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THE EFFECTS OF TWO KINDS OF STEREOTYPE THREAT ON IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS IN
AFRICAN-AMERICANS

by

BRAD THOMAS

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2020

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Brad Thomas

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

The Effects of Two Kinds of Stereotype Threat on Implicit Racial Bias in African-Americans

by

Brad Thomas

Adviser: Paul Wachtel, PhD

The goal of the present study was to investigate the role of two types of stereotype threat on implicit racial bias in African-American college students. Research studies have shown that even those people who openly espouse egalitarian values can endorse racial preferences or biases on an implicit level. Furthermore, when an implicit measure shows that African-Americans have a stronger preference for Whites than their own group and/or believe negative stereotypes about their own race, this concept is called internalized racism. Research has also shown that negative stereotypes about the intelligence of African-Americans can impair performance when the threat of confirmation in the relevant domain is activated. This concept is known as stereotype threat. Using an experimental design, the present study determined whether exposure to two stereotypically negative conditions of threat would affect those participants' responses on a test of implicit racial bias (i.e. Implicit Association Test), and whether the potential effects of internalized racism would be mitigated by a strong affiliation with one's own internalized racial identity. The IAT uses response latencies to assess the relative strength of association between the target concept (e.g. Black faces vs. White faces) and an attribute (e.g. Pleasant words vs. Unpleasant words) to determine whether pro-Black bias, pro-White bias or no preference is indicated. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 1) internalized racism stereotype threat; 2) intellectual ability stereotype threat; and 3) no information given (i.e. the

control). Students also completed the Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI) and the Appropriated Racial Oppression Scale (AROS). This study did not find support for the hypotheses that IAT scores of pro-White bias would be greater for the stereotype threat conditions than for the control condition, that stereotype threat would decrease post-IAT MIBI scores compared to the control, and that stereotype threat would increase post-IAT AROS scores compared to the control. Additionally, the findings did not support the hypotheses that overall IAT scores would show less pro-White bias when the MIBI was administered pre-IAT than when it was administered post-IAT, and that Pro-White bias would be greater on an implicit measure of racial bias (IAT) than on an explicit measure of internalized racism (AROS). An exploration of the implications of these results for mental health professionals, caregivers and educators is provided.

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents who shaped me through their example, to the inspirational force that is my wife, and to those people who desire to be agents of change in the fight against internalized racism.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

When education will reduce the size of the negro's penis as well as bring about the sensitiveness of the terminal fibers which exist in the Caucasian, then will it also be able to prevent the African's birthright to sexual madness and excess (Howard, p. 424, 1903).

Where do ideas about the inferiority of African-Americans come from? Slavery is the most likely culprit. The West African slave trade and its soul-crushing and deadly Middle Passage (approximately 2 million slaves died on ships headed to the New World from Africa from a combination of disease, suicide and murder) lasted almost 400 years (Kolchin, 1993). As far back as 1501, the Spanish were the first Europeans to import a modest number of African slaves into places like Hispaniola and Cuba (Davis, 2006). Almost 12 million Africans were forcibly sold into slavery between 1619 and 1859, about 500,000 of which found themselves in what is now the United States (Davis, 2006). During this time, African men and women were treated as chattel and considered partial human beings. This ideology was illustrated in the Three-Fifths Compromise of 1787 (Lynd, 1966). Interestingly, African men and women were viewed as having no capacity to be affectionate, to love or to cherish, and were also regarded as having a notorious capacity for licentiousness, promiscuity and permissiveness.

Although explicit slavery no longer exists, Blacks are still subjected to racism. This concept has been described as beliefs, attitudes, and individual and systemic approaches that degrade people based on the color of their skin (Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999; Williams & Williams-Morris, 2000), and as the deployment of power by the White majority against groups perceived as inferior (Blacks and other minorities). This can occur at both institutional and individual levels, and through both intentional and unintentional action (Jones, 1997) which makes racism a particularly debilitating kind of systemic oppression. This unequal

distribution of systemic power that favors Whites at the expense of people of color is manifested in four different dimensions: (a) the power to make and enforce decisions; (b) access to resources; (c) the ability to set and determine standards for what is considered appropriate behavior; and (4) the ability to define reality (Bivens, 1995). This imbalance of power influences the intra- and extra-personal outcomes for both Whites and Blacks who may or may not want to dismantle oppressive structures.

The literature suggests that African-Americans continue to experience racism on a regular basis in America. The results of a 2008 nationally representative Gallup study showed that that 56% of all adults and 78% of Black Americans see racism as being “widespread” in the United States. In addition, the results of a 2013 nationally representative Pew Research Study revealed that 88% of Black Americans and 57% of White Americans believe that Black Americans experience racism in the United States (Graham et al. 2016). This stigma has been linked to poor mental health, physical illness, academic underachievement, infant mortality, low social status, poverty, and reduced access to housing, education, and jobs (Allison 1998, Braddock & McPartland 1987, Clark et al. 1999, Yinger, 1994). And, a 2009 study on the predictive relationships between race, implicit racial bias and simulated treatment recommendations showed that health disparities between Blacks and Whites was significant. Black patients were 5.4 times more likely than were White patients to receive fewer than the mean number of treatments (Charles, 2009).

The powerful effects of racism provide a rich context for understanding why it is not surprising that it has been found in numerous empirical studies that Blacks have consistently shown a preference for Whites over their own race on measures of implicit racial bias (Spicer, 1999). On an unconscious level, this marginalized group has come to internalize some of the

racist assumptions about their attributes held by mainstream society. This phenomenon is closely related to what W.E.B. DuBois described in the *Souls of Black Folk* as a “double consciousness” whereby Blacks are always looking at themselves through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of the world that looks on in amused contempt (1989 [1903]:3). The identifying feature of implicit cognition is that traces of past experience influence judgment in a fashion not introspectively known by the actor (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Also, it refers to the attitudes or stereotypes ascribed to people on the basis of attributes such as race, ethnicity, age, or appearance) that affect our understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner. Residing deep in the subconscious, these biases are different from known biases that individuals may choose to conceal for the purposes of social and/or political correctness (Mazzocco, 2015). According to social cognition researchers, an attitude is "an evaluation that is, the tendency to like or dislike, or to act favorably or unfavorably towards someone or something” (Greenwald & Krieger, p. 948, 2006). A racial attitude, for example would be the tendency to like or dislike members of a certain race.

The effects of implicit racial bias are so far-reaching that they have recently prompted psychologists, neuroscientists, and lawmakers to investigate the extent to which scientific advancement can be of more service to decision-making in the legal system (Gazzaniga, 2008; Lane, Kang, & Banaji, 2007). For example, prosecutorial discretion plays a role in this startling statistic: one out of every twenty-nine Black adult men and women are currently incarcerated compared with only one out of every 194 whites (Warren, 2008). Prosecutors are faced with the some of the following questions on a daily basis: Should someone who’s been arrested be charged with a crime? How much bail should be recommended? Should a plea bargain be offered or negotiated? Should bail be opposed? And, will minority judges be challenged for

cause or with peremptory challenges (a defendant's or lawyer's objection to a proposed juror, made without needing to give a reason) (Smith et al., 2011)? Prosecutors, judges, lawyers, police and jurors who may explicitly disavow racial prejudice are helping to perpetuate racism and discriminatory practices in ways that are often not consciously known to them.

Racism's contemporary footprints are found in the media's oftentimes negative portrayal of African-Americans' language, expectations, and in the substance of everyday encounters (e.g. situations prone to evoke racial prejudice) that might be more easily adopted by the oppressed group on an unconscious level (Speight, 2007). The normalization and structuralism of oppression in daily life necessarily facilitates the internalization of the dominant White group's values, norms, and ideas by African-Americans and other people of color. Through its internalization, oppression becomes self-sustaining or domesticating (Watts et al., 1999). The target group members believe the dominant group's version of reality, in turn ceasing to independently define themselves (Speight, 2007). Watts-Jones (2002) explained that "when people of African descent internalize racism it is an experience of self-degradation, and self-alienation; one that promotes the assumptive base of our inferiority" (p. 592). According to Williams and Williams-Morris (2000), "Internalized racism refers to the acceptance, by marginalized racial populations, of the negative societal beliefs and stereotypes about themselves" (p. 255).

Like all forms of internalized domination, internalized racism is not the result of some cultural or biological characteristic of the subjugated. Nor is it the consequence of any weakness, ignorance, inferiority, psychological defect, gullibility, or other shortcoming of the oppressed. The internalization of oppression is a multidimensional phenomenon that assumes many forms and sizes across situational contexts, including the intersections of multiple systems of

domination (Padilla, 2001). It cannot be reduced to one form or assumed to affect similarly located individuals or groups in precisely the same way. It is an inevitable condition of all structures of oppression (Schwalbe et al., 2000). Although internalized racism has been most studied in African-Americans, it can also impact the way in which other minority groups view themselves. There have been two studies conducted that relate internalized racism and ethnic identity, and a negative relationship was found between internalized racism and ethnic identity which was detected in Black and Latina/o college students (Cokley, 2002; Hipolito-Delgado, 2007). Internalized racism is so insidious that it has been known to be transmitted inter-generationally (children of color may be told by their parents to avoid socializing with others that have not embraced mainstream White culture). This sharing of historical oppression has been observed in Native-Americans (Duran and Duran, 1995), Jewish survivors of the Holocaust (Krell, 1990; Moskovitz & Krell, 1990; Solomon, Kotter, & Mikulincer, 1988), and Japanese American WWII internees (Nagata, 1990). Other groups that suffer from internalized oppression include women (Bearman & Amrhein, 2014), LGBT (Nadal & Mendoza, 2014), and people with disabilities (Watermeyer & Görgens, 2014).

African-Americans are members of a stigmatized group, and according to Goffman (1963), stigma is a mark or sign that designates the possessor as “spoiled” and, therefore, valued less than “normal” people. People who fall into this category are seen as inherently flawed and are often aware of the negative view that society holds about them. This is called stigma consciousness. Being aware of this fact has some predictable psychological, social, and behavioral consequences (Crocker & Major, 1989). In this regard, Steele and Aronson’s (1995) research investigating stereotype threat is particularly meaningful. This kind of threat is the apprehension experienced by members of a group who feel they might perform less well in a

situation that is consistent with a negative stereotype (especially when the situation is self-relevant) than in a situation in which he or she feels no such pressure. Stereotype threat diminishes performance on tests of intelligence (Steele & Aronson, 1995), math ability (Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999), affective processing (Leyens, Desert, Croizet, & Darcis, 2000), and even on tests of athletic performance (Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999). Just as stereotype threat undermines performance of people in other valued domains, it may also have an impact on White people who are concerned about “failing” a test of racism (Frantz et al., 2004).

The pervasive and grave nature of racial disparities between Blacks and Whites in the educational system is not only due to educational inequities, but also disparities due to stereotype threat. The academic performance of Blacks is more negatively and disproportionately affected than Whites which can be partially explained by the enduring academic achievement gap between both groups. African-Americans, aware of the stereotypes of their intellectual inferiority, perform worse than Whites on tests believed to measure intelligence. To wit, African-Americans perform worse than Whites on vocabulary, reading and math tests, and score below 75% of American whites on most standardized tests, and this gap begins before kindergarten and remains into adulthood (Jencks & Phillips, 1998). As Link and Phelan (2001) emphasized, “No one in the immediate context of the person needs to have engaged in obvious forms of discrimination. Rather the discrimination lies anterior to the immediate situation and rests instead in the formation and sustenance of stereotypes and lay theories” (p. 8). The target’s awareness and internalization of society’s stereotypes is sufficient to produce a psychologically threatening situation. A racially discriminatory act does not have to occur. However, it is worth noting that when stereotype threat is not evoked, many of the performance differences disappear (Steele, 1997).

Literature Review

Part I of the following chapter will examine some of the factors that have been postulated to play a role in the academic achievement gap that exists between Black and White students. The concept of stereotype threat will then be brought forth, followed by empirical studies that have validated the potent effects of stereotype threat and conditions required for its activation and influence on test performance, behavior, cognition and judgment. Those factors that have been hypothesized to potentially mediate and moderate stereotype threat will also be investigated.

In Part II of this chapter, the role of implicit racial bias in the perpetuation of racial stereotypes will be reviewed. Empirical studies and theories will be presented in order to illustrate how the influence of stereotypes can elicit implicit racial bias, and the degree to which implicit racial bias can influence test performance, behavior, cognition and judgment. Those factors that have been hypothesized to potentially mediate and moderate implicit racial bias will be also be reviewed.

Part III of this chapter will explore some of the factors that have been hypothesized to play a role in the internalization of racism. Furthermore, the concept of internalized racism will be introduced, followed by empirical studies that have demonstrated the powerful effects of internalized racism and conditions required for its activation and influence on test performance, behavior, cognition and judgment. Those factors that have been hypothesized to potentially mediate and moderate internalized racism will be also be examined.

Part I

What factors contribute to the gap in achievement?

Influenced by the historical context of the racial caste system of Jim Crow laws and the subsequent relaxation of these draconian measures that in essence became a way of life for Blacks and Whites until desegregation, it makes sense that even as Blacks fought for education, their efforts were tossed aside and disparaged. African-Americans desperately tried through legislation to acquire and have access to resources that were rightly theirs, and were degraded and met with accusations of Black inferiority by many from the White community (Chambers, 2009). As a result, there has been considerable debate in attempting to make better sense of the factors that are responsible for the stark achievement gap between Blacks and Whites.

Black adolescents have consistently scored lower on standardized tests than White adolescents. This phenomenon received the most attention and even became one of former President Bush's primary objectives as he put forth the *No Child Left Behind Act* (NCLB, 2002), the largest and most sweeping federal education reform initiative since the 1960s (McGuinn, 2006). The racial achievement gap is defined as the observed gap in academic performance, usually with White and Asian-American students as one comparison group, and African-American and Latino students as the other (Noguera, & Wing, 2006). Even though research studies have found that there has been a decrement in the gap in test scores of Blacks and Whites over the last 30 years, the margin is still prodigious and given the present rate of variability, it has been estimated that it will take 50 years to extinguish the gap (Hedges & Nowell, 1998). This is significant because test scores are important in determining what school one attends, how much one can earn, and where one finds employment (Kane, 1998). However, it shouldn't go unnoticed that African-American and Hispanic students have made legitimate gains in

performance over the past few decades. Solid progress has been made in high school completion rates, participation in formidable coursework, college attendance and graduation, acquisition of advanced degrees, and other areas (Kober, 2001). More recently, a study by Darenbourg & Blake (2014) found that the achievement gap could be more clearly understood by using a sample of Black adolescents transitioning to middle school through the identification of protective factors that could help attenuate the decrement in achievement observed in this population. The authors found that achievement values (i.e. the importance of academic success) significantly predicted engagement (i.e. the level of interest in valuing education) and engagement significantly predicted achievement. The role of parental and peer influence also played a role in the aforementioned outcomes. This means that the more students feel that their friends encourage them in their academic pursuits, abide by school norms, and have a strong desire to succeed, the more probable students are to possess values and beliefs that education will be a vital component for their future (Darenbourg & Blake, 2014).

