linguistic explication. Language itself would, then, be meta-linguistic all the way down. However, if it is believed that *Sprachspiele* are of a

piece with games like playing soccer, then linguistic practice is *pre*-linguistic, to a large degree, since the game does not run on tracks amenable to propositional knowledge and linguistic packaging. What we do with words, it would turn, cannot be really talked about with words. Language itself would, then, not be meta-linguistic all the way down. I take this second possibility to be perhaps the essential insight of the *Philosophical Investigations*. I also take it as the premise from which much more “continental”-minded thinkers (Bourdieu, 1982; Butler, 1997) will construct their own theories of the speech act, to be discussed below. Of course, in some sense rules can always be explicated. Grammars for learning a “language,” for example, show how linguistic utterances *could be* mapped out as generative rules. However, it is one thing to map language as structure post hoc and it is quite another thing to postulate that the rules are there in medias res “with” the speaker in the act.

2.2 How to Follow a Rule

In elucidating speech acts in chapter I, I spent a lot of time puzzling over toy cases: marriage ceremonies, ship-christenings, bet-makings, and the like. Such Sprachspiele, much like chess, are paradigm examples: the “rules” of the game can be, more or less, talked about. A la Austin (1962) these cases also demonstrate that language is not composed of representations of logical propositions all the way down. What is called language is not just an elaborate manner of pointing at things, like the Augustinian account of language that Wittgenstein rehearses in the opening pages of the *Philosophical Investigations* (§1). Such clearly performative statements like “I do!” in a marriage ceremony have no *no truth value*, viz., they cannot be true nor false, because they do not refer to or pick out a state-of-affairs. Rather a performative like “I do!” caps off a particular social ritual. Instead of representing a *particular* part of the world in a *particular*

way--like Frege's theory of sense and reference discussed in Chapter III section 2--such performatives complete a move in a game.

The payoff here is to show that the performative seriously undermines the assumption that language tout court is an array of propositions that depict states-of-affairs. Speech Act Theory's granular attention to and description of performatives functions as a methodology to *show* that there are vast stretches of linguistic terrain in which language is performative and ritualistic instead of propositional and declarative. I reiterate this difference because the above claim that language is largely *pre*-linguistic only makes sense against the assumption that language is *ex vi termini*--by the force of the term itself--propositional and declarative. Said another way: my claim herein on probation can only be coherently developed against the contrastive claim that maintains that language is by definition the storehouse of knowledge-*that*, i.e., propositional knowledge.

I am claiming that language is by and large *pre*-linguistic because actors' ability to explain the games they play with it is rather shockingly limited. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein illustrates this point with his discussion of "following the rules." By offering endless counter-examples, Wittgenstein intends to show that the rules of the game can never be locked down in an ironclad, decontextualized fashion. For example, I can teach you the rules of a number-adding game by which I show you a series of numbers: "0, 2, 4, 6, 8" and tell you to go on. You continue "10, 12, 14, 16" and I think to myself: "Ah! This person has grasped the rules of the number-adding game!" But then much to my dismay, once you reach 1,000 you continue with "1,004, 1008, 1,0012." Dumbfounded, I ask: "But didn't you *understand* the rule?" and you tell me: "Sure! I took the sample series that you gave as depicting the rule to 'add 2 up to 1,000, 4 up to 2,000, 6 up to 3,000 and so on.'" (Wittgenstein, 1953,

§185). My wires are crossed. I am confounded. But I also have no way to prove that you followed the *wrong* rule. And, by the same hand, you had no way of knowing-*that* the rule that I “taught” upon which you thought to have had a firm grip was not the right one.

Taylor (1993) explains Wittgenstein’s point here as such: “If in order to understand directions or to know how to follow a rule, we have to know that all these deviant readings are deviant, and if this means that we have to have formulated thoughts to this effect already, then we need an infinite number of thoughts in our heads to follow even the simplest instructions“ (p. 46). Every rule is subject to an infinite number of mis-interpretations. It seems like it cannot really be explained how one *knows* to follow an arrow in a road-sign from its feather to its tip and not its tip to its feather (Wittgenstein, 1953, §85) or how one *knows* that when someone points to something one should follow the direction from wrist to fingertip and not fingertip to wrist (Wittgenstein, 1953, §185). If the only way I guard against such strange ways of following the rules is by knowing-*that* everything single misapplication of the rule is, in fact, a misapplication, i.e., by keeping them “stored” in my mind linguistically as propositional knowledge, then I would have to know—and be able to say!—all possible misapplications in advance. And this is clearly absurd. But the fact remains that do folk *do* follow successfully pretty much each and every time.

In following the arrow from feather to tip on hiking trail and I go left instead of right. When you point out a red cardinal perched on a tree branch “over yonder” my eyes trace your hand from wrist to fingertip. From this perspective, it would follow that if rule-following is not a matter of knowledge-*that*, it must then be a matter of knowledge-*how*. It would also follow that if for every rule that exists an infinite number of possible misapplications, then rules cannot be

wholly expressed linguistically, since this would entail enumerating the infinite number of possible misapplications.

For the later Wittgenstein, following a rule is embedded in an intuitive cultural understanding that lends intelligibility to social ritual and practice: “Is what we call ‘obeying a rule’ something that it would be possible for only *one* man [*sic*] to do, and to do only *once* in his [*sic*] life?—this is of course a note on the grammar of the expression ‘to obey a rule’” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §199). Instead of universal metaphysical function applied to a local circumstance, a rule is a social practice intuitively understood by those who have been acculturated into the game. In this sense, the performative “I do!” in a marriage ceremony does not so much express a proposition that shows knowledge about a state-of-affairs in the world as it *expresses* the participant’s understanding of what it means to play a particular role in a particular ceremony. And, as the Wittgensteinian account of rules makes clear, such understanding in the key of knowledge-*how* cannot fully reduce to the key of knowledge-*that* without also introducing a vicious epistemic regress. It is as if an interpretation of a rule “hangs in the air along with what it interprets” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §198). The rules of the game cannot be grounded in anything outside of the game itself.

2.3 The Habitus

What is off-the-cuff taken as language is deeply rooted within the Sprachspiele wherein language is found. Within a maximal reading of the later Wittgenstein there is no language without a game that underpins it. A speaker can learn new linguistic features, only if she is already well-versed in the moves of the game for which the linguistic feature stands. An explanation of a word’s meaning tells a speaker its use “because, as if we might say, the place for

it was already prepared” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §31). One’s mastery of language presupposes one’s mastery of Sprachspiele.

If, for example, a hypothetical researcher is parachuted into a hypothetical culture, in order to learn the hypothetical language, she must first learn the “language” of the Sprachspiele. What such a researcher “has to witness in order to figure out the words of an unknown language are the language-games in which the speakers of the language and through which their basic language-world relations are revealed because that is wherein they consist” (Hintikka & Hintikka, 2007, p. 34). To speak a language not only means to have an idiolectal stock of structural and lexical features. It also means becoming a skilled player in the language game—that intuitive touch that allows speakers to rumor, threaten, promise, report, scam, warn, bet, exclaim, insinuate, predict, and the like. As the above section sought to clarify, the rules of Sprachspiele qua culturally bounded activities are off a different sort the rules of language qua structural and lexical features. Language in the second sense *can* be well ordered as propositional knowledge. Language in the first sense cannot. However, Sprachspiele are to a large degree marked by their regularity and durability: the same games get played over and over and over again without a hitch. As a hermeneutic for understanding this aspect of Sprachspiele, I move to Bourdieu’s theory of language (1982) and his concept of habitus (1990).

In much of his writing on language, Bourdieu puts pressure on the Chomskyan linguistics. Bourdieu argues that the most striking feature of linguistic practice is not the ability of speakers to produce an *infinite* number of grammatical sentences, but rather their ability to produce a *single* utterance precisely fitting to the social situation at hand. As Thompson describes in his introduction to Bourdieu’s theory of language, “The kind of competence that *actual* speakers possess is not a capacity to generate an infinite sequence of grammatically well-

formed sentences, but rather a capacity to produce expressions which are appropriate for particular situations, that is, the capacity to produce expressions à propos” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 7). Unlike Chomsky who focuses on the possibilities of linguistic invention Bourdieu, thus, focuses on the kairoic nature of linguistic practice: that speakers so often seem to “know” the right thing to say at the right time to the right person.

The question, then, turns out to be quasi-epistemological. Even if speakers’ can readily explain post hoc why they said what they said that does not ipso facto imply that speakers in medias res can propositionally explain why certain utterances are fitting in certain circumstances: such “knowledge” that enables successful performativity must run on different tracks. The appropriate way of understanding the speech act of apology begins to look completely different than the appropriate way of understanding the linguistic elements of the utterance: “I’m sorry.”

Bourdieu accounts for these different types of knowledges—what I have called knowledge-*that* and knowledge-*how* following Ryle (2009)—through recourse to his theory of habitus. Mainly drawing on the existential phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (1962), habitus aims to describe the practical knowledge-*how* that social actors express in a variety of social settings. Habitus aims to split epistemological-ontological difference: one’s ability to handle one’s self in a culture neither cashes out in i) knowledge-*that* of interlocking propositions (what Merleau-Ponty would call “rationalism”); nor in ii) a Skinner-eseque type of behaviorism, wherein, stimuli and reactions are mapped onto one another in a strict 1-to-1 correspondence (what Merleau-Ponty would call “empiricism”).

Instead, à la Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu hypothesizes that actors have an interpretive sense for the game that neither functions as explicit mapping of the game, nor as a conjunction of knee-jerk reactions. Within familiar social milieux, actors cope with the exigencies of social life

in the same way that skilled athletes comport themselves in a sport—through a type of incorporated understanding that allows of rapid-fire interpretive decisions without the intervention of thematic-linguistic reasoning. Humans-in-habitus command a “practical sense” that:

is a quasi-bodily involvement in the world which presupposes no representation either of the body or the world, still less of their relationship. It is an immanence in the world through which the world imposes its imminence, things to be done or said, which directly govern speech and action. It orients “choices” which, though not deliberate, are no less systematic, and which, without being ordered and organized in relation to an end, are nonetheless charged with with a kind of retrospective finality. (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 66)

Habitus is the stage-setting against which social action makes sense. It is that which funds the legibility and the credibility of the social field: “Human beings are socialized into this system of dispositions that enable them produce on the appropriate occasion skillful social activity that embodies, sustains, and reproduces the social field that in turn governs this very activity” (Dreyfus & Rainbow, 1993, p. 37). Backtracking to my above discussion of rules, it could be said that the rules of Sprachspiele are bound up in the habitus. To speak “a language” means *to incorporate* a particular culture’s way of doing things--to viscerally understand the games this culture plays—before or equiprimordial with the mental acquisition of a new linguistic sign:

Adapting a phrase of Proust’s, one might say that that arms and legs are full of numb imperatives. One could endlessly enumerate the values given body, *made* body, by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy which instill a whole cosmology, through injunctions as insignificant as “sit up straight” or “don’t hold your knife in your left hand,” and inscribe the most fundamental principles of the arbitrary constant of a culture

in the seemingly innocuous details of bearing or physical or verbal manners, so putting them beyond the reach of consciousness and explicit statement. (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 69).

It is crucial to reiterate what Bourdieu here makes apparent that the “structures” of habitus and its “cosmology” are beyond the reach of propositional knowledge and linguistic representation and that such a claim *does not* a fortiori turn humans into automatons, solely mechanically carrying out pre-packaged reactions to basic stimuli. The habitus is a realm of creative free play that is never fully finished off or determined, filled with moves, strategies, interpretations, judgements, goals, procedures and the like that require no thematic representation in order to be executed. The habitus is the requisite background for à propos speech. If this is the case, then, once again, i) pre-linguistic structures and dispositions are what subtend manifest linguistic practice; and ii) the role of the body, and its allocation within a pre-linguistic and hierarchically distributed social field, makes a significant contribution to linguistic practice. In taking up conclusion ii) habitus as “incorporated belief” points to the body’s occupation of cultural coordinates as the “invisible” locus of linguistic meaning. Or said differently: On Bourdieu's account to interpret the legibility of speech is to interpret legibility of the body. Below, I turn to Butler’s (1997) account of the speech act in order to better understand this conclusion.

