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Soldiers of Science--Agents of Culture: American Archaeologists in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)

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SOLDIERS OF SCIENCE—
AGENTS OF CULTURE

AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGISTS
IN THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES (OSS)

ABSTRACT

"Scientificity" and appeals to political independence are invaluable tools when institutions such as the American School of Classical Studies at Athens attempt to maintain professional autonomy. Nonetheless, the cooperation of scientists and scholars with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), among them archaeologists affiliated with the American School, suggests a constitutive affinity between political and cultural leadership. This relationship is here mapped in historical terms, while, at the same time, sociological categorizations of knowledge and its employment are used in order to situate archaeologists in their broader social and political context and to evaluate their work not merely as agents of disciplinary knowledge but also as agents of culture and cultural change.

A soldier,... a diplomat,... a politician,... a businessman ... may be excused if they set patriotic devotion above common everyday decency and perform services as spies. They merely accept the code of morality to which modern society still conforms. Not so the scientist. The very essence of his life is the service of truth.

—Franz Boas, 1919

We live in an interlocking world, in which no sphere and no area is insulated. ... [We] must choose our priorities, and do it on the basis of inadequate evidence. To disregard consequences in the name of purity of principle can itself often be a kind of indulgence and evasion.

—Ernest Gellner, 1990

Stationed in a country where cultural heritage is guarded with nationalistic fervor and latent anti-Americanism can be ignited at any time, the American School of Classical Studies at Athens (ASCSA) has neither celebrated nor condemned the service of some of its most prominent members during the Second World War in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the first American intelligence agency. The School has strategically engaged

1. I am especially grateful to Jack L. Davis, former director of the ASCSA, and Natalia Vogeikoff-Brogan, the ASCSA archivist, for inviting me to contribute to this volume and for facilitating my research at the Archives of the School. I am also thankful for their insightful comments and suggestions.

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in “boundary work,” emphasizing its scientific mission and nonpolitical disposition. “Scientificity” and appeals to political independence are invaluable tools in the efforts of institutions such as the ASCSA to maintain their professional autonomy, and, as Gieryn suggests, to seal themselves off from outside powers and from any blame for undesirable consequences of nonscientists’ consumption of scientific knowledge. Yet again, the rhetoric of scientific purism prevents us from understanding the social and historical complexities of scientific and cultural practices. A microsociological approach, a biographical lens that will focus not on “scientists qua scientists” but on their relations with other social groups and functions and on their commitments to multiple identities and roles, can offer us a more nuanced, richer perspective on the place of archaeologists within the social, political, and cultural milieu in which they operate.

A discussion of American archaeologists’ activities during the war may touch upon at least two sensitive areas. First, it may be seen as a challenge to the basic premises on which the relationships of foreign archaeological institutions with their host country, Greece in this case, are based—namely, those of pure scientific interest and independent scholarly preoccupation. Second, it may appear to contest the presumed divide between American archaeology in Greece and politics. In many circles, definitely in academic ones, the relationship between archaeology and espionage is well known. Studies of the relationship between archaeology and state projects such as nation building, colonialism, and imperialism also abound, with the lion’s share undoubtedly focusing on the Middle East, since it occupies a central place in world politics today. More and more, the field of Greek archaeology is also being opened up to discussions about nation building, national identity, and representation politics, while the role of classicism and Hellenism as a western European project is treated in an ever-growing literature. The often contentious Greek-American post–World War II relationship, however, has put a cap on exploring and arguing about the social, political, economic, and broader cultural role of American institutions such as the ASCSA in the recent history of Greece. I argue, therefore, for an open, historically grounded discussion.

A study of American archaeologists’ work in espionage and intelligence can be framed within the postwar American agenda to broaden its sphere anonymous Hesperia reviewers, as well as Volker R. Berghahn, Thomas Gallant, Eavanthis Hatzivassiliou, Kostis Karpozilos, Nikolas Kosmatopoulos, and Kalliopi Minioudaki, for carefully reading the initial manuscript and contributing their advice and assistance. Early versions of this paper were presented at the ASCSA Philhellenism workshop in Athens (May 18, 2010) and the Center for the United States and the Cold War, the Tamiment Library & Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, New York University (April 5, 2012). I am very grateful to my audiences in Athens and in New York for their discussion.

2. The term was coined by Thomas F. Gieryn (1983) to describe discursive practices in which scientists engage to establish their epistemic authority and to separate their work from the non-scientific world and from rival epistemic authorities. The ASCSA was established in 1881 by a consortium of nine American universities in collaboration with leading businessmen as a privately funded, nonprofit educational institution with the explicit goal to promote the study of Classics in the United States. For the history of the School, see Lord 1947 and Meritt 1984.


4. Fierman 1986; Mabee 1987; Clogg 2000; Richter 2008. Susan Allen’s book Classical Spies: American Archaeologists with the OSS in World War II Greece (2011) is the most detailed account we have so far of the work that the OSS undertook in the region and of the active role that American archaeologists played.


of political and economic influence and to impose its system of values and ideas. Such an instrumental approach, however, despite its merits, would discount the diversity of actions and opinions within the circles of individuals studied, as well as the various nuances that can be distinguished in the complex relationship between intellectual and political practices. As in the case of the Frankfurt School intellectuals, it may be argued that the archaeologists of the ASCSA had a limited influence on the prosecution of the war and the government policies that followed. I suggest, however, that this episode in the history of the School showcases the porous boundaries between scholarly and political practices, challenging the proclaimed social, political, and cultural marginality of the archaeologists, speaking to their national as well as their scholarly identity and further affirming what Pierre Bourdieu has suggested: “capital breeds capital.”

The OSS programmatically drew from and capitalized on the intellectual resources of the United States, and for the first time on such a large scale brought together the decision-making and the scholarly elites, often creating incongruous alliances.

The intellectual and cultural authority that archaeologists such as Carl W. Blegen, Rodney S. Young, M. Alison Frantz, John L. Caskey, Dorothy H. Cox, and others were called upon to give to the war effort hardly steered the course of the war. It did, however, provide the intellectual grounding that all public policy needs, and contributed to the formulation of a narrative that first explained the need for greater American involvement in the region, then outlined the political, economic, and ideological future of postwar Greece. While aware of the moral compromises they were often called upon to make as they navigated the treacherous and violent political waters of Greece, the archaeologists under discussion and the institution they represented emerged invigorated from the war, and again found themselves in a position of authority as cultural interpreters and mediators between the two countries.