Income does appear to factor into the achievement of children, but maybe not to the degree that earlier studies had suggested (Duncan & Magnuson, 2005). The gap in family income between White children and Black and Hispanic children is significant and estimated to be approximately \$30,000. In a study conducted by the Infant Health and Development program, the difference between Black and Whites in a test of verbal ability is approximately one standard deviation (approximately 15 points), and 8 of those points seem to be the result of SES differences in Black and White children (Duncan & Magnuson, 2005). Poor students of color are also more likely to attend schools with lower quality resources and facilities (Kozol, 2005).

There have been numerous other studies that have found that a considerable portion of the Black-White differences in achievement is attributable to family dynamics, such as family

size, composition or socioeconomic status (aggregate of income, education and occupation, but also privilege, power and control when viewed through a social class perspective), but these studies have overlooked a certain aspect of SES that can further account for this gap. It has been argued that wealth (an indicator of both financial and human capital defined as the value of all assets of a family or individual entity minus debt) is the critical missing piece, and has only recently been viewed as such, differentiated from income in the debate regarding educational outcomes (Orr, 2003). Conley's (1999, 2001) study was able to show that there were significant effects of wealth on a diverse group of outcome measures, some of which were attainment of education (graduation from high school and college), the likelihood of drop-out, the risk of being expelled and the prospect of having to repeat a grade. But, even though Conley did not make a direct link to academic achievement, he did refer to its connection to wealth in 2001 when he asked: "Can an effect of wealth be detected in students' aspirational expectations, and even performance?" (p.70).

Other researchers like Phillips, Brooks-Gunn et al. (1998) started to include the concept of wealth in their working models of academic achievement among five to six-year-old children as a way to address this potential relationship. They were unsuccessful in finding an effect of wealth, which may have been due to the young age of their participants, but it was later tested whether or not an effect could be found in an older sample by Orr (2003). In this study, it was hypothesized that a link between wealth and the Black-White test score gap would be found in older children for two reasons: (1) older children are more cognizant of limitations and costs associated with wealth and (2) wealth may have a more powerful effect on adolescents than younger children because adolescents more strongly identify with kids their own age than with their parents (Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986). The results of the study found that wealth *does*

have a positive effect on achievement, even after the family SES variable is held constant, and is helpful in explaining some of the Black-White gap in achievement. However, the hypothesis that the relationship between Black-White test scores and wealth would be more prominent in older children was unfounded. The study showed that the influence of wealth *does not* differ significantly when the ages of the children are accounted for (Orr, 2003).

Another factor that is implicated in the Black-White achievement gap is based on the color-blind perspective of Oppositional Culture Theory (OCT). It contends that an essential cause of this gap is due to the existence of an oppositional culture that exists among minority students that motivates them to reject school as a way to social advancement and to view academic achievement as something that is the antithesis of their minority identity, thus resulting in academic underperformance (Merolla, 2014). From this perspective, minorities who achieve academic success are “acting white” (the discouragement of Black Americans by other Black Americans who discourage their peers, maybe unconsciously, from modeling white people in academic aspirations). This phenomenon serves as proof that racial identity has the potential to influence behavior and psychological states by creating resistance, according to Fordham and Ogbu (1986). They contend that subpar academic performance in African-Americans is attributable to the hierarchical divisions of socioeconomic status, marginality, and racism they have experienced in mainstream society (Ogbu, 1978; Spencer et al. 1987).

Starting in the late 1980s, OCT’s ideas regarding the role of student attitudes in contributing to the achievement gap has been one of the most routinely cited (Merolla, 2014). But, empirical research on student attitudes doesn’t support the OCT structure, finding that what was considered to be the oppositional stance to learning in Black students is mostly untrue. Even accounting for and recognizing the structural impediments inherent in the school, work and

housing environment, Black students generally have pro-school attitudes and have a propensity to support the American spirit of hard work and effort as the crucial underpinnings of upward economic mobility (Downey, 2004; Harris, 2006; 2011; Harris & Robinson, 2007; Tyson, Darity & Castellano, 2005).

Finally, discrepancies in disciplinary actions in school between Whites on the one hand and Blacks on the other may be another contributing factor in the Black-White achievement gap. A nationally representative study in 2003 that relied on parent reports found that Black students were significantly more likely to be suspended than White or Asian students ($p < .001$). Chiefly, almost 1 in 5 Black students (19.6%) were suspended, compared with fewer than 1 in 10 White students (8.8%) and Asian and Pacific Islanders (6.4%; KewalRamani et al. 2007). Another nationally representative survey of 74,000 10th graders showed that approximately 50% of Black students described that they had been suspended or expelled compared with about 20% of White students (Wallace et al. 2008). Additionally, the study showed that, unlike the pattern for other racial and ethnic groups, suspensions and expulsions of Black students increased from 1991 to 2005 (Wallace et al. 2008).

Stereotype Threat

Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson (1995) have brought to light a social-psychological phenomenon that has been consistently shown to influence the academic achievement gap: stereotype threat. One of the most widely examined topics of the last twenty years in social psychology, stereotype threat is defined by Steele (1997) as: the event of a negative stereotype about a group to which one belongs becoming self-relevant, usually as a plausible interpretation for something that one is doing, for an experience one is having, or for a situation one is in, that has relevance to one's self-definition. It occurs when one becomes a part of the *field* of the

stereotype, what Cross alludes to as a “spotlight anxiety.” (p. 195). This current definition emphasizes that a negative stereotype must be self-relevant for it to be threatening, and then the contingency it induces – the accompanying anxiety that occurs when the possibility of conforming to the stereotype or being treated or judged as a result of it -- becomes threatening to the self (Steele, 1997).

As an example, Steele and Aronson (1995) showed in several experiments that Black college freshmen and sophomores performed more poorly on standardized tests than White students on standardized tests when their race was emphasized. When race was not emphasized, however, Black students performed better and equivalently with White students. The results showed that performance in academic contexts can be negatively impacted by the awareness that one's behavior might be viewed through the lens of racial stereotypes. In general, there are several conditions that produce stereotype threat: First, a self-relevant negative stereotype must exist and be commonly known (e.g., "I am a woman. Women are not expected to be good at math." and "This is a difficult math test." Second, the individual must be in a situation where there is a risk of conforming to the negative stereotype. Third, individuals are more vulnerable to stereotype threat if they identify with the performance domain to which the negative stereotype pertains. Experimenters manipulate stereotype threat by placing domain-identified participants in situations where their abilities in the negatively stereotyped domains will allegedly be diagnosed through testing. Those situations that increase the salience of the stereotyped group's identity (e.g. Blacks being asked to take a test of intelligence) has the potential to increase one's susceptibility to stereotype threat (Steele, 1997).

The consequences of stereotype threat

The consequences of stereotype threat on performance have been widely documented,

and there have been considerably more than 100 separate studies examining performance deficits (Davies, Spencer, & Steele, 2005). But, the consequences of stereotype threat are much more comprehensive and extend further than impaired performance in a task-relevant domain. These consequences are important to grasp because these effects can serve as a precursor to withdrawal from the performance domain (Spencer et al. 2016). The arousal of negative emotions in the performance domain is one consequence of stereotype threat. When people complete a high-threat test, they report decreased task interest (Smith et al. 2007) and have more negative evaluations of their experiences (Adams et al. 2006) than do non-targets or targets under low- threat conditions. Stereotype threat also minimizes targets' perceptions of their own competence in the stereotyped domain. As soon as elementary school, girls describe a reduction in math self-confidence under high threat conditions (Muzzatti & Agnoli 2007), and as young adults, women under stereotype threat make more internal acknowledgements of failure on a computer task than men (Koch et al. 2008). The combination of attenuated enjoyment and reduced self-confidence may explain why women experiencing stereotype threat report less interest in math and science domains and more fragile leadership aspirations than men or non-threatened women report (Davies et al. 2002, 2005).

Stereotype threat can also impinge upon and undermine targets' sense of belonging, creating an unstable environment in which their motivation is affected and a greater possibility that they will withdraw from their surroundings (Walton & Cohen, 2007). In the academic or professional milieu, there is a tendency for those from stereotyped or otherwise discriminated groups to have doubts about the quality and level of their social connections (Spencer et al. 2016). It is for this reason that they become acutely aware of signs that they are unwanted. In one study, researchers created a manipulation in which students were persuaded to feel as if they

didn't have a lot of friends in their field of study. This damaged Black students' sense of belonging and trust in their potential to succeed in the field (Walton & Cohen, 2007). In another study, a video showing gender imbalances in a specific environment led women to endorse a decreased sense of belonging and lesser desire to participate in the setting (Murphy et al. 2007).

Empirical investigations about stereotype threat

Over 300 experiments have documented the ways in which stereotype threat can have vast and often harmful effects on a multitude of populations (Walton & Spencer, 2009). The possibility of confirming a negative stereotype about one's group can lead to underperformance on a number of academic or non-academic related tasks: For example, White men in sports (Stone, Lynch, Sjomerling, & Darley, 1999); women in negotiation (Kray, Galinsky, & Thompson, 2002); gay men in providing childcare (Bosson, Haymovitz & Pinel, 2004); women in driving (Yeung & von Hippel, 2008) and the elderly in memory performance (Levy, 1996). The phenomenon is not limited to historically stigmatized groups. As Steele (1997) noted, everyone is a member of a group that is characterized by some sort of stereotype. stereotype threat has been invoked even among White men, a group that is traditionally thought of as unstigmatized (Aronson et al., 1999; Leyens et al., 2000).

As an example of such a phenomenon occurring in White college students, and a partial model for this author's study, Frantz et al. (2004) examined the intersection of stereotype threat and implicit racial bias in White participants in their study, *A Threat in the Computer: The Race Implicit Association Test as a Stereotype Threat Experience*. By investigating whether stereotype threat distorts some participants' responses on the race Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), a widespread measure of implicit racial attitudes. They posited that the race IAT engenders some of the essential conditions of stereotype threat: it

concerns a domain (racism) in which the experimental population (White Americans) is negatively stereotyped (racist). To the extent that participants believe the IAT is diagnostic of racism, it presents a risk of conforming to the negative stereotype. They also explored a potential solution to the stereotype threat problem: If the situation is threatening, perhaps affirming important sources of self-esteem (Steele & Aronson, 1995) can alleviate the threat (Franz et al., 2004) when participants were given the opportunity to affirm their commitment to control prejudiced responses *before* taking the IAT.

Although White people may not perceive their group as one that is generally stigmatized, the literature indicates that there is one area in which they do feel vulnerable -the accusation that they may be racist - and this may be sufficient to induce stereotype threat. Thus, the internalization of a broader, negative stereotype about White people is not required (Frantz et al. 2004) for this effect to occur. Previous research supports the contention that many White people are concerned about appearing racist (Devine & Monteith, 1993; Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Greenwald et al., 1998). Vorauer and colleagues (Vorauer, Hunter, Main, & Roy, 2000; Vorauer, Main, & O'Connell, 1998) suggest that members of majority groups believe that minority group members expect them to be prejudiced and that, in turn, majority group members are concerned about appearing prejudiced in intergroup interactions. Therefore, some White people might experience a sense of threat when they believe their racial attitudes are being evaluated.

What lies at the center of the stereotype threat phenomenon is the context's potential to damage the target's positive self-concept. On a very broad level, the self-concept can be defined as an associative network containing connections between the concept of self and attribute concepts (Greenwald et al., 2002). This would include not only attributes per se (e.g. outgoing), but also roles (e.g. teacher), groups (e.g. one's family of origin) and activities (i.e. Pilates). The

associations of the self with attributions of intrinsic “good”-ness or “bad”-ness occur directly (e.g. “I’m a good mother.”) or are mediated through other aspects of the self-concept (e.g. “I can be forgetful.”) -- allude to one’s self-esteem (Greenwald et al., 2002; see also Zeigler-Hill & Jordan, this volume). Self-esteem then represents the affective part of the self-concept rather than an entity independent from the self- concept. It is thought that if the self-system can be strengthened, the threatening context may not have such a negative impact on performance (Franz et al. 2004). Steele has emphasized the role of self-affirmation (Steele, 1988; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993) using the concept of domain identification. He believes that those who are more identified with a particular domain (i.e. math, old age, appearing racist, body image) will be more susceptible to the effects of stereotype threat than less domain-identified individuals. Identification speaks to the way in which an individual defines themselves, and this personal identity is self-evaluative in nature (Steele, 1997). Steele (1997) states that one way to decrease the possibility of stereotype threat for domain-identified individuals is to get them to directly affirm their belongingness in the potentially threatening domain, which has the potential to be useful.

In these studies, “self-affirmation” is used to describe situations that produce conforming thoughts of the self within domains that are irrelevant to the threatened domain (Tesser, 2000). As an example, one might expect people to affirm themselves *after* they feel the threat of possibly being classified as prejudiced by thinking about other ways in which they are moral, thoughtful, or a similar descriptive. But Tesser (2000) suggests that self-affirmation is most powerful when the aspect of the self that has been threatened is bolstered, although this is often more difficult to achieve than domain-irrelevant self-affirmation. Self-affirmation also has the potential to reduce threat *before* the fact (Cohen, Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Sherman, Nelson, &

Steele, 2000). Sherman et al. (2000) showed that those participants who were affirmed prior to an exposure of threat were more inclined to receive and benefit from potentially dangerous health information than were non-affirmed participants. In this same vein, Frantz et al. 2004 hypothesized that bolstering one's egalitarian values before the measurement of one's racial attitudes may improve self-esteem and help attenuate the decrements in performance caused by stereotype threat.

In one experiment, Frantz et al. (2004) manipulated whether people believed the IAT was diagnostic of racial attitudes (*explicit threat* condition) or not (*no threat* condition). The researchers also built in a control condition, in which there was no mention of racial attitudes (*no information* condition). It was predicted that (a) participants who believed the test measured racial attitudes would show a stereotype threat effect—they would have elevated IAT scores (pro-White bias) relative to those who believed it was not a measure of racial attitudes, and (b) participants who were not explicitly told what the study entailed (the *no information* condition) also would show elevated IAT effects relative to the *no threat* condition, given that participants' suspicion about the true nature of the test may also might generate threat (Frantz et al., 2004).

Another Frantz et al. (2004) experiment was interested in identifying a way in which the IAT could be administered that would be *immune* to stereotype threat effects, and ostensibly serve as an intervention. As previously indicated, self-affirmation prior to an event that threatens one's self-esteem can minimize defensive reactions. Half of the participants were given the opportunity to affirm their commitment to control racial prejudiced responses before taking the IAT. An interaction effect was hypothesized: Conditions of threat would impair IAT performance of those who were unaffirmed, but not the performance of those who were self-affirmed prior to taking the IAT. Results of this study showed support for the authors' hypothesis

that those participants who were given the opportunity to affirm their motivation to control racial prejudice prior to taking the IAT did not show elevated effects (Frantz et al. 2004).

In a contrasting domain, Najdowski (2011) examined the consequences of stereotype threat deriving from the stereotype of Blacks as violent. The study's hypothesis that police encounters serve as a context for Blacks to experience stereotype threat is supported by research citing the negative stereotype that portrays Blacks as prone to criminality (Devine, 1989; Devine & Elliot, 1995). Most Blacks are aware that they are viewed by other racial and ethnic groups in this regard. Sigelman and Tuch (1997) found that 82% of Blacks believe that Whites perceive them as being violent, and Cheryan and Monin (2005) showed that 20% of Blacks described that they were misjudged as criminals by people they didn't know. Blacks are more likely than Whites to think that racial profiling is rampant and (Carlson, 2004; Ludwig, 2003) think that police treat them unfairly overall and (Hagan & Albonetti, 1982; Hagan, Shedd, & Payne, 2005) in in vivo criminal justice interactions (Ludwig, 2003).