2.4 Productive Censorship

Butler’s (1997) most explicit account of the speech act sets out to understand the legibility of the performative through a hermeneutic that both accounts for the givenness of social factivity and the possibility for radicalizing the speech act through the insurrection of speaker agency. Butler’s end goal here--much like the rest of her work—is to develop a conception of agency that allows of a revolutionary politics without recourse to a pre-cultural agent. Butler argues repeatedly across her body of work that “freedom” is never simply a

throwing-off the shackles of politics in order to discover the pre-discursive self, un-marked by social inscription. Instead, “freedom”—a concept in Butler-talk that is better denominated as “agency”—is a re-inscription of the body in a new kind of politics.

The body “is not an independent materiality that is invested by power relations external to it, but is that for which materialization and investiture are coextensive” (Butler, 1993 p. 34). The speaking-body is always already intermeshed within the politics and the culture and the nexus of power relationship in which it is thrown. The habitus is not an optional social contract that counterposes the state of nature against society. Without converting into a *fait accompli*, the habitus is the *sine qua non* background against which social acts and ritual show up as meaningful. Simply put: to be an agent is to perform through the habitus. There exists no escape hatch. There are only revolutionary ways to re-articulate the habitus.

However, insofar that habitus is constrictive by that self same degree it is also productive. The rules of the game are what make game-play possible. A political discourse that converts subject and society into antonyms with the goal of developing a fuller picture of agency “falsely presumes that (a) agency can only be established through recourse to a prediscursive ‘I,’ even if that ‘I’ is found in the midst of a discursive convergences, and (b) that to be *constituted* by discourse is to be *determined* by discourse, where determination forecloses the possibility of agency” (Butler, 1990, p. 182). The cultural background which is the habitus makes agency possible through the selfsame incorporated methodologies by which it limits it.

This walks a fine ontological line. The agent does not fully determine the habitus, nor does the habitus fully determined the agent: “is there not also the case where we play--and make up the rules as we go along? And there is even one where we alter them--as we go along” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. §83). Both exist in an open-ended dialectical relationship which is

mutually constitutive yet which is never mutually exhaustive. The habitus does not fully constrict what it constructs. The “rules” of the habitus can feel as fixed and solid as those of chess or as opened-ended and plastic as a rainy-day game made up on the spot: “It’s two points if the paper ball goes into the wastebasket directly, one point if it bounces off the wall.” It is thus imperative to understand the simultaneous rigidity and flexibility and the permanent state of incompleteness of social ritual in order to understand how i) speech acts exist within social temporality (Cf. my discussion of Butler in Chapter II); and ii) to understand how speech acts can be *both* legible *and* transgressive--how a performative can signify without strictly adhering to already-established rules and conventions.

As noted in Chapter I, SAT in its analytical iteration tends to hypostatize the speech act as an atemporal set of rules, metaphysically locked up in an ideal realm. The act of illocution—the successful realization of a speech act in light of conventions established before the act—presupposes such airtight logics. On the analytical account, a speech act falls on the chess side of the spectrum: “I do!” in a marriage ceremony realizes a universalized procedure just as much as “Checkmate!” does in chess. Butler (1997), however, is quick to point out the fallacy embedded in such thinking. The moment of speech act realization is never singular, but rather it “is a condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past and future directions, an effect of prior and future invocations that constitute and escape the instance of the utterance” (p. 3). Butler's opening play here is to fluctuate the speech act: the performative utterance, seemingly is never wholly perlocutionary nor illocutionary. It makes sense in light of the conventions of past invocations but iterates on them in aleatory and agentive ways.

Whereas an analytical approach to speech acts is primarily concerned with what constitutes an appropriate utterance within the speech act, Butler, on the other hand, is primarily

concerned with what constitutes an appropriate speaker within the speech act. Borrowing a rhetorical term, Butler shifts analytical attention away from discourse and towards ethos of the speaker. It is by understanding what constitutes a legible speaker that it can be understood what counts as a legible performative. And not vice versa.

Such a move affects a reversal in the rhetorical temporality traditionally associated with ethos. On the traditional account: a speaker's credibility is granted as *the effect* of past credible discourses accrued to the speaker. Call this a posteriori ethos. On the account on probation here: the speaker's instituted role conferred by the game and played out in the game is *the cause* of whether their discourse is deemed credible or it. Call this a priori ethos. This, by and large, is an insight garnered from Bourdieu. Bourdieu (1991) compares the authority embedded in the speech act that permits speakers' legible speech to the Homeric skeptron, which conferred rhetors the right to speak. What I would call a priori ethos is granted to a speaker: "only under certain conditions, namely those which define legitimate usage: it must be uttered by the person legitimately licensed to do so, the holder of the skeptron, known and recognized as being being able and enabled to produce this particular class of discourse" (p. 113). Once recognized that it is *not* the case that legible speech confers the speaker with linguistic authority and that it *is* the case institutional authority of the speaker confers speech legibility, the analytical task is to understand i) precisely *how* such authority is conferred, and ii) by what means such authority can be contested and redistributed.

3 Moving Back to Rhetoric

Extrapolating out from these claims, I hypothesize a *pre*-linguistic intuitive sense for the language game is what arrays rhetorical situations for the speakers. Take for example a typical college classroom: one large desk next to the action of the lectern and the chalkboard and rows

and rows of small individual desks in front of it. Here, the rules of the *Sprachspiel* are inscribed in the very architecture of of space. Students who have been acculturated by years of compulsory schooling *already* “know” what their speaking-role will be in such a space: sit quietly, raise your hand, and wait for the teacher to call on you. In the same way, an actor “becomes” Hamlet when she enters the stage and the curtain rises, a student “becomes” a student when she crosses the threshold of the classroom. The incorporated understanding made available by the habitus lays out the groundwork for such performatives, without the need for explicit instruction.

Such possible examples abound. I “know” neither to talk louder nor more often than an intermittent whisper in a library reading room. I “know” how much small talk with a colleague is appropriate in a crowded elevator. Likewise, for a native New Yorker, there perhaps nothing more jarring than a stranger who tries to strike up a conversation in the subway at rush-hour. This commuter does not “know” the rules of the commuting-game, and the ways that New Yorkers tend to value anonymity and privacy in public spaces. Like the last example of the subway car, social actors do not often recognize such rules as rules until someone “breaks” them. The student who “calls out,” the elevator chatter that goes deeper than the weather, the talkative tourist on the 6 train--all expose what the implicit norms were all along through the transgression of them.

Folk follow the rules, for the most part, as a routine. And folk can recognize when the rules are “broken” by others and by ourselves. But it does not seem like folk can state the rules before the fact or in medias res, even if folk can post hoc explain them. I often ask my students how they *knew* which desks were theirs and how they knew to start taking notes. Normally, this question gets no answer. Rightfully so: since there really isn’t one. The rules of the game inhabit the body in a way out of reach to verbal language—what Bourdieu (1977) calls *bodily hexis*:

“Bodily hexis speaks directly to motor function, in the form of a pattern of postures that is both individual and systematic, because linked to a whole system of techniques involving the body and tools, and charged with a host of social meanings and values” (p. 87). And elsewhere: “Bodily hexis is a political mythology realized, em-bodied, turned in a permanent disposition, a durable manner of standing, speaking, and thereby of feeling, and thinking” (p. 94). *To be* an appropriate student in a typified classroom means having incorporated the appropriate bodily hexis for that setting. For example, in K-12 settings a good deal of teaching time is spent trying to inculcate this appropriate bodily hexis. Imperatives like: “Raise your hand before you speak!” “Don’t sit on top of your desk!” “Don’t chew gum in class!” bring the body into the fold of the habitus and defines the playing field for appropriate classroom discourse just as much as (if not more than) the official transmission of linguistic rules and conventions.

Flores & Rosa (2015) speak to this claim with their theory of racio-linguistic ideologies, arguing that the racialized bodies of speakers are what mark their linguistic practices as “non-standard,” rather than any objectively observable linguistic feature: “non racialized people are able to deviate from[...] idealized linguistic practices and enjoy the embrace of mainstream institutions, while racialized people can adhere to [...] idealized linguistic practices and still face profound institutional exclusion” (p. 165). Language, in this sense, is coded from the “outside” just as much from the “inside.” Language is issued from bodies that, in turn, are *pre-linguistically* and hierarchically configured in the habitus.

The translingual turn, however, has focused nearly exclusively on spoken and written language far more than on “hexis” or embodied discourse. Stemming largely from applied linguistics, composition / rhetoric studies, and pedagogical theory, what is taken as language in

this research literature is taken in its most off-the-cuff definition: utterances or textual discourse constituted by sounds and written signs.

Throughout this project, I have intended to show that language can be isolated as sounds and signs—or meaningful types of lexical and structural features—within only a limited set of circumstances. In particular, in the opening sections of this chapter, I have tried to bear out the slogan that what can be said is based on what cannot be said. The games speakers play with language are based in social ceremonies and rituals and forms of incorporated understanding that cannot be reduced without distortion to a nexus of explicitly articulated rules and regulations that could be in turn represented within systems of representation that off-the-cuff referred to as “languages.”

Below, I switch gears and begin to develop an account of “translanguaging,” based on the claims thus far developed. Using the theory of rhetoric developed in Chapter I, I postulate that translanguaging is fundamentally a perlocutionary speech act that pushes and redefines both performative and linguistic conventions. As such, translanguaging is also a *political* act, since its transgressive property has the capacity to challenge the status quo power relations.

The power of the term translanguaging lies in the emphasis that gives the speaker agency. To translanguage is an act by which speakers authorize themselves to change the rules of the game, even while the game itself is being played. In order to conceptualize how translanguaging *ex vi termini* transgresses, below I turn to a reading of Muñoz’s (1999) concept of disidentification. While my reading of Bourdieu and Butler above aimed to emphasize that actors are always already embedded in a social field that they enact by cooperating with it or acting against it, my reading of Muñoz will interpret how the habitus is challenged and even revolutionized through acts of agentive performatives.

Even though the possibility of performative transgression is present in the writing of Bourdieu and Butler, Muñoz focuses on developing vocabulary for how particular performatives can iterate on solidified norms, challenging their underlying structures. In this line of investigation, I will also rely on Maffesoli & Gutiérrez's (2005) use of the "anomic" and the "nomic" as a tool to understand how the dominant logics of the habitus at the same time establish the obverse possibility of subversion. This argument will track Foucault's (1978) aphoristic quote: "where there is power there is resistance" (p. 95). Where there are "rules" there are also deliberate "misapplications" of them.

3.2 Disidentification and Translanguaging

To understand disidentification, I back-track to Butler (1997). Borrowing from Lacan, Butler describes a process of "foreclosure" that constitutes the subject as viable. Foreclosure is the series of necessary prohibitions that one must follow in order to be successfully incorporated in the habitus. One might think of Levi-Strauss's early structuralist writings on the incest taboo as a description of a paradigm case of foreclosure. Such a taboo generates a fundamental logic—a baseline structure—in which a culture can take root. Much like the boundary lines on a tennis court that establish "in" and "out," and, thus, makes possible the game of tennis, foreclosure a la Butler describes a cultural injunction of "in" and "out," and, thus, makes possible the games of the habitus. The grammar of "foreclosure" is instructive here; it suggests settling on one set of possibilities and ruling out another set. *Vis-à-vis* the speech act, foreclosure is an act of censorship that bifurcates discourse into the sayable and the unsayable. It is, at one and the same time, a restrictive and productive form of power:

The operation of foreclosure is tacitly referenced in those instances in which we ask: what must remain unspeakable for contemporary regimes of discourse to continue to

exercise their power? How is the “subject” before the law produced through the exclusion of other possible sites of annunciation within the law? To the extent that such a constitutive exclusion provides the condition of possibility for any act of speech, it follows that “uncensoring a text is necessarily incomplete.” On the assumption that no speech is permissible without other speech becoming *im*permissible, censorship is what permits speech to inform the distinction between permissible and impermissible speech. Understood as foreclosure, censorship produces discursive regimes through the production of the unspeakable. (p. 139)

The constitutive act of censorship is a double-edged sword: foreclosure is an act of disclosure just as much as disclosure is an act of foreclosure; the boundary line of a tennis court only has an “in” if there is also an “out,” and only has an “out” if there is in an “in.” The same strike that produces the sayable also produces the unsayable. Or, in other words, the demarcation of the sayable cannot be realized without purposefully or inadvertently demarcating the unsayable. Perhaps, paradoxically, the sayable is only actualized through the shadowy realm of the unsayable: outlawed discourse is as necessary to lawful discourse as much as it is also a threat to it.

