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POWER AND AUTHORITY IN KARL MARX, NICCOLÓ MACHIAVELLI AND THOMAS
HOBBS

by

EKİM KILIÇ

A master's thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York

2023

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APPROVAL

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This thesis has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in
Political Science in satisfaction of the thesis requirement for the degree
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ABSTRACT

Power and Authority in Karl Marx, Niccolò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes

by

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The concepts of power and authority have been fundamental to political philosophy and science from the beginning. However, in much recent thinking, power's central and defining relationship with the state has been called into question. This thesis studies the understanding of power and authority in the works of Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and Karl Marx, in the context of the emerging trend around the world today of searching for a new social, economic, and political order. It aims to demonstrate how the works of Marx may open a path to rectify the limitations of the traditional thinking of power and order, particularly that which stems from Machiavelli and Hobbes. This thesis considers Marx's response to Machiavelli and Hobbes in light of a realist approach to politics, their different versions of materialism, recognition of the role of the multitude or masses, and the question of the autonomy of the political.

Keywords: Power, influence, force, legitimacy authority, liberty, Marx, Hobbes, Machiavelli, hegemony

*To working-class organizer, liberation fighter, and comrade Toby Emmer
who is no longer with us*

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Power and authority are often seen as interchangeable concepts, both in daily life and social science literature. They seem inseparable as the root concepts of the politics, and between them, there is a constant dialogue. Although analytical tools have revealed many different aspects of power and authority to date, the political-philosophical attempts at divining the source of political power and explaining its transformation into authority have proven insufficient. Specifically, they lack salience in debates aimed at finding solutions to modern socioeconomic inequalities. While post-modernist approaches and those founded in cultural criticism disregard the reality that power exists as a centralized force which maintains all relationships of oppression, more positivistic thinkers tend to conflate power with mere elite play. A third approach represents a left opposition which is composed of democratic socialist/social-democratic and abolitionist / neo-anarchist ideas (Blanc 2021; Davis 2003; Honneth 2016; Lih 2006). Although these ideas have roots in the ideas of Bernstein, Kautsky, and the thinkers of Frankfurt School, they experienced renewed currency after the 2008 financial crisis. However, they also reject the idea that power requires the use of force to effect the conditions for systemic change.

This rejection appears as an anti-authority stance within abolitionist circles and means democratic socialist groups choose to seek institutional reform and development within the existing political order. Both approaches therefore fail to create the conditions for the social transformation necessary to confront the socioeconomic realities of capitalist society. The analyses of these ideological sects are either reductionist or far from the sociology of power. Marlies Glasius (2018) remarks that the treatment of authoritarianism by the academy invites the “analytically unhelpful” definition of “all political phenomena that have a negative impact on people’s lives,

including discrimination, violence, corruption, or inequality.” (525). The prevalence of these watered-down analyses requires us to revisit the architects of political realism and works derived from their thought. While this anti-authority tendency of modern academic leftism opposes the existing form of capitalist governance, it comports theories of liberation to the conventions of liberalism and fails to consider the imposing nature of power and the conditions in which power exists. I aim to fill gaps in existing literature on power and authority by critically evaluating these concepts through Marxist, Machiavellian, and Hobbesian lenses.

The concepts of power and authority and their relationship to political change can be seen in a dialogue of how Marx, Machiavelli, and Hobbes interpret these concepts. Knowing how ‘theory’ and ‘theatre’ come from the same root word — to able to see, critically evaluating these concepts requires putting these thinkers into a discussion, into a play. This brings theoretical questions and how it might help us evaluate the concepts of power and authority. Today’s dominant approach to political realism and its architects, Machiavelli and Hobbes, can be dismissive and overly moralistic, because some scholars claim both thinkers disregard the ‘good’ in human nature. Furthermore, they assert that power politics requires the virtuous man to become ‘vicious’ and ‘hungry for power.’

Hence the claim here is not seen as distinct from a critique of social democratic and abolitionist political ideas which resonate with rejection of authority in theoretical terms. Engels, one of the founders of Marxism, remarked of individuals who put forward arguments in this vein: “Have these gentlemen ever seen a revolution? A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets, and cannon — authoritarian means if there be at all”

(Tucker 1978, 733). Because the same allergy also arises in a form of critique to the analyses of both Machiavelli and Hobbes. These critiques are generally formed in a way that these thinkers are pro-authority and anti-liberty. Although we agree that their explanations fell short of explaining what they intended to explain due to structural reasons, analyses of them often include a political distancing from authority and therefore lack a complete analysis of power's role in society.

Nevertheless, these thinkers expose the vicious nature of elite politics. However, the source of power and the political capabilities of the group/class/strata who own these sources remain ambiguous or belittled. Also, social-democratic and abolitionist ideas miss the same point. Karl Marx, as a philosopher of liberation, presents here class antagonism which stems from the question of who owns the means of production that produces daily life and perpetuates society. The struggles between socio-economic classes are key in the relationship between power and authority. Marx's concept of socioeconomic classes, relationship of production and class antagonism will help to evaluate critically the concept of power, authority and their relationship to political change in *the realpolitik* of Hobbes and Machiavelli. Because Marx's systematic thought aims to bring about human liberation, charges of amorality against the philosopher are not supported by his body of work. But the assumption that politics and moralism are diametrically opposed causes scholars to be indifferent to the source of authority and power and its impact. In addition, Gramsci will be referenced, since the class nature of this intellectualist politics, the aforementioned critiques of amoralism are mostly directed at Machiavelli, or because doing politics itself is demonized as Machiavellian politics.

Working Definitions of Power and Authority

This questioning requires both an understanding of power and authority as a descriptive starting point in this study. It is to say, these definitions can be questioned and changed throughout the discussion between Marx, Machiavelli and Hobbes. However, we will make a broad definition of power and authority for the purposes of this study. It will also acknowledge an important element that plays between power and authority — which is *legitimacy*.

Power is visible on a plane that is composed of political, social and economic relationships. It is present in at least one aspect in every action that a person performs with the will to live, that is, the necessary emergence of social relations. Forming a society is necessitated for eligible conditions to have the means of survival. Humans must reproduce and have food and shelter. In that sense, production and consumption relations are the basis of all social relations. Over time, learned, habitual methods of exerting power have become behaviorally inherited in humans. Just as a stone ax is a replica of the human arm and hand, our political and general daily relations exist as an extension of these production and consumption relations. *Power is the ability to organize the society, but this ability is visible in relation. In other words, as long as the society as an order needs to be organized, power remains indispensable. Beyond it is institutional aspect; it is relational and therefore vectorial like in physics.* In this metaphor, matter might be the forms of power.

When power is exerted, the direction of this exertion can be described as the character of power itself. Robert Dahl (2002) refers to power as *influence*. By saying *influence*, he means one's "capacity to bring about outcomes favorable to [their] preferences or desires" (17). Although we also recognize the distinctions between associations of love, respect, dedication, shar-

ing beliefs, and so on, as Dahl did, politics depend on what is necessary to form a society. As such, production and consumption exist as a means of survival, and we claim that these associations can be politicized to the extent of lack of means of survival. In other words, all forms of relations can be turned into a field of exercise of influence if any part of the society experiences a lack of distribution of resources needed for survival. For Marx, power is a resource that is conditioned by private property of means of production. For Machiavelli, it finds itself in the ability of imposing calculated action for staying in power. Hobbes, on the other hand, defined the power as the skill to assure personal benefit “to obtain some future apparent Good” (1997, 48).

Power has such a relational character in forming human societies. Yet, it is not aimless. Exercising power must give birth to authority by establishing a new set of morals, or any precedent. As Dahl claims, authority is “the most desirable and most important form of influence” and is linked with *legitimacy* (2002, 41). It is up for debate, in that sense, whether authority is a form of power. It is true that authority requires legitimate power. However, I believe it would be fallacious to define authority solely as a category of power. On the other hand, exercise of power can be pointless beyond establishing the authority of the subject who exercises power. Hence exercising power often aims to constitute or to reproduce legitimate conditions for authority. Authority in that sense has more of an instrumental meaning. But this doesn’t mean that authority can’t serve as a leverage or as an instrument for the political interests of the individual or of a group.

Engels approaches authority in a similar fashion by acknowledging its double sidedness: “Authority, in the sense in which the word is used here, means: the imposition of the will of another upon ours; on the other hand, authority presupposes subordination” (Tucker 1978, 730). On the other hand, Hobbes calls it as “the Right of doing any Action, is called AUTHORITY” (1997,

89). For Machiavelli, authority resonates with the prince's control by using pure fear or fear combined with consent and/or love of the people. He finds a reciprocal relation with authority between the prince and people preferable rather than bloodlines. Therefore, definitions of authority intersect at the point that acknowledges having power conditions authority.

As a note, linkages can be interchangeable between legitimacy and authority. In the context of political power, authority for Marx can only be established with the power gathered after private ownership of the means of production has been obtained. Whatever the case it is, legitimacy enables authority. For Marx, legitimacy works by hard and soft means of bourgeois state within its ideological dominance. However, there are other political sources of authority. For Weber (2004), authority depends on different sources of legitimacy such as (1) traditional authority, (2) charismatic authority and (3) legal-bureaucratic authority (35-8). Firstly, traditional authority is the right to rule which is specific to monarchic powers. There is a continuous exercise of political power through blood line. On the other hand, charismatic authority requires impactful personal properties of the political leader. And lastly, legal-bureaucratic or legal-rational, in which authority derives from the political office the individual holds, not vice versa (2004, 35-8). Legal-bureaucratic authority reveals that although power has a role to establish authority, they can divorce too. In that sense, political authority is the recognition of the right to govern regardless of the sanctions the ruler may have. Furthermore, power and authority are descriptive of linkages between the interests of political institutions and groups. Exercising influence/power and gaining legitimacy as relations acknowledges the existence of two parties and that their interests can be in contradiction. It is called conflict.

