Brazil as a Regional and International Leader

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Abstract

Brazil’s critical role in South American integration and political crisis management in Latin America, as well as its increasing power in international trade, finance, and security underscore that Brazil influence over regional and international affairs. This thesis argues that Brazil has leveraged its economic strength and soft power—which it derives from its successful domestic social policies and distinguished diplomatic history of promoting international cooperation and peaceful conflict—to project regional and international leadership.
Chapter I: Literature Review

In The New Brazil, Riordan Roett examines Brazil’s development into an emerging market and world power. The author provides a concise overview of Brazil’s political and economic history from Portuguese colonization, to independence, industrialization, military rule, democratization, and social reform. He also analyzes Brazil’s regional and international leadership in the wake of the 2008 economic downturn. Roett argues that Brazil’s economic growth and political stability are a result of the Real Plan, which enacted reforms that ultimately stabilized economic conditions in the country. Economic stability, Roett claims, allowed President Cardoso (and subsequently President Lula) to address national poverty reduction—one of Brazil’s most pressing national issues.

Brazil’s economic growth has given it an increased stake in the global economy and thus established a foundation for that country’s diplomatic activism and burgeoning role in international decision making. Roett frames Brazil’s increased role in international affairs in terms of the BRICs’ (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) increasing economic clout relative to Western countries and their newfound ability to challenge those countries’ traditional dominance of international organizations. However, as illustrated by its instrumental role within the G20 throughout the Doha Round of trade negotiations and during the global response to the 2008 financial crisis, Brazil stands out among the BRICs as a “key spokesperson” and a generator of alternative policies for developing countries. Roett notes that IMF quota and World Bank voting power shifts favoring emerging economies were a major accomplishment of BRIC lobbying, in which Brazil played a major part.

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2 Roett, Riordan. 2010. The New Brazil, 9
Roett credits Brazil’s central role in dispute settlement and regional integration, cooperation, and institution building in part to strong leadership by President Lula and Itamaraty. Furthermore, Roett briefly examines the failings of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and argues that Brazil’s frustrations with the stymied progress of that organization (for example the inability to establish a dispute settlement mechanism and institutional decision making process) have led it to pursue broader regional initiatives such as Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and Latin American and Caribbean Summit for Integration and Development (CALC). Lastly, the author states that Brazil’s obstruction of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and exclusion of the U.S. in UNASUR and CALC should not be viewed as anti-American, but rather as “pro-Latin America and the Caribbean in the changing twenty-first century.”

In his 2004 book, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Nye defines soft power as the states’ ability to attract. He argues that states may reach their desired outcomes because other states “admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness--want to follow it.” Moreover, the resources that contribute to a country’s soft power are its values, culture, political institutions, internal policies, and the manner in which it interacts with others.

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3 Roett, *The New Brazil*. The author credits Lula with taking initiative to host conferences for UNASUR and other regional initiatives, and formulate regional objectives, such as the creation of the South American Defense Council (adopted by UNASUR heads of state during a conference in Brazil in 2008); however, he details little about Itamaraty’s role in that leadership. I will address the role of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry in regional and international leadership in a later chapter.

4 Ibid, 131

Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in his memoirs,\(^6\) recounts Brazilian history since the time of Dom Pedro II until the end of his presidency in 2003. The author provides personal perspective into the role of the military in society, systemic racial and economic inequalities, the roots of Brazil’s hyperinflation and national debt and Brazilian political culture (for example, Cardoso explores the effects of Brazilian “jeitinho”—or the Brazilian way—which he characterizes as “the artful little trick of getting around the system,”\(^7\) on Brazilian democracy.

The author also includes a personal account of his economic and social policies while in office, including the Real Plan, Bolsa Escola, as well as land reform and AIDS reduction policies which I will utilize in my discussion of domestic policy as a Brazilian soft power asset.

Hal Brands contends that Brazil’s “grand strategy” under Lula was to “hasten the transition to a multipolar order in which international norms and institutions no longer favor the developed world at Brazil’s expense.”\(^8\) Because Brazil lacks the material capabilities to challenge the West’s dominance of international institutions, it must project its influence through soft-balancing, coalition building, and skillful multilateral diplomacy. Such strategies, Brands notes, are components of what Robert Keohane refers to as a “middle power” strategy.\(^9\) Brands holds that Brazil’s middle power strategy was threefold. In order to dilute U.S. dominance of the international system, the Lula Administration promoted adherence to international rules, norms, and the use of multilateral forums for decision making. It lobbied for the G20 to replace the G8 and united opposition to U.S. agricultural subsidies within the WTO, which stymied the Doha Round trade talks. At the UN, Brazil supported collective security missions, leading the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). It also provided troops in peacekeeping

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\(^7\) Cardoso, *The Accidental President of Brazil* The Accidental President of Brazil, 204.


missions in East Timor and elsewhere, and rejected the U.S.’s unilateral invasion of Iraq. Strengthening the international economic system and denying legitimacy to the unilateral use of force are classic soft-balancing techniques according to Brands, the former because it increased representation in economic decision making, and the latter because it raised the diplomatic cost of military action which had not been approved by the Security Council.

The second aspect of Brazil’s middle power strategy, according to Brands, was the cultivation of strategic South-South partnerships to strengthen its influence. To further increase the representativeness of the international system, Brazil sought to use the G4 (Japan, Germany, India and Brazil) as a mechanism to support its bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Of Brazil’s South-South diplomacy, Brands believes that IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) is the most viable partnership. That forum is working to increase trade and between the three countries and is working in tandem on investment, the environment and development projects in Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, and other poor countries. Each country has also pledged to support one another’s bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council.

Brazil’s third middle power strategy is to position itself as the leader of a unified South America. Brands refers to this as “regional formation,” a process through which Brazil seeks to establish South America as a “distinct geopolitical entity and claim leadership status within that entity.”10 This would enable Brazil to act as the recognized representative of the region in international forums thus “improving its diplomatic credibility and negotiating capacity.”11 Moreover, heading a more politically and economically integrated region would further increase Brazil’s economic leverage in trade, as it would preside over a larger market.

Brazil faces challenges to its regional leadership. Countries like Chile and Colombia have opted for free trade agreements with the United States while Venezuela exploits its oil

10 Ibid, 24
11 Ibid, 24
wealth to buy regional influence. Despite Brazil’s willingness to grant concessions, such as its acquiescence in Bolivia’s nationalization of PETROBRAS assets, Brands maintains that Brazil will have to “forge consensual arrangements that provide its neighbors with economic and political benefits while drawing them deeper into the Brazilian orbit.”

In an article that addresses Brazil’s consensual leadership in South America, Sean W. Burges draws on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, which states that to lead, a state must convince others to support its ideas and policies and accept them as their own. Because Brazil is limited in its military and economic capabilities, its ability to lead, to a certain extent, depends on its ability to generate such support for its proposals. Burges argues that there are three aspects of a “consensual hegemony”—what he describes as a non-coercive order with Brazil positioned at the center—in South America: ideas, economics, and security.

Hence, Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) sought to drum up support for the idea that a unified and autonomous zone of cooperation would be beneficial not just for Brazil, but for all of South America. It claimed that cooperation in trade (Mercosur) and infrastructure integration (The Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America) would advance mutual interests in that it would expand regional firms’ markets for value-added goods, buttress smaller countries’ negotiating leverage vis-à-vis Northern states, and create an economy of scale capable of attracting the foreign direct investment needed to “revitalize regional industries, generate employment, and bring new production technology processes.” Burges utilizes Brazil’s role in preventing the FTAA through consensus building, proposing ideas, and guiding discussions (which he notes is the same strategy Brazil would later use in the G20 to

12 Ibid, 76
rally opposition to U.S. agricultural subsidies during the Doha Round) to illustrate the power of Itamaraty’s ideational leadership.

The Brazilian regional project succeeded to a certain degree in establishing an economic hegemony. Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, as a result of Mercosur, became more dependent on Brazil as an export market; Paraguay and Bolivia came to rely significantly on Brazilian energy, thus directing “domestic interests in other South American countries towards Brazil.”

Yet internal disputes and the absence of a dispute resolution mechanism call into question Mercosur’s viability. Further challenges to Brazilian economic hegemony include Argentina’s opposition to Brazil as a regional representative and Venezuela’s rival attempts to lead the region.

Regarding the security aspect of consensual hegemony, Burges contends that Brazil upholds the norms of sovereignty and democracy. Only when strategic foreign policy goals were jeopardized did Brazil take forceful action. The fact that the Haitian crisis took place during UN Security Council reform talks “all but forced Brazil to take a leadership role in a hemispheric security crisis if its bid for a permanent [seat] were to retain any credibility.”

Furthermore, defending democracy and autonomy served a dual purpose for Itamaraty. First, by establishing that security operations are the exclusive responsibility of national governments—not foreign states or supranational organizations—Brazil has hindered U.S. involvement in security-related matters in the region such as narco-trafficking and guerilla activities. Second, national autonomy over security, meant that Brazil could call for regional cooperation in pooling resources for national governments to combat internal threats, thus circumventing “nationalist responses from neighboring countries in response to possible extra-territorial operations of Brazilian police and

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military forces.” Burges concludes by noting that the case of Brazil demonstrates that a measure of hegemony can be achieved without coercion and that moreover Brazil exemplifies how emerging markets can leverage regional collective action to advance national interests.

Burges, in his article in the *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, claims that during the Cardoso Administration, Itamaraty was “explicitly engaged in a leadership project” in South America, despite Brazilian diplomats’ reluctance to publicly acknowledge such an objective. That project sought to integrate South America and establish that continent as a distinct geopolitical and economic unit. The purpose of Burges’ article, however, is to examine Itamaraty’s consensus-generating leadership style. “The question of leadership,” Burges states, relates to a “state’s ability to conceptualize...a vision of the world or regional order -- and persuade other countries to embrace the project, an approach that provides some solidity to notions of soft power and ideational diffusion.” In explaining the reasons for Brazil’s leadership style, the author cites that country’s inability to bribe or coerce due to shortage of resources (military and economic), historical fears that perceived hegemonic ambitions would lead to a coordinated attack against it by its Spanish-speaking neighbors, and the idea that regional integration requires cooperation from neighboring countries, which would be unobtainable if Brazil had publicly stated its intentions.

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16 Ibid, 80
18 Burges, “Without Sticks or Carrots: Brazilian Leadership in the Cardoso Era, 1992-2003.” 27. Burges cites several interviews with Itamaraty in which diplomats discourage the notion that Brazil sought to lead South America with the qualification that leadership requires military power and willingness to accept the costs of leadership (which Brazilians would not support). However, Burges claims that a statement by former Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia in an interview in which he stated Brazil’s intention to use its critical mass (ideational creativity, market size, and security capacity) to strengthen the idea of South American integration amounts to an explicit acknowledgement of Brazil’s desire to lead.
19 Ibid, 26
To illustrate Brazil’s leadership style, Burges underscores Itamaraty’s role during the FTAA talks, especially its utilization of the Rio Group to maintain a collective position against that of the U.S. He further cites its ability to leverage the size of its internal market to form “new trade agreements that would advance the continental project and open up international markets.” Moreover, the IIRSA, which was born out of the 2000 Brasilia Summit of South American Presidents, showcases the Gramscian nature of Brazil’s leadership. Itamaraty introduced the topic of regional infrastructure integration for discussion “to mould the thinking of other states.”

Burges concludes by highlighting that Brazil’s leadership exemplifies how a middle power may gain support for a clearly articulated foreign policy objectives without resorting to coercion. However, he notes that the inability or unwillingness to make economic concessions, illustrated by Brazil’s policy of contracting only Brazilian engineers, consultants and suppliers for Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) funded projects is an obstacle to its leadership of the regional integration project.

A Woodrow Wilson Center panel discussion on Brazil, entitled “Brazil as a Regional Power: Views from the Hemisphere,” features some of the foremost Brazil scholars including Riordan Roett, Paulo Sotero, Peter Hakim, and Monica Herz, as well as high level Brazilian government officials including former Ambassador to the United States (now Foreign Minister) Antonio de Aguiar Patriota. The theme of the dialogue, “New Directions in Brazilian Foreign Relations,” focuses on the continuities and divergences between the Cardoso and Lula Administrations. Patriota clarifies that what distinguishes foreign policy under Lula is its

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20 Ibid, 32
21 Ibid, 37
transformational aspects, which he enumerates as increased international reach, such as greater interaction with Africa and reaching a strategic partnership with the EU, emphasis on Mercosur and improving relations with Argentina, and a more ambitious political-diplomatic campaign to democratize international organizations.

Herz notes that there is more continuity between Cardoso’s and Lula’s foreign policy than the “political leadership…and diplomats would like to admit,” such as the belief that Brazil should play a larger role in global affairs, efforts to increase its autonomy, and promotion and adherence to formal and informal international norms and rules. What distinguishes the Lula Administration, however, is its willingness to “challenge the agenda that leads to the formation of international norms.”

De Almeida’s article on Brazil’s diplomacy under President Lula is useful in defining terms. He clarifies that Brazil, despite its status as a regional power and growing diplomatic reach, cannot be considered a major global power because it lacks military and economic capabilities. Instead, it is an “emerging economy and a power broker.” Moreover, De Almeida lists “objective criteria” for what makes a “natural” regional leader, which includes “territorial, economic and demographic dimensions; size of internal markets; presence in external markets; concentration and diversification of investments; level of industrial development” and more—all of which Brazil possesses, he claims.

While crediting Lula for establishing a greater role for Brazil in international affairs, De Almeida also criticizes Brazilian diplomacy under Lula for its poor human rights credentials.

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23 Aronson and Sotero, “Brazil as a Regional Power: Views from the Hemisphere,” 16.
24 Ibid, 16
27 Ibid, 161
(because of its cozy relationship with Iran and “indulgence toward dictators like Fidel Castro”\textsuperscript{28}) personalistic nature, its antiquated anti-imperialist ideology, and for its promotion of protectionism and import-substitution-industrialization, which the author claims is a direct result of the PT’s leading role in foreign policy.

The Workers’ Party (PT) coalition publication, “Para o Brazil Seguir Mudando,”\textsuperscript{29} outlines President Dilma Roussef’s thirteen “general commitments.” The last of Dilma’s thirteen commitments outlines her governing coalition’s foreign policy, which seeks to defend national sovereignty and establish an active Brazilian presence in the world. Key diplomatic initiatives include the promotion of South-South diplomacy (BRIC and IBSA), democratization of international organizations (mentioning the UN, IMF, and World Bank), continued dialogue with developed and developing countries through the G20, support of human rights, non-intervention, and disarmament, and consolidating the implementation of Lula’s 2009 national defense strategy. This government document is useful since it gives a concise synopsis of the current administration’s foreign policy objectives.

An Economist 2006 article, “Who Leads Latin America?,”\textsuperscript{30} argues that Brazil’s regional leadership would be enhanced if it made efforts to reform its electoral system and party accountability (in order to tame corruption), simplify investment rules, invest in infrastructure improvements, reduce taxes on businesses, and distance itself from Venezuela. This article is a reminder that there are substantial reforms needed for Brazil to continue to grow economically and exercise leadership in Latin America.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid, 161
\textsuperscript{29} Rousseff, Dilma and Michel Temer. “Para o Brazil Seguir Mudando.” Comissao de Programa de Governo da Coligacao.
The Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force, composed of scholars, government officials, and the business and non-profit community, gives a comprehensive analysis of Brazil’s growing economy, energy and climate change agenda, role in regional and international diplomacy, and its relationship with the U.S.\(^3\)

The section on Brazil’s economy breaks down the strengths and weaknesses to continued growth. As a result of sound economic policies, which have attracted foreign investment, growing domestic demand (attributable to responsible redistributive policies), and the booming market for Brazil’s agricultural exports driven by China’s and other emerging market countries’ demand, Brazil boasts a strong position in the global economy today with continuously positive growth prospects for the future. The Task Force notes that GDP per capita has doubled over the past ten years and poverty has been cut nearly in half. Moreover, the Task Force holds that Brazil has leveraged its robust economy to increase its global commercial and diplomatic footprint.