The foreclosure / disclosure of the unsayable and the sayable that Butler describes above can be further elucidated in light Maffesoli & Gutiérrez’s (2005) development of Durkheim’s use of the anomic / nomic division. In a sociological account of presence of the representation of the devil across Latin America, Maffesoli & Gutiérrez conceptualize the anomic, as the realm of obverse possibility generated by the conventionalization of normative procedures and structures within the realm of institutionalized ideology. The anomic counter-power is to status-quo power as negative space is to positive space in a photograph or painting. It can be said that the

“anomic” is co-extensive and co-temporal with the “nomic,” since The practices of counter-power exist alongside the practices of power. The presence of such “counter-practices” furthermore provides dominant ideology with the requisite justification for its being. In the same way that the church “needs” the devil to vouchsafe its existence, the nomic maintains its control through the continual spectral presence of the anomic:

Like the devil, the informal aspect of anomic behavior is generally located in the margin of a formal structure and in the constant interchange between actors, within a wide array of factors. The phenomena of the anomic, in effect, represent a large part of the operation of social and political richness. They are part of the underlying processes of individual interactions where power-relations and the struggle for power is put into play; [the anomic] is the *potential* contra power. The informal phenomena--the substratum of anomic behavior--are nothing more than the *mirror image* of formal structures that permits actors to activate the shock absorbers and mechanism of compensation [of dominant culture], intrinsic to every society and human group [my translation]. (p. 16).

To use a bland term, the anomic is a “counterculture” *made possible* by the dominant culture. This strikes me as an important point: the anomic does not come out of left field, but rather is the unintended or aleatory possibilities generated by and through the intersections of the formal structures of the dominant ideology. For example, Political graffiti in protest of government policy on walls of state buildings is only possible because there are state buildings and because reading and writing are learned in state-sponsored schools. Sit-ins in college campuses are only possible because there are college campuses. Parody and satire are only possible because there is something to parodize and and satirize. To standardize the rules of the game by definition negatively defines a “deviant” way of doing things. The standard provides a warrant for its

existence through the putative necessity to dominate the un-standard that it itself created. Returning briefly to Wittgenstein's account of rule following, any attempt to standardize completely and fully *one* possible interpretation of a rule—paradoxically—credits the possible existence of all potential misapplications of a rule.

I read Muñoz's (1999) concept of disidentification as outlining a particular type of rhetorical discourse that is implicitly based on my above discussion of "foreclosure" and the "anomic." In line with the habitus-based approach to performativity of Butler, Muñoz's task is to understand how new cultural practices can be constituted without recourse to a utopic framework that posits a space of agentic freedom counterposed against the prohibitions of dominant ideology. If, for example, a performative identification, say, lines up without remainder with the perceived norms of said speech act, then a performative of disidentification *repurposes* the rules of the game without entirely denying them. If the performative "I do!" completes the norms of a marriage ceremony in an act of identification, then, it could be said, that a performative like "I kind of perhaps maybe do!" puns on or repurposes the performative in a way that does not deny utterly the "correct" institutional response. Muñoz writes: "Disidentification is the third mood of dealing with dominant ideology, one that neither opts to assimilate within a structure nor strictly oppose it; rather, disidentification is a strategy that works on and against dominant ideology" (p. 11). If the belief is accepted that actors are always already within productive and constructive habitus--one which is enabling yet never totally rounded off and finished--then the generation of new cultural practices must, in some, already be "there" within the already marked off social fields of the habitus. Disidentification can account for such "already-there-ness" of subversive cultural practices through understanding the realization and development of such practices as *a*

consolidation of the anomic centrifugal behaviors generated by the continual stabilization of the nomic centripetal status quo:

Instead of buckling under the pressures of dominant ideology (identification, assimilation) or attempting to break free of its inescapable sphere (counter identification, utopianism), this “working on and against” is a strategy that tries to transform a cultural logic from within, always laboring to enact a permanent structural change while at the same time valuing the importance of local or everyday struggles of resistance. (ibid.)

With this notion of disidentification up and running, a new working definition of rhetoric comes into view. As argued in Chapter II, it seems that defining rhetoric as future-tensed perlocutionary discourse might ultimately fail, if all invocation is at one and the same time a *re*-invocation of past performatives and a stage setting for future ones. Such a definition “temporalizes” *all* performatives and collapse Speech Act Theory distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. However, rhetorical discourse can still be seen as “future-tensed” by defining it as *a* type of disidentification discourse that centralizes, develops, and narrativizes the anomic practices constituted at the fringes of and by virtue of the repetition of the formal structures of the nomic, dominant discourse.

4 (Neo)liberal Agency and Translanguaging

The goal of chapter III was to show that the meaningful potential linguistic expression-- or what I have called “linguistic packaging”—is not generated by the putative linguistic systems of named national languages. Instead, it is the relation that a linguistic feature holds vis-à-vis a meaningful element within a Sprachspiele that thus allows it to “signify.” In other words, if a linguistic element can be correlated with a move in the language game, then the grammar of the game, so to speak, takes over. Any sundry item can be a chess knight, if both players understand

the role that the chess knight plays. This argument, to a certain extent, is intended to bear out the translingual turn's central claim, that named languages need not be postulated in order to understand linguistic meaning. However, "language" is clearly more than linguistic features, just as chess is clearly more than the particular pieces of any random chess set. In this section, I claim that the narrow focus that translanguaging and / or translingualism gives to "language" as idiosyncratic collations of linguistic features possessed by single speakers can inadvertently elide important questions of power.

Sprachspiele can be played with an infinite variety of pieces. Again, I hope this is evident from Chapter III. But, for my money, rather than asking after how games can be played with so many different pieces, the more fundamental question is what are the games being played and to what ends are they played. It is my contention that if "translanguaging" ends up just saying that speakers can play the status quo Sprachspiele instituted in and through dominant ideology with any variety of linguistic features, then the political and perhaps revolutionary potential of the term is seriously undermined.

4.1 (Neo)-Liberal Agency

Translanguaging often seems to operate within an extremely "liberal" picture of agency, in a sense strictly limited to political philosophy. Speakers have unique language resources that they negotiate in light of societal constraints. Such an image is highly reminiscent of Locke's (1960 [1689]) basic conception of the liberal individual. Humans, by intrinsic nature, are "in *State of perfect Freedom* to order their Actions [...] as they think fit [...] without asking leave, or depending on the Will of any other Man" (p. 287). This premise is the basis of generic social contract theory: the individual is properly *pre-political* and only relates to other individuals

through various types of official or sanctioned relationships. The individual can enter and exit the political sphere in the same way that a person can get on and off a bike.

The story of translanguaging often follows this liberal narrative: speakers must conform to societal standards of named language or discursive conventions when in public, but in private they can language authentically, as they see fit: “A translanguaging epistemology would be like turning off the language-switch function on the iPhone and enabling bilinguals to select features from their entire semiotic repertoire, and not solely from an inventory that is constrained by societal definitions of what is an appropriate ‘language’.” (García & Li Wei, 2014, p. 23). Such a claim tracks nearly step for step the Lockean picture above that, in a nutshell, claims that in pre-societal state speakers have an acultural set of desires and rationality, which, in turn, is lamentably constricted by societal expectations. Freedom is loosening those constricts on the individuals whenever possible so that they might realize their “perfect state of freedom.” On this account, a politics is the arrangement of so many individualistic desires and rationalities, instead of being so many desires and rationalities being the result of a politics.

The political liberalism embedded in translanguaging is evident in other venues. Otheguy et al. (2015) argue that translanguaging is “the deployment of a speaker’s full linguistic repertoire without regard for watchful adherence to the socially and politically defined boundaries of named (and usually national and state) languages” (p. 283). And elsewhere in a different formulation: translanguaging is “using one’s idiolect, that is, one’s linguistic repertoire, without regard for socially and politically defined language labels and boundaries” (p. 297). Such claims *prima facie* have a political bent to them. The socio-political categories of “English” and “Spanish,” say, impose a limitation on a speaker who would otherwise speak freely.

Dismantling named languages lifts an unnecessary sanction imposed on the speaker by the “Will” of another party.

However, I argue that even if the sanctions of named languages are lifted, translanguaging as defined above, is still embedded in a web of Sprachspiele that are made available in and through the habitus. To fully deconstruct the picture of named languages does not ipso facto generate a linguistic utopia, wherein unfettered “communication” can occur.

Language is Sprachspiele all the way down. There is no escape-hatch from the game. I defend this thesis fully: even a conversation with our dearest friends is still a language-game. It is “rule” bound. The utterances, even in this game, are drawn out or harken forth by the incorporated sense of the performative circumstances at hand. The deepest secrets told in Catholic confession are circumscribed by the most intricate forms of pageantry: the material architecture of the confessional expiates the sin just as much as the word of the supplicant. As I am wont to ask my students: Would you pay attention to me if I approached you on a street corner and started lecturing about rhetoric? The chalkboard and the lectern mark classroom discourse “academic” just as much as the ideas do (Even if there were “pure communication,” would it not be the case that “pure communication” would be the name of the Sprachspiel being played?)

Challenging named languages and named languages alone will do little to bring about political change, if the Sprachspiele that underpin all linguistic expressions are not also contested. A working-class Latinx student from the South Bronx, stuck in a low-wage retail job has to talk “white,” no matter if “English” and “Spanish,” really exist or do not. A child has to answer an abusive parent with the correct performative—or suffer the consequences—even if she can draw on her full range of linguistic resources in doing so. Multinationals are quick to

translanguage in their advertisements when good profit is to be had. In these cases the linguistic features are “liberalized” or “deregulated” but the underlying corrosive game remains the same.

In a word: it seems that the translingual turn is more concerned with the *how* of language than the *what*. I take this, as more or less, unintentional. Uprooting the entrenched ideology of monolingualism (Matsuda, 2006) is no small feat. But, without a concerted effort to the contrary, translanguaging runs the risk of being co-opted within the fold of neoliberal ideology.

Flores (2013) examines in detail the possible symbiotic relationship between an ideal neoliberal subject and the trending interest in fostering speakers with fluid, translingual semiotic resources. Both the ideal neoliberal subject and the “plurilingual subject” are:

characterized as dynamic and ever changing, and able to adapt to the increasing diversity of society through a lifelong development of cultural competence and lifelong expansion of their linguistic repertoire. In addition, both subjects are depicted as emerging naturally from the changing global political economy and as the inevitable and desired outcome for all the world’s population. In the case of neoliberalism, the emergence of dynamic subjects as flexible workers able to continually accumulate human capital is argued to be necessary for economic development. In the case of plurilingualism, the emergence of dynamic subjects as fluid language users able to continuously accumulate new language competencies is argued to be necessary for the development of a new citizenship to fit a new common communicative sphere. The many parallels between the two ideal subjects, as well as the aura of inevitability of both discursive regimes, indicates a possibility of their convergence in ways that are molding fluid linguistic practices in the service of the neoliberal agenda. (p. 513).

Translanguaging's emphasis on a speaker's ability to transcend the borders of named language often surprisingly mirrors the types of post-national economic relationships engendered by a global neoliberal market place. Just as much as the traditional confines and regulations of the labor market are being pluralized by the gig economy, so too are the traditional boundaries and rules of language. In fact, a translingual proficiency, and ability to command multiple linguistic features associated with different "languages" along with different modalities—is precisely what is demanded of the neoliberal, gig worker. The uber-driver-*cum*-pastry-chef-*cum*-web-programmer needs to manipulate multiple discursive registers and linguistic features and modalities just to get by. Whereas the long-standing fixity of national languages mirror economic nationalism, the flexibility of linguistic practices called for by translanguaging neatly mirrors the flexibility called for by the neoliberal market.

4.2 Named Languages and the Idiolect: A New Political Ideology

Translanguaging a la Otheguy et al. (2015 & 2018), I have maintained, is fully committed to the non-existence of named languages, and, in making this argument, this account of translanguaging made the idiolect of individual speakers its conceptual center piece.

It seems to me that such a theoretical move can be simplified and exemplified in the following way: Sofia, instead, of speaking "English" and "Spanish" and "Portuguese" and "a little bit of German," speaks *Sofia*. Juan, instead of speaking "Arabic" and "Urdu" and "French" and "a little bit of Mandarin," speaks *Juan*. In one sense, the shift towards the idiolect does, in fact, get rid of named national languages, like "English" and "Spanish." However, in a much more important sense, this shift gets rid of named languages of nation-states by replacing them with the named languages of individual speakers. Thus, if Sofia speaks *Sofia* and Juan speaks *Juan*, the world is still populated by named languages, albeit at a different scale. This "scale,"

furthermore, is wholly amenable to the worldview instituted by the discursive regime of neoliberalism: a post-national epoch in which the individual herself is turned into a self-sufficient corporation of one and the primary donée of political life.