Literature Review

This research analyzes the nature and limits of power and authority, through the writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and Karl Marx¹ (Engels 1895; 1942; 2006; Gramsci 1920; 1957; Hobbes 1909; 1992; 1997; Lenin 1992; Machiavelli 1950 ; Marx 1844 ; 1844 ; 1942; 1998; 2004; 2006; Marx and Engels 1906; Tucker 1978). Specifically, it investigates what is missing in the examination of the nature of power and authority by evaluating Machiavelli and Hobbes critically, and how Marxism can be helpful in this case. Before the literature that is written about these writers, this study primarily relies on primary sources within our study of how these thinkers treat power and authority by taking Marx's Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, On the Jewish Question, the German Ideology, Hobbes's *Leviathan* and Machiavelli's *The Prince* and *Discourses* within the context of my research question (Hobbes 1909; 1992; 1997; Machiavelli 1950; Marx 1844; 1844; 1998). As the secondary primary sources, this study will also refer to Gramsci's terminology such as organic intellectuals, the historical bloc, and hegemony. Engels's and Lenin's works on force and state (Engels 1895; 1942; 2006; Gramsci 1920; 1957; Lenin 1992) will also be consulted. As an addition, this paper will benefit from Robert Dahl's relational description of power and Isaiah Berlin's concepts of positive and negative liberties (Berlin 1958, Dahl 2002).

The secondary literature primarily focuses on Machiavelli and Marx in the context of power and authority. In a considerable amount of the literature both, either together or separately,

¹Since the works of Marx and Engels constitutes the foundation of Marxism, this thesis does not limit itself to the writings of Marx. In addition to Engels, the works of Marxists, who worked on power and authority in theory and practice, will be used here, such as Lenin and Gramsci.

are evaluated within the perspective of political realism. Hobbes, on the other hand, has been analyzed by centering his theory of social contract and how modern theorists can apply the idea to present-day conditions. Interestingly, though the reevaluation of Hobbes' perspective is a matter of political realism, references to Machiavelli were present rarely. Much of the literature treats Machiavelli somewhat unfairly while remaining analytical and descriptive in its treatment of Hobbes's social contract and individuality. The context of the necessity of and the limits to power and authority are mostly evaluated lightly or any discursive approach doesn't go further from the literature and terminology of political philosophy.

While the nature of power appears as calculation, *virtù* and *fortuna* in Machiavelli, the root of authority and authority itself presents desires, motion, and social contract in Hobbes. Marx conditions them with the relationship of production. He demonstrates that power and authority emanate from socioeconomic class struggles. These struggles are based on lack of distribution of natural resources, hence private property of means of production. However, Marx has been frequently, if not always, accused of economic determinism and obligation to anti-democratic Machiavellian means (Honneth 2017, 908-20; Nair 1984, 232). Throughout the literature, one of the main accusations directed at Marxism is that the theory can't exceed economic determinist limits (Honneth 2017, 908-20; Needleman and Needleman 1969, 323). The theme of how the works of Machiavelli and Marx constitutes a continuity is present when it comes to how Machiavelli's work relates to Marx's. "Compatibility" is a theme in the literature apart from the similarities and differences between them, such as "necessity," "autonomy of politics" and liberty being obliged to power (Abensour 2011; Flynn 2017; Fontana 1993; James 2014; Jovanoski 2020; Lefort 1960; 2012; Nair 1984; Nelson 2012).

For Leo Strauss, Machiavelli is a “teacher of evil” who signals the beginning of modernity (1978). On the other hand, he discovered the “mass” as a force in politics for Sheldon Wolin (2019). He is also recognized by Berlin and Croce as the one who established the “autonomy of politics” (Fontana 1993, 13). Nevertheless, he represents a radical rupture in the history of Western political thought. His thoughts are always being revisited as a teaching that has remained relevant in “amoral” and “realist” statecraft (Althusser 1999; Flynn 2013; Giorgini 2013; Kamenev 1962; Lucchese 2014; Meinecke 1924; Rauch 1982; Ritter 1947; Strauss 1978; Viroli 2010; Voegelin 1998; Wolin 2019). Machiavelli’s work has been received with similar reactions in both Italian and world scholarship. In Italian scholarship, some found his work to be “a frank, sometimes ironic, description for the benefit of the people of the evil means used by bad rulers; others read in it evil recommendations to tyrants to help them maintain their power” (Giorgini 2013, 625). More broadly, he was addressed to “as the ultimate interpreter of Staatsräson [raison d’État] (Meinecke 1924) or, as a true ‘master of evil’ (Strauss, 1978), as a neopagan and demonic thinker (Ritter 1947; Voegelin 1998), as a humanist imbued with religious republicanism (Viroli 2010), as an anti-modern thinker of ‘aleatory politics’ (Althusser 1999) or as being among the founders of modern politics (Skinner 1978)” (Cerella and Gallo 2016, 435-36).

Unlike Machiavelli, the scope and truth of Hobbes’ social contract has been questioned in the literature. Sheldon Wolin (2019) claims that Hobbes has “no genuine theory of society,” “treating the institution of property as a simple set of juristic relations between subject and sovereign with no attention paid to the social influence of property rights,” and his failure to comprehend the interconnections between social and political conditions. On the contrary, he is named as “the father of political economy” by Taylor (2010) because he succeeded in “initiating

a debate over self-interest and public welfare” (416). His analysis of the conflictual nature of politics is also seen as a theory of peace (Springborg 2018). Since he analyzed this nature of politics, it has been used as a tool to determine the issues that arise from revolutionary violence. It matters because of how revolution is defined as being “about how to implement them, and about who gets to decide” (Edelstein 2017, 96). However, as Wolin (2019) did, Burns (2014) addresses how Hobbes draws dense attention to fulfilling human desires as being the main motivation as opposed to “the human longing for the divine” (424). In the introduction of Mészáros’s book called *Beyond Leviathan* that is inspired by the question being asked in *Leviathan*, *what requires the state*, Foster summarizes a core theme of the book

“...a hierarchical political command structure is necessitated by the lack of cohesion in the constitutive cells of class societies, where human beings are alienated from one another in and through production and by virtue of class relations, extending to all social forms” (2022, 28).

For Mészáros, “the state is a hierarchal and repressive form of the necessary overall political command structure which all class societies must have in some form” (28). In other words, the state is “a top-down system of class power” (28). In other words, the lack of cohesion requires hierarchy and violence. In that regard, one may consider how Mészáros might draw specifics from the theories of Hobbes and Weber. His point reflects intersections on monopoly and on the legitimacy of violence for the sake of cohesion. Hobbes is seen as a materialist like Machiavelli. Heinrichs (1976) claims that “Hobbes' political philosophy shows that the commonwealth is humanly necessary,” hence he is rooting the state’s necessity into an ontological base² (3). He names Hobbes approach as materialist metaphysics (1976, 1). That is to say, Hobbesian theory is

² It disregards state being temporal political organization in reverse to Marx.

not independent from Christian understanding of state and world relations; although it does include a critique of Christianity by taking "the Bible out of the hands of the theologians, and place it in the hands of state-appointed officials" (Morrow 2011, 33). In *Leviathan*, the public person that unites and represents all individual subjects may have been inspired by the Christ (Hill 1979, 22).

In the next chapters, we discuss and reevaluate shortcomings and misconceptions in the study of power and authority within the limits of the works of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Marx based on the literature.

CHAPTER II: MACHIAVELLI, POLITICAL REALISM AND MORALITY

Niccolò Machiavelli [1469-1527] is an Italian statesman and intellectual who is widely accepted as a founder of political realism after Thucydides in political science literature (Korab-Karpowicz 2018). With this feature of his writings, Machiavelli continues to confront many people who produce moral arguments in the field of politics. As Gramsci argues, Machiavelli has always been cursed by politicians “sanctimoniously,” but the way he articulates politics has been the essence of politics (Gramsci 1957, 141). For the purposes of this study, we will focus on what he articulated and what is absent in his writings.

One of the first recognized writers of political realism, Machiavelli introduced the role of masses to politics. He introduced the role of masses within the light of their relationship with the prince. Thus, the administrative aspect of politics was presented as a reciprocal relationship between the ruler and the ruled, instead of being presented as a one-sided relationship in which the influence of the masses is not acknowledged. In his dedicatory letter to Lorenzo de Medici, he said, “Nor will it, I trust, be deemed presumptuous on the part of a man of humble and obscure condition to attempt to discuss and direct the government of princes; for in the same way that landscape painters station themselves in the valleys in order to draw mountains or high ground, and ascend an eminence in order to get a good view of the plains, so it is necessary to be a prince to know thoroughly the nature of the people, and one of the populace to know the nature of princes” (Machiavelli 1950, 4). By positioning people and princes in such a way that allows them to see each other in this geographical analogy, Machiavelli acknowledges the existence of different actors and the presence of power and hierarchy within state and society.

How Machiavelli was able to see and document the experience of his time cannot be evaluated independent from his own time. Machiavelli lived between 1469 and 1527 during a tumultuous time in Europe, specifically in Italy (Machiavelli 1950, xxxiii). Widening trade routes after the East opened due to the Crusades, explorers to the Americas, and hence enormous economic growth forced “the bounds of existing political forms” of the city-states of Italy (xxxii). This tumultuous time he lived in was molding embryonic forms of capitalism and modern state. It was a preliminary stage. Therefore, capitalism sprouted in the late medieval and early modern era (Wood 2002, 3). Hence, Machiavelli was an intellectual product of this transformative time in which objective conditions required an intellectual account of realism to be written, to be articulated.

According to Kamenev, a famous Bolshevik intellectual, “In Machiavelli’s work there is not the slightest mention of a religious or metaphysical ‘essence’ of the state, not a word about the ‘divinely chosen’ ruler—even of the Papal domain, not one reference to the ‘will of the people’, to the ‘laws of history’, to the ‘interests of humanity’. This servant of the Florentine oligarchy was not afraid to look at the political reality of his time and to reveal behind the broad banners and paltry finery its true countenance: an oppressive class of masters struggling amongst themselves for power over the labouring masses” (Kamenev 1962). Hence a critique of Machiavelli must be made cautiously since current and mainstream criticism leaves the merciless world of politics to be evaluated via the means of religious-like moralism, i.e., seeking an ambitious “good” without attempting to define how possible that “good” can exist in such power relations. In that sense, the critiques or way how Machiavelli is framed romantically as the master of evil or amoral falls into rejection of how politics work rather than a critique of the ‘amoral.’