Nevertheless, reforms are needed. According to the Task Force, Brazil must redouble its efforts to upgrade its infrastructure, which will require labor, pension, and social security reform to improve the state’s public ability to finance such projects. Furthermore, the Task Force recommends the simplification of corporate and labor taxes to buttress the country’s ability to attract FDI and allow small and medium size businesses to operate more easily. The Rousseff administration must also continue to target inflation and ensure prudent regulation of consumer credit to insure against overheating.

Brazil’s frequent non-permanent membership on the UN Security Council provides that country with a platform for participation on critical international security issues. With its

growing economic and diplomatic clout, Brazil has demonstrated responsibility for the maintenance of regional and international security. While its command of MINUSTAH best exemplifies that responsibility, Brazil is fourteenth in troop contributing countries, and works to build security capacity in developing countries such as Guinea-Bissau where it is building a police training academy. The Task Force urges the U.S. to support Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council, which it believes would strengthen that institution’s responsibility and accountability. In addition, the Task force calls on Brazil to increase its annual financial and troop contributions to the UN to better reflect its active role in that institution.

The Task Force establishes that Brazil’s activism within the G20 is the catalyst for its increased international economic and financial leadership. It has successfully used its prominent role within that group to increase its voting rights in the IMF and WB, and to rally support behind efforts to reduce U.S. agricultural protectionism (which ultimately led to the stalling of the Doha Round in 2003). Furthermore, Brazil’s enterprises, such as Embrapa, Odebrecht, Vale, and Petrobras, which were invigorated by capitalization under Lula, have internationalized their investments and act as a facet of soft power. In Africa, for instance, those firms have contributed valuable technology transfers, skills training, research and development, and capital.

South American energy and infrastructure integration is important for Brazil’s economic growth, as its trade with the continent as a whole exceeds that with China or the U.S., its two largest individual trading partners. Establishing South America as a unified regional trading bloc would also bolster its negotiating position in trade talks and global economic governance.

Cason and Power claim that there is a bias within the international relations literature which focuses on the strategic goals of Brazil’s foreign policy and that country’s relationships with foreign states. In contrast, Cason and Power discuss how foreign policy making in Brazil
has changed over the past twenty years, and examine contributing international, regional, and domestic factors with equal weight.

Cason and Power argue that Itamaraty’s traditional dominance over foreign policy making has declined in relation to the role of the president and domestic interest groups since the Cardoso administration.\(^{32}\) The authors argue that with democratization came the pluralization of civil society and business groups and as a result the increased prominence of the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) and other government agencies in relation to Itamaraty.

Beginning with Cardoso, the president’s role in diplomacy also expanded. The authors argue that this can be attributed to Brazil’s shift from an ISI to a neo-liberal development model after the Cold War. They claim that under import-substitution-industrialization (ISI) “there was no need for presidentially-led diplomacy”\(^{33}\) since that model prioritized the development of domestic industry and sought to replace foreign imports with domestically produced goods. The adoption of market reforms changed Brazil’s development orientation from “inward to outward,” and forced presidents to “calculate their moves on a whole range of policies (e.g., industrial, trade, and macroeconomic) with the international environment in their minds.”\(^{34}\) The authors highlight the top-down nature of the formation of Mercosur under President Collor as one of the first examples of presidential leadership, noting that business and civil society opposed its creation. Cardoso and Lula’s subsequent leadership and investment of political capital in that organization made it a “crucial element of Brazil’s new development strategy.”\(^{35}\) Moreover, the

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\(^{32}\) Cason, Jeffrey and Timothy Power. 2006. “Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making from Cardoso to Lula.” German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

\(^{33}\) Cason and Power, “Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making from Cardoso to Lula,” 14.

\(^{34}\) Ibid, 14-15

\(^{35}\) Ibid, 17
reputation of Cardoso as Latin America’s leading statesman and Lula as the voice of the downtrodden advanced the presidentialization of foreign policy.

In terms of the impact that presidential activism has had on foreign policy and diplomacy, the authors conclude that Brazilian foreign policy has become less strategic and more ideological, citing Brazil’s acknowledgement of Bolivia’s right to nationalize its energy resources in spite of that action’s detriment to Brazil’s economic interest. Cason and Power explain the infusion of ideology into Brazil’s diplomatic agenda as a PT attempt to cater to its left wing base since it has implemented neo-liberal policies domestically.

In his Oxford University Press articles, Andrew Hurrell juxtaposes the Lula Administration’s “pessimistic” view of the international system with its “belief that there is scope for an activist and assertive foreign policy.” 36 Seeking to assert itself into a hegemonic system, Brazil has formed strategic relationships with other rising powers to increase its bargaining power and reduce international unipolarity. To further bolster its national autonomy, Brazil has emphasized the pursuit of developing nuclear technological capacity, and sought to maintain its industrial base (which Hurrell explains as the reason for which Brazil thwarted Free Trade Area of the America talks).

Brazilian diplomacy is characterized by soft power. Hurrell refers to Brazil’s “diplomatic GNP,” or its capacity for building coalitions, activism within international organizations, and ability to frame claims for greater representational fairness (such as its bid for a seat on the Security Council and promotion of a global hunger fund) as beneficial to the rest of the developing world. It is at the regional level, however, where the limits of the Lula Administration’s foreign policy are most visible. Hurrell claims that Lula’s activism was

excessively personalistic and voluntaristic, and notes that there has been a conspicuous gap between rhetoric and actual achievements.

For instance, while Lula was verbally committed to strengthening Mercosur, his administration was unwilling to invest in strengthening that organization’s institutional structure. Furthermore, Hurrell states that if the measurement of success of Brazil’s regional strategy is the creation of a regional bloc “with a significant degree of internal cohesion and a capacity to increase the region’s power in the world, then...the strategy has failed.”\textsuperscript{37} While South American countries’ economies and infrastructure have become significantly more interconnected since Mercosur’s inception, the widespread perception that market reforms have failed, and the revival of economic nationalism (in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador for example) remain barriers to further regional integration.

Hurrell also points out the limits of South-South diplomacy, noting that the bulk of Brazil’s trade is with the industrialized world, China’s unwillingness to support Brazil’s candidacy for a Security Council seat, and furthermore that efforts to gain support for that ambition have led it to diminish its commitment to human rights. Such tensions in the objectives of its foreign policy are likely to persist, and reflect Brazil’s multifaceted identity and strategy as a leader of the South, a bridge between North and South, and as a rising power which employs South-South unity and claims to represent global justice for its own welfare.

According to Soares de Lima and Hirst, Brazil’s domestic efforts to address income inequality and its activist foreign policy are “two sides of the same coin,” and hence that country’s “international confidence and credibility” derives from its successful democratic consolidation and economic policy reform. Thus, political and economic stability, combined

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, 55
with efficient and effective redistributive social policies are fundamental to Brazil’s legitimacy-based leadership in international affairs.

Soares de Lima and Hirst argue that from the creation of the League of Nations in 1919 to the formation of the G20 during the Doha Round in 2003, Brazil has presented itself as a mediator between developed and developing countries, “defending the rights of the latter, and, simultaneously, positioning itself to assume a status equivalent to the former.”38 In international trade and development negotiations since World War II, however, Brazil has consistently favored the third world’s positions. It opposed the GATT’s free market principles, favoring rules that benefitted developing countries, such as most favored nation status as a way of offsetting developed countries’ unilateral protectionism. The authors note that while the unity of the G77 withered in the Uruguay Round, the formation of the G20 in Cancun represented a revival of the “Third World coalition spirit.”39 Given its traditional emphasis on procedural issues regarding market fairness within the WTO and the competitiveness of its agricultural exports, the G20’s concentration on obtaining access to developed countries’ agricultural markets presented Brazil with an opportunity to reassert itself as a mediator between “weak” and “strong.”40 Moreover, Brazil sees its function as a mediator and efforts to increase Security Council representativeness as legitimate ground for it to obtain a permanent seat on that body.

The authors hold that Brazil’s identity has shifted from Latin American to South American largely because policy makers in that country doubted the conception of Latin America as a unit after the creation of NAFTA. The Lula Administration has prioritized South American regional integration. Brazil’s regional policy encompassed three assumptions: First,

40 Ibid, 27
that a greater regional presence would increase political ties with Argentina; second, that deeper involvement would promote greater regional stability; and third, that integration would foster neighbors’ support for it to represent the region in international affairs.

The first assumption has succeeded to a certain degree, as Mercosur has deepened investment, cultural, educational, and inter-societal ties between the two countries; however Brazil’s unwillingness to make concessions on investment policies has led to “bitter disagreements” and “postponed...a successful revitalization of Mercosur.”

Regarding the second assumption, while Brazilian mediation has contributed to reducing regional political tension and insecurity and promoting democracy (in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Haiti, etc.), the tumult of regional politics has exceeded its capacity according to the authors. The third assumption, as evidenced by difficulty obtaining support for director-general of the WTO and Colombia and Argentina’s unwillingness to back Brazil’s Security Council bid, has proved overly sanguine.

In their 2005 Third World Quarterly article, Alden and Vieira’s discuss the trilateral diplomatic partnership between Brazil, India, and South Africa that emerged from cooperative efforts between those countries during trade negotiations at Cancun in 2003. The purpose of that partnership has been to promote cooperation on issues such as defense, multilateral diplomacy, international trade, technology, and social development. The three countries have also issued joint statements supporting Security Council reform, thereby legitimizing “their own claims to any regional allocation of new permanent seats.” Furthermore, the three countries’ leading positions within respective regional trading blocs has facilitated efforts to establish inter-

41 Ibid, 31
regional trade agreements, and have formed a trilateral business council to increase the competitiveness of their multinational corporations. Most significant, according to the authors, is the partnerships’ function as a “stepping stone towards broader cooperation among developing countries.”  

Long-term prospects for the success of IBSA largely rest on the economic profitability of the relationship for each country. The authors state that the potential economic benefits for each are modest in comparison to regional opportunities. Significant barriers to economic integration between the three include difficulties in negotiating tariff reductions (in India especially) and the objection of the business and agricultural export community, right-wing parties, liberal segments of the foreign ministry, academics, and business associations in Brazil, which oppose deeper ties with the South, citing the comparatively more lucrative prospects of trade deals with the U.S. and the EU.

Hunter notes that during its time in opposition, the PT contributed to the consolidation of democracy by acting as loyal opponent (never undermining the political system), and served as a legitimate and non-violent channel for social demands such as the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra (Landless Movement). It also diminished fragmentation by subsuming other leftist parties. The PT appealed to voters based on its programs, values and ideals, and eschewed clientelism and individualistic candidate appeals (in other words, voters identified with the PT, not just Lula). Regarding policy, the PT promoted land redistribution in favor of the poor, opposed privatization of state-owned enterprises, strong labor laws, economic nationalism, government transparency, and greater citizen autonomy and involvement in public decision-making.

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44 Ibid, 1090  
The PT also stood out as a disciplined party. It sought uniformity in its party platform at all levels of government and retained high levels of cohesion in party voting. The PT preserved its identity by allying strictly with parties of the left. Furthermore, PT politicians generally shared dedication to the party’s values and program. In short, throughout the duration of its time as an opposition party since the return to democracy until Lula’s election in 2003, the PT maintained its reputation as a transparent organization representing good governance.

Hunter explains that as a part of its bid to capture presidency, the PT was forced to move to center to capture a larger segment of the popular vote. Lula sought to convince his party to reform its rigid standards for forming alliances, and in 2002 the party allied with the Liberal Party (PL)—whose constituency consists of a mix of evangelicals and affluent businessmen. This was controversial within the PT and led to a distancing between Lula and his party. Other explanations for the PT’s moderation are that its experience governing at local level made it more practical, and alternatively, that changes in the global economy made market reforms inevitable.

During the 1998 election, the PT accepted market reforms, the need to honor public debts (IMF), and eliminated “socialism” from its program. It also adopted a political marketing strategy to change the party’s image and reformed campaign finance methods to increase its funding.

The PT’s first term in office has been dubbed “Cardoso’s third term” as the party ran a fiscal surplus, maintained high interest rates to check inflation, reformed pensions, and expanded upon Cardoso’s redistributive social policies. Unfortunately, however, the PT lost its reputation as a clean player after the “mensalão” scandal (monthly bribes to obtain federal deputies’ support
for legislation), and kickbacks on government contracts that went toward the PT’s campaign financing.

In short, the PT moved toward the center in a bid to win the 2003 election, and is now much less a party of the left than during its years in opposition. According to Hunter, the transition of the PT to a status quo party has lessened its ability to strengthen the party system and hence Brazilian democracy. Moreover, the PT’s low popularity in Congress reflects public disillusionment with its conduct in office.

Santos and Vilarouca conclude that Mainwaring’s concerns that presidentialism combined with an open list proportional representation electoral system would foster weak, undisciplined parties, personalized politics and governability have turned out to be overblown. The claim that the centrality of the executive branch paired with party leaders’ control over the legislative agenda have served to counteract against legislators’ pursuit of parochial interests. The presidency’s control over administrative and budget issues, along with its ability to enact laws by decree and request urgency for the passage of bills (legislative bills take three times as long as executive bills to pass) serve to mitigate against government gridlock.

A high percentage of voters, despite the large number of political parties and quantity of individual candidates on ballots, are able to distinguish parties despite their ideological convergence, which suggests that the electoral system is competitive. Nevertheless, the authors note that the high rate of politicians switching parties is problematic (although this usually occurs among parties within the same coalition), and recommend implementation of legislation that would penalize such behavior and encourage parties to take greater care in their selection of candidates and heighten their concern about their party’s reputation.

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In his chapter on the reduction of ideological cleavages in Brazilian politics, Timothy J. Power discusses three traditional ideological cleavages among the Brazilian political class which have diminished over time since the return to democracy.\(^47\) The first—economic management—has attenuated since the Real Plan as parties across the political spectrum have formed a consensus around successful neoliberal policies. This has narrowed the ideological distance between parties and served to erode political polarization.

The second cleavage, what the author terms “authoritarian debris versus democratic renewal” as during the Sarney period, the military retained direct cabinet representation and the right to intervene to protect internal order due to the insistence of right wing parties. Between 1990 and 2005, Power finds that parties of the right stabilized their commitment to democratic rule. Nevertheless, according to Power’s survey of the political elite, more than 50% still believe that the armed forces should have the constitutional right to intervene to maintain internal order.

The third cleavage is political institutions (the extent to which politicians favor individual liberty versus party-centered politics). Power concludes that while Brazilian politicians are reluctant to move towards a party-centered system, support for the open-list has diminished from 1990 to 2005.

Ames, Baker, and Renno find that there is an impressive amount of “issue voting,” (voters choosing politicians based on the quality of that candidate’s program will affect the public welfare).\(^48\) The large number of political parties and unwieldy amount of candidates on ballots (a product of Brazil’s open list proportional representation electoral system) confounds voters in legislative elections only. Yet fragmentation is not an issue in national presidential

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elections, which the authors determine based on the fact that the previous four out of five of the previous elections have been contests between two parties: the PDSB and the PT.\textsuperscript{49} The authors also find that clientelism (politicians exchanging jobs or gifts for votes) was not a significant problem during the 2002 election, as only 5\% of voters reported such activity.

During legislative elections, in contrast, voters tend to base decisions on “pork,” or promises to build public works projects. This leads to perverse incentives for deputies, encouraging them to cast votes on national legislation based on the likelihood that it will allow them to access federal funding for their particular projects. The authors believe that this can have negative effects for fiscal discipline and economic efficiency.

According to Amaral, Kingstone, and Krieckhaus, Lula’s implementation of neoliberal parties, despite his campaign against them, reflects the need to please foreign investors and creditors and retain capital in the country.\textsuperscript{50} The need for foreign investment curtails macroeconomic policymaking autonomy for the political left in Brazil. When Lula took office, Brazil was on the verge of default, and negative investor sentiment had put downward pressure on the real and upward pressure on national debt. Lula, despite his campaign against neoliberal policies, was thus forced to reassure investor confidence with the “Carta ao povo Brasileiro” (Letter to the Brazilian People), in which he informed the public that neoliberal policies were necessary to protect the economy. In fact, according to the authors, Lula, as a leftist was forced to move his policies farther to the right than those of a conservative candidate to secure the confidence of foreign investors, who generally distrust parties of the left.