However, I do not seek to deny the possible validity of the idiolect. It strikes me as ultimately tenable to argue that unique speakers bring idiosyncratic styles to the language game—just imagine how many batting stances there are in baseball or how many ways there are to shoot a free throw in basketball. Imagine a chess tournament, for instance, in which the players, instead of using standardized pieces, bring their own motley assortment of pieces to play the game, ad hoc mixtures of pieces collected over time, through playing the game with different players in different parts of the globe.

These above analogies strike me as the best means to describe the best case version of a idiolectal approach to translanguaging: each speaker brings heteroglossic semiotic resources idiosyncratically organized in light of her own subjective history to the common and mostly objective language game. However, at this juncture, I register a strong disagreement with the political neoliberalism of idiolectal translanguaging. It is not the case that the speaker's linguistic repertoire is essential and the language game is accidental. Rather, it is the case that the language game is essential and the speaker's linguistic repertoire is more or less accidental. Sprachspiele are the sine qua non background of all idiosyncratic linguistic practices.

The realization that speakers could play the language game with a variety of pieces does not ipso facto cash out in the actual possibility that speakers can—or, better yet, are *allowed to*—play the game with non-standardized pieces. It is easy for me to picture the toy-case above in which the chess players in a chess tournament are invited by the tournament organizers to bring their own assortment of pieces. But it is even easier to imagine the more probable case in which

the tournament demands that all pieces in play be “standard.” Again, chess could be played with any hypothetical number of pieces. However, if in the game at hand the rules dictate that standard pieces must be used, even if such a rule is not essential to the game play itself, it is still, nevertheless, a foundational rule of that game at hand.

Even if a given Sprachspiel could be played with any number of linguistic features this realization does not ipso facto cash out in the fact that the Sprachspiel can or is *allowed to* be played with all available linguistic features. A teacher’s callous injunction of “English only!” is a rule of the language game played in that classroom even if it does not “have” to be. Named languages from the sub-specie aeternitatis perspective of theoretical existence are not real, but as the generative rules of Sprachspiele, they often turn out to be very real.

The ontological waters muddy here: If language is Sprachspiele all the way down, and the injunction to use certain linguistic features and not others can be considered a constitutive rule of the language game, it would then follow that the sets of linguistic features institutionally marked as this or that named language can shape linguistic practice at a very basic ontological level. To uproot named languages, in this sense, would require not only a reminder of the infinite possibilities of linguistic expression, but it would also require deep revisions in basic rules of dominant Sprachspiele. Thinking along with Bourdieu, it is not what speakers could do with language that counts, but rather what speakers are allowed to do with it.

5 Conclusion

It is imperative not only change how speakers language, but also why speakers language and with what goals in sight. Translanguaging and/or translingualism often seem not to be able to see beyond, well, “language,” in a sense strictly limited to the types of arbitrary linguistic expression outlined in Chapter III Section 2. The translingual turn, in general, has brought

analytical and theoretical attention to linguistic practices that have been for a long time utterly marginalized and considered aberrant from the norm. Understanding such practices from a theoretical and practical perspective has, as I have argued in Chapter III Section 1, raised essentially an ontological question regarding language and languages. It has thoroughly critiqued the straw-man folk belief that linguistic expressions are meaningful because they are generated in and through the rules of named languages (Cf. my reading of McGinn [2015] in Chapter III Section 2). However, applying pressure to the norms of linguistic expression alone, without critiquing the *Sprachspiele* that underpin risks the possibility that the same old language game continues to be played, albeit with different pieces. To see that named languages have nothing to do with the significance of linguistic expression is to catch a glimpse of *what* does make language mean.

I have thus outlined that to understand linguistic expression it is perhaps more productive to look towards the conferred legibility of the speaker than towards the legibility of the performative utterance. And to understand this “a priori ethos” it is necessary to understand the *pre*-linguistic structures of the habitus that locate bodies hierarchically within a grid of status quo power relations. Authority in language comes from the “outside” and that language is, “at best” a representation of this extra-linguistic authority (Bourdieu, 1982, p. 109). Again, to understand that speakers could translanguage—viz., use the full range of their linguistic repertoire to play the language game—is not of the same order as understanding when they, in fact, can. As argued above, Flores and Rosa (2015) issue a forceful reminder of this fact, that those granted racial privilege from “outside” of language, so to speak, are given free reign to translanguage, and those who are denied such privilege are not. Perhaps, then, translanguaging is best seen not as a linguistic freedom independent of the language game, but rather as a transgressive performative

within the game itself. Translanguaging, in this sense, is to take the skeptron, even though it has not been granted.

Of course, taking the skeptron comes at a great cost. Many of the counter-arguments that are endlessly rehearsed against any type translingual pedagogy runs along the tracks of: “well, that’s all well and good perhaps in your classroom, but what about when these students need to write a cover letter?” And there is a tinge of truth here: Sprachspiele are often very high stakes games and failure to play the right piece at the right time can result in anything from economic loss to physical harm. A translingual approach for me, then, would not entail emphasizing the possibility of a neoliberal linguistic freedom, wherein speakers idiolects are counter-positioned against accidental societal impositions, but rather it would be a thorough-going analysis of how every linguistic feature is one and the same time *a move* in the language game. For example, to convert a college classroom into a translanguaging space requires a lot more effort than overt instruction by the instructor that such linguistic practices are valid and encouraged here. Instead, it requires a type of exploration of the classroom Sprachspiele and what it means to hold skeptron and to issue a performative utterance under the constraints of this game. In terms of disidentification, it seems to me that translanguaging signals those linguistic-performative practices that intend to re-inscribe the rules of the game without exiting it. A worker “cannot” give an order to a boss. But, in a transgressive act of re-appropriation, if a worker does in fact give an order to her boss, then the rules of the game—mid-gameplay—are contested, and not only the linguistic features used to play it. Even if the rules of the game are constitutive, this does not mean that they are also fixed.

Agency, in this sense, is not a freedom from “societal constraints” but rather a product of them. Power is restrictive and productive. Foreclosure is at one and the same time disclosure.

The rules prohibit and enable. A social actor is at all times made possible by the habitus, but the habitus, in turn, can never finalize completely the actions and the choices and the performative realizations of the actor. Translanguaging, I feel, would be much better off with this picture of agency instead of the often-hinted-at picture of neoliberalism embedded in the picture that locates the speaker here independent and self sufficient of arbitrary cultural norms and rules there. All the rules of the game are always open for agentive contestation but they are not optional.

Translanguaging as such would acknowledge that the majority of what makes “language” possible is rooted in pre-linguistic incorporated knowledge-*how*—the bodily hexis that Bourdieu describes. To rummage around in the Pandora’s Box opened up by the questions: “What is language?” and “What are languages?” seems to lead to the realization that the practices and rules and conventions crowded in under the term “language” all seem to hang “in the air,” as it were. Colleagues small talk in elevators. Students raise their hands in classrooms to answer teachers’ questions. Rumors are successfully spread, and all is this is skillfully and routinely accomplished even if nothing seems to ground the rules of these Sprachspiele that exceeds the confines of the game itself. Translanguaging is to go off script as much as it is to change around the linguistic features—the pieces of the game. And this is where the “freedom” of translanguaging lies: the ability to repeat the rules differently, to evoke the practice in a different key. Translanguaging is when the performative changes over from rehearsal to premiere, when the possibilities on “the other side” of the rule come back around to change the rule or create a new game itself.

Chapter V: Translingual Pedagogy

1 Introduction

The dominant definitions for what language “is” and what languages “are” will, no doubt, dictate thinking, writing, reading, and speaking, as well as how they are taught in schools in colleges. All pedagogy is rooted in ontology. And, ontology, in turn bespeaks the predominant foundational understandings of the reality of experience. What educators take to be existent, in turn, conditions inexorably what subjects should be taught and how to teach them. These chapters have revolved around making sense of the “ontological” arguments of the translingual turn. I have intended, from a variety of philosophical perspectives, to explicate possible conclusions and consequences of what I take as the bedrock sine qua non translingual claim: that languages (plural) do not exist, but language (singular) does.

In tracking the contours of this claim, I have both concurred and dissented. On the side of concurrence: languages do not exist when language is assumed to be linguistic expression and linguistic expression alone. If language “is” the arbitrary linguistic features contained inside the practical envelope of the utterance, then I firmly hold with the theoretical linguistic account of Otheguy et al. (2015 & 2018) that language qua named languages are nowhere to be found. The word shines forth as the word. All there is is language. On the side of dissent: languages do, indeed, exist, and are, in fact, incommensurable with one another, when language is assumed to be the constitutive *Sprachspiele*—the social rituals and games that dictate what folk do with words—that circumscribe and bring significant life to the utterance and its “linguistic” content. This hypothesis of incommensurability is directed at the nexus of constitutive rules that define

the language game through and through: a checkers player cannot play the queen's gambit, just as much as a public proclamation cannot be made in secret.

Reviewing: the rules of language qua linguistic expressions are sets of *external* relationships. The rules of the language qua Sprachspiele are *internal* relationships. I take this thesis as describing a rather basic empirical observation. I can rumor, for example, in an admixture between “English” and “Spanish,” but I cannot rumor by stating a blatantly obvious fact. I take this yes-and-no position as theoretically centrist. It splits the difference between a linguistic utopia that translanguaging often seems to promise, founded in the political philosophy of liberalism, and a rigid monolingual view, founded in the ideology of colonialism that fixes languages as static, immutable systems (Pennycook & Makoni, 2006). My thesis, however, is also intended to offer a critique. Limited attention to the linguistic features that play the role of moves and strategies in the language game and *not* the rules of the language game itself can often elide questions about *why* and *to what end* the language game is played.

The goal of this present chapter is to use the theory built in the prior chapters in order to bear out two claims about composition-rhetoric pedagogy: i) that this pedagogy is primarily and essentially concerned with understanding the constitutive relationship between linguistic features and the moves in the language game; and that ii) composition-rhetoric pedagogy *as such* is *already translingual*: the study of the language game—what speakers do with words—transfers across all “languages” (and, for that matter, what one might call “modalities” as well). These claims are founded in the premise that what I will call “linguistic-rhetorical metacognition”—or a speaker-rhetor's ability to reflect analytically over linguistic practice in the act of crafting appropriate utterances or writing—typically precedes what might be called “language acquisition.” If linguistic features are tied to the roles, intentions, and uses they perform, then it

would seem to follow that in order for a student to incorporate new linguistic features, she must be able to articulate or to clarify the rules of the language game first.

The straw-man critique of the translingual turn is that it wants to throw out the rule book, and, thus, leave teachers with no singular language as the subject to teach. However, this could not be further from the truth. The translingual turn, as I hope to have made clear, does not abandon the belief that language is fundamentally rule-bound, but rather it locates the “rules” differently. The constitutive rules are not “in” named languages but “in” the language game, the situationality that brings forth the intelligibility of discourse. In fact, a translingual approach to composition-rhetoric pedagogy requires an analytical attention to language that is far more nuanced and attentive than that which can be captured in standard, skill-and-drill pedagogies. To reject the belief that there are such entities in the world as “standard” named languages does not cash out as the abandonment of grammar, but rather broadens it. This move understands all language use as grammatical and rhetorical, and it understands grammar and rhetoric in turn as hermeneutics that locate linguistic practice as the dialectical effect of its practical conditions of production and reception.

In Chapter IV, I argued that the game has always been going on and that *to be* a social actor, in a certain sense, is to be through the habitus. Put differently: humans-in-habitus already have a deep understanding of the social institutions that set the stage for meaningful social activity, even if they can only explain the rules of the game as rules on occasion. To live through the habitus makes no use of explicit instructions or thematic playbooks. However, the habitus *can* be put on display, so to speak, by the means of clear-sighted description and critical reflection. In this final chapter on pedagogy, I intend to develop dialogic pedagogy (Freire, 1968; Shor, 1980) as a methodology which surfaces the existential structures of the habitus and which,

in turn, thematizes these structures as the discursive context of the educational practices of composition-rhetoric pedagogy.