ARCHAEOLOGISTS AT WAR AND THE PROSPECT OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

In 1942–1943, the archaeologists of the ASCSA, like many historians, political scientists, psychologists, anthropologists, scientists, and scholars from virtually all academic disciplines and branches of knowledge, went to war and for the most part served in various OSS posts. The OSS recruited extensively among scholars and intellectuals, counting on their linguistic, historical, and cultural knowledge of distant nations such as Greece for the development of military strategies and public policy. American archaeologists affiliated with the School were recruited to serve in the Department of Research and Analysis (R&A), as Secret Intelligence officers (SI), in a variety of disciplines: historians, economists, political scientists, geographers, psychologists, anthropologists, and diplomats. The R&A’s roster included two generations of leading scholars, such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Walt W. Rostow, Edward Shils, Herbert Marcuse, H. Stuart Hughes, Gordon Craig, Crane Brinton, John King Fairbank, Sherman Kent, and Ralph Bunche (https://www.cia.gov/Ubibrary/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/oss/art04.htm).
Counterintelligence (X-2), and in the Special Operations Branch (SO), which ran guerrilla campaigns in Europe and Asia. The OSS, established in 1942, radically departed from earlier views such as those expressed by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail," and until 1945, before being succeeded by the CIA, it was the nation's central intelligence agency.

The war declared by the Italians on October 28, 1940, did not take the School by surprise. As early as 1939, it had authorized Lincoln MacVeagh, the American ambassador in Greece, to have the legation take over the property of the School in case of emergency. In collaboration with the Greek archaeological authorities, measures were taken for the protection of monuments, and records and finds were packed away in bombproof shelters; on the initiative of some of the younger and most adventurous members of the School, an ambulance was donated to the Greek Red Cross and driven to the Albanian front. The driver, Rodney Stuart Young, who had joined the staff of the Agora excavations in 1933 before receiving his doctorate in classical archaeology from Princeton in 1940, would risk his life twice during the war. In the spring of 1941, he was carried to a hospital with perforated intestines after trying to drive the ambulance from the front back to a Red Cross station. In 1945, during a mission by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) to the Aegean islands, his boat capsized with great loss of life and Young was saved only after enduring five hours in the water.

Young's contribution to the war effort in Greece, and that of other members of the School, however, extended far beyond the relief and rehabilitation work; such efforts occupied him and many of the others even after their return to the United States. Some of these men were also involved in the gradual articulation of postwar American policy in the region and its disentanglement from the policies of its wartime allies, primarily those of the British—"the cousins," as they were often identified in code. A year before taking up his assignment as SI officer and head of the Greek Desk in Cairo in May 1943, Young had worked with the directing officers of the Secret Intelligence Services (SIS) to design and promote what was entitled the Comprehensive Greek Project. While alluding to the potential role of the U.S. in the postwar world, this report at the same time identified a role for individuals such as Young in the endeavor: "Questions of High Policy do not come near the scope of an S.I. Officer, but the number of Americans who are intimately identified with and who know Greece by instinct rather than by intellect are so few that when such an officer chances to have a

12. Stimson and Bundy 1948, p. 188.
15. ASCSA AdmRec, box 804/4, folder 1, Gorham P. Stevens to Leslie E. Reed, American Consul General, May 24, 1941.
16. ASCSA AdmRec, box 804/2, folder 8, "Informal Report concerning the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, May and June 1945," Gorham P. Stevens and Aristides Kyriakides to Louis E. Lord, July 1, 1945. Young was the assistant to the chief of UNRRA's Greek mission in Athens, a position that he held from November 1944 until his return to the ASCSA to work for the Agora excavations in 1946. In this position, he would again find himself in the midst of the battles that raged in the center of Athens in December 1944, driving the trucks of UNRRA and negotiating directly with the antartes (rebels) for the safe passage of the food and supplies he was delivering. See United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (ARMS), UNRRA Greek Mission: Office of the Chief, PAG-4/3.0.12.0.0, box 1, S-0527-0531.
Greek assignment, he is compelled to recommend conference and action beyond and outside his line of duty.\(^{17}\)

The Project called directly for "executive attention," invoking Roosevelt's philhellenism—it made the rather weak case that the President was a member of AHEPA, a Greek-American fraternal organization, and that his grandfather had arranged for the sale of American warships to Greece\(^{18}\)—and sketching a picture of postwar America that would break with America's long tradition of noninterventionism. Rather contemptuous of the European leadership, the Project urged that "the United States must have their say in the establishment of the new Europe, and in view of the record of consistent failure in the past of the so-called 'Great European Powers'. . . it would be well that the United States had the greatest say."\(^{19}\)

Young, the head of the Greek Desk, took it upon himself to implement what he and his colleagues had recommended earlier in the Comprehensive Greek Project: the mobilization of all available organizations and individuals who had established connections with the Greek state. The Greek Orthodox Church in the U.S., the Greek Red Cross, Athens College in Athens, the American Farm School and Anatolia College in Thessaloniki, sporting clubs, business and relief organizations such as Ulen & Company and John Monks & Sons, a partner firm (which had constructed the Marathon Dam and ran the Athens Water Company), the Near East Foundation, the American Express Company, and the Standard Oil Company all suggested themselves "as good recruiting grounds for agents."\(^{20}\) Young, however, was first and foremost an archaeologist, and his immediate circle consisted of archaeologists, many of whom had a long association with the ASCSA and shared strong bonds of friendship and professional camaraderie; this would be the main pool from which he would recruit his staff.

The Greek Desk in Cairo was officially established in May 1943 upon the arrival of Young, James H. Oliver, and John F. Daniel, all archaeologists who had worked in Greece and Cyprus. Soon after, in September 1943, Sterling Dow,\(^{21}\) another archaeologist and ASCSA member, would run the office set up to establish contacts and operations with bases in Cyprus, Izmir, and Istanbul, from where networks of agents that could communicate with the occupied areas would be built. The Greek SI activities in all these bases were, without exception, headed by individuals who had conducted archaeological work in the region and had on occasion collaborated on various projects. For instance, Jerome Sperling, who worked from Istanbul, and John Caskey, head of the base at Izmir, both Yale University graduates and fellow graduate students of Blegen's at the University of Cincinnati, had

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17. NACP-OSS, record group 226, entry 190, box 3, folder 29, "The Comprehensive Greek Project."

18. See n. 17, above, "The Comprehensive Greek Project."

19. See n. 17, above, "The Comprehensive Greek Project."

20. NACP-OSS, record group 226, entry 190, box 3, folder 29, Interoffice memo from Young to Lt. Col. Ulis L. Amoss. For more on Ulen & Company and John Monks & Sons, see Robinson, this volume.

21. Sterling Dow (ASCSA member 1931–1936, 1959–1960) was a professor of archaeology at Harvard University, specializing in Greek inscriptions and classical civilization. His obituary in the New York Times (January 14, 1995, p. 30) remembered him as the person who "discovered a kleroterion, a mechanical device that the Athenians had used to allot offices by random choice rather than through election. It helped to explain the nature of Athenian democracy."
collaborated in the early 1930s in excavations at Troy, along with Marion Rawson and Dorothy Cox, all under the supervision of Blegen.

