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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC MEASURES, LGBTIAQ* RIGHTS
ACCEPTANCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN AID ALLOCATION IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

by

Jacqueline R. Biergans

A master's thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts,
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2023

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APPROVAL

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts.

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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

ABSTRACT

The Relationship between Democratic Measures, LGBTIAQ* Rights Acceptance, and U.S.

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by

Jacqueline R. Biergans

Advisor: Professor Dr. Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner

U.S. democratization efforts abroad are sometimes framed as motive for U.S. aid allocations to Global South countries. In that regard, Jasbir Puar (2007 and 2013), Cynthia Weber (2016), and Laura J. Shepherd (2006) critique U.S. foreign policy for using LGBTIAQ* rights as an empty rhetoric rather than as benchmark by which to identify and reward countries' level of democratization in the Global South. However, Claire Apodaga and Michael Stohl (1999) explain that the United States is prioritizing economic and security interests instead, whereas countries receive military support despite their human rights abuses at home. In this thesis, the relationship between democracy, human rights (including LGBTIAQ* acceptance) and foreign aid is assessed for 2017-2020. In addition, a qualitative analysis of two cases, Uruguay and Saudi Arabia, countries on the opposite side of the democracy and human rights spectrum, is undertaken to see if changes in U.S. foreign aid match changes in democratization. The results of both the quantitative and qualitative analysis show that there is no significant relationship and are in line with the findings of the scholars cited above. Yet the United States does not use aid for economic and security purposes alone. Democratization seems to be rewarded if civil and political rights are improved, whereas specific social issues such as LGBTIAQ* acceptance seem to matter less.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In the Western hemisphere there tends to be a strong relationship between democratization, human rights, and economic development. Many scholars posit that foreign aid is commonly promoted to support democratization and human rights (Burcu Savun and Daniel C. Tirone, 2011; Tomohisa Hattori, 2001; Ben Lai, 2003; James M. Scorr and Caire A. Steele, 2011; Steven E. Finkel et. al., 2007; David L. Cingranelli and Thomas E. Pasquarello, 1985). Yet others criticize U.S. efforts as serving political and security interests rather than democracy, whereas the United States supports foreign military despite human rights abuses in receiving countries (Claire Apodaga and Michael Stohl, 1999; Zehra F. Arat, 1999; M. G. Kaladharan Nayar, 1980; Cynthia Weber, 2016; Jasbir Puar, 2007 and 2013; Laura J. Shepherd, 2006). While the relationship between democratization, human rights, and foreign aid is not a new topic in international relations, there is very little recent data and not much research on the relationship with LGBTIAQ* rights.

This thesis tries to provide the missing data through quantitative analysis and qualitative case studies that test and analyze the relationship between countries' level of democratization, level of democracy, human rights, LGBTIAQ* acceptance, and three types of U.S. foreign aid to the Global South: 1) democracy and human rights aid, 2) peace and security aid, 3) economic (development) aid. The goal is to understand if 141 countries in the Global South receive more U.S. foreign aid if they are 1) more democratic, 2) more democratized, 3) more protective of human rights, and 4) more accepting of the LGBTIAQ* community.

The analysis starts with a quantitative approach to test if there is a pattern in U.S. foreign aid giving processes based on different levels of democracy and human rights, and then specifically LGBTIAQ* rights over 2017-2020. It consists of three quantitative analyses that test 1)

correlations between aid of all types and democracy levels, and 2) variances in aid receipts between three different groups of countries: democratic (categorized as “free” by Freedom House), democratizing (categorized as “partly free”), and non-democratic (categorized as “unfree”). The first section provides the results for a relationship with all U.S. foreign aid. The second section provides the results of tests for only democracy and human rights aid on the assumption that the relationship will be even stronger. The last section asks if U.S. foreign aid is dependent on how accepting a Global South country is of their local LGBTIAQ* community.

This thesis continues qualitatively by focusing on two case studies, Saudi Arabia and Uruguay, which have opposing views on democracy and LGBTIAQ* human rights. The goal is to understand if and to what extent the level of democracy, and LGBTIAQ* human rights matter for U.S. foreign aid allocation in both countries or if aid is dependent on security and economic concerns. A historical view is taken to see if any pattern emerges.

In sum, this thesis aims to analyze the relationship between democracy, human rights (including LGBTIAQ* rights), and foreign aid. This thesis will give an answer about how relevant democracy, democratization, and human rights are in recent U.S. aid allocation, how these factors may have shaped diplomatic relations with the Global South, and if scholars and politicians’ critique of the United States on these issues hold true.

CHAPTER 2

Research Design

This thesis analyzes the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and democracy across developing countries and economies in transition asking the following research questions:

Q1: What is the relationship between recipients' levels of democracy/human rights and U.S. foreign aid?

Q2: What is the relationship between democratization/human rights and foreign aid?

Q3: Is the respect for LGBTIAQ human rights related to the receipt of foreign aid?*

The concurrent hypotheses were as follows:

HP1: The more democratic a country, and the more it respects human rights, the more likely it is to receive U.S. aid.

HP2: The more committed a country is to democratization, and the respect for human rights, the more likely it is to receive foreign aid.

HP3: The more committed a country is to LGBTIAQ human rights, the more likely it is to receive U.S. foreign aid.*

To get a comprehensive understanding of these issues, I combined a quantitative and qualitative approach. I analyzed U.S. foreign aid statistics retrieved from the Department of State's database on Foreign Assistance. Only Global South countries were selected because these are the primary recipients of aid. In this thesis the term Global South refers to as a combination of what the United Nations defines as 124 developing countries and 17 "economies in transition" in their latest report "World Economic Situation and Prospects" from 2022. To classify these countries as democratic,

democratizing, and non-democratic, the latest report from Freedom House of 2023 was used, classifying Global South countries based on their democracy scores into free (democratic), partly free (democratizing), and not free (non-democratic). Not all years were used. 2017-2020 was the time frame for my quantitative analysis since the goal was to retrieve the most recent data. The latest 2019 social acceptance report from the William Institute at the University of California, Los Angeles did not provide any data for countries' LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores after 2020. Since this UCLA report was used to classify and analyze the 141 Global South countries by their LGBTIAQ* acceptance, I analyzed the relationship until 2020 only, starting in 2017. Countries' LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores were not provided in single years, but periods that combined three to four years. The quantitative section, therefore, uses only one average LGBTIAQ* acceptance score, that is, for the whole period of 2017-2020.¹

The *quantitative analysis* includes three parts that employed two statistical methods: 1) Pearson's *r* correlation, and 2) a single-factor ANOVA, including a Tukey test if an ANOVA test showed significance. Two dependent variables from the Department of State's database were analyzed: all aid comprising democracy and human rights aid, peace and security aid, and economic aid; and democracy and human rights aid alone. Both foreign aid variables were tested using absolute dollar amounts of aid at first, and later, using per capita aid on the assumption that controlling the data for population would result in more significant results. To determine countries' foreign aid per capita, I retrieved population data from the World Bank's databank. Lastly, I used the same two statistical methods to first test the relationship between countries' level of democratization and

¹There was no LGBTIAQ* acceptance score provided for the following 19 Global South countries: Brunei, Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Fiji, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, North Korea, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, and Vanuatu. These 19 countries were excluded in any quantitative section that analyzed a relationship with countries' LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores.

their level of LGBTIAQ* acceptance, and secondly the relationship between LGBTIAQ* acceptance and all foreign aid, and specifically, democracy aid.

In the *qualitative section* I took a closer look at the two cases of Uruguay and Saudi Arabia. These cases were chosen because they are on opposing ends in their democracy status and LGBTIAQ* acceptance. Uruguay ranks the highest on the democracy and LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores in the Global South, whereas Saudi Arabia is known to be one of the least democratic and the least accepting of the LGBTIAQ* community. For each country I analyze both the “foreign aid” they received as well as the democracy and human rights aid specifically. The time frame was extended to 2000-2020 to see if and under what conditions historical patterns exist, especially since in 2011 Barack Obama announced that LGBTIAQ* human rights was a U.S. foreign policy priority. The Freedom House’ data on democracy scores was extended accordingly, while an additional UCLA report from 2018 was used to retrieve the additional LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores between 2000 and 2017. Once more, the UCLA data was provided in average scores for time periods of three to four years each (2000-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-2013, 2014-2017). To understand the causes of patterns observed, I also briefly analyzed social, political, and economic circumstances between 2000 and 2020 in domestic, regional, and international contexts of both countries. Information was collected from news articles, research papers, the website of the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Embassies in both countries, the Uruguayan and Saudi Arabian embassy in Washington D.C., as well as the website of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans, and Intersex Association (ILGA World).

CHAPTER 3

Literature

Classifying Democracy

Democracy is a political system commonly referred to as “good governance” (Diamond and Morlino, 2004, p. 21). It is in theory “completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens,” which distinguishes democracy from other political systems such as authoritarianism and totalitarianism (Dahl, 1971, pp. 2-4). It puts a nation’s citizens first. However, definitions used by scholars and practitioners differ in semantic and structural characteristics (Hyland, 1995, pp. 48-49). Different components are seen as key to establishing “good governance” and to creating a citizen-focused approach.

Robert Dahl argues that political development is key when focusing on citizens’ needs within a democracy. To reach an end goal of increased inclusiveness, the political system must be constantly challenged to keep up with steady changes in society. This requires citizens to publicly contest their ideas and values either individually or by forming a “permissible opposition” (public contestation) to then compete against the government and any other opposition (political competition) (Dahl, 1971, p. 4). These two axioms of 1) public contestation and 2) political competition will lead to greater political and social representation and to more inclusion subsequently. This is to say that the government must let anyone 1) formulate their preferences, 2) signify these preferences, and 3) have these preferences weighted equally in government. Yet the government must be willing to compete too. This happens if old standards are no longer economically efficient, that is A) suppression is more costly than acceptance, B) the benefits of toleration are higher than the costs of toleration (Dahl, 1971, pp. 3, 15).

To support citizens' interests and to protect them from potential autocracies, institutional arrangements must be fulfilled, appropriately. Political institutionalism is seen as the gatekeeper to democratic structures and equality. Institutions such as the parliament, the Supreme Court, or political parties guard democratic development (Béteille, 2012, p. 1). While they likely differ based on countries' different types of democracy (e.g., representative democracy, direct democracy, democratic monarchy), institutions let a democratic system rise and fall. They protect democratic demands of public contestation and political competition. Accordingly, Robert Dahl defines eight systemic requirements for democracy that domestic institutions must ensure and embody: 1) Freedom to form and join organizations; 2) Freedom of expression; 3) Right to vote; 4) Right of political leaders to compete for support and votes; 5) Alternative sources of information; 6) Free and fair elections; 7) Eligibility for public office; 8) Regulatory institutions for government (Dahl, 1971, p. 3). For John Burnheim these dimensions can, however, only work and survive along with a decentralized government with autonomous bodies that negotiate "among themselves or if that fails by quasi-judicial arbitration" (Hyland, 1995, p. 44; Burnheim, 2006, p. 5). Put differently, citizens' beliefs are diverse. For these to be represented accurately, not only institutional structures but institutional bodies must be diverse and decentralized. Accordingly, diverse decentralized institutions form and sustain a democracy by working towards citizens' political rights (Schmitter and Karl, 1991, p. 76).

However, decentralized institutionalism will only work if institutions are simultaneously held accountable for their actions by their citizens and elected civilians (Burnheim, 2006, p. 81; Schmitter and Karl, 1991, p. 76). Otherwise, decentralized institutions are not necessarily supportive of a democracy. For example, institutions such as the military may override elected civilians through interventions (Huntington, 1991, p. 11). To prevent this, Philippe C. Schmitter

and Terry Lynn Karl add to Robert Dahl's required institutional structures for a democracy. A democracy can only work and be sustained if elected civilians are not subject to overriding through institutions and they are able to act independently of these institutions to hold institutions accountable and protect democratic structures and citizens' demands (Schmitter and Karl, 1991, pp. 81-82).

Seymour Martin Lipset goes further. For him accountable decentralized institutions are not enough protection since elected civilians are not held accountable. Yet these institutions may provide "opportunities for changing the governing officials" (Lipset, 1959, p. 71). Thus, for Lipset elected civilians must take on an active role of consistently proving themselves to their citizens to form a democratic system. They must show that they are the legitimate ruler by not only representing popular beliefs but doing so in an effective way that will support their citizens' values and needs in everyday activity, political problem-solving, and moments of crisis such as war and economic depressions (Lipset, 1959, pp. 84-87; Dahl, 1971, pp. 78-80). If not, a political system is not democratic, nor can it be sustained. For example, Germany's first democracy of the Weimar Republic failed. The government and elected officials lobbied for values and symbolism that did not represent German society back then. In response, citizens opposed the elected officials and brought the country's democracy down since the government was ineffective in proving themselves to be the legitimate power for their citizens' needs (Lipset, 1959, pp. 86-87). Put differently, the more cleavages in society elected civilians can resolve, the more they secure their own spot as ruling party in a democratic system.

However, major issues such as religion, citizenship, and income distribution have always split political societies throughout history (Lipset, 1959, p. 92). As a result, Samuel Huntington speaks of phases of democratization along which countries historically establish, sustain, or demolish the

factors relevant for a democratic political system, depending on what circumstances their nations faces at times (Huntington, 1991). No country is ever fully democratized (Dahl, 1971, p. 8). Still, Western scholars and politicians speak of democracy as a “sortal concept” that exists or does not exist (Hyland, 1995, p. 54). Other forms of non-Western democracies are denied (Jones, 2006, p. 13). Democracy is no longer only a form of political system; it is also a political and social ideal (Hyland, 1995, p. 53). Accordingly, Western scholars and politicians primarily discuss democratization to make sense of the quality of a democracy and evaluate the quality of results, quality of content, and procedural quality of democracies (Diamond and Morlino, 2004, pp. 21-22). By doing so, they, however, forget about variations in democracies based on different cultural demands, domestic standards, and questions governments may face at home (Hyland, 1995, pp. 40, 49).

In this respect, the next section on democratization will discuss what factors define democratization, where it starts, what influences it, and which factors are commonly seen to support, sustain, and protect the goal of a (stable) democracy.

Classifying Democratization

Democratization describes the institutionalization of democratic values. It makes sense of how democracies come into being in practice compared to the theoretical concept of democracy (Bunce, 2000, p. 708; Diamond and Morlino, 2004, p. 27; Davenport, 1999, p. 92). Democratization refers to the conditions and causes leading to greater or fewer democratic values and makes sense of what stabilizes them while analyzing the intensities and variations among countries (Tilly, 2000, p. 2; Huntington, 1991, p. 11).

Therefore, democratization is a measurement tool in international politics to identify the quality of a democracy and compare countries and their systemic structures with one another (Diamond and Morlino, 2004, p. 22; Huntington, 1991, p. 7). Democratic structures may, however, even differ within domestic contexts. A government may choose fair democratic elections while domestic private associations and subnational organizations prefer hegemonic structures instead (Dahl, 1971, pp. 12-13). At other times a country may not apply all democratic features at once. For example, China has the right to vote. Yet civilians cannot choose from opposing political sides because of China's one-party system. In other words, democratization can apply even if not all required democratic characteristics are checked. After all, democratization is not a steady process (Rustow, 1970, p. 21). "(N)ot all democratizations occur in the same way and these differences are systemic not random" (Geddes, 2007, p. 20).

Democratic Transitions

Democratic transitions start with reformers acting on an institutional and civic level. It is, however, not only the opposition that acts on both levels by trying to bring the nondemocratic system down; the government can be involved too. Elites in power might transform the system by themselves or even collaborate with the opposition to extricate current problematics in their political system (Huntington, 1991, p. 583; Share and Mainwaring, 1986, pp. 177-79; Dahl, 1971, p. 15).

Samuel Huntington argues that historically most cases of democratization have involved joint actions of elites in power and the opposition although one may have taken a bigger role than the other one in the long run (Huntington, 1991, p. 584). Some scholars may assign a greater responsibility to the elite in power whereas others look at civic power through social movements

and civic organizations, assuming that these have a greater impact on democratization processes (Bunce, 2000; Diamond, 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).

Nonetheless, for democratization to start, either the elite in power or/and civil society need to make use of political competition and public contestation (key democratic characteristics; see section on classifying democracy also) to reform current conditions, which in the end also defines their country's quality of democracy. The reasons why one of them might act can, however, differ.

Causes of Democratization Today

There are different endogenous and exogenous causes why the elite in power and/or the opposition start to act and introduce democratization to reform their countries.

As Seymour Martin Lipset explained, greater socioeconomic issues cause domestic instability and will shift political attention towards these issues. A government needs to prove itself to be able to manage these crises. If not, it poses a threat to maximizing and securing their own power and they will most likely be overruled by another democratic opposition (Lipset, 1959, p. 93; see section on classifying democracy also). Correspondingly, Samuel Huntington also argues that unsolved problems (usually economic), increased repression, and the government's fear of losing power are common reasons for democratization. At times, democratization has been started by the government as damage control before the opposition takes over completely. At other times, a nondemocratic government hopes to use democratization as a tool to secure and renew their legitimacy. It could, however, potentially fail if civic dynamics take over, as happened in India when Indira Gandhi was ruling, in Chile with the Pinochet government in the 1980s, and when the military took over the Turkish government in 1980 (Huntington, 1991, p. 593). Yet the government

might also work towards democratization for their nation's good and not only to keep power. For Huntington this can happen if they simply see a democratic system as more favorable. Secondly, democratization may be caused by exogenous factors that could benefit the country and, therefore, transform the government's perspective. Examples are the search for international legitimacy, the end to sanctions, and the desire for greater economic and military assistance (Huntington, 1991, p. 593).

Influences on Democratization Today

Contemporary interdependence in international politics can be traced to 19th century globalization (O'Rourke and Williamson, 2002). It increased further with the extended establishment of international institutions since 1945 and the end of colonialism beginning in the 1960s. Former colonies suffered from economic dependence on their colonizers despite decolonization. Economic imbalance was established and acknowledged in world politics by the 1970s (Namkoong, 1999, pp. 121-122). Meanwhile, "new democracies" (primarily former colonies) were experiencing failure. While these "new democracies" such as Nigeria, India, and Pakistan emerged because of decolonization at the end of World War II, by the 1960s they returned to authoritarian systems and the second wave of democratization ended. Pessimism arose about whether democratization of former colonies could be sustained (Huntington, 1991, pp. 19-21). The solution was quickly seen in economic development.

Robert Dahl argues that economic development "automatically generates" and establishes democratization (Dahl, 1971, p. 78). After all, economic development includes increased income, greater economic security, and higher education, with the last shaping "more complex and

gradualist views of politics” (Lipset, 1959, p. 83). As Moshe Lewin puts it, an educated, attentive, and expectant public is more likely to demand inclusion and accountability if it is supported through economic growth (Bunce, 2000, p. 707). It strengthens the opposition as it changes social conditions for workers and causes the middle-class to grow. In that way, not only are citizens able to engage more politically but also they “reward moderate and democratic parties and penalize extremist groups” (Lipset, 1959, p. 83). Citizens can focus on claiming their political power while also holding institutions and elected civilians accountable. In other words, economic development supports the decentralization of more institutions. More capital allows more organizations and institutions to be built and to present and protect citizens’ diverse needs and demands (Lipset, 1959, p. 84). Centralism is not sustainable for economic growth (Dahl, 1971, p. 78).

While economic development may work in favor of democratization, exceptions exist. For example, Croatia and Slovakia were both “upper economic tier(s) of the region” in the 2000s but their democratic characteristics during that period were lower than countries such as Mongolia whose economic conditions were worse than of Croatia and Slovakia at the given time (Bunce, 2000, p. 707). Accordingly, more recent research has also revised the correlation between democratization and economic growth. Economic development does not always automatically ensure and establish democratization but can certainly help sustain it (Bunce, 2000, p. 706; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997, p. 177). Ultimately, civilians are more likely to be engaged in public contestation and political competition with economic growth. Elites in power, on the other hand, use economic growth to secure their position in power in government by reducing political problems resulting from economic suffering. In doing so, economic growth supports both groups simultaneously and increases democratization.