By and large, what I describe below is meant for students' whose average-everyday linguistic practices are routinely stigmatized as "broken" or "non-standard." The joint interpretation of the language game already in play instead of the transmission of a fictional linguistic code especially positions linguistically-minoritized students as expert linguistic practitioners who are, perhaps, not well-versed in discussing critically and explaining analytically their own expertise. Like a skilled driver who can use a manual transmission with ease but cannot teach someone else how to do it or cannot say aloud how she knows when to downshift, my students often lack ability to articulate their skillful practices as skillful practices. They know the "rules" but they are hesitant to articulate the "rules" as rules. In this vein, the pedagogy developed below uses the explicit hermeneutic of the habitus as a springboard for linguistic-rhetorical metacognition: students' development of meta-vocabularies derived from and for the description and the analysis of the everyday language game fosters the critical skill of theorization in general.

I take this as a fundamental element of linguistic-rhetorical transfer. That is, without the ability to theorize a linguistic practice, the skills developed in one linguistic-rhetorical domain will not be carried over to another. This claim about transfer and the translingual approach that I outline also suggest a disciplinary claim about composition-rhetoric pedagogy. I aim to disambiguate composition-rhetoric pedagogy from pedagogies premised on the incorporation of new linguistic features, whether such pedagogies be "second-language" acquisition or "skill-and-drill" approaches to composition and rhetoric.

The capacity for the invention of ad hoc meta-descriptive vocabularies for any number of linguistic-rhetorical contexts is the domain of composition-rhetoric pedagogy, whereas the ability to learn *already-made* vocabularies is the domain of linguistic acquisition vocabulary. To learn the conjugation of the “French” verb “être” in the indicative and subjunctive tense is distinct from learning how to describe and theorize the Sprachspiele in which this word might play a role. Language acquisition pedagogy is concerned with the former, and composition and rhetoric pedagogy is concerned with the latter. Furthermore, I argue that i) one cannot reduce to another, that is, composition-rhetorical pedagogy cannot reduce to language-acquisition pedagogy, nor vice versa; and that ii) while I consider them to be equally important, I maintain that linguistic-rhetorical metacognition typically comes *a* step before linguistic acquisition. A speaker-rhetor must already “have a place” for the new linguistic feature, before it can be learnt. This place is realized through the development of linguistic-rhetorical metacognition.

However, I signal from the onset that my description of composition-rhetoric pedagogy is not meant to demote language acquisition pedagogy. Folk learn new “languages” and new linguistic features of “languages” they already know successfully and routinely. There is no doubt about this. My argument is, instead, that composition-rhetoric pedagogy is a different pedagogical category with a fundamentally different pedagogical scope, which often, mistakenly, is pigeon-holed within the pedagogical practices and educational outcomes of language-acquisition pedagogy. I intend to “extract” composition-rhetoric pedagogy and show it to be concerned with a different—yet equally important—type of language learning.

A translingual approach to composition-rhetoric pedagogy focuses on what speaker-rhetors do with language (Lu & Horner, 2016) without fixating on any one set of linguistic features. Said differently: what most interests this approach is the constitutive relationship

between the exigency of the language game at hand and the linguistic features selected—thematically or a-thematically—by the speaker-rhetor to accomplish that exigency. This premise, again, is translingual since it goes beyond this or that “language.” The emphasis on the relationship between exigency and elected linguistic feature is broad enough to capture anything from punctuation marks to digital modalities to facial expressions to road signs to typeface deployment. As I hope is apparent from the prior chapters, it is this “grammatical” relationship that makes linguistic practice significant instead of the “grammatical” relationships that obtain inter se within the putative linguistic systems of named languages.

A general translingual approach, thus, to composition-rhetoric pedagogy is interested in this “vertical” grammatical relationship between linguistic feature and move in the language game and relegates the “horizontal” grammatical relationship descriptive of internal relationships of named languages to sidelines. The translingual and dialogic approach for which I advocate here begins to surface and explicate this “vertical” grammatical relationship through dialogic inquiry into everyday linguistic practice. Once an understanding of this relationship is developed through the study of such practices, it then can be applied in order to understand other linguistic-rhetorical practices, including highly formalized and conventionalized academic discourse conventions.

2 Moving “through” Discourse: Dialogue

The view of dialogue I want to develop begins with an etymological consideration. Dialogue combines the prefix Greek “*dia*” (διά), meaning “through” (like the Latin “*per*”) with “*logos*” (λόγος). Thus, one could understand the substantive “dialogue” as a movement through the logos and the verbalization “to dialogue” as the indication of this movement. Immediately, I bracket the millennia of commentary on the precise valence of logos and define its semantic

content along the lines of what is nowadays generally defined as “discourse.” Following almost step-for-step as what I take Butler to say about discourse (1990; 1993), logos qua discourse is what articulates the habitus. Discourse makes intelligible the social world by providing it with a hierarchical system of signification, constantly clarifying what is good, what is possible, and what is real (Therbon 1980). Discourse, in this sense, is a “telling” that mediates being-in-society. It “tells” or “facilitates” social actors, enacting in social contexts what it means to be a “man” or a “woman,” a “worker” or a “boss,” a “citizen” or a “stranger,” etcetera. Discourse is performative through and through. Although it is the background that funds the significance of social life, it is maintained in the foreground through its performative repetition. The reiterated performative realized in the foreground is meaningful in light of the background that the performative itself projects as an effect of its iterative temporality. Dialogue moves through discourse, explores it, puts it on display. Dialogue is the intention to catch discourse in the act: the hermeneutic procedure that explicates the background / foreground relationship of social performativity without hypothesizing an exit from that relationship.

The goal of dialogue, then, is to understand the sedimented rules of the habitus generally and for the purposes of composition-rhetoric pedagogy the rules of dominant Sprachspiele specifically. Dialogue is, on this account, “analytical” in a loose Kantian sense of the term: it looks for the grounds of intelligibility by seeking to articulate the conditions by which “experience” itself becomes accessible. However, insofar that dialogue is analytical in this philosophical sense, it is *not* restrictive in terms of its methodology. Dialogue requires *no* pre-existing conceptual tools nor predetermined vocabularies. Dialogue is constituted by the intention to move through the logos—to put discourse on display—and through this intention alone. *Any* “language” or linguistic feature can be put to service of the dialogic intention. In fact,

it is often in the most “ordinary” and off-the-cuff language that discourse is most clearly revealed, since “the speaker’s participation in discourses pre-supposes the *unthematized* positing of particular basic assumptions with respect to the domain of experience involved in the discourse” (Kögler, 1999, p. 207).

In a metaphorical sense, to dialogue is to do philology in “real time”: instead of attempting to understand the generative symbolic orders and the latent assumptions of the social practices of a distant historical cultural, it is the attempt that the dialogue’s participants undertake to understand these things in terms of their *own* cultural-historical moment. All can dialogue—all can perform this analytic—since all are always intimately involved in discourse. I take this as the ground floor premise of “critical pedagogy” (Freire, 2000; Shor, 1980; Berlin, 19996; hooks, 1994; Flores, 2013). The question, then, for a dialogic approach to pedagogy is not in the first instance how to “transmit” the tools for dialogue to students, but rather how to inspire the dialogic intention.

Critical or analytic dialogue, in a certain sense, begins when something “goes wrong.” Inquiry sparks when actors experience a tension in day-to-day routines and rituals and “common sense” beliefs. When something goes off script, all of a sudden, one can catch a glimmer of what it meant to stay on script all along. Imagine, for example, walking down Park Avenue and almost getting hit by a car, because it was driving on the left side of the road. In this moment of non-compliance with the rules of the legal-driving game, you realize (and, perhaps, viscerally) what the rules of legal driving are: that, in the state of New York, drivers drive on the right side of the road. However, even if clearly you “know” this rule—you can readily cite it upon prompting—you might not have “seen” the rule in a long time. In the moment of failure—when the game breaks down before your eyes—the rules become apparent by which the game has always been

played. It is also in this moment when the normalized rules become apparent that they also become available for analysis and re-negotiation. “Perhaps, the driver is from London” you wonder to yourself after unleashing a chain of expletives as the car speeds way. And, if you *stay* with the tension, perhaps you finally ask yourself: “Why do drivers drive on the right side of the road here in New York and on the left side of the road in London?” Here, perplexity begins: realizing that the practices of the habitus that are routinized into oblivion are all that there is to go on, while realizing at the same time these practices themselves are unfounded *sub specie aeternitatis*.

Dialogue grips, so to speak, when beliefs go cross-wire and the subsequent tension between beliefs cannot be easily or readily resolved. In more technical language dialogue is generated by the discovery of *aporia*, in a sense of the term more or less restricted to its etymology. An “*aporia*,” as the privation of “*poros*” (πόρος), “a passageway or a means to get across,” suggests a tension. In discovering *aporias* in doxic experience—in realizing that one cannot go any further—social actors also realize that, in a certain sense, they “knew” where they were going all along. Dialogue is generated by temporarily blocking up the well-worn paths of doxic experience in order to see the trajectories of the paths. This “blocking up” also has the potential to create new ones: in generating *aporias* dialogic pedagogy, at one and the same, time hypothesizes alternating views of re-understanding the ordinary.

The linguistic-rhetorical metacognition described in this chapter’s introduction is rooted in dialogue. The type of reflection and analysis sought after by composition-rhetoric pedagogy begins in the analysis of everyday language practices. This is an insight that I have garnered largely from Shor (1980; 1992): that dialogue always begins in *medias res*. Students begin to exercise and develop the capacity for linguistic-rhetorical metacognition through an analysis of

the linguistic practices already on hand. This, by no means, is a gimme: theorizing “on-the-ground” linguistic practices is often more difficult than explicit texts. To borrow a Freirean term, daily experience must be captured—so to speak—through the process of “codifications.” To dialogue about everyday experience, such experience must be isolated as structured or rule-bound, in some sense, in order that that dialogue centers on a phenomenon that is accessible to teachers and students, and, at the same time, so that the dialogue moves beyond the mere interchange of opinions. Dialogue has in its sight the “unwritten rules” of the dominant Sprachspiele always already in play. The more the dialogue can “grip” on to these “rules” the more generative it becomes: through successive layers of joint discovery teachers and student continue the archeology of sedimented linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-*how*.

Composition-rhetoric pedagogy begins by interpreting this social and linguistic knowledge-*how* in dialogue but it is not solely concerned with it. The structures of doxic experience are the preliminary content of dialogue, so that students’ reflexive-analytical capacity might transfer to other domains, whether they be formalized linguistic practices of the university or different realms of socio-political life. In reality, the goal here is not to make the analytic of everyday experience the preparatory act for texts already codified and made explicit. Instead, the goal is to establish students as capable of performing reflexive analysis on any and all speech acts and social rituals. In one single strike the world becomes rhetorical--waiting to be read. Clearly, though As Shor (1980) argues, the “skills developed through consideration of an experiential problem will make education an ongoing process of life—a state of being rather than a course in an institution” (p. 105). It is only when students locate this linguistic-rhetorical analysis as a tool vital in and out of the class, that the world becomes rhetorical as such. Thus, it might be said that composition-pedagogy as such is not only dialogical but also dialectical. It is

always pushing into the most basic conditions of possibility for speech acts while at the same time examining overly formalized texts.

In Chapter IV, I defended the claim that overt linguist practice is rooted in the pre-linguistic structures of the habitus. Speaker-rhetors' ability to rumor, say, is founded on their sense for the language game, instead of being the result of explicit instructions (imagine, for example, trying "to teach" someone how to rumor). The ability to play the language game is a knowledge-*how* even if the linguistic expression that is used to play the language game can be described as a knowledge-*that*. To drive this point home: how a speaker-rhetor rumors is a question of knowledge-*how* and what linguistic content the rumor use is a question of knowledge-*that*. In this sense, the utterance: "They are saying that Sofia is going to be the associate provost" can be hypothetically individuated as a product of knowledge-*how* and knowledge-*that*. It is a product of knowledge-*how*, in that, if it pulls off the speech act of rumoring successfully, it has realized a particular bit of cultural savoir-faire that cannot be thematically mapped out without distortion. It is a product of knowledge-*that*, in that the linguistic expression of the utterance can be thematically mapped without distortion; the syntactic and lexical elements of the utterance are captured fully by explicit, propositional meta-language. Composition and rhetoric pedagogy is concerned with the knowledge-*how*. Linguistic acquisition pedagogy is concerned with the knowledge-*that*. These need not by definition be mutually exclusive. But the fact that they are not mutually exclusive does not mean that they are ipso facto the same knowledge domain. On my account, this also means that composition and rhetoric pedagogy is almost by definition translingual. It is not concerned with this or that "language" or linguistic feature. It is concerned with the knowledge-*how* that speaker-rhetors must possess in order to play the game.