The partnership of the OSS with the American archaeological community in Greece ran deeper still. It was first established in Washington, D.C., and in Princeton at the Institute for Advanced Study, where the ASCSA had its publications office. Blegen, an eminent archaeologist known worldwide for his excavations at Troy and Pylos, who had been affiliated with the ASCSA since 1910, was recruited to head the Greek section of the Foreign Nationalities Branch (FNB) in Washington, D.C., with Mary Alison Frantz as his assistant. Blegen and Frantz, whose careers are inextricably intertwined with the history of the ASCSA, called upon their colleagues at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton early in 1942 to assist in the composition of a monograph titled "The Kingdom of Greece," which outlined the modern history of Greece and its current state of affairs. It was also at the Institute that the OSS would seek advice regarding personnel. Frantz, for example, was introduced to the service by Benjamin D. Meritt, professor of epigraphy there and longtime member of the ASCSA. Like many of their colleagues, Blegen and Frantz were intimately familiar with modern Greece and its turbulent political history; on occasion, they would also step away from their professional lives to serve in other capacities. In 1918, Blegen served for a year on the American Red Cross Commission, investigating eastern Macedonia and assisting with the repatriation and rehabilitation of thousands of refugees who had been held as prisoners in Bulgaria during the war.

For the most part, the FNB studied European and Mediterranean ethnic groups living in the United States and gathered, by tape recorder, their knowledge of political trends and conditions affecting their native lands. Frantz described her work as Junior Social Science Analyst as follows:

The branch that I was concerned with was working on political movements of exiles in the United States. So many of the occupied countries had their statesmen, politicians, or interested persons taking refuge in all kinds of places, and a great many of them, of course, ended up in the United States. And we were following political movements, sometimes little embryonic movements that would burst into full-fledged revolution or something less violent. But there was a great deal of political activity of foreign nationalities. . . . We followed the local press. . . . I also used to see a lot of the statesmen and politicians who came and find out [sic] just

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22. In 1939, Blegen unearthed the Palace of Nestor at Pylos, as well as clay tablets inscribed in Linear B that, after being deciphered by Michael Ventris in the early 1950s, would demonstrate that Greek was spoken in Greece already by the end of the 12th century B.C. For a short biography of Blegen, see Caskey 1972.

23. William Donovan, the head of the OSS, wrote personally to Theodore Leslie Shear (director of the Agora excavations until 1945) and Young to thank them for their contribution to the volume. See NACP-OSS, M1642, roll 123, frame 1097 and roll 106, frame 64, letters from Donovan dated May 16, 1942. See also the memorandum to John Cooper Wiley, assistant director of OSS, from D. C. Poole, director of the FNB, dated January 6, 1942 (NACP-OSS, M1642, roll 56, frame 762-7). Poole records his visit to the Institute for Advanced Study together with Uliss Amoss, and their discussions with Meritt and with Frank Aydelotte, the Institute's director.

24. Barry 1919; see also Davis, this volume.
what they thought was going on. We had all kinds of ways of contacts with people, just to learn what they had in mind and what they were preparing.25

Back in the lands surrounding occupied Greece, SI and SO operations were designed to supplement British and Greek intelligence while serving the particular needs of the United States, which remained largely undefined in 1943. The OSS often emphasized its apolitical outlook, in direct contrast to that of the British, whose imperialistic agenda in the region was well known and increasingly resented by the growing resistance movement in Greece. By the end of 1944, that resentment would grow into a full-fledged confrontation. Americans observed from afar and maintained, for a little longer, the cautious trust of all political parties in the country.

Before delving into this political scene, it is vital to discuss the operations of the OSS in Greece and explore further the processes through which American archaeologists came to inform and articulate U.S. policy in the area. On the coast of Turkey, the base in Izmir directed by Caskey was only a few miles away from the closest Greek island. It was also the most active, having handled a total of 30 missions by November 1944, when it was closed down. From Izmir and two other bases along the same coast—“Key West,” which was the code name for Arslan Buru south of Kuşadası, and “Boston,” north of Ali Ağa—caiques (fishing boats) infiltrated occupied Greece with OSS agents, for the most part Greek personnel or Greek-Americans familiar with the land and the language, in order to establish connections in the country, especially with the antartesvAio who were putting up a tenacious but unequal fight against the Axis powers. Men, documents, radio equipment, gold for payments, and other supplies to and from Greece and the Middle East passed chiefly through Izmir. Liaisons with the U.S. Department of State, through the embassy in Ankara and the consulate in Izmir, and with the British, Greek, Italian, and Turkish intelligence services were all handled by Caskey, operating undercover as a Lend-Lease officer.26 The bases in Cyprus and Alexandria, run by Oliver and Daniel, respectively, had a supporting role for the Greek SI operations en route from Egypt to Turkey.

The gathering of intelligence was the primary goal of the base in Izmir; when refugees or enemy deserters reached the base, OSS officers took the opportunity to interview them, adding an important body of intelligence to the regular reports of their own agents. Dorothy Cox, who worked as a Report Officer while undercover as a civilian relief worker for the Greek

25. Alison Frantz Papers, PUL (C0772), Correspondence, box 4, folder 6. This memoir is the product of a tape-recorded interview with Frantz conducted for the Smith Centennial Study by Jacqueline Van Voris on December 4, 1971.
26. Lend-Lease (Public Law 77-11) was the program under which the United States supplied the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, France, and other Allied nations with vast amounts of war material between 1941 and 1945 in return for military bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, and the British West Indies. It began in March 1941, over 18 months after the outbreak of the war in September 1939. See Kimball 1969.
War Relief Association in Izmir, provided an interesting account of her work, as well as the challenges she faced:

The refugees were questioned on military, political and economic questions. . . . In 1941 and 1942, thousands of poor Greeks, men, women and children, fled to Asia Minor because of the difficulty in obtaining food in Greece, but by early spring of 1943, shipment of food from America had eased this situation and the majority of those coming out were men who wished to serve in the Greek armed forces, those who had been too active in the underground and were wanted by the Germans and those with political ambitions. From this mixed group one got a variety of opinions which taken together gave a more or less true picture of conditions in Greece.

Besides random groups of individuals, however, the base in Izmir had established connections with the antaltes: according to Cox, "as representative of the Greek War Relief, [they] came to [her] for supplies of clothes, food and medicine. In exchange they gave information." As for the challenges, Cox reported,

we were working in a British Theater of Influence. . . . They had a definite policy with which we were in rather nebulous agreement but had no clearly defined policy of our own. . . . This may seem unrelated to the gathering of information, but it is not. In interviewing intelligent men a certain give and take is necessary to inspire confidence. At no time was it possible to give any definite answer as to the opinion of the United States and what America was doing about the Atlantic Charter, a question which arose weekly. At all times it was necessary to defend to some extent the rightist attitude of Great Britain as that of an ally with whom we were cooperating. We could only say that our immediate objective was to win the war and that the United States had no desire to interfere with the internal politics of any nation. While making my usual excuse to one astute politician, saying Greek politics was after all a purely Greek affair, he interrupted to say "Oh no, it is a British affair." Cox's description, together with the observations of the "astute politician" who alluded to the century-old Anglo-Russian rivalry in the eastern Mediterranean that would culminate in the "Percentages Agreement"
between Churchill and Stalin, outlines the internal political rivalries in Greece at the time as well as the foreign imperialistic trends in the region. For a better understanding of the political and socioeconomic environment within which the OSS operated, however, it is essential to take a closer look.