By reducing the potential of revolution, economic growth is commonly identified as a way for foreign countries to not only support democratization but to secure and maintain global democratic peace too. After all, “democratic peace” theory proposes that democracies are less likely to fight each other since they become dependent on each other (primarily economically) and share the same values (Russett et. al., 1995). It is therefore argued that securing global democratization will subsequently lead to fewer conflicts both domestically and internationally. Accordingly, governments may democratize to show support for global security. Democratization embraces international legitimacy and may secure reciprocal support for their own economic and security interests at home (Huntington, 1991, p. 93; see section on causes of democratization today also). Put differently, economic dependence has pushed governments globally to start working collaboratively on democratization and economic development to sustain their political interests of power and security.

Researchers claim that economic growth and democratization have become an ideology that is commonly followed by elites in power globally (Donnelly, 1999, p. 608). But other ideologies may influence democratization and economic growth and lead the elite in power or the opposition and/or civil society to act. For example, human rights establish a ground for citizens to act and start claiming basic rights instead of holding them as normative values only (David, 2020, p. 48). Human rights concerns encourage citizens to form an opposition, engage in public contestation and political competition, and maybe to even form institutions to lobby for their interests. In that way citizens lobby for democratization while demanding economic rights as a path to economic development. Human Rights have become an integral part of democratization and is supported by growing globalization and digitization. As more information is being shared and more people gain access to political opportunities, human rights discourses build up pressure on the elite in power

and foreign partners to intervene and support. Put differently, civic society groups act to promote human rights and by doing so they promote democratization and economic development. Foreign partners also push for human rights improvements in foreign countries to establish, secure, and sustain democratization for global peace and their own interests. (Arat, 1999, p. 142)

In sum, reformers causing and introducing democratization can be the elite in power or opposition/civil society working with or against each other to sustain domestic power, peace, and security. Ideologies, international interdependence, international security, and economic development may influence decisions on democratization or de-democratization. Moreover, human rights embrace all these aspects in the globalized world of today. The next section will discuss further why human rights discourses have become the leading narrative for discussions around democratization and economic development.

The Correlation of Democratization and Human Rights


Human rights are a set of “moral rights” (Besson, 2011, p. 21). They are intended to protect every human being’s physical integrity and their social, economic, and political freedom, according to 30 articles within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948). Yet it is not about individual fulfillment and capabilities alone. Human rights and human rights organizations protect “general human interest” from intervention by public institutions (Besson, 2011, pp. 21, 22).

Accordingly, democratization and human rights share the same values and aim to realize the same goal of individual fulfillment, civic control, and inclusion. Combined, the articles of the Declaration of Human Rights directly speak to democratic fundamentals such as public

contestation, political competition, accountable and decentralized institutions, and an accountable elite in power. For example, *Art. 18* (Freedom of thought/conscience/religion), *Art. 19* (Freedom of opinion and expression), and *Art. 20* (Freedom of peaceful assembly) speak to Robert Dahl's idea of public contestation. Taking up *Art. 20* again and combining it with *Art. 21* (Freedom to participate in government themselves or through representatives through free elections), both articles present Robert Dahl's definition of political competition as much as Seymour Martin Lipset's demand of holding the elite in power accountable.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, however, recognizes that human rights go beyond political rights and include economic and social rights. But historically, the focus on human rights began with political rights. After all, the basic idea and concept of human rights has been around since the French Revolution and the U.S. Bill of Rights (Sikkink and Keck, 1998, p. 79). Michael Elliott's graph shows how human rights were increasingly included in domestic and international discussions since the 19th century:

Chart 1: Increase in International Human Rights Instruments from 1863-2003



Source: Elliott, M. (2011). *International human rights instruments signed over times (Master List) 1863-2003 (Figure 1)*, in *The institutional expansion of human rights, 1863-2003: A comprehensive dataset of international instruments. Journal of Peace Research*. 48 (4), pp. 537-546.

Waves of democratization, globalization, and the tragedies of World War I and II have pushed discussions of political rights to a global level. Civic development and social movements have broadened the human rights context. Human rights discourses have included more segments of the population. For example, voting rights as a basic political right have not always been accessible to every citizen. They were long limited to male identifying citizens alone. Only years later were women able to vote (e.g., United States in 1920, Germany in 1918, Great Britain in 1918, France in 1944). Women and other groups of individuals made use of basic democratic principles such as public contestation and political competition to improve their political and later social and economic conditions. In other words, throughout time women did not only demand their basic political rights but also, they focused on social and economic issues such as the protection of reproductive health. In 1994 reproductive health was introduced into international human rights

discussions (Pizzarossa, 2018, p. 2). Civil rights movements have pushed for the incorporation of social, economic, and cultural rights in the human rights agenda and extended its early narrow focus on political rights (Arat, 1999, pp. 122-123).

In the late 1960s the focus turned to LGBT rights. Protests such as the Stonewall Movement in 1969 allowed the community to call for their own demands to be protected as LGBTIAQ* individuals – *Queer Human Rights*. Examples are same-sex marriage, recognition of one’s gender identity by law, and healthcare protection for transgender individuals (Human Rights Watch, 2023).

These community struggles explain how human rights originate in domestic contexts and are sequentially enforced and sometimes violated in these same contexts (Besson, 2011, p. 40). But they also clarify that human rights and democratization processes can differ based on cultural background (Arat, 1999, p. 142).

In the case of LGBTIAQ* human rights, cultural preferences are very visible. There is no global protection available yet. Whereas Western countries have established many protections, many others have not. Few countries in the Global South such as Argentina, Uruguay, Nepal, and Israel accept and have legal protections in place. Other countries still do not accept same-sex marriage (Poushter and Kent, 2020; Miller and Thome, 2022, p. 140).

Democratization is commonly seen as the structural prerequisite for human rights. Democratization allows civic society to develop and further extend their social, economic, and cultural human rights by making use of their political rights of public contestation and political competition. Democratization supports and implements human rights protections, realization, and improvements (Arat, 1999, pp. 120, 121). In doing so, democratization and human rights not only

share values of inclusion and civic control, but democratization is seen as a structural solution alongside which human rights are protected and can flourish.

Just as it is for democratization, given this close relationship between democratization and human rights, economic development is seen as just as important for human rights. Economic liberalization allows citizens to make use of their political rights (democratization) to then compete for social, economic, and cultural justice, including these human rights norms (Huber et. al., 1993, pp. 83-84; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; see section on influences on democratization today also). Economic growth is required for human rights to be fully developed, as captured in article-22 of the Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948). Economic development is not only framed as crucial for human rights protection, realization, and development, but is a category in the Declaration of Human Rights (=economic right) that must be protected in domestic and international politics (United Nations, 1948).

Accordingly, democratization, human rights, and economic development are pushed as a package-deal in international contexts. Greater democratic features are good for human rights while fewer are jeopardizing (Davenport, 1999, p. 109). Failed democratization is seen as reason for failed human rights protections. Economic development supports both, and is, therefore, commonly framed as an additional requirement (Huber et. al., 1993, pp. 83-84; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997, p. 177; Nayar, 1980, pp. 79-81).

Enforcement

While the Declaration of Human Rights was introduced to protect civic society, it simultaneously created a basis for “external limitations on state sovereignty” (Besson, 2011, p. 20). With 192

countries signing the Declaration of Human Rights as of April 2023 (Honduras and Yemen have not signed), a diplomatic norm was created to guide global negotiations. Sanctions may be enforced if countries do not recognize, realize, and protect certain human rights (Arat, 1999, p. 124). However, no legal consequences can follow. The United Nations has no legal ability apart from sanctions. A country's sovereignty still protects a nation from international intervention even though sanctions might apply (Korab-Karpowicz, 2010, p. 1).

Zehra F. Arat argues that human rights are no longer a goal. Nowadays, human rights are a tool instead, to support and measure democratization and economic development. The focus has changed (Arat, 1999, p. 141; Puar, 2013, pp. 336, 338; Nayar, 1980, p. 79). For example, LGBTIAQ* human rights have become a contemporary measurement of a country's quality of democracy and democratization and have replaced traditional questions of women's rights in the development context (Shepherd, 2006, p. 26; Puar, 2013, p. 338). However, critics claim that the United States uses LGBTIAQ* human rights to secure and extend its political and economic imperial position and to impose neocolonial regulations on the Global South (Weber, 2016, pp. 112-114).

Human rights discourses have become a soft-power tool for foreign governments to shape other countries' democratization and economic conditions in their favor. Global human rights discourses allow domestic civil society and reformers to be more empowered to (re)take political, social, and economic control by introducing new possibilities. On the other hand, they allow for domestic governments to use these human rights discourses as a soft-power tool to build and sustain international legitimacy (Nye, 2004; Chong, 2010; see sections on causes of democratization today and influences on democratization today also).

Nonetheless, while countries globally align with the basic ideas of human rights by signing the Declaration of Human Rights, cultural differences in domestic implementation of human rights are often defined as problematic due to their supposed negative influence on democratization, economic development, and democratic peace concurrently (Said, 1978, p. 1; see section on influences on democratization today also). In this respect, Rhoda E. Howard argues that a cultural war has emerged over what the best practices around human rights and various communities such as the LGBTIAQ* community are (Howard, 1997, p. 94). Western countries such as the United States and many European countries, including the European Union, are being highly criticized as having started to claim sexual exceptionalism. They claim to know how to protect women and LGBTIAQ* rights best compared to developing countries (Puar, 2007, p. 8; Grewal, 2005, p. 105; Spade, 2014, p. 11; Colpani and Habed, 2014, p. 74-77). This imperial thought may even go as far as to become a leading part of Western identities (Homonationalism), which enables Western countries to spread their ideologies of specific LGBTIAQ* acceptances in the name of protecting the community globally while at home the community still faces discrimination and harassment (Puar, 2007, p. 113).

Foreign aid similarly opens opportunities to control and influence these human rights developments abroad by spreading one's own ideas of human rights through offered support. The relationship between foreign aid and human rights, democratization, and economic development will be discussed further in the next section.

Foreign Aid and Human Rights

Foreign aid is a voluntary way of giving and providing material goods and services to a country (recipient) by other richer countries (donors) (Hattori, 2001, p. 635). Aid can be provided in the form of “capital, commodities, expertise” to the recipient (Huntington, 1970-71, p. 163). U.S. foreign aid covers development, humanitarian, economic, security, and military aid (Congressional Research Service, 2022, pp. 6-11). Some researchers, for example Hattori (2001), think that foreign aid should not be conceptualized as “other forms of resource allocation, such as military sales on credit or ‘congressional loans’”. For him loans, grants, and foreign aid are different things since foreign aid does not involve “contractual obligations” (Hattori, 2001, p. 636). However, this is a very narrow definition of foreign aid, covering primarily what is known as official development aid (ODA).

Recipients of foreign aid, broadly defined, end up becoming dependent on their donors within today’s globalized society. Foreign aid reflects a country’s foreign policy and diplomatic relations and is often a long-term process instead of a one-time investment (Wright and Winters, 2010, p. 75; Carnegie and Marinov, 2017, p. 680). Foreign aid is also seen as a form of intervention since it involves not only a decision about when to provide foreign aid but also a question of when to withhold it (Baldwin, 1969, p. 425, 429). Compared to sanctions, interventions through foreign aid are, however, more of a preventive nature or are used to reward successful processes of democratization and human rights (Bermeo, 2011, p. 2029). Therefore, foreign aid, the amount of aid, and its timing are a strategic question, serving the donor’s political, security, and economic interests and concerns (Chong and Gradstein, 2008, p. 1).

In other words, foreign aid can be applied and restricted in certain ways. Sometimes it flows into structural support such as financing certain domestic institutions or projects. At other times, it may

be used for social purposes such as education, health, as well as to promote democratization (Knack, 2004, p. 251). But it is a controlled investment by richer countries such as the United States and European countries. Thus, foreign aid is often seen as having a direct influence on democratization by supporting the decentralization of autonomous bodies or by increasing economic security to support citizens to take political action. On the one hand, it may be offered to all citizens. At other times it may be tied to issues or communities that are suffering in receiving countries. For example, on October 6th, 2011, Barack Obama announced that securing and improving LGBTIAQ* human rights will be a US foreign policy priority moving forward. Section 3 and 7 of the presidential memorandum also highlight redirected foreign aid programs for the LGBTIAQ* community through agencies such as the United States Agency for International Development and various Departments of State (Office of Press Secretary, 2011).

Foreign aid is closely linked to foreign policy interests and diplomatic relations. Therefore, the amount, the receiving countries, and the issues in which donor countries invest their aid will differ based on the interests and ideologies the various elites in power have. For example, whereas Barack Obama was keen on investing in LGBTIAQ* human rights abroad, Donald Trump rejected this, and Joe Biden picked it up again in 2021 (Office of Press Secretary, 2011; U.S. Department of State, 2021; Crehan et. al., 2020). Put differently, foreign aid is a geopolitical tool (Fleck and Kilby, 2010, p. 195). Countries receive aid not for economic development per se but for political and security issues that can be secured and advanced through economic growth (Chong and Gradstein, 2008, p. 12). Based on the priorities a donor government sets, foreign aid investments change accordingly.

Whatever the underlying motives, governments of the United States, liberals more than conservative ones, usually promote the belief that foreign aid has a positive impact on

democratization and human rights, particularly in developing countries (Savun and Tirone, 2011, p. 240; Hattori, 2001, p. 648; see section on enforcement also). But while the United States has been one of the biggest donor countries to the Global South since the end of World War II, it does not solely control outcomes in the Global South. Developing countries take pride in agency through soft-power strategies which they apply to secure and support their own interests in return (see section on causes of democratization today also).

This thesis seeks to determine the extent to which U.S. aid is given to strengthen democratization and LGBTIAQ* human rights recognition, realization, and protection abroad in the Global South. Economic growth is supposed to support democratization and human rights as well as international and domestic security. Some research has been done on the correlation between foreign aid and democratization and has shown that the relationship between foreign aid, democratization, and human rights is, however, not so clear. Instead, it seems that time and other factors define if and to what extent democracy and human rights become relevant to the amount of aid the United States allocates to developing countries. Researchers have found no significant relationship during the post-Cold War period. If countries were more accepting of human rights, they received greater amounts of U.S. aid during the post-Cold War period. But they did not have to be more democratic to receive greater amounts since democracy aid was used and showed a positive impact on democratization for non-democratic countries that received greater amounts (Lai, 2003, pp. 119-120, 124; Scott and Steele, p. 65). Other quantitative research confirms the high connection of democratization and U.S. aid but speaks of a lagged relationship only, meaning the impact is not felt until several years later (Finkel, 2007, pp. 435-436). Moreover, human rights and democratization seem to have influenced decisions on economic aid distribution only while having little influence on the distribution of military aid (Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985, p. 560). In

this respect, Claire Apodaga and Michael Stohl argue to the contrary that human rights and democratization are only of little relevance to U.S. aid allocation compared to other military or economic interests. Large amounts of military assistance are still provided to countries in the Global South that rank badly on human rights and democratization (Apodaga & Stohl, 1999, pp. 195-196). In this thesis, I will add to this body of research by analyzing the relationship in more recent years of 2017 until 2020, and by taking a more focused look at LGBTIAQ* rights as one type of human rights along three types of U.S. foreign aid: 1) Peace and Security Aid, 2) Development (Economic) Aid, 3) Democracy and Human Rights Aid.

CHAPTER 4

Results and Analysis

Democracy and Overall Aid

Table 1: Relationship between Democracy Scores and Foreign Aid*²

U.S. Aid by Type	Years Distributed/Correlations x Democracy Scores			
	2017	2018	2019	2020
All Aid	0.05	0.10	0.07	0.02
Development Aid	0.04	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
Peace and Security Aid	0.11	0.10	0.08	0.03
Democracy and Human Rights Aid	-0.01	0.11	-0.07	0.02

*Correlation in Pearson's R. Significance level expected at $p \leq .05$; foreign aid is measured as total absolute dollar amount. No significant correlation was found.

Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); U.S. database for Foreign Assistance (<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>)

As Table 1 shows, for my first test there were no significant correlations between the level of democracy and any type of foreign aid that the Global South countries in my dataset received from the United States between 2017 and 2020. For each year there were extremely low correlation coefficients, close to zero. While in some years the correlation was positive while staying close to zero, in other years a country's level of democratization was negatively but not significantly correlated with the foreign aid received.

The low correlation coefficient based on the absolute dollar amounts might not be fully representative of trends in the relationship between foreign aid and a country's democracy score. After all, while Afghanistan (recipient of a total of \$28,701,657,110 in 2017-2020) received over

² For full information on the distribution of democracy scores and aid levels, see Appendix 1 and 2.

100 percent more foreign aid than Uruguay (recipient of \$2,330,714) throughout 2017-2020, its population was also greater by more than 100 percent than the Uruguayan population: Afghanistan had a population of 35.6 million in 2017 versus a Uruguayan population of 3.4 million in 2017. In other words, differences based on countries' sizes should be eliminated since it is reasonable that larger countries will receive greater absolute amounts of foreign aid than smaller ones. In this respect, the tests were run again, controlling for population size by using per capita aid. However, there were still no significant correlations. A country's level of democratization still was not correlated with the foreign aid received in each year; correlations stayed close to zero (see Table 2).

Table 2: Relationship between Democracy Scores and Per Capita Foreign Aid*³

U.S. Aid by Type	Years Distributed/Correlations x Democracy Scores			
	2017	2018	2019	2020
All Aid	0.04	0.09	0.09	0.09
Development Aid	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01
Peace and Security Aid	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.10
Democracy and Human Rights Aid	-0.07	0.08	-0.10	0.06

*Correlation in Pearson's R. Significance level expected at $p \leq .05$. No significant correlation was found. Taiwan was excluded when the absolute amount of aid was controlled by population since no data on Taiwan's population was provided in the World Bank databank.

Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); U.S. database for Foreign Assistance (<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>); World Bank population data for per capita data (<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=>)

While there was no linear relationship between foreign aid and a country's democracy score in each year 2017 to 2020, it is reasonable to expect (as discussed in the literature) that there is a lag between democracy level and foreign aid. In other words, a country may receive foreign aid for

³ For full information on the distribution of democracy scores and aid levels, see Appendix 1 and 2.

democratization, but the effect will not be seen until years later. Similarly, a country may improve its democracy score and then receive assistance as a reward years later. Table 3 shows the results when the data is intercorrelated for all years. There is no lagged relationship between a country's democracy score and the foreign aid received.

Table 3: Relationship between Democracy Scores and Foreign Aid, all years*⁴

U.S. Aid by Type <i>And Years distributed</i>	Correlations x Democracy Score			
	2017	2018	2019	2020
All Aid				
2017	0.05	0.05	0.04	-0.05
2018	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.01
2019	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.03
2020	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.02
Development Aid				
2017	0.04	0.04	0.03	0
2018	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02
2019	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
2020	-0.06	-0.06	-0.06	-0.03
Peace and Security Aid				
2017	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.05
2018	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.02
2019	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.04
2020	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.03
Democracy and Human Rights Aid				
2017	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
2018	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.09
2019	-0.08	-0.08	-0.07	-0.02
2020	-0.08	0.07	0.03	0.02

*Correlation is Pearson's R. Significance level expected at $p \leq .05$; foreign aid is measured as total absolute dollar amount. No significant correlation was found.

Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); U.S. database for Foreign Assistance (<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>)

⁴ For full information on the distribution of democracy scores and aid levels, see Appendix 1 and 2.

For my second set of tests, I was interested in whether significant differences in aid existed for three separate groups: democracies (designated as “free” by my source), democratizing (partially free), and non-democratic (unfree) countries. To gauge this, I used an ANOVA test. Preliminary data (Table 4) showed that there were fewer democratic countries than democratizing and non-democratic, and that these democratizing and non-democratic receive less average foreign aid per capita than democratic countries, except that in 2017 democratizing countries received more foreign aid per capita than either democratic or non-democratic countries (see Table 4).

