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Confronting Transnational Threats; Strong State Strategies of Cooperation with Weak States and Effectiveness

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Confronting Transnational Threats:

Strong State Strategies of Cooperation with Weak States and Effectiveness

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June, 2014

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Abstract

Historically recent changes in the structure of the international system, as a result of globalization and the related empowerment of transnational actors, have put states at a disadvantage in dealing with threatening transnational actors. In the past, strong states could do what they wanted and weak states would obey, but because the fates of strong states and weak states are tied together in the struggle against transnational threats, it behooves both parties to seek the most effective solutions. I will test that hypothesis by observing several cases of strong state cooperation with weak states to confront transnational threats and categorizing the cases in terms of the degree of weak state input in policy formulation. The cases considered are: United States and European Union strategies in confronting the transnational illicit drug trade with Colombia; and United States and European Union approaches to global terrorism emanating from East African states. The study found that weak state input did not make a significant difference in reducing the inflow of drugs into the US or the EU. In fact the US tendency to dominate in policy planning produced temporary results. On the other hand, these results came at significant costs in terms of violence and militarism, whereas the EU’s programs tend to be successful as models focused on social and economic development. The results, therefore, were mixed.
Chapter 1: Rationale

Changing global trends have begun to shape a world that connects together the fortunes and fates of strong and weak states. These globalizing trends have undermined the traditional strengths of states, such as their monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their borders, have made them more vulnerable to the forces that link states together, and have given rise to new forms of transnational actors. Transnational actors have new power over states, for benevolent, like transnational social movements such as the movement for human rights,¹ and for nefarious purposes, such as transnational criminal organizations.² This thesis is interested in transnational actors that threaten states and the ways in which strong and weak states cooperate to confront them.

More than a decade has passed since the terrorist attacks of September eleventh, 2001 (referred to colloquially as 9/11). Those attacks and the response to them by the United States inaugurated a new era of world politics. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne suggest that, “for years to come, if not decades, the ‘war on terrorism’ will be the defining paradigm in the struggle for global order.”³ In the time that has passed the world has found that, despite Thucydides’ maxim that the strong do what they will and the weak do what they must, even the strongest are limited in their ability to confront threats that transcend state borders. Transnational threats are the defining security issues

of our time. These are non-traditional security issues that threaten the national security or economic stability of a state’s society, and are not bounded by the borders of any state.

Transnational threats did not emerge fully formed with the 9/11 attacks. They have deep historical roots, but have evolved most rapidly during and immediately following the Cold War-era. The advent of airplane hijackings in the 1970s was the birth of modern transnational terrorism, according to Bruce Hoffman in his book *Inside Terrorism*, because all elements of the act transcended borders. The victims, perpetrators, and audience of the acts were from and in many different states, and the hijackings themselves took advantage of the new normal of high-speed international air travel. Human-based transnational threats, such as terrorism and transnational crime, have changed in structurally significant ways since the end of the Cold War, and states are struggling to catch up.

Globally-oriented terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) have evolved in response to the myriad changes taking place in the world. Technological advances, cultural shifts, rapid industrialization and urbanization in the Global South, and increasing economic interdependence provided fertile ground for the evolution of an organizational structure that could confound powerful states. Changes in the organizational structure of groups that pose threats on a transnational level as well as changes in the international system coincided to subvert the traditional power of states to handle these threats unilaterally.

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Given these changes in the international system, I am interested in investigating how powerful states address transnational threats, and how they could do so more effectively. My assumption is that transnational threats cannot be successfully addressed by just one state – even if that state is a hegemonic power. If transnational threats are addressed unilaterally by a state, no matter the power of that state, the strategy will fail. The opposite contention is not necessarily true – that if transnational threats are addressed cooperatively, the threat will be successfully addressed. However, I argue that success is more likely if the threat is confronted through strategies of cooperation.

Weak states tend to seek cooperation with stronger states when dealing with transnational threats because they lack the resources to take them on alone. Strong states tend to impose strategy on weaker states when they can, as Thucydides described. Because today’s security threats transcend state borders, imposed strategies tend to be unsuccessful. My hypothesis is therefore that the more deeply strong states collaborate with weak states in developing strategies to confront transnational security issues, the more likely it is that transnational threats will be effectively addressed. This may even involve granting weaker states strategic leadership in the identification of appropriate solutions.

Outline

The argument of this thesis begins by grappling with the question: how can states better address transnational threats? Transnational threats are at the top of the international security agenda and they have become a permanent feature in world politics,
which implies that they are not being countered effectively by states.⁶ Thus, the argument of this thesis builds from the premise that the world has changed in significant ways in recent history, and that transnational actors that pose a threat to states have adapted to take advantage of those changes. States, on the other hand, have not yet caught up and are vulnerable to transnational threats. This thesis will explore the United States and the European Union’s strategic approaches to tackling the problem of TCOs trafficking in illicit drugs, as well as the problem of preventing terrorist groups from successfully striking their targets, to illustrate how strong states attempt to cope with transnational threats. I will give a thorough account of the US and EU’s strategic approaches to cooperation with Colombia and East Africa, respectively, in my case studies. Finally, I will conclude with an analysis of the relative success and failure of the policies and programs resulting from the strategies of cooperation adopted by the strong states in an attempt to see the degree to which, if at all, variations in weak state input in policy formulation correlate with variations in the effectiveness of those policies.

**Background**

Until the 20th Century, transnational issues were not posed as a serious problem for states. Historically, international politics has been just that: the politics that takes place among nation-states. From the consolidation of the Westphalian conception of statehood to the end of the Cold War, international politics was concerned with the

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⁶ Cambone, pp. 49-50.
relations of war and peace, wealth and poverty between and among states. Yet, transnational issues were not absent from the international agenda. Trafficking in illicit drugs, for example, has been an issue states have grappled with on the international level since before even the 1912 Hague Opium Commission. However, these issues did not take center stage, but rather existed in the “penumbra of diplomacy,” often set aside for the more immediate concerns of power politics.

Transnational threats gained in prominence on the agenda of international politics in the 1970s. At that time attention turned to the increasing interdependence of states due to the rise of international institutions, the deepening of the economic and financial ties between states, and the rise of environmental awareness. The rise of terrorism and drug trafficking gained global attention; in that period, however, they were addressed within the framework of the Cold War rather than as an independent phenomena. Terrorism was linked to ongoing conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and transnational cartels gained material capacity, in terms of weapons and funding, through the insurgencies and civil wars associated with the Cold War.

Nye state in the beginning of their 1971 article on transnational relations. They go on to say that the state is the basic unit of action in world politics, agreeing with Hans J. Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, and Kenneth Waltz, the preeminent realist scholars of that time. They summarize the realist’s view as follows: “Since force, violence, and threats thereof are at the core of this interplay [of governmental policies that makes up world politics], the struggle for power, whether as end or necessary means, is the distinguishing mark of politics among nations.” Keohane and Nye go on to critique this view of international politics, citing the transnational issues that even in the early 1970s were beginning to creep into the conversation.

Transnational issues gained in importance throughout the Cold War, and became the defining issues of the post-Cold War world. To demonstrate the change, I can contrast two books by the international relations scholar Paul Kennedy. In 1987 Kennedy wrote *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, putting the post-WWII years into perspective in world history. In it, Kennedy writes of the arc and trajectory of great powers in broad perspective, demonstrating the importance of economic growth as a necessary part of international power. In his concluding chapters Kennedy argues that the dynamics of international politics are unlikely to change anytime soon:

> The international system, whether it is dominated for a time by six Great Powers or only two, remains anarchical – that is, there is no greater authority than the sovereign, egoistical nation-state. In each particular period of time some of those states are growing or shrinking in their relative share of secular power. […] In sum, without the intervention of an act of God, or a disastrous nuclear conflagration, there will continue to be

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a dynamic of world power, essentially driven by technological and economic change.\textsuperscript{18}

Kennedy is comfortable comparing Charles V’s Habsburg Empire with British hegemony in the late 1800s and early 1900s, and he predicts not much variation in the future.

In 1992 Kennedy wrote another book, this one titled, \textit{Preparing for the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century}. The origins of this book are recounted by the author in his foreword, and they are worth repeating verbatim:

This book had its origins in a debate which took place between me and a large group of economists at the Brookings Institution in Washington in the spring of 1988, and which centered on my newly published work \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers}. In the course of a lively evening one critic- not known to me – declared that he couldn’t understand why such a fuss was being made about \textit{Rise and Fall} by everyone. It was, after all, a very traditional sort of book, focusing upon the nation-state as the central actor in world affairs. Why hadn’t I used my time better, to write about much more important and interesting issues, those forces for global change like population growth, the impact of technology, environmental damage, and migration, which were \textit{trans}national in nature and threatened to affect the lives of us all, peasant as well as premiers?\textsuperscript{19}

As a result of this critique Kennedy began to pay more attention to transnational issues. He started by collecting newspaper clippings and eventually he wrote a book that focused entirely on transnational issues. In the years between 1987 and 1993 Kennedy went from a book that dealt solely with great powers to one that dealt primarily with transnational issues. In his words, “Regardless of whether the Cold War is over […], there now exist vast \textit{non}military threats to the safety and well-being of the peoples of this planet which deserve attention.”\textsuperscript{20} This brief comparison illustrates how one of the preeminent scholars of international relations noticed a sea change in the issues states would be, and are now, dealing with.