POLITICAL FACTIONALISM AND REVOLT

Greece had joined the family of European fascist governments already in 1936, before the Axis powers engulfed the country. General Metaxas's dictatorship, which was deeply rooted in the old schism between Republicans and Royalists over the question of monarchy, sprang from circumstances similar to those elsewhere in Europe: the economic slump of the 1930s, the inability of the political parties to relieve the crisis, and the rise of the Communist party, which in the elections of 1936 held the balance of power. King George II, fearing another of the many coups that had punctuated the modern history of the country, the escalation of social unrest, the ascendance of the Communists, and probably the loss of his own position (he had, after all, just returned from a 12-year exile), endorsed Metaxas's regime and presided over an ever-more divided country.

The German occupation incongruously gave rise to some new prospects for change in this scene, with the emergence of a popular movement that out of frustration with mainstream politics, famine, and death would create pockets of civil society away from the traditional centers of power. The Greek government, under the leadership of Emmanouil Tsouderos, together with the king and elements of the Greek armed forces, moved to Cairo, leaving the country to be ruled by a puppet government under General Tsolakoglou that the Germans had installed. While the infighting for power would continue in Cairo, in occupied Greece various groups also sprang up, of which the most popular and organizationally stable was the National Liberation Front (EAM). Effectively led by the Communist Party (KKE), by 1943 the EAM had emerged as the most powerful governing body, with a central organization, a union arm, a youth movement, and a military branch, the Greek People's Liberation Army (ELAS), which would lead the resistance movement.

Rivalries among various groups would coalesce in the opposition between the EAM and the National Republican Greek League (EDES). The latter was supported by factions of the old anti-Communist political powers, on occasion collaborated with the occupation forces, and eventually played a dubious role in the fight of the British against ELAS.

31. The agreement, which took place at the Moscow Conference on October 9, 1944, divided southeastern Europe into spheres of influence: the Soviet Union would exercise 90% influence in Romania, 80% in Bulgaria, and 80% in Hungary; Great Britain would have 90% in Greece, and Yugoslavia was equally divided. See Sfikas 1999.


33. The account offered here is a broad outline of a complex history that can be studied in detail in the numerous sources available. Mazower ([1993] 2001, pp. 265–296), for example, provides an eloquent account of what he calls the "morality of mobilization," describing the participation of the villagers in "people's courts," the mechanisms for pricing and distribution of food, and other reforms in which common people actively participated for the first time. Mazower also paints an intriguing picture of the ideological struggles within EAM and against long-established traditions, as well as the dark and oppressive side of the movement, which prosecuted and often swiftly executed enemy collaborators or other elusive opponents. See also Hondros 1983 and, for further bibliography, Fleischer and Bowman 1981; Koulouris 2000.
The British policy toward the resistance movement in Greece was ambivalent, ambiguous, and underhanded, to say the least. While the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) was ordered to carry out intelligence and sabotage operations among the antartes in the mountains of Greece and to serve as the communications link between Cairo and Greek resistance organizations, a systematic effort was made to keep this collaboration on strictly military terms.34 As the war was coming to a close and the time for political choices neared, the British openly pitted EDES against EAM, undermining the latter’s authority.35 William Donovan, the head of the OSS, in a memorandum to the joint chiefs of staff dated November 26, 1943, characterized the situation as follows:

Originally, all guerrilla groups in Greece were set up under a joint GHQ over which the senior British liaison officer presided although his functions were, strictly speaking, only advisory. The political situation has changed this and now it is the proposed policy of the British to attempt to build up the EDES group in opposition to the EAM group which is to be starved of supplies and attacked on the propaganda front.36

As Cox had pointedly stated in her report, the U.S. had no definite policy for Greece, and consequently the OSS operated largely independent of any overarching governmental directive other than that of strict objectivity. Some of the most important missions in the region were designed and, upon approval from Headquarters in Washington, implemented by the Greek Desk in Cairo and the other bases abroad. Early in 1944, the acceleration of events in Greece found the OSS rather invigorated, prone to act ahead of the government it was serving and even independently of the British authorities, who were by now openly resented by the antartes. It was assessed that due to the lack of trust between the antartes and the British, the intelligence that the OSS received through British channels was biased and inadequate. The Greek Desk, therefore, took it upon itself to go where no one had been able to go before—the Central Headquarters of EAM.

In March 1944, the Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA), also called the “Mountain Government,” in effect a third Greek government, was elected and set in motion a series of events:37 a mutiny of factions of the Greek army in Cairo, its violent suppression by the British, and ultimately the initiation of discussions between the government-in-exile and EAM for a unity government.38 In the midst of these events, the

34. Woodhouse 1948.
35. The tactic of divide et impera on which the British Empire thrived was applied in neighboring Yugoslavia as well, where infighting between the resistance groups led by Tito and Mihailović was greatly encouraged. The constitutional future of both countries, Yugoslavia and Greece, was at stake and in both cases British policy was unabashedly pro-monarchical. See Auty and Clogg 1975; Vlavianos 1989; Wheeler 1989.
36. NACP-OSS, record group 226, entry 99, box 54, folder 1, “History of OSS Cairo.”
37. Orchestrated by EAM, the “revolutionary elections” of 1944 brought together the revolutionaries, who advocated a complete break with the traditional political authorities, and the reformists, who maintained that some degree of collaboration with the government-in-exile would lead to national unity. Most importantly, however, this show of unity expressed the people’s hope for a better life and some form of self-determination. For an analysis of the nature of these elections and the problems surrounding them, see Mazower [1993] 2001, pp. 291–296.
38. The discussions in May 1944 led to the Lebanon Agreement and the “Unity Government” under George Papandreou (the British choice for the leadership), providing for 24 ministers,
American Archaeologists in the OSS

Greek Desk managed to install three of its agents in the EAM headquar-
ters with the general objective of "obtaining at first hand current strategic
intelligence . . . exclusively through American channels." The Pericles
Mission, as it was known, was led by Costas Couvaras, a native Greek who
had studied political science and history at Cornell University; it sought
to secure an alliance with the Central Committee of the EAM and, in the
face of recent developments, to specialize in political reporting. EAM,
entirely disillusioned with the British, and despite the avowals of the OSS
that it "was without authority to make any political commitments and
that the sole modus vivendi must be a common desire to bring about the
enemy's destruction," complied with the proposition. It was evident that
the political future of the country, once again, would not be entirely in the
hands of its own people, if at all, and EAM therefore cautiously examined
the possibility of new alliances.

The Archaeological Captains as Communist Sympathizers

We had been at war with Germany longer than any other power, we
had suffered more, we had sacrificed more, and in the end we would lose
more than any other power. Yet here were these God-awful American
academics rushing about, talking about the Four Freedoms and the
Atlantic Charter, and criticizing us for doing successfully what they
would try and fail to do themselves later—restrain the Russians.