Table 4: Total U.S. Foreign Aid received, by Groups*⁵

Year	N/Mean		Democracy Type		
			Democracies	Democratizing	Non-Democratic
2017	N	Absolute	35	57	49
		Per Capita	34	57	49
	Mean	Absolute	\$170.2 M	\$368.4 M	\$599.6 M
		Per Capita	\$22.48	\$28.48	\$20.06
2018	N	Absolute	36	56	49
		Per Capita	34	53	46
	Mean	Absolute	\$102.5 M	\$89 M	\$176.1 M
		Per Capita	\$12.68	\$5.77	\$5.82
2019	N	Absolute	35	56	50
		Per Capita	34	55	47
	Mean	Absolute	\$115.7 M	\$107.4 M	\$147.8 M
		Per Capita	\$14.32	\$7.91	\$6.21
2020	N	Absolute	32	60	49
		Per Capita	26	59	44
	Mean	Absolute	\$121.2 M	\$98.6 M	\$140.5 M
		Per Capita	\$17.10	\$8.82	\$4.78

*Taiwan excluded in per capita calculations because of missing population data. Ns for per capita aid differ because some countries received very low amounts of aid, considered at zero level in statistical analysis.

Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); U.S. database for Foreign Assistance (<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>); World Bank population data for per capita data (<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=>)

⁵ For full information on the distribution of democracy scores and aid levels, see Appendix 1 and 2.

However, an ANOVA test showed that there was no significant difference between the three groups in terms of the total amount of foreign aid they received, even after countries' population differences were taken into consideration by using per capita aid (Table 5).

Table 5: Differences in Total and Per Capita Foreign Aid Received, by Groups*⁶

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
2017	Absolute	<i>Between Groups</i>	3856920.89	2	1928460.44	.793	.454
		<i>Within Groups</i>	3355265.17	138	2431351.57		
		<i>Total</i>	339383.44	140			
	Per Capita	<i>Between Groups</i>	1984564	2	992282	.202	.817
		<i>Within Groups</i>	6730541.46	137	4912804		
		<i>Total</i>	6750387.10	139			
2018	Absolute	<i>Between Groups</i>	2178362.77	2	1089181.39	.433	.650
		<i>Within Groups</i>	3473747.00	138	2517207.97		
		<i>Total</i>	3495530.62	140			
	Per Capita	<i>Between Groups</i>	1199887	2	599944	.538	.585
		<i>Within Groups</i>	1449712	130	1115163		
		<i>Total</i>	1461710.86	132			
2019	Absolute	<i>Between Groups</i>	4615450.72	2	2307725.36	.100	.905
		<i>Within Groups</i>	3195926.96	138	2315889.10		
		<i>Total</i>	3200542.41	140			
	Per Capita	<i>Between Groups</i>	1395469	2	697734	.570	.567
		<i>Within Groups</i>	1629363.88	133	1225086		
		<i>Total</i>	1643318.56	135			
2020	Absolute	<i>Between Groups</i>	3676869.96	2	1838434.98	1.507	.225
		<i>Within Groups</i>	1683684.54	138	1220061.26		
		<i>Total</i>	1720453.24	140			
	Per Capita	<i>Between Groups</i>	2486932	2	1.243.466	.921	.401
		<i>Within Groups</i>	1700492.56	126	1.349.597		
		<i>Total</i>	1725361.88	128			

*Significance level expected at $p \leq .05$; Taiwan excluded in per capita calculations because of missing population data. No significant difference between groups was found.


Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); U.S. database for Foreign Assistance (<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>); World Bank population data for per capita data (<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=>)

⁶ For full information on the distribution of democracy scores and aid levels, see Appendix 1 and 2.

Democracy and Human Rights Aid

Countries in my dataset received less aid for democracy and human rights each year than for development and security purposes:

Chart 2: Differences in Types of Total U.S. Aid, each year between 2017 and 2020



Source: U.S. database for Foreign Assistance (<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>)

Despite a small increase in U.S. democracy and human rights aid in 2018 and 2019, U.S. democracy aid was relatively stable from 2017 until 2020. At the same time, countries' democracy scores were relatively consistent between 2017 and 2020.⁷ However, overall, there were no significant correlations between democracy aid and scores on the democracy index between 2017-2020 (Table 1).

⁷ After 2018 Freedom House no longer awarded points to traditional monarchies if they “provided some form of consultation with the public” even though they had no political parties. Some countries democracy score, accordingly, decreased after 2018 since the extra point for the “consultation with the public” was excluded (Freedom House, 2023).

And as already shown in Table 3, there was no lagged relationship between countries' democracy scores and the democracy and human rights aid received. In this respect, it cannot be said that U.S. democracy aid had any influence on Global South countries' democratization.

Nonetheless, the means (Table 6) showed that the United States allocated more democracy and human rights aid per capita to democratizing than to non-democratic and democratic countries in each year between 2017 and 2020.

Table 6: Total U.S. Democracy and Human Rights Aid received, by Groups*⁸

Year	N/Mean		Democracy Type		
			Democracies	Democratizing	Non-Democratic
2017	N	Absolute	35	57	49
		Per Capita	34	57	49
	Mean	Absolute	\$4.0 M	\$29.4 M	\$15.5 M
		Per Capita	\$0.71	\$2.29	\$0.63
2018	N	Absolute	36	56	49
		Per Capita	34	53	46
	Mean	Absolute	\$61.9 M	\$20.3 M	\$14.0 M
		Per Capita	\$0.90	\$1.44	\$0.58
2019	N	Absolute	35	56	50
		Per Capita	34	56	50
	Mean	Absolute	\$4.2 M	\$57.2 M	\$19.2 M
		Per Capita	\$0.52	\$4.91	\$0.76
2020	N	Absolute	32	60	49
		Per Capita	31	60	49
	Mean	Absolute	\$3.7 M	\$18.8 M	\$18.4 M
		Per Capita	\$0.48	\$1.29	\$0.74

*Taiwan excluded in per capita calculations because of missing population data. Ns for per capita aid differ because some countries received very low amounts of aid, considered at zero level in statistical analysis.

Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); U.S. database for Foreign Assistance (<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>); World Bank population data for per capita data (<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=>)

⁸ For full information on the distribution of democracy scores and aid levels, see Appendix 1 and 2.

An ANOVA test confirmed that there was no significant difference in absolute amounts of democracy and human rights aid between democratic, democratizing, and non-democratic countries. Comparing the groups of countries by democracy aid per capita, however, changed the outcome slightly. While there was no significant difference between groups at the 0.05 level, there was *some* evidence that aid per capita in 2018 and 2020 would be related to democracy (significance level .074 in 2018 and .089 in 2020), as shown in Table 7:

Table 7: Differences in Democracy and Human Rights Aid Received, by Groups*⁹

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
2017	Absolute	Between Groups	1456525.88	2	7282629.39	1.824	.165
		Within Groups	5509990.00	138	3992746.37		
		Total	5655642.58	140			
	Per Capita	Between Groups	89913	2	44956	2.262	.108
		Within Groups	2722853	137	19875		
		Total	2812766	139			
2018	Absolute	Between Groups	5421166.94	2	2710583.47	.842	.433
		Within Groups	4440726.90	138	3217918.05		
		Total	4494938.57	140			
	Per Capita	Between Groups	20378	2	10189	2.658	.074
		Within Groups	525121	137	3833		
		Total	545499	139			
2019	Absolute	Between Groups	7044950.21	2	3522475.11	1.946	.147
		Within Groups	2497522.67	138	1809799.05		
		Total	2567972.19	140			
	Per Capita	Between Groups	607984	2	303992	1.135	.324
		Within Groups	3668104.5	137	267745		
		Total	3728902.9	139			
2020	Absolute	Between Groups	5560984.01	2	2780492.00	1.150	.320
		Within Groups	3335227.35	138	2416831.41		
		Total	3390837.19	140			
	Per Capita	Between Groups	15864	2	7932	2.467	.089
		Within Groups	440448	137	3215		
		Total	456311	139			

*Significance level expected at $p \leq .05$; Taiwan excluded in per capita calculations because of missing population data. No significant difference between groups was found.

Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); U.S. database for Foreign Assistance (<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>); World Bank population data for per capita data (<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=>)

An additional set of Tukey tests for the years 2018 and 2020 confirmed that there was a small difference (though not significant at .05) between per capita aid received by democratic and

⁹ For full information on the distribution of democracy scores and aid levels, see Appendix 1 and 2.

democratizing countries in 2020, and a small difference as well between per capita aid received by democratizing and non-democratic countries in 2018 (Table 8).

Table 8: Differences in Level of Democracy Aid Received, between Groups*¹⁰

Country Type/With		Year Received							
		Mean Difference Absolute Aid/ Mean Difference Per Capita Aid		Std. Error Absolute Aid/ Std. Error Per Capita Aid		T Absolute Aid/ T Per Capita Aid		Sig. Absolute Aid/ Sig. Per Capita Aid	
		2018	2020	2018	2020	2018	2020	2018	2020
Democratic	Democratizing	\$41,564,931 -\$0.55	-\$15,158,146 -\$0.81	\$38,320,938 \$0.42	\$10,761,343 \$0.40	1.09 1.31	-1.41 2.03	.525 .403	.339 .104
	Non-Democratic	\$47,916,932 \$0.32	-\$14,779,863 -\$0.26	\$39,377,456 \$0.44	\$11,173,588 \$0.41	1.22 0.73	-1.33 -0.64	.445 .745	.385 .797
Democratizing	Non-Democratic	\$6,352,001 \$0.87	\$378,283 \$0.55	\$35,090,542 \$0.38	\$9,465,918 \$0.35	0.18 2.29	0.04 1.57	.982 .063	.999 .254

*Significance level expected at $p \leq .05$; Taiwan excluded in per capita calculations because of missing population data. No significant difference between groups was found. Note that the direction of the statistics changes from plus to minus, depending on how data is input.

Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); U.S. database for Foreign Assistance (<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>); World Bank population data for per capita data (<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=>)


In sum, it cannot be said that any pattern existed in terms of how the United States allocated its democracy and human rights aid to Global South countries from 2017 until 2020. No significant correlations were found between countries' democracy scores and the amounts of U.S. democracy aid (absolute numbers and per capita) Global South countries received. Similarly, there was no significant difference in U.S. democracy aid between democratic groups apart from a possible relationship in 2018 (significance at .063). The relationship/mean difference at .063 was between democratizing and non-democratic countries. Yet, overall, democratizing countries did not always receive significantly more democracy aid.

It should be noted that U.S. democracy and human rights aid is given for the Rule of Law and Human Rights as a top priority, followed by Good Governance (Table 9). It is plausible that democracies would receive less democracy aid most of the time as democratizing countries are in

¹⁰ For full information on the distribution of democracy scores and aid levels, see Appendix 1 and 2.

most need of such aid. The United States is primarily focused on reforming authoritarian regimes through democracy and human rights aid allocations.

Chart 3: Issue Distribution of Democracy and Human Rights Aid in 2017-2020



Source: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>)

LGBTIAQ* Acceptance as Relevant Factor in Today's Foreign Aid Giving¹¹

Turning now to my third hypothesis, since the UCLA LGBTIAQ* data was an average of 2017-2020, I correlated it with the average democracy score for this period. There was no significant correlation between countries' democracy score and their LGBTIAQ* acceptance score between 2017 and 2020. The correlation coefficient was close to zero, - 0.33. Although it is logical to think

¹¹ There were no LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores provided for the following 19 Global South countries and therefore they were excluded from this quantitative section: Brunei, Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Fiji, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, North Korea, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, and Vanuatu.

of LGBTIAQ* acceptance as part of a package of human rights that includes political rights, LGBTIAQ* acceptance is a social and cultural right that may not merely be endorsed in democratic countries but may be shared across many political systems. Table 9 confirms this by showing a range of scores among groups.

Table 9: Range of LGBTIAQ* Acceptance Scores by Democratic Type¹²

Country Type		Amount of Members (N)		
	Mean LGBTIAQ* Score (μ)	High LGBTIAQ* Score (~7.90-5.74)	Medium LGBTIAQ* Score (~5.73-3.60)	Low LGBTIAQ* Score (~3.55-1.42)
Total Members		14	49	59
Democratic Countries (N = 26)	4.99	7	15	4
Democratizing Countries (N = 54)	3.66	5	18	31
Non-Democratic Countries (N = 42)	3.49	2	16	24

Sources: UCLA report (<https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/global-acceptance-index-lgbt/>); Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>).

As can be seen in Table 9, all groups contained a certain number of high and medium scoring members, meaning that countries that are not democracies are not automatically to be considered as low scoring on the LGBTIAQ* acceptance index. Nonetheless, the table shows that democratic countries seem more likely to score higher on the LGBTIAQ* acceptance index than less democratic countries. And, with fewer democracies than democratizing and non-democratic countries in the Global South (Table 9), more countries fall in the lower average LGBTIAQ* acceptance category than in the high. An ANOVA test was done to see if these differences were indeed significant. The results showed that LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores did vary significantly between the three democratic groups (Table 10).

¹² For full information on the distribution of democracy scores and LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores, see Appendix 1.

Table 10: Differences in LGBTIAQ* Acceptance Scores, by Groups*¹³

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	p-value
Between Groups	40.989	2	20.494	12.180	*.000
Within Groups	200.233	119	1.683		
Total	241.222	121			

*Significance level expected at $p \leq .05$; Significant differences between democratic groups found.

Sources: UCLA report (<https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/global-acceptance-index-lgbt/>); Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>).

An additional Tukey test confirmed that democracies had significantly higher LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores than democratizing and non-democratic countries (Table 11). There was, however, no significant difference between democratizing and non-democratic countries as both scored similarly low or medium on the LGBTIAQ* acceptance index (Table 11).

Table 11: Differences in LGBTIAQ* Acceptance Scores, between Groups*¹⁴

Country Type/With		Mean Difference	Std. Error	T	Sig.
Democratic	Democratizing	1.33350*	.30964	4.29	*.000
	Non-Democratic	1.49604*	.32370	4.69	*.000
Democratizing	Non-Democratic	.16254	.26688	0.59	.815

Significance level expected at $p \leq .05$; Significant difference between democratic with democratizing/non-democratic countries found. Taiwan excluded in per capita calculations because of missing population data. Note that the direction of the statistics is always a positive difference with country types having a greater LGBTIA acceptance score than the country type compared with.

Sources: UCLA report (<https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/global-acceptance-index-lgbt/>); Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>).

¹³ For full information on the distribution of democracy scores and LGBTIAQ* levels, see Appendix 1.

¹⁴ For full information on the distribution of democracy scores and LGBTIAQ* levels, see Appendix 1.

For my next test I was interested to see if Global South countries were rewarded with greater amounts of foreign aid if they were more accepting of their local LGBTIAQ* community. Once again, since the LGBTIAQ* acceptance score produced by UCLA was an average of the three years 2017-2020, I correlated it with the average foreign aid over the same period. However, again, there was *no significant correlation* between Global South countries' LGBTIAQ* acceptance score and foreign aid of any type. Taking countries' population into consideration did not change the outcome (Table 12). While there was no relationship between the average LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores in Global South countries and foreign aid, it could be that data for individual years may have shown that LGBTIAQ* acceptance score and human rights violations in Global South countries influences U.S. foreign aid spending in the years following, or that a country's LGBTIAQ* acceptance score may have improved the years after a country received U.S. foreign aid. Since the UCLA report did not publish data on individual years between 2017 and 2020, this type of lagged relationship could not be analyzed. On the other hand, given the lack of significant data on the relationship between democracy and aid, it is likely that LGBTIAQ* acceptance does not matter for U.S. aid allocation at all. It only confirms that there was no significant pattern.

Table 12: Relationship of LGBTIAQ* Acceptance Scores with Foreign Aid*¹⁵

U.S. Aid by Type	Correlations x LGBTIAQ* Acceptance Scores Total Amounts of Aid/Per Capita Aid
2017-2020	
All Aid	-0.04
	-0.03
Development Aid	-0.19
	-0.18
Peace and Security Aid	0.05
	0.08
Democracy and Human Rights Aid	-0.05
	-0.18

*Correlation in Pearson’s R. Significance level expected at $p \leq .05$; Second figures are per capita aid. No significant correlation was found.

Sources: UCLA report (<https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/global-acceptance-index-lgbt/>); Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); World Bank population data for per capita data (<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=>).

Therefore, despite the lack of a significant correlation between aid and LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores, an additional ANOVA test was done to see if U.S. foreign aid differed between groups scoring high, medium, or low on the LGBTIAQ* acceptance index. It confirmed that general foreign aid as well as democracy and human rights aid did not significantly differ between Global South countries based on their high, medium, or low LGBTIAQ* acceptance score. While the F statistic was higher when analyzing my data for aid per capita, it was still not high enough and reconfirmed no significant difference in U.S. aid allocation between groups with high, medium, and low LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores (Table 13).

¹⁵ For full information on the distribution of LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores and aid levels, see Appendix 1 and 2.

Table 13: Differences in Foreign Aid, between LGBTIAQ* scoring Groups*¹⁶

Type of Aid			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Overall Aid	Absolute	<i>Between Groups</i>	8493906.76	2	4246953.38	.442	.644
		<i>Within Groups</i>	1142361.38	119	9599675.48		
		<i>Total</i>	1150855.29	121			
	Per Capita	<i>Between Groups</i>	4627163.40	2	2313581.70	.773	.464
		<i>Within Groups</i>	3530929.84	118	2992313.40		
		<i>Total</i>	3577201.47	120			
Democracy Aid	Absolute	<i>Between Groups</i>	2868576.62	2	1434288.31	.382	.683
		<i>Within Groups</i>	4470306.26	119	3756559.88		
		<i>Total</i>	4498992.02	121			
	Per Capita	<i>Between Groups</i>	436784	2	218392	1.265	.286
		<i>Within Groups</i>	2036681.30	118	172600		
		<i>Total</i>	2080359.80	120			

*Significance level expected at $p \leq .05$; Taiwan excluded in per capita calculations because of missing population data. No significant difference between groups was found.

Sources: UCLA report (<https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/global-acceptance-index-lgbt/>); Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); World Bank population data for per capita data (<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=>).

In sum, while LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores in the Global South were significantly higher for democracies than democratizing and non-democratic countries, this seemed to have not impacted U.S. aid allocation. Earlier, in Table 6, it was observed that a country's democratic level did not significantly matter when it came to U.S. aid allocation, and if it did, democratizing countries were the category receiving significantly greater amounts of U.S. per capita democracy aid, not democracies (see Table 6). These are the very same countries that were likely to have lower LGBTIAQ* scores. In other words, LGBTIAQ* acceptance did not impact U.S. foreign aid allocation. As my literature section has clarified, previous research has found that economic and

¹⁶For full information on the distribution of LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores and aid levels, see Appendix 1 and 2.

security needs have had greater influence on U.S. aid allocation historically than social and cultural dimensions such as LGBTIAQ* rights.

Despite the lack of positive results in my quantitative analysis, it seemed possible that a deeper qualitative analysis might turn up some patterns not revealed by the overall data. I, therefore, selected two countries to analyze if there is a more complex relationship than shown in the quantitative data, between Global South countries' level of democracy, their LGBTIAQ* acceptance score, and foreign aid.

Case Studies

The purpose of this section is to analyze two different cases to supplant the quantitative section after all three hypotheses that Global South countries receive foreign aid in greater amounts if they are more democratic, more democratized, and more accepting of LGBTIAQ* human rights were rejected. In this qualitative section, I am providing a closer look at the relationship between changes in democratization/LGBTIAQ* rights and U.S. aid in two very different countries - Uruguay and Saudi Arabia.

Uruguay

Uruguay is classified as an established democracy and as such scored highest of all countries on political rights, civil liberty, and LGBTIAQ* acceptance each year from 2017 to 2020 on the Freedom House and University of California indexes. These high-ranking scores are not random. Uruguay's democracy score has been in the 90s since 2000 and its LGBTIAQ* acceptance score was already highest of all countries in 2000, and yet still saw an overall growth of +2.1 between the years 2000 and 2020.