I want to formalize a thesis at the onset: the first move of composition and rhetoric pedagogy is to bracket out the study of linguistic knowledge-that in order to isolate the knowledge-how of speaker-rhetors as the primary inquired-after phenomenon. Composition and rhetoric pedagogy should want to know about the game being played, not the arbitrary pieces used to play it. However, this “bracketing-out” is routed through a study of linguistic features themselves: it seeks to surface the game by ferreting out the strategy “behind” the deployment of each linguistic feature, instead of seeking how such deployment fits “laterally” with the conventions of named languages. Thus, again, a translingual composition-rhetoric pedagogy is not at all a surrender of careful attention to linguistic features to an “anything goes” mentality, but rather a linguistic focus that is so astute that it goes beyond the limited scope of named languages and that of arbitrary linguistic expression.

This “bracketing-out” is both challenging and requisite, so that teachers and students can “see” the game together, to “surface” it, to bring it to light. If the ability of humans-in-habitus to play the language game is in the key of knowledge-*how* instead of knowledge-*that*, the educational “content” of composition-rhetoric pedagogy cannot be taught through the transmission of facts about things—what Freire (2000) would call the “banking” concept of education (p. 71). Lots of things, however, can indeed be wholly learned through transmission: conjugation tables of Latin verbs, the periodic table, the rules and strategy of chess, etcetera. An argument for dialogic pedagogy is not necessarily an argument against fact-based transmission pedagogy. Yet if one buys the account on probation here that linguistic knowledge-*that* is of a different sort than language-game knowledge-*how*, then language-games—what speaker-rhetors do with words—cannot be “taught,” in the sense of “teaching” restricted to the transmission of

abstract rules of grammar, syntax, punctuation or style, that is, the “banking” concept of transmission.

If linguistic skill cannot be thematized propositionally, then it should be understood hermeneutically. Speaker-rhetors are already in the language game, and, thus, the question becomes not how the “rules” of the game can be explained, but, rather, how they can be *made* apparent. Furthermore, it is in this “making-apparent” that metacognition is developed and refined. In interpreting language games already in play, teachers and students learn the processes of interpretation instead of learning the fixed rules of any particular game. This, as well, is the skill that transfers. It is not the particular skilled know-how of any old game nor the fixation and transmission of its rules, but rather the ability to apprehend and to interpret explicitly the rules that allows for the incorporation of new language games and the acquisition of new linguistic features.

3 Changing Over

Composition-rhetoric can maintain its status as a “gateway” course in the university not because it provides students with a “standardized language” that they can use in all their courses (Matsuda, 2006), but rather because rhetoric is the metavocabulary through which all linguistic-rhetorical practices in the university (and outside of it) is best understood. Composition-rhetoric as a “subject matter” can maintain its position as a nearly universalized course and rid itself of monolingual prejudices i) by fully decoupling itself from language-acquisition pedagogy; and ii) articulating the possibilities of rhetoric as a the language requisite both for the understanding and production of “language.”

This, of course, entails a change-over in learning outcomes and methodologies of assessment, both at the localized level of individual courses and at the broader level of

institution-wide writing programs. It is myopic to think that such a change over is out-of-hand or impossible: with enough planning and development, students' linguistic-rhetorical metacognition can be articulated point-by-point as learning objectives and assessed in a manner just as robust--if not more so--than a narrow focus on "standardized language" or belletristic, monologic essay structures.

Such a metacognitive approach is neither really "product"-based nor "process"-based. This approach is not interested in creating finalized texts, nor is it interested in developing the so-called "writing process" of students. Instead, this pedagogy is primarily interested in the metastatements that students can make about their own rhetorical choices and the rhetorical choices made in the world that surrounds them. Boldly: this approach is not interested in composition and rhetoric at all, but rather statements *about* composition and rhetoric, as they emerge in practical contexts. It is reflective, situated, and hermeneutic through and through. This approach converts all teacher statements of the type "this is how it should be done" into teacher interrogatives of the type: "why did you make that rhetorical choice here?", and, furthermore, looks to students' responses—i.e., their skills for linguistic-rhetorical analysis—as the space for pedagogical assessment and intervention.

This pedagogical coin has two faces. One side is practical. The other side is political. On the coin's practical side, I contend that all students benefit from a translingual, metacognitive approach. The ability to explicate critically the relationship between the move in the language game and the elected linguistic feature is simply a more useful skill than rote-mastery of any mythical "standard" language. Again, even if one wants to teach said mythical standard, I would still contend that it is best taught as a series of rhetorical choices that bear a "family resemblance" to one another.

On the coin's political side, an unwavering focus on linguistic-rhetorical metacognition and a thorough bracketing out of the "standard" / "non-standard" distinction brings an immense amount of educational-institutional equity to linguistically minoritized students (I will outline this in detail below). Linguistic-rhetorical metacognition anchored in daily linguistic-rhetorical practices situates students as expert language-users who for years of their educational careers have been systematically linguistically marginalized. Such students already have profoundly dexterous linguistic-rhetorical skills. What they are "missing" is the metalanguage to explicate it and analyze it. "Incorrect" and "correct" as the defining binary of current-traditional composition-rhetoric pedagogy is replaced by the binary of "implicit" and "explicit." The essential movement of this education is not the movement from "incorrect" to "correct," but rather the movement from implicit linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-*how* to explicit—to degree by which such explication is possible—articulation of that knowledge-*how*.

4 About and Aboutness: Discourse and Content

A translingual approach to composition-rhetoric builds language out from the ground floor up. It starts with the conditions of speech in order to understand how speech is made possible by those conditions. A composition-rhetoric pedagogy based in the explication of linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-*how* requires a methodology for isolating and thematizing quotidian experience so that it becomes "textual." This approach requires that educators have a tool set that can concretize run-of-the-mill experience—which usually goes un-interpreted—into something which feels structured enough to warrant sophisticated interpretation. Educators need to have a content "empty" set of concepts that can hypothetically be applied to any speech act or social ritual in order to isolate the "rules" of the game *as* "rules." This vocabulary is more or less strictly formal, in the sense that its concepts are applicable across speech act and social ritual.

Provisionally, I would mark this content “empty” formal network of concepts as *rhetorical theory*. Rhetorical theory, in this provisional sense, is the stock of formal concepts that locate and explicate the situationality of language praxis and the set of hypothetical vocabularies invented ad hoc in order to understand the language game at hand; it is the metalanguage that both generates and is generated through the dialogic reflection upon embodied linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-*how* already in play.

In Corcoran & Wilkinson (2019), we describe what this pedagogy looks like, materialized as a gateway assignment for an Accelerated Learning Placement developmental writing course. Using the standardized vocabulary of the “rhetorical situation,” our assignment asked students to think through several everyday “linguistic situations” using the concepts grouped under the umbrella heading of the rhetorical situation. This means that students were prompted to use “genre,” “audience,” “purpose,” and “medium” in order to locate and explicate the structures of everyday linguistic practice, instead of an already codified text--whether it be something plainly average like an advertisement on mass transit or a more “literary” text. This assignment in particular and this approach in general looks to intervene *a* step before explicit texts no matter what those texts are. Thus, this approach starts by bracketing “texts” *fully* and nominating entirely “experience,” as the initial subject matter for dialogue through which linguistic-rhetorical metacognition will be developed.

The educational outcome here is, once again, transfer. It is assumed that students who can metacognate on daily linguistic-rhetorical practices will be better suited to do as such on formalized texts. But, once again, I want to deny that this approach is teleological: first experience, then academic texts. Dialogue on everyday linguistic practice is not solely a stepping stone for studying formalized texts, even if it sometime fulfills this role. The goal of all

metacognitive practices in the composition-rhetoric classroom is to frame linguistic-rhetorical metacognition as the main learning outcome. To take up an earlier refrain: composition-rhetorical pedagogy, on my account, is translanguaging because it is not concerned with this or that “language” or this or that “text.” It is instead concerned with the statements *about* this or that “language” or this or that “text.” Texts are relevant insofar that they can generate incisive reflection into the language game itself. Maximally: “texts” are the starting gun that sets off the dialogic race. I stress that this is not an ipso facto renunciation of “objectivism” in favor of a whirlwind exchange of individual points of view. If Chapter IV’s claims are accepted that social actors are from the get-go “humans-in-habitus,” then the possibility of dialogue between agents is always delimited in advance by the subtending structures of the habitus. A “text,” in this maximal sense, is little more than the initial moment of strangeness that precipitates reflective inquiry into the language game that is already in place.

Courses on 19th Century American Literature have to teach Melville and Hawthorne and Dickinson. Courses on Early Modern Philosophy have to teach Leibniz and Descartes and Spinoza. *Here* there is educational content. And rightfully so. To teach and to learn these subjects is to engage with a set of theories and data and lines of inquiry already set out before the particular student or the particular teacher has arrived on the scene. These subjects are content-*full*. And that is good. However, composition-rhetoric pedagogy, as I am spinning it, is content-*empty*. There is no predetermined set of theories or data or lines of inquiry that are existent before the particular teacher or the particular student arrive on the scene. All that exists from this pedagogical perspective are the *formal* vocabularies of rhetoric that help surface the rules of the language game and are thus refined and expanded in this process. Composition-rhetoric pedagogy is “meta” through and through. It is not about anything. It is about the aboutness.

This can be a tough idea to communicate to students. The vast majority of them have become acculturated to content-full courses. The vast and intricate note-taking strategies often on display in the library reading rooms—highlighting, sticky notes, different colors of inks for different themes and ideas--attest to the default assumption that being a student just is ferreting out and creating a hierarchy of the essential education content. Even in seminar-style classes that encourage debate and discussion, the critical thinking that goes on is still rooted in the read text. It is still about *something*. It is interested in this and it is not interested in that. Frequently, my colleagues who teach literature courses often wonder out loud how to keep class discussion “rooted” in the text.

Composition-rhetoric pedagogy in the translingual form that I describe is fully reductive, in a strictly limited sense of that term: it continually strives to bracket out content altogether by constantly developing and redefining the metavocabularies of aboutness, instead of focusing on developing any specific claims about any particular content.

Clearly, to talk about aboutness *ex vi termini* is always at one and the same time to talk about something. To be about is to be about something. This is to say that a pedagogy can only arrive at the study of “aboutness” through the study of content. This is the tricky part: to trade in content but not to investigate content. However, this is what once again makes composition-rhetoric pedagogy different than linguistic-acquisition pedagogy. If composition-rhetoric pedagogy were about something, then it would seem to follow naturally the content that it is about could be filled in the way that it most often it is: composition-pedagogy is about “standard English,” “this or that genre,” “citation styles,” etcetera. But composition-rhetorical pedagogy *qua* translingual composition-rhetoric pedagogy is not about something, and, therefore, cannot be reduced to the transmission of a specific content. In order for composition-rhetoric pedagogy to

be really composition-rhetoric pedagogy and not merely a different name for linguistic acquisition pedagogy, it must be about the aboutness of discourse, and not about the content of discourse itself. Instead of aboutness being the tool to get at content, content is the tool to get at aboutness.

5 Linguistic-Rhetorical Metacognition and Linguistic-Rhetorical Educational Equity

For a site specific application of this pedagogy, cashed out as a series of assignments and classroom activities that seeks to create educational-institutional equity, I present here my classes for “basic writing” students whom I continue to teach in the SEEK program at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY. In my SEEK composition-rhetoric classrooms, nearly one-hundred percent of my students have daily contact with Languages Other Than English (LOTES) or routinely employ linguistic features outside the parameters of “Standard English.” From the knowledge-*that* perspective of monolingualism, these students possess linguistic capacities profoundly “deficient”: they lack the “advanced” structural and grammatical acumen of “Standard English” to perform well in the university. In other words, a monolingual pedagogy--as far as I can tell--would be primarily focused on developing students’ writing as a series of finished, polished-off utterances. Students would be expected to command one code of “Standard English” that is the medium of “professional” or “academic” rhetorical acts. This code, furthermore, travels as a universal standard that is in no need of justification or explanatory context.