—Sir Ronald Wingate

British Colonel Wingate's grievance succinctly summarizes the often con-
tentious relations between the SOE and the OSS and its so-called archaeo-
logical captains, a term first used to refer to the many archaeologists and
classics studying the Greek Desk in Cairo. The prevalent perception
was that certain of the archaeological captains were sympathetic to EAM.
On one occasion at least, Ambassador MacVeagh would call Young to
account for the misconduct in the field of OSS agents who were allegedly
supporting EAM. Costas Couvaras was a case in point.

Couvaras spent more than five months in the mountains with the
Pericles Mission, reporting extensively on EAM's activities; in his colorful
portrayal of the *antartes* endurance of hardships and struggles for social
justice, he often glossed over the atrocities and cold-blooded assassinations
that he witnessed firsthand. The Pericles Mission pressed for the develop-
ment of 12 or more large operations that would cover the whole country

6 of whom came from EAM. The agreement, which did not settle the
issue of disarmament, would eventually be breached in December of the same
year.

39. NACP-OSS, record group 226,
entry 99, box 55, folder 1, "Outline of
SI, OSS/Cairo."

40. See n. 39, above.

41. For the epigraph above, see
Nalmpantis 2010, p. 156, quoting from
Cave Brown 1982, p. 609. The quota-
tion is also found in Winks 1996,
p. 214 and Clogg 2000, p. 135. Win-
gate was probably referring to Moses
Hadas's critical analyses of British
activities in Greece. Hadas, an eminent
linguist and classicist who taught at
Columbia University, worked exten-
sively for the OSS, traveling between
Cairo, Cyprus, and Greece, and report-
ing on all developments on the field at
the time. For the term "archaeological
captains," see Clogg 2000, p. 112.


and would depend on closer collaboration between EAM and OSS, but the proposal would ultimately be rejected. In the midst of intense political activity in Cairo, the U.S. government hesitated to take a more direct approach, and for a little longer remained almost indifferent to the urgent calls from the OSS field agents for direct action.\textsuperscript{44}

Couvaras sympathized with a people that had become disillusioned with the traditional political elite and, in the middle of an atrocious occupation, had set up their own independent organizations to distribute food and mete our justice, although they were often vindictive and excessive in their punishments. Given the likely grim political future of postwar Greece, EAM appeared to many as the most viable prospect; to others, its ascent to power was a catastrophic scenario. The modest aspirations of young people such as Pavlos, a guerrilla whose “great ambition in life [was] neither to become a policeman nor to get a comfortable government job [but to] go to America and open a restaurant,” touched Couvaras the most, however, and he identified an opportunity for American policy.\textsuperscript{45}

In the meantime, the antartes’ leadership had a single objective in mind. In the words of Yannis Ioannides, the KKE second-in-command during the war:

There was this American agent that we had acquired over at General Headquarters. . . . I wanted to take full advantage of him. But [his superiors] were smart . . . what probably happened is that his superiors figured, “Look at that idiot, we sent him to sucker them and he was the one who got suckered.” So it all stopped . . . but by that point in time we really didn’t need him as much since the end was approaching . . . but those brand new weapons that they gave us were immediately sent to Athens . . . three or four separate drops . . . all of it directly to Athens.\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{flushright}
\textbf{Liberation, Civil Strife, and American Realpolitik}
\end{flushright}

In February 1944, on Young’s initiative, the Greek Desk had already drawn up what came to be known as the Young Plan, an operation that envisaged the spreading of OSS personnel all over Greece as quickly as possible after the German evacuation.\textsuperscript{47} It was by now clear to everyone that a period of unrest would follow, and the Young Plan held that “in this period of uncertainties, independent, uncolored secret information regarding Greek internal and international affairs will provide a basis for the formulation and rejection of the proposed plan. See NACP-OSS, record group 226, entry 99, box 35, folder 5, “MEDTO Daily Report, Monday, 10 July 1944”: “Young, Penrose, Mac [MacVeagh] and I all strongly disapprove plan of gathering intelligence from EAM-ELAS, as operations of great proportions are no longer necessary in Greece. . . . Hazardous political repercussions with British and Greeks would result if Americans were to assist ELAS.”

\textsuperscript{45} Couvaras 1982, p. 48.

\textsuperscript{46} Ioannidis 1979, pp. 294–295, as translated by Nalmpantis (2010, p. 334).

\textsuperscript{47} NACP-OSS, record group 226, entry 154, box 34, folder 518, memorandum dated February 10, 1944, from Young to Lt. Col. John Toulmin.
of U.S. policy not only toward Greece and her neighboring Balkan states, but toward the other, larger powers which have interests in those states.\textsuperscript{48} Young, along with Lieutenant Colonel John Toulmin (a Harvard University graduate who was to become the vice president of the First National Bank of Boston), successor of Amoss as head of the OSS in Cairo, designed the operation and entered Greece on October 12, 1944, the day the Germans withdrew from Athens. Young, who headed the first small advance team in Athens, temporarily established a small office at 9 Ploutarchou Street, an address in Athens closely connected with the history of the ASCSA since 1929.\textsuperscript{49} Soon after, the offices were moved to 1 Phidiou Street, the then vacant German Archaeological Institute building that had served during the occupation as the headquarters of the German intelligence services. According to one of its first reports, the Young team found its own intelligence customers on their knees on its doorstep.\textsuperscript{50}

As much as a year after the Young Plan was operationalized, its agents found themselves without clear directives. With very little direction from Washington and on the pretext that the OSS was in Greece to dismantle operations and not to introduce new ones, the team responded to requests for information from the Allied Military Liaison (AML), UNRRA, and the U.S. Embassy in Athens. At the time, the embassy would have had access only to information provided by the Greek government, which had recently moved back from Cairo but controlled only Athens and Piraeus. The rest of the country was effectively in the hands of EAM, while a small part of Epirus was now controlled by EDES. By the time of the liberation, the OSS had 23 missions in Greece\textsuperscript{51} reporting on economic, political, and military conditions in the country, now not only to the OSS director via Cairo but also directly to MacVeagh, who would even recommend that the OSS be put under the control and authority of the embassy.\textsuperscript{52}

In contrast to the OSS's audacity in the field, the American government's reaction was protracted and hesitant. MacVeagh succinctly summarized the situation in one of his many "Dear Franklin" letters addressed to President Roosevelt: "Parenthetically, I realize that Yugoslavia,—and Greece to an even greater extent,—are very small potatoes still in the typical American view of foreign affairs." He emphasized, however, the importance that the region, together with the Near East, would hold for

\textsuperscript{48} NACP-OSS, record group 226, entry 154, box 34, folder 518, "Special Plan for SI Activities in Greece, Statement of the Problem," August 29, 1944.

\textsuperscript{49} The house at 9 Ploutarchou, known as the Biegen House, had been the residence of Carl Biegen and Bert Hodge Hill, directors of the ASCSA at different times, and their wives Elizabeth Pierce Biegen and Ida Thallon Hill, also archaeologists, from 1929 until 1971. A gathering place for archaeologists and all kinds of distinguished personalities, the house became closely linked with the cultural life of the ASCSA. The Biegens and the Hills are buried in the Protestant section of the First Cemetery of Athens.