Table 14: Uruguay’s Democracy, Personal Liberties, and LGTIAQ* Acceptance Scores from 2000 to 2020¹⁷

Period	Democracy Score	Personal Liberty Score	LGBTIAQ* Acceptance Score
2000-2003	90	NA	5.8
2004-2008	94.8	15	6.6
2009-2013	97	15	7.1
2014-2017	98	15	7.6
2017-2020*	98	15	7.9

*The last period includes 2017 instead of beginning in 2018. This is as it appears in the UCLA report.


Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); 2018/2019 UCLA reports on countries’ LGTIAQ* acceptance levels (<https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/global-acceptance-index-lgbt/>)

U.S. aid to Uruguay has mainly been in form of peace and security aid (see Chart 4). Uruguay has proven itself a strong ally of global security interests by supporting U.N. peacekeeping missions since 1952 (its neighbors Argentina only joined the U.N. peacekeeping missions in 1958 and Brazil in 1956). As Peter Meyer and Ramon Miro say, “Uruguay is one of the largest per capita contributors of forces globally to U.N. peacekeeping missions” (Meyer and Miro, 2023, p. 2). Since the early 2000s, the United States has supported UN and regional peacekeeping efforts and has invested “\$35 million of equipment and training to Uruguay through the *Global Peace Operations Initiative* since FY2008” (Meyer and Miro, 2023, p. 2). In addition to the United States rewarding Uruguay for democratic and collaborative security efforts around the globe, the United States also financed a joint initiative on counter-narcotics in Uruguay. The counternarcotics strategy has been important to decreasing Uruguay’s domestic crime rates, human rights abuses, and threats to democracy caused by drug-trafficking and money laundering in the country which

¹⁷ For full information on the distribution of democracy scores and LGTIAQ* scores, see Appendix 1.

peaked during 2011 and 2015 (U.S. Department of State, 2016). U.S. security aid to Uruguay, therefore, seems to have been intended to secure democratization efforts by the Uruguayan government at home and abroad, stabilize regional security, and eliminate threats to U.S. security interests such as drug trafficking.

Chart 4: Total U.S. Aid to Uruguay from 2000 to 2020




Source: U.S. database for Foreign Assistance (<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>)

As the chart shows, U.S. economic aid to Uruguay has been much lower than security aid but still greater than democracy aid. The United States is Uruguay’s third largest trading partner after China and Brazil (U.S. Department of State, 2023). Uruguay’s foreign trade is based on its agricultural sector. The country had to stabilize its economy after it suffered tremendous economic, social, and political instability following its military dictatorship, during which many citizens fled the country in the 1990s (Goycoechea, 2013; U.S. Department of Commerce – International Trade Administration, 2022; Finch, 1985; Barahona de Brito, 1997). To support its economy, Uruguay

not only turned to the United States but joined the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) with Paraguay and its two neighbors of Argentina and Brazil in 1991, agreeing to establish free trade agreements with its regional allies and strong trade partners (Felter et. al., 2021).

Turning now to democracy aid, for a strong democracy as Uruguay, it intuitively makes sense that the United States would reward Uruguay with greater amounts of democracy and human rights aid when there are certain democratic improvements. The next chart 5 shows that the United States did invest in Uruguay’s democracy and human rights more in certain years and less in others.

Chart 5: U.S. Democracy and Human Rights Aid to Uruguay between 2000-2020



Source: U.S. database for Foreign Assistance (<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>)

As this Chart 5 shows, U.S. foreign democracy aid was highest in 2001, with other peaks in 2004, 2012 and 2014. However, U.S. democracy aid to Uruguay decreased over time just as all other forms of aid. Uruguay’s democracy grew stronger over the years, and the government was able to increasingly handle social, economic, and security crises on its own. This was, however, not

always the case. Due to Uruguay's social, political, and economic issues in the 1990s, many citizens fled the country, as mentioned before. Many political opposition groups formed after Uruguay introduced a new electoral system in 1996. As a result, multiple parties participated in Uruguay's election in 1999 and 2000, and the country democratically voted for its first ever president, which was unique to Latin America back then (Cason, 2002, pp. 89-90; Espíndola, 2001, p. 650).

A year later in 2001, Uruguay received the highest amount of democracy and human rights aid recorded for the period of 2000-2020 (see chart 5). Intuitively, it seems that Uruguay was rewarded for its political pluralism. Beyond the democracy and human rights aid received, it seems that Uruguay was also rewarded economically by the United States. In 2002 the United States and Uruguay created a Joint Commission on Trade and Investment that helped stabilize Uruguay's economic exports, and Uruguay secured greater amounts of U.S. development aid in the years following (U.S. Department of State, 2023; see chart 4 also). As a result, the United States was able to help Uruguay decrease local poverty, while also securing its own agricultural imports from Uruguay (Ture, 2015, p. 1).

In 2004 Uruguay received its next allocation of democracy and human rights aid. At the time, after criminalizing acts against the LGBTIAQ* community in 2003, a non-discrimination act followed in 2004 that may have led not only to more U.S. democracy aid but also economic aid, both of which increased in 2005 and 2006 (ILGA World, 2023; see chart 4 and 5). Uruguay improved its LGBTIAQ* human rights further when President Tabaré Vázquez legalized civil unions for same-sex couples in late 2007, the first country in the Latin Americas to do so (ILGA World, 2023). In this respect, U.S. democracy and development aid were mostly continuous from 2003 to 2008.

On the other hand, this aid may have been due to other more general efforts of democratization rather than LGBTIAQ* acceptance specifically. After Tabaré Vázquez won the presidential election, social policies such as a welfare package to tackle poverty further, and an increase in income for the working class were introduced in 2005 (BBC, 2018; Oyhantcabal, 2019, pp. 122-123). As already noted, U.S. aid continued to 2008. Given the fact that in 2009 all aid dropped in the Global South, the drop in U.S. aid to Uruguay was probably related to the global recession in 2009.¹⁸

Between 2010 and 2012 democracy aid quickly started to increase again after Tabaré Vázquez lifted the ban on gay people joining the military in 2009 which was imposed during Uruguay's military dictatorship (Desantis & Hornos, 2009). Additionally, Uruguay legalized joint and second-parent adoption for same-sex couples in 2009 and became the first country in the Latin Americas to do so (ILGA World, 2023; Klein, 2009). More broadly, Uruguay quickly stabilized its economy from the world economic crisis of 2008 and in 2010 expanded social benefits for retired and employed workers (The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean, 2010-2011, p. 156; Estrades & Llambí, 2013, p. 1). Democracy aid was resumed after 2009.

In 2012 Uruguay became the second country in the Latin Americas to legalize abortion (Zissis et. Al., 2022). In 2013, Uruguay legalized same-sex marriage and authorized the legal use of marijuana (ILGA World, 2023; Queirolo et. al., 2018). The legalization of marijuana has been an effective internal counternarcotics strategy that replaced illegal with controlled drug consumption and reduced stigmatization that helped to minimize drug trafficking and money

¹⁸ U.S. Foreign Aid Assistance Database: <https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>.

laundering in the country (Tzanis, 2021). Accordingly, Uruguay was able to secure more democracy aid and security aid in the following year of 2013.

In sum, Uruguay has made many improvements in democracy and civil liberties over the years and as a result, has received U.S. democracy, development, and security aid. Uruguay has been rewarded for its democratization efforts. However, it is not clear that a greater LGBTIAQ* acceptance had a greater impact on rewards for democratization than other democratic factors such as political pluralism and other social policies to tackle economic inequality.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is classified as a non-democratic country, scoring low on political rights and civil liberty during 2017-2020. Saudi Arabia has had a problematic reputation on democracy and human rights for a long time (Poushter, 2013). Its score of 3.6 on LGBTIAQ* rights during these years was also low, yet surprisingly higher than that of some other countries in the Global South such as Jordan (1.87), Indonesia (2.79), or Ghana (2.68).¹⁹ Saudi Arabia's LGBTIAQ* acceptance score equaled the average LGBTIAQ* acceptance score in the Global South during 2017-2020. Between 2000 and 2017, Saudi Arabia's score on democracy improved while its personal liberty and LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores were stable:

¹⁹ For full information on the distribution of LGBTIAQ* acceptance scores, see Appendix 1.

Table 15: Saudi Arabia’s Democracy, Personal Liberties, and LGTIAQ* Acceptance Scores from 2000 to 2020²⁰

Period	Democracy Score	Personal Liberty Score	LGBTIAQ* Acceptance Score
2000-2003	9	NA	3.7
2004-2008	10.6	2	3.6
2009-2013	11	2	2.8
2014-2017	10	2	3.0
2017-2020*	7.75	2	3.6

*The last period includes 2017 instead of beginning in 2018. This is as it appears in the UCLA report.


Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); 2018/2019 UCLA reports on countries’ LGTIAQ* acceptance levels (<https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/global-acceptance-index-lgbt/>)

U.S. aid to Saudi Arabia has been mainly in the form of peace and security aid (chart 6). Both countries have established a security partnership focused on counterterrorism and regional stability in the Middle East, beginning with trying to fight communism during the Cold War, and ending, more recently, in combating Iran trying to build regional hegemony (U.S. Department of State, 2022; Bronson, 2010; Gause, 2016, pp.115, 116). In this respect, chart 6 shows that there were certain peaks in security aid to Saudi Arabia in moments of crises. These include: in 2005 when al Qaeda attacked two oil installations in Abqaiq that threatened the country as well as U.S. oil supply; in 2008 when Somali pirates attacked an oil tanker that was worth \$100 million; and in 2009 when an al Qaeda terrorist bomber attempted to attack Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef (NPR, 2008; Alsharif, 2009; Henderson, 2006). While the relationship has existed since the 1950s based on the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement that both have signed, Saudi Arabia has not always been as cooperative as after 9/11 (Byman, 2016). Both do not share common (democratic) values besides their shared security and economic interests. Yet the United States seems to have

²⁰ For full information on the distribution of democracy scores and LGTIAQ* scores, see Appendix 1.

looked past Saudi Arabia’s democratic issues and human rights violations and continues to support Saudi Arabia in exchange for oil. Additionally, the United States supports Saudi’s mediation efforts in the Arab Israeli conflict and Saudi’s help in regional disputes with religious overtones (Hassan, 2015, pp. 481, 482; Council on Foreign Relations, 2018; Dhanani, 1982; Jabber, 1980).


Chart 6: Total U.S. Aid to Saudi Arabia between 2000 and 2020



Source: U.S. database for Foreign Assistance (<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>)

Turning now to democracy aid, it intuitively makes sense that the United States will reward Saudi Arabia less often and with less democracy aid since Saudi Arabia is non-democratic. However, the United States did invest in Saudi Arabia’s democracy and human rights more in certain years and less in others (Chart 7).

Chart 7: Democracy and Human Rights Aid to Saudi Arabia between 2000-2020



Source: U.S. database for Foreign Assistance (<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>)

As this chart 7 shows, democracy aid was highest in 2011 and 2020 with other smaller peaks in 2008 and 2016. Comparing this to the previous chart 6, we can see that U.S. democracy aid to Saudi Arabia increased over time whereas both development and security aid decreased. Additionally, Saudi Arabia received the smallest amount of aid for economic compared to security and democratization purposes between 2000 and 2020. The United States and Saudi Arabia both share a common interest in sustainable development (U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Saudi Arabia, 2023), but the United States is not oil-rich Saudi Arabia's only trade partner. Saudi Arabia's trade partners include the traditional Western countries but also China, India, Japan, South Korea (Stevens et. al., 2019). As of April 2023, China has even become a bigger importer of Saudi oil than the United States (Aizhu et. al., 2022). With these economic ties to Asia, Saudi Arabia has been able to secure its economic interests, and as a result, does not require much U.S. development aid since its economic circumstances allow its economy and society to grow. Yet Saudi Arabia is

required to satisfy its trade partners' diplomatic and political conditions to sustain its economic ties. If not, the United States could decide to focus on other partnerships instead. For example, in the early 2000s the United States shifted its primary oil imports from Saudi Arabia to Canada after Saudi Arabia was implicated in the 9/11 attacks (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). This seems to apply to U.S. aid allocations too. Saudi Arabia received almost no aid in the first few years of 2001 until 2004. In 2004 the U.S. 9/11 Commission announced that “no evidence” had been found “that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded” al Qaeda (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 171). All three types of aid increased afterwards.

In 2003 a National Dialogue Forum was initiated, allowing some input from certain sectors on national issues (The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C., 2019). In 2005 Saudi Arabia held its first municipal council elections, allowing male citizens to vote on local issues such as transportation even though federal politics were not impacted (Whitaker, 2005). Saudi Arabia seems to have been rewarded with democracy and human rights aid a year later in 2006 (Chart 7). However, U.S. democracy aid to Saudi Arabia decreased in 2009 which was probably related due to the global recession in 2008.²¹

In 2011 democracy and human rights aid rose sharply. While this was probably related to the Arab Spring protests for democracy around the Middle East region, some improvements in human rights were also taking place in Saudi Arabia. Reformers were appointed to the government and the first woman was assigned deputy minister of education, becoming the first woman to ever hold the rank of minister in Saudi Arabia in 2009 (Rajkhan, 2014, pp. 8, 16). Before this, women had been denied access to public and political spheres. The deputy minister of education built a

²¹ U.S. Foreign Aid Assistance Database: <https://www.foreignassistance.gov/data>.

foundation for women to take greater influence in public and political spheres. Also in 2011, Saudi Arabia had its second municipal elections. Women were still not allowed to participate but these second elections introduced the one vote system and increased the number of municipal council from 179 to 258 (Buchanan, 2011). In 2013 30 women gained access to the Shura council, Saudi Arabia's advisory body "which advises the government on new legislation", for which women had to contest publicly and compete politically (BBC News, 2013). These improvements in political and women's rights seem to be one reason why democracy aid was forthcoming. In 2015 women were able to participate in the third municipal elections in 2015 (Quamar, 2016, pp. 433-434).

In 2019 U.S. democracy aid peaked for a second time after it started increasing a year earlier in 2018. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was appointed as de factor leader in 2017. Bin Salman introduced an anti-corruption campaign in 2017 to improve foreign relations by showing efforts at democratization (BBC News, 2019). Women's rights improved further. In 2018 women earned the right to obtain a driver's license and actively drive (The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C., 2019). Since 2019 Saudi women have also been able to travel on their own with an individual passport whereas in the years before women had only been able to do so when their names were on an accompanying man's passport (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

While the increases in democracy aid can be explained above, we should note that at the same time as democratization was taking place, LGBTIAQ* rights were not. For example, a 67 old man was arrested for wearing women's clothing in 2009 (Human Rights Watch, 2009), while in 2012 260 people were also arrested for same-sex activity (Human Dignity Trust, 2023). In 2017 two transgender Pakistanis were tortured to death by the police (Human Dignity Trust, 2023). Article 6 of Saudi Arabia's new Anti-Cyber Crime Law from 2007 enabled Saudi police and

authorities to arrest a group of men for uploading a Tik-Tok video for attending a same-sex wedding later in 2018 (ILGA World, 2023). These are just some examples of the Saudi's rigid homophobic culture. Despite these incidents, U.S. aid was not decreased.

In sum, Saudi Arabia has made some changes toward democratization and has successfully stabilized its relations with the United States since a low point after 9/11. In doing so, Saudi Arabia has been rewarded with democracy aid. However, given the U.S. support is based more on basic democratic principles than on Saudi Arabia's respect for the LGBTIAQ* community.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions

This thesis analyzed how U.S. foreign aid spending differs based on countries' level of democracy, level of democratization, and their LGBTIAQ* acceptance in the Global South.

Statistically, and contrary to what my hypothesis one assumed, there was no significant correlation between Global South countries' democracy score and U.S. foreign aid allocations between 2017 and 2020. A country's level of democracy does not correlate with peace and security aid, development aid, as well as democracy and human rights aid distribution by the United States. Peace/security aid and development aid are given primarily with technical purposes in mind but may also contain conditions such as good governance and environmental reasons. The reasons are defined on an individual basis and focus on common interests that both the United States and a receiving country share. Thus, all Global South countries receive security and development aid, and shared interests and local issues in the receiving country define the amount of security and development aid allocated.

While there is no quantitatively significant relationship between democracy and aid, the qualitative analysis suggests that as individual countries democratize, U.S. aid is more forthcoming, giving some affirmation to my hypothesis two. First, Global South countries may use democratization as a soft power tool to secure foreign aid, to build international legitimacy, and to improve foreign relations with the United States by reciprocating Western values. Secondly, the United States rewards democratization across country types. Non-democratic countries such as Saudi Arabia as well as democratic countries such as Uruguay receive democracy aid when democratizing. After all, as Valerie Bunce (2000), Charles Tilly (2000), Christian Davenport (1999), Samuel

Huntington (1970 and 1991), as well as Larry Diamond and Leonardo Molino (2004) explain, democratization is democracy in action and stabilizes democratic values, even along established democracies.

Yet not all aspects of democratization seem to matter the same to the United States. Rejecting my hypothesis three, there is no correlation or significant difference between Global South countries' level of democratization, LGBTIAQ* acceptance, and the amount of foreign aid received. It may be related to the fact that democracy is considered as a way to foster peace and cooperation between and among countries, whereas LGBTIAQ* acceptance is a cultural issue that may be contentious. LGBTIAQ* human rights acceptance is not solely tied to democratic behavior as my data shows. It, therefore, can also not be said that LGBTIAQ* rights are a benchmark to measure democratization. Even U.S. President Barack Obama announced that LGBTIAQ* rights would be a priority in U.S. foreign policy in 2011, LGBTIAQ* rights are not universally accepted in the United States. But for some cases such as democratic Uruguay, it is possible that Uruguay may have been rewarded for improving LGBTIAQ* rights since these advances are frequent and other core democratic principles are already met.

In sum, democratization is important to a degree in the U.S. aid allocation to the Global South, but my data cannot identify what such democratization needs to look like to be rewarded by the United States. Further research should analyze the relationship between democratization and foreign aid in more detail by including more specific variables that support democratization, such as political pluralism and free speech, as well as social variables such as the provision of education, health, and other rights to the population, and acceptance of women's rights, abortion, and of course LGBTIAQ* rights by governments and peoples. In that way we can explain what types of democratization the United States rewards and favors over others in aid allocation, if these show

any pattern, and if they do to what extent. This would also help us to get a comprehensive understanding of whether LGBTIAQ* rights are only a rhetorical matter in U.S. foreign policy or really will begin to matter.