Even though Machiavelli “was not afraid to look at the political reality” according to Kamenev, Machiavelli’s analysis centers on elites (Kamenev 1962). The role of popular massive is passive in most of the cases. Unseen should be seen here. Because existing societies’ class struggles do not show themselves only in apparent and mobilizing forms but also subtly. Although Machiavelli does not address the existence of classes, he definitely lays out the political reality clearly which Gramsci (1957) defines as “The first point is that there do in fact exist rulers and ruled, leaders and led. The whole of the science and art of politics is based on this primordial, irreducible (in certain general conditions) fact.” in his *Modern Prince* (143). Gramsci also supports Machiavelli by saying “It is usually said that Machiavelli’s standards for political behavior “are applied but not spoken about”; the great politicians—it is said—begin by cursing Machiavelli, declaring themselves anti-Machiavellians, just in order to apply his standards “sanctimoniously”.” (141)

Since we are aware that Machiavelli was a statesman of his time, his ideas could be defined as the footprints of the political space he had experienced. His biggest contribution was to post political questions as they are. The form of this presentation represents a breakthrough with longtime establishment of Christian morality in Western Political Thought. Despite all the ascriptions, the recognition of the autonomy of politics is a revolutionary intellectual development to see the politics as itself: a field which has idiocratic qualities. Aside from the Machiavellian understanding of politics meeting class antagonism despite Machiavelli’s obvious elitism, a path opening question here becomes “what is the matter being discussed over perceived images of Machiavelli?”

The distinction between Gramsci's Machiavelli and Croce's Machiavelli done by Fontana reveals that there is a Machiavellian objectivism (Fontana 1993, 8, 9, 11). This objectivism shows the rationalistic nature of politics in grand scheme regardless of political agency. Fontana (1993) describes the Gramscian Machiavelli as an attempt to recognize the role of the masses and to generate a critique of rationalization and justifications for the existing power structure (11,12). And Crocean Machiavelli is "a form of political knowledge that understood politics as pure power and technique, a knowledge that reduces itself to the elaboration of means and instruments by which power could be attained and maintained" (9). The distinction between these two Italian thinkers in their interpretations of Machiavelli basically is that while he represents an absolute disjunction between thought and action for Croce, he represents unity between two spheres for Gramsci. It is then Sami Naïr, who tries to open a path out of the brutal reality of politics that is revealed by Machiavelli, asks:

"Dès lors la grande question qui se pose n'est pas celle de l'emancipation du sujet social, mais plutôt et surtout celle de sa manipulation, de son instrumentalisation. Si le Politique doit donc se déployer sur le corps du Social, quel va en être le principe médiateur?" (1984, 11).³

Even though Naïr brings calculation and virtue as a possible answer, the question remains the same as to whether or not the aim justifies the means (11). However, this question is a very political question which is a result of political abstraction. It is precisely at this point that Machiavelli's political advice is taken out of objectivity more than it should be and criticized without fully

³ "Therefore, the big question that arises is not that of the emancipation of the social subject, but rather and above all that of its manipulation, its instrumentalization. If the Political must therefore be deployed on the body of the Social, what will be the mediating principle?"

expressing what he said. These criticisms generally focus on social liberation agendas. They are advised to stay away from Machiavellian tactics. Again, these criticisms are made to defend a liberal pluralistic society order and to assert that this society is still possible.

Labeling Machiavelli as the master of the evil goes with accusations of anti-democracy and elitism. One of the reasons why these accusations are made so boldly is that Machiavelli is being discussed almost independently of other social and economic conditions and forces under the guise of the autonomy of politics. Although Machiavelli spoke of the masses, nobles, princes, and that inequality could affect them, he naturally did not elaborate on them.

Then, instead of evaluating Machiavelli and his definitions of power and authority by looking only at what Machiavelli said and what he did not say, it is necessary to acknowledge the conditions he experienced. Aside from what he meant in his own context, Machiavelli's writings represent an appeal and affirmation for unity and republic. Although the expression of political power is unclear whether he meant an abstract political, institutional and juridical structure, the modern state, or a field of power exercising, it is certain that Machiavelli approached the political problems of his time with a solution-oriented approach (Cassin, Apter, Lezra and Wood 2014, 1055). Therefore, his writings are a work of art of politics in forming an administration rather than a guide for the power-hunger.

In addition, it is necessary to see Machiavelli's writings, which are against abstract and concrete institutions such as religion and church, which produce discourses for the goodness of human nature and advocate a moral order in society, instrumentalizing them. Because if these moral institutions, which can be instrumentalized, can become the tools of a political actor seeking more power, it means that they have no sanctity. However, is it Machiavelli who desecrated

these institutions, or did Machiavelli articulate the real functions of moral order advocacy institutions such as religion and church, which are already used for political purposes, in fact, in political and social life? For instance, Machiavelli categorizes mainly three types of principalities: hereditary, mixed, and new along with the civic principality and ecclesiastical principality according to their power acquirement mechanisms (Machiavelli, 4, 5, 6). Therefore, he equalizes bloodlines or divine rules with people's will as the political sources of political power. It is to say, anything holy loses its meaning. Hence, what Kamenev says about the absence of religious and metaphysical references in Machiavelli's works is justified.

However, the prevailing view in the debate that we mentioned in our literature review over Machiavelli did not distance itself from philosophical idealism. Or, even if they claim to distance themselves, they feed off debates about the good and evil of human nature on the matter of Machiavelli. At least, this is true for those who belong to more progressive and liberal movements. For those who are more positivist, for whom political struggles only take place among the elite, and for those who assign a passive role to the masses of the people, as Croce understands from Machiavelli, politics consist only of power and technique. So, power is a new church. And behind this church is an underrated source that could be anything. On the other hand, in Machiavelli, there are ways of acquiring political power other than the sources of power. Even if he touches on socioeconomic inequality, Machiavelli is an early modern political thinker in this sense. He has proven the autonomy of politics as a mechanism possessing its own characteristics by which people decide how to conduct their social lives.

Again, Machiavelli was a high-ranking statesman who was removed from his position after the Medici family's defeat, tortured and observed political fluctuations, specifically in the

late 15th century of Florence and Italy in general. Depending on these experiences, he is mostly framed as an immoral political theorist with his advice regarded as cruel. However, one must point out that (1) Machiavelli was a high-ranking clerk of politically tumultuous times in which he was able to watch leaders closely, (2) he was able to distinguish the field of ethics and the field of politics remarkably, (3) and his elite background.

After addressing these three points, one should not expect any interpretation through the affirmation of an ideal virtue - the good from Machiavelli because his positions and privileges made him able to see and define the nature of the upper class politics. That is to say, Machiavelli's advice is an extension of the statesmanship, which is knowledge of hundreds of years of elite ruling experience, first slave owners, then feudal lords, and kings for him— capitalists for current society today. Otherwise, the state, the constitution, or judicial organs would be meaningless. These structures are meant to be in place in order to organize, legitimize, ease and finalize political battles within the body of the state. In other words, if there is no accepted authority for different social classes or groups, the state of nature or rejection of the power itself could be a point of discussion. The latter would make no sense. The existence of these structures are testaments that there are non-virtuous power relations within a highly political field which must be checked regularly. Therefore, the power exists.

Even though power is a calculated action in the service of staying in charge in a Machiavellian sense, he is not insisting on the application of brute force. The reciprocal relationship between the prince and people are preferable. For him, authority is solely possible in two ways, either by using fear or a combination of fear and love from people. Machiavellian understandings of authority represent a coherent framework of what a prince should do to keep himself in power.

In the Prince, he advises to governors being on good terms with the “people,” primarily before elites (Machiavelli 1950, 35-9).

If Machiavelli's concepts of calculation and virtú and his analysis of power-authority are considered together, two prominent aspects of Machiavellian political understanding can be mentioned. One of them is politics as power relations; the other is that his advice is according to the nature of elite politics. This distinction is observable in how he treats the “people” and acknowledges the weight of the “people” in the politics. Machiavelli, while he frames “people” as more of an actor with an inactive agency⁴ (inactive role), he acknowledges that the prince must have a fear of people. He also says that “It is better to be feared than to be loved if one cannot be both” (Machiavelli, 1950, 62). But when it comes to rooting the Prince’s own base, Machiavelli advises the Prince that should be keener on the people’s support rather than elites - because they are the majority (35-9).

However, even then, there is a nuance. People might be controlled by means of suppression and deceitful actions. But being loved is not dispensable necessarily. This stress demonstrates that while Machiavelli was aware that elite rule has strong means to control by using fear, hence it is a comfort for the elites, he was also aware that there is a strong agency, a possibility of emerging collective will/action from the people to overthrow the prince. So long as the favor of the people is being gained by the prince, he should not fear any danger. This is not because Machiavelli supports the interests of ordinary people. Instead, as a theoretician and statesman

⁴ Inactive agency addresses a perception here that the impact of the “people” in the politics is not directly related with their interests but their political facility is only up to the politics of the prince. Therefore, people could react accordingly. This perception would claim that elites and noble ‘heroes’ write the history, not slaves, plebeians or workers.

who comes from elites, he understands that politics is established on a dichotomy between the ruling and the ruled. The fear of the “people” is strong in Machiavelli’s framework of power politics. He says that: “Having considered these things I would therefore praise the one who erects fortresses and the one who does not, and would blame anyone who, trusting in them, reck little of being hated by his people” (Machiavelli, 81).

“Verità effettuale della cosa,” means *the effective truth of the thing*, or “the real truth of the matter” (Machiavelli 1950, 56). And this composes of Machiavelli’s realism in governing a town, city, or country. If a prince sees the required acts that the nature of political ongoings tempt him to do, they will be successful. Hence, the nature of these ongoings also requires princes to be cautious of their subordinates. Because as we mentioned before, they are the base the prince depends on.

Going back again, Machiavelli was a statesman of his time who introduced popular masses to politics despite being in a passive disguise. This articulation is also meant to be an appeal to the irrefutable source of authority, people. Whether it be through love, fear, or both, it is important for him to garner their support. It could be the only way that conditions could lead unity because people enabled it. While he acknowledges their role again in a passive form, the way he calls on princes to observe the activities of the people is also an acknowledgement of people, popular masses, being an active subject.