The authors make the case that regulatory policy should be an area where left wing parties retain some autonomy. Yet despite the PT objective to gain more control over regulatory

\textsuperscript{49} With the election of Rousseff, the last five out of six elections have now been fought between the PT and PSDB.

agencies (which oversee privatized utility companies) it did not succeed in doing so. Internally divided, the party heeded Finance Minister Palocci’s position: to respect the agencies’ political independence in order to maintain those companies’ attractiveness to foreign investors. The authors conclude that the economic policy making constraints which face the left could lead to voter disillusionment and to the deterioration of the quality of democracy and the legitimacy of democratic institutions.

Andre observes that there has been remarkable continuity between the Cardoso and Lula administrations. Lula fused Bolsa Escola with three other conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs (Auxilio Gas, Bolsa Alimentacao, Cartao Alimentacao) to create Bolsa Familia under the Ministerio para o Desenvolvimento Social e Combate a Fome. Under Bolsa Familia, low income families with children under sixteen receive a stipend which is linked to school attendance and various health measures. After municipalities screen for eligibility, beneficiaries receive debit cards and withdraw funds directly from the National Savings Bank. Thus, because funds are distributed from the federal government directly to recipients without state involvement, the opportunities for corruption are minimal.

Bolsa Familia also reflects the strengthened fiscal position of the Brazilian federal government after Cardoso’s reforms (particularly due to the Fiscal Reform Act) during the 1990s, which reigned in state spending, augmented federal revenue, and led to presidential control over poverty reduction and the universal implementation of the program (nearly all municipalities participated in the program by 2004). The authors note, furthermore, that the impact and the efficiency of the program have been striking. They credit the program with the

reduction of Brazil’s Gini Coefficient from .60 in 1998 to .57 in 2004 while absorbing only one percent of GDP.

Anthony Pereira underscores how public insecurity undermines the quality of Brazilian democracy, especially for low-income individuals. While Brazil has achieved political and macroeconomic stability, it has failed to curb violent crime. The homicide rate has increased per 100,000 from 11.7 in 1980 to 28.5 in 2002. Long borders which are permeable to drug trafficking and organized crime, the five fold rise in youth unemployment between 1979 and 1998, and a dysfunctional criminal justice system which permits impunity all reinforce Brazil’s high homicide rate.

The author divides public security problems into three categories: Public sector fragmentation, police politicization, and the privatization of security. The first derives from states’ lack of accountability to the federal government on security matters. States obtain funding from the National Secretariat for Public Security but do not comply with that agency’s initiatives. Moreover, the division between civilian and military police weakens the government’s ability to effectively respond to crime. Military police are responsible for patrolling the streets while civil police handle criminal investigations. Unfortunately, there is a severe informational and organizational disconnect between the former and the latter. Military police do not share a common dispatch with civil officers and live separately on military barracks. “This division of labor,” Pereira says, “leads to competition and duplication of effort.” Furthermore, the military police lack sophisticated police training and employ repressive tactics (there were 1063 extrajudicial killings in Rio in 2006). The civilian police

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54 Ibid, 196
lack managerial oversight, and as a result lack the incentive to write quality police reports and send them to the district attorney’s office within a reasonable amount of time. Overall, this leads to a low level of public prosecutions and a lack of public transparency and accountability. In addition, mayors and governors of different political parties do not cooperate.

Politicians in Brazil utilize security institutions as political tools. Parties staff the National Secretariat for Public Security with politically loyal officials, which contributes to a lack of public security policy continuity between administrations. Moreover, police promotions are also based on loyalty and politicians retain the ability to transfer “troublesome” officers, especially those that investigate them or their party.

Safety is not a public good in Brazil; it is accessible only to those that can afford to hire private security forces. There are more than twice as many private security guards (many of which are off-duty or retired police officers) than there are civil and military police. This creates a perverse incentive for security officials to manufacture violence to increase the demand and price for private protection, which has led to the blurring of the line between the police and organized crime. Moreover, routinized prison torture and police repression weaken Brazil’s human rights reputation.

Ollie A. Johnson debunks the myth that Brazil is a multi-racial democracy. He asserts that blacks and mulattos in Brazil have been marginalized in education, employment, and upward mobility.\textsuperscript{55} Due to dogged efforts by black rights’ organizations (the Black Experimental Theatre and the Unified Black Movement) racial inequality has inserted itself into the public discourse. Currently, affirmative action in Brazil is a salient and polarizing debate. While some universities have enacted racial quotas for blacks and mulattos, many prestigious universities,\textsuperscript{55}

such as the Universidade de Sao Paulo and the Universidade Federal de Rio de Janeiro have refused to do so, and many prominent academics have voiced vociferous opposition to the adoption of affirmative action policies. Overall, the author concludes that the return to democracy, persistent black activism, and leftist electoral victories has created a political and intellectual environment more open to Afro-Brazilians.

Through an intergenerational study of favela residents in Rio de Janeiro, Janet Perlman determines that those residents’ sense of disenfranchisement since re-democratization in Brazil has worsened due to deteriorated public security, exposure to violence, and exclusion from jobs, schools, etc.\(^56\) Furthermore, the urban poor have little to no influence over elected officials and are generally disappointed with democracy. Thus, “Brazilian democracy has a long way to go in terms of consolidation, equality under the law, protection of its citizens from violence, and meeting the needs of the underclass.”\(^57\) In short, the inability to provide security, sufficient employment, education, and political access for low income citizens undermines their support for democracy. Perlman concurs with a recent UNDP study which confirms nostalgia for the safety of order under authoritarian rule.

Jean Krasno claims that by virtue of its geographic and economic size, population, vital environmental resources, diplomatic leadership and democratic consolidation, Brazil is a pivotal state in Latin America.\(^58\) Krasno notes that Itamaraty has a long history of negotiating peaceful solutions to conflict, a tradition which began with Foreign Minister Rio Branco (1902-1912), who successfully negotiated several border disputes with neighboring countries. That tradition


has been expanded to beyond its own borders. Krasno cites the examples of Brazil’s role in helping prevent a military coup in Paraguay, sending peacekeeping troops to the Ecuador-Peru border during a crisis over a long time border dispute, and its initiation of a treaty on regional cooperation on the use of the Amazon Basin, which was signed by eight foreign ministers.

Brazilian diplomacy was also crucial in establishing Latin America as a nuclear free zone (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and was instrumental in convincing Cuba to sign that treaty. In conjunction with its neighbor and long time rival, Argentina, Brazil created the Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, a mutual inspection regime, which was an essential step in normalizing relations between the two countries. In addition, Brazil has been a leader in the Rio Group, an informal diplomatic forum committed to promoting peace, development, and democracy in the region, and also plays an active role in Portuguese speaking countries such as Mozambique and East Timor.

Brazil’s democratic consolidation is imperative for Latin America. As Latin America’s “most populous and largest country,” if Brazil were to revert to military rule, Krasno maintains, “Military regimes could be emboldened to take over in other countries, perhaps even with the tacit support of Brazil.”

As noted by Perlman and Pereira in Democratic Brazil Revisited, the problems of impunity and unequal justice continue to blight the quality of democracy and should be addressed by public policy to assure continued popular support for democratic governance.

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59 Krasno, “Brazil” 184.
Chapter II: Analysis of Brazilian Leadership

Scholars concur that Brazil’s growing economic weight is the root of its newfound influence in international affairs. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Brazil’s “economic prowess places it in a leadership position in Latin America and in the world and boosts the region’s strategic importance globally.” Brazil has the world’s fifth-largest population and landmass. It also ranks as the world’s eighth-largest economy and is projected to become the fifth-largest by 2016. Additionally, among non-OECD countries, Brazil ranks second in foreign direct investment behind China.

As a leading producer of hydro-power and biofuels, and with the possible development of extensive off-shore pre-salt oil reserves, Brazil has reduced its susceptibility to oil shocks (the 1973 oil embargo was a principal cause of Brazil’s national debt and hyperinflation during the 1980s). Further sheltering it from external shocks is Brazil’s well-diversified economy. While it is a leading exporter of primary goods, Brazil also has a competitive industrial sector, which produces aircraft, automobiles, consumer durables, machinery and equipment, computers, and accounts for about one third of GDP. Such diversification shields Brazil’s economy from swings in international market prices for primary goods.

Underscoring the resilience of its economy, Brazil emerged from the 2008 economic downturn relatively unharmed, in large part due to prudent policies carried out under the

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61 Bodman, Samuel W., James D. Wolfensohn and Julia E. Sweig. “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations.”

62 Ibid, 10. Brazil is the world’s largest producer of beef, cane sugar, and coffee and the second-largest producer of soybeans. Its technologically advanced agricultural sector puts Brazil on par with the U.S. for the largest producer of cane-based ethanol.


64 Bodman, Samuel W., James D. Wolfensohn and Julia E. Sweig. 2011. “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations.”
Cardoso and Lula administrations which stabilized Brazil’s currency, built up foreign reserves, tamed chronic inflation through privatization of industry and fiscal responsibility, and strengthened its banking system. Reflecting investor confidence in the stability of Brazil’s economy and political system, all major credit rating agencies have upgraded Brazil’s debt to investment grade status, which, as Roett notes, allows Brazil to borrow on more favorable terms, and helps mitigate that country’s vulnerability to increases in international interest rates and fluctuations in the value of the dollar and real.

The strength of its economy and financial system in the wake of the 2008 recession have bolstered Brazil’s leadership within international economic organizations, landing it a position among global powers at the G-20. A Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force report describes Brazil as a “natural leader” within the G-20, and notes that it succeeded in using that institution as a vehicle to increase voting rights for itself and other emerging economies within the IMF and World Bank and push for equitable access to industrialized countries’ agricultural markets. During the Doha Round of trade negotiations at the WTO, Brazil used its leadership position within the G-20 to position itself as representative of developing country’s interests and rally opposition to U.S. and European agricultural protectionism. Undoubtedly, Brazil’s increased economic weight has translated into influence over international economic decision-making.

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65 Ibid. While Western economies stagnated, Brazil’s grew at 7.5% in 2010. It is projected to grow at 4.5% in 2011 and long-term growth prospects are positive.
67 Roett, 121. Brazil now has the fourth-largest stock market in the world.
68 Bodman, Samuel W., James D. Wolfensohn and Julia E. Sweig, “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations.”
69 World Trade Organization. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm. The Doha Round is also referred to as the Doha Development Agenda, since one of its principal objectives is to improve trade opportunities for developing countries.
Along with its activism in international economic organizations, Brazil’s activism on the UN Security Council, along with its command of MINUSTAH, a Chapter Seven operation, and involvement in several other UN peacekeeping missions\(^{70}\) demonstrates its willingness to use force to maintain international peace and security. This marks a break with past foreign policy in Brazil, which embraced the principle of non-intervention.

A 2010 Economist article notes that, although Brazil has long been active in peacekeeping missions,\(^{71}\) it eschewed forcible Chapter Seven interventions, espousing respect for national sovereignty. That policy change, explains Monica Herz, a professor at the Pontificia Universidade do Rio de Janeiro, is due to the fact that “Brazil’s elite thinks peacekeeping is part of the price you have to pay to be among the nations who make the rules.”\(^{72}\) In other words, the Brazilian government hopes that, if and when permanent Security Council membership expands, its leadership in the maintenance of international peace and security will bolster its qualifications for a seat. Further exemplifying its security leadership, Brazil opened a peacekeeping school in Rio de Janeiro (Centro de Instrucao de Opera de Paz) in 2005. According to the Economist, the school has trained 15,000 troops, and is contributing to the modernization of the Brazilian army\(^{73}\) and the pacification of Rio de Janeiro favelas.\(^{74}\)

Brazil has also played a fundamental role as diplomat in the mediation of regional conflicts. During the 1990s, Brazil assisted in preventing a military coup in Paraguay and


\(^{73}\) Ibid. Brazil’s army has changed little since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985. The school is contributing to a change in military mentality and focus from war and security to conflict prevention, civilian governance, and the rule of law.

\(^{74}\) Ibid. The article highlights that Brazil’s peacekeepers conduct joint exercises with Rio police.
mediated a border dispute between Ecuador and Peru, and since 2003, has intervened in political crises in Venezuela (as part of the Group of Friends of Venezuela), Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Haiti, and most recently in Honduras after a military coup ousted democratically elected president Manuel Zelaya.

In Latin America, Brazil has been instrumental in the creation and leadership of regional political and economic organizations, including Mercosur, Unasur, and the Rio Group. Mercosur is a free trade bloc between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, with five associate members: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Now the fourth-largest trading bloc in the world (after the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Mercosur was created by the Treaty of Asuncion. While the treaty succeeded in advancing regional economic integration through the reduction of trade barriers between members and establishing a limited customs union, it has not resulted in a common market (free movement of capital and labor).

Despite Lula’s verbal commitment to strengthening Mercosur, that organization is “far more divided than any time in history.” The lack of a dispute resolution mechanism, and the pending accession of Venezuela, a non-democratic country which opposes free trade, could further dilute the strength of the organization. Moreover, the “widely perceived failures of economic liberalism…narrowness of electoral democracy, and a powerful resurgence of

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A Christian Science Monitor article comments that Brazil’s harboring of Zelaya at the Brazilian Embassy in Honduras positioned it at the center of the conflict and was illustrative of Brazil’s aspirations to assert itself as a regional leader.
economic nationalism” in the region remain substantial barriers to further economic integration.

According to a Council on Foreign Relations Task Force report, Mercosur and Unasur are not only instruments for regional economic and political integration, but also a key part of Brazil’s ambition to establish the region as “an attractive trade bloc and global strategic actor, with [itself] as its anchor.” Despite increased trade ties and infrastructure integration with its neighbors, Brazil has been unable to leverage increased economic cooperation into a bloc of regional support for its leadership in global affairs, as Argentina and other neighbors reject the idea of Brazil as a regional representative, remaining skeptical that it has their interests in mind.

Brazil was critical in the 2004 creation of Unasur. That organization “aims to create a single South American market and to foster economic and infrastructure cooperation and development” and in 2008, Brazil spearheaded the creation of the South American Defense Council, a sub-organization of that organization which seeks to enhance regional security cooperation. The organization has served as a multilateral alternative to the OAS for mediating regional conflicts, such as the police uprising in Ecuador and tensions between Colombia and Venezuela in 2010.

The Rio Group was an informal coalition of Latin American states that arose in 1986 from regional cooperation on the Central American peace process. The objectives of the group included regional coordination of common policy positions on international issues, promoting

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80 Hurell, “Lula’s Brazil: A Rising Power, but Going Where?” 56.
82 Hurrell, “Lula's Brazil: A Rising Power, but Going Where?”
83 Bodman, Wolfensohn and Sweig. “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations.” 59
84 Ibid
improvement in the function of regional integration organizations, presenting solutions to regional conflicts, and to promoting cooperation on social, economic, and technological development.85 Brazil was able to leverage its position in the Rio Group to generate support for its foreign policy positions and curtail U.S. dominance in South America. For example, during the FTAA negotiations, Itamaraty used Brazil’s presidency of that organization to coordinate support from Argentina for its trade positions (which contradicted those of the U.S.). This ultimately led to the failure of the talks.86

The Rio Group has now been superseded by the creation of the Latin American and Caribbean Summit (CELAC). While still in its “early stages of formation, CELAC,” according to a Council on Foreign Relations task force, “would be the first formal association of states to include every Latin American and Caribbean nation and exclude the United States and Canada.”87

Successful economic reform has also enabled Brazil to bolster its legitimacy-based leadership, or what Joseph Nye would refer to as “soft power.” Nye’s theory of soft power holds that “intangible assets such as an attractive personality...institutions, and a vision that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority” are cost-effective means of exercising power.88 Brazil’s soft power emanates both from its domestic and foreign policies.