In many ways, the translingual composition-pedagogy that I advocate is the mirror image of this hypothetical monolingual approach. Whereas a monolingual approach is primarily concerned with the form of the utterance, the translingual approach is primarily concerned with the context of the utterance. Glossing metaphorically: monolingualism is concerned

grammatically with the “text.” Translingualism is concerned grammatically with the “paratext.” This reversal of priority, I feel, is called for given the types of students I frequently teach. Constantly moving through multilingual ecologies, these students have a highly-nuanced and dexterous linguistic knowledge-*how*: when to use a “Spanish” linguistic feature, when to use an “English” linguistic feature, what to say to a boss, what to say to a friend, the multiple modes of digital modalities. Ironically, these basic-writing students are *language-rich*: they are expert speaker-rhetors. The problem is that their linguistic-rhetorical aptitudes go unrecognized by the “Standard English” rubric. Thus, the goal of translingual composition-pedagogy is not to change necessarily students’ linguistic-rhetorical practices, but instead to change the rubric of a restrictive or singular “standard English.”

My CUNY students repeatedly self-report that they have “bad grammar” or that they speak “broken” “English.” My “Spanish”-speaking students—most often from the Caribbean—often self-report that they speak “Spanish” “slang” or “Spanglish.” These determinations have a not-so-silent pejorative ring to them: so often my CUNY students have incorporated the toxic narrative that their linguistic repertoires are a source of embarrassment and in dire need of educational correction. As long as this narrative is operative in the classroom, students enter and engage with classroom discourse trepidatiously: they do their best to copy the sets of linguistic features that they have been told are appropriate for the “English” classroom, and—more often than not—they silence their own voice in doing so.

The monolingual narrative turns the composition-rhetoric classroom into just another hassle for these students: a routine composed of the daily grind of long delay-filed commutes, family obligations, jobs in retail and food service, to which subordination in the writing classroom to the “English” professor’s nit-picking red pen is added in. In this sense,

composition-rhetoric as a required two semester course sequence at CUNY quickly becomes analogous to Driver's Ed: best to get over it quickly and get on with your life. Neither the large class sizes nor the material conditions of most CUNY classrooms helps to change the general Driver's Ed vibe: the drab lighting and rows and rows of students in single, lonely desks activates all the worst institutional memories of high school.

I propose here that the best counter-tactic to monolingualism is to signal overtly to students in plain language that this composition-rhetoric class is about the skill of their already-existing language uses and not their status as linguistic deficits in light of "Standard English." This is the requisite change-over for translingual composition-rhetoric founded in dialogue. Unlike linguistic-rhetoric knowledge-*that*, all speaker-rhetor\rs are already experts in this knowledge-*how*. As Shor (1996) describes in detail, a lot of this linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-*how* is already activated by the material architecture of the standard classroom. Students' frequent desire to sit in the row of desks furthest from the front of class represents a type of cultural linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-*how*. It demonstrates a particular understanding of the language game of the classroom and a particular strategy to cope effectively with it. The move from knowledge-*that* to knowledge-*how* also requires a shift over in classroom discourse. If all speakers have sharp linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-*how*, then the teacher is no longer the sole expert in the room. What the teacher "has" that the students "do not" in this translingual scenario is the meta-language of linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-*how* and the dialogic processes of explicating the "rules" of the language game. This changeover also entails a role-reversal. In the standard classroom, the teacher speaks in the indicative and the students speak in the interrogative. The professor professes and the students, if permitted, ask clarifying questions. But a translingual approach reverses the script: the teacher speaks in the "interrogative" and the

students speak in the “indicative.” Students are prompted by the teacher to make statements *about* their linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-*how*.

It takes a profound effort to counteract the monolingual ideology written into the walls of the drab, institutional classroom. It is still the case that the monolingual narrative of the composition-rhetoric classroom is *already* in place, whether an educator wants it to be there or not. It is still very much the societal norm, keenly reflected when composition-rhetoric professors tell strangers what they do for a living and they hear the shop-worn, eye-roll inducing response: “I better watch my grammar around you!” For the public and for students alike, teaching composition-rhetoric just is teaching “right” and “wrong” “grammar.” Cross the threshold of the classroom and teachers become composition-rhetoric educators who must choose what kind of pedagogues to become. Freire’s maxim (1985), “‘washing one’s hand’ of the conflict between the powerful and the powerless means to side with the powerful, not to be neutral” (p. 122) applies here too: those in composition-rhetoric who do not work to challenge the monolingual narrative are complicit in its continuation.

6 Moving to Problem-Posing

The dialogic approach is founded in problem-posing pedagogy (Freire, 1969; Shor, 1980). It is by “finding the seams,” so to speak, in what Bourdieu (1980) would call the “doxic experiences” (p. 26) in the habitus that dialogue can begin. The processes of dialogic pedagogy aim to de-naturalize the sedimented structures of routinized experience in order to make them available to explicit apprehension and interpretation. One might say that it is through the “shock” of the posed problem--the tension embedded in the linguistic encounter of dialogue--that the rules of the game shift over from invisible to visible. Through dialogue, language becomes both the content of and method of access to the selfsame investigation--a process of generating a self-

reflexive discourse about discourse. I will group the meta-terms that compose this discourse about discourse, after Shor (1992), under the terminological heading of “the third idiom.”

Problem-posing education converts the mundane world of average everydayness into an endless series of texts to be interpreted. The parlor trick of a an educator well-versed in problem-posing is her ability to generate dialogue starting with the most quotidian of objects: the size of the teacher’s desk compared with the students’ in the classroom, the greasy food in the cafeteria, an advertisement vaguely noticed on a student’s commute. The starting premise of problem-posing is that all texts are, in a sense, equalized. Incisive critical dialogue can be achieved whether reading “literary” texts like Shakespeare or reading a meme on Instagram or reading the physical architecture of the classroom itself. The text does not matter. The dialogue does. Texts are levelled off to the same plane of hermeneutic relevance, if and when a problem-posing educator can awaken a profound sense of wonder in the face of the ordinary in students: the fact that ordinary doxic experience is *already*, in some sense, *understood* along with the strangeness of this understanding becomes the guiding light and central “content” of the problem-posing classroom.

In terms of composition-rhetoric pedagogy this type of problem-posing takes root in the fascination that folk can speak and write at all, that there is language instead of no language. It is from the point of view of linguistic wonder, that the distinction between “correct / incorrect” or “appropriate / inappropriate” or “standard / non standard” fades away into non-existence. Language use decenters sets of “rules” or “conventions,” while foregrounding a phenomenon of investigation. The composition-rhetoric educator based in problem-posing, as such, does not transmit these putative linguistic “rules” or “conventions,” instead she leads the investigation into language use as a dialogic mediation towards understanding experience.

I want to emphasize that this is not an abandonment of linguistic “standards.” It is rather the pedagogical realization of the fact that what lies behind what is called “standard” language are moves in this or that language game. To put this bluntly: whereas a current-traditional approach to composition-rhetoric pedagogy might assume that a “standard” language is existent prior to or independent of the act, a translingual composition-rhetoric pedagogy only assumes that the relationship between linguistic features and choice is existent. In a fully rhetorical model of composition-rhetoric pedagogy not only do “standard” languages disappear but so do “languages.” This is because what is studied is not the language qua linguistic expression of an utterance or text, but rather the constitutive relationship between the utterance, the linguistic expression contained in the utterance and the meaning of a situation. The former, once again, would be the subject-matter of the knowledge-*that* pedagogies of language acquisition. If I want to learn “Arabic,” say, then what I want to learn is how the linguistic features historically grouped under the named language “Arabic” have traditionally worked together.

I am arguing, then, that translingual composition-rhetoric pedagogy does not deny the existential possibility or efficacy of language acquisition pedagogies. People learn new linguistic features successfully each day across the globe in their “native languages” and in “second languages,” too. However, composition-rhetoric pedagogy (which, once again, on my account, is, by my stipulation, translingual) is concerned with the unitary phenomenon of the rhetorical act. Furthermore, I argue that even if an educator or an institution is preoccupied with teaching the “standard,” this mythical linguistic entity itself is best taught as a series of rhetorical acts realized always in response to a series of highly contextualized rhetorical exigencies. Where a current-traditional pedagogy sees a “standard” a priori linguistic substance applied *in* the

rhetorical act, a translingual pedagogy sees a “standard” as the a posteriori *effect* of so many rhetorical acts that bear a family resemblance to one another.

Let me try this out with two claims: a student who has a nuanced acuity in interpreting and analyzing the constitutive relationship between the move in the language game and the linguistic feature played is better equipped to learn the “standard” and employ it, than the student who merely learns by rote a set of rules to be followed or broken. It would follow, then, that if composition-rhetoric focuses solely on the situationality of all speech acts, then, in a certain sense, the “standard” is implicitly taught as well. If the learning outcomes of composition-rhetoric pedagogy remain sharply focused on the development of linguistic-rhetorical metacognition, then students will, in effect, be able to recognize and deploy the “standard” on their own accord, since they will have the capacity to analyze in detail the relationship between the speech act and its practical conditions of production or reception. Standard usage will have been demystified by its secondary placement into a meta-process that first foregrounds inquiry into situated meaning.

These “meta” abilities exercised in a non-subordinating critical writing class can then transfer across other speech acts and rhetorical situations, because they are the key to language learning that goes beyond the limited confines of the classroom. It is through understanding the why of a rhetorical act that students really learn the how and the what of linguistic expression.

The claim that I forward is that an education in critical-dialogic composition-rhetoric pedagogy is one of the fundamental premises for language acquisition pedagogy. And not vice versa. In order to learn a new linguistic feature, a student needs to have a place for it. Speaker-rhetors can only map linguistic features to moves in the language game when they i) realize that there is a game in play; and ii) when they can discourse about the game with sufficient explicit

acuity. In sum: linguistic metacognition comes before linguistic skill acquisition. Even to learn a simple conjugation chart of the “French” verb “être” is, in fact, to i) to understand, at some level of explicitness, what it means to use a verb that signifies “to be”; and ii) it is to understand the language game of language learning—a student has to have a grasp, at some level of explicitness, what it means to use a textbook or what a conjugation chart “is.”

7 The Third Idiom

This “aboutness” can be elucidated through recourse to the concept of the “third idiom.” Shor (1992) articulates the third idiom as the vocabulary that results when students and teachers attempt to bracket out their pre-judgements as to what counts as fitting and unfitting discourse in a classroom setting. Through dialogue, a class develops a “language” of terms and concepts generated through the joint-effort of interpreting the joint-structures of doxic experience. The third idiom, in this sense, is not necessarily composed of *already* formalized conceptual language, but rather is the in-process, situated re-construction of prior language that teachers and student reinvent during the class.

The belief here is that dialogic pedagogy can induce the creation of a meta-language, *without* the teacher introducing formal meta-concepts. I (2017) describe the third idiom as “a discursive amalgam” that “discovers a vocabulary of familiar words, rhetorics and ideas used to understand these selfsame words, rhetorics, and ideas in unfamiliar ways” (p. 56). The third idiom is founded on the premise that ordinary language is already suited to perform reflexive analysis of ordinary language. Advanced linguistic-rhetorical metacognition can be generated without out-of-hand barring students from using their authentic linguistic repertoires. In the third idiom, everyday speech gets re-signified as analytical, instead of being solely practical.

This is the starting point of the third idiom: mutual generation of critical dialogue and writing using the linguistic resources already present in the classroom based on a social justice orientation of the teacher that extant student linguistic capital is transformable into analytic tools. However, herein, I would walk the third idiom out another step and relate it more directly to the concept of linguistic-rhetorical metacognition and the study of aboutness that I continue articulating. The third idiom, by definition, is not a static lexicon for discourse or a fixed network of meta-terms. The third idiom itself is an empty space waiting to be filled in by a network of meta-terms generated ad hoc from and for the existential reality of any given course. The third idiom is an intentional medium to create and invent a network of meta-terms that highlight and interpret the rules of the language game that has yet to come into existence.

As a discursive space that is an “empty” a priori that exists as a theoretical potential realized in practice, the third idiom is also utterly self-reflexive. It bears no commitment to this or that network of meta-terms. Instead, it is the commitment to the discovery of new meta-terms and the analysis of the meta-terms already discovered. It is due to this structural feature that third idiom becomes the pedagogical tool par excellence for investigating aboutness.