This acknowledgment is important for this study since a critique of Machiavelli claims that he is associated with anti-democratic behavior. The masses of the people are an object that is spoken about under grand titles such as human nature, but which cannot rationally be conscious of their interests. However, there is no such elitism in Machiavelli. Although Machiavelli shared

exclusive examination of the masses of the people with his critiques, he says that political power and authorities can be established by those who can manage the power and legitimacy relations between the ruler and the ruled.

In that sense, the role of masses is a strong take from Machiavelli until the point where his work does not recognize what the source of political power is to maintain its governance despite mentioning the effects of inequality on politics (Machiavelli 1950, 118-30). Political power in any form of principality requires compliance with the interests of the people. And their interests are not unified. In Machiavelli, socioeconomic classes are absent, but there is a sociologist approach. It could be defined as if there is a homogeneous contingent of people which is objectified, hence passive. There is no activity of social sections within these people. Although lack of resources is recognized as a catalyst of conflict later, the root cause, the private property, is not emphasized sufficiently.

To sum up, there are two takes. First it is important to reveal Machiavelli's political realist approach and evaluate it aside from his elite politics. Secondly, there is also more to say about how Machiavelli is criticized than what Machiavelli says. Him being criticized as the master of evil and amoral reveals that critiques of Machiavelli criticize how politics work rather than how he understands the politics. Under the light of these two takes, power and authority are both reciprocal between the ruled and rulers. They belong to the virtuous. The one who has both virtue and calculation can lead the way. However, this highly political debate does not reveal how socioeconomic parameters are effective to drive politics.

CHAPTER III: HOBBS, SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE BASE OF LEVIATHAN

English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes lived between 1855 and 1679. Like Machiavelli, he experienced and benefitted from the tumultuous times he lived through. Times of English Civil War [1642-1651] are embodied as a political theory in his work *Leviathan*. For Hobbes, Leviathan, namely the state, is a depiction of what comes out of social contract. According to his theory, individuals give up some of their natural rights to gain security, and transmit from anarchic, chaotic order of state of nature to a civic order by agreeing on a social contract. He composed his theory of state in relation to the political crisis resulting from the war. Hobbes' social contract takes place in a time and place independent from social and economic forces. At that point, it is important to distinguish what Hobbes could say by putting forward such independent variables to his abstraction and examining what fell short to explain the general phenomena of power and authority. This historical event gave him perspective to see the situation in a country when the established authorities grip on their governing power is loosened:

“In the 29. Chapter I have set down for one of the causes of the Dissolutions of Commonwealths, their Imperfect Generation, consisting in the want of an Absolute and Arbitrary Legislative Power; for want whereof, the Civill Sovereign is fain to handle the Sword of Justice unconstantly, and as if it were too hot for him to hold: One reason whereof (which I have not there mentioned) is this, That they will all of them justifie the War, by which their Power was at first gotten, and whereon (as they think) their Right dependeth, and not on the Possession” (1997, 255).

Handling the Sword of Justice appeals as a reference to Hobbes' absolutist orientation when it comes to his politics. For him, this orientation is required to prevent human passions from disrupting the dominant authority and provide constant security. Treating the relationships

of power and authority as a structure of human passions imparts to it a quality of being part of human nature for Hobbes. Although Hobbes prioritizes authoritative politics, he recognizes a subject's right to embrace another authority:

“When it is that a man hath the liberty to submit, I have shewed before in the end of the 21. Chapter; namely, that for him that hath no obligation to his former Sovereign but that of an ordinary Subject, it is then, when the means of his life is within the Guards and Garrisons of the Enemy; for it is then, that he hath no longer Protection from him, but is protected by the adverse party for his Contribution” (1997, 254-5).

Power and authority are transmittable, but transmission is not preferable. Generally speaking, the transmittable nature of power and authority and this aspect being undesirable invalidates misconceptions that Hobbes finds human nature to be evil. Self-preservation and the need for security being basic survival instincts, it is fair to say that our existence relies on it. Therefore, this is why morality is based on body and motion.

The need for survival necessitates people to be selfish and prioritize their needs for security. By doing that, he basically establishes virtues on a physical world. This alone constitutes an important communication that is arranged discursively with the concrete roots of power and authority. Hence, Hobbes seeks the structure that upholds the state in this very material world as opposed to the misrepresentation claiming inherent evil in human nature.

However, this definitive account of material nature that maintains the existence of a comprehensive political machine resulted in Hobbes being accused of heresy, denounced as an atheist by the House of Commons in 1666 because of his work, *Leviathan* (British History Online, 636-37). The name of Hobbes's work, *Leviathan*, which refers to the biblical creature as analogous

with the state as being the provider of collective security, also includes viewpoints on both power and authority since the state revolves around these terms including *legitimacy*.

Thomas Hobbes defines authority as “the Right of doing any Action, is called AUTHORITY” and power as the skill to assure personal benefit “to obtain some future apparent Good” (1997, 48, 89). The crucial part in these definitions, again, is how Hobbes addresses sources of these both right and skill. According to Hobbes, the source of right to authority is neither God nor bloodlines, a sentiment that earned him the label of heretic, but the need for security and prosperity. To be more elaborate, Hobbes does not point out an organized society, or a community necessarily, but a group of individuals. Therefore, there is not a society that is distinct from the state, the *leviathan*, but a collection of faces of individuals throughout the body of this giant creature, such as in the famous depiction of the leviathan (Hobbes 1997, Frontispiece).

His description of the source of power serves the same purpose to some extent. It is being used by stressing realizing one aspect of power: achieving one’s goals. The important feature is how power becomes a skill to assure personal benefit. Thus, Hobbes’ world of politics begins with the agency of the individual. Then it ends with state itself. The aim of the state is to preserve the individual, hence their security (Hobbes 1997, 96-102). But these two domains, individual and state, are connected through social contract rather an organization of society. Some authors of political philosophy literature, on the other hand, have claimed Hobbes as having “no genuine theory of society,” “treating the institution of property as a simple set of juristic relations between subject and sovereign with no attention paid to the social influence of property rights,” and his failure to comprehend the interconnections between social and political conditions according to Wolin (2019).

Then, it is important to note what Hobbes was able to demonstrate by seeing how generating consent to composing a Leviathan between individuals and administrators (elites) while ignoring social and economic variables. Hobbes, to maintain Machiavelli's heritage, could build arts of politics on a physical base such as *body* and *motion*, and recognize more autonomy both in politics and the individual. Through his abstractions independent from social and economic variables, he was able to show how humans interpret politics as a means of survival like economic and social activities separately. This provides an angle to the general literature to see the politics as it is, within its own laws, without interfering with other determinants. Politics becomes an equal domain to economy and society by seeing them as a requirement or having to be successful as a means of survival.

Moreover, individualism becomes an agency of politics in Hobbes. Despite ignoring society as an organization, individual self-interest is politicized in Hobbes. This primordial and ahistorical explanation of politics presents a secular account of individualism, another reason enough to be accused of heresy. Until then, these individuals or groups of individuals had been deserving of being ruled by families changing through noble bloodlines or monarchs with the permission of the God. As opposed to the church, which is supposed to be the ambassador of God on the Earth, or nobles, rooting the base of power and authority into the domain of the individual is a move to secularize the politics, to bring the individual forward as a subject of politics.

Hobbes's approach to the question of the ruling and the ruled is quite distinct. Contrastingly, the same approach causes him to fall short of explaining the general phenomena of power and authority as a whole. This is a consequence of ahistoricism which disregards analyzing how

power and authority are required in the society in the first place but rather assigning it primordial time and space.

The over abstraction of the state appears as another problem. It causes certain problems, such as who run the leviathan, or what is the individual consenting to give up on, perhaps some of their natural rights, to obtain protection. Although Hobbes composes a materialist theory, it is ahistorical, taking place in an ideal time. Hobbes similitudes state to Leviathan—which is a monster that represents absolute state rather than seeing aspects of this monster, such as external or internal security forces, officials of legislative and judicial offices. On the other hand, judging him for not analyzing these aspects sufficiently would ignore the historical objectivity, which required a general theory of state to be written by the time of the English Civil War. It became a reason to write this theory grounded into this civil war. In times of a civil war, a time of extreme division, needs for survival are prioritized rather than institutions of state. To escape from this chaotic situation, submission to a ruler becomes necessary at the expense of some natural rights.

For him, people give up on their freedom for security against the law of nature— anarchy. Leviathan is a monster that recognizes everybody has an appetite. This is to say, everyone is equal. He builds up his understanding of power and authority over a system of fundamental appetites that stem from *body* and *motion*. Hobbes tempts one to imagine an ahistorical meeting to sign the social contract by the subjects. This becomes the bed where the creature was born. Everybody is equal preserving their right. People who have similar appetites consent to making an agreement which is the legitimacy for Hobbes.

However, Hobbes is an absolutist who defends a top-down authority. As a theoretician, Hobbes' call for a state absolutism can be understood from examining his lived experience. For

Hobbes, it is never justified to rebel against the state. In the way around, one might say that if the state is composed of people's will in the social contract, it can be renewed too. It is self-evident from the times he lived through and his theory that we must give up freedom for security. But what about if the rule we live under is not stable anymore? What if there is an unqualified modern prince? Besides recognizing a change in authority in the times of war since it is a life-threatening occasion for the ruled population, change in authority is not preferable politically within Hobbes' text. Therefore, the table where that hypothetical social contract was signed is not able to be overturned.

Contradictory to this, he defends the subordination of the Church to the government and discusses the limits of the Church's authority, and indirectly, the limits of 'the kingdom of God on earth' in several chapters of his book (Hobbes 1997, 245-8). That's another testament of how Hobbes acknowledges dynamism between institutions and people. Therefore, his ahistorical approach brings more ambiguity to the source of authority and power although he already centers the role of the individual in political administration clearly instead of either God or bloodline. That is to say; the question comes forefront again that individuals are not organized as a network of socially, politically and/or economically qualified groups of people, namely, society, community or class, but individuals. Yet, a hundred trees cannot constitute a forest because it requires an ecosystem between them.