Domestically, stable public finances and political consensus on market reforms have allowed Brazil to prioritize the promotion of political transparency, anti-corruption and poverty reduction. The new Brazilian government, under President Dilma Rousseff has taken a strong

87 Bodman, Wolfensohn and Sweig. “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” 59.
stance against corruption, and has dismissed several prominent government officials for alleged misconduct.\textsuperscript{89} The administration also recently passed two important pieces of legislation—one which seeks to promote public access to state documents, and another which will establish a truth commission to shed light on state-sponsored human rights abuses that occurred during the military dictatorship.\textsuperscript{90}

Economic growth, innovative and efficient cash transfer program (“Bolsa Familia”), along with cheap credit and increased minimum wages have combined to reduce Brazil’s Gini Coefficient from .61 to .54 since 2001\textsuperscript{91} and have lifted thirty million people out of poverty into the lower middle class between 2003 and 2009.\textsuperscript{92} Bolsa Familia, a national conditional cash transfer program which seeks to reduce poverty and inequality as well as the “inter-generational transmission of poverty”\textsuperscript{93} by conditioning transfers on compliance with school attendance and health requirements demonstrates Brazil’s commitment to that effort.

The largest program of its size, Bolsa Familia reaches eleven million families.\textsuperscript{94} Its success\textsuperscript{95} has attracted significant attention from Latin American policy makers. Mexico and several other Latin American countries have adopted programs replicated on Brazilian municipal conditional cash transfer programs.\textsuperscript{96} For example, as a 2010 Economist article on Brazilian

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{91} Maresch, “President Rousseff Takes Stand on Corruption,” 21.
\bibitem{92} Ibid, 10
\bibitem{94} Lindert, Kathy Anja Linder, Jason Hobbs and Bénédicte de la Brière, “The Nuts and Bolts of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia Program: Implementing Conditional Cash Transfers in a Decentralized Context,” 9.
\bibitem{95} Roett, Riordan. 2010. \textit{The New Brazil}. Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C. Bolsa Familia successfully brought tens of millions out of out of abject poverty and for the first time since 1500 has created a lower middle class.
\bibitem{96} Lindert, Kathy Anja Linder, Jason Hobbs and Bénédicte de la Brière, 2007.
\end{thebibliography}
foreign aid notes, “One of the most successful post-earthquake initiatives in Haiti is the expansion of Lèt Agogo (Lots of Milk, in Creole), a dairy co-operative, into a project encouraging mothers to take their children to school in exchange for free meals.”

That program, financed by the Brazilian government, is modeled after Bolsa Familia and serves as a clear illustration of Brazil’s legitimacy, and its ability to impact other states through the attractiveness and ingenuity of its policies.

According to Soares de Lima and Hirst, Brazil’s domestic efforts to address income inequality and its activist foreign policy are “two sides of the same coin,” in other words, that country’s “international confidence and credibility” derive from its successful democratic consolidation and economic policy reform. The incorporation of its domestic social policies into its foreign aid programs, such as in Lèt Agogo, reflect Brazil’s confidence in its policies. The reach of Brazilian soft power extends beyond the Western Hemisphere, notably in Africa. This will be addressed in more detail in Chapter Five on Brazil’s international leadership.

As scholars confirm, Brazil has leveraged its robust economy to expand the reach of its global diplomacy. Diplomacy is an integral component of Brazilian soft power. According to De Almeida, Brazil’s diplomatic strength is its best mechanism “for projecting power abroad,” and claims that its “diplomatic GDP” is greater than its economic GDP, and the latter is certainly greater than its ‘military’ GDP.” Moreover, international relations scholars praise Brazil’s Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) for its world-class diplomats. Brands notes, for

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97 The Economist. “Brazil's foreign-aid programme: Speak softly and carry a blank cheque. In search of soft power, Brazil is turning itself into one of the world's biggest aid donors. But is it going too far, too fast?” July 15, 2010.
99 Roett in The New Brazil and Bodman, Wolfensohn, and Sweig in “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations.”
100 De Almeida, 164
101 Hal Brands, Sean W. Burges, and Riordan Roett for example.
example, that “Itamaraty is the best diplomatic service in Latin America, and its representatives receive rigorous professional and linguistics training.”

To understand what makes Itamaraty the best diplomatic service in Latin America demands both a comprehensive examination of the institution’s historical development. As Krasno notes, Itamaraty has a long history of negotiating peaceful solutions to conflict, a tradition which began with Foreign Minister Rio Branco (1902-1912), who successfully negotiated several border disputes with neighboring countries. Rio Branco, according to Celso Lafer, was instrumental in inspiring “the style of diplomatic behavior [which] characterizes Brazil,” which Lafer describes as the promulgation of cooperation and adherence to international law, or “the capacity to ‘de-dramatize the foreign policy agenda, that is, to reduce conflicts, crises and difficulties to their diplomatic bedrock.’”

A more thorough analysis of Brazil’s diplomatic leadership, therefore, should link the origins of Itamaraty’s ideological and institutional development, with the training of its diplomats and internal management in order to provide a more comprehensive explanation for its dynamism in trade negotiations, conflict mediation, and activism in international organizations (the WTO and the UN for example).

As noted, along with steady economic growth, Brazil’s innovative efforts to reduce poverty through social programs are an example of its soft power appeal; various countries have attempted to replicate Brazil’s programs domestically. Brazil’s success in lifting thirty million people from poverty, notwithstanding, that country remains one of the most unequal societies in Latin America and the Caribbean. Brazil’s Human Development Index (HDI) ranking—a

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measurement that accounts for education, health, and economic prosperity\textsuperscript{105} is .699, placing it 73rd out of 169 countries in the UNDP Human Development Report. By comparison to the regional average, Brazil’s HDI score improvement since 1980 lags: The average country in Latin America/Caribbean has progressed from .578 to .706.\textsuperscript{106}

Moreover, perhaps most concerning, incessantly high rates of violent crime and insecurity prevents society—especially poor shanty town dwellers, or \textit{favela}iros—from reaping the benefits of democracy and economic development. According to Arias, a perverse interaction between drug traffickers, the state, and civil society organizations enables traffickers to maintain state and social support for their control over \textit{favelas} (shanty towns).\textsuperscript{107} Thus, the Brazilian government’s inability to provide security, as well as sufficient employment, education, and political representation for its underclass undermines democracy. Furthermore, widespread human rights abuses by military police, prison torture, and rampant impunity\textsuperscript{108} are issues that could taint Brazil’s image abroad and undermine its soft power leadership capacity.

The upcoming World Cup and Olympics in Rio de Janeiro, however, may provide the needed impetus for the Brazilian government to implement a holistic policy response to Rio’s crime problem. The New York Times notes that specially trained Police Pacification Units, which combine policing with social work have succeeded in reducing homicide rates and significantly increasing school attendance in some Rio neighborhoods. Those accomplishments, according to The Washington Post, have begun to improve the Brazilian police force’s

\textsuperscript{108} Pereira, Anthony W. 2008 “Public Security, Private Interests, and Police Reform in Brazil.” In \textit{Democratic Brazil Revisited}. Edited by Peter R. Kingstone and Timothy J. Power. University of Pittsburgh Press: Pittsburgh. Brazil’s homicide rate increased per 100,000 from 11.7 in 1980 to 28.5 in 2002. That rate is reinforced by the country’s dysfunctional criminal justice system.
“reputation for brutality and corruption in favelas.” Complementing its increased police presence and reformed pacification strategy, the Brazilian government is investing in the infrastructure of those neighborhoods, awarding $4.7 billion to 40 firms to redesign 582 of them, which it hopes will provide employment opportunities for residents.

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110 Grudgings, “Brazil - and its businesses - look to bring new order to slums.”
Chapter III: The Origins of Brazilian Diplomatic Identity and Foreign Policy

Nye holds that there are three sources of soft power for states: culture, political values and foreign policy. To be sure, Brazil possesses all three facets. Though this thesis focuses primarily on the impact of domestic and foreign policy, it is worth briefly noting the attraction of Brazilian culture. The most conspicuous example of that attraction of Brazilian culture is that country’s prowess in the world’s most popular sport—soccer. Brazil has won five world cups, more than any other country and arguably the most talented player ever to play the game, Pelé (Edson Arantes do Nascimento), is Brazilian. According to an ESPN article, “Pelé and Brazil helped shape the World Cup into the greatest show on earth.”111 Underscoring the power and reach of Brazilian soccer, in 1968 the belligerent parties to the Nigerian civil war agreed to a forty-eight hour cease-fire in order to watch Pelé play an exhibition game in Lagos.112 Moreover, Brazil’s economic transition, stable political system and social policy serve as a model and source of inspiration for other developing countries. Bolsa Familia, as noted in the previous chapter, has been replicated in Haiti and elsewhere.

Because Brazil is a geopolitically isolated middle power (it lacks the military and economic strength of a great power), diplomacy is a critical asset for projecting influence and obtaining foreign policy objectives. Brazil’s ministry of foreign relations, Itamaraty, promotes multilateralism, adherence to international law and norms, international cooperation, and peaceful solutions to conflict. Scholars have exalted Itamaraty’s talents in conflict mediation,

and have labeled it the “best foreign ministry in Latin America.” Moreover, Itamaraty has long been an elite institution and an instrument of Brazilian soft power. This chapter traces the origins and evolution of Brazil’s foreign policy vision and diplomatic culture.

Itamaraty, scholars note, possesses uncommon skills in conflict mediation. To be sure, Itamaraty has demonstrated a capacity for negotiating peaceful resolutions to political conflict since around the turn of the twentieth century. Between 1895 and 1909, it settled all of Brazil’s border disputes with neighbors and colonial powers through diplomatic negotiations and arbitration, and promoted cooperation between states in the Western Hemisphere (pan-Americanism).

Brazil, as illustrated by its role in mediating bilateral conflicts between Peru and Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela; combating internal threats to democracy in Paraguay, Venezuela, and Ecuador; and the use of military force (under UN auspices) to maintain international peace and security in Haiti remains a champion of diplomacy and international law as a conflict resolution mechanisms.

Burns and Lafer attribute Itamaraty’s ideological roots to the Rio Branco, Brazilian consul and foreign minister (1902-1912), who used his extensive knowledge of South American history and geography to peacefully and favorably resolve Brazil’s territorial disputes. Furthermore, he built the institution of Itamaraty, and “inspired the style of diplomatic behavior

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114 An analysis of Itamaraty’s internal management and training as it relates to Brazil’s ability to obtain favorable outcomes in international negotiations should be a topic of future research; it is beyond the scope of this thesis.
116 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations.
118 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations.
that...characterizes Brazil,” which Lafer describes as “constructive moderation.” Moreover, there is a “line of continuity” in Brazilian diplomacy that can be drawn from the peaceful settlement of Brazil’s borders and pan-Americanism during the time of Rio Branco to modern Brazilian foreign policy initiatives such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), the creation of Mercosur (1991), and command of MINUSTAH (2005). Moreover, the principles of foreign policy advocated by Rio Branco remain at the core of modern Brazilian diplomacy. To understand the roots of Brazil’s diplomatic culture and Itamaraty as an institution requires a more detailed discussion of foreign policy under Rio Branco and the legacy he bequeathed to both the former and the latter.

During his tenure as Minister of Foreign Relations, Rio Branco had three principal foreign policy objectives: To settle Brazil’s border conflicts, establish its leadership in Latin America, and augment its international prestige. To be sure, Rio Branco’s most outstanding achievement, for which he became a national hero, was his successful negotiation of Brazil’s border disputes with France, Britain, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina, which yielded 342,000 square miles of additional territory for Brazil (an area of land...
Rubens Ricupero aptly captures the importance of that accomplishment, noting that, “it is difficult to find, in the history of international relations, a negotiating performance and an exclusively peaceful pattern similar to the Brazilian one in the establishment of national borders.”

Two important facts further shed light on the critical significance of that accomplishment. Firstly, Brazil shares a nine thousand mile border with ten states. And secondly, as Bradford observes, border disputes have been the cause of nearly all South American wars. For those reasons, Rio Branco sought to demarcate Brazil’s territorial dimensions. Moreover, the settlement of those four century-old disputes, the last of which negotiations (with Uruguay and Peru) concluded in 1909, averted the further escalation of border wars (armed conflict had already broken out in the Amazon along the borders with Peru and Bolivia before mediation with those countries began). This enabled Brazil to establish a peaceful developmental trajectory from the early twentieth century onward without the nagging threat of armed conflict with neighboring states, a luxury which distinguishes it from Spanish American countries. Border conflicts persisted between Peru and Ecuador, Argentina and Chile, Venezuela and Guyana, Belize and Guatemala continued to struggle with border disputes into the 1990s and 2000s, and emerging markets—Russia and China especially—still grapple with such quandaries.

Furthermore, Brazil’s state-building process distinguishes itself from both BRIC countries and emerging markets—Russia and China especially—still grapple with such quandaries.

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126 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations, 49
127 Lafer, “Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” 214
128 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations, 40
129 Ibid, 47-48. Rio Branco negotiated territorial disputes with France (French Guiana), Great Britain (British Guiana), Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Uruguay.
130 Ibid
131 Roett, Riordan. 2010. The New Brazil. Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C. Brazil’s long history of peaceful domestic political transitions is also an anomaly in Latin American politics. It became an autonomous monarchy in 1822 without a war of independence from Portugal and in 1889 transitioned peacefully from monarchy to republic. The military coup in 1964 which deposed President Goulart occurred without bloodshed, as did the return to democracy in 1985.
many Spanish American states in that it “has been the result of successful diplomatic negotiation rather than engagement in military disputes.”

Examining the methods and principles which Rio Branco applied during the resolution of Brazil’s border disputes, is instructive for tracing the origins of the diplomatic identity that characterizes Brazil today. Rio Branco peacefully resolved territorial disputes through arbitration and diplomatic negotiations. His first diplomatic victory came in 1895 (before his tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs) through arbitration. U.S. President Grover Cleveland arbitrated Brazil and Argentina’s contested ownership of the Missions territory, during which Rio Branco’s argument, which he based on eighteenth-century documents, maps and Brazilian settlement of the area reigned triumphant. President Cleveland, thus, awarded the 13,680 square mile territory to Brazil.

Although he would later become leery of arbitration after an unfavorable ruling in favor of Great Britain issued by Italian King Victor Emmanuel, that process was instrumental in delineating Brazil’s borders and was an essential aspect of Rio Branco’s diplomatic ambition to “distinguish his country as an outstanding world leader in peaceful solutions to international problems.” Although this effort was partially designed to deflect criticism of its rearmament program, by 1909, only Spain and the U.S. had signed more treaties of arbitration than Brazil.

The loss in arbitration to Great Britain over British Guiana led Rio Branco to emphasize direct (bilateral) negotiations in later conflicts, a strategy which lent Brazil greater leverage in the processes. As a part of his strategy, Rio Branco chose to negate “vague” previous treaties

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134 Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations, 52, 53
135 Ibid, 53
between Spain and Portugal which governed disputed South American territories. Instead, he utilized the doctrine of *uti possidetis* as the criterion for territorial ownership. That principle (inherited from Portugal) stated that the requirement for territorial possession “would be whose citizens inhabited the disputed area.”

*Uti posseditis* proved to be a powerful diplomatic tool in the dispute with Bolivia over Acre, where Brazilian rubber gatherers had come to constitute the majority of the population in that region. Furthermore, Bolivia’s claims to the region were complicated by its effective lack of control over the region due to its distance from the Bolivian capital. In essence, Brazilians formed the majority of the population and exercised *de facto* control over the economic activity in the territory. The Treaty of Petropolis reflected that reality, and gave Brazil possession of the 73,000 square mile area in 1903. In negotiations with Lima over Peruvian claims to Acre (North of the land claimed by Bolivia), Rio Branco successfully employed the same principles of negotiation. Since Brazilians also made up the majority of the population in the Northern area of Acre, his argument proved most cogent. Hence, Brazil took control of 63,000 square mile of that territory to Peru’s 10,000.