\textsuperscript{18} Kennedy, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers}, p. 440.
\textsuperscript{20} Kennedy, \textit{Preparing for the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century}, p. 14.
Stephen Cambone, a scholar with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote in 1998 that, “a set of threats has emerged that is not of the traditional variety and whose origin may be abroad but whose impact can be felt in the United States by US citizens.”

This definition of transnational threats written for US foreign policy decision makers captures the essence of the post-Cold War system. Cambone goes on to state that, “These threats include terrorism, the use of WMD, organized crime (including drugs), and illegal immigration.” For the sake of brevity this thesis will only deal with global terrorism and transnational crime, but I expect the results of this study to be generalizable to such issues as weapons of mass destruction proliferation and climate change.

The world system has changed, and transnational actors have evolved to take advantage of those changes. At the same time, those changes weaken states relative to transnational actors. The most tangible manifestation of the abstract concept of sovereignty is a state’s borders. The lines between states are marked by signs, gates, walls, flags, and sometimes armed guards. Nowhere except, perhaps, a nation’s capital is sovereignty so evident. Borders, however, are a double-edged blade for states because their very existence gives an advantage to transnational networks. They give international criminals and violent groups places to hide. They make illicit smugglers rich by raising the price of illicit goods. Moisés Naim, former editor of Foreign Policy, makes this point in his book on modern trends in transnational criminal organizations, Illicit:

For criminals, frontiers create business opportunities and convenient shields. But for the government officials chasing the criminals, borders are often insurmountable obstacles. The privileges of national sovereignty are

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21 Cambone, p. 49.
22 Ibid.
turning into burdens and constraints on governments. Because of this asymmetry, in the global clash between governments and criminals, governments are systematically losing.\textsuperscript{24}

Borders benefit criminals by protecting criminals from retaliation and raising their profits, and they limit states’ ability to address transnational issues because of the limited jurisdiction of a state’s legitimate use of force.

**Importance**

In the twelve years since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, many scholars have written about transnational threats.\textsuperscript{25} They have focused on the structure of terrorist cells, counterterrorism tactics, international legal frameworks, and the historical evolution of the threat.\textsuperscript{26} They have noted that the evolving structure of transnational threats, like terror and crime, combined with the changing international system, has handicapped states vis-à-vis these non-state actors. There is, however, a gap in the literature with respect to the role of cooperation between strong and weak states in confronting transnational threats. This thesis enters into that open territory and attempts to provide a preliminary glance at the trends and correlations involved in confronting transnational threats.


Chapter 2: Research design

States have been struggling with the problem of transnational threats since before the end of the Cold War with little to show for their efforts. The world entered a “unipolar moment” when the Cold War ended, leaving the United States the sole superpower.¹ Even as the most powerful state in the world, the US has not effectively addressed transnational threats like terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). This thesis attempts to grapple with the question of how strong states can better confront these non-traditional security issues. Building on the current literature in the field, this thesis seeks the answer to that question in the ways in which strong and weak states cooperate to confront transnational threats.

History tells us that stronger states prefer to maintain the upper hand, often to the point of resorting to coercive methods, vis-à-vis weaker states with regard to security issues.² Recent changes in the international system have combined to create a global reality that puts states – strong and weak – at a disadvantage when dealing with transnational threats. In order to address transnational issues, states must cooperate. Weak states are often most affected and involved in those issues, so it stands to reason that those states ought to play a pivotal role in resolving them. If strong states develop strategies to address transnational threats more cooperatively, including, if need be,

granting weaker states strategic leadership in the search for effective solutions, threats will be more successfully addressed.

Methodology

In order to test this hypothesis I will attempt to describe and classify, in a small sample of cases, the strategies of cooperation strong states employ to deal with transnational threats along a spectrum of weak state input. Following that classification I will demonstrate the relative success or failure of the policies and programs employed in those cases. The independent variable in this study is the degree of weak state input in the formation of strategies to confront transnational threats, and the dependent variable is the degree of success of those strategies in addressing transnational threats. If my hypothesis is correct, we would expect strategies with a higher degree of weak state input succeeding against transnational threats at a higher rate than strategies with a lower degree of weak state input.

Due to space constraints, this thesis will be limited to two primary case studies, divided into four sub-cases. The first case will compare and contrast the United States and the European Union’s approaches to handling transnational crime, in this case drug trafficking, with Colombia from the late 1990s to 2012. The second case will similarly compare and contrast the US and EU’s strategic approaches, this time in relation to counterterrorism efforts in a post-9/11 world in East Africa. This study will consider the EU as a state for two reasons. First, its relative size and economic strength make it one of the most powerful international actors on the world scene. This allows for comparison
between the case studies that will follow. Second, the Maastricht Treaty states that the EU will form a common foreign and security policy, including a common defense policy.³

In order to evaluate the relative success of each case, I will categorize the strategies of cooperation employed by strong states along a spectrum from strong state imposition to weak state strategic leadership. In Table 1, below, I lay out the five primary strong state strategies. These strategies are placed on a spectrum from no or limited weak state input (at the top of the table) to weak state strategic leadership (at the bottom). At the top of the table are the least desirable strategies, in terms of this paper’s hypothesis, and at the bottom are the most desirable.

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<th>Table 1: Strong State Strategies of Cooperation</th>
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In this thesis I will categorize the cases using the following methodology.

When the weak state is not given the opportunity to provide input or is ignored in strategic deliberations, or when the strong state does not consult with the weak state before providing a fully fledged strategy, I classify the case as one of a strong state

imposition (1). In these cases, one might see the small state balk at implementing the specifics of the strategy despite having nominally accepted the strategy.

When the strong state dominates in the formulation of a strategy to address a transnational problem, but the weak state approves of that strategy (2), one would expect to see a small amount of consultation with the weak state during the formulation process. This strategy fits within the dependency theory literature that finds that weak states side with strong states not because of force, but because of shared values between elites in both states.\(^4\) Thus, weak state input in the formulation of strategy, should it occur at all, would take place at the elite level, and might be protested by other segments of the weak state’s society. The assumption here is that the elites in both the weak and strong states agree on the problem and the solution, and one would see indications of this in the public statements made by the weak and strong states.

When the strong state crafts the strategy with weak state input (3), one would expect to see substantive weak state input. Indications of this would be if the primary weak state strategic goals were adopted in the final strategy, but the majority of the strategic debate took place in the strong state; also there would be high-level meetings between weak and strong state representatives. Another indicator might be if the strategic negotiation took place in a multilateral institution such as the United Nations. While hegemonic stability theory, described in more detail below, posits that the hegemon, or strongest power in a given region or international system, sets up international institutions in order to preserve and codify the existing balance of power, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argue that the UN gives weaker states more power vis-

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à-vis strong states in negotiations, because of the principle of one state, one vote.\(^5\)
Keohane and Nye refer primarily to the General Assembly of the UN, where Global South states have banded together to defeat some policies endorsed by stronger states,\(^6\)
although any strategy that includes force is the prerogative of the Security Council, in which the P-5\(^7\) states have veto power. Regardless, strong and weak state strategic negotiations that take place within international institutions will evince more input from the weak state than negotiations that take place solely in the strong state.

When strategy formulation takes place in both the strong and the weak state, when significant weak state proposals end up in the final strategy, and when most or all of the strategic provisions are debated by the weak state legislature, then the participation in strategy formulation can be seen as roughly equal (4). The location of strategy formulation is important because the process of implementing strategy requires mobilization on the part of both states, but just as the weak state is usually more impacted by the transnational issue, so too will it be more impacted by the strategy to confront it. Strategy formation that takes place in a weak state will likely include more representatives of the agencies and organizations directly involved in implementing the strategy, giving them a larger voice and stake in the proceedings. As stated above, the closeness of the final strategy decided upon to the original proposal of the weak state should indicate the degree of weak state input. Finally, the domestication of international legal provisions (be they bilateral, multilateral, regional, or global) in terms of legislation passed can serve as a reliable indicator of a national government’s acceptance of a

\(^{6}\) Braveboy-Wagner, pp. 1-7.
\(^{7}\) The US, the UK, France, Russia, and China.
strategy. Beth Elise Whitaker, an international relations scholar, uses domestication of international legal provisions – or the lack thereof – to measure compliance with the US-led counterterrorism regime among weak African states.8

Weak state strategic leadership (5) can be said to have occurred in cases where one observes the strategy formation process take place inside the weak state; all weak state provisions are included in the final strategy; and all strategic provisions are codified by the weak state. Weak state strategic leadership can take place in an international institution or in a neutral state, but that is usually a part of a more domestic process.