Despite the absence of emphasis on society, Hobbes' Leviathan provides an explanation to vacuums in authority. The need for authority is based on the need for survival, however, the definition of survival reveals some ambiguity due to the absence of society in Leviathan. Hobbesian interpretation equalizes survival with security, protecting lives. For him, the state of nature

is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 1997, 70). This characterization suggests that survival is conditioned by physical security. On the other hand, changing needs, habits, and customs in the society create new social, cultural, economic and political actors which contradict each other to the extent of threatening peace in the society, not necessarily survival. Although Hobbes addresses human desires as a force behind transformation, he does not go further to explore economic and social properties that cause civil strife. Since the society is not emphasized within Hobbes’ text, it is difficult to see and locate possible social conflicts that can occur in the society rather than between groups of individuals. In that sense, the formulation of authority as being between individuals and elites does not enable us to see social conflicts whose magnitude may affect political rules, spark reform or change them fundamentally.

Individualism becomes a space for politics. Desires and virtues are subjects of his analysis. The virtues, such *cleernessse of judgement* and *largenessse of fancy*, are crucial ways of associations that rulers should have (Hobbes 1997, 254). In that sense, it is self-evident that these individuals’ connections with state are through these subjects, after signing the social contract based on the needs of survival. The important contribution here is that Hobbes, like Machiavelli, negated that forced religious moral order which informed politics to be measured by moral codes that were decided by the church. It is not to say that Hobbes rejects morality. For instance, he advises people to not to rebel against the authority by characterizing it as something ‘criminal,’ and “against reason” (Hobbes 1997, 81, 155). He provides a realistic base to politics in which popular masses became an actor rather than God’s confirmation, or noble bloodlines, even though the popular masses in his writings appear as individuals.

The analytical problem stems from the unseen absence of society, where the legitimacy of the current government is rooting institutionally. It is a space which allows to see economic, social and ideological functions of the ruling elites. In *Leviathan*, one has to say that Hobbes claims that the ones who declare the kingdom of the Lord within the world are deceptive. By doing that, Hobbes ceases the authority of Heaven over politics in order to recognize more authority to the metaphorical Leviathan. He discusses the roots of authority partially by using religious idiomatic language even though he is aware how the consent of masses makes the institution. That reveals him, again, as being aware of the dynamic nature of institutions. Hobbes does not find rebellion as rational action; the discontent here represents the popular reaction of the time to the absence of indispensable rights. He mentions that “the Liberty of Disputing against absolute Power” is among the reasons behind the weakening of the state (Hobbes 1997, 169). Otherwise, how could one explain civil strife that is embodied by a war between elites. The lack of justice causes the loss of faith in the political rule, which he also points out (Hobbes 1997, 79-88). One may say that the force imposing itself can create consent to give up rights for laws that might constitute an absolute form of state. At that point, the state's preservation of individuals would be a controversial topic. If citizens cannot see their representation in a political body, they might not feel a sense of belonging. Going back to how Jesus added Jews to his Father's kingdom, people can be represented in a body, but with the consent of one of each (Hobbes 1997, 90). Therefore, social rights and representation are matters that come out between the lines of *Leviathan* beyond the needs for survival and physical security.

That is to ask, in what conditions do the ruling elite lose their authority for Hobbes? For Hobbes, it is again about whether a ruling elite can maintain that decision-making capacity after the power is consented by popular masses. In Chapter 38, Hobbes says:

“The maintenance of Civill Society, depending on Justice; and Justice on the power of Life and Death, and other lesse Rewards and Punishments, residing in them that have the Sovereignty of the Common-wealth; It is impossible a Common-wealth should stand, where any other than the Sovereign, hath a power of giving greater rewards than Life; and of inflicting greater punishments than Death” (Hobbes 1909, 345).

Therefore, right to authority does not just represent consent given by the individuals. This right could be interrupted by the forces which have enough power or skills to underestimate the authority of the rulers.

The other point during this process was the division between elites which was also a central concern of Hobbes' *Leviathan* at the time he wrote the book. The English Revolution and division within aristocracy were parallel conditions in which Hobbes saw the necessity of an absolute state in which a monarchy could be the best (Hobbes 1997, 162-3). Despite favoring absolutism, he can see what is required politically to establish authority. But again, it is a way to see the politics from the eyes of a ruler. Rulers must be trumped by another force in the society. Thus, it does not clearly reveal if these rulers already lost their economic and social functions which provide political legitimacy. There must be popular consent at the worst absolutist order. It may tell us that even though it is not the best ideally, it is the best today. In other words, powerlessness of a prospective social opposition can mean that their powerlessness is tied to social and economic conditions that do not provide the necessary means to that opposition, allowing them to garner political power. Therefore, giving consent to an absolutist leviathan could be a result of

despair that appeared when the English elites lost their economic and social functions and, ultimately, their political authority.

To sum up, Thomas Hobbes' contribution to theory of state and society elevates the position of the individual within their negotiation with a state. Simultaneously, it provides a secular perspective to evaluate affairs of state and society instead of appointing authorities through religious sources or noble lineages. According to him, people need to consent to surrender their natural rights to receive security, which will constitute the base of the social contract. Besides suggesting such a hypothetical perspective, Hobbes provides a material base to a considerable extent, such *desires* and *motion*. "Motion," for him, "is a continual relinquishing of one place, and acquiring of another" (Hobbes 1992, 109). Additionally, morality roots into body and motion.

All sources of power come from people themselves. While the source of authority is to have "the Right of doing any Action," power is the skill to guarantee benefits (Hobbes 1997, 89). Hence, his perspective places all these qualities around the need for survival and allowing people to be selfish. He connected the roots of power and authority to the real world discursively. Hobbes was able to show how elites could generate consent in popular masses to compose a leviathan. For this, the concept of individualism presents itself as political.

However, Hobbes's explanation lacks comprehension due to what he disregarded in his abstraction. To be more specific, Hobbes's individuals are in solitude in front of a group of elites to sign the social contract. In other words, the structure of society is absent. Individual and state are in a dialogue over this contract. But in this dialogue, state comes forward as a monolithic organization rather than an organization with its institutions or comprised of ruling elites that are

characterized by socioeconomic specifics. Despite the lack of society and state in detail, Hobbes' *Leviathan* is a frame with which to see the vacuum of authority.

Lastly, the cause of authority, the need of survival, is not also sufficient. Survival might not mean security providing physical insurance. There might be other needs of society which may incline the public to disregard their lifestyles, identities, or beliefs, hence these tensions can create social and political forces that could affect the society in general. This analytical puzzle is not solely the result of how he describes the need for survival, but also a result of the unseen absence of society. Because legitimacy as a constant question of political powers embodies institutionally. Thus, these institutions represent economic, social and ideological functions of the ruling elites.

CHAPTER IV: MARX, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND LIBERTY

Karl Marx, the leading thinker of proletarian socialism, and founder of dialectical materialism, like the others, is a product of the tumultuous time in which he lived during a sway of workers' uprisings. He mentions that relationship of the production determines the forms of institutions in superstructure. In this context, he describes power as a resource that is determined by private ownership of the means of production, and authority as a legitimate power gained by controlling the means of production. Additionally, Marx recognizes several aspects of authority, such as ideological and cultural hegemony of the ruling class beyond the political: "The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas; hence of the relations which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance" (Marx 1998, 67). Engels, on the other hand, acknowledges that there might be different meanings of authority, and defines it as "the imposition of the will of another upon ours; on the other hand, authority presupposes subordination" (Tucker 1978, 730).

However, the relationship of power and authority revolves solely around private ownership of the means of production. The establishment of authority, in that sense, becomes a matter of socioeconomic classes. Since bourgeoisie holds the ownership of productive means, they hold the power and wield authority. Although power in the sense of force has a founder role in the formation of society, Engels points out that Bismarck's policy of blood and iron failed to modernize Germany, despite uniting it (Engels 2006, 124-34). In other words, a policy that centers around using force and enabling the unification of Germany failed to develop further since the limits of its application depends on the socioeconomic conditions that have been provided. En-

gels points out that Prussian upper classes developed and mobilized their resources to prepare the country for unification. Hence, what drives the society and politics is basically what made the society, producing for the needs of survival.

However, production for survival resulted in the birth of administrative and governmental tasks to organize the production. These tasks do not directly affirm that state is required. Because state is required to impose pressure of one class over another to keep it under the control. Additionally, modes of production require more coherency throughout each political-economic phase of human societies, such as primitive communal, slavery, feudalism and capitalism. As labor became more concentrated —more organized— enabling the production of certain commodities within a certain amount of time and creating competition within markets, politics became more institutionalized. But it also triggered the question of liberty. Because as production becomes more sophisticated again, it caused enlightenment among popular masses, and opened a discussion in which it was claimed that the participation of conscious citizens within politics is possible. Because laborer was not a slave anymore, but a free laborer, which is “free in the double sense, that as a free man he can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that on the other hand he has no other commodity for sale” (Marx 2004, 272) This novel condition enables active involvement and political change. Socioeconomic freedom, even in a partial sense, encourages the appetite for having more say in politics — more succinctly in administrative matters. Therefore, citizens became an active part of the state in a broader sense as if politics of the state were collectivized.

Frankly, it is not possible to succeed unless the owner and manager of the productive means remain the same. Socioeconomic inequality and the existence of a ruling class which al-

ways has the last word is indispensable. Although, one may assume that political equality bolsters socioeconomic equality. However, this later formulation expresses a motion rather than an end. The way that this formulation presents or, vice-versa, will not provide a final solution to the existing inequalities in the society.

On the other hand, existence of free laborers shows that developing these modes of production makes more individuality available, hence more independent participation. However, when such socio-political institution comes to intervene in how the economy is organized, they face the owners of the means of production. And directly, the political and economic rulers also use the tools of political pressure. Making societies move forward requires a type of authoritarian action that even the power holders cannot confront. This is to say, as Engels puts forward:

“A revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other part by means of rifles, bayonets and cannon — authoritarian means, if such there be at all; and if the victorious party does not want to have fought in vain, it must maintain this rule by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionists. Would the Paris Commune have lasted a single day if it had not made use of this authority of the armed people against the bourgeois? Should we not, on the contrary, reproach it for not having used it freely enough?” (Tucker 1978, 733)

Therefore, entanglement between power and authority cannot be responded to by that gradual increase in political equality. Then, one might expect that it will encourage socioeconomic equality, but it requires a final attempt to make an utter change that can achieve human liberty and collectivization by means of politics, namely administrative and governmental tasks.