In his endeavors to establish Brazil’s international prestige and regional leadership, Rio Branco shifted the focus of diplomatic relations from Europe to the Western Hemisphere. He sent diplomats to both Quito and Bogota, capitals which had previously shared one representative and for the first time assigned representatives to several Central American

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136 Ibid, 40. The treaties of Tordesillas (1494), Madrid (1750), and San Idelfonso (1777) all divided South America in general terms.
137 Ibid, 44
138 Ibid. This was not always the case. In 1867, the two governments negotiated the Treaty of La Paz de Ayacucho, which recognized *uti posseditis* as the principle of ownership of the territory, and at that time favored Bolivia. However, Bolivia’s neglect of that area allowed Brazilian rubber explorers to enter the region, later becoming the majority of its population.
139 Ibid
140 Ibid, 47
countries and Cuba, and sent his best diplomats to Washington, Lima, Santiago and Buenos Aires, thus prioritizing relations with those countries.\textsuperscript{141}

Maintaining a friendly relationship with Washington was pivotal. First of all, a close relationship with Washington was a matter of pragmatism for Brazil since the U.S. was the most lucrative market for its main export—coffee—and purchased an average of nearly 40\% of its total annual exports from 1909-1911.\textsuperscript{142} Thus, Rio Branco and Ambassador Joaquin Nabuco sought successfully to maintain the favorable terms of trade that previous pro-American Ambassador to the U.S Salvador de Mendonça had obtained.\textsuperscript{143} In a bid to preserve access to the U.S. market, Nabuco honed friendly relationships with U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root, President William H. Taft, and several influential senators, and managed to reduce Brazil’s tariffs on American goods, which had risen substantially since the 1891 agreement. In addition, having congruent economic interests\textsuperscript{144} served as a foundation for strong political ties between the two countries.

Historical and political ties also facilitated Rio Branco’s efforts to maintain a close relationship with Washington. The two countries shared a natural bond as young sizable republics and after its independence in 1889, Brazil looked to the U.S. Constitution as a model for its political organization and based its own constitution on that document. The U.S., “pleased to welcome another nation into the republican fraternity, especially one that openly took the Constitution of 1787 as its model” became the first international power to give that country

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid. Under Mendonça, Brazil and the U.S. maintained signed a trade reciprocity agreement in 1891. Under the agreement, Brazil’s primary exports (coffee, rubber, sugar, cocoa, and hides) entered the U.S. duty free or with minor tariffs and vice-versa.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid. On no economic front were Brazil and the U.S. competitors. This stood in contrast to the U.S.-Argentina economic relationship, as both were wheat exporters. Brazil, in contrast was an exporter of tropical primary goods, none of which the U.S. produced.
diplomatic recognition. Furthermore, President Cleveland, as aforementioned, arbitrated the dispute with South American rival Argentina over the Mission, awarding that territory to Brazil.

Seeking to augment its prestige and regional leadership, under the stewardship of Rio Branco, Brazil used its support of the U.S.’s foreign policy toward Latin America to establish itself as an intermediary between the U.S. and the region. While many Latin American countries viewed the Monroe Doctrine, the Roosevelt Corollary, the Big Stick, and Dollar Diplomacy as a threat to sovereignty, Brazil viewed those policies as beneficial for its national defense (deterrence against European invasion) and for its position in regional disputes. Diplomatic proximity to the U.S. assured that country’s moral support (or neutrality at the least) during in conflicts with neighbors,\(^{145}\) and increased “its diplomatic maneuverability in the South American chess game.”\(^{146}\) Furthermore, Rio Branco saw friendship with Washington as an opportunity to “offset [its] feeling of solitude or ostracism in South America.”\(^{147}\)

In the view of the U.S., Rio Branco’s favorable interpretations of what Spanish America deemed to be an aggressive stance toward the region acted to boost support for its regional policies. Furthermore, the presence of a friendly power in South America would make the formation of a regional alliance against it improbable.\(^{148}\) For Spanish America, Brazil’s representation in Washington (Brazil and the U.S. had mutually upgraded their foreign legations to embassies in 1905, signaling the strength of their relationship),\(^{149}\) and apparent ability to

\(^{145}\) Ibid. This enhanced Brazil’s leverage in regional territorial disputes. During negotiations over Acre with Peru, Brazil was able to utilize diplomatic pressure from Washington to its advantage.

\(^{146}\) Ibid, 171

\(^{147}\) Ibid, 170. This was the result of a shared sentiment of isolation in a predominantly Spanish-speaking region. With the exception of Chile, distrust and conflict characterized all of Brazil’s relationship with South American countries. According to Burns, it was natural, therefore, for the the two “outcasts” to forge a closer relationship.

\(^{148}\) Ibid, 175

\(^{149}\) Ibid, 95. During that time, because states possessed few embassies, this was a significant step that marked the strength of the two countries’ ties. Burns notes that in 1904, the U.S. had only seven embassies, while Brazil had none.
interpret American policies gave the impression that Brazil could lobby Washington on its behalf.

Brazil’s role as intermediary between Spanish America and the U.S. was particularly salient in maintaining smooth Chilean-American diplomatic relations. During a 1908 boundary dispute between Chile and Peru, Ambassador Nabuco weighed in on Chile’s behalf and sought to secure Washington’s support of Chilean claims.\textsuperscript{150} That same year, Brazil lobbied Washington on Paraguay’s behalf, to establish a legation in that country.

Rio Branco strove to maintain cooperative relations with Brazil’s neighbors through support of pan-Americanism, albeit as a part of a strategic effort to raise Brazil’s international prestige.\textsuperscript{151} Despite publicly promoting the pan-American ideal of “friendship among the American peoples,” in reality, the foreign minister privately distrusted Brazil’s neighbors and once declared that “no Spanish-speaking country is good and no person of Spanish blood can be trusted.”\textsuperscript{152} Hence, it should be noted that a staunch realism guided Rio Branco’s official promotion of cooperation with Latin America.\textsuperscript{153} However, acrimonious relations and conflict with those states would have impeded his ultimate objectives of advancing Brazil’s regional and international prestige. In short, by establishing itself as an essential diplomatic link between the U.S. and Latin America, Brazil enhanced its prestige and leadership in the region—two of Rio Branco’s primary foreign policy objectives.

Despite his leeriness of Spanish America, Rio Branco, according to Burns, promoted regional cooperation, or Pan-Americanism, in three ways. First, his resolution of Brazil’s territorial boundaries removed the primary cause of armed conflict in Latin America—border

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid, 175
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid, 178
\textsuperscript{153} Hilton, “Brazil and the Post-Versailles World: Elite Images and Foreign Policy Strategy,” 157
disputes—and established a platform for cooperation with neighboring states.\textsuperscript{154} Second, he expanded Itamaraty’s participation in international affairs, which gave impetus to regional cooperation. Brazil also attended regional and global conferences such as the Montevideo Sanitary Congress (1904), the Geneva Conference on the Red Cross (1906), and the Fourth International Congress of Fisheries (1908), and the Second International Peace Conference at The Hague to name a few.\textsuperscript{155} And third, Rio Branco used Brazil’s position as a regional intermediary to ameliorate relations between the U.S. and Spanish America, as evidenced by his efforts at the third Third Pan-American Conference in Rio de Janeiro where the “U.S. was accepted more by the continent and old suspicions and resentments were mitigated.”\textsuperscript{156}

Rio Branco was also instrumental in the early institutional modernization of Itamaraty. As Minister of Foreign Relations, he oversaw the expansion of Brazil’s diplomatic workforce, which he sought to fill with young attractive (tall and European looking) intellectuals, including recognized authors and cultural icons of the time. He also enhanced diplomats’ pay and beautified the Itamaraty building establishing an extensive library and map archive. According to Burns, Rio Branco transformed Itamaraty from a “cramped and disorganized” institution into an “up-to-date, efficient, and tightly run ministry,” and “made it capable of fully implementing” his foreign policies.\textsuperscript{157}

Rio Branco’s impact on Brazilian diplomacy was long lasting. The enhancement of prestige, pursued through close relations with the U.S. and participation in international forums, remained a core element of Brazilian foreign policy until after World War II. To strengthen their relationship with Washington and buttress its international prestige, Brazil distinguished itself as

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid, 158. Burns adds that Rio Branco conducted these negotiations in such a fashion that allowed disputants to remain friendly relations after reaching a resolution.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid, 51
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid, 158
\textsuperscript{157} Ibid, 39
the only South American country to declare war on the Axis powers and contribute to the Allies’ World War I effort.  

Brazil seemingly accomplished its objective: three of the Big Five countries—Great Britain, France, and Italy—upgraded their delegations in Rio de Janeiro to embassies. Furthermore, Brazil, having declared war on the Axis powers, had ostensibly gained a role in European affairs, which led Itamaraty to conceive of an important dual role for Brazil in promoting cooperation in Europe and Latin America.  

With key support from Washington, Brazil participated in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, out of which came the Treaty of Versailles, which delineated the terms of peace after the war, and the League of Nations. That same year, Brazil became the only Latin American state to obtain a seat on the first Council of the League of Nations, to which it would be re-elected in 1922. Thus, as Stanley observes, “The 1920s offered...what seemed to be a unique opportunity for bolstering Brazil’s international status through the political endorsement of the great powers.”

Seeking to consolidate Brazil’s prestigious role in international politics, during the mid-1920s, the President Bernardes’ administration “exerted itself ‘to the utmost’ to secure permanent membership” on the League’s Council. Parallel to its efforts to position itself as a diplomatic intermediary between the U.S. and Latin America under Rio Branco, Brazil sought to establish a niche role for itself at the League of Nations as a spokesperson for smaller countries’ interests, while expecting to be treated as an equal to the great powers.

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160 Ibid


164 Ibid. This was a quote from American Ambassador Edwin Morgan regarding Brazil’s efforts to obtain permanent membership, 352
Great powers scoffed at those efforts; For example, British Ambassador to Brazil, John Tilley, characterized Brazil’s interest in permanent membership as “showy” in a report to the Foreign Office, and predicted that if not granted a permanent seat, it would lose interest in the organization as a whole.\textsuperscript{165} As Stanley notes, Tilley’s suspicion proved correct, as in 1926 Brazil pulled out of the organization after European powers neglected to grant it permanent membership after admitting Germany.\textsuperscript{166} Europe’s rejection of Brazil as a key player in the maintenance of international peace and security and was a “major diplomatic defeat...that revealed how chimerical the pursuit of elevated international status was without sufficient national power”\textsuperscript{167} and pushed Brazil back towards one of the keystones of Rio Branco’s diplomacy: prioritization of relations with the Western Hemisphere. Hence, Brazil, despite its international activism failed to obtain the political endorsement from great powers that it sought.

The same foreign policy objectives which propelled Brazil to partake in World War I and the League of Nations also motivated Brazil to participate in the Allied effort during World War II. Hilton describes Vargas’ decision to send the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (over 20,000 Brazilian troops) to alongside the American 5th Army in Northern Italy\textsuperscript{168} “as a calculated move to enhance Brazil’s prestige and bargaining position in postwar councils.”\textsuperscript{169} Brazil’s wartime partnership with the U.S. was not just a “showy” affair, but also a strategic calculation which yielded much needed military and industrial development assistance. Brazilianist Thomas E. Skidmore affirms that in 1942, with the Brazilian Air Force only three years old, the U.S. took over “training of Brazilian pilots and began furnishing hundreds of planes under the lend lease

\begin{footnotes}
\item[165] Ibid, 352
\item[166] Ibid
\item[167] Ibid, 363. During the inter-war period, Brazil’s military was weak and remained inferior to Argentina’s.
\end{footnotes}
act” and furthermore that there “followed a flood of other military equipment from the U.S.” as well as “financing for a national steel plant which was later constructed at Volta Redonda.”

At the end of the Second World War, Brazil felt deserving of special treatment from Washington for its contribution to the Allied war effort; the U.S.’s attention, however, was concentrated Cold War security and the rebuilding of Western Europe, and Washington issued only indefinite promises of a Latin American Marshall Plan, which amounted to minimal actual economic aid. Santos notes that between 1945 and 1952, Belgium and Luxemburg together received more economic assistance from the U.S. than all twenty Latin American states combined. Lack of economic assistance, along with Roosevelt’s unfulfilled promise to Brazil that it would obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, produced a sense of disillusionment in the Brazilian foreign policy community. In turn, what Brazil perceived as the betrayal of its most important ally, engendered a major shift in the focus of that country’s diplomacy away from the prioritization of prestige and cultivation of close ties with Washington.

Instead, from the 1960s to the early 1980s, Brazil aligned itself politically with Third World coalitions and adopted economic development as its core objective; hence, Brazil was proactive within the G-77 and the trade related organizations of the post-war era, particularly the GATT and UNCTAD. Within those organizations, it strongly defended non-discrimination measures, such as a Most Favored Nation status as well as policies which favored developing countries. Brazil also favored non-reciprocity (and the right to take retaliatory action in the form of anti-dumping measures and countervailing duties) in trade negotiations to counteract against

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170 Skidmore, “Brazilian Foreign Policy Under Vargas, 1930-1945: A Case of Regime Type Irrelevance.” 338-339
“arbitrary measures and unilateral...protectionist action of the industrialized countries.”\footnote{173}{Ibid, 26}

However, while voicing strong support of the aforementioned principles, Brazil did not play a leading role in lobbying for developing countries’ interests during trade negotiations.\footnote{174}{Ibid} Furthermore, from 1968 to 1988, Brazil remained absent as a non-permanent member on the UN Security Council. That lack of participation was uncharacteristic of Brazil, as that country has served as a non-permanent member of the Council ten times (twenty non-consecutive years) since the creation of the UN, which is more than any other non-permanent member.\footnote{175}{United Nations Security Council. http://www.un.org/sc/searchres_sc_members_english.asp?sc_members=167} Brazil’s leadership role in international institutions would resume after its economic stabilization under the Cardoso and Lula administrations.

As evidenced by the Cardoso and Lula administrations’ emphasis on multilateral diplomacy as a means of addressing peace and security, trade, and the post-2008 global economic recovery, soft power remains a core element of Brazilian foreign today. As this chapter shows, Brazilian diplomatic culture’s embrace of multilateralism and championship of international law and diplomacy as tools of peaceful conflict resolution are legacies of Rio Branco.

**Chapter IV: Brazil’s Regional Leadership**

As the previous chapter illustrates, the concept of Brazil as a regional leader is not a novelty in Brazilian foreign policy. Rio Branco, Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations from 1902-1912, sought to raise Brazil’s prestige and regional leadership. He attempted to achieve that objective by augmenting Brazil’s participation in regional and international organizations, establishing Brazil as a leader in peaceful solutions to international conflict, promoting hemispheric cooperation and by honing an informal alliance with the United States that
buttressed its relative power and allowed it to become an intermediary between Washington and Latin America.

This chapter will examine three facets of Brazil’s role as a regional leader: crisis management, economic integration, and political cooperation. To elucidate those aspects of Brazilian regional leadership, case studies will be provided. In assessing Brazil’s role as regional crisis manager, I will discuss its mediation of the Ecuador-Peru border conflict, persuading Cuba to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco, combating the return of authoritarian rule in Paraguay and Honduras, and its command of MINUSTAH. Moreover, to elucidate its economic leadership I will examine Brazil’s role in Mercosur, while Unasur and the Rio Group will serve as case studies for Brazilian political leadership. Lastly, I will assess the successes and limitations of Brazil’s regional leadership.