Najdowski et al. (2015) examined the effect that this stereotype would have on Blacks in their encounters with police. They suggested that Blacks were expected to feel stereotype threat (anxiety about being unfairly judged and treated by law enforcement because of the stereotype) in these types of interactions. This is concerning because stereotype threat has been shown to have ironic effects on performance and behavior, which can inadvertently increase an individual's likelihood of confirming the stereotype (e.g., Bosson, Haymovitz, & Pinel, 2004; Goff, Steele, & Davies, 2008; Steele & Aronson, 1995). The study also sought to see how gender effected the degree to which individuals endorsed a certain level of stereotype threat in encounters with police. Najdowski & et al. (2015) found that, as hypothesized, Blacks, but not Whites, reported that they were concerned with police officers stereotyping them simply because

of their race. This effect was found for Black men, but not Black women. In another study by Najdowski & et al. (2015), researchers asked both Black and White participants to imagine an encounter with police and determined the ensuing consequences of stereotype threat. Consistent with the findings of the first study, Black, but not White men anticipated stereotype threat in the imagined police interaction. Additionally, racial differences in anticipated stereotype threat translated into racial differences in anticipated anxiety, self-regulatory acts (including a high alertness to potential threat-related triggers and active attempts to scrutinize behavior), and actions that are generally seen by police officers as suspicious. More specifically, Black men were shown to be significantly more likely than their White counterparts to think they would experience anxiousness, anticipate they would closely watch the context and their behavior for the prospect of being stereotyped, and, ironically, act in ways that police have been found to perceive as deceptive or suspicious (e.g., Akehurst et al., 1996).

Criticisms of stereotype threat

There clearly is not universal agreement about the mechanisms that underlie and produce stereotype threat. A typical stereotype threat study is configured as a 2 (negatively stereotyped social group in a domain vs. non-negatively stereotyped social group in a domain) X 2 (stereotype threat condition vs. no-threat condition) design (Spencer, Steele & Quinn, 1999; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Individuals who are negatively stereotyped are anticipated to perform better in a no-threat condition as opposed to a stereotype threat condition. Individuals who are not stereotyped are expected to perform in the same manner, irrespective of the condition. This is attributed to the fact that there isn't a negative stereotype associated with their social group (thus negating potential stereotype threat) in that domain. Lastly, individuals who are stereotyped are frequently found to perform as well as individuals who are not stereotyped when no

stereotype threat is evoked (Xavier et al. 2014). Lamentably, dependence on outcome data to show the effects of stereotype threat makes it doubtful whether the underlying mechanism causing impaired performance is experienced stereotype threat (Osborne, 2001; Smith, 2004).

A reasonable assumption can be made that if feelings of stereotype threat induce a decrement in performance in negatively stereotyped people in conditions of threat, negatively stereotyped people in conditions of threat should self-report feeling a higher stereotype threat response than negatively stereotyped people in conditions of no-threat and nonstereotyped people in both conditions (Xavier et al. 2014). Regretfully, the majority of studies fail to achieve this distinctive style of results (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Bergeron, Block, & Echtenkamp, 2006; Chasteen, Bhattacharyya, Horhotta, Tam, & Hasher, 2005; Steele & Aronson, 1995). As a primary example, Aronson et al. (2005) conducted a study in which a self-report measure of stereotype threat was used and a main effect for race was found. This meant that African-Americans experienced a higher degree of stereotype threat than Whites in all three conditions of the experiment, despite the fact that one of those conditions should have been reduced threat (Xavier et al. 2014). Comparably, Bergeron et al.'s (2006) study examined stereotype threat effects on women's management ability and found that women endorsed more stereotype threat than men in all conditions, despite the fact that one condition was configured to elicit higher degrees of stereotype threat than the other. Finally, a study by Steele and Aronson (1995) showed that African-Americans encountered a greater degree of stereotype threat than Whites in conditions of threat or no-threat. Due to the paucity of evidence that negatively stereotyped people describe enduring more stereotype threat in stereotype threat conditions in comparison to a nominal condition of no-threat, questions arise about the construct validation of the concept. Solutions to this issue are necessary so that stereotype threat can be more adequately measured

(Xavier et al. 2014). It is important to remember that stereotype threat can be activated in part outside of conscious awareness. One doesn't need to be (consciously) worried that the stereotype of oneself is true for it to occur (Steele, 1997).

Stereotype threat and the influence of social identity

Social identity theory (Turner & Tajfel, 1986) emphasizes the importance of preserving a positive view of one's group. It has led to studies exploring, among other issues, which of people's multitude of social identities is induced at a given moment. Social identity theory is based on people's motivation to feel positively about the self, and to the ways people fulfill this desire in large measure through the identification with social groups (Rydell et al. 2009). From this vantage point, stereotype threat researchers (e.g., Steele, 1997) can be seen as studying the ways in which people process having group memberships that are unable to support a more robust self-esteem (e.g., group identities that are related to negative performance stereotypes). Turner and Tajfel (1986) articulated three different ways that those affected by these situations can cope. First, people choose to leave a group that doesn't add value to the self, and this withdrawal can be subjective or objective. To leave subjectively means to decrease identification with the group that is negatively portrayed and increase identification with another group, or increasing personal identification by choosing to view the self more positively (Rydell et al. 2009). Two other alternative options for members of a negatively portrayed group (either objectively or subjectively) are that they can find new meaning in their group attributes in order to make them more suitable, or become more active in enacting more positive changes for the group (Rydell et al. 2009).

The natural link between social identity theory and stereotype threat research is further extrapolated in Schmader et al. (2008) (see also Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002) who argue

that stereotype threat results from a cognitive imbalance that develops in the context of an inconsistent view of self. When individuals' high regard for self conflicts with the assumption that their identified social group should be unsuccessful in a given performance domain, an inconsistent identity emerges. As an example, the majority of women rate themselves as competent and having the ability to be successful. Yet, the stereotype exists that women are bad at math (e.g., Beilock, 2008; Beilock et al., 2007; Spencer et al., 1999). This inconsistency engenders a cognitive imbalance in women due to the fact that in the absence of activation of the female social identity, they expect to be capable at math. But, when the negative stereotype regarding women and inferior math performance can be accessed through the incitement of their female identity (e.g., Schmader, 2002; Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999), this stereotype is incompatible with their positive expectations. This contradictory information regarding the manner in which the self performs at math, and how women perform at math becomes the catalyst for stereotype threat (Rydell et al. 2009).

Mediators of stereotype threat

Anxiety. Steele and Aronson's (1995) initial study on the effects of a self-relevant threat on African-Americans' intellectual performance did not show self-reported anxiety to be a significant mediator. Spencer et al (1999) expanded on this work by demonstrating that reported anxiety was not predictive of the degree of influence that a negative group stereotype had on the mathematical achievement of women. Other studies have substantiated this finding (Devine & Brodish, 2003; Keller & Dauenheimer, 2003; Temple & Neumann, 2014). However, there have been research studies that *have* supported the claim that anxiety can and does act as a mediator for the self-relevant domain-identified threat and performance. Chung et al. (2003) established in a field study that self-reported state anxiety and a belief in one's ability to be successful in

specific situations sequentially mediated the influence of stereotype threat on African-Americans' promotional exam performance (Pennington et al. 2016). A study by Mrazek et al. (2011) replicated this outcome by finding that anxiety and mind-wandering sequentially mediated stereotype threat effects on women's mathematical performance.

Cognitive appraisal. There is an existing literature that focuses on coping strategies employed by people who attempt to combat the potential performance effects of being negatively stereotyped (Pennington et al. 2016). Cognitive appraisal is a marker of such a strategy in which individuals not only judge the importance of a context, but also become attuned to their capacity to control it (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). It is likely individuals encountering stereotype threat (accompanied by negative emotions, such as fear, worry and anxiety) may try to produce more effort on a task when the context appears challenging (a focus on the opportunity for growth), but may withdraw from the task if they assess the context as threatening (Drach-Zahavy & Erez, 2002; White, 2008). Taking into account this outcome, Berjot et al. (2011) assessed how individuals who experienced stereotype threat reacted to the particular context in terms of their primary appraisals (threat/challenge), and investigated whether those appraisals had the potential to mediate the relationship between stereotype threat and performance. Threat appraisals are characterized by the fear of failure and the fear of being negatively evaluated (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). It is characterized by negative cognitions such as stress, fear, worry and anxiety when confronted with situations that threaten personal or social identity (see Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007, for a review). Challenge appraisals are those evaluations of the self that are centered on the personal growth fundamental to an interaction with others. It is characterized by positive cognitions, such as contentment, pride, love and hope (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987).

Berjot et al. (2011) showed that secondary school students from a North African secondary school performed below standards on a test of visuospatial skills when they perceived that French students owned perceptual motor skills that were superior (thus inducing a threat appraisal) (Berjot et al. 2011). Surprisingly, it was found that appraisal of threat didn't mediate the relationship between stereotype threat and performance as predicted. However, when one perceived the situation as challenging, this response significantly mediated the stereotype threat-performance dynamic. Furthermore, those participants who appraised stereotype threat as challenging performed at a higher level than those who did not. These results indicate that individuals may endeavor to meet head on, rather than disengage from intellectual demands, and reshape the stereotype endorsed by members of a relevant out-group in a positive direction (Cohen & Garcia, 2005).

Moderators of stereotype threat

Black racial identity. The literature on stereotype threat has consistently shown a multitude of ways in which individuals can buffer themselves against psychological threats. One of those moderating factors is racial identity attitudes. Oyserman and her colleagues were able to show that endorsing higher levels of racial identification does indeed serve as a protective factor against threats to self-esteem from their social environment (Davis et al. 2006). An influential theory of Black racial identity has been formulated by Cross (1971, 1991). Helms (1990) stated “the Cross (1971, 1978) model, in toto or in part, has been the primary means of investigating racial identity in the counseling and psychotherapy process” (p. 19). His Nigrescence model (1971) viewed “becoming Black” as a process that evolved through stages – now viewed as “statuses” in order to highlight them as points in which changes in values, attitudes and worldview occur. This idea is in contrast to Piaget’s theory of developmental stages which one

must pass through in order to enter into adulthood and from which one does not return (Davis et al. 2006). On the other hand, statuses are essentially mindsets through which one may pass, but which one may return to as a reaction to meaningful life events (Helms, 1995). Cross (1971) argued that an individual's racial identity began as a personal naiveté and an underdeveloped awareness of one's race and evolved into a stronger commitment to and understanding about one's race. This is what Cross (1991, 1995) essentially saw as *nigrescence* -- not just the process of becoming Black, but the psychological processes through which one adopted a healthier image of their Blackness, especially for those deracinated, assimilated, deculturalized or miseducated Black adults.

Evans, Forney, Guido, Patton, and Renn (2010) stated, "Cross introduced a five stage Nigrescence model, but in 1991, he condensed it to four stages," (p. 256) combining stages four and five. I will review the original five stages. They are: (1) Pre-encounter, (2) Encounter, (3) Immersion-Emersion, (4) Internalization, and (5) Internalization- Commitment. Those persons in the *Pre-encounter* stage are seduced by the idea of assimilation and integration in which they internalize a "pro-White" identity that validates "White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant" values and neutralizes non-WASP behavior (Cross, 1971, p. 16). Pre-encounter Blacks are thought of as being anti-Black and self-hating. Carter (1991) has shown that Pre-encounter attitudes are correlated with anxiety, general psychological distress and feelings of inferiority. *Encounter* Blacks are those that feel compelled to work hard to challenge their existing worldview. It is necessary for others to intervene and provide some direction as to how a particular person may come to be transformed through resocialization (Cross, 1991). In other words, circumstances can serve as a potential motivator for identity change. *Immersion-Emersion* Blacks for Cross (1991) were described as being in the midst of "the most sensational aspect of Black identity

development, for it represents a vortex of psychological nigrescence” (Cross, 1991, p. 201-202). This stage is described as being a time in which everything must be applicable to Blackness, perhaps including becoming voracious readers of “Black literature and [devoting] much contemplation to the forms of being Black” (Hall et al., 1972, p. 6). Immersing oneself into Blackness – the overindulgence in the acceptance of everything Black -- is the first step to internalizing a Black identity. During the process of *Internalization*, Blacks begin to feel less anger and guilt that arose from the stage of Immersion-Emersion, and start accepting themselves as Black without idealizing and romanticizing Blackness or having enmity towards Whites (Vandiver et al. 2001). The fifth and final stage of the Nigrescence model is *Internalization-Commitment*. It is a stage that is characterized by a racial identity that results from being involved and embracing activism that becomes crystallized with consistent participation in organizations that espouse diversity. Entering this stage is the product of “self-healing” (Cross, 1995, p.96) with feelings of insecurity and inadequacy replaced by “Black pride” and “self-love” (Cross, 1991, p.159). In Cross’ revised Nigrescence model (1991), stage four and five were combined into *Internalization*. This was due to the finding of few attitudinal differences between the psychological component of Blacks in the Internalization and Internalization-Commitment stages (Vandiver et al. 2001).

Internalized racism. In addition to individual difference factors that serve as moderators of stereotype threat such as domain identification (Aronson et al., 1999), acculturation (Rosenkrantz, 1994), sensitivity to rejection based on race (Aronson & Inzlicht, 2004), general appreciation for and alertness to stigma (Brown & Pinel, 2003), and self-monitoring – which is the extent to which one care’s about controlling the impressions they generate in the context of an audience (Inzlicht, Aronson, Good & McKay, in press),

internalized racism also may have potential moderating effects on stereotype threat. Even though this connection has not yet been studied, internalized racism is a type of racism that most likely relates to stereotype threat and outcomes due to its fundamental effect of inducing individuals to react to stereotypes, and given that internalized racism is a set of attitudes or beliefs about stereotypes regarding one's own group. Consequently, it is reasonable to assert that the effect that stereotype threat has on outcomes is likely to be affected by internalized racism.

Part II

Implicit Racial Bias

Implicit bias refers to the attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious manner. These biases are pervasive, inescapable from anyone's possession. This is true even for people who have committed themselves to upholding justice, fairness and impartiality, such as judges (Mazzocco, 2015). Implicit and explicit biases are related, but distinguishable psychological constructs. They are both able to occur at the same time, and may even serve to reinforce each other. Explicit attitudes are consciously activated and are often assessed by classic, self-report measures. On the other hand, implicit attitudes are evaluations or beliefs that are triggered by the utter existence (actual or symbolic) of the object for which one has an attitude (Pearson et al., 2004). Implicit attitudes and stereotypes are usually measured by using response latency mechanisms (e.g., see Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983), memory tasks, physiological measures (e.g., heart rate and galvanic skin response), and indirect self-report measures (e.g., biases in behavioral and trait attributions) (Pearson et al., 2004). Additionally, the implicit associations people hold do not necessarily match their stated beliefs and may not even be indicative of positions individuals would explicitly endorse. People are generally inclined to hold implicit biases that favor their own in-group, although research has

found that individuals can still hold implicit biases against their in-group. Implicit biases are also flexible, and given that the human brain is incredibly complex, the implicit associations that have emerged can be gradually unlearned through de-biasing techniques (Mazzocco, 2015).