Again, for Marx, power belongs to the socioeconomic class that controls the means of production. This also says that the form of power does not have to be a state or government in basic terms. The assumption here is that if the state can be “withered away” by dictatorship of

proletariat, working class governing, the only possible way to abolish the state is the collectivization of the means of production (Lenin 1992, 77-82). Private ownership of the means of production is a condition for maintaining power. For him, collectivization of the means of production is a problem of freedom. Achieving full political liberty is conditioned by the elimination of socioeconomic inequality. Hence, having control of the means of production by the society at large will open a path for a fundamental solution. By doing that formulation, he also addresses one of the root questions of politics which is claimed that politics stem from a lack of resources and conflict over said resources.

In “the Jewish Question,” he approaches the problem of civil societies as a problem of emancipation. He provides that in generalizing civil rights the problem is solved. Generalization means the recognition of everyone’s rights; therefore, they can benefit from such rights: “The formulation of a question is its solution. The critique of the [Jewish] question is the answer to the [Jewish] question.” (Marx, 1844). In the Jewish question, Marx replies to Bauer’s point by saying that, “How is an opposition resolved? By making it impossible. How is *religious* opposition made impossible? By *abolishing religion*. As soon as Jew and Christian recognize that their respective religions are no more than *different stages in the development of the human mind...*” (1844). That is to say, the politics has a liberating effect. Since the politics is a way of imposing one’s or some’s own will onto the other/s, means of politics should be used adequately in the service of liberation. These means should be used until the limit where society cannot advance a solution to eliminate the institutions of old society. In doing so, one may reach the limits of politics’ capability for liberation. Adequacy here is used to counter the claims that hierarchical and authoritarian means have to be avoided, because it can create another type of authoritarianism.

However, waging struggle for liberation is also a dialectical, hence a matter of ongoing time during which popular working masses will learn how to democratize their own means of politics in Marxist terms.

Although ‘*what is the end*’ is not the question to ask in the investigation of how means should form accordingly. It may lead to another discussion of if the ends justify the means. On the other hand, the nature of different interests of different classes remains a question to decide the magnitude of effects the socioeconomic classes have on how democratic an organization can be accordingly. Nevertheless, the central question remains as to what kind of emancipation is needed: “It was by no means sufficient to investigate: Who is to emancipate? Who is to be emancipated? Criticism had to investigate a third point. It had to inquire: *What kind of emancipation is in question?*” (Marx, 1844).

However, it is not limited to political emancipation: “Political emancipation is, of course, a big step forward. True, it is not the final form of human emancipation in general, but it is the final form of human emancipation within the hitherto existing world order. It goes without saying that we are speaking here of real, practical emancipation” (Marx, 1844). That is to say, “Political emancipation itself is not human emancipation” (Marx, 1844). On the other hand, considering specifically the transformation from feudal society to modern capitalist civil society, political emancipation is at least, “the *dissolution* of the old society on which the state alienated from the people, the sovereign power, is based” (Marx, 1844). What this type of emancipation brings is the citizen: “Political emancipation is the reduction of man, on the one hand, to a member of civil society, to an *egoistic, independent* individual, and, on the other hand, to a *citizen*, a juridical person” (1844). Therefore, a free laborer is a citizen, or an independent individual who may ac-

tively join political life as a juridical person. These are the limits that a capitalist state recognizes as a mobilizable field for its citizens.

However, Marx does not state that the individual and state are solely political formulations. There is the mention of communities and society along with the concept of socioeconomic classes. These communities and societies manifest as polarizations within the contradictions of the state. Hence, this individual and their liberty must be seen within their relation to the community, society and state. The political limits of this individual have been taught since birth through the embedded political, social, and economic mechanisms in society and state. For this reason, it is inevitable that this individual learns the hierarchical mechanisms that are given in society and the state, and that an emancipatory organization reflects this society. But the preconditions of the demand for a genuine democracy, which foresees this organization, and the effect of the political understanding in a positive direction cannot be denied. Because the problem is that capitalism does not allow the existence of a fully independent individual. It is about capitalism as a mere category as well as its belonging to the world of classist social orders. This questioning brings the conclusion that that *independent individual* needs to learn the means of imposing force to emancipate fully. To put it differently, hierarchical and authoritative nature of politics must be embraced if certain powers are distributed well.

The relationship of legitimacy with power and authority should also be noted in the distribution of powers. Legitimacy as a living question as exercising power becomes more and more sophisticated while the needs of society advance and change. The forms of legitimacy are constantly determined in the class struggle, as such, authority takes different forms, strict or lax, according to the needs of classes and their organized power. For example, right to unionize was

recognized for workers during 1930s in the United States (NLRB 1935). Since then, any work cleavages or disagreement between workers and employers has been mediated by the National Labor Relations Board. This is a time which is accepted as labor leadership started to be coopted into the Democratic Party (Schlozman 2013). This means that it would not be legitimate to shut down a union anymore, but one government may exercise its control through the existing unions. Therefore, the character of power remains the same in essence, but means of authority develop as the point of legitimacy shifts from rejection to acceptance of workers' unions.

The same fluidity can be seen in what political measures are needed in order to be able to carry out emancipatory political practices. If the power and authority relations change to such an extent that it threatens the existing class power, the ruling class may go to an iron fist-style authoritarianism, ignoring the consent of the popular masses that are inherent in the legitimacy mechanisms. In this sense, relations of power, authority and legitimacy through politics are not strictly independent of socioeconomic conditions and changes. In this sense, different political tendencies are like spices that turn darker as water boils in a pot. But it is possible the burner could be turned on high.

On the other hand, politics demonstrates its dependence on these socioeconomic conditions in the process, not in the moment. It is important to remember Marx's emphasis on dialectics in this sense. Because what is meant is not a dull, doctrinal determinist formula. On the contrary, it is an analytical medium where those who have the material tools that enable power in a process shaped by social, political and economic conditions that shape each other in the process often win. In other words, these conditions have independence as well as interdependence. In this

context, Marxism also recognizes the independence of politics. Importantly, Engels has a detailed account in terms of how political force played an important role:

“The role played in history by force as contrasted with economic development is now clear. In the first place, all political power is originally based on an economic, social function, and increases in proportion as the members of society, through the dissolution of the primitive community, become transformed into private producers, and thus come to be more and more separated from the administrators of the general functions of society. Secondly, after the political force has made itself independent in relation to society, and has transformed itself from society’s servant into its master, it can work in either of two directions. Either it works in the sense and direction of the regular economic movement — in which case no conflict arises between them, the economic development being only accelerated : or, (political) force works against economic development — in which case, as a rule, with but few exceptions, force succumbs to it. These few exceptions are isolated cases of conquest, in which barbarian conquerors have exterminated or driven out the population of a country and have laid waste or allowed to go to ruin productive powers which they did not know how to use” (Engels, 2006; 53).

In other words, although force and politics may exist as independent agencies in society, socio-economic relations determine forms of political and social developments in the last instance.

Marx, and Marxist thought, have similar particularities like other realist thinkers, such as being anti-idealistic and in recognition of popular masses and autonomy of politics.

Ironically, the concept of false consciousness, a concept which explains how the ruling class and its several political parties organizes as a political power in society, is often criticized as being idealistic. Some workers support political parties which defend anti-worker policies.

The misrepresentation here comes from where consciousness is reduced as a matter of rational

choice.⁵ However, consciousness is a space where one may find both mature ideas as well as intuitive thoughts.

A similar caricaturizing continues when it comes to define how the relationship of production determines superstructure at the last instance. ‘Economy trumps politics’ is often the way in which Marx’s politics are defined. In most of the cases, it is a critique of Marx directed towards a Marx that is vulgarized by some, rather than what Marx himself says. Engels (1890) replies to this critique in his correspondence with publicist Joseph Bloch:

“According to the materialist conception of history, the *ultimately* determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Other than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the *only* determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure — political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas — also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their *form*. There is an interaction of all these elements in which, amid all the endless host of accidents (that is, of things and events whose inner interconnection is so remote or so impossible of proof that we can regard it as non-existent, as negligible), the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary. Otherwise the application of the theory to any period of history would be easier than the solution of a simple equation of the first degree.” (Engels 1890)

Moreover, critiques of the Marxist understanding of power and authority takes similar forms. On the one hand, young Marx is separated from late Marx by marking a “Machiavellian moment” of

⁵ What makes the difference between the two can be explained by their opposites. While the current level of consciousness allows us to see what workers choose in either case based on their experiences, the unconsciousness choice is more likely a reflexive, an accustomed choice. This can’t be explained in the dichotomy between rationality and irrationality. Because rationality assumes logical choice based on the interests on the specific unit, irrational choice brings one almost to an unknown world. Although this research acknowledges that there can be insufficiency of the empirical means of the social sciences, this insufficiency should not force to us to create a caricature of the worker, or idealization of the concepts.

Marx. On the other hand, the leader of the Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin, is named as a Machiavellian Marxist (Nair 1984, 232). Whether or not being a Machiavellian means rejection of a substantive democracy is unclear. “Machiavellian” might mean being dictatorial, or denoting the embracement of hierarchical and authoritative means of politics. Whatever negative connotation it may mean, it manifests an escape from the necessities of transformative politics.

As a conclusion, Marx recognizes power as a resource that is rooted into the private ownership of the means of production, while authority is seen as a legitimate power which is dependent on the means of production. For him, ruling classes maintain their rule by using different means of hegemony. This situation is framed within the concept of the relationship of production which all relationships of power, authority and legitimacy revolves around. These relationships are being managed by a class. The ultimate form of this class power is state. And state is not just a sum of administrative and governmental functions, but also a tool of oppression used by one class on another. This condition requires that it needs to be forced out, hence revolution, *the most authoritarian thing*, and *withering away* the state. The only possible way is to force out of them collectivization, or/and generalization of the ownership of the means of production and gifting it to the society as a whole. Such a power struggle requires one to welcome the hierarchical and authoritative nature of politics in the service of liberating practices. In that sense, the content and nature of this liberation movement guarantees and forces democratic aspirations in such a practice/organization to provide a platform to different voices for them to fulfill their potential. Therefore, they may embark on the path of human emancipation in which they realize their potential.