Crisis Management

Brazil has long played a role as a diplomatic interlocutor and defender of regional democratic norms. As the previous chapter reveals, Brazil established itself as an intermediary between the U.S. and Latin America around the turn of the century during Rio Branco’s tenure as foreign minister. Beyond the role of intermediary, Brazil also has a chronicled history of involvement in regional peacekeeping, which dates to the time of the League of Nations when that country sent a

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176 OAS Inter-American Charter. http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/tables_en.htm. The 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter asserts that democratic governance is a requisite for OAS membership, and “alteration or interruption of the democratic order in a state of the hemisphere constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to participation of that state’s government.” See the expulsion of Honduras from the organization in 2009.
naval officer to join a committee which administered a dispute between Colombia and Ecuador over the Leticia territory.\textsuperscript{177}

\textit{Ecuador-Peru Border Dispute}

As a part of a group of “friendly powers” (Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and the U.S.) Brazil was instrumental in resolving a border dispute between Ecuador and Peru which dates back to the early 19th century. Both disputants signed the 1942 Rio Protocol, as did the four powers as a formal means of signaling their commitment to resolving disagreements over border demarcation and the enactment of a treaty provision which called for mutual land concessions. The Brazilian government appointed Naval Captain Braz Días de Aguiar as a technical expert to assist an Ecuadorian-Peruvian mixed boundary commission to delineate the border between the two countries; according to St. John, the commission heeded De Aguiar’s decisions regarding the disputant’s geographic boundaries with only minor exceptions.\textsuperscript{178}

The resolution of the conflict in 1945 was short-lived, however, as a U.S. Air Force aerial study of the Cordillera del Condor, the region in question, revealed the inaccuracy of previous geographic depictions. That study reignited the conflict. The Ecuadorian government claimed that the terms of the Rio Protocol, which were based on flawed information, unfairly favored Peru and impeded it from obtaining fluvial access to the Amazon (via the Marañon River). Peru, in contrast, continued to support the terms of the Rio Protocol. Despite the friendly powers’ attempts to resolve the conflict, most prominently by the U.S. under the Carter Administration and afterward under Secretary of State Alexander Haig, both sides remained intransigent and

periodic minor skirmishes persisted until tensions led to a month long military clash (the Cenepa War) in January 1995.\textsuperscript{179}

Brazil was central to negotiating the end of the Cenepa War, which claimed the lives of more than one thousand people.\textsuperscript{180} In February 1995, Ecuador and Peru signed The Declaración de Itamaraty in Brazil, which included a cease-fire, provisions for military demobilization, and a framework for bilateral talks.\textsuperscript{181} Later, in 1998, Brazil again hosted Ecuador and Peru in Brasilia, where the two countries signed the Acta de Brasilia, which marked the conclusion of the five-decade old conflict and addressed the remaining differences between the two countries.\textsuperscript{182} During the commemorative ceremony, President Cardoso spoke on behalf of the four guarantors of the Rio Protocol, and commended the Peruvian and Ecuadorian Presidents (Alberto Fujimori and Jamil Mahuad) for their perseverance in guiding their countries to peace.\textsuperscript{183}

\textit{Cuba}

The Treaty of Tlatelolco, which makes Latin America a nuclear weapon free zone, while initiated in 1967, did not enter force until 1994, requiring the signatures of every state in the region to take effect. In that year, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim made a three day

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid
\textsuperscript{181} St. John
\textsuperscript{183} Jimenez, Carlos. October 27, 1998. “Los presidentes de Perú y Ecuador firman la paz en Brasilia y delimitan su frontera.” \textit{El Pais}. Accessed November 7, 2011. http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/FUJIMORI/_ALBERTO/MAHUAD/_JAMIL_/POLITICO_DE_ECUADOR /PERU/LATINOAMERICA/ECUADOR/presidentes/Peru/Ecuador/firman/paz/Brasilia/deliminan/frontera/elpepiint/19981027/elpepiint_11/Tes. In attendance were the presidents of the two other South American guarantors, Carlos Menem and Eduardo Frei of Argentina and Chile, respectively as well as a presidential representative from the U.S. The presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, the King and Queen of Spain, and a representative of Pope John Paul II also were present.
trip to Cuba, which at that time was the only Latin American country which had not yet signed the treaty. During that visit, Amorim convinced Fidel Castro “to join [the Treaty of Tlatelolco] on the grounds that it benefitted Latin America, irrespective of the United States’ interests.”

Moreover, as Krasno notes, this was “a major achievement for non-proliferation and Latin America.”

Paraguayan Democracy

The Cardoso Administration’s role in preventing a 1996 military coup in Paraguay highlights the key role that Brazil plays in safeguarding democratic governance in the region. Democracy had only recently been restored in that country after thirty-five years of authoritarian rule under Alfredo Stroessner, with the first civilian president, Juan Carlos Wasmosy, elected by popular vote in free and competitive elections in 1993. According to Valenzuela, despite democratically held elections, the armed forces still wielded considerable control over governmental decision making, and posed a formidable challenge to democratic consolidation in Paraguay. Hence, when Wasmosy insisted on dismissing army commander General Lino Cesar Oviedo from his post, a confrontation that threatened to upset Paraguayan constitutional

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186 Krasno 1999, 185
188 Valenzuela, “The Coup That Didn’t Happen”
order ensued. With the support of other Paraguayan generals, Oviedo\textsuperscript{189} responded with threats to spill “rivers of blood.”\textsuperscript{190}

The Cardoso Administration, alongside the U.S. and the EU, stood firmly in support of the Wasmosy administration and made clear that a coup would result in Paraguay’s isolation and economic sanctions. Brazilian Ambassador Marcio D’Oliveira Dias issued a strong initial public statement on behalf of Mercosur condemning Oviedo’s actions. Later during the crisis, after Wasmosy had sought to compromise by allowing Oviedo to assume command of the Ministry of Defense, Ambassador Dias attempted (unsuccessfully) to convince Oviedo not to accept the offer, given the overwhelming opposition of the Paraguayan people.\textsuperscript{191}

Leveraging Paraguay’s membership in Mercosur and growing economic dependence on Brazil (in 1995 Paraguay’s exports to Brazil accounted for half of its GDP), the Cardoso Administration threatened to cut trade ties, suspend payments for electricity generated by Paraguay’s portion of the Itaipu Dam (which represented 26\% of the Paraguayan government budget)\textsuperscript{192} and eliminate other crucial subsidies.\textsuperscript{193} Moreover, according to Genna and Hiroi, Brazil’s staunch support of Paraguayan democratic leadership proved prominent in leading the general and his followers to recognize “the futility of their actions.”\textsuperscript{194} 195

\textsuperscript{189} Genna, Gaspare M. and Taeko Hiroi. 2004. “Brazilian Regional Power in the Development of Mercosul.” \textit{Latin American Perspectives} 34: 43-57. General Oviedo barricaded himself at the First Army Corps headquarters, and declared that he would only relinquish his command of the army if he was made defense minister.

\textsuperscript{190} Valenzuela, “The Coup That Didn’t Happen,” 46-47. Stroessner ruled from 1954 to 1989 after being deposed in a coup by the armed forces.

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid

\textsuperscript{192} Genna, Gaspare M. and Taeko, “Brazilian Regional Power in the Development of Mercosul,” 47. Sanctions against Paraguay were economically risky for Brazil too, as severing trade with Paraguay and effectively shutting down the Itaipu generator would have led to a 25 percent reduction in Brazil’s electricity.

\textsuperscript{193} Genna, Gaspare M. and Taeko, “Brazilian Regional Power in the Development of Mercosul,” 47

\textsuperscript{194} Ibid, 47. General Oviedo subsequently turned himself in on April 24, 1996.

\textsuperscript{195} Valenzuela, “The Coup That Didn’t Happen,” 51. Valenzuela attributes the prevention of the coup less to Paraguay’s economic dependency and more to “loyalist sectors of the armed forces” which came to see civilian rule as the best way to assure the preservation of the armed forces.
In contrast to its prominent role in defending Paraguayan democracy, Brazil has been less proactive on other instances of democratic erosion in Peru under Alberto Fujimori, and in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez. As the Council on Foreign Relations notes, Brazil “does not...engage in what U.S. policymakers would recognize as democracy or human rights promotion.” Regardless, Brazil has reduced the saliency of Chavez’s vision through its diplomacy and the precedent it has set for the region through its own process of democratization, economic reform, and successful redistributive social policies.

Peacekeeping in Haiti

Brazil has commanded the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the only peacekeeping mission in the Americas, since 2004. There are roughly 2,200 Brazilian personnel in MINUSTAH. The stabilization mission, established by Security Council Resolution 1542, involves a wide variety of tasks, including “the monitoring, restructuring and reforms of the Haitian national police; assisting the transitional government with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes for armed groups; assisting with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti; protecting United Nations personnel and installations and local civilians. Brazil’s presence in

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197 Bodman, Samuel W., James D. Wolfensohn and Julia E. Sweig, “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations”
201 Soares de Lima and Herz, “Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities,” 32.
Haiti, before the devastating 2010 earthquake, according to one UN General Assembly official, assisted in bringing greater stability to the capital city, Port-au-Prince.

The 2010 earthquake and the subsequent outbreak of Cholera on the island have added to the complexity and responsibilities of that mission, to which Brazil responded with increased financial and personnel support, thus “reaffirming its commitment to Haiti’s development and UN peacekeeping.” Brazil sought to lead the humanitarian recovery efforts, putting together a $205 million relief package, which the Foreign Minister dubbed the “Lula Plan.” Brazil also sent a rescue contingent of 1,300 workers, ten units of doctors, 6,000 tons of food, and eleven tons of water.

Scholars and journalists unanimously explain Brazil’s efforts in Haiti as an integral part of its bid to prove itself worthy of a seat on the Security Council, if and when that body expands its permanent membership. Military command of a major UN peacekeeping mission--currently the only one in the Western Hemisphere—is a great source of prestige. It also enhances Brazil’s international image as a promulgator of international security norms and showcases its commitment to the UN’s founding purpose of maintaining international peace and security. The strategic aspects of Brazil’s role in Haiti will be discussed more in depth in the subsequent chapter on Brazil’s international leadership.

Despite its contributions to security and the humanitarian relief effort in Haiti growing public outrage at UN peacekeepers over the Cholera epidemic, as well as recent allegations that Uruguayan troops sexually assaulted an eighteen-year-old man, seem to have motivated Brazil to

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202 Mosk, Matthew and Rym Momtaz. November 8, 2011. “Report: UN Peacekeepers Caused Cholera Epidemic in Haiti.” ABC News. The epidemic infected over half of a million people, killing more than 6,000, and is blamed on reckless behavior of Nepalese UN peacekeepers who allegedly allowed raw sewage to seep into the island’s largest river.


hasten its exit from Haiti, as Defense Minister Celso Amorim announced that Brazil will begin a partial withdrawal of its troops next March.\textsuperscript{205}

\textit{Economic Integration}

Brazil played a pivotal role in the creation of Mercosur, a free trade organization and customs union with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Mercosur’s underpinning is Brazil’s rapprochement with its long time rival--Argentina. The military regimes which ruled those countries (in Brazil from 1964-1985 and in Argentina from 1976-1983) viewed one another as national security threats. As a result of the rivalry and mutual distrust that characterized the countries’ bilateral relationship, both had developed secret nuclear programs.\textsuperscript{206} However, under the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), and in coordination with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the two countries agreed to “mutual inspections to ensure that neither country [was] pursuing nuclear weapons and that nuclear research facilities [were] not diverting nuclear material for weapons use.”\textsuperscript{207}

Those measures assisted in bringing about a thaw in relations between the two countries, and in 1986 civilian presidents José Sarney of Brazil and Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina met at the Iguaçu River, (which separates the two countries), signifying a formal normalization. Later that year, Sarney and Alfonsín signed a twelve point protocol to create a common market.\textsuperscript{208} Mercosur later incorporated Paraguay and Uruguay as formal bloc members in 1990,\textsuperscript{209} and more

\textsuperscript{208} Krasno 1999, 187
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid, 187
recently signed a deal with the Community of Andean nations, thus making Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Bolivia associate members.

Mercosur holds great economic and political consequence for Brazil. As the most competitive economy within the world’s fourth largest trading bloc, Brazil stood to benefit from expanding regional markets for its exports and investment opportunities for its enterprises and to increase its leverage in international trade negotiations by creating an economy of scale.

The organization has succeeded in deepening Brazil’s trade and investment ties with members. As a result, Brazil’s future economic development, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, is tied to further integration of regional infrastructure.\(^\text{210}\) Since 2004, Brazil’s total trade with Mercosur countries more than doubled, from $15.3 to $36.6 billion.\(^\text{211}\) Worth noting, also, is the fact that Brazil’s annual trade with the Latin America and the Caribbean (the majority of which is with Mercosur countries) exceeds trade volumes with Brazil’s two largest trading partners, China and the U.S., respectively.\(^\text{212}\) Significantly, Brazil’s trade with Argentina, which suffered after the Brazilian currency devaluation (1999) and Argentine financial crisis (1999-2001), has reached record levels. Total trade between the two countries rose from $30.86 billion in 2008 to $32.95 billion in 2010.\(^\text{213}\)

Despite record volumes, however, the two states’ trade relationship remains conflictive, as does intra-bloc trade in general. Much of the enduring tension has to do with Brazil’s economic preponderance, the persistence of its protectionist practices, and its unwillingness to


\(^{212}\) Bodman, Wolfensohn and Sweig. “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations”

\(^{213}\) Ibid
make trade and investment concessions.\textsuperscript{214} Furthermore, tariff disputes continue, and are aggravated due to Mercosur’s lack of institutionalization: That organization has failed to implement a genuine customs union and common external tariff, and lacks a viable dispute resolution mechanism.\textsuperscript{215}

Thus, Mercosur lacks the ability to internally resolve trade conflicts between Argentina and Brazil, which have been commonplace over the past few years. The most recent of those tiffs, over Brazil’s refusal to grant import licenses for Argentine auto imports (a critical Argentine export, 80% of which go to Brazil) could significantly harm the Argentine economy, which is already experiencing double digit inflation.\textsuperscript{216} Despite the frequency of Brazilian-Argentine trade conflicts, however, this one in particular marks a divergence in foreign policy between the Rousseff and Lula Administrations. While Lula, in the name of advancing regional cooperation, sought to curtail such disputes, the new Rousseff administration seems to be forgoing such “strategic patience.”\textsuperscript{217}

Ideological opposition from Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, which view free trade as exploitative, also poses as a barrier to regional economic integration. In an effort to co-opt Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s attempts to expand its socialist-statist ideological influence through “largesse stemming from his country’s windfall oil profits,”\textsuperscript{218} the Lula Administration sought that country’s accession as a full member of Mercosur. According to The Economist,

\begin{thebibliography}{1}
\bibitem{214} Ibid
\textsuperscript{As a result, Mercosur countries must challenge each others tariffs through the WTO.}
\bibitem{217} Otaola, Jorge and Brian Winter, “Tariff dispute deepens between Argentina and Brazil.” The author quotes a Sao Paolo trade consultant who notes the divergence in Roussef’s trade policies.
\end{thebibliography}
Venezuela’s accession, which is still pending Brazilian congressional approval, could undermine not only that organization’s commitment to free trade, but also to democratic governance, and is a step in the wrong directions.\textsuperscript{219}

South America seems to be moving away from regional integration toward the formation of two distinct trading blocs.\textsuperscript{220} Countries such as Colombia, Peru, and Chile despite their status as associate members of Mercosur, favor trading arrangements with the U.S. and Asia. Recently, those three countries signed a free trade agreement with Mexico, designed to create an integrated market that can compete with Brazil and further ties to Asian markets.\textsuperscript{221} Thus, the fragmentation of free trade agreements in South America poses as a barrier to Brazilian leadership of an economically integrated region.

Brazil has furthered its role as a regional creditor and investor: In 2010, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) disbursed $100 billion in credit projects throughout Latin America, twenty-three percent higher than in 2009 and exceeding investment totals by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the World Bank (WB). Brazil is also a much needed source of foreign direct investment in the region. Brazilian conglomerates, with financing from the BNDES, an institution which former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso describes as a lever for the expansion of Brazilian business, have invested in infrastructure


Much of that sentiment has been a reaction to the BNDES’ expansionary lending policies\footnote{Lissardy, Gerardo. “El banco brasileno que mueve America Latina.” The BNDES estimates that it has increased credit available to Brazilian firms for investment in Latin America and the Caribbean by 1.083\% and will disburse $860 million in the region in 2011. Originally, the BNDES was designed to promote domestic growth; however, under the Lula administration it began to direct loans toward regional infrastructure projects.} aimed at expanding Brazilian firms’ presence in the region, and in no country has opposition been as fierce as in Bolivia, where violent protests recently forced President Evo Morales to suspend the construction of a BNDES funded highway. The project was to be completed by a Brazilian firm, OAS. In connecting Cochabamba to Beni the highway would traverse a natural reserve and pass through indigenous territory. Those who oppose the project, including the indigenous population and Bolivian intellectuals, claim that the project would solely benefit Brazil. They argue that Brazil would obtain a Pacific export outlet, while Bolivia would get stuck with the deleterious environmental effects of the project. Protestors have labeled Brazil’s intentions as imperialistic, “likening [Brazilians] to the slave hunters who
expanded the boundaries of colonial Brazil;” those sort of accusations, Romero notes, are usually reserved for the U.S.  

The governments of Guyana, Peru, Ecuador, and Argentina have also suspended BNDES financed projects. Those countries’ governments’ concerns stem from a perceived lack of economic benefit, citing labor distributions which favor jobs for Brazilians for example, and also apprehensive over possible negative environmental impact and the displacement of indigenous people. Hence, economic asymmetries, an enduring fear of hegemonic exploitation, and political instability in South America present significant challenges to Brazil’s efforts to lead economic integration efforts in that region.