\textsuperscript{50} NACP-OSS, record group 226, entry 99, box 52, folder 4, "Thirteenth Semimonthly Report of Activities of OSS-ME (for period October 31 to November 15, 1944)" to the director of Strategic Services, Washington, D.C.

\textsuperscript{51} NACP-OSS, record group 226, entry 99, box 57, folder 6, "Greece, Accomplishments During Past Year, Operations between 1 May 1944 and the Liberation of Athens on 12 October 1944."

\textsuperscript{52} Iatrides 1980, p. 633.
American policy, drawing attention to the weakening of the British empire and the need for a new kind of foreign policy:

I doubt if in any other part of the world it can appear so clearly as here,—along its principal artery,—that, militarily speaking, the British Empire is anachronistic, perfect for the eighteenth century, impossible for the twentieth. ... The future maintenance of the Empire depends on how far England consents to frame her foreign policy in agreement with Washington, and how far we in our turn realize where that Empire, so important to our own security, is most immediately menaced.\(^53\)

MacVeagh concluded his letter with a long quotation from an OSS agent’s report that acknowledged the strength of the movement created by EAM, the need for compromise between the traditional political forces and EAM, and the failures of British political maneuvering. But he would shy away from making any predictions for the immediate future, which was soon to take a gory turn.

MacVeagh largely expressed the views held by most of the OSS officers discussed above. Antimonarchical in principle, opposed to British colonial high-handed attitudes, and sympathetic to the struggles of EAM, the OSS, with its firsthand knowledge of the conditions on the ground, advocated for the development of a systematic American policy that would invite EAM to participate in the postwar political negotiations. The OSS officers did not, however, advocate the establishment of a Communist regime; on the contrary, they envisioned Greece as the last stronghold against Soviet expansion in southeastern Europe.

In the Comprehensive Greek Project, designed in 1942, Young and his colleagues had stressed the importance of operations in the country based on a nine-point argument that emphasized its strategic location for obstructing any future attempts by the Axis against the Suez Canal and the oil fields of Iraq, as well as for immediate operations against Axis-held Yugoslavia and Italy. The ninth point anticipated the postwar alignment of powers: “The presence of Allied forces in Southeastern Europe might serve as a check on possible Russian moves after the collapse of Germany. A Balkan front would serve at the same time as a prop and check to Russia.”\(^54\) In 1942 and even until 1947, when President Harry Truman would ask the U.S. Congress to join him in the struggle to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,”\(^55\) it was unclear what this policy would consist of, but its American military and economic advisors. Truman argued that “one of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.” The new enemy, unspoken in his address to Congress, was none other than the U.S.S.R., and Truman would now call for its containment by saving Greece and Turkey from perceived Russian influence. The Truman Doctrine was the first in a series of containment moves that would soon take the U.S. as far afield as Korea and Vietnam.
intellectual base was slowly taking shape over these years; the archaeologists and scholars who worked for the OSS played a more or less direct role in this process.

The events that followed the liberation confirmed the long-held fears, already expressed in 1942 by Young and all the authors of the Comprehensive Greek Project, that political factionalism would lead to civil war. Less than two months after the German troops' departure from Athens, and following EAM's demonstration of December 3, 1944, images of British troops fighting in the streets of Athens against one of the most resilient anti-Nazi movements in Europe caused rage in the House of Commons and in the British and American media. Whether the demonstration represented a takeover attempt by EAM is still a hotly debated issue, as is the ensuing role played by the Soviet Union in the conflict.\(^{56}\) According to Blegen, the 37-day battle that followed between the British troops, Greek government forces, and EAM-ELAS constituted "a carefully laid plan for the seizure of power by the Left," into which the British "were inevitably drawn... in support of the government, as the legally constituted regime."\(^{57}\) The British went from liberators to instigators of a brutal civil war, further inflamed after the March 1946 elections and the September plebiscite that brought the king back. The issue that had been polarizing Greek society since the early 1920s and had for years brought negotiations between the more moderate political forces to a standstill was forced upon the Greeks by Churchill's myopic and nostalgic colonialist vision.\(^{58}\)

The moral compromises that were made in the process of achieving at least a semblance of political stability were obvious to all American archaeologists who followed these events; only on a few occasions, however, were they openly criticized. In the summer of 1947, for instance, ASCSA staff members Robert L. Scranton and David M. Robinson criticized, to little avail, the suppression of civil rights in Greece and the complicity of the American Mission in the New York Times and the Baltimore Sun.

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56. Answers to the first question vary, from, e.g., that of L. S. Stavrianos (1949), who argued that there was no plot on the part of EAM, to that of William H. McNeill (1949), U.S. military attaché to Greece (1944–1946), who asserted that on December 6, 1944, EAM attempted a coup d'état when it attacked the main government buildings. For a more nuanced approach, see Iatrides and Rizopoulos (2000), who argue for a Communist coup-in-the-making that may have been either part of a larger master plan or simply an attempt to gain leverage pending further negotiations. On the part that Moscow played in the conflict, scholars generally agree that the Soviet government, in adherence to the agreements already made with the British, did not encourage a Communist uprising. What has been debated, however, is whether a Communist victory would have encouraged Soviet penetration, an argument central to Cold War politics in the region. The most recent, and controversial, publication on the topic (Marantzidis 2010) emphasizes the coercive nature of the Democratic Army of Greece (DSE; the military arm of EAM after 1946 that was effectively controlled by the KKE) and of its leadership, poised for power, as well as the systematic assistance that the DSE received from the governments of Yugoslavia and Albania, and perhaps secretly and indirectly from the U.S.S.R.

57. Blegen 1948, p. 133 (ASCSA Carl W. Blegen Papers, box 25, folder 3). In 1945, while he was still in the employ of the FNB in Washington, D.C., Blegen was invited by Harvard University Press to contribute a volume on Greece for a series focusing on the importance of various parts of the world to the foreign relations of the United States. This manuscript (Blegen 1948), which was never published, provided an overview of Greek history and, in keeping with the project, explained Greece's geopolitical importance to American interests. For more on Blegen's unpublished book, see Lalaki 2012, esp. pp. 556–566. See also Davis, this volume, p. 19, n. 16.

58. Roosevelt himself, however, appears to have been responsible for the King of Greece not going ahead with the plebiscite, which had already received British assent. In December 1943, while in Cairo, for obscure reasons he advised the king to reject the plan: Nalmpantis 2010, p. 121.
respectively. On the other hand, Blegen condoned British policy, or at least viewed it as inevitable, given the prospect of a Communist takeover. According to Blegen, the Allied Mission for Observing Greek Elections (AMFOGE), with British, French, and American participants, guaranteed that "it was unquestionably as fair and honest an election as could be held in a country so recently torn by civil war." He was equally encouraging about the plebiscite that recalled the king to the throne: "The result unquestionably represented the conviction of the majority of the Greek people that at the time the only possible safeguard against Communist domination lay in rallying about the King and the monarchical form of regime." Alison Frantz, who had taken part in the AMFOGE in March 1946 and followed events closely, was less sanguine, however; on August 24, 1946, she wrote to her mother, rather cynically and resignedly: "The plebiscite is scheduled for a week from today. No one has any illusions about the outcome. It will probably be technically honest, in that the King won't get 107% of the votes as he did last time, but only the very brave republicans will dare to vote. I'm glad I wasn't involved in AMFOGE II."