Appendix 1: Democracy and LGBTIAQ* Acceptance Scores in the Global South

Country	Democratic Type 2017	Democratic Type 2018	Democratic Type 2019	Democratic Type 2020	Democracy Score 2017	Democracy Score 2018	Democracy Score 2019	Democracy Score 2020	LGBTIAQ* Acceptance Score between 2017-2020
Afghanistan	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	24	26	27	27	3.32
Albania	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	68	68	68	67	2.65
Algeria	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	35	35	34	34	4.28
Angola	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	24	26	31	32	3.66
Argentina	Free	Free	Free	Free	82	83	84	85	7.07
Armenia	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	45	45	51	53	2.17
Azerbaijan	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	14	12	11	10	1.42
Bahamas	Free	Free	Free	Free	91	91	91	91	4.09
Bahrain	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	12	12	12	11	5.73
Bangladesh	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	47	45	41	39	3.69
Barbados	Free	Free	Free	Free	98	96	96	95	4.43
Belarus	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	20	21	19	19	3.38
Belize	Free	Free	Free	Free	87	86	86	86	4.14
Benin	Free	Free	Free	Partly Free	82	82	79	66	3.88
Bhutan	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	55	55	59	59	4.18
Bolivia	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	68	67	67	63	5.24
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	55	55	53	53	2.87
Botswana	Free	Free	Free	Free	72	72	72	72	4.3
Brazil	Free	Free	Free	Free	79	78	75	75	7.22
Brunei	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	29	28	29	28	NA
Burkina Faso	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	63	60	60	56	2.96
Burundi	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	19	18	14	13	3.3
Cabo Verde	Free	Free	Free	Free	90	90	90	92	NA
Cambodia	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	31	30	26	25	4.96
Cameroon	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	24	22	19	18	2.79
Central African Republic	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	10	9	9	10	2.62
Chad	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	18	18	17	17	2.72
Chile	Free	Free	Free	Free	94	94	94	90	6.83
China	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	15	14	11	10	3.69
Colombia	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	64	65	66	66	6.1
Comoros	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	55	55	50	44	3.47
Congo, Democratic	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	19	21	21	20	3.32
Congo, Republic	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	27	17	15	18	3.27
Costa Rica	Free	Free	Free	Free	91	91	91	91	6.35
Cote d'Ivoire	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	52	51	51	51	3.55
Cuba	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	15	14	14	14	5.8
Djibouti	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	26	26	26	24	2.89
Dominican Republic	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	68	67	67	67	4.98
Ecuador	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	57	60	63	65	5.47
Egypt	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	26	26	22	21	2.48
El Salvador	Free	Free	Free	Partly Free	70	70	67	66	5.22
Equatorial Guinea	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	8	7	6	6	NA
Eritrea	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	3	3	2	2	NA
Eswatini	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	18	16	16	19	NA
Ethiopia	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	12	12	19	24	1.63
Fiji	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	59	59	61	60	NA
Gabon	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	32	23	23	22	2.8
Gambia, The	Unfree	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	20	41	45	46	2.44
Georgia	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	64	64	63	61	2.94
Ghana	Free	Free	Free	Free	83	83	83	82	2.68
Guatemala	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	54	56	53	52	4.71
Guinea	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	41	41	43	40	3.06
Guinea-Bissau	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	40	41	42	46	NA
Guyana	Free	Free	Free	Free	74	74	75	74	4.36
Haiti	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	39	41	41	38	3.32
Honduras	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	46	46	46	45	5.15
India	Free	Free	Free	Free	77	77	75	71	5.28
Indonesia	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	65	64	62	61	2.79
Iran	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	17	18	18	17	2.11
Iraq	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	27	31	32	31	3.81
Israel	Free	Free	Free	Free	80	79	78	76	5.69
Jamaica	Free	Free	Free	Free	75	77	78	78	3.83

Jordan	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	37	37	37	37	1.87
Kazakhstan	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	22	22	22	23	2.69
Kenya	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	51	48	48	48	3.62
Kiribati	Free	Free	Free	Free	92	93	93	93	NA
Korea, Democratic	Free	Free	Free	Free	82	84	83	83	4.53
Korea, Republic	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	3	3	3	3	NA
Kuwait	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	36	36	36	36	3.61
Kyrgyzstan	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	37	37	38	39	NA
Laos	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	12	12	14	14	4.89
Lebanon	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	44	43	45	44	3.63
Lesotho	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	64	64	63	63	4.18
Liberia	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	62	62	62	60	2.65
Libya	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	13	9	9	9	3.78
Madagascar	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	56	56	56	61	3.36
Malawi	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	63	63	64	62	1.75
Malaysia	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	44	45	52	52	3.48
Maldives	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	40	35	35	40	NA
Mali	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	45	44	44	41	2.74
Mauritania	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Partly Free	30	30	32	34	1.77
Mauritius	Free	Free	Free	Free	89	89	89	89	5.34
Mexico	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	65	62	63	62	6.5
Moldova	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	62	61	58	60	1.91
Mongolia	Free	Free	Free	Free	85	85	85	84	2.71
Montenegro	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	69	67	65	62	3.53
Morocco	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	41	39	39	37	3.39
Mozambique	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	53	52	51	45	4.92
Myanmar	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Unfree	32	31	30	30	4.11
Namibia	Free	Free	Free	Free	77	77	75	77	4.93
Nepal	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	52	55	54	56	7.84
Nicaragua	Partly Free	Partly Free	Unfree	Unfree	47	44	32	31	5.57
Niger	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	49	49	49	48	2.97
Nigeria	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	50	50	50	47	2.18
North Macedonia	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	57	58	59	63	3.13
Oman	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	25	23	23	23	NA
Pakistan	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	43	43	39	38	3.66
Panama	Free	Free	Free	Free	83	83	84	84	5.28
Papua New Guinea	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	64	63	64	62	NA
Paraguay	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	64	64	65	65	4.74
Peru	Free	Free	Free	Free	72	73	73	72	5.15
Philippines	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	63	62	61	59	6.06
Qatar	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	26	24	25	25	3.54
Russia	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	20	20	20	20	3.28
Rwanda	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	24	23	23	22	2.77
Samoa	Free	Free	Free	Free	80	80	81	81	NA
Sao Tome and Principe	Free	Free	Free	Free	81	82	83	84	3.15
Saudi Arabia	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	10	7	7	7	3.6
Senegal	Free	Free	Free	Partly Free	78	75	72	71	1.85
Serbia	Free	Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	76	73	67	66	3.71
Sierra Leone	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	66	66	65	65	2.97
Singapore	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	51	52	51	50	5.86
Solomon Islands	Free	Free	Free	Free	71	72	79	79	NA
Somalia	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	5	7	7	7	1.59
South Africa	Free	Free	Free	Free	78	78	79	79	6.01
South Sudan	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	4	2	2	2	2.73
Sri Lanka	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	56	55	56	56	3.23
Sudan	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	6	8	7	12	2.99
Suriname	Free	Free	Free	Free	77	78	77	75	4.64
Syria	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	-1	-1	0	0	5.22
Taiwan	Free	Free	Free	Free	91	93	93	93	5.74
Tajikistan	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	11	11	9	9	1.56
Tanzania	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	58	52	45	40	3.27
Thailand	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Partly Free	32	31	30	32	5.81
Timor-Leste	Partly Free	Free	Free	Free	65	69	70	71	NA
Togo	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	48	47	43	44	3.15
Trinidad and Tobago	Free	Free	Free	Free	81	81	82	82	4.7
Tunisia	Free	Free	Free	Free	78	70	69	70	3.38
Turkey	Partly Free	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	38	32	31	32	3.94
Turkmenistan	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	4	4	2	2	NA

Uganda	Unfree	Partly Free	Unfree	Unfree	35	37	36	34	3.63
Ukraine	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	61	62	60	62	2.91
United Arab Emirates	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	20	17	17	17	NA
Uruguay	Free	Free	Free	Free	98	98	98	98	7.9
Uzbekistan	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	3	7	9	10	3.68
Vanuatu	Free	Free	Free	Free	80	81	82	82	NA
Venezuela	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	30	26	19	16	5.51
Vietnam	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	20	20	20	20	4.99
Yemen	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	Unfree	14	13	11	11	3.41
Zambia	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	Partly Free	56	55	54	54	2.04
Zimbabwe	Partly Free	Unfree	Partly Free	Partly Free	32	30	31	29	1.57

Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); 2018/2019 UCLA reports on countries' LGBTIQ* acceptance levels (<https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/global-acceptance-index-lgbt/>).

Appendix 2: Foreign Aid Types in the Global South

Overall Aid

Country	Absolute Overall Aid 2017	Per Capita Overall Aid 2017	Absolute Overall Aid 2018	Per Capita Overall Aid 2018	Absolute Overall Aid 2019	Per Capita Overall Aid 2019	Absolute Overall Aid 2020	Per Capita Overall Aid 2020
Afghanistan	\$16,568,811,853	\$464.85	\$4,665,479,269	\$127.17	\$4,237,372,714	\$112.19	\$3,229,993,274	\$82.88
Albania	\$115,367,194	\$40.15	\$16,624,651	\$5.80	\$20,067,521	\$7.03	\$46,775,697	\$16.48
Algeria	\$28,963,629	\$0.70	\$4,315,659	\$0.10	\$16,790,688	\$0.39	\$3,013,263	\$0.07
Angola	\$17,961,787	\$0.59	\$5,003,806	\$0.16	\$894,167	\$0.03	\$4,182,199	\$0.13
Argentina	\$19,640,079	\$0.45	\$5,193,289	\$0.12	\$8,572,293	\$0.19	\$6,638,039	\$0.15
Armenia	\$104,927,228	\$36.79	\$26,067,490	\$9.19	\$23,355,533	\$8.28	\$35,768,224	\$12.75
Azerbaijan	\$80,892,214	\$8.21	\$23,377,869	\$2.35	\$26,001,595	\$2.59	\$16,882,570	\$1.67
Bahamas	\$14,688,452	\$36.81	\$247,160	\$0.61	\$7,886,492	\$19.49	\$5,220,171	\$12.84
Bahrain	\$42,182,371	\$28.95	\$467,990	\$0.31	\$22,903,909	\$15.33	\$18,526,182	\$12.54
Bangladesh	\$405,231,829	\$2.50	\$106,303,334	\$0.65	\$113,346,251	\$0.68	\$96,542,576	\$0.58
Barbados	\$2,955,480	\$10.59	\$618,755	\$2.21	\$930,437	\$3.32	\$305,007	\$1.09
Belarus	\$26,023,313	\$2.75	\$7,201,280	\$0.76	\$7,145,448	\$0.76	\$5,582,184	\$0.60
Belize	\$23,507,439	\$62.74	\$3,570,546	\$9.35	\$8,013,451	\$20.60	\$5,104,511	\$12.93
Benin	\$169,095,439	\$14.58	\$14,131,447	\$1.18	\$50,538,127	\$4.11	\$42,105,837	\$3.33
Bhutan	\$1,472,130	\$1.95	\$79,841	\$0.10	\$993,733	\$1.29	\$160,556	\$0.21
Bolivia	\$5,329,776	\$0.47	\$1,364,459	\$0.12	\$1,514,610	\$0.13	\$519,574	\$0.04
Bosnia and Herzegovina	\$197,061,821	\$57.28	\$40,387,669	\$11.88	\$45,933,344	\$13.67	\$75,618,466	\$22.79
Botswana	\$3,649,911	\$1.52	\$731,793	\$0.30	\$938,036	\$0.38	\$1,310,363	\$0.51
Brazil	\$48,303,852	\$0.23	\$14,351,495	\$0.07	\$16,512,506	\$0.08	\$6,166,216	\$0.03
Brunei	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$1,028	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Burkina Faso	\$114,517,770	\$5.77	\$24,331,515	\$1.19	\$27,597,258	\$1.32	\$23,704,926	\$1.10
Burundi	\$17,885,597	\$1.60	\$4,412,901	\$0.38	\$4,936,860	\$0.42	\$5,056,762	\$0.41
Cabo Verde	\$13,150,999	\$23.28	\$5,403,190	\$9.46	\$526,555	\$0.91	\$157,946	\$0.27
Cambodia	\$175,878,453	\$11.11	\$31,211,394	\$1.95	\$37,675,337	\$2.32	\$69,216,376	\$4.22
Cameroon	\$62,509,208	\$2.56	\$13,156,599	\$0.52	\$16,244,412	\$0.63	\$28,116,421	\$1.06
Central African Republic	\$55,371,317	\$11.08	\$22,423,311	\$4.40	\$11,417,161	\$2.19	\$9,874,982	\$1.85
Chad	\$58,473,273	\$3.88	\$13,324,772	\$0.85	\$33,827,717	\$2.10	\$4,298,345	\$0.26
Chile	\$1,739,799	\$0.09	\$569,909	\$0.03	\$483,983	\$0.03	\$94,156	\$0.00
China	\$62,001,970	\$0.04	\$18,199,921	\$0.01	\$13,815,804	\$0.01	\$14,297,631	\$0.01
Colombia	\$1,435,419,506	\$29.69	\$347,247,232	\$7.05	\$373,101,505	\$7.43	\$371,904,212	\$7.30
Comoros	\$113,000	\$0.15	\$323,740	\$0.42	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Congo, Democratic	\$194,319,026	\$2.31	\$56,375,195	\$0.65	\$50,318,555	\$0.56	\$43,313,162	\$0.47
Congo, Republic	\$1,171,071	\$0.22	\$56,375,195	\$10.36	\$288,870	\$0.05	\$0	\$0.00
Costa Rica	\$63,168,435	\$12.65	\$15,269,161	\$3.03	\$19,954,240	\$3.92	\$18,127,002	\$3.54
Cote d'Ivoire	\$59,248,243	\$2.38	\$12,622,423	\$0.50	\$11,277,424	\$0.43	\$24,633,794	\$0.92
Cuba	\$25,975,984	\$2.29	\$8,368,737	\$0.74	\$11,587,909	\$1.02	\$8,600,131	\$0.76
Djibouti	\$87,251,981	\$83.88	\$8,502,552	\$8.04	\$64,693,657	\$60.24	\$12,907,041	\$11.84
Dominican Republic	\$94,501,432	\$8.88	\$30,468,161	\$2.83	\$23,078,821	\$2.12	\$19,935,717	\$1.81
Ecuador	\$22,033,602	\$1.32	\$3,964,732	\$0.23	\$5,023,478	\$0.29	\$8,949,837	\$0.51
Egypt	\$4,076,253,230	\$40.05	\$1,076,093,995	\$10.37	\$1,402,955,604	\$13.28	\$1,359,344,214	\$12.65
El Salvador	\$345,122,596	\$55.07	\$73,800,055	\$11.76	\$111,911,501	\$17.82	\$104,891,101	\$16.67
Equatorial Guinea	\$39,470	\$0.03	\$127,514	\$0.08	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Eritrea	\$226,269	\$0.07	\$120,617	\$0.04	\$55,774	\$0.02	\$0	\$0.00
Eswatini	\$1,167,637	\$1.01	\$452,135	\$0.39	\$217,174	\$0.19	\$140,761	\$0.12
Ethiopia	\$295,742,677	\$2.73	\$69,278,566	\$0.62	\$80,655,355	\$0.71	\$100,494,020	\$0.86
Fiji	\$3,678,590	\$4.00	\$200,000	\$0.22	\$1,131,175	\$1.23	\$2,068,368	\$2.25
Gabon	\$2,078,134	\$0.97	\$540,205	\$0.25	\$3,214	\$0.00	\$126,917	\$0.06
Gambia, The	\$8,891,643	\$3.73	\$1,619,931	\$0.66	\$4,948,632	\$1.97	\$2,530,352	\$0.98
Georgia	\$425,066,068	\$114.02	\$94,859,789	\$25.46	\$98,508,921	\$26.48	\$137,493,091	\$36.93
Ghana	\$411,619,845	\$13.62	\$86,320,318	\$2.80	\$80,745,369	\$2.56	\$114,371,822	\$3.55
Guatemala	\$414,050,578	\$25.74	\$100,448,507	\$6.14	\$110,826,318	\$6.67	\$84,506,071	\$5.01
Guinea	\$52,960,925	\$4.33	\$16,770,760	\$1.34	\$10,631,603	\$0.83	\$14,422,069	\$1.09
Guinea-Bissau	\$2,481,806	\$1.32	\$1,071,611	\$0.56	\$742,682	\$0.38	\$620,260	\$0.31
Guyana	\$3,497,953	\$4.58	\$567,624	\$0.72	\$1,145,682	\$1.43	\$1,115,714	\$1.40
Haiti	\$356,463,973	\$32.81	\$92,668,985	\$8.41	\$70,837,643	\$6.35	\$59,359,130	\$5.25
Honduras	\$321,499,957	\$33.40	\$102,792,380	\$10.50	\$88,656,757	\$8.90	\$37,269,188	\$3.68
India	\$92,604,274	\$0.07	\$18,163,698	\$0.01	\$22,948,566	\$0.02	\$32,992,580	\$0.02
Indonesia	\$407,985,448	\$1.54	\$83,886,808	\$0.31	\$151,222,236	\$0.56	\$108,750,174	\$0.40