So, how is implicit bias measured? One procedure is to use the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) which assesses the relative ease with which people make associations between target categories and evaluations (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In a society such as the present-day United States, with its clear signs of residual racism, White Americans may have an easier time associating White with Pleasant words and Black with Unpleasant words (Greenwald et al., 1998). The IAT Effect refers to the discrepancy in the speed with which a person responds to the superimposed pairings. In other words, one might either respond faster to the Black +Pleasant/White +Unpleasant pairing or to the Black +Unpleasant/White +Pleasant pairing (Frantz et al., 2004).

If one is quicker to associate good words with white faces than good words with black faces, and/or slower to associate bad words with white faces than bad words with black ones, then the test will report that you have a *slight*, *moderate*, or *strong* preference for white faces over black faces or some similar language. One might also find evidence that he or she has an anti-*white* bias, though that is significantly less common. By the normal scoring conventions of the test, positive scores indicate bias against the out-group, while negative ones indicate bias against the in-group. For example, the IAT has shown that approximately 70% of individuals have an implicit preference for Whites over Blacks. On the other hand, only half of Black individuals prefer Blacks over Whites. Blacks who fall into the latter category show that they have internalized the racist notions that society has about their racial group. Additional outcomes for people with higher implicit pro-White bias include making economic decisions that

are more disadvantageous to Black people (Stanley, Sokol-Hessner, Banaji, & Phelps, 2011), prescribing fewer medical treatments to Black people seeking health care (Green et al., 2007), and having less friendly social interactions with Black people (McConnell & Leibold, 2001).

The consequences of implicit racial bias

The consequences of implicit racial bias can be extremely dire for African-Americans. In order to assess what some of those insidious outcomes are, it is beneficial to look first at a factor responsible for *producing* implicit racial bias: dehumanization.

The Black man has no rights which the White man is bound to respect. . . . He may justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery . . . and treated as an ordinary article of traffic and merchandise.
—Chief Justice, Roger Brooke Taney (*Dred Scott v. Sandford*, 1856)

The United States' history of the dehumanization and subjugation of Blacks is reprehensible. Language in the Constitution spoke of enslaved Africans as three fifths of a human being. But in contemporary society, explicit racial prejudice is seemingly less openly condoned and has taken on more subtle, implicit and often unintended forms, and may have prompted researchers and the general population to attribute this new understanding of the dehumanization of Blacks to a historical phenomenon (Goff et al., 2008). But, this perception was flawed and naïve, and as recent as the early 1990s, state police officers in California made a euphemistic reference to cases involving young Black men as N.H.I. – No Humans Involved (Wynter, 1992).

Representations of Africans as dehumanized beings are almost as old as Europe's first interactions with West Africa (Ovington, 1929). Early nautical writings of Europeans' experience with Africans described them as primitive people more closely akin to apes than to White explorers (Dapper, 1688). As race theory moved from a theological perspective to a biological one, a racial hierarchy emerged in order to provide itself with a rationale and justification for its heavy reliance on the "Negro-ape metaphor," as Lott (1999) detailed it. Although this relationship existed before scientific racism (pseudoscientific study of techniques

and hypotheses in order to support or justify the belief in racism, racial inferiority, or racial superiority; Porter & Ross, 2003; Gould, 1981; Kurtz, 2004), it gained in popularity when Franz Boas, the most renowned anthropologist of his era, and even Charles Darwin, speculated about the possibility of an evolutionary spectrum within primates (Lott, 1999). They believed that the least evolved side of the spectrum contained monkeys and apes, and moved through savage and/or deformed anthropoids, culminating with Whites at the other end (as most evolved; Jahoda, 1999). It was speculated that African descendants were situated somewhere between the deformed and the simian (Goff et al., 2008).

One study (Goff et al., 2008) looked at the material consequences of the Black–ape association by wondering if this association in contemporary society can lead people to condone violence against Black targets, despite individual differences in anti-Black prejudice. The participants were subliminally primed with words associated with apes or big cats, and then were asked to observe a videotape of police officers beating a suspect whom the participants were led to believe was either Black or White. The authors hypothesized that the participants primed with the ape words would be more apt to condone violence aimed at the suspect, but only when they thought the suspect was Black (Goff et al., 2008). Results showed that the association between Blacks and apes can lead to a greater endorsement of violence against a Black suspect than a White suspect, even controlling for implicit anti-Black prejudice. In a subsequent study, Goff et al. (2008) found that subtle media representations of Black death-eligible defendants as apelike were more likely to occur than the news coverage of death-eligible White defendants, and that these representations were associated with jury decisions to execute Black defendants.

Empirical investigations about implicit racial bias

A multitude of experiments have documented the occurrence of implicit racial bias

(attitudes about other racial groups that are automatic evaluations of social stimuli beneath an individual's conscious awareness) and the initiation of it without deliberate intention (Posner and Snyder, 1975). One of the ways in which this phenomenon has been assessed is through the use of the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Studies have consistently shown that White participants exhibit an implicit preference for White, race-related stimuli over corresponding Black stimuli. It has also been established by scholars in many fields of study that people generally tend to have more positive associations with the color white and more negative associations with the color black (Smith-McLallen et al., 2006).

The use of the IAT as an instrument to measure implicit racial bias is not without its critics, even though it is one of the most extensively used tools for assessing this construct (Blair, 2001; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Beach, 2000; Fazio & Olson, 2003). Various researchers have taken issue with what the IAT actually measures. Some have wondered whether responses on the IAT are reflective of individual differences in implicit attitudes or cultural associations (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Other researchers have studied the potential for confounding variables as a result of spurious methodological observations in IAT procedures, like task-switching effects (Mierke & Klauer, 2001) and the frequent exposure to names indicating racial categories (Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000; Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999). There is also some controversy surrounding additional factors that are confounding, such as the function of the participants' cognitive abilities (McFarland & Crouch, 2002) that can affect the rigorous assessment of implicit associations.

Three studies by Smith-McLallen et al. (2006) using White participants investigated the possible relationship of general implicit evaluative associations with the colors black and white and IAT responses to race-related stimuli such as stereotypical names generally associated with

Blacks and Whites, and photographs of Black and White faces that are typically used to measure racial associations that are of an implicit nature. All three investigations found that Whites showed an implicit preference for Whites relative to Blacks after controlling for color preferences (Smith-McLallen et al., 2006). Even though Whites implicitly preferred the color white over the color black and this finding was consistently correlated with their racial preferences, there was a significant finding that their implicit racial preferences persisted outside of any effect of color preference (Smith-McLallen et al., 2006). This finding illustrated a powerful effect considering the depth and range of the results. It was attained after using several different IAT tasks that used color and grayscale photographs, photographs of images in their entirety viewed from above the shoulders, or masked only to show skin color and facial features, and stereotypic names as stimuli. In aggregate, these findings support the belief that IATs of these forms systematically determine racial preferences and associations (Cunningham, et al., 2001; Dasgupta et al., 2000; Greenwald et al., 1998; Nosek et al., 2002).

Implicit racial bias can have serious real-world consequences in the form of racial disparities in health care between Whites and Blacks. It has been widely documented that the racial disparities in the treatment of cardiovascular disease (Smedley & Nelson, 2003) is alarming, with Whites up to two times as likely to receive treatment for thrombolytic therapy for myocardial infarction than Blacks (Petersen et al., 2002; Allison et al., 1996; Canto et al., 2000; Weitzman et al., 1997; Taylor et al., 1998). Studies have investigated whether the biases of healthcare providers are responsible for these disparities in treatment. Some physicians may presume that Black patients are not as likely to follow treatment recommendations as their White counterparts (Bogart et al., 2001), and as a result, offer treatment less frequently. But, it is much more probable that unconscious bias is the underlying factor responsible for this disparity in

treatment, and not overt prejudice (Schulman et al., 1999).

Green et al. (2007) study was designed to test whether physicians show implicit racial bias and whether the relative size of this effect predicts thrombolysis recommendations for Black and White patients who suffer from acute coronary disease. The authors used a Race IAT to give an account of implicit bias among emergency medicine and internal medicine residents. They also developed two new IAT's in order to assess stereotypes about general cooperativeness (The Race Cooperativeness IAT) and specific cooperation with medical procedures (Race Medical Cooperativeness IAT). The other outcome variable was the assessment of physicians' endorsement of *explicit* racial biases via questionnaire. It is important to note that there have been over 200 studies that have employed the use of various versions of the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) and statistics from 5 million tests has been compiled from www.implicit.harvard.edu, but this measure has not been used to systematically study how healthcare professionals conduct themselves, especially toward others until now (Green et al., 2007).

The results of this study were not surprising. Most of the physicians did not admit to any explicit forms of racial bias, but on measures of implicit bias, most nonblack physicians produced some degree of bias that showed they preferred Whites over Blacks. White physicians also reported that they saw Blacks as less cooperative with medical procedures and less cooperative generally. Scores of participants on the race IAT resulted in a range of implicit race bias analogous to earlier studies on non-physicians (Greenwald et al., 2003). The newly created Cooperativeness IATs had a normal distribution and was correlated to a degree with the race IAT, inferring that these tests measure disparate, but affiliated aspects of race bias. These findings indicate that physicians as well as others may maintain preferences and stereotypes of Blacks that operate outside of conscious awareness that affect clinical decisions (Green et al.

2007).

Criticisms of implicit racial bias

Despite the fact that a multitude of researchers have been able to determine the presence of implicit bias through long-standing methods derived from principles of cognitive psychology that have been developed over the course of almost a century, some still question whether or not the IAT is a valid instrument in measuring implicit bias (Jost et al. 2009). As an example, Tetlock & Mitchell (2009) make the assertion that “there is no evidence that the IAT reliably predicts class-wide discrimination on tangible outcomes in any setting,” charge their colleagues with breaching “the injunction to separate factual from value judgments,” unwavering devotion to a “statist interventionist” (asserting direct control over something with impunity) ideology, and of orchestrating an intensive effort to expose implicit racists, sexists, and others as subversive based on suspect evidence (Jost et al. 2009).

In meta-analyses of Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, and Banaji (2009) and Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, and Tetlock (2013), the integral question was how well Implicit Association Test (IAT) scores predict behaviors, judgments, and decisions that may possibly express the occurrence of ethnic or racial discrimination. Oswald et al. (2015) found that it didn't matter what data selection protocols were adhered to, how the data was combined or what statistical methods were used to analyze data, the mean effect sizes within and between data pairings were small or minuscule, and often not reflective of theoretical predictions or reasonable expectations. According to the authors, there was nothing offered in the reanalysis of their meta-analysis by Greenwald, Banaji, and Nosek (2015) that changed their conclusion. This confluence of findings from two separate research entities suggests that, by prevailing scientific standards, IATs enjoy only a finite ability to predict ethnic and racial discrimination and, by inference, to

elucidate discrimination by attributing it to unconscious biases (Oswald et al., 2015).

More specifically, Greenwald et al. (2015) were critical of Oswald et al. (2015) analysis of their work by making the argument that they included “a substantial minority of correlations for which there was no theoretical expectation of a predictive relationship” (p. 560). Oswald et al. (2015) countered that they used the same inclusion criterion as Greenwald et al. (2009) and currently upheld by Greenwald et al. (2015), because Oswald et al. (2015) included additional studies so that “(a) measures of attitude toward a group should predict behavior favorable or unfavorable to the group, and (b) measures of a stereotype of the group should predict stereotype-consistent judgments or behavior toward members of that group” (p. 556). It is Oswald et al. (2015) position that the question is not about the existence or non-existence of a theory guiding decisions regarding inclusion, as Greenwald et al. (2015) propose, but rather, should the different theories and hypotheses of each respective IAT researcher ascertain whether an effect be included in a meta-analysis or the way in which it should be coded? Or is this something that should be resolved with the assistance of an explicit set of rules that can be applied to all studies of this nature? In contrast to Greenwald et al. (2009), Oswald et al. (2015) employed an often-used approach that included the meta-analyst’s verbalization of a priori rules for deciding the coding procedures for all effects, safeguarding the process in which the same coding system is applied uniformly across all reports.

Mediator of implicit racial bias

Perceived Similarity. In a study by Jacoby-Senghor et al. (2015), the authors tested a novel process they described as *implicit homophily* whereby perceivers’ outgroup bias influences their affiliative responses toward ingroup targets with friends in the outgroup as a product of perceived similarity. This investigation showed that White participants with higher implicit anti-

Black bias endorsed affiliative responses to a lesser extent toward White targets with Black friends compared with White targets with White friends, and this effect remained even after the effects of implicit pro-White bias and explicit racial bias (Studies 1-3) were accounted for (Jacoby-Senghor et al., 2015). Additionally, evidence showed that the relationship between implicit anti-Black bias and affiliation endured because participants had the ability to make inferences about the degree to which targets felt at ease with outgroup members (Preliminary Study), and the ability to use this knowledge to make assumptions about similarity on this dimension (Studies 1-3). In other words, it was found that perceived similarity mediates the relationship between implicit bias and affiliative tendencies (Jacoby-Senghor et al., 2015).

Moderator of implicit racial bias

Executive Functions (EFs). There have been recent studies that have proposed that performance on laboratory-based implicit tasks are shaped by higher-order executive control processes or executive functions (EFs), and not solely on the vitality of automatic associations (Ito et al., 2015). According to Bargh (1994), the term “automatic” has been inadequately defined despite its prodigious use. Automatic processes are generally comprised of one or more of the following factors: speed, absence of motive, absence of awareness, low cost on cognitive resources, parallel processing, inescapability (i.e., difficulty overriding the mechanism once it’s begun), and an integration of less critical aspects. In studies by Ito et al. (2015), they used the term “automatic” mainly to refer to processes that lack intention and are difficult to avoid, and aimed to model the relationship between individual differences in EFs and how racial bias is conveyed. Results of this study found that EF and projections of automatic processes both predicted a level of implicit bias, and also created an interaction to the degree that the relationship between automatic processes and expression of bias was attenuated at higher levels

of EF. More specifically, EF was shown to moderate the effect of automatic processes on implicit bias (Ito et al. 2015).

Part III

Internalized Racism

When you control a man's thinking you do not have to worry about his actions. You do not have to tell him not to stand here or go yonder. He will find his 'proper place' and will stay in it. You do not need to send him to the back door. He will go without being told. In fact, if there is no back door, he will cut one for his benefit. (Woodson, p. xix, 1933).

Woodson's *The Mis-Education of the Negro* (1933) illustrates how more than 80 years later, Blacks are still inculcated with self-hatred as a result of being culturally indoctrinated by the White majority. The devaluation of self remains at the very crux of internalized racism. Internalized racism has been defined as the "acceptance of stereotypes or beliefs that paint one's racial group as subhuman, inferior, or a burden on society" (Padilla, 2001, p.26). According to Bulhan (1985), the target group members come to believe the dominant group's reality and therefore fail to independently define themselves. Socially stigmatized groups accept negative messages about their aptitude, abilities, and place in society, resulting in devaluation of self and others within the group (Essed, 1991; Jones, 2000; Lipsky, 1987; Pheterson, 1990; Pyke & Dang, 2003).