In sum, the breakdown of strategies and indicators is as follows:

- (1) Strong state imposes its will
  - Low or no weak state input
    - Few high-level meetings
    - Few weak state priorities maintained in final strategy
  - Lack of weak state domestication of strategic provisions

- (2) Strong state dominates, weak state concurs
  - Low to mid weak state input
    - Some high-level meetings with weak state elites
    - Some weak state priorities maintained in final strategy
  - Civil society in weak state may object

- (3) Strong state crafts strategy with weak state input
  - Relatively substantial weak state input
    - Many high-level meetings
    - Primary weak state priorities maintained in final strategy
  - Strategic debate takes place primarily in the strong state
  - Strategic debate can take place in international organization

- (4) Strong and weak states participate equally
  - Substantial weak state input
    - Many high-level meetings
    - Most weak state priorities maintained in final strategy
  - Strategy formation takes place in both the strong and the weak state
  - High degree of domestication of strategic provisions

- (5) Weak state leadership
  - Some strong state input
  - Strategy formation takes place in the weak state

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- All weak state goals and priorities maintained in final strategy
- All strategic provisions domesticated in weak state

Using this methodology, at the end of each case I will match the case to the strategy of cooperation utilized by the US and the EU to confront transnational threats, specifically trafficking in illicit drugs and global terrorism.

The dependent variable, the degree of success to both parties of the policies and programs that are the outcomes of the cooperation between the strong and weak state, will be measured as follows: in terms of transnational crime, success is measured by reductions in drug flows into the strong state, as well as by a decline in drug-related crime in the target country. In terms of terrorism, success will be measured by a decline in the rate of terrorist incidents in the weak state, in the strong state by organizations based in or linked to the weak state, and against strong state targets in the weak state.

Both metrics of success will be judged in relation to the introduction of the policy or program, keeping in mind that most policies take at least a year to begin to have an effect, so in tables and graphs depicting the metric of success over time we would expect to see success increasing as the policy or program took effect.

Success against transnational crime, meaning, in this study, drug trafficking, presents a difficult challenge for measurement. Successful crime is, by its clandestine nature, not reported. Variables in analyses of real world events seek to be reliable, in that they are consistent metrics, and valid, in that they measure the phenomenon they purport to measure. Governments and news organizations seeking to measure trends in transnational crime tend to focus on variables that are conveniently and reliably measured, but that are not necessarily valid. For example, the US government sets goals regarding the reduction of hectares of ground dedicated to the production of coca, and of tons of
cocaine interdicted. These goals are premised on the assumption that there is a fixed amount of cocaine being trafficked and that by interdicting the cocaine or defoliating the crop, the inflow of illicit drugs into the US will decrease. Unfortunately, that assumption is flawed, as is discussed below in chapter three, and measuring the amount of coca bush defoliated or of cocaine interdicted does not, on its own, tell us anything about the flow of cocaine into the US. In this thesis I will estimate the success of the policies and programs enacted through cooperation between strong and weak states with two metrics that get at the goals of the strong and weak states. The virtue of using two different proxy variables in this case is that it more accurately measures success for both parties. Strong and weak states have different goals regarding transnational crime.

The first metric, which seeks to measure the aspect of transnational crime that strong states are most effected by – drug inflows, is estimates of illicit drugs entering the strong state. A valid estimate of the flow of cocaine into a state is the fluctuation in the price of cocaine in that state. The principle of supply and demand tells us that when demand outstrips supply, prices go up, and when supply outstrips demand, prices go down. Demand for cocaine in both the US and the EU has remained relatively stable in the time period of this study, and fluctuations are taken into account in the analysis. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides street cocaine prices by purity level going back to 1990. I will use this data to analyze the success of the

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policies and programs enacted by the US and EU by observing the fluctuation in price, and therefore supply, over time. This is similar to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) composite estimate of illicit drug flows into the US.\textsuperscript{13}

Violence is the main problem associated with transnational crime for weak states. The rate of violence is a valid metric of the instability of a state.\textsuperscript{14} In this thesis I make the assumption that state stability and TCO strength have a zero-sum relationship, meaning that as a state becomes more unstable, TCOs grow stronger. This assumption is based off of a tradition in the literature that says that, “as state authority weakens and fails, [...] so lawlessness becomes more apparent. Criminal gangs take over the streets of the cities. Arms and drug trafficking become more apparent.”\textsuperscript{15} The second metric I use to evaluate the success or failure of the policies and programs described in the cases below gets at the threat TCOs pose to the stability of weak states – rates of violence. The UNODC offers the public a comprehensive database that includes homicide rates and the rates of violent crime linked to gangs and criminal organizations.\textsuperscript{16} I will use this data, along with data that shows the rate of violence in various parts of the country and battle-related deaths, to measure the degree of success or failure of the policies arrived at by cooperation between the US and Colombia and the EU and Colombia in diminishing the strength of TCOs and other armed groups beholden to the drug trade.

Success against global terrorism is comparatively easier to measure, because the problem of global terrorism for strong and weak states alike is the frequency and intensity

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of terrorist incidents. For measuring the rise and fall of incidents of global terrorism the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is a freely available database made available to the public by the University of Maryland. The database draws from over 25,000 news sources, and covers a period of time stretching from the advent of modern terrorism to 2012.\textsuperscript{17} This study will not use terrorist incidents reportedly stopped by governments, as this data is necessarily incomplete and subjectively reported.

In each case study, chapters four and five, I will categorize the cooperative strategies of the strong states according to the degree of weak state input in the formation of policies and programs to confront transnational threats. In the analysis portion of this thesis, chapter six, I will discuss the success or failure of those policies and programs, and I will compare the degree of weak state input against the success or failure of those policies and programs. Assuming the evidence supports my hypothesis, this analysis will demonstrate a positive correlation between the depth of strong state strategic cooperation with weak states, especially to the point of weak state strategic leadership, and the success of the policies employed against transnational threats.

Definitions

The concept of transnationalism is intrinsically tied to globalization. Globalization, the historically recent phenomenon characterized by overlapping economic, technological, cultural, social, and political processes connecting states and

societies to one another at multiple levels, has changed the world system. This phenomenon has tied states closer together through deepened economic interdependence and political integration so that gains and losses are more dependent on others; it has connected individuals and networks through; it has provided fertile ground for an explosion in the quantity and capacity of non-state actors, both violent and non-violent; it has increased the crossing of borders as trade, migration, crime, and labor increase between nations; and it has decreased the frequency of conflict between states while increasing the frequency of conflict within and across states. These changes highlight the two trends that compose the concept of transnationalism: people and peoples connect more and more frequently on individual, group, and network levels all over the world; and more people, goods, money, and even ideas flow across state borders. As a result, the lots of states of different strength and weakness are connected. There are many positive effects of a more interconnected world, such as increased trade and decreased interstate conflict, but this more interconnected world has also led to the development of new threats. Transnational threats, like globally-oriented terrorism and transnational crime, take advantage of the changes in the international system in ways make it impossible for a single state to confront them. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are organizations whose operations span states and whose purpose is to obtain power, influence, or financial gains by illegal means. Globally-oriented terrorist groups

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20 Ibid.
are groups whose operations span states and whose purpose is to influence states and provoke a large-scale confrontation by violently and indiscriminately attacking people and symbols associated with their enemies. These are the transnational threats I will deal with below.

In this thesis I will discuss strong and weak states, and it will clarify my argument considerably to have a clear definition of what they are. Weak states, for the purposes of this paper, are states considered to be in the Global South. Global south is a term that refers to what was once known as the Third World during the Cold War. Global south states make up approximately two-thirds of all states in the global community and are predominantly located in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The main characteristics these states share is lower levels of development relative to the Global North; most are multiethnic and many are dealing with governance problems. They are militarily weak vis-à-vis the North.

Strong states, on the other hand, are generally richer, more developed states. They tend to be in the northern hemisphere, though not exclusively, and many of them share powerful positions in the world’s largest international organizations, like the United Nations Security Council and the Group of 8 (G8).

Weak states are more affected by transnational issues than larger states. Much like trees in a flood, the larger the tree, the less the current damages it. Weak states bend and threaten to fall under the weight of transnational issues. Terrorism provides an

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illustrative example. The US lost fewer than 3,000 people in the 9/11 attacks, and the state apparatus itself was mostly unharmed by the attack. Afghanistan, Yemen, and Mali have been completely destabilized by the influence of al-Qaeda and their allies and affiliates. Countless lives have been lost and the states themselves have been compromised by the influence of transnational terrorism and the efforts to combat it. Because these states are small not just on the international stage, but also tend to have less ability to project power domestically, they make excellent breeding grounds for borderless groups seeking to avoid notice. Transnational problems such as terrorism and crime disproportionately affect weak states in part because they are often hosts, willing or no, to those groups. Other reasons for the tendency of transnational problems to hurt weak states more than strong states are weak states’ vulnerability to fluctuations in the international economy, their dependence on conditional foreign aid, and their weak control over the use of force within their borders.