CHAPTER V: GENERAL ANALYSIS ON POWER AND AUTHORITY

Three philosophers are representatives of political realism in different scopes. The reality of power and authority can be described within the works of Machiavelli and Hobbes most clearly despite their flaws— which vacuum can be only fulfilled by Marxist understanding of power and authority. Firstly, this claim compels to see similarities and differences between Marx, Machiavelli and Hobbes on power and authority. Then, thanks to the formulas presented by Marx, it can be seen that the exit from the equation of power and authority will be possible beyond political emancipation.

When it comes to these terms, the most appealing commonality between three thinkers is that they place the source of power and authority on a material base rather than divine right or lineage. The realization of popular masses in politics is at the center of their attention despite the form of masses varying for each. Machiavelli [1588] appoints determinant role to the *virtue* and *fortuna*. However, these are effective means if they succeed in their intended end, staying in power and controlling its base. For him, popular masses are recognized as a homogeneous group of people remaining outside of prince and nobility. Unlike Machiavelli, Hobbes [1640] designs a hypothetical contract where individuals assuming the role of the ruled and the ruling power coming together to sign, delivering security in the expense of natural rights. Marx [1848], on the other hand, draws attention over to socioeconomic classes.

In the philosophical level, these thinkers have a similarity in terms of how they can be located around a materialist worldview against mystifying the power instead idealist moralism. Their assumptions are similar on the question of morality to the extent of how politics both antagonizes and embraces this field. They recognize how determinant the role of power is to the

very last point throughout a historical development/process. For them, politics is an amoral field. Although the Marxist approach tends to recognize a space of morality to the extent where it has a/n educative/forming role, see *Lenin* and *Gramsci*, this case is different in Machiavelli and Hobbes.⁶ While Machiavelli speaks within the borders of a political battlefield divorced from moral values, Hobbes derives his argument from how our beings necessities the things, appetite.

In a different aspect, morality plays different roles within these thinkers' political analyses. While the relationships of power and authority reveal themselves within the conflict between rulers and ruled in Marx, Machiavelli and Hobbes, the way of how these rulers construct their authorities differ, which brings the question of legitimacy. In the writings of Marx and Machiavelli, popular masses have a role that rulers must be attentive. Even though Hobbes does not emphasize this openly, he acknowledges this very reality of impact on popular masses by calling rebellion against the absolute monarch as amoral. Denouncing acts of rebellion as amoral is in recognition of the will and possible threat of popular masses.

Power is the ability to exercise full or partial control over the community. When it is the role to take the form of organizing authority, legitimacy appears as a matter. And it defines how power is embraced by the community. This is to say, power cannot deliver an entity to obtain authority over a community without gaining legitimacy within that community. The power that will be exercised requires a bond with consent explicitly, so it becomes the authority. In consequence, gaining consent as a concept is what defines legitimacy. It can be through the use of either soft or

⁶ It is intended to cover Gramsci's point of views by calling Marxist approach instead Marx's. Because Gramsci is not to deviate but to expound how to organize a set of policies to establish hegemony of his *Modern Prince*, proletariat party.

hard means of political rule. Morality plays a role in that it regulates the story of why consent should be recognized to the ruler. Legitimacy requires standards and customs.

Karl Marx explains the legitimacy of authority through false consciousness. Marx's point of contention is that popular masses are not homogenous as they have been formed into socio-economic classes. In the realm of politics, one person means one vote, but this is not the case in economics. If you are a worker, there is a boss stronger than you. In other words, he reveals the legitimacy of ruling classes coming from the division of ruled classes. Because some support the political agenda of ruling classes instead of their own liberation.

On the other hand, Machiavelli situates the power that drives political battles between the elites, the prince, and the people. By doing that, he defines the principal axiom of politics. In his dedicatory letter to Lorenzo de Medici, Machiavelli described it more or less, "Landscape painters station themselves in the valleys in order to draw mountains or high ground, and ascend an eminence in order to get a good view of the plains, so it is necessary to be a prince to know the nature of the people thoroughly, and one of the populace to know the nature of princes" (Machiavelli 1950, 4). In other words, Machiavelli defines sides of the political battle as being as distinct as a valley and a mountain.

However, Hobbes enlarges and extends the relationship between those at the top of the mountain and in the valley. Therefore, power becomes more of a transformative phenomenon through Hobbesian lenses. Giving up on rights at the expense of laws constitutes the base of a social contract on which the state emerges for the sake of society's protection. Leviathan as the sole protector of the people, is a consented actor which is assumed to represent all the bodies of

the existing society. Therefore, metaphorically speaking, Machiavelli's valley fractures and becomes a mountain for Hobbes.

In Machiavelli's *Prince*, the reciprocal relation between and among these power dynamics is more exposed than in the *Leviathan*. After the social contract is settled, Hobbes recognizes sweeping powers to the state. The *Leviathan* becomes the face of the people. Therefore, while Machiavelli claims that it is between prince, elites and people in the times of Florentine Republic, it is governed and governing in social contract for Hobbes. Thus, both authors defined reciprocal relation in two different spatial settings. Hobbes defines an ahistorical setting and Machiavelli reflects what he experienced during his time. Both authors experienced tumultuous times. Fragmented political relations allowed these two authors to see clearly what was happening, such as what are the points of disagreements, how they can be overcome and by which means. In that sense, the times of the two writers prove that the unifying and disintegrating effects of power in all its aspects can be seen in an environment where relations that increase and become clear are intense.

However, both understandings of power are often disregarded because of claims that they are morally questionable. While Machiavelli gives a high ground to the prince, Hobbes addresses monarchy as the best political system. They affirm the tutelage of elites over people. We might not expect more than such an affirmation of elite power unless there is another intellectual account of power which may allow for comparison. Recalling Marx's famous quote, "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles," the problem of political realisms can be critically evaluated using the Marxist understanding of power here (Marx and Engels 1906, 12). While Machiavelli places the role of virtues as to how a prince may utilize them,

Hobbes establishes the need for an absolute state for preserving rights over some of these virtues. Therefore, using socio-economic class may allow for the drawing of a better picture of them.

From Machiavelli and Hobbes, Marx's difference resides in treating power as a historical, perpetuating phenomenon beyond his stress on the relationship between the power and class struggle and positions. On the other side, although Machiavelli and Hobbes define power and authority as a reciprocal relation, Machiavelli's description is more explicit on this equation. He can see the power dynamic both from the upper classes and ordinary people of his time.

Marx fits here in two ways. First, Marx's approach is always dialectical [processual, flowing], hidden in the emphasis of "at the last instance." Therefore, Hobbes's social contract can be expired, or Machiavelli's Prince may no longer respond to the needs of the people. Engels describes Marxist approach to the processual nature of events in his article on class struggles in France. In his "Introduction to Marx's Class Struggles in France," Engels says, "...The conditions of the struggle have essentially been altered. The rebellion of the old style, the street fight behind barricades... has become antiquated" (Engels 1895). Engels claims that the general franchise to working-class made them use elections for their demands, so it is no longer necessary to barricade fights. Likewise, how arenas were the places to settle problems in ancient times, courts are now places to settle these problems (Fontana 2021).

Beyond these nuanced differences, all three appeal to the autonomy of politics. Machiavelli is accepted as the founder of "autonomy of politics" as a field that is independent from metaphysical forces (Fontana 1993, 13). While Hobbes' Leviathan recognizes the autonomy of politics as a matter of survival through surrendering their rights, Marx does the same by establishing a difference between political emancipation and human emancipation: "Political emanci-

pation is, of course, a big step forward. True, it is not the final form of human emancipation in general, but it is the final form of human emancipation within the hitherto existing world order. It goes without saying that we are speaking here of real, practical emancipation” (Marx 1844).

Political emancipation is not enough. It might be the fallacy of conformist thoughts across the part of the academy that appeals for so-called social change. Because social change is not possible by forming a political movement by itself. Although a political movement can be a point of leverage to lead opposing forces toward social transformation, it will not be able to go further than this point of success at the best. Because the political revolution that has been claimed from social democratic and liberal strains of academic social opposition has been reluctant to reverse the role of the working class where the power makes more concrete sense, in the hands of the class that create the value. It seems that the problem goes further than that. Years long exploitation feed off a heavy tiredness on the politically consciousness circles to take up the cause and further it. Although one may pull the flag of “Pessimism of the Intelligence, Optimism of the Will” here, it seems that the will is not even optimistic within the circles that feel responsible themselves for change (Gramsci, 1920).

Without creating another creed, as Isaiah Berlin makes a good critique to vulgar materialists, we may ask the question how it is possible for us to obtain the goal of socioeconomic liberation. Although great revolutions of 19th and 20th centuries has been depicted in an epic way, alter results and setbacks wondered intellectuals to ask, “*Is it the end of history?*” (Fukuyama 2006). Here, that famous claim of Fukuyama has more than a simple convincing effect on the intellectuals, and universities, it is a foundation of *reasonable surrender*.

It is correct to say that liberty is liberty (Berlin 1958). But there are categories of liberty, which Berlin also does not reject. Conceptually, Berlin makes a distinction on liberty, and he defines this doctrine of negative and positive liberties as a part of modern age. While the former defines the liberty of individual sharply, the other makes a distinction in an individual. A liberty that is divorced from social and material conditions fully might remain solely conceptual. As Berlin says, imagine a person under torture gives all the secrets, hence they sell out all their friends. It can be evaluated as reasonable in the scope of negative liberty, but historically it rejects the reality that a form of oppression is gaining influence over individual spheres of citizens, this brings us to a contradiction within the conceptual claim of negative liberty.

Nevertheless, positive liberty is being clearly defined in that sense. In the expense of reaching their full capacity, it is up to the person to limit their desires, so there are two “me.” But is it true to sacrifice themselves for something that is not certain to be successful in the future, hence it is unclear that there will be a platform where individual may fully realize itself? Otherwise, it wouldn’t create another idea of heaven and hell. As long as Marxist interpretation of the things limit itself to political, social and economic perspectives, it remains reluctant to one field of influence, a way of thinking: morality in action.