Iran	\$1,874,000	\$0.02	\$958,900	\$0.01	\$1,386,000	\$0.02	\$0	\$0.00
Iraq	\$3,743,915,956	\$94.49	\$1,547,296,134	\$38.12	\$328,507,882	\$7.90	\$810,441,084	\$19.04
Israel	\$3,178,029,256	\$364.73	\$3,100,052,720	\$348.99	\$3,300,075,170	\$364.49	\$3,301,629,691	\$358.28
Jamaica	\$49,315,126	\$17.56	\$13,287,573	\$4.73	\$11,437,550	\$4.06	\$11,658,958	\$4.13
Jordan	\$5,510,434,595	\$539.43	\$1,075,390,392	\$102.81	\$1,309,931,520	\$122.44	\$2,126,589,474	\$194.59
Kazakhstan	\$155,393,130	\$8.61	\$41,530,128	\$2.27	\$35,699,666	\$1.93	\$45,271,756	\$2.41
Kenya	\$521,866,873	\$10.66	\$152,263,622	\$3.05	\$100,728,124	\$1.98	\$105,274,308	\$2.03
Kiribati	\$0	\$0.00	\$4,177	\$0.03	\$19,648	\$0.16	\$0	\$0.00
Korea, Democratic	\$8,316,086	\$0.33	\$2,595,914	\$0.10	\$3,444,143	\$0.13	\$0	\$0.00
Korea, Republic	\$258,500	\$0.01	\$6,190,013	\$0.12	\$8,670,462	\$0.17	\$15,341,076	\$0.30
Kuwait	\$464,000	\$0.11	\$0	\$0.00	\$474,547	\$0.11	\$852,007	\$0.20
Kyrgyzstan	\$103,449,609	\$16.69	\$28,140,879	\$4.45	\$22,898,548	\$3.55	\$22,012,034	\$3.35
Laos	\$104,160,970	\$14.88	\$16,103,430	\$2.27	\$30,258,102	\$4.20	\$51,049,410	\$6.97
Lebanon	\$1,091,913,134	\$178.73	\$261,828,909	\$44.00	\$345,833,215	\$59.81	\$322,908,783	\$57.02
Lesotho	\$250,306	\$0.12	\$186,969	\$0.09	\$712,920	\$0.32	\$1,202,282	\$0.53
Liberia	\$442,191,343	\$92.19	\$118,995,914	\$24.34	\$84,823,105	\$17.01	\$89,820,902	\$17.65
Libya	\$191,613,008	\$30.04	\$54,701,089	\$8.44	\$55,274,298	\$8.41	\$58,275,659	\$8.76
Madagascar	\$22,586,234	\$0.86	\$3,265,189	\$0.12	\$6,139,790	\$0.22	\$6,507,322	\$0.23
Malawi	\$385,604,716	\$21.56	\$118,943,390	\$6.48	\$104,707,830	\$5.55	\$37,760,268	\$1.95
Malaysia	\$224,057,681	\$7.01	\$29,878,416	\$0.92	\$151,618,555	\$4.62	\$37,635,043	\$1.13
Maldives	\$3,771,500	\$7.98	\$804,069	\$1.64	\$1,886,901	\$3.74	\$2,266,132	\$4.41
Mali	\$188,932,962	\$9.78	\$59,835,782	\$3.00	\$45,754,889	\$2.22	\$38,468,520	\$1.81
Mauritania	\$34,445,346	\$8.28	\$9,613,065	\$2.25	\$16,953,997	\$3.87	\$3,165,737	\$0.70
Mauritius	\$449,641	\$0.36	\$508,335	\$0.40	\$393,026	\$0.31	\$726,302	\$0.57
Mexico	\$1,203,494,894	\$9.80	\$261,386,474	\$2.11	\$446,219,912	\$3.57	\$218,972,655	\$1.74
Moldova	\$147,747,569	\$53.63	\$34,314,911	\$12.68	\$141,460,686	\$53.10	\$30,082,628	\$11.42
Mongolia	\$57,207,866	\$55.42	\$8,327,551	\$4.28	\$22,074,721	\$9.29	\$18,734,098	\$34.50
Montenegro	\$34,490,802	\$4.65	\$2,662,844	\$1.19	\$5,779,411	\$1.01	\$21,432,780	\$13.33
Morocco	\$165,302,180	\$4.54	\$42,926,238	\$1.26	\$36,705,625	\$0.98	\$48,871,208	\$1.04
Mozambique	\$129,635,844	\$4.75	\$37,042,390	\$4.69	\$29,746,442	\$4.66	\$32,449,864	\$3.81
Myanmar	\$248,443,278	\$0.42	\$247,188,841	\$0.02	\$247,360,423	\$0.03	\$203,390,285	\$0.05
Namibia	\$1,001,524	\$7.82	\$46,845	\$1.67	\$74,289	\$2.11	\$135,966	\$1.64
Nepal	\$220,380,393	\$12.15	\$47,549,719	\$3.28	\$60,807,838	\$2.04	\$48,034,207	\$2.31
Nicaragua	\$78,708,514	\$10.54	\$21,532,936	\$1.35	\$13,611,727	\$2.95	\$15,590,000	\$3.31
Niger	\$229,018,276	\$1.72	\$30,482,187	\$0.39	\$69,180,815	\$0.47	\$80,557,271	\$0.44
Nigeria	\$333,192,803	\$47.83	\$77,028,749	\$9.97	\$94,627,232	\$12.83	\$92,057,645	\$13.49
North Macedonia	\$99,219,184	\$13.93	\$20,692,611	\$0.66	\$26,648,938	\$11.43	\$27,956,805	\$1.04
Oman	\$63,262,723	\$7.81	\$3,043,672	\$1.20	\$52,622,591	\$2.63	\$4,739,830	\$1.05
Pakistan	\$1,689,637,646	\$19.27	\$262,909,763	\$2.99	\$588,200,072	\$3.75	\$238,166,112	\$5.60
Panama	\$78,926,700	\$0.18	\$12,444,605	\$0.10	\$15,888,204	\$0.05	\$24,036,149	\$0.06
Papua New Guinea	\$1,647,920	\$6.93	\$937,377	\$1.93	\$441,699	\$1.75	\$628,786	\$1.25
Paraguay	\$44,013,744	\$9.07	\$12,429,929	\$1.81	\$11,425,264	\$2.13	\$8,276,921	\$2.21
Peru	\$286,681,213	\$7.99	\$58,410,265	\$1.63	\$69,941,042	\$2.67	\$73,693,180	\$2.32
Philippines	\$852,872,722	\$0.17	\$176,870,108	\$0.00	\$294,768,265	\$0.24	\$260,300,020	\$0.17
Qatar	\$458,852	\$2.33	\$0	\$1.11	\$686,873	\$0.06	\$466,004	\$0.02
Russia	\$337,359,116	\$8.11	\$160,358,376	\$1.80	\$8,209,531	\$2.34	\$2,684,639	\$2.41
Rwanda	\$99,172,104	\$0.25	\$22,545,494	\$0.43	\$30,090,904	\$0.05	\$31,700,028	\$0.00
Samoa	\$52,000	\$3.31	\$89,944	\$1.37	\$11,525	\$0.16	\$0	\$0.04
Sao Tome and Principe	\$689,110	\$0.06	\$289,675	\$0.00	\$34,441	\$0.03	\$9,620	\$0.05
Saudi Arabia	\$2,096,120	\$12.67	\$33,192	\$3.62	\$1,067,826	\$2.76	\$1,651,789	\$2.45
Senegal	\$192,015,910	\$8.54	\$56,396,106	\$2.22	\$44,102,850	\$3.01	\$40,210,622	\$3.81
Serbia	\$59,949,693	\$6.78	\$15,479,345	\$2.41	\$20,873,223	\$1.32	\$26,278,251	\$1.46
Sierra Leone	\$52,016,361	\$0.27	\$18,957,885	\$0.04	\$10,656,763	\$0.06	\$12,022,435	\$0.09
Singapore	\$1,513,447	\$0.52	\$219,330	\$0.35	\$351,065	\$0.86	\$515,096	\$0.03
Solomon Islands	\$334,500	\$60.70	\$228,820	\$18.53	\$578,338	\$13.94	\$22,501	\$13.63
Somalia	\$902,293,397	\$1.66	\$285,565,331	\$0.50	\$222,816,298	\$0.33	\$225,357,670	\$0.40
South Africa	\$94,247,995	\$26.91	\$28,698,470	\$8.24	\$19,093,641	\$6.78	\$23,527,599	\$4.19
South Sudan	\$286,822,228	\$6.52	\$85,630,568	\$2.30	\$70,859,576	\$1.42	\$44,449,000	\$1.55
Sri Lanka	\$139,723,448	\$0.60	\$49,860,650	\$0.15	\$30,871,525	\$0.10	\$34,008,972	\$0.18
Sudan	\$24,383,591	\$0.46	\$6,180,979	\$0.33	\$4,380,568	\$0.11	\$7,978,691	\$0.18
Suriname	\$269,010	\$13.67	\$193,913	\$5.50	\$64,680	\$2.39	\$111,603	\$2.90
Syria	\$259,562,549	\$11.00	\$106,342,182	\$2.74	\$47,985,694	\$2.07	\$60,198,205	\$2.41
Taiwan	\$0	NA	\$0	NA	\$2,203	NA	\$175,508	NA
Tajikistan	\$98,214,204	\$5.15	\$24,978,780	\$1.35	\$19,342,672	\$1.05	\$23,019,930	\$0.95
Tanzania	\$289,828,753	\$1.55	\$78,626,124	\$0.21	\$62,835,443	\$0.46	\$58,648,007	\$0.57
Thailand	\$109,555,646	\$32.70	\$14,777,903	\$6.08	\$32,918,280	\$6.38	\$40,625,258	\$11.97
Timor-Leste	\$40,647,728	\$0.48	\$7,668,979	\$0.17	\$8,164,556	\$0.11	\$15,556,725	\$0.12
Togo	\$3,781,008	\$4.36	\$1,366,722	\$0.43	\$930,295	\$1.26	\$995,041	\$1.32

Trinidad and Tobago	\$6,441,232	\$61.67	\$645,914	\$12.12	\$1,921,235	\$18.20	\$2,007,013	\$17.70
Tunisia	\$728,389,311	\$0.72	\$144,588,164	\$0.11	\$219,246,653	\$0.14	\$215,233,693	\$0.35
Turkey	\$59,165,091	\$1.88	\$8,971,336	\$0.34	\$11,914,805	\$0.55	\$29,424,525	\$0.80
Turkmenistan	\$11,212,738	\$10.89	\$2,084,376	\$3.01	\$3,373,005	\$4.23	\$4,998,108	\$1.47
Uganda	\$436,951,626	\$38.90	\$124,801,733	\$10.52	\$181,461,111	\$9.79	\$65,347,231	\$10.62
Ukraine	\$1,743,793,171	\$0.27	\$469,472,513	\$0.11	\$434,750,500	\$0.02	\$468,465,619	\$0.04
United Arab Emirates	\$2,434,515	\$0.43	\$968,588	\$0.16	\$154,650	\$0.08	\$406,434	\$0.02
Uruguay	\$1,455,049	\$1.99	\$531,463	\$0.31	\$283,767	\$0.53	\$60,435	\$0.61
Uzbekistan	\$64,294,264	\$0.00	\$10,312,725	\$0.00	\$17,673,113	\$0.07	\$20,890,223	\$0.00
Vanuatu	\$0	\$2.31	\$0	\$0.27	\$20,174	\$0.55	\$0	\$1.41
Venezuela	\$70,576,213	\$4.03	\$7,923,772	\$0.75	\$15,984,042	\$1.04	\$40,114,153	\$1.52
Vietnam	\$379,278,811	\$3.62	\$71,300,638	\$0.96	\$99,305,662	\$1.20	\$147,145,158	\$1.25
Yemen	\$108,661,107	\$3.36	\$29,452,668	\$0.70	\$37,994,726	\$0.88	\$40,309,501	\$0.83
Zambia	\$58,206,883	\$6.39	\$12,499,194	\$1.74	\$16,229,226	\$1.60	\$15,658,322	\$1.30
Zimbabwe	\$94,309,818	\$18.48	\$26,222,721	\$2.63	\$24,629,203	\$6.83	\$20,359,287	\$5.69

Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); World Bank population data for per capita data (<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=>).

Peace and Security Aid

Country	Absolute Peace & Security Aid 2017	Per Capita Peace & Security Aid 2017	Absolute Peace & Security Aid 2018	Per Capita Peace & Security Aid 2018	Absolute Peace & Security Aid 2019	Per Capita Peace & Security Aid 2019	Absolute Peace & Security Aid 2020	Per Capita Peace & Security Aid 2020
Afghanistan	\$3,687,230,844	\$103.45	\$4,150,894,263	\$113.14	\$3,437,568,161	\$91.01	\$2,544,584,980	\$65.29
Albania	\$14,815,700	\$5.16	\$3,324,076	\$1.16	\$8,626,158	\$3.02	\$33,994,975	\$11.98
Algeria	\$5,818,006	\$0.14	\$3,836,423	\$0.09	\$16,402,273	\$0.38	\$2,220,207	\$0.05
Angola	\$7,994,140	\$0.26	\$4,817,182	\$0.15	\$382,769	\$0.01	\$3,583,794	\$0.11
Argentina	\$666,992	\$0.02	\$1,229,669	\$0.03	\$3,964,313	\$0.09	\$677,774	\$0.01
Armenia	\$6,071,256	\$2.13	\$11,612,847	\$4.09	\$7,617,408	\$2.70	\$16,145,837	\$5.75
Azerbaijan	\$5,666,986	\$0.58	\$15,707,859	\$1.58	\$17,929,689	\$1.79	\$11,155,572	\$1.11
Bahamas	\$1,676,160	\$4.20	\$247,160	\$0.61	\$7,886,492	\$19.49	\$5,220,171	\$12.84
Bahrain	\$1,062,012	\$0.73	\$467,990	\$0.31	\$22,079,199	\$14.78	\$18,526,182	\$12.54
Bangladesh	\$22,512,163	\$0.14	\$20,509,359	\$0.13	\$27,410,943	\$0.17	\$34,603,294	\$0.21
Barbados	\$1,102,000	\$3.95	\$618,208	\$2.21	\$929,691	\$3.32	\$284,859	\$1.01
Belarus	\$553,405	\$0.06	\$50,184	\$0.01	\$1,297	\$0.00	\$6,828	\$0.00
Belize	\$6,576,438	\$17.55	\$3,480,903	\$9.11	\$7,849,251	\$20.17	\$4,151,027	\$10.51
Benin	\$1,471,934	\$0.13	\$1,879,103	\$0.16	\$16,760,665	\$1.36	\$1,102,718	\$0.09
Bhutan	\$200,000	\$0.26	\$79,841	\$0.10	\$993,733	\$1.29	\$160,556	\$0.21
Bolivia	\$679,125	\$0.06	-\$10,341	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$13,429	\$0.00
Bosnia and Herzegovina	\$10,429,260	\$3.03	\$9,208,698	\$2.71	\$19,636,352	\$5.84	\$54,582,616	\$16.45
Botswana	\$870,975	\$0.36	\$649,022	\$0.26	\$401,726	\$0.16	\$202,700	\$0.08
Brazil	\$5,167,025	\$0.02	\$8,314,560	\$0.04	\$921,305	\$0.00	\$336,157	\$0.00
Brunei	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Burkina Faso	\$2,607,202	\$0.13	\$14,810,985	\$0.73	\$18,549,744	\$0.89	\$11,065,498	\$0.51
Burundi	\$1,550,496	\$0.14	\$1,917,936	\$0.17	\$1,110,846	\$0.09	\$1,182,753	\$0.10
Cabo Verde	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Cambodia	\$13,702,632	\$0.87	\$10,444,609	\$0.65	\$16,292,796	\$1.01	\$23,896,619	\$1.46
Cameroon	\$7,193,656	\$0.29	\$11,220,996	\$0.45	\$14,258,675	\$0.55	\$26,401,127	\$1.00
Central African Republic	\$2,830,331	\$0.57	\$17,518,747	\$3.44	\$4,195,121	\$0.81	\$1,203,000	\$0.23
Chad	\$6,817,523	\$0.45	\$13,221,782	\$0.85	\$33,733,596	\$2.09	\$3,464,688	\$0.21
Chile	\$556,216	\$0.03	\$485,544	\$0.03	\$390,705	\$0.02	\$71,046	\$0.00
China	\$63,000	\$0.00	\$2,782,000	\$0.00	\$137,272	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Colombia	\$212,277,422	\$4.39	\$180,299,945	\$3.66	\$146,999,119	\$2.93	\$107,925,607	\$2.12
Comoros	\$113,000	\$0.15	\$323,740	\$0.42	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Congo, Democratic	\$502,788	\$0.01	\$537,554	\$0.01	\$0	\$0.00	\$5,956,489	\$0.06
Congo, Republic	\$12,445,180	\$2.34	\$12,058,848	\$2.22	\$12,218,700	\$2.19	\$0	\$0.00
Costa Rica	\$8,302,346	\$1.66	\$13,669,218	\$2.71	\$19,097,112	\$3.76	\$16,017,703	\$3.13
Cote d'Ivoire	\$1,695,753	\$0.07	\$2,670,276	\$0.10	\$218,946	\$0.01	\$280,907	\$0.01
Cuba	\$38,876	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Djibouti	\$3,298,640	\$3.17	\$7,911,345	\$7.48	\$63,758,786	\$59.37	\$9,250,875	\$8.49
Dominican Republic	\$6,487,493	\$0.61	\$4,142,591	\$0.38	\$5,595,749	\$0.51	\$9,832,464	\$0.89

Ecuador	\$164,499	\$0.01	\$469,878	\$0.03	\$232,128	\$0.01	\$2,796,141	\$0.16
Egypt	\$204,427,208	\$2.01	\$1,004,164,355	\$9.68	\$1,307,717,787	\$12.38	\$1,305,350,931	\$12.15
El Salvador	\$10,235,697	\$1.63	\$7,003,650	\$1.12	\$9,427,949	\$1.50	\$2,796,323	\$0.44
Equatorial Guinea	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Eritrea	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Eswatini	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Ethiopia	\$5,926,800	\$0.05	\$7,384,098	\$0.07	\$9,680,966	\$0.08	\$25,370,844	\$0.22
Fiji	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Gabon	\$1,339,472	\$0.63	\$540,205	\$0.25	\$1,520	\$0.00	\$123,403	\$0.05
Gambia, The	\$26,004	\$0.01	\$524,799	\$0.21	\$1,723,135	\$0.69	\$530,614	\$0.21
Georgia	\$53,087,704	\$14.24	\$59,782,973	\$16.04	\$59,681,569	\$16.04	\$90,875,006	\$24.41
Ghana	\$3,694,963	\$0.12	\$4,122,031	\$0.13	\$3,308,611	\$0.10	\$3,704,691	\$0.12
Guatemala	\$34,046,226	\$2.12	\$29,826,429	\$1.82	\$5,198,093	\$0.31	\$9,241,271	\$0.55
Guinea	\$2,822,602	\$0.23	\$2,898,277	\$0.23	\$3,615,660	\$0.28	\$5,356,523	\$0.41
Guinea-Bissau	\$255,621	\$0.14	\$869,905	\$0.45	\$546,775	\$0.28	\$556,900	\$0.28
Guyana	\$538,580	\$0.71	\$345,751	\$0.44	\$885,039	\$1.11	\$52,386	\$0.07
Haiti	\$3,040,557	\$0.28	\$5,502,084	\$0.50	\$221,868	\$0.02	\$898,074	\$0.08
Honduras	\$20,503,944	\$2.13	\$10,500,122	\$1.07	\$7,733,626	\$0.78	\$3,623,758	\$0.36
India	\$8,789,769	\$0.01	\$5,801,153	\$0.00	\$12,897,030	\$0.01	\$15,037,120	\$0.01
Indonesia	\$24,585,722	\$0.09	\$30,355,144	\$0.11	\$99,461,727	\$0.37	\$38,746,803	\$0.14
Iran	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Iraq	\$1,031,206,534	\$26.03	\$1,508,045,774	\$37.15	\$284,266,618	\$6.84	\$745,369,949	\$17.51
Israel	\$3,178,029,256	\$364.73	\$3,100,052,720	\$348.99	\$3,300,000,066	\$364.48	\$3,300,000,000	\$358.11
Jamaica	\$3,853,904	\$1.37	\$5,683,756	\$2.02	\$2,995,457	\$1.06	\$3,937,309	\$1.40
Jordan	\$503,426,761	\$49.28	\$522,727,165	\$49.97	\$491,219,442	\$45.91	\$521,934,118	\$47.76
Kazakhstan	\$30,624,322	\$1.70	\$36,759,513	\$2.01	\$32,292,744	\$1.74	\$41,057,005	\$2.19
Kenya	\$88,253,338	\$1.80	\$74,252,382	\$1.49	\$30,477,763	\$0.60	\$29,783,377	\$0.57
Kiribati	\$0	\$0.00	\$4,177	\$0.03	\$19,648	\$0.16	\$0	\$0.00
Korea, Democratic	\$0	\$0.00	\$195,000	\$0.01	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Korea, Republic	\$0	\$0.00	\$6,042,813	\$0.12	\$8,659,023	\$0.17	\$15,282,780	\$0.29
Kuwait	\$464,000	\$0.11	\$0	\$0.00	\$10,547	\$0.00	\$284,386	\$0.07
Kyrgyzstan	\$2,641,362	\$0.43	\$1,056,395	\$0.17	\$1,629,037	\$0.25	\$1,842,853	\$0.28
Laos	\$23,704,960	\$3.39	\$13,413,733	\$1.89	\$14,138,534	\$1.96	\$41,356,875	\$5.65
Lebanon	\$137,022,797	\$22.43	\$219,024,199	\$36.81	\$284,187,866	\$49.15	\$252,221,621	\$44.54
Lesotho	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$76,404	\$0.03	\$500,000	\$0.22
Liberia	\$6,537,199	\$1.36	\$17,274,603	\$3.53	\$9,733,122	\$1.95	\$12,900,411	\$2.54
Libya	\$15,165,025	\$2.38	\$33,583,304	\$5.18	\$23,702,689	\$3.61	\$21,425,077	\$3.22
Madagascar	\$327,110	\$0.01	\$626,372	\$0.02	\$925,193	\$0.03	\$742,838	\$0.03
Malawi	\$489,615	\$0.03	\$1,120,628	\$0.06	\$225,501	\$0.01	\$405,265	\$0.02
Malaysia	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Maldives	\$1,353,292	\$2.86	\$804,069	\$1.64	\$811,767	\$1.61	\$1,612,732	\$3.13
Mali	\$1,454,806,232	\$75.33	\$10,914,203	\$0.55	\$9,270,861	\$0.45	\$10,919,196	\$0.51
Mauritania	\$3,926,059	\$0.94	\$8,958,706	\$2.10	\$16,358,346	\$3.73	\$2,279,535	\$0.51
Mauritius	\$449,641	\$0.36	\$507,968	\$0.40	\$393,026	\$0.31	\$164,470	\$0.13
Mexico	\$52,297,082	\$0.43	\$36,217,180	\$0.29	\$201,084,856	\$1.61	\$20,198,373	\$0.16
Moldova	\$17,115,549	\$6.21	\$4,761,152	\$1.76	\$11,194,600	\$4.20	\$3,471,060	\$1.32
Mongolia	\$5,269,767	\$1.70	\$5,566,685	\$1.76	\$19,745,745	\$6.11	\$14,702,536	\$4.46
Montenegro	\$3,200,062	\$5.14	\$1,095,696	\$1.76	\$4,343,120	\$6.98	\$20,785,820	\$33.46
Morocco	\$17,537,010	\$0.49	\$27,316,140	\$0.76	\$17,574,569	\$0.48	\$28,417,228	\$0.77
Mozambique	\$1,125,158	\$0.04	\$841,085	\$0.03	\$346,895	\$0.01	\$4,708,508	\$0.15
Myanmar	\$9,099,452	\$0.17	\$16,145,247	\$0.31	\$20,441,167	\$0.39	\$13,648,215	\$0.26
Namibia	\$144,936	\$0.06	\$46,845	\$0.02	\$68,721	\$0.03	\$0	\$0.00
Nepal	\$6,619,700	\$0.23	\$5,422,482	\$0.19	\$9,423,179	\$0.33	\$2,331,574	\$0.08
Nicaragua	\$3,088,000	\$0.48	\$96,166	\$0.01	\$339,295	\$0.05	\$293,480	\$0.04
Niger	\$18,323,738	\$0.84	\$16,445,334	\$0.73	\$35,666,660	\$1.52	\$25,794,792	\$1.06
Nigeria	\$20,599,679	\$0.11	\$36,314,452	\$0.18	\$41,317,499	\$0.20	\$48,117,607	\$0.23
North Macedonia	\$10,363,142	\$5.00	\$9,718,634	\$4.68	\$14,705,054	\$7.08	\$17,961,610	\$8.67
Oman	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Pakistan	\$334,300,826	\$1.54	\$43,580,996	\$0.20	\$402,497,093	\$1.80	\$60,087,560	\$0.26
Panama	\$16,851,519	\$4.11	\$9,624,550	\$2.31	\$13,673,664	\$3.23	\$21,578,428	\$5.02
Papua New Guinea	\$618,247	\$0.07	\$928,364	\$0.10	\$286,023	\$0.03	\$159,697	\$0.02
Paraguay	\$769,288	\$0.12	\$1,399,512	\$0.22	\$2,688,558	\$0.41	\$1,061,381	\$0.16
Peru	\$39,427,000	\$1.25	\$24,989,364	\$0.78	\$19,812,175	\$0.60	\$7,764,572	\$0.23
Philippines	\$87,388,897	\$0.82	\$155,041,787	\$1.43	\$251,643,462	\$2.28	\$202,551,669	\$1.81
Qatar	\$38,901	\$0.01	\$0	\$0.00	\$445,318	\$0.16	\$179,782	\$0.07
Russia	-\$17,442	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$35,000	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Rwanda	\$1,464,636	\$0.12	\$2,115,469	\$0.17	\$1,875,462	\$0.15	\$1,615,150	\$0.12