Literature Review

26 An argument can be made that by provoking the Bush administration into spending an enormous amount of blood and treasure in Afghanistan and Iraq, the harm caused by the attack was much greater than the tragic, but circumscribed, casualty count lets on. That argument is beside the point here. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia Updated Edition, London, UK: I.B. Taurus via Yale University Press (2010) pp. 67-81.
There are three dominant approaches to the question of the utility and effectiveness of cooperation: realism, liberalism, and constructivism and critical approaches. I intend to use the literature from all three major traditions in the international relations literature to build a foundation for this thesis. Realism, liberalism, their variants, and those theorists that critique them are tools that can be used to better understand international relations.

The dominant theoretical tradition in international relations has historically been realism. Realist theorists begin from the premise that states are the key actors on the international stage. States, or state leaders, are actors that behave rationally, and their primary interest is the maximization of their own security or power, depending on the specific subspecies of realism. The primary variants of realism are classical, defensive, and offensive realism. The foundational assumption of the realist ontology is that states are formally equal units in an anarchical international system. Knowledge is always incomplete, so the intentions of another state can never be known for certain. Trust, then, is in short supply, so states must rely upon themselves for their own security in a condition known as “self-help.”

Classical realism asserts that the roots of the anarchical international system can be traced to human nature. Man is driven to conflict by nature, and in the absence of hierarchy man will exist in a Hobbesian war of all against all. In classical realism, human beings make decisions and they do so to maximize power. E.H. Carr’s The

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34 Ibid, pp. 41-78.
36 Viotti and Kauppi, pp. 39-41.
Twenty Years’ Crisis and Hans Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations are two of the definitive works in the tradition of classical realism. Classical realists argue that state leaders choose to cooperate primarily to maintain a balance of power.

Structural realism raises the level of analysis from the level of the individual to the level of the structure of the international system. The basic tenets of structural realism are similar to the ontological foundations of classical realism: the state is the primary actor in world politics; states are unitary, rational actors; and the international system is anarchical. Both branches of realism primarily study great powers, and neglect the Global South. Security issues are at the top of the agenda for all realists. However, structural realists argue that states are concerned with survival more than power, and that states can only help themselves. Defensive and offensive realism are both variants of structural realism.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 41-78.}

Kenneth Waltz was one of the first theorists to put forth a structural theory of international relations. In his seminal work, Theory of International Politics, he draws heavily from behavioral economics to argue that state behavior is primarily a function of the structure of the international system. Termed “neo-realism,” this sub-branch of realism argues that the balance of power is actually a systemic feature of international politics because states are concerned not with the maximization of their own power, but with gaining more security. This foundational belief is the basic premise of defensive realism. Security, Waltz argues, is a zero-sum feature of world politics, so all gains (military, economic, social, diplomatic, etc.) are made in comparison to other states – not in a vacuum. Waltz proposes that states’ concern for their own security, the relative nature of all gains, and the lack of trust in an anarchical international system leads to a
spiral model, or security dilemma.\textsuperscript{38} However, a feature of the international system is that any change in the distribution of capabilities in the international system affects the relative gains of every state, provoking a balancing coalition.\textsuperscript{39} Cooperation, therefore, occurs naturally in reaction to changes in the distribution of capabilities in the international system.

Stephen Walt modifies Waltz’s defensive realism, arguing instead that states cooperate by forming balancing coalitions in opposition to threats. Relative gains alone are not what provoke balancing coalitions – cooperation occurs in the face of fear. Walt expands defensive realism’s concept of alliance formation and cooperation with \textit{The Origins of Alliances}. In it he proves that states tend to balance against states they perceive as threatening: “External threats are the most frequent cause of international alliances.”\textsuperscript{40} Threat, for Walt, is measured in terms of geographic proximity, aggregate power, offensive capabilities, and intentions. These factors bring the human dimension back into structural realism, making cooperation a decision rather than a natural feature of the international system. Walt is important to this study not only for his contributions to defensive realism, but because he studied weak states in a theoretical school that marginalizes and ignores all but the great powers;\textsuperscript{41} and the hypothesis of this thesis depends on the fact that states will form balancing coalitions against what they perceive to be threats.

\textsuperscript{38} A security dilemma is a situation in which the actions taken by a state to increase its security (e.g. expanding its military capabilities by purchasing new weapons systems) lead other states to respond with similar measures, ad infinitum. This can lead to armed conflict. Robert Jervis, \textit{Perception and Misperception in International Politics}, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, (1978), pp. 58–113.
\textsuperscript{41} In \textit{The Origins of Alliances}, Walt researched and wrote a recent diplomatic history of the Middle East because there were no comprehensive sources available.
Offensive realism, a structural realist theory, similarly begins with the foundation that states, and primarily great powers, are the key actors in world politics; states are unitary, rational actors; the international system is anarchical; there is a lack of trust in the international system; and states desire security. John Mearshimer, a prominent offensive realist, argues that Waltz’s theory of international politics is biased toward the preservation of the status quo. Defensive realists, according to Mearsheimer, believe that states seek only enough security to maintain the balance of power. Offensive realism, on the other hand, does not believe states stop gaining security after they reach a balance of power. Rather, offensive realists believe that states are power-maximizing actors quick to resort to offensive action to increase their security: “The greater the military advantage one state has over other states, the more secure it is.”\(^{42}\) For Mearsheimer, anarchy and relative gains provoke a spiral model of fear for survival, and rather than there being a natural balancing impulse in the international system, states “look for opportunities to alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of potential rivals.”\(^{43}\) States do not seek a balance of power, they seek hegemony. More important than military gains, however, is self-help. Interdependence is an uncomfortable reality for states to endure because it undermines self-help. In an anarchical system, depending on other unknowable potentially threatening states makes you vulnerable to attack or exploitation.\(^{44}\) Cooperation is an extremely fraught concept for offensive realists.

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\(^{44}\) Viotti and Kauppi, pp. 39-78.
Hegemonic stability theory, a realist theory that argues that a state with a preponderance of power facilitates peaceful cooperation and effectively addresses international problems, borrows heavily from offensive realism. In fact, Mearsheimer supports this theory in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* when he argues that states struggling to maximize security will attempt to install themselves as regional or global hegemons, shaping the international system to their benefit.\(^45\) In hegemonic stability theory the hegemons stabilize the world system by solving common goods problems, setting global norms and rules, controlling key resources, establishing international institutions to codify the existing order, and promoting its own culture as the international culture.\(^46\) Cooperation occurs through the leadership of the hegemons: “Leadership provided by hegemonic states is understood as facilitating achievement of collaboration among states.”\(^47\) In an anarchical world with functionally equal actors devoid of trust, international cooperation facilitated when incentives are given (and disincentives are threatened) by a state vastly more powerful than the rest. Hegemonic stability theory predicts that the world’s current superpower, the United States in today’s terms, and the organizations, norms, regimes, and laws it has helped to form, will lead the world in confronting transnational problems. Realist theory contains the null hypothesis for this thesis – increased cooperation with weak states does not better address transnational issues. Hegemonic stability theory predicts that strong state dictation of the terms of cooperation and strategy will be more effective.

Liberal theorists believe that states, as well as non-state actors like international organizations, multinational corporations, and transnational criminal groups, are

\(^{45}\) Mearsheimer, pp. 29-54.

\(^{46}\) Viotti and Kauppi p. 73.

\(^{47}\) Ibid, pp. 71-73.
important in world politics. States, organizations, NGOs, TCOs, and other international actors are enmeshed in a complex web of politics. The agenda of world politics is not necessarily hierarchical with security matters paramount, in the liberal view economic, social, and environmental issues are equally significant issue areas. Liberal theorists disaggregate the state, looking behind the black box of the state to see what makes states act the way they do. Finally, they tend to orient their research agenda around discovering what conditions cause, or at least facilitate, international cooperation.\footnote{Viotti and Kaupi, pp. 129-130.}

Liberal theorists believe that democracy, interdependence, and globalization increase peaceful outcomes in international politics.\footnote{Ibid, pp. 129-135.} Bruce Russett and John Oneal draw from Kant, one of the historical contributors to liberalism in international relations theory, in their book, \textit{Triangulating Peace}, by arguing that democracy, international organizations, and economic interdependence substantially increase the likelihood of international peace.\footnote{Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, \textit{Triangulating Peace}, New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (2001), pp. 157.} They write that as the economic activities of citizens become more globalized, as they make states more interdependent, states will create laws and institutions to facilitate those activities. The system of laws and institutions thus created then further encourages the deepening of economic interdependence. Russett and Oneal argue that those factors, along with high levels of democracy, correlate strongly with reduced levels of conflict. Democracy is included for the Kantian reason that because publics are most detrimentally affected by war, when publics have a say in the decision to go to war, they are less likely to choose to do so – especially when their incomes are tied to that of the other state, as is increasingly the case due to economic interdependence.\footnote{Russett and Oneal, pp. 157-179.}
The liberal tradition of thought accepts and encourages the current trend of globalization and deepening interdependence, believing that these forces bring with them peace and prosperity. As discussed above, levels of interstate conflict have indeed dropped as states have become more interconnected. This thesis takes the democratic proposition of Russett and Oneal’s argument further, arguing that the inclusion of publics closest to the problems caused by transnational threats in the formulation of policies to confront those threats will lead to more successful policies. Just as Russett and Oneal argue that democracy helps to cause peace because it includes in policymaking those who are most affected by the consequences of the decision, so to do I argue that the inclusion of weak states in the formulation of strategies helps to more effectively address transnational threats for the same reason. Of course, domestic and international policymaking are two different processes, and Russett and Oneal’s argument regarding democracy contains more nuance than the simplified version I have presented above, but the factors they find causal have not been accepted uncritically as they are the factors being tested in the cases below.