That is not to say that Brazil has made no concessions to its neighbors in the process of economic integration. For Mercosur’s smallest economies--Uruguay and Paraguay--membership has brought benefits some benefits. Both states have increased their leverage in international trade negotiations and taken advantage of development assistance from Mercosur’s Fund for Structural Convergence (FOCEM), an institution designed to reduce structural asymmetries between the bloc’s weaker and stronger economies and counteract against the effects of tariff reductions. That fund has favored Uruguay and Paraguay, which have received $191 and $822 million in soft loans compared to Argentina and Brazil’s $27 and $45 million allotments. Paraguay, in particular, has availed itself of FOCEM funding to build a 500 kilowatt electrical grid, which will connect Asuncion to Itaipu Dam on the Brazilian border, and 300 kilometers of electricity lines to support its industry, housing, and water supply.

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Paragraph one.
226 Ibid
228 “Mercosur ‘structural convergence fund’ has distributed 1.1bn USD in 37 projects”
Nevertheless, Paraguay and Uruguay’s trade relationship with Brazil and Argentina remains contentious. Uruguay, frustrated by an unresolved dispute with Argentina over a paper pulp mill on their shared border, signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the U.S.; if that agreement leads to a formal free trade agreement, it would violate Mercosur’s charter, which prohibits members from signing bilateral agreements with non-members. Moreover, the bloc would either have to expel Uruguay or rewrite its charter to allow for such trade agreements to occur. In any case, the case illustrates both the disillusionment and lack of respect for Mercosur as an institution.

Political Leadership: The Rio Group and the Community of South American Nations

Brazil is the architect of the Rio Group, a coalition of Latin American states which emerged in 1986 as the successor to the Contadora Group, a diplomatic union which sought a regional resolution to the Cold War related conflicts in Central America during the 1980s. Brazil formed part of the Contadora Support Group, which also included Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay.

The Rio Group, composed of twenty-three Latin American states, is an informal diplomatic group and lacks a permanent institutional structure. Members’ heads of state meet annually to discuss regional and international issues of common interest and seek to form

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230 The original members of the group were Venezuela, Mexico, Columbia, and Panama.
common foreign policy positions. The group also sought to enhance cooperation on economic, social, scientific and technological development issues.

Burges highlights the Rio Group’s utility for Brazil as a tool for regional leadership in his analysis of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations, a U.S. proposal to make the Western Hemisphere a free trade zone. At the Miami Summit, Itamaraty used its temporary presidency of that group as a mechanism to coordinate a common economic position in negotiations. The U.S. sought to use access to its lucrative domestic market as a lever to liberalize Latin American economies. Yet, Brazil and other South American economies were still hurting from liberal economic adjustments.

Itamaraty capitalized on this shared experience; it drafted alternative treaty text and guided a consensus position among Rio Group members opposing U.S. trade positions, such as longer adjustment periods for implementation of tariff reductions and the decoupling of environmental, labor, and good governance from a final trade agreement. Furthermore, Brazil thought Rio Group cooperation could serve to extract a more favorable agreement for itself South American countries. The end result, in short, was the failure of a hemispheric free trade union due to diverging Rio Group-U.S. positions; instead, negotiations splintered and produced an assortment of bilateral trade agreements. Regardless, Brazil’s ability to generate ideas, frame the terms of trade talks, and employ its central position in the Rio Group to unite South American countries in support of its objectives showcases its consensual form of leadership.

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Moreover, Brazil eschewed overt leadership, for historical reasons and because it lacked the financial resources to conduct carrot-and-stick diplomacy and offer incentives for cooperation. As Burges notes, Brazil’s style of leadership “provides some solidity to notions of soft power.”

In 2000, under President Cardoso’s leadership, Brazil initiated a dialogue on far-reaching regional integration in South America at the Brasilia Summit (also known as the First South American Presidential Summit) in the Brazilian capital. The summit produced five regional priorities: the integration of Mercosur and the Andean Community (CAN); regional transport and infrastructure integration, cooperation on the development of science and technology, reduction of corruption and money laundering, and the consolidation of democracy, human rights and freedom.

South American presidents reconvened at summits held in Guayaquil in 2002 and Cuzco in 2004. The 2004 summit produced the Cuzco Declaration, which vowed to improve regional diplomatic and political coordination as a means of expanding South America as a “pole of economic and political power in order to influence world politics.” The Cuzco Declaration also vowed to create a “United States of South America” modeled on the European Union, and called for the creation of a common currency, a tariff-free common market, and a regional parliament. At Cuzco, President Lula was instrumental in the creation of the South American Community of Nations (SACN), and that group’s successor, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) which replaced the SACN at the former group’s third presidential summit in

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235 Burges, Sean W., “Without Carrots or Sticks: Brazilian Leadership in South America during the Cardoso Era, 1992-2003.” Since the Rio Branco era, Itamaraty has promoted multilateralism and regional cooperation, fearing that the pursuit of hegemony would prompt its Spanish American neighbors to coordinate an attack against it.  
236 Ibid, 26.  
238 Guedes de Oliveira, Marcos Aurelio, “Sources of Brazilian Counter-Hegemony.” 137.  
Brazil in 2008.\textsuperscript{240} Furthermore, as Roett observes, Brazil is UNASUR’s acknowledged leader, and while the prospects for success of the deep regional integration measures envisioned by that group remain uncertain, Brazil’s central role in that institution building process is a conspicuous illustration of that country’s newfound self-confidence.\textsuperscript{241}

**Conclusions**

Undoubtedly, Brazil is a \textit{de facto} leader in Latin America: It possesses the largest territory, population, and economy, and has become a crucial source of investment and growth in the region. Furthermore, it has taken responsibility for promoting political stability and peaceful conflict resolution through both diplomatic and military means. Although Brazil has succeeded in deepening regional trade and investment ties, and serving as a force for stability, it has failed for a variety of reasons to garner neighboring countries’ support for its leadership both in the region and in international affairs.

Brazil hoped that economic integration would improve cooperation with its neighbors and help to consolidate regional support for its burgeoning international activism. Yet as the persistence of Mercosur trade conflicts and resistance to BNDES financed projects illustrates, South America is far from uniting as an economic and political bloc, and much less so as one that would lend its support to Brazil as its representative. As Hurrell observes, some Latin American states are unconvinced that Brazil has their interests in mind and refuse to support Brazil as a spokesperson for the region in international affairs.\textsuperscript{242} While Brazil has obtained a significant amount of support for its aspiration toward permanent membership on the UN

\textsuperscript{240} Roett, \textit{The New Brazil}
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid
Security Council, Argentina and Colombia especially remain opposed.\textsuperscript{243} Moreover, Brazil has encountered difficulty in generating support for its candidates Brazilian candidates in other international organizations. As Soares de Lima and Hirst highlight, during elections for the director-general of the WTO, Brazil failed to unite regional support for its candidate.\textsuperscript{244}

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\textbf{Chapter V: Brazil’s International Leadership}
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Domestic economic and political stability have permitted Brazil to renew its long time foreign policy goal of obtaining a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. To craft support for that objective, Brazil has sought to bolster its qualifications through its command of MINUSTAH, and through cultivating diplomatic partnerships with both emerging market and industrial countries. As the world’s eighth largest economy, Brazil has leveraged its increased economic standing to lead emerging market countries’ push to obtain greater influence within the Bretton Woods organizations. Moreover, using its own social policies as a model, Brazil has bolstered its soft power through foreign aid to developing countries.


\textsuperscript{244} Soares de Lima, Maria and Monica Hirst, “Brazil as an intermediate state and regional power: action, choice and responsibilities.”
The Unforgotten Quest for Permanent Security Council Membership

As discussed in Chapter Three, Brazil has long taken an active role in international collective security organizations. It was an original non-permanent member of the League of Nations and the United Nations, reflecting its military alliance with the Allies in World Wars I and II and its diplomacy promoting cooperative relations in Europe and Latin America. In addition, Brazil has been elected as non-permanent member to the Security Council ten times since the creation of the UN—a more than any other country.245

Vigorous Itamaraty attempts to secure support for Brazil’s permanent seat on the League of Nations and UN Security Council, however, failed. This was largely a consequence of its lack of economic and military capabilities and inability to secure the unanimous political endorsement of great powers. Having consolidated economic and political stability after the 1994 Real Plan, Brazilian foreign policy carries a newfound self-esteem. Its confidence restored, Brazil has strengthened its international leadership, and renewed its elusive quest for a permanent seat on the Security Council.

Brazil frames its ambition on notions of representational fairness and the need to reflect the rising power of developing countries as well as the absence of geographical permanent representation for South America on the Security Council. In a written commentary to the UN General Assembly regarding its position on Security Council reform, the Brazilian Mission stated: “We want our region to be present in the Security Council on a permanent basis and, through ample coordination and consultation, to have an even stronger collective voice.”246 Presidents Cardoso and Lula invested ample political capital in building regional economic and

political ties through the promotion of Mercosur and Unasur in order to solidify the concept of South America as a political and economic unit with Brazil as its leader and regional representative. That endeavor failed, nonetheless, as Brazil has been unable to consolidate support among its historically distrustful Spanish-speaking South American neighbors, which doubt that Brazil has their interests in mind. Notably, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela have expressed opposition to Brazil’s potential accession as a permanent Security Council member.

Notwithstanding regional opposition, Brazil now counts on a broad alliance of support from major powers, emerging markets, and developing countries for its permanent accession to the Security Council. Among major powers, Brazil has backing from the UK, France, and Russia. The U.S. has voiced support of Brazil’s contribution to security and development in Haiti, though it has not given an outright endorsement for its permanent membership. Members of the G4 (Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India), IBSA Forum (Brazil, India, and South Africa), and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (Brazil, Portugal, São Tomé, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Angola) also support Brazil’s candidacy.

To bolster its credentials for permanent membership, Brazil maintains an active role in UN peacekeeping missions. Brazil has historically been a moderate contributor to UN peacekeeping missions since its participation in the League of Nations (during which time it mediated a territorial dispute between Peru and Colombia) and since the creation of the UN, it has supplied seventeen million personnel. In 2011, Brazil was the second largest contributor of the BRICs to UN peacekeeping personnel (behind India) and the thirteenth overall, with 2,260 troops. However, that number is still relatively low compared to the number of personnel supplied by other countries.

248 Ibid
contributed by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh for example. While the centerpiece of that effort is its command of MINUSTAH, Brazil also contributes personnel to missions in East Timor, Lebanon, Cyprus, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sudan, and Western Sahara.

What is unprecedented about Brazil’s peacekeeping role is the type of its participation. It leads MINUSTAH, which is a Chapter Seven peacekeeping mission. Chapter Seven Security Council resolutions allow forcible international intervention into a state to restore international peace and security if other measures, such as economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, are deemed inadequate. It is noteworthy that in heading that mission, Brazil departed from its former policy of non-intervention.

Leadership of MINUSTAH is a strategic component of Brazilian foreign policy designed to showcase its capacity to mitigate threats to international peace and security. There is no immediate national interest in Haiti’s stability for Brazil as there is for the U.S—after all, those seeking to escape that country’s misery do not end up on Brazil’s shores. Rather, as Herz notes, “Brazil’s elite thinks peacekeeping is part of the price you have to pay to be among the nations who make the rules.”

Soft Power through Foreign Aid

Despite having a large poor population of its own, Brazil is becoming a major foreign aid donor. During Lula’s last two years in office, Brazil’s annual aid expenditures tripled, reaching about $4 billion in 2010, which as a Guardian article notes, is roughly the equivalent of what

250 Ibid
252 Ibid, paragraph two.
established Western donors like Canada and Sweden spend. Contrasting Brazilian foreign aid to China’s is useful in elucidating Brazil’s emphasis on soft power: The majority of Brazilian foreign aid goes to social, and agricultural programs while China’s focuses on building infrastructure projects in return for access to commodities.

Brazil is well-situated to share best practices in social development, agricultural research and public health management with developing countries. Bolsa Familia, a conditional cash transfer program, has diminished rural poverty in the Northeast of Brazil and narrowed the national income gap. As an upshot of the program’s success, Brazil has adopted it as a model for its poverty reduction efforts abroad.

As a leader in biofuels and agricultural technology, Brazil is a valuable source of expertise for developing countries with tropical climates. This is currently taking place in several African countries: The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa), in tandem with the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC), monitor food security programs in Mozambique, Senegal, and Mali. According to Embrapa’s website, its transfer of technology and worker training in cassava, cotton, cashew, and biofuel production is worth approximately $2.8 million. In Mali, in particular, Embrapa has contributed to “soaring” cotton production. Moreover, Odebrecht, a Brazilian construction conglomerate and a large investor in African infrastructure, is the largest private sector employer in Angola. In Liberia, Odebrecht is working to repair that country’s railway system, and has done so using 75% Liberian labor.

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255 In Chapter Two I give the example of the Lét Agogo program in Haiti.
while “training teams of engineers, technicians and accountants to help run its offices.”\(^{258}\) This “diplomacy of generosity”\(^{259}\) is a boon for Brazilian soft power and stands in marked contrast to China’s public works projects in Africa, which employ mostly Chinese workers, and has employed heavy-handed treatment of workers.\(^{260}\)

Having deterred the spread of AIDS domestically through successful public policies, Brazil’s strategy for combating the disease has been replicated across the globe. In his memoir, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso recounts that in 1990, the UN estimated that Brazil could have up to 1.2 people infected by 2002.\(^{261}\) Cardoso’s administration implemented an aggressive public sex education campaign and encouraged Brazilian pharmaceutical firms to produce generic versions of anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs). This vexed U.S. trade officials and prompted them to file a complaint in the WTO claiming that Brazil was in violation of intellectual property rights.

According to Cardoso, Brazil assembled a coalition of support for its position on generic ARV production, and worked to curry public opinion in its favor. In 2001, UN agencies passed resolutions declaring access to generic drugs to be a human right, and after the 2001 UN AIDS Conference, the U.S. dropped its trade complaint against Brazil.

Furthermore, Brazil led the charge in the WTO in negotiating a compromise to the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) clause in order to protect human lives. That effort produced agreements which “affirmed, in principle, the right of countries...to issue

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\(^{259}\) “Brazil’s foreign-aid programme: Speak softly and carry a blank cheque.” \textit{The Economist}. July 15, 2010.

\(^{260}\) Lewis, “Special Report: In Africa, can Brazil be the anti-China?” Paragraph 5. The author recounts that in Zambia, “last October, the Chinese managers of Collum Mine shot and wounded 11 local coal miners protesting over pay and working conditions.”

compulsory licenses to improve access to ARVs.” As evidence of Brazilian soft power, other developing countries, including India, South Africa and Thailand emulates Brazil’s defiant stance and followed suit in issuing compulsory licenses allowing generic drug production.

Illustrative of the success of Brazil’s fight against AIDS, in 2002, just .3% of the population was infected. And in recognition of its triumphant national AIDS program, Brazil received the Culture of Peace award in 2001 and the Gates award in 2003.