The first psychological research on internalized racism was a sequence of now-famous doll studies (1939; 1952). It was developed by psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark during the early Civil Rights era. The experiment was conducted using young Black children from segregated schools in Washington, D.C. and integrated schools in New York, as its subjects. Its main purpose was to highlight the "genesis and development of racial identification (and preference) as a function of ego development and self-awareness in Negro children (Clark &

Clark, 1947, p. 169). Each child was presented with two dolls. Both of these dolls were completely identical except for the skin and hair color. One doll was white with yellow hair, while the other was brown with black hair. The child was then asked questions inquiring as to which doll they would play with, which doll is the nicer doll, which doll looks bad, and which doll has the nicer color, etc. (Clark & Clark, 1947). The results showed an overwhelming assignment of positive attributes (prettiness, niceness, and intelligence) to White dolls and negative attributes (untrustworthiness, suspect character (badness), and ugliness) to Black dolls. Clearly, internalized racism can be particularly insidious to the psyche of African-Americans. It may be the most psychologically damaging injury of racism (Speight, 2007). Watts-Jones (2002) asserts that the wound of internalized racism is shame, while other researchers have linked internalized racism to depressive symptoms (Taylor, Henderson, & Jackson, 1991) and high stress levels (Tull, Sheu, Butler, & Cornelious, 2005).

It has been argued that oppression is a state or process that is a consequence of “long term and consistent denial of essential resources” (Watts & Abdul-Adil, in press). This condition is one in which a subjugated group endure the degrading effects of withholding, ostracism, injustice and being taken advantage of (e.g., Bartky, 1990; Sidanius, 1993; Young, 1990). Bartky (1990) came to the conclusion that one cannot fully appreciate and understand oppression without addressing its political and psychological components that are fundamental to that awareness. These two dimensions of oppression are inextricably linked and jointly determined. Those who are psychologically oppressed develop into their own oppressors and this process becomes known as the “internalization of intimations of inferiority” (Bartky, 1990, p. 22). Prilleltensky and Gonick (1996) view their own conceptualization of psychological oppression similarly. For them, the predominant feature of this phenomenon speaks to the internalization of negative conceptions of the self, and it occurs on the intrapersonal level. This level alludes to the

motivating or driving forces functioning within a single individual. Psychological factors such as learned helplessness, surplus powerlessness, obedience to authority, and internalization of images of inferiority serve as catalysts for psychological oppression (Prilleltensky and Gonick, 1996). Individuals who belong to stigmatized groups are in agreement about that effect (Memmi, 1967,1968; Miller & Mothner, 1981; Pheterson, 1986; Pilar Quintero, 1993; Woolley, 1993). A deaf author concurred, “we are oppressed from without by a society which does not value us and therefore does not give priority to our needs, and we are oppressed from within because we have internalized those same attitudes toward ourselves” (Woolley, 1993, p. 81).

The consequences of internalized racism

There has been a number of empirical studies that have suggested that groups who have experienced discrimination and thus internalized cultural stereotypes can manifest presumptions, anxieties and responses that can negatively affect social and psychological functioning (Williams and Williams-Morris, 2000). Fischer and colleagues’ (1996) review of studies from various countries suggests that groups who are socially viewed as stigmatized perform more poorly on tests of academic achievement than their peers who are viewed more favorably (such as Koreans versus Japanese in Japan, Scots versus the English in the United Kingdom, and Eastern European origin versus Western European origin Jews in Israel). Additionally, there have been studies of mental patients that have found that an individual’s expectation that they would be labeled in a stigmatizing way negatively affects their social world, work performance and how positively or negatively they view themselves (Link, 1987, 1989).

Investigations conducted by Jerome Taylor and his colleagues have systematically focused on how best to confront the mental health consequences that result from internalized racism. In a study by Taylor and Jackson (1990) of 289 African-American women, a positive

association was found between internalized racism and alcohol consumption. The instrument used in this study was a 30-item measure called the Nadanolitization Scale, designed to capture the extent to which Blacks believe in their race's innate inferiority and feel discomfort in the company of other Blacks. It was also shown that a significant, positive relationship between internalized racism and psychological distress (Taylor & Jackson, 1991) remained even after SES, stress, social support, religious preference, marital status and physical health were accounted for. Other studies that have used the Nadanolitization Scale have formed similar conclusions. McCorkle (1991) showed that internalized racism was analogous to decrements in self-esteem, reduced ego identity, and had a deleterious effect on the socio-emotional growth of children whose mothers scored high on internalized racism. Equivalently, a study whose participants were low SES Black mothers found a positive relationship between internalized racism and depressive symptoms (Tomes et al., 1990).

Empirical investigations about internalized racism

The Clark's (1939) Doll Study was particularly powerful in its portrayal of young Black children's internalization of White aesthetic (beauty) ideals. It highlighted their seemingly overwhelming preference for White dolls they deemed 'prettier' than Black 'ugly' dolls. The racial asymmetry in ingroup esteem was noted. Blacks and other minority groups who attempt to appropriate American Standards of Beauty have internalized the racist views that mainstream society has of them. This process includes the disparaging of one's racial group's physical attributes, including skin color, shape of one's nose and skin color. American Standards of Beauty is one of the four factors that emerged in a confirmatory factor analysis in the development and preliminary validation of the Appropriated Racial Oppression Scale by Campón and Carter (2015), a measure of internalized racism. Interestingly enough, there are

benefits associated with the attainment of White standards of beauty by minority groups. Matching this standard endows certain benefits, such as income, education, housing, and outgroup friendships (Espino & Franz, 2002; Hill, 2000; Hughes & Hertel, 1990; Hunter, 2007; Keith & Herring, 1991). More specifically, those who were non- Black, were more likely to be dismissive of invitations of friendships from African-Americans who enjoyed prototypically Black features, such as wider noses and fuller lips (Hebl, Williams, Sundermann, Kell, & Davies, 2012).

Many minority groups may also embrace Western ideals of beauty (Rudman and McClean, 2016). African-Americans have determined that ingroup members are physically attractive to the degree to which they have lighter skin (Hill, 2000, 2002). Latinos who used the attitude IAT automatically judged ingroup members more positively who were lighter-skinned than darker-skinned ingroup members (Uhlmann, Dasgupta, Elgueta, Greenwald, & Swanson, 2002; see also Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2007). White ideals of beauty are disseminated through advertisements, TV shows and in motion pictures (Baumann, 2008; Leong, 2006; Milkie, 1999; Winders, Jones, & Higgins, 2005), creating a worldwide demand for products used to bleach skin (Fokuo, 2009; Glenn, 2008; Hunter, 2011). It was described by Hunter (2011) that there has been a proliferation of web sites where consumers can acquire “racial capital” (e.g. skin lightening creams and cosmetic surgery) as a “merging of “merging of new technologies with old colonial ideologies” (p. 142).

Well-studied intergroup frameworks such as social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and self-categorization theory (Turner & Oakes, 1986) maintain that people are compelled to show preference for their own ingroups over outgroups. Self-reports measures largely support this hypothesis, though automatic ingroup biases materialize more robustly for majority than

minority group members (e.g., Nosek et al., 2002; Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002). As an example, given the tens of thousands of people who've completed the Black-White IAT, close to 80% of White participants showed a preference for their own ingroup. On the other hand, only 40% of Black participants showed a preference for their own ingroup (pro-Black bias) ((Nosek et al., 2002). *Implicit outgroup preference* is rare and predominantly restricted to groups who tend to be more likely to suffer from appearance stigma: African Americans (Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2003), older adults (Greenwald et al., 2002; Hummert, Garstka, O'Brien, Greenwald, & Mellott, 2002), and the overweight (Rudman et al., 2002).

A study by Rudman and McClean (2015) was interested in the asymmetry that exists in Blacks due to their automatic pro-White bias and the negative social and psychological consequences that result (Ashburn- Nardo & Johnson, 2008; Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2003; Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2007). It showed that minority groups who show implicit outgroup preference are also likely to suffer from appearance stigma (from deviating from cultural norms of beauty; Goffman, 1963), further entrenching Western culture's preference for White people as the ultimate symbol of attractiveness. Their three studies found that Black-Americans demonstrated a pro-White preference on the attitude IAT, manifesting in Whites showing considerably more implicit ingroup esteem than Blacks. Also, when Blacks were given the aesthetic IAT, they either implicitly associated Whites more than their own group with attractiveness or showed no preference for their own group, contrary to Whites' implicit preference for their own group's attractiveness (Rudman and McClean, 2015).

Criticisms of internalized racism

What is internalized racism? Many scholars who have defined and analyzed internalized racism have failed to capture its complexity. It has been alluded to as "internalized racial

oppression,” “internalized White supremacy,” “internalized Whiteness,” internalized White racism,” and the often-criticized “racial self-hatred” (Pyke, 2010). Hall (1986) believes that internalized racism is one of the most frequent and least examined components of racism, and defines it as “the ‘subjection’ of the victims of racism to the mystifications of the very racist ideology which imprison and define them” (Hall, 1986:26). Internalized racism is a concept that has the potential to add to a general theory of the reproduction of inequality and internalized oppression (Pyke, 2010). Schwalbe (2000) makes the case that it is necessary to have a “sensitizing theory of generic processes through which inequality is produced (p. 419). Although the processes that Schwalbe allude to do not directly address the concept specifically, some of the mechanisms that are highlighted have aspects of internalized oppression, such as “defensive othering” (Schwalbe et al. 2000:425; e.g., distancing) and “subordinate adaptation” (Schwalbe et al. 2000:427; e.g., the sub-ethnic identity term “FOB” -- an acronym for “Fresh off the Boat”).

Even the famous Doll Studies (Clark and Clark, 1939, 1947) that examined the internalized racism of young Black children have been faulted for their invalid quantitative measures of self-esteem, identity and preference (Baldwin 1979; Banks 1976), prompting calls for this test to “be laid to rest as a valid indicator of African-American children’s self-esteem” (McMillan 1988:71; for a review, see McLemore 1994:135–37). Other scholars have taken issue with the results of the doll studies that have proposed that to be Black, at its fundamental core, is to be self-hating (Comer 1970; Kardiner and Ovesey, 1965), inferring an intrinsic “racial” personality type (Schaefer, 2004, p.63). The first research study on “race” identity was performed by Ruth Horowitz (1939) in which she gave two variants of her husband Eugene Horowitz’s Show Me Test (children, all boys, were required to rank, in order of preference, a

group of photographs of both White and African-American children) to 24 White and Black nursery school children aged 2.3 to 5.1 years-old (Cross, 1991). The Horowitzes were acquaintances of the Clarks at Columbia University. Back then, it was assumed that two domains comprised self-esteem: personal identity (PI) and reference group orientation (RGO), which Ruth Horowitz erroneously believed were highly correlated and subsequently treated them with the same regard. When she conducted her first experiment on “race” identity, she measured RGO, not both RGO and personal identity. This error persisted into the Clarks’ doll studies where only RGO was quantified through doll preference and color preference exercises, and this understanding and measure of racial identity became a matter of course in subsequent studies on racial identity until the 1970s (Cross, 1991).

Moderator of internalized racism

Racial Identity. Cokely’s (2002) study tested Cross’s (1991, 1995) revised racial identity model in which the relationship between racial identity attitudes and internalized racialism was analyzed in 153 African-American college students who attended a historically Black university (HBCU). Participants were administered the Cross Racial Identity Scale and the Nadanolitization Scale. The author defines internalized racialism as a unique concept that differs from internalized racism even though it subsumes it. Cokely (2002) describes internalized racialism as being more nuanced than internalized racism, and as a concept that cannot be simply reduced to racial self-hatred. Cokely argues that internalized racism is more limited in its breadth because of its fundamental meaning (the internalization of negative stereotypes about one’s racial group). These stereotypes are often motivated by, or serve to motivate the group’s inferior status. Conversely, internalized racialism encompasses an individual’s identification with any stereotype about its own group be it positive or negative, and is based upon the understanding

that racial categories have innate and enduring qualities (Cokely, 2002). As an example, African-Americans who believe they naturally jump higher than Whites are experiencing a form of internalized racialism. This is also true if Blacks believe they are more prone to commit crimes than Whites (Cokely, 2002). The results of this investigation revealed that in the pre-encounter stage (i.e. Cross's earliest stage of racial identity), miseducation and self-hatred attitudes were significantly and positively related to the beliefs in the mental and genetic deficiencies of Blacks, but unrelated to beliefs in sexual prowess or the natural ability of Blacks (Cokely, 2002). In contrast, pre-encounter attitudes pertaining to assimilation were not significantly related to beliefs in the mental and genetic deficiencies of Blacks or to beliefs in the sexual prowess of Blacks, but were significantly and negatively related to beliefs in the natural abilities of Blacks (Cokely, 2002).

Mediator of internalized racism

Shame. Jefferson's (2011) study examined the mediational role of shame that it plays between anti-Black racial identity attitudes (i.e. pre-encounter attitudes) and negative affect (negative emotions such as anger, guilt, contempt, disgust and fear, and poor self-concept) in college African-American students. How has shame been defined? From the *pudor* (Kaster, 1997) of the Romans to the Chinese notion of *face* (Ho, 1976), shame has generally been defined as the feeling of wanting to escape from view or keep from others (Lewis, 1987a; Tomkins, 1963), or as the experience of feeling less socially attractive (Van Vliet, 2008). Considerable theoretical (Kaufman, 1996; Lewis, 1987b) and empirical (De Rubeis & Hollenstein, 2009; Gilbert, McEwan, Bellew, Mills, & Gale, 2009) research shows a strong relationship between affect that is depressive in nature and shame. The correlation between the two has been found to range from .59 to .79 (Cook, 1994). Additionally, research has shown a consistent negative

correlation between endorsement of pre-encounter attitudes and self-esteem (Collins & Lightsey, 2001; Munford, 1994; Pyant & Yanico, 1991; Speight, Vera and Derrickson, 1996). Jefferson's (2011) study showed that shame acted as a mediator between African-Americans' endorsement of pre-encounter attitudes and both feelings of depression and global self-esteem.

The Present Study

The General Social Survey (GSS, 2018), a highly regarded survey of social indices in the United States found that attitudes about racial inequality are liberalizing, but discrimination and racism still persist. It was reported that 52% of American adults (an all-time high) say that the country doesn't spend enough money on improving the conditions of Black Americans. Also, when using 2014 as a reference, more Americans also reported that inequalities between Blacks and Whites are due to discrimination (an increase from 33% to 45%), lack of access to education (an increase from 42% to 50%), and with fewer stating that it is attributable to a lack of will power or motivation (a decrease from 45% to 36%). Although the percentage endorsing affirmative action (i.e. preferential hiring and promotion) for Blacks in order to address past discrimination is only 23%, that percentage is up from 2014 when it was 18%. Given the aforementioned data, it is not surprising that African-Americans are more negatively regarded than any other group (including Asians, Hispanics and Whites). Hispanics are regarded at least twice as negatively as Asians, and there is a propensity to regard Jews more favorably than other Whites (Davis & Smith, 1990). Given the magnitude and persistence of negative stereotypes of African-Americans, it is understandable that some Blacks have internalized the racist projections (i.e. the oppressed has accepted some of the identities imposed on them by their oppressor) that mainstream society offers on a daily basis. This study will investigate the role of implicit racial

bias, internalized racism and stereotype threat on African-Americans' racial attitudes. The research questions for the current study were as follows:

Research Question #1: Will IAT scores of pro-white bias be greater for the stereotype threat conditions than for the control condition?