Andrew Moravcsik puts forth a liberal theory of international relations that rests on the three assumptions: (1) the actors in international relations are individuals and private groups who tend to be rational and act to maximize material and ideal welfare; (2) state preferences are determined by some subset(s) of domestic society; and (3) state behavior is constrained by the configuration of interdependent state preferences. The implication of the first two assumptions is that states do not automatically maximize fixed conceptions of security, sovereignty, or wealth. Rather they pursue particular interpretations and combinations of security, welfare, and sovereignty preferred by
powerful domestic groups. Moravcsik upends the realist conception of power based on state capabilities when he states that, “the willingness of states to expend resources or make concessions is itself primarily a function of preferences, not capabilities.” Hence his final assumption, that state behavior is constrained by the pattern of policy interdependence, means that while states attempt to do what they want in international politics, the state with a more intense interest tends to get what they want relative to others. Cooperation, for Moravcsik, is a product of the pattern of interdependent state preferences. States cooperate when their preferences align, or when they must in order to accomplish a common goal. States are less afraid of relative gains because they are not the atomistic billiard balls realists assume they are. States may instead gain in absolute terms, cooperation playing the role of the tide that lifts all ships. The condition of anarchy itself is different for Moravcsik. States are embedded in their own domestic society and the larger transnational society. States do not act, they are used by small groups of individuals in positions of power for particular definitions of interests. They are bounded domestically, by their own disaggregation, and internationally, by the web of interdependence that characterizes the international stage for Moravcsik.

A different variant of liberalism looks more closely at the role of institutions in facilitating cooperation than at domestic political preferences. Robert Axelrod’s *The Evolution of Cooperation* uses a game theoretic model to show how institutions that iterate interactions can give incentives to cooperating states and punish those who do not

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53 Moravcsik’s examples here are the Boer War, Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Chechnya (p. 524).
54 Moravcsik, pp. 513-553.
Axelrod’s work supports the categorization in this thesis’s methodology of international organizations as sites of increased cooperation, though he does not address the effect of strength imbalances in states on cooperation.

A neoliberal theory of international cooperation comes from Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. Their theory is closer to realism than Moravcsik’s in that it accepts the analytical necessity of power in determining causality in international relations. In 1977 they published *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, and in it they laid out the concept of complex interdependence:

> Its hallmarks are (1) multiple channels of diplomatic interaction, by all types of actors, (2) absence of hierarchy on issues (that is, security issues do not dominate the global or bilateral agenda, and many issues arise from domestic sources), and (3) irrelevance of military force in determining the outcomes of bargaining and conflicts.\(^5^6\)

Similar to Moravcsik, the actors in international politics for Keohane and Nye are not just states, but also individuals and groups, and security is not the only issue on the table. Gains made by states may be absolute. Cooperation is more likely because states are disaggregated and interdependent. Keohane and Nye make the point that while weak states may depend on strong states for many things; strong states also depend on weak states.\(^5^7\)

Under situations of complex interdependence conflict is rare because states are so closely intertwined by multiple points of dependence that aggression on the part of one state would hurt itself. Cooperation is the natural state for relations between two states


related by complex interdependence. Keohane and Nye are not saying that states will tend towards this kind of relationship naturally, and they allow for the possibility that states will continue to strive for hegemony. Complex interdependence is a phenomenon these two scholars observed emerging between some states in the 1970s, and the trend towards greater interdependence has only increased.58

Liberalism recommends that states cooperate through international institutions to confront transnational threats, utilizing the power of iterated cooperation and the benefits of interdependence to confront actors that transcend borders. Liberalism is useful for this study because it widens the scope of theory to include non-state groups, international organizations, and international regimes as actors in world politics, all of which are instrumental in the cases below. Also, it helps to provide a foundation for my hypothesis by arguing that as policymaking is brought closer to those most affected by a problem, that policymaking will be more effective. Liberalism’s foundational underpinnings allow for more and stronger cooperation between states, as gains are not necessarily absolute and security is not always at the top of the agenda of world politics. The perspective of liberalism is important for this study because it highlights the growing role of transnational groups and processes and interdependence in shaping the world.

Constructivism and critical approaches to international relations theory have a different approach. Constructivists challenge the basic ontology of realism and liberalism, arguing that the world is not given, but made. Norms, ideas, discourse, and history all play a much larger role in constructivism than they do in realism or liberalism. Critical theorists, like postcolonial theorists point out the degree of hierarchy embedded in the

international system, while constructivists argue for the power of norms, words, and ideas in shaping the political system.  

Interdependence and the growing trend of transnationalism are not just negative or positive processes. They have uneven benefits and detriments to different states. Keohane and Nye’s concept of complex interdependence provides insight on how strong states may be linked to weak states. In fact, they argue that weak states are empowered in situations of complex interdependence because their domestic interests are less complex than those of large states. This observation is in accordance with critical theorists who study the interplay between weak and strong states in world politics.

Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner and Michael Snarr argue that as the world is drawn closer together, weaker states have more power vis-à-vis larger states because they have solidarity of purpose. The Global South, the current term for the large group of states located primarily in the southern hemisphere with a common post-colonial history, have tended to act together on the international stage. Keohane and Nye go on to argue that the strategy of solidarity in the Global South has been developed at international conferences, often under the auspices of the UN. The UN’s largest organ, the General Assembly (GA), tends to favor small states because of the practice of “one state-one vote.” Keohane and Nye argue that the GA has agenda-setting power on the international stage, and international organizations like the UN may act as catalysts for coalition formation and as arenas for political initiatives. Weak states, in their view, have an enormous advantage in a world where complex interdependence is increasingly common,

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59 Viotti and Kauppi, pp. 277-278.
60 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence 3rd Ed, pp. 20-32.
states tend towards interdependence, and international organizations are plentiful and powerful, compared to times past.\textsuperscript{61}

Most states are weak states. The Global South makes up about two-thirds of the global community of states.\textsuperscript{62} Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, in her introduction to \textit{The Foreign Policies of the Global South}, looks at small state foreign policymaking at the state, regional, and Global South units of analysis. She concludes that while there is much that continues to unite the countries of the Global South, the heyday of their solidarity, under the Non-Aligned Movement, passed with the end of the Cold War. States in the global south act as a single unit less than they did before. In addition, the rise of middle powers like Brazil and India has stratified the global south and made the grouping itself less coherent. Regional integration has tended to favor intergovernmentalism rather than EU-style supra-nationalism. National strategies vary, therefore, among global south countries. The regional and Global South levels remain important contextualizing factors, but the primary level of foreign policy formation is the domestic for small as well as large states.\textsuperscript{63}

Critical theory lends much to this thesis, especially the importance of weak states to world politics. Constructivism adds the power of ideas, norms, and words to international relations, a consequence of its ontological foundation that holds that the world is made rather than given. The influence of constructivist thought on this thesis is demonstrated in the methodology, where words and ideas are the primary way I categorize the strategies of cooperation strong states use. Martha Finnemore, in her

\textsuperscript{62} Braveboy-Wagner, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, 1-7.
seminal work *National Interests in International Society*, argues that communicative acts are the primary means by which ideas become norms.\(^6^4\) Norms are important in the constructivist ontology because, for constructivists, outcomes in international politics are not caused by the structure of the international system and calculations of power. Rather, people make decisions, and those decisions are influenced by decision-makers’ prejudice, opinions, and frames, all of which exist in a dynamic relationship with the norms, history, and social systems that surround and immerse us all.\(^6^5\) The communicative interactions that take place during strategy formation are, according to constructivism, critically important to the outcomes of those negotiations.

This thesis draws from realism, liberalism, constructivism, and critical theory. All of these theoretical approaches help to ground the hypothesis, rationale, and methodology of this thesis. Realist theory contains the most direct counterargument against my hypothesis. While I propose that strong states would be more effective in their attempts to confront transnational threats if they were to allow for more weak state input, especially to the point of weak state leadership, hegemonic stability theory argues that strong states would be more effective if they were to impose strategy upon weak states. The cases and analysis that follow will see which approach more accurately describes the world. Before that, however, the next chapter will explore the context of this thesis in more detail.