Following Truman's call for economic assistance to Greece in 1947, American involvement would henceforth be systematic and decisive. While the emphasis of American policy toward Europe in general was on reconstruction and economic development, the problems in Greece were primarily political and military. The implementation of the Marshall Plan in Greece was in effect an exercise in Realpolitik meant to defend U.S. strategic interests in the area. Fearing that the expansion of Soviet influence in Greece would mean the fall of the Middle East, American advisors and administrators brought the entire Greek state apparatus under their direct control, openly manipulated the Greek government, gave almost absolute control to the military, which they separated from civil political authority, and tolerated mass executions and the open persecution of the Left by a regime that, in the American media, was often compared with that of the Nazis.

ARCHAEOLOGISTS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: TREASON OR RESPONSIBILITY?

On December 20, 1919, under the heading "Scientists as Spies," The Nation published a letter by Franz Boas, the father of academic anthropology in America. In it, Boas charged that four American anthropologists had abused their professional research positions by conducting espionage in Central America during the First World War. He strongly condemned their actions, stating that they had "prostituted science by using it as a..."


62. Alison Frantz Papers, PUL (C0772), Correspondence, box 8, folder 10.

cover for their activities as spies." According to Boas, other professionals such as soldiers, diplomats, politicians, and businessmen "may be excused if they set patriotic devotion above common everyday decency and perform services as spies. They merely accept the code of morality to which modern society still conforms. Not so the scientist. The very essence of his life is the service of truth."\(^{64}\)

Boas's scathing critique reproduces many of the normative definitions of scientists' and intellectuals' obligations and moral codes. Julien Benda, possibly the founding theorist of the sociology of intellectuals, defined them as "all those whose activity is not in the pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science or metaphysical speculation," and he maintained that their duty was "to set up a corporation whose sole cult is that of justice and of truth."\(^{65}\) According to Edward Said, marginality and exile provide the conditions for the emergence of the true intellectual.\(^{66}\) Furthermore, due to their devotion to ideas not always in harmony with society's more pragmatic concerns, intellectuals can often find themselves alienated.\(^{67}\)

Since modernity seems to have replaced faith with reason and religion with science, intellectuals and scientists have come to embody what our modern societies hold sacred: objective knowledge independent of personal interests and subject only to observation, experiments, and the laws of nature. Archaeology as a discipline has gone to great lengths to establish itself as a science, and the ASCSA's archaeologists have every reason to take pride in their adherence to rigorous methodology, attention to minute detail, and use of modern technologies in their research endeavors. The definitions of Boas, Benda, and even Said reflect precisely this ideal type of knowledge to which intellectual life aspires.

Yet the story discussed here and, indeed, world history suggest otherwise.\(^{68}\) Said's public intellectual life is, after all, a testament to the fact that marginality does not necessarily indicate an apolitical intellectual life. Scholars, intellectuals, and scientists are more directly engaged with the public sphere than has often been acknowledged. As critics of orthodoxy and dogma (a common connotation of the term "intellectual"),\(^{69}\) as counselors and advisors to governments, experts are an integral part of public and political life. Practical realities require that our societies and, still more, democracies depend on experts and expert knowledge.\(^{70}\) The history of modernity and of the state itself is coterminous with the history of the rise of the intellectual,\(^{71}\) and, as Zygmunt Bauman furthermore asserts, "there is a constitutive affinity between the political rulers and the cultural leaders ... the relation is, rather, of a Haßliefen type. Suspicion and dissent constantly alternate with a powerful attraction—nay, fascination—with the power of the state."\(^{72}\) The extensive literature on nationalism, state formation, and state projects such as colonization and empire building

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64. Boas 1919.
65. Benda 1927, pp. 43, 45.
67. See, e.g., Lipset 1972; Shils 1972; Pels 1999.
70. Schudson 2006.
points to the importance of intellectualism and scholarly production for establishing and maintaining rule.\textsuperscript{73}

The collaboration between the OSS and Blegen, Young, and most of the archaeologists associated with the ASCSA and Greece at that time indicates not a merely lukewarm relationship with the American government, but a conscious political engagement and commitment to the liberal American ideals of democracy, popular sovereignty, and self-determination. Yet their commitment, as often happens, did not extend to direct, overt criticism of their government when it became clear that the road to democracy was taking a few very undemocratic detours. At that point, their national allegiance and ideological choices proved stronger than their intellectual and professional commitment to truth and impartiality. They identified the role that the U.S. was called upon to play within the new emerging world system and they saw the strategic importance of Greece in America's impending rivalry with the Soviet Union; many of them acknowledged the need for political change, to which a compromise between EAM and the traditional political elite could lead. Cautious about their own professional futures, as well as that of the institution they represented, however, they refrained from any public expression of their discontent and quietly transferred responsibility to the public-policy experts.

But how can we account for these events in the intellectual history of the ASCSA without reaching the impasse that dichotomies such as "treason" versus "responsibility" can generate? The argument developed by Yannis Hamilakis with regard to the broader role of archaeologists in the field of cultural production and their respective responsibilities as intellectuals is situated precisely at the center of this dichotomy. He argues that along with the realization that the archaeological record preserves only fragmented material traces of the past that are produced as a "record" or "evidence" comes a certain intellectual responsibility to challenge the regimes of the "production of truths" and to interrogate the links of knowledge with power.\textsuperscript{74}

I suggest that we can further qualify this argument, which assumes a complete break between political and intellectual authority, by directing our attention to the various ways that knowledge is employed and the different publics that it often addresses. Michael Burawoy, for instance, distinguishes among four types of sociological knowledge that can, by analogy, be discerned in the field of archaeology as well; he discusses and differentiates among policy, public, professional, and critical knowledge, all four forms being interdependent, albeit antagonistic at times.\textsuperscript{75} Policy sociology, he argues, responds to specific requests and goals set by a client, providing answers and solutions to any given set of problems. Public sociology, on the other hand aspires to generate dialogue between sociology and a public. Not unlike policy sociology, it is practiced outside the strict academic boundaries of the discipline in the public sphere—in the media, for instance. Unlike policy sociology, however, which is often practiced in very private spheres bounded by expertise, knowledge, and authority, public sociology invites the community—the public—into a dialectic relationship. Neither policy nor public is possible, however, without professional sociology, which "supplies true and tested methods, accumulated bodies

\textsuperscript{73} Foucault 1980; Anderson 1983; Herzfeld 1986; Chartier 1993; Giesen 1993; Stoler 1995; Steinmetz 1999; Boyer and Lomnitz 2005; Frankel 2006.