Research Question #2: Will stereotype threat decrease post-IAT MIBI scores compared to the control?

Research Question #3: Will stereotype threat increase post-IAT AROS scores compared to the control?

Research Question #4: Will overall IAT scores show less pro-white bias when the MIBI is administered pre-IAT than when it is administered post-IAT?

Research Question #5: Will pro-white bias be greater on an implicit measure of racial bias (IAT) than on an explicit measure of internalized racism (AROS)?

Chapter 2

Method

Participants

The current study's inclusion criteria consisted of third generation (at least one grandparent, one parent and the participant were all born in the United States) non-immigrants who were at least 18 years old and self-identified as Black/African-American/of African descent currently attending a 4-year college or university. Participants were also required to spend at least 500 seconds (8 minutes and 20 seconds) completing the survey to try and ensure task integrity. Eligibility was determined via an informed consent screener. 229 (176 females, 49 males, 3 gender non-conforming and 1 transgender woman) participants who met the inclusion criteria were recruited online from MTurk and Question Pro. MTurk is a crowdsourcing platform that enables workers to complete surveys -- i.e. Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) -- advertised on the site in exchange for a specified fee. MTurk participants were compensated \$2. QuestionPro is a web-based participant panel company that enables users to share their survey with a pre-recruited pool of individuals who match research requirements for a specified fee. QuestionPro participants were compensated \$5. Both MTurk and Question Pro participants were provided a Qualtrics link to the online study.

Table 1: Demographics Information for Study Participants (N=229)

RACE	N	%
African-America/Black/of African Descent	229	100
GENDER		
Male	49	21.4
Female	176	76.9
Gender non-conforming	3	1.3
Trans Woman	1	.4
LEVEL OF EDUCATION		
4-year college and/or university	229	100
STATUS		
Non-immigrant	229	100
NUMBER OF GENERATIONS IN U.S.		
Third generation	229	100
AGE		
18-24	186	81.2
25-35	40	17.5
Over 35	3	1.3

Measures

Implicit Measure *Implicit Association Test (IAT)*. The Implicit Association Test used in the present study was based on the race IAT developed by Greenwald et al. (1998). It used response latencies to assess the relative strength of association between the target concept (e.g.

Black faces vs. White faces) and an attribute (e.g. Pleasant words vs. Unpleasant words). Two categories appeared at the top left and right of the computer screen as a 2-choice task (e.g., Black faces vs. White faces), or Pleasant words vs. Unpleasant words. In the task, words and/or images appeared in the middle of the screen. If the word or image belonged to the category on the left, participants were instructed to press the E key as fast as they could with the left index finger. If the word or image belonged to the category on the right, participants were instructed to press the I key as fast as they could with the right index finger. If a participant more quickly associated highly associated categories (e.g., White faces +Pleasant words) than less associated categories (e.g., Black faces +Pleasant words), the pairing was indicative of pro-White racial bias. If a participant more quickly associated less associated or “incompatible trial” categories (e.g., Black faces +Pleasant words) than highly associated or “compatible trial” categories (e.g., White faces +Pleasant words) the pairing was indicative of implicit pro-Black racial bias. Incompatible trials are presumed to be incongruent with participants’ associations/biases and congruent trials are presumed to be more congruent with participants’ associations/biases.

Table 2: IAT Procedure

Block	Number of trials	Items assigned to left-key response	Items assigned to right-key response
B1	20	White faces	Black faces
B2	20	Unpleasant words	Pleasant words
B3	20	White faces or Unpleasant words	Black faces or Pleasant words
B4	40	White faces or Unpleasant words	Black faces or Pleasant words
B5	40	Pleasant words	Unpleasant words
B6	20	White faces or Pleasant words	Black faces or Unpleasant words
B7	40	White faces or Pleasant words	Black faces or Unpleasant words

There are four possible IAT starting permutations (Target A on the right initially positive [compatible]; Target A on the right initially negative [incompatible]; Target A on the left initially positive [compatible]; Target A on the left initially negative [incompatible]) (Carpenter et al., 2018). Target A refers to a White face. Left/right starting positions for targets and categories are counterbalanced between subjects (i.e., first compatible for half of participants, and first incompatible for half of participants; Greenwald et al., 1998; Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007; Rudman, 2011; Nosek et al., 2005) with one starting configuration randomly assigned to each participant in Qualtrics via a randomizer.

Participants in the present study completed 7 blocks (trials) in which stimuli were randomly sorted. Blocks 1 (20 trials) and 2 (20 trials) were practice blocks with only targets (e.g. Black faces and White faces) and categories (i.e. Pleasant words and Unpleasant words) presented respectively (Carpenter et al., 2018) In Block 1, individuals were prompted to categorize stimuli into two categories. For example, a given participant might see the word “Black” appear at the top right-hand corner of their computer screen and the word “White” appear at the top left-hand corner. In the middle of the screen, an image of a Black or White face would appear. For each face that appeared in the middle of the screen, the participant was prompted to sort the face into the appropriate category by pressing the appropriate left-hand or right-hand key (i.e. E or I). In Block 2, the individual was prompted to complete a similar sorting procedure, but was asked to categorize attributes (i.e. Pleasant and Unpleasant words) instead of faces. Examples of pleasant words included happy, cheer, laughter, family, freedom, friend, love and heaven. Examples of unpleasant words included poverty, evil, assault, abuse, rotten, hatred, death and ugly. For instance, a given participant might see the word “Unpleasant” appear at the top left-hand corner of the screen and the word “Pleasant” appear at the top right-

hand corner. A pleasant or unpleasant word would appear in the middle of the screen, and the individual would be prompted to sort the word into the appropriate category by pressing the appropriate key.

In Block 3, participants were prompted to complete a combined task which used both targets and categories from the first two blocks. For example, a given participant might see the words “Black/Pleasant” appear in the top right-hand corner and the words “White/Unpleasant” appear in the top left-hand corner. In the center of the screen, individuals would then see a group of stimuli consisting of either a face or a word, and then would be prompted to press E if the stimuli belonged to the “White/Unpleasant” category and I if the stimuli belonged to the “Black/Pleasant” category. Depending on the initial left/right assignments in the previous blocks, “White/Unpleasant” (i.e. incompatible) may have appeared in the top right corner and “Black/Pleasant” (i.e. incompatible) may have appeared in the top left corner. Block 3 served as practice for Block 4 (i.e. 40 critical trials) which was a repeat of the same sorting condition found in Block 3.

In general, practice blocks are important on the IAT because participants have spent several blocks participating in whatever starting configuration randomly appeared first. Also, participants who have not been given the opportunity to learn the new positioning (i.e. if you first pair Black+Unpleasant/White+Pleasant and then pair Black+Pleasant/ White +Unpleasant) your results may be more slightly negative (i.e. trending in a pro-White direction) and thus representative of an order effect than if the reverse pairing (i.e. Black+Pleasant/ White +Unpleasant then Black +Unpleasant/White+Pleasant) had been completed first. One may be slower not because of an implicit pro-White bias, but because of a hindrance caused by previous learning (Greenwald et al., 1998). This means that without sufficient practice of the new

configuration of stimuli using the aforementioned example (i.e. pairing an incongruent trial after pairing a congruent one), the potential is greater for the participant to be slower to categorize positive attributes with Black faces than positive attributes with White faces given the fact that the participant was first exposed to more highly associated categories (i.e. White +Pleasant) that are presumed to be more congruent with participants' associations/biases.

Block 5 consisted of 20 practice trials and was a repeat of Block 2 except that the positioning of the two target words (Pleasant words vs Unpleasant words) was reversed. If "pleasant" had previously appeared at the top left of the screen in a previous block, it now appeared at the top right). This helped eliminate practice effects learned in the previous blocks. Finally, participants in Block 6 (20 practice trials) were asked to repeat the combined blocks from Block 3, but the positioning of the target words and categories was reversed. Block 7 was a repeat of Block 6 and consisted of 40 critical trials (Carpenter et al., 2018).

Table 6 displays the average IAT scores for participants by condition. Trials over 10,000ms were omitted (scored as missing) and so were any IAT data from participants with greater than 10% of responses less than 300ms per Greenwald et al. (2003). As a result, 19 participants' IAT scores were omitted, and the remaining 210 participants' IAT scores were used for data analysis. Participants' IAT scores were calculated by first subtracting the mean response latencies for compatible trials (Black +Unpleasant, White+Pleasant) from the mean response latencies for incompatible trials (Black +Pleasant word, White +Unpleasant word) in both practice combined (B3 and B6) and critical combined (B4 and B7) blocks. Next, one pooled standard deviation was calculated for all trials in B3 and B6 and another standard deviation for B4 and B7. The resulting mean values for each of the four blocks were used to create mean difference scores (i.e. $Mean_{B6} - Mean_{B3}$ and the $Mean_{B7} - Mean_{B4}$). The difference scores were

then divided by their associated standard deviation, and those two resulting quotients were then averaged (Nosek et al., 2007). The result was a standardized difference score (D-score) computed for each participant and an indicator of which condition (incompatible vs. compatible) they were faster in pairing target concepts with attributes. A score of 0 equaled no preference. A score greater than zero indicated that one was faster in the compatible block (e.g. White faces+pleasant words) and was indicative of a pro-White bias. A score less than zero indicated that one was faster in the incompatible block (e.g. Black faces+pleasant words) and was indicative of a pro-Black bias. This scoring procedure was validated by Greenwald et al. (2003).

Explicit Measures The *Appropriated Racial Oppression Scale* (AROS; Campón et al., 2015). This scale measured explicit endorsement of internalized racism. The AROS was normed on a predominantly Black population, followed by Multiracial, Asian, Latino and Native-Americans in both Phase 1 and 2. The 315 adult participants' (Phase 2) data were used in a confirmatory factor analysis that resulted in a 4-factor, 24-item model fit. The four factors were *Emotional Reactions*, $\alpha=.83$ ("There have been times when I have been embarrassed to be a member of my race"), *American Standard of Beauty*, $\alpha=.85$ ("I prefer my children to marry lighter-skinned individuals"), *Devaluation of Own Group*, $\alpha=.86$ ("Whites are better at a lot of things than people of my race"), and *Pattern of Thinking*, $\alpha=.70$ ("Most people of my race would rather rely on welfare than get a job"). These items are rated on a 7-point scale (1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree). A higher score is indicative of more explicit internalized racism. Cronbach's α for the total scale was .90 for the validity study and .96 for the present study. It has been found that there is preliminary evidence for the validity of the newly developed AROS (Campon et al., 2015).

The revised *Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity* (MIBI; Sellers, R. et al., 1997)

is a 56-item scale that was developed to measure the three stable dimensions (centrality, ideology and regard) of MMRI (Multidimensional Model of Racial Identity) in African-American college students and adults. The scale was normed on 474 Black college students from a predominately African-American university and a predominantly White university. The MIBI consists of a Centrality subscale, four Ideology subscales (Nationalist, Oppressed Minority, Assimilationist, Humanist), and two Regard subscales (Public Regard and Private Regard). The Centrality subscale measures the frequency with which an individual defines him- or herself with respect to race. The Ideology subscale is a measure of the beliefs, attitudes and opinions that individuals have about how members of their own race should act. The Regard subscale refers to the extent to which an individual perceives the evaluation of African-Americans by non-Blacks (Public Regard), and how adept an individual is in judging and evaluating his or her race (Private Regard). These items are rated on a 7-point scale (1= strongly disagree to 7= strongly agree). A higher score was indicative of a stronger affiliation with one's Black identity. Scores are computed by finding the mean score of each subscale, not by calculating a sum score. The MIBI has been evaluated to be an internally reliable and valid measure of racial identity. Alpha levels obtained in the validation study ranged from .70 (humanist and nationalist) to .79 (assimilation). Cronbach alphas for all subscales in the present study ranged from .73 to .84.

Sociodemographic Questionnaire. Participants completed a sociodemographic self-report measure that asked participants their age (i.e. under 18, 18-24, 25-35, over 35) gender (i.e. female, male, gender non-conforming, trans woman, trans male), level of education (i.e. junior college/community college degree, currently enrolled in a 4-year college or university, college degree or college graduate) and their self-identified race (i.e. Caucasian, African-American/Black/of African descent, Asian, Latinx, Bi-racial or Other), status (non-immigrant or

immigrant) and number of generations in the United States for non-immigrants (i.e. first, second, or third and higher).

Procedure

MTurk and QuestionPro participants were recruited and identified after viewing an advertisement through each company's respective Web site that described the study as investigating the impact of social and cultural factors on the expression of racial attitudes. Interested participants clicked on a Qualtrics link provided at the end of the advertisement which directed them to a screener. The screener asked participants five questions related to their demographic information in order to determine eligibility for the study. If eligible, participants were required to accept an internet based *Consent to Participate in a Research Project* prior to participation. Expected completion time for the study was 15 minutes.

Experimental Conditions

Students who met criteria for this study were randomly assigned via a Qualtrics randomizer to one of three experimental conditions: internalized racism stereotype threat, intellectual ability stereotype threat and no information condition (control) that followed some of the instructions used in Frantz et al. (2004). Next, all participants read a vignette that varied depending on the condition. Those students in the **internalized racism stereotype threat condition** read the following:

The IAT compares your attitudes toward two different racial groups. It is a measure of racial bias. In this experiment, we are interested in measuring your unconscious racial attitudes toward Blacks and Whites as accurately as possible. Research shows that a high proportion of Blacks show a preference for White people. This is a challenging task, but it's necessary for the aim of this study. Please try hard to help us in our analysis of

individuals' racial attitudes.

Those students in the **intellectual ability stereotype threat condition** read the following:

The IAT is not only a test that compares your attitudes toward two different racial groups, but it is also a test of mental speed processing which has shown to correlate with intellectual ability. This is a challenging task, but it's necessary for the aim of this study. Please try hard to help us in our analysis of individuals' racial attitudes.

Those students in the **no information given condition** read the following:

This is a challenging task, but it's necessary for the aim of this study. Please try hard.

Half of the participants in each of the three conditions were administered the MIBI before completing the IAT and AROS, and the other half were administered the MIBI after completing the IAT and AROS. The IAT measures strengths of associations between concepts by observing response latencies in computer-administered categorization tasks. For example, faster responses (reaction times) for the {White+positive|Black+negative} combined task than for {White+negative|Black+positive} indicate a stronger association of White than of Black with positive valence (Greenwald, 1998). Mean and individual reaction times were recorded for all conditions in order to determine whether a pro-White or pro-Black implicit racial bias was shown. Mean scores were recorded for the individual MIBI subscales and for the Total subscale scores of the AROS.