Chapter 3: Introduction to Transnational Threats – Crime and Terrorism

In the introduction to a 2009 Brookings Institution publication, Javier Solana wrote that non-state actors have evolved much more rapidly than states’ ability to confront them:

It is clear that globalization remains the dominant trend shaping our world. It has offered millions a chance to live better lives. But globalization has also unleashed forces that governments can neither stop nor control on their own. The list of problems is by now familiar. The “dark side” of globalization requires us to address climate change, nonproliferation, state failure, energy security, and financial instability. In recent years, all these problems have become more urgent and complex. But our capacity to address them has not kept pace.1

This chapter will explore how two of the main human-based transnational threats, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and global terrorist groups, have evolved to take advantage of the changing world, and how those changes subvert the power of the state.

The Growth of Transnational Criminal Organizations

Although transnational criminal organizations obtain their revenue streams through a variety of methods, for this study I will focus on the smuggling of illicit narcotics, specifically cocaine, because of its centrality to the Colombian case. “People of every generation have needed chemicals to cope with life: sobriety is not an easy state

for human beings,”² says Richard Davenport-Hines in his history of narcotics, *In Pursuit of Oblivion*. Drug use has been a part of the human experience since before even ancient Sumerians cultivated opium in what is now Iraq.³ Anyone who has lived with addiction or addicts can testify to the damage drug addiction can wreak on individuals, but what makes drugs a transnational issue is not the substances in and of themselves. Rather, the problem of transnational crime is the harm and violence is done by transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), huge, complex organizations of networked individuals working toward a common goal, and the damage done by states in their efforts to disrupt the flow of drugs through their borders.

David Campbell argues that issues in foreign policy are defined as dangerous by people for a reason, not because things are dangerous in and of themselves. Foreign policy making is identity making, according to Campbell. It is deciding what we are and what we are not, and what we are not is what we must fight against.⁴ Why then is the production and trafficking of cocaine a security problem for states strong and weak? Drug production, trafficking, and use did not become a problem of international affairs until the Anglo-Chinese Opium Wars of the mid-1800s. The Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860) were caused by aggressive expansion of the opium trade to China by the British and subsequent Chinese attempts to prohibit its sale.⁵ In the 1870s, outraged by their government’s use of force to expand trade in a substance they deplored, British groups began to advocate against the opium trade. British Quakers and other “moral

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entrepreneurs,” Ethan Nadelmann’s term for individuals and groups who are the front
runners in defining a substance or practice as evil, formed the Anglo-Oriental Society for
the Suppression of the Opium Trade in 1874. By 1906, following the Liberal Party’s
ascendancy, the British government began to phase out opium exports from British India
to China. Nadelmann points to both the advocacy of the Anglo-Oriental Society for the
Suppression of the Opium Trade and like-minded groups, and to the diminishing
significance of opium revenues to account for this policy reversal. This redefinition of
state preferences by gradual pressure from domestic groups, changing political parties,
and shifting economic interests fits neatly with Andrew Moravcsik’s account of the
disaggregated state, discussed above.

This pattern of pressure by domestic groups resulting in a change in state
preferences and subsequent change of foreign policy, was repeated in the United States.
A coalition of domestic groups including American missionaries to the Far East, various
religious groups, economic, and political interest groups was to:

prove largely successful in stimulating both state and federal drug
prohibition legislation with in the United States as well as the creation of a
global drug prohibition regime institutionalized in international
conventions and the drug control agencies of international organizations.

Nadelmann’s account of the creation of the global drug prohibition regime closely
mirrors the logic of Campbell’s account of foreign policy as identity formation.

Prohibition movements were caused not by the legitimate fear of drug abuse, but rather
by popular association of certain drugs with certain marginalized populations within the

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6 Ethan Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society,”
7 Ibid, p. 504.
9 Nadelmann, p. 504.
United States. The earliest anti-opium laws, passed in 1875 in San Francisco, were aimed at opium smoking, a practice associated with immigrant Chinese. Opium in the form of laudanum or other liquids was associated with white women in the South and West and was not prohibited.\textsuperscript{10}

The first international anti-narcotics conference was held in Shanghai in 1909, and the United States lobbied to restrict and criminalize the trade of opium in China and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{11} This was followed by the 1912 Hague Opium Commission, which resulted in binding commitments for states to restrict opium cultivation.\textsuperscript{12} The major international treaties on the illicit narcotics trade are the 1961 Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1975 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.\textsuperscript{13}

Cocaine is primarily produced in the South American Andean region (Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia). Opium, the essential ingredient in heroin, is also produced in Colombia, but most of the world's supply comes from Central and Southeast Asia (the “Golden Crescent” of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan and “Golden Triangle” of Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand respectively). The trade in cocaine travels from source, the Andean region of South America, to sink. The United States of America is the world's largest consumer of cocaine, though in recent years cocaine use has dropped in the U.S. in favor of synthetic drugs, and the market in the European Union has begun

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid, p. 506.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 12.
to grow. Transit from source countries to the U.S. involves transnational cartels and local gangs working in loose association to control local territory in transit states (primarily the Northern Triangle of Central America – Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador – and Mexico). The trade involves numerous moving parts that link together the farmers who grow the coca plants and harvest the leaves, the production cartels that secure and often tax those farmers, the transit cartels, the local gangs in Honduras or other transit states, and the final smugglers who take the drugs into the U.S. All of these groups are struggling against one another for more territory and profit, and against the enforcement mechanisms that seek to prevent this trade, and in some cases, to profit by it.

The efforts of the U.S. to halt the production and transit of cocaine have demonstrated that this problem cannot be resolved one state at a time. Every time one state applies enough pressure on drug producers or smugglers to cause a reduction in profits, the trade shifts to accommodate the change. This is called the balloon effect, because like squeezing the middle of a balloon, rather than popping the pressure just expands to new areas. The Mexican crackdown on Ciudad Juarez is in part what led to the crisis in Honduras in 2011-2012. The influx of cocaine traffickers into Mexico in the first place was due to the success of the Miami-based Caribbean interdiction unit in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

17 “Impact of the South Florida Task Force on Drug Interdiction in the Gulf Coast Area,” United States Senate, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, J-98-103 (1983), pp. 4-6.
The overwhelming bloodshed associated with the illicit drug trade and the United States-sponsored war on drugs has been going on since the early 1970s, and there seems to be no end in sight. Cartels grown powerful from profits associated with the drug trade have overwhelmed the capacity of some affected states to respond. *Mano Dura*, or hard-line, policies by governments have pushed violence into adjacent countries. Refugees displaced by the violence are uprooted from their homes to seek safety elsewhere. The cartels themselves have become strong transnational actors, forming alliances with local youth gangs to project power over distance and utilizing the international financial system to launder their profits. Some states cannot confront these cartels because they simply do not have strong enough law enforcement, rule of law, economic stability, or even popular legitimacy. Others cannot confront TCOs on their own because doing so would require them to act within the borders of another state, subverting sovereignty and possibly leading to greater regional instability.

**The Evolution of Global Terrorist Groups**

Non-state groups with political motivations who violently and indiscriminately target civilians to advance their goals are not altogether new in history. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was one of the first internationally-oriented groups that

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Both tables contain the same information, but are sorted in ways that allow for easier navigation depending upon the information you are looking for. Accessed 11/10/12.


20 Ibid, pp. 70-77.
used terrorist tactics to advance political goals. The PLO model was to use the spectacle of terrorism to attract attention from the international community. By 1968, television and air travel had become ubiquitous. The PLO took advantage of those technological innovations through airplane hijackings captured live on 24-hour news channels. Brian Jenkins, a RAND Corporation terrorism expert, wrote of PLO-style terrorists that they, “want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.” Still, the PLO and groups similar to it (e.g. the Basque separatist group ETA, the Irish Republican Army, and West German terrorist groups) have goals that are geographically-bounded. Though their tactics are international, like hijacking international flights, their goals are local. In addition, for traditional terrorist groups, terrorism is a tactic used to accomplish a goal. George Habash, one of the founders of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP – at the time a primary component of the PLO), said of the hijackings, “When we hijack a plane it has more effect than if we killed a hundred Israelis in battle. For decades world public opinion has been neither for nor against the Palestinians. It simply ignored us. At least the world is talking about us now.” Habash said that in an interview in 1970. The PLO achieved UN observer status in 1973.

Traditional terrorism harnessed changes in information and communication technology to advance political goals through the targeting of civilians with violence. The violence, however, was not indiscriminate. Targets were chosen because they would attract the most attention, and with an aim to minimize unnecessary bloodshed. These terrorists, “had a sense of morality, a self-image, operational codes, and practical

concerns – they wanted to maintain group cohesion, avoid alienating perceived constituents, and avoid provoking public outrage, which could lead to crackdowns.”