\textsuperscript{74} Hamilakis 1999.

\textsuperscript{75} Burawoy 2005.
of knowledge, orienting questions, and conceptual frameworks." Burawoy’s categorical distinctions point to the differentiated uses of sociological knowledge, further suggesting that each aspect of the discipline has its own sets of truths to which it adheres, draws legitimization from different sources, has its own accountability, and, last, has its own pathologies. Most importantly, Burawoy makes a distinction between sociology and its internal divisions and the sociologists, who at any time may occupy multiple locations and cut across the various divisions of the discipline.

Archaeologists, too, may find themselves in different trajectories in their field—occupying academic positions, for instance, working from within the established norms and theoretical frameworks of their profession, while advising the state on issues of cultural heritage management and development, thereby applying their professional expertise to issues of public policy and administration. The development of archaeological parks and museums, the promotion of cultural and archaeological tourism, and the institution of cross-national research and educational programs—to mention only a few examples—are based on the close collaboration of what we can call "professional" and "policy" archaeology. The public is, most often inadvertently, invited into the discussion, since questions of culture often touch upon daily concerns and issues related to urban development and economic considerations, as well as questions of power, authority, and identity. The removal in the 1930s of over 500 private residences that stood on top of the ancient Agora of Athens to make way for the excavation of the site, or the development in the 1990s of the archaeological site and museum at Vergina, a project closely entangled with national and identity politics in Macedonia, exemplify the public character of archaeology and the pressures that this aspect of the field can place on professional archaeology. Like any field dedicated to the production and promotion of knowledge, archaeology has a strong ethical, political, and cultural dimension that places it in direct dialogue with society and the public.

In the 1980s Michael Shanks and Christopher Tilley argued persuasively that the field of archaeology was in a state of deep crisis, which to a great extent reflected the reluctance of the discipline to consider the lessons learned from a series of critiques coming from the directions of critical theory, feminist studies, hermeneutics, and poststructuralism. In brief, archaeology, holding firm to its commitment to construct a disinterested and objective understanding of the past, fell out of tune with its social reality. Lacking a more reflexive and critical standpoint, archaeology and its practitioners were failing to address two vital questions: "archaeology for whom?" and "archaeology for what?"

77. Bourdieu 1996.
The ASCSA, from within the boundaries of scholarship and professionalism, has carefully refrained from public discussions that pertain to the products of its work, while also cautioning its members against any involvement in activities that may have political consequences. Moreover, it has engaged only hesitantly with critical archaeology and the discussions that take place among critical intellectuals who may transcend disciplinary boundaries. A discussion of the ASCSA's partnership with the OSS may seem an embarrassment in the history of an institution that has so carefully crafted its nonpolitical image. Archaeologists, along with anthropologists and scholars generally, however, have always shaped policy, and not merely the development of cultural policy. Again today, in the face of the obstacles presented by Afghanistan and Iraq, the Allied forces together with the U.S. Department of Defense are calling for greater cultural insight. Scholars have certainly been invited to participate in the discussion; it is clear that many have already responded to the call and that others will follow.

The OSS story offers an opportunity to discuss an event in the history of the ASCSA that is neither exceptional nor unique. It may appear sinister, but only if it remains concealed from the public sphere and unexamined by the archaeologists themselves, who ought to engage in reflexivity not merely as practitioners within their field but also as social, political, and cultural agents. The collaboration between the OSS and the academic community was mandated by historical circumstances and hardly constitutes "treason" vis-à-vis the archaeologists' intellectual and professional obligations. I maintain, however, that our scholarly practices have a strong social dimension, that our cultural and research institutions are accountable not only to peer review but also to the publics that they serve, directly or indirectly. Dialogue among the various divisions of archaeological labor can only lead to greater democratization of knowledge.

COMING HOME TO ROOST

Political and intellectual activities occupy different spheres, and, as Edward Shils has pointed out, they cannot be practiced simultaneously over extended periods of time. Traditionally, scholars are more committed to their disciplinary traditions and obligations than to their political or other civil responsibilities. Most of the archaeologists affiliated with the ASCSA returned to work as soon as the occupation was over, while the fight between the EAM and the government was still raging in Athens. The city, and to an even greater extent the rest of Greece, would be a dangerous place for travel and research for some time to come, but new opportunities for institutional advancement soon became very clear. The postwar American intervention in Greece created a favorable political and economic environment for the work of institutions such as the ASCSA. Many of its members, such as Blegen, Frantz, and Caskey, were also advantageously positioned as well-connected and experienced public servants by the end of the war. Blegen would serve as cultural attaché of the U.S. Embassy in Athens for a year; in 1946 he would be succeeded by Frantz, who served until 1949. While in these positions, using networks of public officials and individuals

79. As in Louis Lord's letter of November 14, 1947, to the staff of the School, cited in n. 59, above.
with great financial resources who were for various reasons drawn into the Greek postwar situation, they would work hard to advance the interests of the ASCSA.

The intellectual and cultural capital of the ASCSA, which since 1931 has been excavating in the Athenian Agora, the civic center of ancient Athens, presents infinite opportunities to celebrate the victories of democracy. From this angle, Biegen energetically lobbied for the inclusion of a museum for the ancient Agora in a Marshall Plan project for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Greek museums in the interest of advancing tourism and economic development. Frantz was instrumental in the establishment of the Fulbright Foundation in Greece, a program through which for years the ASCSA would draw a disproportionate share of the applicant pool, further solidifying the institution’s position as the sole point of entry for American archaeologists, historians, and classicists in Greece. The first decade of the postwar American presence in Greece was one of the most productive for the ASCSA. Under Caskey’s directorship (1949–1959), the School would complete one of its most ambitious and symbolically burdened projects, clearly proclaiming the American commitment to liberty and democracy: the reconstruction of the Stoa of Attalos as the museum of the ancient Agora. The museum, an undertaking that the School had been planning and negotiating with the Greek archaeological authorities for years before the war, would evolve into an over $3 million enterprise that tied into the broader discussions of the time about Greece’s future. The promotion of cultural heritage raised great hopes for the growth of tourism and economic development and, in consequence, political stability and democratization.

If the archaeologists’ collaboration with the OSS seems like a tale of strange bedfellows, an improbable relationship forged in the extremities of the war, closer examination of the ASCSA’s postwar work may further illuminate the reciprocity of the relationship between administrative and scholarly preoccupations. If “the arts of domination and administration require attention to rhetoric, ideological invention, and communication across different stations as well as rational calculation,” as Dominic Boyer and Claudio Lomnitz propose, scholarly and intellectual activities are enabled by the political and economic networks in which they are embedded. Ultimately, by recognizing the agency of American archaeologists in state projects such as the one undertaken by the OSS, and by bringing them out of their dimly lit offices and silent libraries into the public light, we of necessity redefine and reimagine their role in relation to the societies and the publics that they serve.
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