Table 3: Configurations by Condition

	Pre-IAT (N=111)	Post-IAT (N=99)
<u>Condition 1:</u> internalized racism	MIBI IAT	IAT AROS

	AROS	MIBI
<u>Condition 2:</u> intellectual ability	MIBI IAT AROS	IAT AROS MIBI
<u>Condition 3:</u> no information	MIBI IAT AROS	IAT AROS MIBI

NOTE: Participants in Pre-IAT conditions were presented with the MIBI first, followed by the IAT, and then the AROS. Participants in Post-IAT conditions were presented with the IAT first, followed by the AROS, and then the MIBI. All conditions (N=210).

Chapter 3

Results

This chapter is a review of the results from several analyses conducted to address the five main hypotheses of the present study. Descriptive statistics for the study sample were first presented on the relevant study variables with attendant tables that present means and standard deviations. Inferential statistics used to address hypothesized outcomes were then delineated. The principle analyses used in the present study were independent samples t-tests, paired samples t-tests and one-way ANOVAs. An alpha level of .05 was used to determine statistical significance for all inferential analyses. For clarification purposes, references to ‘pre-IAT’ refer to the presentation of items given before the administration of the IAT and references to ‘post-IAT’ refer to the presentation of items given after the administration of the IAT.

Operational Hypotheses	Analyses Used
<u>Hypothesis 1</u> (stereotype threat) IAT scores of pro-white bias will be greater for the stereotype threat conditions than for the control condition.	Independent samples t-test One Way ANOVA
<u>Hypothesis 2</u> (stereotype threat) Stereotype threat will decrease post-IAT MIBI scores compared to the control in the subsample that received the MIBI post-IAT (N=111).	One-Way ANOVA
<u>Hypothesis 3</u> (stereotype threat) Stereotype threat will increase post-IAT AROS scores compared to the control.	One-Way ANOVA
<u>Hypothesis 4</u> (inoculation) Overall IAT scores will show less pro-white bias when the MIBI is administered pre-IAT than when it is administered post-IAT (N=210).	Independent samples t-test

<p><i>Hypothesis 5</i> (conscious vs unconscious) Pro-white bias will be greater on an implicit measure of racial bias (IAT) than on an explicit measure of internalized racism (AROS).</p>	<p>Paired samples t-test of standardized scores</p>
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Descriptive Results

Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations of each of the seven subscales of the Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI; Sellers et al., 1997) across the sample (N=229). Due to the fact that the MIBI is grounded in a multidimensional conceptualization of racial identity, a total score for the entire scale is unsuitable and scores are generally reported for the separate subscales, but not for a total of the subscale scores. Cronbach alphas for all subscales in the present study ranged from .73 to .84. A 7-point Likert-type scale (1= *Strongly Disagree*, 2=*Moderately Disagree*, 3=*Slightly Disagree*, 4=*Uncertain*, 5=*Slightly Agree*, 6=*Moderately Agree*, 7=*Strongly Agree*) was used for response rating. A higher score is indicative of a stronger affiliation to one's Black racial identity. With respect to Black racial identity, average participants responses to each subscale were: *Private Regard* (M=6.07) (e.g. I am happy that I am Black); *Humanist* (M=5.06), (e.g. black values should not be inconsistent with human values); *Assimilation* (M=4.97) (e.g. blacks should feel free to interact socially with White people); *Minority* (M=4.95) (e.g. the dominant society devalues anything not White male oriented); *Centrality* (M=4.86) (e.g. my destiny is tied to the destiny of other black people); *Nationalist* (M=4.05) (e.g. whenever possible, Blacks should buy from other Black businesses); and *Public Regard* (M=3.52) (e.g. overall, Blacks are considered good by others). Public Regard was the only subscale in which the direction of the mean score was not trending toward the direction of racial pride. This outcome is due to the fact that this subscale was not directed

toward how participants view themselves, but rather the extent to which they sensed others having positive feelings toward African –Americans (Sellers et al., 1997).

Table 4: *Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity (MIBI)*

	M	SD
Centrality	4.86	1.23
Private Regard	6.07	1.02
Public Regard	3.52	1.12
Assimilation	4.97	1.05
Humanist	5.06	1.01
Minority	4.95	0.97
Nationalist	4.05	1.02

Means and standard deviations for all conditions (N=229).

Table 5 depicts means and standard deviations of the Appropriated Racial Oppression Scale (Campón et al., 2015) across the sample (N=229). This table shows the degree to which participants explicitly endorsed internalized racism across the sample (N=229). A 7-point Likert-type scale (1= *Strongly Disagree*, 2= *Moderately Disagree*, 3= *Slightly Disagree*, 4= *Uncertain*, 5= *Slightly Agree*, 6= *Moderately Agree*, 7= *Strongly Agree*) was used for response rating. A higher score is indicative of greater internalized racism. The Cronbach alpha for the total scale in the present study was .96. With respect to explicit endorsement of internalized racism, average participants responses to each subscale were: *Emotional Reactions* (M=3.05) (e.g. there have been times when I’ve been embarrassed to be a member of my own race); *Patterns of Thinking* (M=2.99) (e.g. people take racial jokes too seriously); *American Standard of Beauty* (M=2.63) (e.g. I would like my children to have light skin); and *Devaluation of Own Group* (M=2.31) (e.g. I wish I were not a member of my own race). AROS total score (M=2.68) indicated

that the direction of the mean score was not trending toward the direction of explicit endorsement of internalized racism beliefs.

Table 5: *Appropriated Racial Oppression Scale (AROS)*

	M	SD
Emotional Reactions	3.05	1.44
American Standard of Beauty	2.63	1.48
Devaluation of Own Group	2.31	1.33
Patterns of Thinking	2.99	1.48
AROS Total	2.68	1.26

Means and standard deviations for all conditions (N=229).

Experimental Main Effects

Hypothesis 1: IAT scores of pro-White bias will be greater for the stereotype threat conditions than for the control condition. Hypothesis 1 investigated whether there was a relationship between the stereotype threat conditions (i.e. internalized racism and intellectual ability) that represented the independent variable and IAT scores (i.e. dependent variable). Table 6 provides mean reaction times (D-scores) and standard deviations across stereotype threat and control condition groups. An independent samples t-test was conducted in order to assess IAT scores of those participants in both stereotype threat conditions (i.e. overall stereotype threat) compared to the control condition. The independent samples t-tests revealed non-significant differences between overall stereotype threat (M= -.08, SD=.44) and the control (M=-.03, SD=.42), $t(208) = -.79, p=.43$. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to assess whether there were significant differences in mean scores between both stereotype threat conditions and the control. The results showed no significant difference between the stereotype threat and control conditions, [$F(2, 207) = .322, p=.725$].

Table 6: *IAT Scores by Stereotype Threat Condition*

	Pre-IAT	M	SD	Post-IAT	M	SD
<u>Condition 1:</u> internalized racism	N=38	-0.10	0.42	N=29	-0.04	0.45
<u>Condition 2:</u> intellectual ability	N=38	-0.15*	0.48	N=35	-0.01	0.40
<u>Condition 3:</u> no information	N=35	-0.03	0.41	N=35	-0.03	0.43

NOTE: The values listed are the differences in mean response times between compatible and incompatible trials divided by the standard deviation. The mean response time with an asterisk is significantly different at the .05 level, and is the result of a one-sample t-test. All Conditions (N=210).

Hypothesis 2: Stereotype threat will decrease post-IAT MIBI scores compared to the control. Hypothesis 2 investigated whether stereotype threat would weaken participants' level of racial pride when the MIBI was presented after administration of the IAT. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test the independent effect of the stereotype threat conditions on post-IAT MIBI scores. No statistically significant differences were found between the stereotype threat and control conditions for the MIBI. Please see Table 7 for post-IAT MIBI scores on the subsample that received post-IAT MIBI administration.

Hypothesis 3: Stereotype threat will increase post-IAT AROS scores compared to the control. Hypothesis 3 investigated whether stereotype threat would increase participants' explicit endorsement of internalized racism when the AROS was presented after the administration of the IAT. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test the independent effect of the stereotype threat conditions on post-IAT AROS scores. No statistically significant differences were found between the stereotype threat and control conditions for the AROS, $F(2,108) = 2.120, p=.13$. Please see Table 7 for post-IAT AROS Total scores.

Table 7: *Post-MIBI and Post-AROS scores for stereotype threat conditions*

		df	F	Sig.
Centrality	Between Groups	2	.838	.44
	Within Groups	108		
	Total	110		
Private Regard	Between Groups	2	1.506	.23
	Within Groups	108		
	Total	110		
Public Regard	Between Groups	2	.304	.74
	Within Groups	108		
	Total	110		
Assimilation	Between Groups	2	.161	.85
	Within Groups	108		
	Total	110		
Humanist	Between Groups	2	.884	.42
	Within Groups	108		
	Total	110		
Minority	Between Groups	2	1.077	.34
	Within Groups	108		
	Total	110		
Nationalist	Between Groups	2	.818	.44
	Within Groups	108		
	Total	110		
AROS Total	Between Groups	2	2.120	.13
	Within Groups	108		
	Total	110		

NOTE: The AROS was given after the IAT in all conditions.

Hypothesis 4: Overall IAT scores will show less pro-White bias when the MIBI is administered pre-IAT than when it is administered post-IAT. An independent samples t-test was conducted in order to analyze pre-IAT scores in all conditions with post-IAT scores in all conditions. The results of the independent samples t-test showed no significant difference between pre-IAT scores ($M = -.10$, $SD = .44$) and post-IAT scores ($M = -.02$, $SD = .42$), $t(208) = -1.228$, $p = .22$.

Hypothesis 5: Pro-White bias will be greater on an implicit measure of racial bias (IAT) than on an explicit measure of internalized racism (AROS). A within-subjects paired samples t-

test was conducted in order to compare participants' overall scores on the IAT with their overall scores on the AROS. SPSS was used for the standardization of the IAT and AROS scores into Z-scores by using the mean and standard deviation scores of both measures, which showed how far individual scores were away from the mean. The results showed no significant difference between scores on the IAT ($M=0$, $SD=1$) and scores on the AROS ($M=-.11$, $SD=.93$); $t(209) = 1.18$, $p=.24$.

Chapter 4

Discussion

The goal of the present study was to explore the degree to which stereotype threat impacts the level of implicit bias. The study participants were third generation non-immigrants (at least one grandparent, one parent and the participant were all born in the United States) who self-identified as Black/African-American/of African descent and were currently attending a 4-year college or university. More specifically, this study investigated whether exposure to two stereotypically negative conditions of threat would affect those participants' responses on the IAT, and whether the potential effects of stereotype threat would be mitigated by a strong affiliation with one's own internalized racial identity. The hypotheses for this study were not supported. Stereotype threat did not impact African-Americans level of implicit or explicit racial bias, and affirming important sources of self-esteem (i.e. black racial identity) on the MIBI pre-IAT did not produce less pro-White bias when compared to administering the MIBI post-IAT.

Discussion of Results

IAT scores, stereotype threat and racial identity

For many years, a multitude of researchers have found that African-Americans, on average, do not show implicit pro-Black bias, while Whites do show implicit pro-White bias (e.g., Axt, Ebersole, & Nosek, 2014; Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014; Nosek, 2007; Nosek, Smyth et al., 2007; Payne et al., 2010). A study which collected data (i.e. approximately 172, 560 completed IATs) on Black (not of Latin origin) participants from July 2000 to May 2006 without conditions of threat showed that their IAT scores were indicative of having no preference for Blacks or Whites (Nosek et al., 2007). The present investigation found a similar result for its sample of African-American participants who were not exposed to stereotype threat, and

surprisingly, also for those participants who were exposed to stereotype threat, which has been shown to induce implicit pro-White bias in several studies.

An earlier study by Frantz et al. (2004) used stereotype threat as a means to increase pro-White bias in White participants exposed to an explicit threat condition. Before administration of the IAT, participants in this condition read that the IAT measured their unconscious racial attitudes toward Blacks and Whites, and that research has demonstrated that a high percentage of Whites show a preference for their own group. As a result, these participants believed that the IAT was a measure of racism. Following the authors' prediction, participants in the explicit threat condition had significantly greater pro-White bias than those in the no threat condition. In another study by Frantz et al. (2004), White participants were administered Dunton and Fazio's (1997) Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions (MCPR) scale, a measure of domain identification (i.e. how strongly participants identify with controlling their prejudiced responses, which is the task-relevant domain being assessed). As predicted, participants in the explicit threat condition who were highly identified with the domain of not appearing racist produced greater pro-White bias than those participants who were not threatened and less identified with the domain of appearing racist.

Frantz et al. (2004) also identified a method that could potentially inoculate White participants against stereotype threat if given the opportunity to affirm the self before exposure to a self-esteem threatening experience. Sherman et al. (2000) theorized that for those who seek to maintain a positive, moral and adaptive self-image, threatening information (i.e. the threat of appearing racist) may induce defensiveness in an attempt to restore their self-image. Steele (1998) suggested that self-affirming thoughts attenuate the demand to reduce the threat intrinsic to this type of information by reducing defensiveness and increasing acceptance. Based on

Steele's reasoning, Frantz et al. (2004) hypothesized that their group of White participants could also benefit from self-affirmation by cementing their beliefs in the equality of mankind by taking the MCPR before exposure to a threatening condition in the hopes of fortifying the self-esteem and decreasing the potential stereotype threat effect. As predicted, it was found that participants who were threatened and unaffirmed (i.e. those participants who took the MCPR post-IAT) showed more pro-White bias than those who were threatened and affirmed (i.e. those participants who took the MCPR pre-IAT). The present study expected to find similar results with an African-American population, but did not. Its sample of third generation, non-immigrant African-American college students showed, on average, no preference for Blacks or Whites whether they were affirmed (i.e. received the MIBI pre- IAT) or unaffirmed (i.e. received the MIBI post-IAT), and showed this same effect regardless of condition.

A plausible explanation for these unexpected outcomes may be linked to Claude Steele's work on stereotype threat, domain identification and self-affirmation, which are interrelated constructs. What Steele means by self-affirmation (Steele, 1988; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993) can be understood through the concept of domain identification. Steele suggests that one way to decrease or alleviate stereotype threat is for individuals to positively affirm their belongingness in the potentially threatening domain *before* exposure to it (Cohen, Aronson & Steele, 2000; Sherman, Nelson & Steele, 2000). As an example, Sherman et al. (2000) conducted a study that showed that protecting one's self-esteem (i.e. self-image maintenance) from potentially threatening health information through self-affirmation can increase acceptance of these types of messages. Female participants were grouped into two categories (e.g. high vs low relevance). High relevance represented coffee drinking and low relevance represented no-coffee drinking. While participants read an article that linked coffee consumption with fibrocystic

disease (i.e. breast cancer), they were randomly assigned to either the self-affirmation condition or the no-affirmation condition. Participants in the self-affirmation condition affirmed a core value by completing a values scale adapted from Allport et al. (1960) by selecting their highest ranked value. Those in the no-affirmation control condition selected their fifth-ranked value on the values scale. Subsequently, all participants completed questionnaires that assessed the degree to which they accepted the information in the article, and their desire to modify their behavior. As predicted, high relevance participants in the no-affirmation condition were more defensive in their reactions and less accepting of the health information than were low-relevance participants. The authors predicted that the opposite tendency would be true with affirmed participants. Consistent with this prediction, high-relevance participants showed a greater degree of acceptance of these types of negative health messages than low-relevance participants. The potentially threatening domain in the present study with African-American participants would ostensibly be their concern that they would “fail” a test of internalized racism allegedly being diagnosed through the IAT, and thus conform to the negative stereotype that African-Americans have internalized the racist beliefs that mainstream society has about their group. Steele (1997) has shown that those who are more identified with a particular domain (i.e. math, old age, appearing racist, body image) will be more susceptible to the effects of stereotype threat than less domain-identified individuals.