Traditional terrorists felt that crackdowns would put their potential constituents in danger because they were geographically bounded within certain areas. New terrorist groups, typified by al Qaeda, count on crackdowns to create constituents. Because al Qaeda has no geographically bounded population it is fighting for, it does not try to prevent crackdowns. Inevitably when states crack down on asymmetrical groups, innocent people are harmed in the crossfire. This creates a constituent base that groups like al Qaeda can take and radicalize.

This phenomenon is highlighted in the fictional film *Dirty War* in which a violent Islamic extremist group modeled on al Qaeda sets off a “dirty bomb” in London. The film illustrates the extreme difficulty of preventing terrorist attacks from occurring, especially this new sort. At one point a character is explaining that with the IRA the British government was aware of 90 percent of what they were up to and attacks still got through. With al Qaeda, the character says, we are lucky if we know 20 percent. Though the film realistically portrays the near-impossibility of preventing terrorist attacks, the most difficult challenge of fighting terrorism is revealed near the end of the movie. The man primarily responsible for the attack has been apprehended and in his interrogation he is asked why he would carry out such an attack when it is sure to produce a violent reaction against the population he claims to represent. “We expect your reaction,” he says. “It is what unites us and divides you.”

This claim gets to the heart of the strategy of terrorism. The primary goal of modern terrorism, as manifested by al Qaeda and its

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23 Jenkins, p. 118.
affiliates, is to provoke a true clash of civilizations. They want to start a war that will pit all “good” Muslims against all non-believers.\textsuperscript{25}

The change in goals, from circumscribed political goals like UN observer status to maximalist goals like the reestablishment of the Islamic caliphate,\textsuperscript{26} is one of the effects caused by combining terrorist tactics with fanatical religion. Religion can act as an accelerant for terrorism, allowing terrorist groups to have millenarian or apocalyptic goals. Specifically, al Qaeda and its affiliates preach a fundamentalist version of Islam born from the combination of Salafi Islam and the historical experience of the victorious jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. This version of Islam preaches violent defensive jihad, which accepts no compromise and sets millenarian goals. These goals allow for the prospect of mass casualty attacks and a larger base from which to potentially recruit new members, as the base is defined not by state but by faith. Millenarian goals make these organizations and their followers think of time in completely different ways from Western policymakers. When your goal is the reestablishment of the Islamic Caliphate or the establishment of God’s kingdom on earth, you are less concerned about preventing collateral damage, or public opinion.\textsuperscript{27} States, especially democratic states, need to produce quick victories and demonstrable gains.\textsuperscript{28}

While the introduction of religion to terrorism changed the size and scale of terrorism, the changes in the structure of terrorist organizations had a much greater impact on states’ ability to confront them. The traditional structure of illicit groups is

\textsuperscript{26} The Al Qaeda Manual, Manchester Metropolitan Police, UK/BM translation, introduced as evidence during the embassy bombing trial in New York (2001).
pyramid-shaped. At the very bottom, the largest population that could be considered part of the group, are passive supporters: people who agree with the aims of the organization, but are not radical enough to get involved. On the next step up the pyramid are active supporters: people who give financial backing, who shelter the people on the next step up. Second to the top are the foot soldiers, and at the pinnacle are the command elite.²⁹

This hierarchical structure worked very well for traditional terrorist groups – groups that needed to control their foot soldiers and plan attacks. However, hierarchical structures present simple targets for states. States could target the top of the pyramid and thereby destroy or disable large sections of the organization. New terrorist groups moved from a hierarchical structure to a hub and spoke structure, with the elite in the hub and the foot soldiers aggregated into cells connected to the hub via spokes. Rohan Gunaratna refers to this as al Qaeda 2.0.³⁰ This structure, too, was amenable to being paralyzed by state action if the hub of the organization was captured, killed, or forced into hiding. Al Qaeda 3.0 is structured as a netwar organization.³¹ Netwar is a strategy also known as “leaderless resistance.”³² New terrorist groups, like al Qaeda, are now enmeshed in a web of interconnections. Leaders are not planners, but those who inspire. Plots are not as sophisticated, but they are much less likely to be intercepted. Netwar organizations are decentralized, dispersed nodes connected by a shared ideology, not necessarily communicative spokes linked to the hub. It is a form of organizational structure used in asymmetric warfare because it gives a huge offensive advantage due to the hidden nature

³¹ Gunaratna, pp. 95, 225.
of the netwar organization. While the first examples of netwar were seen in Latin
American guerrilla insurgencies, it is now being utilized by al Qaeda in its most recent
form. The information communication technology revolution has made netwar a much
more powerful strategy.\textsuperscript{33}

Terrorism is a dramatic act – it aims to influence a third party, an audience to the
act. Modern terrorism is global not only in its reach and operation, but also in its target
audience. Al Qaeda wants Western audiences to watch, but is also attempting to
influence other Muslims to join the cause. The immediate goal of any terrorist group is
survival, and so al Qaeda constantly attempts to draw Muslims into their base of passive
supporters, convert those to active supporters, and radicalize those supporters to the point
where they will go on to commit acts of terror.\textsuperscript{34} They accomplish this through public
diplomacy (via media old and new, word of mouth, and social and religious institutions),
and effectively combating a larger foe (successful terrorist attacks that make their
enemies look weak).\textsuperscript{35} However, no amount of active recruitment on the part of terrorist
groups could convince the vast majority of even Salafi Muslims to join the violent cause.
For that, they rely on the inevitable collateral damage that accompanies state reprisals to
terrorist attacks.

Summary

Transnational threats have evolved at a pace and in a way that puts them at an
advantage against strong and weak states. Most states seem like giants compared against

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{34} Gunaratna, p. 225.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
transnational threats, large and strong due to their command of resources and monopoly on the legitimate use of force within their borders. Transnational threats, on the other hand, act more like viruses, small and nimble and rapidly contagious, flitting from giant to giant and thriving off of the giants’ inability to work together to come up with a cure. What follows is a case by case examination of how the US and the EU have attempted to confront transnational threats in cooperation with Colombia, in terms of drugs, and East Africa, in terms of terrorism.
In the preceding chapter I explained some of the key structural changes transnational criminal groups have undergone with the amplification of the effects of globalization. Here I will begin to compare and contrast the United States and the European Union’s responses to the growing influence of drug traffickers in recent history. With this case study I am attempting to uncover the “why” behind the failure or success of a strategic response to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) trafficking in illicit drugs, looking at strategies of cooperation or imposition. Increased understanding of what facilitates success in dealing with TCOs will help states determine what strategies to use in the future. I hypothesize that in confronting transnational threats, strong states should cooperate with small states, and if necessary, allow for weak states to take the strategic lead.

This chapter will give an account of US and EU strategies of cooperation with Colombia over the issue of illicit drug trafficking. First it will address the US and Colombia, then the EU and Colombia. Each sub-case will begin with a brief historical context section, will outline the strategy adopted, will analyze the interactions between the strong and weak states in the strategy formation stage, and will code the sub-case according to the five strategies of cooperation outlined in chapter two: strong state imposition; strong state dominates, but weak state approves; strong state crafts strategy with weak state input; strong and weak states participate equally; and weak state leads.
The United States and Colombia

Colombia suffered a period of extreme political violence from 1948-1958 termed “La Violencia,” costing the country between 200,000 and 300,000 lives over the ten year period; more than a half a million (between 600,000 and 800,000) people were injured in a conflict primarily between “self-defense” and guerrilla military units formed by the country’s Liberal, Conservative, and Communist parties.¹ The conflict began in the mid-twentieth century and had its origins in the socio-economic inequalities institutionalized in laws that favored the landed class.² A lack of land reform and a radicalized political dispute between conservatives and liberals led to the consolidation of unregulated and illegal armies, both on the left and the right.³ La Violencia came to an end in 1958 with a pact between the elites in the Liberal and Conservative parties to form a “National Front” whereby Liberal and Conservatives would govern jointly and alternate the presidency.⁴ Some scholars argue that the violence continued on, in a different form, through the 1960s.⁵ This continuation of the conflict took place between those in power – the elites of the Liberal and Conservative parties – and remnants of the Communist party and new Castro-influenced groups. These communist-oriented groups succeeded in influencing some of the bandit remnants of the old armed groups and some of the autonomous

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⁵ Bailey, p. 566.
peasant collectives in the campo with their ideology. In 1966 various communist guerrilla groups coalesced into the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with Manuel Marulanda Velez, a former Liberal party guerrilla during La Violencia in the late 1940s, as its Chief of Staff.