Samoa	\$52,000	\$0.25	\$89,944	\$0.43	\$11,525	\$0.05	\$0	\$0.00
Sao Tome and Principe	\$337,974	\$1.62	\$289,675	\$1.37	\$34,441	\$0.16	\$9,620	\$0.04
Saudi Arabia	\$22,012	\$0.00	\$24,792	\$0.00	\$1,060,268	\$0.03	\$701,119	\$0.02
Senegal	\$18,831,529	\$1.24	\$10,868,268	\$0.70	\$12,813,386	\$0.80	\$10,597,851	\$0.64
Serbia	\$5,138,655	\$0.73	\$3,025,464	\$0.43	\$3,111,086	\$0.45	\$6,595,698	\$0.96
Sierra Leone	\$3,377,665	\$0.44	\$7,519,077	\$0.96	\$3,772,586	\$0.47	\$2,808,064	\$0.34
Singapore	\$318,607	\$0.06	\$178,830	\$0.03	\$333,916	\$0.06	\$477,315	\$0.08
Solomon Islands	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Somalia	\$150,649,747	\$10.14	\$251,016,838	\$16.29	\$191,601,286	\$11.99	\$170,727,979	\$10.32
South Africa	\$8,121,517	\$0.14	\$5,767,067	\$0.10	\$3,399,626	\$0.06	\$14,352,943	\$0.24
South Sudan	\$33,317,196	\$3.13	\$30,486,990	\$2.93	\$26,629,061	\$2.55	\$15,756,380	\$1.49
Sri Lanka	\$7,474,966	\$0.35	\$12,842,625	\$0.59	\$7,518,679	\$0.34	\$11,269,447	\$0.51
Sudan	\$2,426,661	\$0.06	\$1,732,281	\$0.04	\$10,247	\$0.00	\$2,066,907	\$0.05
Suriname	\$269,010	\$0.46	\$193,913	\$0.33	\$64,680	\$0.11	\$111,603	\$0.18
Syria	\$41,652,776	\$2.19	\$90,644,058	\$4.69	\$38,610,196	\$1.92	\$55,776,429	\$2.69
Taiwan	\$0	NA	\$0	NA	\$2,203	NA	\$0	NA
Tajikistan	\$13,727,987	\$1.54	\$7,882,897	\$0.86	\$2,706,921	\$0.29	\$10,884,261	\$1.14
Tanzania	\$8,994,145	\$0.16	\$8,464,484	\$0.15	\$7,679,680	\$0.13	\$9,675,947	\$0.16
Thailand	\$16,192,154	\$0.23	\$9,370,046	\$0.13	\$25,836,110	\$0.36	\$35,115,655	\$0.49
Timor-Leste	\$773,523	\$0.62	\$378,022	\$0.30	\$191,869	\$0.15	\$1,239,539	\$0.95
Togo	\$1,580,341	\$0.20	\$989,642	\$0.12	\$599,254	\$0.07	\$482,345	\$0.06
Trinidad and Tobago	\$1,889,863	\$1.28	\$545,027	\$0.36	\$1,897,481	\$1.25	\$2,006,308	\$1.32
Tunisia	\$120,443,715	\$10.20	\$102,881,214	\$8.62	\$119,182,177	\$9.89	\$118,003,117	\$9.70
Turkey	\$5,534,116	\$0.07	\$4,285,152	\$0.05	\$9,940,584	\$0.12	\$28,467,526	\$0.34
Turkmenistan	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Uganda	\$6,950,041	\$0.17	\$79,092,727	\$1.91	\$126,805,242	\$2.95	\$13,224,029	\$0.30
Ukraine	\$289,523,489	\$6.46	\$373,285,759	\$8.37	\$307,209,545	\$6.92	\$308,210,741	\$6.98
United Arab Emirates	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Uruguay	\$508,450	\$0.15	\$427,834	\$0.12	\$233,121	\$0.07	\$60,435	\$0.02
Uzbekistan	\$13,262,799	\$0.41	\$5,293,772	\$0.16	\$7,077,971	\$0.21	\$7,858,409	\$0.23
Vanuatu	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$20,174	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Venezuela	\$55,000	\$0.00	\$50,000	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$17,424	\$0.00
Vietnam	\$44,301,052	\$0.47	\$50,676,183	\$0.53	\$66,300,276	\$0.69	\$96,020,643	\$0.99
Yemen	\$1,774,563	\$0.06	\$10,841,905	\$0.35	\$16,822,437	\$0.53	\$10,920,042	\$0.34
Zambia	\$454,984	\$0.03	\$942,292	\$0.05	\$185,084	\$0.01	\$69,258	\$0.00
Zimbabwe	\$4,116,786	\$0.28	\$3,936,410	\$0.26	\$1,117,911	\$0.07	\$2,392,089	\$0.15

Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); World Bank population data for per capita data (<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=>).

Development (Economic) Aid

Country	Absolute Development Aid 2017	Per Capita Development Aid 2017	Absolute Development Aid 2018	Per Capita Development Aid 2018	Absolute Development Aid 2019	Per Capita Development Aid 2019	Absolute Development Aid 2020	Per Capita Development Aid 2020
Afghanistan	\$247,334,238	\$6.94	\$131,820,154	\$3.59	\$157,123,285	\$4.16	\$180,457,444	\$4.63
Albania	\$3,359,999	\$1.17	\$3,670,235	\$1.28	\$2,532,930	\$0.89	\$3,001,875	\$1.06
Algeria	\$40,000	\$0.00	\$168,567	\$0.00	\$97,415	\$0.00	\$793,056	\$0.02
Angola	-\$689,149	-\$0.02	\$15,398	\$0.00	\$61,347	\$0.00	\$51,597	\$0.00
Argentina	\$1,560,070	\$0.04	\$2,980,526	\$0.07	\$3,760,721	\$0.08	\$4,410,447	\$0.10
Armenia	\$4,904,941	\$1.72	\$4,618,156	\$1.63	\$5,368,767	\$1.90	\$5,892,574	\$2.10
Azerbaijan	\$3,487,915	\$0.35	\$3,115,651	\$0.31	\$3,459,543	\$0.35	\$2,730,456	\$0.27
Bahamas	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Bahrain	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Bangladesh	\$56,067,497	\$0.35	\$69,832,771	\$0.43	\$64,339,061	\$0.39	\$43,040,182	\$0.26
Barbados	\$574	\$0.00	\$547	\$0.00	\$746	\$0.00	\$20,148	\$0.07
Belarus	\$1,581,290	\$0.17	\$1,304,087	\$0.14	\$1,462,016	\$0.16	\$1,112,676	\$0.12
Belize	\$238,789	\$0.64	\$89,643	\$0.23	\$160,000	\$0.41	\$350,000	\$0.89
Benin	\$60,719,527	\$5.24	\$11,746,827	\$0.98	\$33,657,460	\$2.74	\$40,735,366	\$3.22
Bhutan	\$38,000	\$0.05	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Bolivia	\$441,018	\$0.04	\$435,402	\$0.04	\$451,260	\$0.04	\$319,845	\$0.03

Bosnia and Herzegovina	\$8,654,990	\$2.52	\$12,558,790	\$3.69	\$11,283,906	\$3.36	\$9,823,500	\$2.96
Botswana	\$128,501	\$0.05	\$82,771	\$0.03	\$536,310	\$0.21	\$1,107,663	\$0.43
Brazil	\$6,123,619	\$0.03	\$5,287,979	\$0.03	\$15,101,032	\$0.07	\$5,654,673	\$0.03
Brunei	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Burkina Faso	\$35,765,770	\$1.80	\$8,639,552	\$0.42	\$7,668,194	\$0.37	\$10,541,358	\$0.49
Burundi	\$901,974	\$0.08	\$758,718	\$0.07	\$996,862	\$0.08	\$1,005,954	\$0.08
Cabo Verde	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Cambodia	\$6,348,119	\$0.40	\$10,100,813	\$0.63	\$8,784,713	\$0.54	\$21,268,625	\$1.30
Cameroon	\$885,224	\$0.04	\$1,695,020	\$0.07	\$1,617,564	\$0.06	\$1,426,675	\$0.05
Central African Republic	\$10,000	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Chad	\$9,900	\$0.00	\$10,000	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	-\$71,145	\$0.00
Chile	\$4,856	\$0.00	\$60,000	\$0.00	\$80,138	\$0.00	\$23,110	\$0.00
China	\$8,386,884	\$0.01	\$8,367,667	\$0.01	\$7,277,305	\$0.01	\$68,537,821	\$0.05
Colombia	\$5,189,754	\$0.11	\$3,022,928	\$0.06	\$36,166,408	\$0.72	\$68,537,821	\$1.35
Comoros	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Congo, Democratic	\$10,802,378	\$0.13	\$10,042,293	\$0.12	\$139,267	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Congo, Republic	\$0	\$0.00	\$84,181	\$0.02	\$8,313,215	\$1.49	\$8,977,257	\$1.57
Costa Rica	\$1,633,736	\$0.33	\$1,599,943	\$0.32	\$857,117	\$0.17	\$2,109,299	\$0.41
Cote d'Ivoire	\$3,539,349	\$0.14	\$4,869,165	\$0.19	\$7,449,757	\$0.28	\$21,482,503	\$0.80
Cuba	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Djibouti	\$815,500	\$0.78	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$2,422,097	\$2.22
Dominican Republic	\$4,543,748	\$0.43	\$17,575,384	\$1.63	\$11,548,841	\$1.06	\$3,135,542	\$0.29
Ecuador	\$393,489	\$0.02	\$286,567	\$0.02	\$888,351	\$0.05	\$1,434,113	\$0.08
Egypt	\$24,358,540	\$0.24	\$58,926,860	\$0.57	\$83,066,173	\$0.79	\$45,009,904	\$0.42
El Salvador	\$19,077,398	\$3.04	\$25,498,469	\$4.06	\$58,724,844	\$9.35	\$70,247,183	\$11.16
Equatorial Guinea	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Eritrea	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Eswatini	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Ethiopia	\$40,096,612	\$0.37	\$59,895,725	\$0.54	\$65,087,255	\$0.57	\$64,411,432	\$0.55
Fiji	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Gabon	\$5,936	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$1,694	\$0.00	\$3,514	\$0.00
Gambia, The	\$792,791	\$0.33	\$765,250	\$0.31	\$1,266,474	\$0.50	\$873,938	\$0.34
Georgia	\$17,821,279	\$4.78	\$13,657,833	\$3.67	\$18,747,699	\$5.04	\$29,309,377	\$7.87
Ghana	\$118,160,937	\$3.91	\$77,343,566	\$2.51	\$70,094,994	\$2.22	\$104,049,017	\$3.23
Guatemala	\$50,285,315	\$3.13	\$15,297,112	\$0.94	\$42,321,968	\$2.55	\$36,420,175	\$2.16
Guinea	\$5,249,735	\$0.43	\$3,161,879	\$0.25	\$2,204,221	\$0.17	\$816,524	\$0.06
Guinea-Bissau	\$252,605	\$0.13	\$201,706	\$0.10	\$195,907	\$0.10	\$63,360	\$0.03
Guyana	\$134,388	\$0.18	\$221,873	\$0.28	\$260,643	\$0.33	\$202,073	\$0.25
Haiti	\$73,658,489	\$6.78	\$53,339,279	\$4.84	\$41,737,274	\$3.74	\$34,031,668	\$3.01
Honduras	\$20,755,226	\$2.16	\$29,028,882	\$2.96	\$30,684,044	\$3.08	\$10,468,466	\$1.03
India	\$14,332,740	\$0.01	\$12,041,107	\$0.01	\$10,022,506	\$0.01	\$17,309,619	\$0.01
Indonesia	\$26,800,015	\$0.10	\$31,083,736	\$0.12	\$25,304,746	\$0.09	\$36,235,117	\$0.13
Iran	\$0	\$0.00	\$170,000	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Iraq	-\$402,821	-\$0.01	\$1,107,815	\$0.03	\$13,843,408	\$0.33	\$10,638,259	\$0.25
Israel	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$27,112	\$0.00	\$1,442,412	\$0.16
Jamaica	\$1,326,728	\$0.47	\$2,343,480	\$0.83	\$1,774,371	\$0.63	\$1,726,219	\$0.61
Jordan	\$76,753,414	\$7.51	\$508,948,529	\$48.66	\$780,580,135	\$72.96	\$1,561,317,656	\$142.86
Kazakhstan	\$748,488	\$0.04	\$1,501,815	\$0.08	\$596,634	\$0.03	\$980,072	\$0.05
Kenya	\$51,483,773	\$1.05	\$59,412,208	\$1.19	\$49,722,563	\$0.98	\$58,183,582	\$1.12
Kiribati	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Korea, Democratic	\$199,929	\$0.01	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Korea, Republic	\$258,500	\$0.01	\$147,200	\$0.00	\$11,439	\$0.00	\$58,296	\$0.00
Kuwait	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Kyrgyzstan	\$13,996,235	\$2.26	\$13,997,153	\$2.21	\$7,028,803	\$1.09	\$6,513,116	\$0.99
Laos	\$1,227,673	\$0.18	\$2,214,012	\$0.31	\$14,499,163	\$2.01	\$2,490,738	\$0.34
Lebanon	\$17,032,187	\$2.79	\$22,575,751	\$3.79	\$25,617,407	\$4.43	\$23,293,136	\$4.11
Lesotho	\$250,306	\$0.12	\$186,969	\$0.09	\$186,516	\$0.08	\$436,075	\$0.19
Liberia	\$89,493,624	\$18.66	\$56,446,009	\$11.54	\$36,046,643	\$7.23	\$39,233,287	\$7.71
Libya	\$5,013,349	\$0.79	\$4,936,011	\$0.76	\$11,876,159	\$1.81	\$6,223,876	\$0.94
Madagascar	\$8,041,483	\$0.31	\$2,104,976	\$0.08	\$3,713,236	\$0.13	\$5,142,477	\$0.18
Malawi	\$120,899,787	\$6.76	\$109,128,629	\$5.94	\$92,312,562	\$4.89	\$23,964,447	\$1.24
Malaysia	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Maldives	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$335,134	\$0.66	\$536,378	\$1.04
Mali	\$26,464,747	\$1.37	\$36,364,275	\$1.82	\$25,818,428	\$1.26	\$16,218,965	\$0.76
Mauritania	\$345,758	\$0.08	\$474,315	\$0.11	\$394,601	\$0.09	\$237,953	\$0.05
Mauritius	\$0	\$0.00	\$367	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$561,832	\$0.44
Mexico	\$4,736,001	\$0.04	\$3,666,556	\$0.03	\$3,270,059	\$0.03	\$6,437,498	\$0.05
Moldova	\$11,497,769	\$4.17	\$14,092,510	\$5.21	\$12,923,110	\$4.85	\$13,060,106	\$4.96
Mongolia	\$1,645,832	\$0.53	\$1,027,937	\$0.32	\$474,014	\$0.15	\$726,585	\$0.22
Montenegro	\$0	\$0.00	\$16,774	\$0.03	\$500,001	\$0.80	\$8,000	\$0.01
Morocco	\$6,042,984	\$0.17	\$3,231,040	\$0.09	\$8,622,664	\$0.24	\$15,460,731	\$0.42
Mozambique	\$30,357,465	\$1.06	\$34,228,964	\$1.16	\$25,090,212	\$0.83	\$24,225,782	\$0.78

Myanmar	\$21,449,172	\$0.41	\$23,958,973	\$0.45	\$16,051,947	\$0.30	\$26,584,202	\$0.50
Namibia	\$498,771	\$0.21	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Nepal	\$43,409,846	\$1.54	\$27,228,729	\$0.96	\$36,754,524	\$1.27	\$29,881,487	\$1.02
Nicaragua	\$9,453,187	\$1.46	\$10,014,089	\$1.52	\$1,248,426	\$0.19	\$316,189	\$0.05
Niger	\$25,762,957	\$1.19	\$9,758,864	\$0.43	\$28,384,677	\$1.21	\$47,325,388	\$1.94
Nigeria	\$25,843,681	\$0.13	\$17,214,592	\$0.09	\$29,704,444	\$0.15	\$26,427,358	\$0.13
North Macedonia	\$3,987,530	\$1.92	\$2,501,802	\$1.20	\$3,178,706	\$1.53	\$3,879,459	\$1.87
Oman	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Pakistan	\$122,120,756	\$0.56	\$143,310,997	\$0.65	\$116,861,777	\$0.52	\$134,867,950	\$0.59
Panama	\$2,848,743	\$0.70	\$2,090,682	\$0.50	\$1,499,754	\$0.35	\$1,804,271	\$0.42
Papua New Guinea	\$0	\$0.00	\$9,013	\$0.00	\$155,676	\$0.02	\$261,687	\$0.03
Paraguay	\$6,956,325	\$1.09	\$6,504,222	\$1.01	\$6,421,310	\$0.98	\$4,555,582	\$0.69
Peru	\$4,306,509	\$0.14	\$1,947,092	\$0.06	\$15,042,033	\$0.46	\$34,312,685	\$1.03
Philippines	\$18,119,550	\$0.17	\$7,608,790	\$0.07	\$25,431,581	\$0.23	\$28,281,931	\$0.25
Qatar	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$8,773	\$0.00	\$125,300	\$0.05
Russia	\$158,937,826	\$1.10	\$153,148,662	\$1.06	\$3,151,926	\$0.02	\$2,684,639	\$0.02
Rwanda	\$12,076,579	\$0.99	\$17,113,954	\$1.37	\$21,619,802	\$1.68	\$25,715,683	\$1.96
Samoa	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Sao Tome and Principe	\$17,400	\$0.08	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Saudi Arabia	\$0	\$0.00	\$8,400	\$0.00	\$3,426	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Senegal	\$35,103,761	\$2.32	\$43,193,275	\$2.77	\$26,954,701	\$1.68	\$27,072,015	\$1.65
Serbia	\$2,719,649	\$0.39	\$4,433,716	\$0.63	\$6,834,590	\$0.98	\$7,561,200	\$1.10
Sierra Leone	\$5,672,589	\$0.74	\$283,583,238	\$36.07	\$5,207,616	\$0.65	\$7,351,509	\$0.89
Singapore	\$10,027	\$0.00	\$40,500	\$0.01	\$17,149	\$0.00	\$37,781	\$0.01
Solomon Islands	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Somalia	\$5,966,993	\$0.40	\$13,879,338	\$0.90	\$10,595,457	\$0.66	\$15,141,918	\$0.92
South Africa	\$12,149,860	\$0.21	\$19,802,415	\$0.35	\$12,798,900	\$0.22	\$6,620,362	\$0.11
South Sudan	\$20,378,144	\$1.91	\$17,868,903	\$1.72	\$26,009,308	\$2.49	\$16,580,174	\$1.56
Sri Lanka	\$7,941,054	\$0.37	\$27,063,539	\$1.25	\$6,646,266	\$0.30	\$6,537,805	\$0.30
Sudan	\$146,454	\$0.00	\$137,120	\$0.00	\$272,965	\$0.01	\$1,947,420	\$0.04
Suriname	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Syria	\$398,866	\$0.02	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Taiwan	\$0	NA	\$0	NA	\$0	NA	\$175,508	NA
Tajikistan	\$9,558,781	\$1.07	\$10,995,368	\$1.20	\$12,148,589	\$1.30	\$9,188,029	\$0.96
Tanzania	\$78,149,874	\$1.39	\$64,959,126	\$1.12	\$47,761,901	\$0.80	\$42,277,705	\$0.69
Thailand	\$105,000	\$0.00	\$172,827	\$0.00	\$365,353	\$0.01	\$846,056	\$0.01
Timor-Leste	\$2,763,631	\$2.22	\$2,850,543	\$2.26	\$4,620,194	\$3.61	\$10,688,886	\$8.22
Togo	\$0	\$0.00	\$231,720	\$0.03	\$190,746	\$0.02	\$512,696	\$0.06
Trinidad and Tobago	\$5,657	\$0.00	\$100,887	\$0.07	\$23,754	\$0.02	\$705	\$0.00
Tunisia	\$14,027,993	\$1.19	\$10,079,730	\$0.84	\$63,220,350	\$5.25	\$39,219,019	\$3.22
Turkey	\$3,643,401	\$0.04	\$2,915,580	\$0.04	\$248,621	\$0.00	\$956,999	\$0.01
Turkmenistan	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Uganda	\$50,541,065	\$1.26	\$38,369,426	\$0.92	\$45,533,368	\$1.06	\$49,156,233	\$1.11
Ukraine	\$29,288,108	\$0.65	\$28,316,090	\$0.63	\$36,490,190	\$0.82	\$60,298,072	\$1.37
United Arab Emirates	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Uruguay	\$4,332	\$0.00	\$50,144	\$0.01	\$30,795	\$0.01	\$0	\$0.00
Uzbekistan	\$3,504,581	\$0.11	\$3,579,628	\$0.11	\$5,204,419	\$0.15	\$5,671,000	\$0.17
Vanuatu	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Venezuela	\$151,956	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$4,279,827	\$0.15
Vietnam	\$8,608,884	\$0.09	\$10,775,231	\$0.11	\$18,902,264	\$0.20	\$32,873,772	\$0.34
Yemen	-\$3,102	\$0.00	\$8,241,031	\$0.27	\$9,819,157	\$0.31	\$14,805,108	\$0.46
Zambia	\$16,498,251	\$0.95	\$10,322,710	\$0.58	\$12,839,666	\$0.70	\$11,291,440	\$0.60
Zimbabwe	\$8,223,200	\$0.56	\$5,299,768	\$0.35	\$8,423,785	\$0.55	\$6,537,040	\$0.42

Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); World Bank population data for per capita data (<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=>).