Brazil’s effective domestic campaign against AIDS and efforts to universalize access to ARVs make it a valuable contributor to global efforts to combat the disease. Together with UNAIDS, Brazil founded the International Centre for Technical Cooperation on AIDS (ICTC) in 2005, an agency which has worked to establish a network of AIDS service providers in developing countries and bolster states’ capacity to combat the disease. The ICTC has become an integral part of the global AIDS fight and in 2008, UNAIDS renewed its agreement with the Brazilian government “to continue their cooperation on providing technical support to countries in strengthening and scaling-up national responses” to AIDS via the ICTC. According to Lee and Gomez, Brazil’s contribution to building disease-fighting capacity and impact on states’

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263 Ibid
264 Cardoso, The Accidental President of Brazil: A Memoir
265 Lee, Kelly and Eduardo J. Gómez, “Brazil’s Ascendance: The soft power role of global health diplomacy.”
266 Ibid. Notably, Brazil’s constitution guarantees universal health care as a human right, and in 1996 the Cardoso administration made access to anti-retroviral drugs universal and free. According to the authors, that legal commitment to universal health coverage is part of what defines Brazil’s activism in what they term “global health diplomacy.”
public health policies through its engagement with international organizations, has “increased the
country’s ability to leverage soft power influence.”268

South-South Partnerships: The G20 as a Vehicle for Restructuring the Bretton Woods
Institutions

Under President Lula’s leadership, Brazil has leveraged its growing economy to push for a
greater role in global trade and finance governance for itself and emerging market countries. Brazil’s leadership in the international economy has been particularly prominent in the Doha round of trade negotiations and in the wake of the 2008 global recession, which revealed Brazil and other emerging market countries’ economic resilience relative to the U.S. and European Union. Reflecting a realignment of global economic strength toward emerging markets, which has become more pronounced since the global economic downturn, the G20, a coalition of developed countries and emerging markets, has replaced the G8 as the forum for global economic decision making. Moreover, within the context of emerging market countries’ increased impact on global economic and financial decision making, Brazil stands out as a key interlocutor in lobbying for what former Foreign Minister Celso Amorim refers to as “moving the tectonic plates of world politics.”269

During the Doha Round (which began in 2001 and centered around improving the economic benefits of trade for developing countries) Brazil “won praise for its leadership role and consolidated its reputation as a tough but pragmatic negotiator.”270 It “spearheaded the

268 Lee, Kelly and Eduardo J. Gómez, “Brazil’s Ascendance: The soft power role of global health diplomacy,” paragraph 17. The authors also emphasize Brazil’s role in promoting strict tobacco control laws (which contributes to its legitimacy since Brazil is a major tobacco exporter), as well as its engagement on fighting malaria and tuberculosis.


creation of the G20 developing nations in Cancún in 2003 to strengthen their negotiating power within the WTO \(^{271}\) and along with India, led the developing world’s attempts to secure reductions in U.S. and EU agricultural subsidies, which stymie exports from developing countries. During talks hosted in Geneva in 2004, after the breakdown of negotiations in Cancún in 2003, those two countries had reached a tentative agreement on the reduction of farm subsidies with the U.S. and the EU. The U.S., however, expected some reciprocity from emerging markets, and when India and China proved inflexible on reducing protections for small farmers, negotiations stalled.

Although, in solidarity with G20 countries, it favored allowing developing countries facing influxes of imports to skirt tariff reductions for certain products, Brazil, in contrast to India and China’s intransigence, demonstrated pragmatism and supported a deal proposed by IMF Director Pascal Lamy under which it would have reduced its industrial tariffs by 56% in exchange for the U.S. lowering its annual agricultural subsidies to $14.5 billion.\(^{272}\) That effort failed, however, as other emerging markets refused to compromise.\(^ {273}\)

According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Brazil has acted as a “natural leader” in the G20 led efforts to reform international financial organizations in the wake of the 2008 global economic downturn.\(^{274}\) Brazil and emerging market countries have pushed for increased voting weight in the IMF and World Bank. The G20 thus advocated for a merit-based reform of the selection process for the election of those organizations’ directors (the U.S. has traditionally managed the World Bank, while Europe has directed the IMF). Exemplifying its leadership role


\(^{272}\) Ibid

\(^{273}\) Ibid

\(^{274}\) Ibid
in the process of reforming global economic governance after the crisis, before the 2008 G20 meeting in Washington, Brazil hosted a meeting of BRIC finance ministers in São Paulo, in which the four countries developed a joint position on the need for more regulation of international financial markets, coordinated government action, and greater participation for emerging market countries in resolving the crisis. In order for emerging market countries to strengthen their participation, the ministers agreed that the Bretton Woods organizations needed to be reformed to account for those countries’ growing economic importance.275

Those positions gained traction and after a 2010 meeting in Korea, the G20 sanctioned a groundbreaking restructuring of the IMF which acknowledged the shift in distribution of global economic power toward emerging market countries. The IMF implemented the agreed upon changes in 2011. As an IMF document notes, the Board of Governors agreed to double members’ quotas (financial contributions which determine voting share).276 That agreement is a nod to the increased economic weight of emerging market countries, and will put Brazil, China, India, and Russia within the top ten shareholders in the organization.277

Brazil and emerging market countries also succeeded in reforming the World Bank, including an $86.2 billion increase in capital and 3.13% rise in the voting power278 for “Developing and Transition Countries” (DTCs) within the bank’s development wing, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).279 As Brands notes, Brazil’s

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22556045--pagePK:64257043--piPK:437376--theSitePK:4607,00.html. DTCs have increased their overall voting power by 4.59% since 2008 and are now represent 47.19% of IBRD voting power.
conversion of its growing economic power into increased voting share in the IMF and World Bank is in large part a result of the Lula administration’s activism in the G20.²⁸⁰

**BRIC**

In line with the Worker Party’s third worldist roots, since 2003, the Lula Administration has emphasized buttressing diplomatic partnerships with emerging market countries to increase its economic autonomy and negotiating power relative to industrial powers. The most significant of those are BRIC—with Russia, India, and China and IBSA—with India and South Africa. The BRIC partnership has yielded some desired results. Apart from its success in lobbying for reform of international organizations, relationships with BRIC countries, China especially, have provided Brazil with lucrative trading opportunities. In 2009, China became Brazil’s largest trading partner. With a slow economic recovery in the U.S. and financial turmoil in Europe after the 2008 crisis, China’s insatiable need for Brazilian soy, iron ore, and oil has boosted the Brazilian export sector and been a key driver of economic growth.²⁸¹ China also became the leading foreign investor in Brazil in 2010, with between $12 and $20 billion invested in steel, oil, mining, transportation, and energy.

The asymmetries of economic relations with China are highly controversial in Brazil. Policy makers and industrial leaders are concerned about the upward pressure on the real against the Yuan and the dollar resulting from Chinese interventions in the foreign exchange market as well as the effects of influx of cheap Chinese goods on Brazil’s industrial sector.²⁸² In addition,

²⁸² Bodman, Samuel W., James D. Wolfensohn and Julia E. Sweig. “Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations.” The industrial sector’s percentage of GDP fell to 15.5%, the lowest since 1947.
Brazil’s industrial exports, while competitive, struggle to gain a foothold in the Chinese market, as state subsidies give domestic firms a distinct advantage.\textsuperscript{283} Recently, President Rousseff responded to concerns about deindustrialization in Brazil, levying an anti-dumping tax against Chinese steel imports.\textsuperscript{284} As trade with China becomes more antagonistic, analysts at the Council on Foreign Relations expect that the Rousseff administration will emphasize ties with the U.S.\textsuperscript{285}

As emerging market countries, China and Brazil have a shared interest in redistributing power within international economic organizations. China’s support of joint BRIC positions was key in the successful effort to increase those countries voting power in the IMF and World Bank. However, China’s value as an ally has its limits. In contrast to a receptive response from European countries and other emerging markets such as India, Russia, and South Africa, China remains unwilling to endorse Brazil’s bid for a permanent Security Council seat.

\textit{IBSA}

Its partnership with India and South Africa, in Brand’s estimation, could be the most important coalition of Brazil’s South-South’ diplomacy, as it unites the largest three democracies in the developing world which combined account for 1.4 billion people and a GDP of more than $3\ trillion.\textsuperscript{286} The three states are also multicultural, multiethnic societies which share internal development challenges such as reducing poverty and improving tax collection; IBSA members view the forum as a center for sharing their own best practices on those issues with other

\textsuperscript{283} Ibid
\textsuperscript{285} Bodman, Samuel W., James D. Wolfensohn and Julia E. Sweig. 2011. The Council on Foreign Relations notes that Rousseff has already eased criticism of U.S. monetary policy in her first months of office.
\textsuperscript{286} Brands, Hal. \textit{Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy}. 
developing countries.\textsuperscript{287} Aside from fostering trade ties between the three states, which the group hopes will total $25 billion by 2015, IBSA cooperates on security—the group conducted joint naval exercises in 2008—and development projects in Haiti and Guinea-Bissau.\textsuperscript{288} Other developing states have solicited IBSA funding. Laos, for instance, sought assistance with watershed management, while Mozambique, Lesotho and Botswana have requested funds for youth centers.\textsuperscript{289}

The IBSA forum also promotes member cooperation on structural reform of Post War international economic and security organizations. All three members acted as representatives of the South’s interests during the Doha round, thus enhancing their credibility among the developing world. India and Brazil, both major contributors to UN peacekeeping missions, have also worked together on Security Council reform, and along with Germany and Japan are part of the G4, a coalition which seeks to expand the Council from fifteen to twenty-five members.\textsuperscript{290}

To pass, the G4 initiative would need two-thirds support—128 countries out of 193 in the General Assembly and would also require amending the UN Charter. That would mean that two-thirds of UN members would also have to ratify those changes in their capitals.\textsuperscript{291} Furthermore, the initiative would need the unanimous approval of the five permanent Council members.

Steward M. Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations notes that the G4 currently has the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[287] "Emerging Powers: India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) and the Future of South-South Cooperation." \textit{Wilson Center} Special Report, August 2009. For more on IBSA’s self-conception, see the summary of comments made by Secretary Figueredo de Souza, assistant of the IBSA Division of Itamaraty.
\item[288] Brands, Hal. \textit{Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy}.
\item[289] "Emerging Powers: India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) and the Future of South-South Cooperation." \textit{Wilson Center}.
\item[291] Conversation with International Relations Professor Jean Krasno. December 6, 2011.
\end{footnotes}
backing of 100 states in the Assembly, and that the 128 mark is within reach; gaining the support of all permanent members remains the challenge, as China remains vehemently opposed to its Asian rivals (Japan and India) obtaining permanent seats.\textsuperscript{292}

\textit{South-South Diplomacy and Human Rights Policy: A Threat to Soft Power?}

The legitimacy and moral authority of states’ foreign policies is a key determinant of soft power.\textsuperscript{293} It follows, then, that Brazil’s long tradition of adherence to international laws and norms and leadership in promoting democratic governance, international cooperation, and peaceful solutions to conflict have buttressed its soft power.

In the same vein, illegitimate policies can detract from states’ soft power. For example, in his discussion of the Bush administration’s foreign policies and soft power, Nye holds that the U.S.’s unilateral response to 9/11, culminating with the illegal invasion of Iraq in 2003, fomented anti-American sentiment. This damaged U.S. legitimacy and undermined American security as it became politically risky for some foreign leaders to cooperate with the U.S. on counter-terrorism.

In his fervent efforts to build an axis of support in the developing world for Brazil’s permanent accession to the Security Council, President Lula compromised a fundamental tenant of soft power by weakening Brazil’s position on human rights. This was most evident in Brazil’s courtship of Iran. During Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s visit to Brazil in 2009, Lula advocated a diplomatic solution to Iran’s controversial nuclear program and voiced his


opposition to economic sanctions sought by the Security Council. Furthermore, Lula lauded Iran’s support of its candidacy for a permanent seat on the Security Council and neglected to speak of its violent response to protests over allegedly fraudulent elections.

In 2010, Brazil in conjunction with Turkey, sought to exploit its growing economic and diplomatic relationship with Iran to negotiate a nuclear fuel-swap deal whereby Iran would ship about half of its nuclear fuel to Turkey for enrichment in return for a medical research reactor in order to assure the peaceful use of that material. The U.S. viewed Brazil and Turkey’s efforts skeptically and as having the potential to delay sanctions and “derail a fragile international consensus to increase pressure on Iran.”

According to one critic, the Lula Administration’s “anachronistic” stance on human rights signaled to the West that it “would be wise to keep that chair [at the Security Council] on hold.” Brazil’s position on Iran is a major part what has kept the U.S. from out rightly supporting its admission as a permanent Security Council member. The Obama administration has voiced support for India’s accession; in contrast, while praising Brazil’s increased role in global security and development has stopped short of endorsing its candidacy. Therefore, by failing to align itself with international human rights norms, Lula may have temporarily jeopardized his administration’s ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

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296 Roett, Riordan, The New Brazil. 148. Roett cites a Washington Post editorial which lambastes Lula for overlooking Iran’s appalling human rights record and claims and furthermore that embracing rogue states will detract from its efforts to enhance its global leadership. For more information see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/26/AR2009112602066.html.
297 Clinton, Hillary R. “Remarks With Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota After Their Meeting.” February 23, 2011. U.S. Department of State. During public remarks after a meeting with Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted the importance of Brazil’s leadership in combating HIV/AIDS as well as its contribution to security and development in Haiti.
President Dilma Rousseff, once a political prisoner, during Brazil’s military dictatorship, has taken a tougher stance on Iran. In March 2011, the Rousseff administration voted in favor of a UN resolution to send a human rights investigator to Iran, thus marking a departure from former President Lula. It is too early to determine the extent of that departure, however, as Brazil has sent mixed messages with its positions at the UN, recently opposing measures to increase pressure on the Syrian regime. Brazil also failed to support the protection of Libyan civilians from imminent in mass murder in Libya by abstaining on Security Council Resolution 1973. Security Resolution 1975, which like Resolution 1973 reaffirmed the UN mandate to protect civilians, confoundingly, received Brazil’s support. Thus, Brazil’s position on human rights and the responsibility of the international community to protect civilians when states are incapable or unwilling do so remains muddled. Furthermore, it is unclear whether Brazil, if it were to become a permanent Security Council member, would contribute to that institution’s capacity to defend human rights.

Conclusion

Charles de Gaulle once declared that Brazil is “not a serious country.” In a recent edition of 60 Minutes, host Steve Kroft noted that Brazil has a reputation for squandering its vast potential, and recalls the saying that “Brazil is the country of future and that always will be.” Yet sixteen years of policy continuity from Cardoso to Lula followed by the 2010 democratic

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election of President Dilma Rousseff, a technocrat, along with the resilience of the Brazilian economy to the 2008 economic downturn suggests that Brazil now enjoys stable democratic governance and is reaping the rewards of domestic reforms. Its newfound stability has allowed Brazil to concentrate on poverty reduction; redistributive yet pragmatic government social policies have lifted thirty million Brazilians from poverty into the lower-middle class.

Brazil has leveraged its economy and soft power—which it derives from its successful domestic social policies and distinguished diplomatic history of promoting international cooperation and peaceful conflict—to project regional and international leadership. In Latin America, Brazil has acted as a crisis manager. It contributed to the resolution Ecuador and Peru’s border dispute, and the protection of democracy in Paraguay, and now commands the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), hence demonstrating its commitment to maintaining regional peace and security. Brazil has also been pivotal in making Latin America free of nuclear weapons. It established a bilateral nuclear inspection regime with Argentina and which rebuilt trust between the two states and led both to abandon their nuclear weapons programs. Foreign Minister Celso Amorim was also instrumental in convincing Cuba to renounce the pursuit of nuclear weapons and sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Brazil also spearheaded regional economic and political integration efforts. Brazil has also deepened economic ties with the region and become an important source of credit and investment. Yet while Brazil is undoubtedly the *de facto* leader in Latin America, its neighbors remain distrustful of its ambitions and oppose its bid to become a permanent member of the Security Council.

On the international stage, Brazil covets permanent membership on the UN Security Council and has sought to demonstrate its competence through its command of MINUSTAH and proactive role in other UN peacekeeping missions. Using its own social programs as a model,

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Brazil has also amplified its soft power through foreign aid. In global economic governance, Brazil positioned itself at the forefront of the G20 and led developing countries’ efforts to obtain better terms of trade during the Doha Round. It also played a major part in emerging market countries’ successful campaign to restructure the IMF and World Bank in their favor.

The soft power which Brazil derives from the legitimacy of its domestic and foreign policy is paramount to its continued leadership in international affairs. That said, ensuring that those policies adhere to widely shared values, such as human rights, is imperative. Domestically, Brazil must continue to address its dysfunctional legal system, correctional institutions, and police force. Furthermore, Brazil tarnishes its own image by honing economic and diplomatic ties with rogue states such as Iran. The reason for Brazil’s fluctuating postures on human rights votes at the UN is likely due to its multifaceted identity as a leader of the South and a bridge between North and South. In order for Brazil to maintain its strong soft power fundamentals, President Rousseff should further clarify Brazil’s position on sovereignty and humanitarian intervention and exploit her own experience as a victim of torture during Brazil’s military dictatorship as a lever to ensure Brazil’s unequivocal support of human rights and democracy.

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