Although morality is not at the center of politics in Machiavelli and Hobbes, positive moral values as values of virtue have persuasive influence, to compose an embryo of new socio-cultural hegemony. But as Gramsci claims, this [embryonic] hegemony cannot be independent from existing forces in the society, hence from which forces compose a historical bloc. *A historical bloc has to do things that the previous one couldn’t do, constitute a full democracy, and gaining the trust of people by practicing this democracy at each level of its modern prince.* (Gramsci

1957). Because a modern prince that does not comprehend which conditions can maintain *negative liberty*,⁷ can't go further than agitative political programs other than offering another creed. As a result of this questioning of the understanding of power and authority, and how central questions they are in politics, hence the progress of humanity, the people who may change the things should believe that things can change. Politics of gradual change and politics of foundational change can involve different levels of turning blind eyes or apoliticism. Because immediacy of the accumulating unresolved problems of the society requires immediate political strategies. Hence these strategies can only be produced by organic intellectuals of respective movements which came out as a response to those problems within the society.

Immediacy of these problems again tempt us to see power as a relational phenomena on the ground of intersection of political, social and economic relationships. In other words, power occurs in relationship between two subjects within a limited physical space. This space could be defined locally, nationally or internationally (Dahl 2002).

However, how power shows its effect reveals another property of power which is how it relates to process, how it is historical. From a Marxist point of view, action and reaction follow each other, amalgamate and create new forms. Immediacy of demands of communities may reach to a point in which they can shape the political system and discourse to some limited extent. In the Jewish Question, Karl Marx addresses political equality in this fashion. This political equality is not sufficient. Because socioeconomic inequality pushes back the gains in the name of political equality.

⁷ Social and economic conditions should not create obligations for people to limit themselves to use their rights.

The same contradiction can be seen in the foundation of liberal democracies. This form of democracy requires a strong and crowded middle class to spread general wealth throughout different racial, ethnic, religious communities and gender in the society. On the other hand, it has been observed many times where these communities are being pushed under the threat of dominant identities of any society as soon as economic downturn begins and depressions are being experienced. It is to say, although political equality saves its role of being an indispensable demand for many, the experience of inequality of different types that are enforced by socioeconomic inequality says different.

In that sense, Marx's aid to Machiavelli and Hobbes comes out at this point. Although power is reciprocal, it is not endless in the sense of state's existence. Because if lack of cohesion requires power, it functions as an oppressive machine, aka state (Meszaros 2018). It must transform into something with a fundamental change. So, to abolish power itself, the same power has to fulfill its duty to maintain and end what drives social order. And it is to succeed full liberty. Where, for example, Hobbes' definition of power fell short is hidden in his moralistic point of view. For Hobbes, "The Power of a Man, (to take it Universally,) is his present means, to obtain some future apparent Good. And is either *Originall* or *Instrumentall*" (1997, 48).

The paradox here as Naïr describes:

“C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi la tradition inaugurée par Engels et développé par Lénine dans L'Etat et la révolution est également équivoque: positive en ce qu'elle place au centre de l'émancipation humaine la nécessaire disparition de la domination politique autoritaire et qu'elle souligne l'impératif de la socialisation non autoritaire des sujets sociaux, elle est aussi négative parce qu'elle soutient que le dépérissement de l'Etat suppose la dictature du prolétariat, donc un renforcement de la fonction répressive de l'Etat durant la période de

transition vers le socialisme. A travers cette affirmation s'ouvre ce que l'on pourrait appeler le moment machiavélien du marxisme” (1984. 232).⁸

For this, Naïr (1984) addresses young Marx: "Si le machiavélisme représente, dans la tradition de la philosophie occidentale, la subordination des moyens à la fin tout autant que la réification du politique, la pensée du jeune Marx apparaît plutôt, à travers la quête d'une socialisation non autoritaire, comme l'appel indéfiniment renouvelé d'une pédagogie de la liberté” (233).⁹

Morality, in that sense, remains entangled in front of progress that might liberate the society from socioeconomic inequality. This can be overcome only by treating Marx as a whole, hence his call for pedagogy of freedom.

It is not morality as a means to associate with the world to the extent of defining good, but it becomes a problem of insufficiency when it comes to explain the world. At this point, one may find similarity between Marx and Machiavelli in terms of how they recognize a space for morality within the politics. Because politics is solely interested in relationships of power and conflict around them. Morality must be divorced. Although it is a point of intersection between two thinkers, Marx welcomes a sociological view where morality is being recognized. From the

⁸ This is moreover why the tradition inaugurated by Engels and developed by Lenin in *The State and Revolution* is equally equivocal: positive in that it places at the center of human emancipation the necessary disappearance of authoritarian political domination and that it underlines the imperative of the non-authoritarian socialization of social subjects, it is also negative because it maintains that the withering away of the State supposes the dictatorship of the proletariat, therefore a reinforcement of the repressive function of the State during the period of transition to socialism. Through this affirmation opens what could be called the Machiavellian moment of Marxism.

⁹ If Machiavellianism represents, in the tradition of Western philosophy, the subordination of the means to the end as well as the reification of the political, the thought of the young Marx appears rather, through the quest for a non-authoritarian socialization, as 'an indefinitely renewed call for a pedagogy of freedom.

introduction of his “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” one may draw a parallel in how he sees religious thought which embraces a set of moral codes: “*Religious* suffering is, at one and the same time, the *expression* of real suffering and a *protest* against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the *opium* of the people” (Marx 1844). For him, morality plays a role as it helps for the oppressed to associate. On the other hand, he is aware that this institution, *religion* here specifically, must be challenged and undone. This states that every phenomenon, from morality to politics, from power relations to culture, is subject to destruction, change and transformation over time.

In Marx, historical, so dialectical understanding of power challenges hypothetical and relatively idealistic approaches of both Hobbes and Machiavelli. While Hobbes defines Leviathan as an outcome of a social contract, hence a contract that are signed by people during a timeless space, Hobbes sees as how power relations work out as they are. Although all these thinkers consider the effects of popular masses, Hobbes and Machiavelli do not have a comprehensive perspective from a sociological and economic analytical point of view by their nature. In other words, Hobbes and Machiavelli did not consider the unseen but the developing, or they lacked the means to do so.

Hence, the nightmare of intellectuals over the question of power starts right here. Because approving the power is the determinant at very last instance means to reach a theory to see who is the heaviest power that all the politics revolves around it.

This question opens a path to Marxism’s class analysis to center itself to expose who makes the last decision to drive the society. To give a picture of which main political contradic-

tion the society revolves around is that social and economic inequality can erode political equality, as well as political equality can breed social and economic equality. For power, today's question is how to liberate the society from such a contradiction, where is it going to end?

This is a question that is interesting to intellectuals as a privileged social agency to reach knowledge before most. Gramsci provides a descriptive account for the role of intellectuals which is "to translate the interests and values of a specific social group into general "common" values and interests" (Fontana 1993, 141). However, their function is paralyzed because of lack of collective solidarity — individualism. Dedication for change requires a pathology of individualistic petty-bourgeois world, in which one may see how their inaction plays a role in having an elephant in the room.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

To conclude, this thesis states how power and authority are described by the thinkers of political realism, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Marx. First, the fact that the works of Machiavelli and Hobbes are limited to the field of politics exposes them to criticism over moral issues and misconceptions. On the other hand, the fact that Marx's comprehensive approach puts the social production that requires them at the center of power and authority relations can significantly explain what Machiavelli and Hobbes mean. Secondly, political emancipation does not mean the emancipation of humanity. In order to go beyond political emancipation, it is necessary to reveal the nature of authority sharply and democratize it as much as possible. Otherwise, rejecting authority altogether means ignoring the imperatives of power relations. And thirdly, it is meaningless to discuss the phenomena of power without discussing its levels of concentration. State, in our case, is the ultimate form. It can be superseded by local communities and their administrative structure since there won't be any need for a cohesive state structure to run the production. In a form of organization, hierarchical and authoritative aspects of power are required by an anarchical order not because of human nature, but because of lack of ability to arrange the production according to the needs of people.

Lastly, if the discussion over Machiavelli and Hobbes reveals that although old formulas must be revisited, as Naïr points out in young Marx pedagogy of liberation carries the most important task to transform the educators, hence the problem is the education of educators (organizers) (1984, 233). Young Marx reaches the idea of communism out fully by breaking away from Hegelians in the German Ideology philosophically. Such a philosophical-educational measure without getting stuck in an economic determinist and vulgar Marxist opinion like that people will

learn such a philosophy through economic struggle may be worthwhile to protect people who support the ideology of liberation from the ugly fascination of power.

Together with these results, this paper presents differences and similarities of their understanding on power and authority. Confronting moralistic accounts of politics, and idealism, recognition of popular masses and autonomy of politics are main commonalities between these thinkers. They describe the relationship of power and authority on a material base and reject any unknown sources of power. In that sense, they are the representatives of political realism in different stages of human history.

In politics, they state that the material base is popular masses. These thinkers analyze the relationship between rulers and ruled as a reciprocal relationship in gaining support to come to power and being able to stay in power. Therefore, they visualize the relationship of power and authority within institutional settings as another mutual aspect.

However, this thesis also shows their differences. While Machiavelli treats popular masses as a group of people outside of the elites and prince, Hobbes designs two actors such individuals and state. Hence, society and the role of social forces are not well-defined in his hypothetical argument. Although Marx recognizes the autonomy of politics, he suggests that there are forces outside of politics which determine politics, namely the relationship of production. Which social agency can take over the power depends on the question of who owns the means of production.

Also, it reveals how they define politics, and what is the required call beyond explaining such concepts. Machiavelli supports the republic within the terms of their period. Hobbes asserts that an absolute monarchy would be the best system after experiencing the conditions arising from the English Civil War [1642-1651]. Marx doesn't necessarily suggest a system, but he

claims that it is a historical necessity that humanity will advance towards socialism, the dictatorship of proletariat, and then communism, a classless society. But he suggests to be a part of this change; “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it” (Marx 1998, 574).

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