White participants in Franz et al. (2004) completed the Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions scale (Dunton et al.1997) in order to determine which participants rated high or low in their identification with the domain (i.e. strong motivation to control appearing racist). Under conditions of threat, high-domain identified participants showed significantly greater pro-White bias on the IAT, but IAT scores of low-identified individuals remained unaffected. Similarly,

participants in the present study with African-American participants were given explicit measures of internalized racism (i.e. AROS) and racial pride (i.e. MIBI) in order to assess the degree to which they endorsed each measure. Results showed that participants generally manifested high, positive racial pride and low internalized racism, which suggests that they were less vulnerable to stereotype threat. Also, no significant difference was found between the scores of the implicit and explicit measures of racial bias. The fact that participants scored similarly (i.e. low pro-White Bias and low internalized racism, respectively) on both the IAT and AROS was surprising given that earlier empirical studies have shown that the two measures can produce different, and even opposing, responses of an evaluative nature (e.g., Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Blair & Banaji, 1996; Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Devine, 1989; Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998). However, the present results reflecting an alignment between implicit and explicit preferences are consistent with more recent research that suggests that African-American's implicit and explicit evaluations are related (Livingston, 2002). Gibson et al. (2017) also found a significant relationship between implicit and explicit measures of racial bias in their young, adult sample of African-Americans who attended a racially heterogeneous university, but did not observe this same effect in their child sample. This outcome suggests that the similarity in implicit and explicit evaluations of Black identity is attained in post-adolescence, and that this dynamic has the greatest opportunity to occur in social contexts where the importance of racial differences between groups is high (i.e. attendance in a racially-mixed school predicted similar implicit and explicit bias scores and provided support for the belief that these university students appeared to be acutely aware of the racial differences between their group and other racial groups).

Participants high scores on a positive racial identity measure and low scores on implicit

and explicit measures of internalized racism may explain why participants in the present study who were exposed to one of the two stereotype threat conditions did not produce pro-White bias scores as had been hypothesized. In the present study, as in a number of others (e.g. Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002; Livingston, 2002; Baron & Banaji, 2009; Richeson, Trawalter, & Shelton, 2005; Nosek, Smyth, Hansen, Devos, Linder, Ranganath, Smyth, Olson, Chugh, Greenwald & Banaji, 2007; Shutts, et al., 2011; Newheiser & Olson, 2012), African-Americans did not show a mean level of implicit pro-Black bias. This finding contrasts with those of Gibson et al. (2017) who found implicit pro-Black bias in a similarly aged sample of young, African-American adults. These researchers contend that findings that show African-Americans as having no racial preference are attributable to a sampling bias that generally selects African-Americans residing in places where they are the local minority. Gibson et al. (2017) conducted the first study that showed that the generalized belief that African-Americans do not show a mean implicit pro-Black bias is not universally applicable to historically marginalized groups of color, and may offer an explanation as to why the present study did not replicate the implicit pro-Black bias that was demonstrated in their sample.

In contrast to Gibson's findings, but consistent with the majority of other studies, the present study did not find a pro-Black bias. Gibson's study suggests that pro-Black bias may be related to where participants attended school. The present investigation did not assess for where participants attended undergraduate school, but Gibson et al. (2017) did in their investigation that used the IAT to assess pro-Black or White bias in African-American college participants without conditions of threat. They found that African-Americans exhibited a significant implicit in-group preference among those who were attending an HBCU (Historically Black College and/or University). However, young adult students attending a racially mixed college demonstrated no

mean level implicit bias for Blacks over Whites, which is concordant with past studies of implicit bias in African-Americans (Nosek & Greenwald, 2002; Livingston, 2002). The authors largely attributed their finding of implicit pro-Black bias in their HBCU sample to the fact that those students were more exposed to African-Americans in positions of authority and leadership, which contributed to the formation of more pro-Black attitudes. The authors also found evidence of a self-selection bias, which meant that those students with more pro-Black bias *self-selected to attend* an HBCU. Additionally, they showed that regardless of what type of college they attended, those young adults who attended all-Black schools from K-12 had significantly greater pro-Black over White bias than those students who attended racially diverse schools. This indicates that exposure to an all-Black environment before attending college, with positive exemplars of the community in leadership roles and positions of power, may increase implicit pro-Black bias in African-Americans (Gibson et al., 2017). This topic should be more closely examined as part of a broader contextualizing variable relevant to all studies on implicit racial bias in African-Americans, and serve as a question to investigate in future studies.

Two other important aspects of the present study worth discussing are immigration status and number of generations that participants represented in the United States, and what impact those factors may have had on the results. The decision to choose non-immigrant African-Americans and not Black immigrants for the study's sample was primarily based on research that has shown that African-Americans and Black immigrants may have different reactions to discriminatory experiences, with the latter possibly being less likely to report instances of discrimination even when exposed to similar types of discriminatory experiences as their African-American counterparts (Waters, M.C., 2001). Additionally, Kane (1996) argued that Black immigrants don't believe that racism perpetrated by Whites "is to blame for virtually every

ill afflicting Black America,” so that may suggest that they are less vigilant of situations that may be otherwise discriminatory to African-Americans. Consequently, these outcomes may also mean that Black immigrants are less likely to internalize racism and to be more resistant to stereotype threat if those constructs appear to be less salient in their experience.

The selection of African-American participants in the present study who were third generation or higher non-immigrants was made with the expectation that these individuals would have been exposed to ostensibly more generations of adult family members’ conceptions of racial beliefs and attitudes compared to a first or second generation sample. And, that the process of internalization would begin with the transmission of knowledge regarding race and ethnicity from adults to the present sample as children through the process of racial socialization (Hughes, Rodriguez, Smith, & Johnson, 2006). Bar & Neville (2014) used the ecological model of racial socialization to talk about how parents have the ability to choose the type of messages they communicate to their children about race and identity. For example, proactive socialization means that positive aspects of Black culture or Blackness are communicated in order to refute negative stereotypes, whereas protective socialization messages intend to protect its recipients from the harsh reality of racism, and also provide strategies to guard against future discrimination and maltreatment.

What are the some of the images that African-Americans have internalized as a result of racial socialization? Those which are negative help contribute to “the ‘subjection’ of the victims of racism to the mystifications of the very racist ideology which imprison and define them” (Hall, p. 26, 1986). In other words, socially stigmatized groups accept negative messages about their aptitudes, abilities, and place in society, resulting in the devaluation of self and others within the group (Essed, 1991; Jones, 2000; Lipsky, 1987; Pheterson, 1990; Pyke & Dang,

2003). For many Blacks from poor socioeconomic backgrounds, academic and social success are viewed as evidence that one has rejected one's station in life and one's racial community, and doing well or speaking standard English has acquired the meaning of being White rather than being oneself (Thompson, 1995). This omnipresent code for what Blackness is encompasses a range of traits that "come to be defined as Black and/or White, when in reality, they are neither" (Thompson, p. 29, 1995), and highlights the propensity of some African-Americans to discriminate against their own group members for either displaying race-based negative stereotypes or their failure to embrace cultural standards of Whiteness (Thompson & Neville, 1999). Other examples of internalized negative images include the belief held by some African-Americans that having lighter skin makes one more attractive. Internalized skin tone bias occurs in racial/ethnic minority communities given the lure of a superordinate social status and more advantages afforded non-Whites with lighter skin, and is the prevailing theme in the mainstream conversation on the subject (e.g., Brooks 1975; Davis 2005; Golden 2004; Lee 1988; Morrison 1970; Sandler 1994; Thurman 1929; Walker 1984). There may be no singular thing that has aggrieved African-Americans more than their internalization of racism.

Positive images that African-Americans have internalized about their own group can occur with a high endorsement of one's own Black racial identity which can serve as a protective factor against threats to self-esteem from their social environment (Davis et al. 2006). Cross's (1971, 1991) Nigrescence model – in which he viewed "becoming Black" as a process that evolved through stages – now viewed as "statuses" in order to highlight them as points in which changes in values, attitudes and worldview occur. *Nigrescence* is not just the process of becoming Black, but the psychological processes through which one has adopted a healthier image of their Blackness, especially for those deracinated, assimilated, deculturalized or

miseducated Black adults (Cross, 1991, 1995). The *Internalization* stage of Cross's Black identity model is characterized by a racial identity that results from being involved and embracing activism that becomes crystallized with consistent participation in organizations that espouse diversity. Entering this stage is the product of "self-healing" (Cross, 1995, p.96) with feelings of insecurity and inadequacy replaced by "Black pride" and "self-love" (Cross, 1991, p.159). Positive media images have also been shown to promote Blacks' self-esteem (Carter, 1991) and achievement (Ward, 1990; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1990) while negative images have been shown to lower self-esteem (Martin, 2008). Jackson (2011) examined the dynamic between Black television programs and racial identity. She showed that Tyler Perry's "House of Payne" and "Meet the Browns" "positively influenced three dimensions of the Black identity including closeness to Blacks, Black separatism, and the belief in positive stereotypes about Blacks, while negatively influencing the dimension that emphasizes negative stereotypes about Blacks" (p. iii).

The results of the present study raise the question whether it is psychologically healthier to have an implicit ingroup bias or to not have a preference at all. For African-Americans who have been victimized by racist attitudes and actions as far back as slavery, this author contends that having no preference is less desirable than having an ingroup bias. The outcome of no preference may indicate an identity crisis which can be partly explained by racial melancholia, a theory of race proposed by Eng & Han (2000). Eng & Han (2000) proposed melancholia as a depathologized component of everyday group experience for Asian Americans (and other people of color) which is at odds with Freud's notion of it. To the degree to which standards and ideals of whiteness for African-Americans remain at an unattainable distance, processes of assimilation are delayed, oppositional and without resolution. The inability to resolve this process positions

the notion of assimilation into a melancholic form, and as a result, produces profound racial injury and grief in people of color (Eng & Han, 2000). And, this psychologically damaging outcome may help explain why almost all studies on implicit racial bias in African-Americans that used the IAT -- with the exception of Gibson et al. (2017) -- have shown that African-Americans show no implicit pro-Black bias while Whites do show implicit pro-White bias. The benefits of having a pro-Black bias have been previously articulated and appear to be a more adaptive and healthier response than having no racial preference given the circumstances (i.e. more exposure to positive African-American exemplars in predominantly Black communities who help thwart negative stereotypes) in which implicit racial bias can occur. In contrast to the potentially positive implications of pro-Black bias in African Americans, this author contends that it is *not* healthy or adaptive for Whites to have an implicit pro-White bias because that outcome would be affirmative of a racist society constructed by cultural hegemony. This process refers to the domination, exploitation or rule of Whites over Blacks (and other minority groups) through social, cultural, ideological or economic control. The ideological element functions to advance appreciable inequalities by associating subordinated groups in the racial hierarchy with less intelligence, beauty and/or self-worth (Bonilla-Silva, 1997; Bonilla-Silva, 1995).

Methodologically, the fact that participants were administered all of the measures (i.e. IAT, AROS and MIBI) online instead of in person may have affected the results and provided a rationale for why stereotype threat did not seem to make a difference. Many of the original studies on stereotype threat were conducted in person. For example, in a particularly interesting illustration, Marx & Goff (2005) instructed Black and White college students to complete a demanding test of verbal ability in the presence of a Black or White test administrator. Black participants disclosed that they felt more threat and performed more poorly when the test

administrator was White rather than Black. When the administrator was Black, Black students performed commensurately with White students -- whose performance remained unaffected by the administrator's race. For the present study, the presence of an in-person administrator might have led the stereotype condition to have more impact and to have affected IAT performance, as it did in the study of Frantz et al (2004). The present study sheds light on the need to further examine why African-Americans, on average, do not show a mean level of implicit own group bias, while Whites frequently do, and the sometimes complex, not completely understood connection between stereotype threat and implicit racial bias in African-Americans.

Potential Limitations

Impact of conducting research online

The potential impact of conducting stereotype threat research online versus in person should be considered. As previously explained, stereotype threat research that has used White test administrators and African-American participants, for example, have shown a stereotype threat effect not present in the current study that was conducted online. Another potential concern that may arise when using online participants relates to the quality of data collected from online subjects. A research study on MTurk users found that some participants may have become familiar with generally known experimental research designs, and may have figured out how to circumvent attention checks more frequently than undergraduates not taking the study online (Goodman et al., 2013). These factors contribute to what is called "participant nonnaivety" which has been shown to reduce effect sizes.

Lack of qualitative data

Qualitative data was attained with White participants in Frantz et al. (2004) in order to assess the extent to which subjects felt threatened by a metastereotype – the idea that Whites are aware that

other groups perceive them as being racist. In order to better understand these kinds of beliefs, the authors asked its subjects to report the type of negative stereotypes they believed others held about their group. Two raters who were blind to the study's predictions assessed whether the responses of the participants characterized Whites as being racist/bigoted/prejudiced and whether Whites were also described as dominant/powerful/oppressors (Frantz et al. 2004). Participants were also asked to determine on a Likert scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely) the degree to which they viewed Whites as more racist when compared to other groups. The results showed overwhelming support for the hypothesis that Whites are aware that they are perceived as being racist by other groups. The present study might have benefitted from this same type of assessment with African-American participants in which they could have specifically identified the metastereotypes that they believed other groups have about their group, and the degree to which they identified with a particular negative stereotype (i.e. domain identification). Had the study been conducted in person, with the opportunity to inquire about the subjects' actual experience of the procedure, it might have been possible to determine whether the stereotype threat condition actually did elicit stereotype anxiety.

Future Directions

This section offers suggestions for researchers who may want to more fully understand the impact that stereotype threat has on implicit racial bias in African-Americans. The results of this study in combination with the findings of Steele (1997) and Frantz et al. (2004) strongly suggest the importance of domain identification when analyzing the degree to which stereotype threat influences implicit racial bias. Those previous studies found that those who were more identified with a particular domain were more susceptible to the effects of stereotype threat than less domain-identified individuals. Future studies should not only assess the metastereotypes

that African-Americans believe other groups hold about their group, but also the extent to which they identify with a given negative stereotype which may produce a stereotype threat effect.

Additionally, the administration of the present study's protocol in-person may have contributed to the inducement of stereotype threat given that past research has shown that the presence of a White test administrator can facilitate stereotype threat in African-American participants. Although it may be more difficult to recruit subjects in this manner, there would be an opportunity to explore the meaning of any biases that became evident. Also, feedback could be provided to participants on their MIBI scores *before* they were administered the IAT in order to maximize the potential for the MIBI to serve as an inoculator against stereotype threat. For example, if a participant knew that they scored high on a measure of positive racial identity before exposure to a potentially threatening event, their self-esteem might have had the potential to become more fortified with this knowledge than without it. The above suggestions regarding the potential need for more qualitative analysis and the administration of the research protocol in person, would offer a more enlightened understanding of the relationship between stereotype threat and implicit racial bias in African-American students.

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