Educators generating the third idiom through dialogue look for and highlight the initial spark when student discourse goes meta: the situational semantic inventions that students often stumble upon in attempting to get abstract or nascent theoretical points across. For example, a student once described the phenomenon that I think most would call “ideology” as “the dream”: how the structures of society are both constitutive *and* contingent—both “real” and *not* “real”—like the experiences one has while dreaming. Through critical dialogue seeking the emergence of the third idiom, students not only have the chance to fill in meta-terms but to coin the meta-terms themselves.

This move fully centers aboutness as the main “subject matter” of the dialogic approach. It moves one step beyond the plug-and-chug methods of discourse analysis that have the critical-conceptual framework prefabricated. Even if a composition-rhetoric pedagogy situates itself as analytical instead of merely acquisitional, such a pedagogy runs the risk of inadvertently codifying the meta-analysis as content for students to memorize and repeat. The formal-definitional structure of meta-terms like “logos,” “pathos,” and “ethos” are just as easily reduced to correct and incorrect answers on a multiple-choice exam as they are made available as lens for hermeneutic interpretation of actual rhetoric.

The stress that the third idiom places on ad hoc invention of meta-terms guards against the tendency for education to turn everything into product instead of process. The reification of education into things-to-be-taught is the structural co-relative of the “banking concept” described by Freire (2000). If, on an uncritical account, education is, by definition, transmission, then education, by definition, needs something to transmit. And, if, on an uncritical account, education is concerned with analysis, then, education must transmit analysis, as if it were content, that is, the products of analysis--contents--are confused with the process of analysis--methods of inquiry. The third idiom, thus, attempts to preempt the “petrifying” tendency of educational “narration” sickness (Freire, 2000, p. 71) by bracketing out not only pre-set content but prefabricated meta-terms as well. The third idiom is constituted by the discourse that results from a fully “reductive” approach: nothing is left besides the language game already in play and the linguistic features already in hand.

This is a maximal account of the third idiom in order to illustrate its constitutively “empty” a priori structure. In the day-to-day run of things, the introduction of prefabricated meta-terms can be highly productive for generating student linguistic-rhetorical meta-cognition.

However, I will still stress that “teacher talk” always tacitly endorses what it speaks. If a third idiom is not already in construction, then the teacher’s introduction of formal meta-terms runs the risk of freezing in place students’ nascent development of their own critical idiom. The teacher’s vocabulary should fall onto a continuum of possible lexicons, instead of installing itself as a singular against which all others are the deviant.

The possibility of a “true” third idiom is, more or less, an ideal goal hypothesized in order to outline the formal characteristics of a critical dialogue as a pedagogical process. In practical articulation, a teacher is always introducing prefabricated meta-terms, typically with some idea of where the dialogue should go. It would be myopic to claim that a strong emphasis on linguistic-rhetorical metacognition does not direct the process of dialogue. It would also be myopic to claim that even if I aim to achieve linguistic-rhetorical metacognition without recourse to prefabricated meta-terms, by delineating the negative space of the third idiom be filled in by dialogue, I, at one and the same time, do not outline a positive direction for discourse.

Thus, the pay-off of the third idiom is not necessarily a complete bracketing-off of all prefabricated meta-terms. Instead, it is a clear-sighted commitment to said terms as purely formal indicators of the embodied structures of doxic experience. In other words, the meta-terms that the teacher introduces function as tool to thematize—or in Freirean terms “codify”—the structuring elements of everyday linguistic practice that, more often than not, get overlooked due to speakers’ profound familiarity with them. A meta-term that already has currency in academic life, often, needs to be re-discovered—by teachers and students alike—in terms of everyday experience in order for it to be authenticated, so to speak. In order to flesh out this point regarding the third idiom in particular and the educational goal of linguistic-rhetorical metacognition in general, I describe below a classroom activity that I often use with my students.

8 A Dialogue on Genre

“Where do we come across ‘genres’ most often?” I ask the class, as I write the question on the board. This, most often, receives rapid fire replies that I write on the board as a list: movies, TV, books, music, etcetera. Having grown up with streaming video and music services, genre, for first-year writing students, is a familiar, everyday word and concept. Next, I ask students to list off the different genres that they know from one of the items on the list. Usually, we end up talking about movies and I make another list: comedies, horror, action, drama, etcetera. Students, at this point, have already made two classificatory moves: they have told me where genres are daily encountered and what genres are daily encountered.

Still, the dialogue up to this point still remains highly structured on my part: students are still filling in the pre-fixed discursive blanks. From the second list of movie genres, I can now pose a more generative problem: How do you know the difference between a comedy and action movie? And, once again, the responses are usually rapid fire: one makes you laugh, the other has lots of special effects, etcetera. The trick, now, is to get students to abstract out a step further: I am looking for students not only to describe a particular genre but to theorize what genres are in general. It is at this juncture of the dialogue that the third idiom can begin to be constituted. This is when students stop filling in the discursive blanks to which my talk has led them and when they must begin to theorize a response. To move from what a concrete genre is to what genres are in general is also to shift statements about specific content to making statements about the general structures that allow for content.

In a hypothetical literature class the concept of “genre” is to name and study comedies--specific examples of comic literature on a course reading list, for example. But in a composition-

rhetoric class, comedy and other specific items under study are used to establish literate habits of abstraction, that is to name a category, like genre as a meta-classificatory move.

Abstracting out from the analysis of *a* genre to the analysis of *genre*, students often offer a wide array of meta-terms that differ from semester to semester. Genres have “component parts,” “features,” and “characteristics,” to name a few. Genres “provoke” certain reactions—comedies make you laugh, tragedies make you cry. Genres have similar “patterns” or “ways of doing things”—think about when we call a movie’s plot generic. And the list goes on. Different classes and different students express in their idiosyncratic linguistic repertoires that genres are more or less typified or routinized or normalized ways of doing things, without me first writing such defining words on the board. Instead of my teacher-talk setting first the definitional terms, what Shor (1992) calls “front-loading teacher-talk,” students build the concept out of their own everyday reality and extant language use.

In contrast, the educational advantage of the front-loading of student discourse here is two-fold: on the one hand, an ad hoc, grounded approach to constructing meta-terms with students generates more active student buy-in. Students begin to see themselves as genuine stakeholders in the course content and trajectory. On the other hand, this approach emphasizes active or participatory learning in linguistic-rhetorical metacognition. Clearly, an understanding of genre alone can be an important educational goal. But an even more important educational goal seems to be for students to generate meta-terms “out of the blue” and “on the spot”: that students develop a conceptual habit of mind for creative invention of meta-terms.

Next in this lesson on genre, a third list takes over: the list of features that students compose in order describe *genre* as opposed to *a* genre. This already is the start of a third idiom, a network of student-generated meta-terms. But I look to push this dialogue out a step further.

Usually, I summarize and thematize what strikes me as some of the more important concepts in the third list of what *genre* is. From this summative list of student ideas, I pose another problem aimed at developing further this nascent linguistic-rhetorical metacognition: Is this classroom that we are in right now a genre? If this is the case, what makes it so? This problem prompts students to re-apply the meta-terms generated through the study of genre in one context to another context. In addition to the challenging task of decontextualizing one theoretical vocabulary in order to use in a different domain, it also abstracts further the notion of genre by applying to an unusual setting. Whatever vocabulary used in the meta-description will have to be refined and negotiated through applying it to a different phenomenon.

Usually in this activity, students generate unique meta-terms from their linguistic repertoire to describe what I would call “typified behaviors” or the “rules” of social ritual. With these terms the new problem posed “Is this classroom itself a genre?” invites students to interpret by making apparent the linguistic-rhetorical knowledge-*how* that is embedded in the fitting social performatives of being a student or being a teacher. The introduction of the prefabricated meta-term on my part, through dialogic co-construction, now provides a framework for critical dialogue by isolating and thematizing the structuring elements of an experience--being in class--that has been familiarized almost into oblivion. This is what Shor (1980) labels as “Extraordinarily re-experiencing the ordinary” (p. 97).

Mostly, students, using their meta-terms, turn to the material architecture of the space. Students report that classrooms typically have a large desk and a large comfortable chair for the teacher, while students typically have small desks with uncomfortable chairs. Classrooms, almost without exception, have a board—dry erase or chalk—and, as recently noted by some of my students, nearly all have the same bland black white clock ticking away (which in many

classrooms, peculiarly, does not give accurate time) in the background. The space itself is normative and typified. It is a generic classroom that students have seen before. Our ad hoc meta terms have allowed the dialogue to freeze frame the liquid flow of quotidian experience and put in under review.

Students also generally comment that the material architecture of the space, walked out a step, also reveals the power structures physically assumed in the space: the teacher is positioned as the unilateral possessor of knowledge that is, nearly literally, broadcasted from the front of the class towards the back. Students, upon prompting, are quick to make connections between rhetorical space and rhetorical power: years of formation in the K-12 setting taught them that the speaker-rhetor at the front speaks, while the speaker-rhetors at the back are supposed to remain silent. To the extent that students' meta-terms begin to pick out more and more the embedded structures of the "genre" of the classroom, the third idiom continues to develop through a dialectic: as the meta-terms catch and clarify more phenomena, these phenomena, in turn, expand and extend the formal parameters of the meta-terms. It is through this type progressive dialogic scaffolding that, if the moment strikes, I can begin to pose problems that require more profound abstract thought. With the relationship of the rhetorical space to rhetorical power tabled, I can, for instance, ask: Is the authority of teachers that grant them the use of the grand desk and chair or is it the authority of the grand desk and chair that grants teachers their authority? Dialogue that can reach this point begins to vibrate, in a certain sense. All of sudden, all things are up for grabs. The ordinary is re-experienced as extra-ordinary.

It is clear, however, that this type of auto-deconstruction of a teacher's authority is, in a paradoxical sense, made possible if and only if such authority is already established. In a classroom where students refuse subtly or overtly to comply with sedimented norms of

classroom comportment, then dialogue cannot take root. This is evident in K-12 settings where classroom practices are a methodology of physical control as much as they are of educational content. Silently copying out answers from a textbook into worksheets inculcates students into certain appropriate behaviors as much as transmits one subject matter or another. Aggressive, institutional discipline in schooling or in work—as Foucault (1976) defined it—creates student alienation from the formal sites of instruction called classrooms. This produces an effect that clearly interferes with the overarching goals of student-centered critical pedagogy.

As Freire (2000) tells us: “dialogue cannot exist [...]without a profound love for the world and for people” (p. 89). For Freire, “love” means a horizontal type of relating to one another, wherein folk mutually construct their social relations--not one side imposing unilateral and often arbitrary power on the other. From this premise, Freire proposes that the gateway problem of dialogic pedagogy is to dissolve the student-teacher contradiction (Freire, 1968, pg. 60). Students and teachers who resent the fact that the state has either overtly mandated or that the culture has tacitly demanded that they are present in a classroom have to overcome that resentment before entering into dialogue. In some classes, no doubt that that the resentment itself can become a starting-point for problem-posing and the development of dialogue, as Shor well describes in the opening pages of *Empowering Education* (1992). However, dialogue, as argued above, is, more than anything, founded on mutual intention, or, to wax poetically, on the joint wonder of teacher and students. Dialogue can be productively conducted with any and all linguistic features. It requires no specialized idiom from the on-set. But without joint intention of teachers and students there is no dialogue, only unidirectional transmission and passive, half-hearted reception.

9 Conclusion

The overarching educational goal of the types of dialogue described in the above classroom example is that, through repeated practice of generating the third idiom, students will need less and less prompting in order to develop critical analytical idioms both in speech and in writing--that students will learn how to theorize instead of only learning this or that theory. For certain students, especially those who have been acculturated into dominating systems of education, this requires a marked shift in attitude. Classroom discourse changes from being merely a short answer activity, yes or no, right or wrong, or repeating what the teacher has already said, to venturing ideas and creating meta-terms that require a high degree of creativity and risk. To coin a term, in the midst of dialogue, signals that the dialogue's participants also trust one another, that the expansion of semantic significance will not be shut down out of hand. Neither the value nor the correctness of the meta-terms of the third idiom can be known in advance, and, in this sense, dialogue, is more or less, poetic: it makes experience, it names the felt-but-unknown into existence. Such discourse requires that students exit, however briefly, from the strategy of merely getting through the hassle of the course, of flying under the radar. Dialogue asks students to own their own rhetorical ethos through inviting them to name the world through their word, instead of receiving the world through the word of others. Dialogue, thus, is always a gamble. It does not codify in advance where it is going but it distributes its ability to get there through offering a profound faith in students' authentic linguistic repertoires to do the critical work.

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