Democracy and Human Rights Aid

Country	Absolute Democracy Aid 2017	Per Capita Democracy Aid 2017	Absolute Democracy Aid 2018	Per Capita Democracy Aid 2018	Absolute Democracy Aid 2019	Per Capita Democracy Aid 2019	Absolute Democracy Aid 2020	Per Capita Democracy Aid 2020
Afghanistan	\$501,403,637	\$14.07	\$382,764,852	\$10.43	\$642,681,268	\$17.02	\$504,950,850	\$12.96
Albania	\$13,723,626	\$4.78	\$9,630,340	\$3.36	\$8,908,433	\$3.12	\$9,778,847	\$3.45
Algeria	\$35,500	\$0.00	\$310,669	\$0.01	\$291,000	\$0.01	\$0	\$0.00
Angola	\$576,624	\$0.02	\$171,226	\$0.01	\$450,051	\$0.01	\$546,808	\$0.02
Argentina	\$211,209	\$0.00	\$983,094	\$0.02	\$847,259	\$0.02	\$1,549,818	\$0.03
Armenia	\$8,759,784	\$3.07	\$9,836,487	\$3.47	\$10,369,358	\$3.68	\$13,729,813	\$4.89
Azerbaijan	\$5,475,986	\$0.56	\$4,554,359	\$0.46	\$4,612,363	\$0.46	\$2,996,542	\$0.30
Bahamas	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Bahrain	\$46,988	\$0.03	\$0	\$0.00	\$824,710	\$0.55	\$0	\$0.00
Bangladesh	\$12,301,112	\$0.08	\$15,961,204	\$0.10	\$21,596,247	\$0.13	\$18,899,100	\$0.11
Barbados	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Belarus	\$6,357,930	\$0.67	\$5,847,009	\$0.62	\$5,682,135	\$0.60	\$4,462,680	\$0.48
Belize	\$3,704	\$0.01	\$0	\$0.00	\$4,200	\$0.01	\$603,484	\$1.53
Benin	\$383,577	\$0.03	\$505,517	\$0.04	\$120,002	\$0.01	\$267,753	\$0.02
Bhutan	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Bolivia	\$1,039,669	\$0.09	\$939,398	\$0.08	\$1,063,350	\$0.09	\$186,300	\$0.02
Bosnia and Herzegovina	\$16,038,092	\$4.66	\$18,620,181	\$5.48	\$15,013,086	\$4.47	\$11,212,350	\$3.38
Botswana	\$101,190	\$0.04	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Brazil	\$1,149,321	\$0.01	\$2,085,885,702	\$9.92	\$490,169	\$0.00	\$175,386	\$0.00
Brunei	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00
Burkina Faso	\$511,099	\$0.03	\$880,978	\$0.04	\$1,379,320	\$0.07	\$2,098,070	\$0.10
Burundi	\$1,210,363	\$0.11	\$1,736,247	\$0.15	\$2,829,152	\$0.07	\$2,868,055	\$0.23
Cabo Verde	\$5,486,032	\$9.71	\$3,453,730	\$6.05	\$2,481	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Cambodia	\$17,724,595	\$1.12	\$10,665,972	\$0.67	\$12,597,828	\$0.07	\$24,051,132	\$1.47
Cameroon	\$257,502	\$0.01	\$240,583	\$0.01	\$368,173	\$0.07	\$288,619	\$0.01
Central African Republic	\$8,815,532	\$1.76	\$4,904,564	\$0.96	\$18,575,726	\$0.07	\$8,671,982	\$1.62
Chad	\$133,871	\$0.01	\$92,990	\$0.01	\$94,121	\$0.07	\$904,802	\$0.05
Chile	\$30,679	\$0.00	\$24,365	\$0.00	\$13,140	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
China	\$8,358,896	\$0.01	\$7,050,254	\$0.01	\$6,401,227	\$0.07	\$5,875,665	\$0.00
Colombia	\$126,236,241	\$2.61	\$163,600,619	\$3.32	\$189,935,978	\$0.07	\$195,440,784	\$3.84
Comoros	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Congo, Democratic	\$21,114,556	\$0.25	\$34,274,054	\$0.39	\$29,786,640	\$0.07	\$28,379,416	\$0.31
Congo, Republic	\$130,729	\$0.02	\$159,022	\$0.03	\$149,603	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Costa Rica	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$11	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Cote d'Ivoire	\$10,043,605	\$0.40	\$5,082,982	\$0.20	\$3,608,721	\$0.07	\$2,870,384	\$0.11
Cuba	\$5,317,696	\$0.47	\$8,368,737	\$0.74	\$11,587,909	\$0.07	\$8,600,131	\$0.76
Djibouti	\$56,688	\$0.05	\$591,207	\$0.56	\$934,871	\$0.07	\$1,234,069	\$1.13
Dominican Republic	\$9,987,492	\$0.94	\$8,750,186	\$0.81	\$5,934,231	\$0.07	\$6,967,711	\$0.63
Ecuador	\$3,623,919	\$0.22	\$3,208,287	\$0.19	\$3,902,999	\$0.07	\$4,719,583	\$0.27
Egypt	\$11,844,354	\$0.12	\$13,002,780	\$0.13	\$12,171,644	\$0.07	\$8,983,379	\$0.08
El Salvador	\$25,778,352	\$4.11	\$41,297,936	\$6.58	\$43,758,708	\$0.07	\$31,847,595	\$5.06
Equatorial Guinea	\$39,470	\$0.03	\$127,514	\$0.08	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Eritrea	\$129,705	\$0.04	\$120,617	\$0.04	\$55,774	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Eswatini	\$370,591	\$0.32	\$259,295	\$0.22	\$146,000	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Ethiopia	\$1,841,663	\$0.02	\$1,998,743	\$0.02	\$5,887,134	\$0.07	\$10,711,744	\$0.09
Fiji	-\$237	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$3,124	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Gabon	\$67,598	\$0.03	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Gambia, The	\$1,038,907	\$0.44	\$329,882	\$0.13	\$1,959,023	\$0.07	\$1,125,800	\$0.44
Georgia	\$23,287,066	\$6.25	\$21,418,983	\$5.75	\$20,079,653	\$0.07	\$17,308,708	\$4.65
Ghana	\$11,434,907	\$0.38	\$4,854,721	\$0.16	\$7,341,764	\$0.07	\$6,618,114	\$0.21
Guatemala	\$37,332,473	\$2.32	\$55,324,966	\$3.38	\$63,306,257	\$0.07	\$38,844,625	\$2.30
Guinea	\$3,878,338	\$0.32	\$10,710,604	\$0.85	\$4,811,722	\$0.07	\$8,249,022	\$0.62
Guinea-Bissau	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Guyana	-\$4,035	-\$0.01	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$861,255	\$1.08
Haiti	\$61,318,024	\$5.64	\$33,827,622	\$3.07	\$28,878,501	\$0.07	\$24,429,388	\$2.16
Honduras	\$51,577,798	\$5.36	\$63,263,376	\$6.46	\$50,239,087	\$0.07	\$23,176,964	\$2.29
India	\$74,092	\$0.00	\$321,438	\$0.00	\$29,030	\$0.07	\$645,841	\$0.00
Indonesia	\$13,358,719	\$0.05	\$22,447,928	\$0.08	\$26,455,763	\$0.07	\$33,768,254	\$0.12

Iran	\$477,000	\$0.01	\$788,900	\$0.01	\$1,386,000	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Iraq	\$26,847,726	\$0.68	\$38,142,545	\$0.94	\$30,397,856	\$0.07	\$54,432,876	\$1.28
Israel	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$47,992	\$0.07	\$187,279	\$0.02
Jamaica	\$7,824,649	\$2.79	\$5,260,337	\$1.87	\$6,667,722	\$0.07	\$5,995,430	\$2.13
Jordan	\$491,563,762	\$48.12	\$43,714,698	\$4.18	\$38,131,943	\$0.07	\$43,337,700	\$3.97
Kazakhstan	\$4,086,929	\$0.23	\$3,268,800	\$0.18	\$2,810,288	\$0.07	\$3,234,679	\$0.17
Kenya	\$25,196,383	\$0.51	\$18,599,032	\$0.37	\$20,527,798	\$0.07	\$17,307,349	\$0.33
Kiribati	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Korea, Democratic	\$2,271,100	\$0.09	\$2,400,914	\$0.09	\$3,444,143	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Korea, Republic	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Kuwait	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$93,074	\$0.02
Kyrgyzstan	\$13,760,551	\$2.22	\$13,087,331	\$2.07	\$1,247,391,953	\$0.07	\$13,656,065	\$2.08
Laos	\$1,021,308	\$0.15	\$475,685	\$0.07	\$1,620,405	\$0.07	\$7,201,797	\$0.98
Lebanon	\$15,046,342	\$2.46	\$20,228,959	\$3.40	\$36,027,942	\$0.07	\$47,394,026	\$8.37
Lesotho	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$450,000	\$0.07	\$266,207	\$0.12
Liberia	\$52,669,193	\$10.98	\$45,275,302	\$9.26	\$39,043,340	\$0.07	\$37,687,204	\$7.41
Libya	\$16,433,589	\$2.58	\$16,181,774	\$2.50	\$19,695,450	\$0.07	\$30,626,706	\$4.60
Madagascar	\$499,813	\$0.02	\$533,841	\$0.02	\$1,501,361	\$0.07	\$622,007	\$0.02
Malawi	\$2,820,891	\$0.16	\$8,694,133	\$0.47	\$12,169,767	\$0.07	\$13,390,556	\$0.69
Malaysia	\$1,009,448	\$0.03	\$1,456,604	\$0.04	\$2,299,965	\$0.07	\$13,087	\$0.00
Maldives	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$740,000	\$0.07	\$117,022	\$0.23
Mali	\$7,189,263	\$0.37	\$12,557,304	\$0.63	\$10,665,600	\$0.07	\$11,330,359	\$0.53
Mauritania	\$440,730	\$0.11	\$180,044	\$0.04	\$201,050	\$0.07	\$648,249	\$0.14
Mauritius	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Mexico	\$220,023,669	\$1.79	\$221,502,738	\$1.79	\$241,864,997	\$0.07	\$192,336,784	\$1.53
Moldova	\$12,450,013	\$4.52	\$15,461,249	\$5.71	\$18,168,989	\$0.07	\$13,551,462	\$5.14
Mongolia	\$1,726,849	\$0.56	\$1,732,929	\$0.55	\$1,854,962	\$0.07	\$3,304,977	\$1.00
Montenegro	\$1,958,646	\$3.15	\$1,550,374	\$2.49	\$936,290	\$0.07	\$638,960	\$1.03
Morocco	\$16,137,926	\$0.45	\$12,379,058	\$0.34	\$10,508,392	\$0.07	\$4,993,249	\$0.14
Mozambique	\$1,390,051	\$0.05	\$1,972,341	\$0.07	\$4,309,335	\$0.07	\$3,515,574	\$0.11
Myanmar	\$83,449,346	\$1.60	\$25,128,479	\$0.48	\$24,133,909	\$0.07	\$29,794,969	\$0.56
Namibia	\$100,717	\$0.04	\$0	\$0.00	\$5,568	\$0.07	\$135,966	\$0.05
Nepal	\$18,712,886	\$0.66	\$14,898,508	\$0.52	\$14,630,135	\$0.07	\$15,821,146	\$0.54
Nicaragua	\$15,602,871	\$2.41	\$11,422,681	\$1.74	\$12,024,006	\$0.07	\$14,980,331	\$2.22
Niger	\$4,987,017	\$0.23	\$4,277,989	\$0.19	\$5,129,478	\$0.07	\$7,437,091	\$0.31
Nigeria	\$23,284,740	\$0.12	\$23,499,705	\$0.12	\$772,399,236	\$0.07	\$17,512,680	\$0.08
North Macedonia	\$9,570,158	\$4.61	\$8,472,175	\$4.08	\$8,765,178	\$0.07	\$6,115,736	\$2.95
Oman	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Pakistan	\$149,511,657	\$0.69	\$76,017,770	\$0.35	\$68,841,202	\$0.07	\$43,210,602	\$0.19
Panama	\$9,837,874	\$2.40	\$729,373	\$0.18	\$714,786	\$0.07	\$653,450	\$0.15
Papua New Guinea	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$207,402	\$0.02
Paraguay	\$7,512,987	\$1.18	\$4,526,195	\$0.70	\$2,315,396	\$0.07	\$2,659,958	\$0.40
Peru	\$40,903,217	\$1.29	\$31,473,809	\$0.98	\$35,086,834	\$0.07	\$31,615,923	\$0.95
Philippines	\$17,705,245	\$0.17	\$14,219,531	\$0.13	\$17,693,222	\$0.07	\$29,466,420	\$0.26
Qatar	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Russia	\$7,601,164	\$0.05	\$7,209,714	\$0.05	\$5,022,605	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Rwanda	\$1,296,390	\$0.11	\$3,316,071	\$0.26	\$6,595,640	\$0.07	\$4,369,195	\$0.33
Samoa	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Sao Tome and Principe	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Saudi Arabia	\$275,000	\$0.01	\$0	\$0.00	\$4,132	\$0.07	\$950,670	\$0.03
Senegal	\$2,431,984	\$0.16	\$2,334,563	\$0.15	\$4,334,763	\$0.07	\$2,540,756	\$0.15
Serbia	\$6,524,095	\$0.93	\$8,020,165	\$1.15	\$10,927,547	\$0.07	\$12,121,353	\$1.76
Sierra Leone	\$1,329,024	\$0.17	\$3,907,194	\$0.50	\$1,676,561	\$0.07	\$1,862,862	\$0.23
Singapore	\$99,322	\$0.02	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Solomon Islands	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$9,001	\$0.01
Somalia	\$17,899,736	\$1.20	\$20,669,155	\$1.34	\$20,619,555	\$0.07	\$39,487,773	\$2.39
South Africa	\$4,741,531	\$0.08	\$3,128,988	\$0.05	\$2,895,115	\$0.07	\$2,554,294	\$0.04
South Sudan	\$37,652,515	\$3.53	\$37,274,675	\$3.59	\$18,221,207	\$0.07	\$12,112,446	\$1.14
Sri Lanka	\$9,566,281	\$0.45	\$9,954,486	\$0.46	\$16,706,580	\$0.07	\$16,201,720	\$0.74
Sudan	\$4,824,158	\$0.12	\$4,311,578	\$0.10	\$4,097,356	\$0.07	\$3,964,364	\$0.09
Suriname	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Syria	\$2,984,826	\$0.16	\$15,698,124	\$0.81	\$9,375,498	\$0.07	\$4,421,776	\$0.21

Taiwan	\$0	NA	\$0	NA	\$0	NA	\$0	NA
Tajikistan	\$7,774,703	\$0.87	\$6,100,515	\$0.67	\$4,487,162	\$0.07	\$2,947,640	\$0.31
Tanzania	\$3,587,882	\$0.06	\$5,202,514	\$0.09	\$7,393,862	\$0.07	\$6,694,355	\$0.11
Thailand	\$6,152,516	\$0.09	\$5,235,030	\$0.07	\$6,716,817	\$0.07	\$4,663,547	\$0.07
Timor-Leste	\$5,720,314	\$4.60	\$4,440,414	\$3.52	\$3,352,493	\$0.07	\$3,628,300	\$2.79
Togo	\$129,426	\$0.02	\$145,360	\$0.02	\$140,295	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Trinidad and Tobago	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Tunisia	\$17,265,561	\$1.46	\$31,627,220	\$2.65	\$36,844,126	\$0.07	\$58,011,557	\$4.77
Turkey	\$2,352,260	\$0.03	\$1,770,604	\$0.02	\$1,725,600	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Turkmenistan	\$1,216,784	\$0.20	\$962,955	\$0.16	\$1,604,081	\$0.07	\$1,678,202	\$0.27
Uganda	\$11,272,350	\$0.28	\$7,339,580	\$0.18	\$9,122,501	\$0.07	\$2,966,969	\$0.07
Ukraine	\$52,292,942	\$1.17	\$67,870,664	\$1.52	\$91,050,765	\$0.07	\$99,956,806	\$2.26
United Arab Emirates	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Uruguay	\$66,602	\$0.02	\$53,485	\$0.02	\$19,851	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Uzbekistan	\$1,679,857	\$0.05	\$1,439,325	\$0.04	\$5,390,723	\$0.07	\$7,360,814	\$0.22
Vanuatu	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.00	\$0	\$0.07	\$0	\$0.00
Venezuela	\$6,347,290	\$0.21	\$7,873,772	\$0.26	\$15,984,042	\$0.07	\$35,816,902	\$1.26
Vietnam	\$8,617,417	\$0.09	\$9,849,224	\$0.10	\$14,103,122	\$0.07	\$18,250,743	\$0.19
Yemen	\$1,852,024	\$0.06	\$10,369,732	\$0.34	\$11,353,132	\$0.07	\$14,555,881	\$0.45
Zambia	\$2,823,247	\$0.16	\$1,234,192	\$0.07	\$3,204,476	\$0.07	\$4,297,624	\$0.23
Zimbabwe	\$10,659,021	\$0.72	\$16,986,543	\$1.13	\$15,087,507	\$0.07	\$11,430,158	\$0.73

Sources: Freedom House data (<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world>); World Bank population data for per capita data (<https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=>).

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