When US President Nixon declared a “War on Drugs” in 1969, Colombia was not heavily involved in the trafficking of illicit drugs. Following the coup against Chilean President Salvador Allende, which resulted in the rise to power of Augusto Pinochet in 1973, Pinochet launched a crackdown on Chilean cocaine traffickers. The production and transit route of Andean cocaine then shifted into Colombia. Early moves by Nixon’s newly formed Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) included Operation Intercept, an operation that blockaded the Mexican border to halt the import of Mexican marijuana. Also, the DEA put serious pressure on the “French Connection” heroin trade. These moves made marijuana production too expensive for Colombian production, and restricted the supply of heroin getting into the US, opening the US drug market to the safer to smuggle and more profitable cocaine. The advent and rise of Colombian cartels followed these developments.

The FARC grew in the 1980s, securing territory rich in natural resources like gold, cattle, agriculture, and oil. They began to develop relationships with the illegal drug industry following a change in FARC policy, which had previously forbidden the cultivation of coca and marijuana. In 1981 the FARC began to promote and protect the coca crop in order to undermine right-wing paramilitary groups’ alliance with drug

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6 Ibid, pp. 568-569.  
traffickers. In 1998 guerrilla groups in Colombia, including the FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and several smaller groups, derived $551 million from working with drug traffickers, much more than from extortion ($311 million) and kidnapping ($236 million), their other major income sources. Left-leaning guerrilla groups are not the only ones to draw significant amounts of their funding from the trafficking of drugs. The United Self-Defense Forces, or right-wing paramilitary groups (sometimes referred to as “Death Squads”), similarly profit from the cultivation of drugs in their territory.

The civil conflict in Colombia intersects with the illicit drug trade in significant ways. An editorial in the New York Times put it this way in 2000, “In recent years both the guerrillas and murderous right-wing paramilitary squads associated with the [Colombian National] army have earned millions of dollars from the drug trade.”

Andres Pastrana took office as president of Colombia in 1998 as the candidate promising peace. His two primary objectives were negotiating a conclusion to the decades-long civil conflict in Colombia and improving foreign relations with the US.

While Pastrana enjoyed relatively good relations with President Clinton at the beginning of his term – he was invited to the White House shortly after his inauguration in 1998 – he did not have such immediate success in achieving his other objective.

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10 Ibid, pp. 32-33.
11 Ibid, p. 33.
For Pastrana, the road to peace led through some form of socio-economic reform, and to address the structural inequalities of the country – especially in the rural parts of the country – he called for a “Marshall Plan” for Colombia. Early reports on this plan defined it as follows, “an ambitious array of ideas [Pastrana] has formulated to curtail drug trafficking and restore a nation reeling from decades of war.” Early parts of the plan created a government bond program aimed at bringing modern infrastructure to “rural areas where poverty and government indifference have allowed coca growing and rebel movements to thrive.” The Colombian State Secretary of Culture said of Pastrana’s plan, “The Marshall Plan here would be called agrarian reform.”

Pastrana’s peace talks stalled when he offered a large zone of peace to the primary leftist insurgent group, the FARC. The FARC took this demilitarized area and set up camp, fielding troops and acting with impunity. In 1999 the pre-negotiations Pastrana initiated following his election resulted in a stalemate – a problem of “structural and strategic symmetry” between the government and the FARC. In order to break the stalemate and drive the FARC to make concessions, Pastrana turned to the United States for assistance, and the US urged Pastrana to develop a plan that could be acted upon by Washington.

Plan Colombia grew out of this push by Pastrana for a Marshall Plan for Colombia. While Pastrana envisioned broad international support, totaling around $7.5

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16 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Pedro Arenas, quoted in Schemo, “Coca Growers in Colombia Scorn New President’s ‘Marshall Plan’.”
20 Serafino, p. 19.
22 Rosen, p. 44.
23 Schemo, “Coca Growers in Colombia Scorn New President’s ‘Marshall Plan’.”
billion over three years ($4 billion of which Colombia would raise internally and 3.5 billion would come from international sources), in the end Plan Colombia became US public law 106-246, a bilateral assistance plan between the US and Colombia subtitled “assistance for counternarcotics activities.”

The substance of Plan Colombia was $7 billion from FY2000 to FY 2010 from the US State Department and Department of Defense accounts for “counternarcotics and related efforts.” In the first year (FY2000-FY2001), around $860 million was provided, primarily for equipment and training for counternarcotics units within the Colombian Army. In order to assist with aerial defoliation on coca fields, the US provided funds for the purchase and transfer of UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter and UH-1H Huey II helicopters, as well as other equipment. Much of the US funding went to the “Push into Southern Colombia” program, training and equipping two new counternarcotics battalions in the Colombian Army who were to assist the Colombian National Police with fumigation of illicit crops and the dismantling of drug laboratories. Following the formation of the Plan, Colombia began to distance itself from its implementation, “the government of President Andres Pastrana has been reluctant to promote the plan at home or to dedicate funds to it, American officials concede.”

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24 Sanin, p. 424.
the incoming Bush administration, and following the 9/11 attacks, the scope of Plan Colombia was expanded to encompass more of the surrounding region with the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI). While more funding was made available to states near Colombia (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Panama, and Venezuela), the central focus of the plan was the training and equipping of counternarcotics forces in Colombia.\textsuperscript{32} The ARI, funded by US public law 107-206 in August 2002 extended Plan Colombia’s central provisions, extended and broadened the Andean Trade Preference Act, introduced counterterrorism funding, and included more funding for economic and social programs.\textsuperscript{33} The act was further broadened to include increased funding for a Colombian army brigade to protect an oil pipeline, and became US public law 108-7 in 2003.\textsuperscript{34} Colombian aid was again expanded in the FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Aid, an appropriations bill primarily for the war in Iraq and the global war on terror.\textsuperscript{35}

In one account of the origins and evolution of Plan Colombia the authors argue, “It is important to note that in the first version of Plan Colombia there was hardly any mention of military strategies.”\textsuperscript{36} Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue and professor of Latin American Studies at George Town University, argued in a retrospective of Plan Colombia in \textit{Americas Quarterly} that:

The original version of Plan Colombia emphasized development and social priorities – both of which received short shrift in the program that was eventually adopted in Washington. But the Colombian government,

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, pp. 2-5.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{36} Acevedo, Bewley-Taylor, and Youngers, p. 3.
under Pastrana administration, also requested some $600 million in military assistance from the United States.  

Pastrana’s original plan focused on the economy more than the military, but it did include a significant amount for the military. The goal for Pastrana was to make peace with these forces by way of addressing the socio-economic inequalities at the heart of the conflict, whereas about 70 percent of the $1.3 billion the US provided for Plan Colombia was directed to Colombia's military. The fact that the armed groups on either side of this conflict received funds from growing and selling narcotics was not a central part of Pastrana’s strategy to confront them.

Following his election, Pastrana fulfilled a campaign promise by ordering Colombian security forces to temporarily evacuate five municipalities, attempting to create a climate of trust in order to facilitate peace negotiations. Instead the FARC used the cease fire zone, or Zona de Distensión, as a base of operations from which they could fortify their position. Negotiations between the government of Colombia, led by President Pastrana, and the FARC did not advance by the summer of 1999. The Zona de Distensión was extended while the stalemate continued, allowing the FARC to continue fortifying their position.

Robert E. White, a former US Ambassador to Paraguay and El Salvador, states that in a 1998 version of Plan Colombia circulated by the Pastrana administration, there

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40 Mesetas, Vista Hermosa, La Uribe, La Macarena, and San Vincente del Caguán.
43 Sanin, p. 417.
44 Ibid, p. 419, also Rochlin, p. 722.
was no mention of military assistance or the Drug War, but rather a request for US aid to assist Colombia with social and economic reforms.\textsuperscript{45} Thomas Pickering, at the time Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, recounts that in late summer of 1999 he received a call from Sandy Berger, President Clinton’s National Security Advisor, saying that, “Things are getting worse in Colombia.”\textsuperscript{46} Before visiting Colombia in the fall of 1999 (when Pastrana would reveal Plan Colombia), Pickering and several US policymakers developed an outline of what would become Plan Colombia:

Peter Romero and Rand Beers, respectively the Assistant Secretaries of State for Inter-American (later Western Hemisphere) Affairs and Narcotics and Crime, suggested we visit Pastrana and his new team in Bogotá, review their plans and see where to go from there. I [Pickering] suggested that we needed a plan of our own in mind before our flight went wheels-up, and together we conceived a joint plan based partly on what we knew the Colombian government was already doing, and partly on how we could help them improve and strengthen that effort.\textsuperscript{47}

The trip to Bogotá involved members from the US Department of State; representatives of the National Security Council; the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy led by General Barry McCaffrey; the Defense Department’s Latin American and Special Operations Divisions; the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified Commander in the Hemisphere; the Agency for International Development (USAID); the Department of Justice and several other relevant domestic departments and agencies, including members of the intelligence community and the CIA to provide support and analysis.

During that first visit Pickering and the team met with President Pastrana and members of his cabinet, and there they pitched the ideas they had come up with, arguing that, “First, we agreed that this would be a Colombian plan, prepared in Colombia and

\textsuperscript{45} Sanin, pp. 424-425.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid, (2009).
presented by Colombia, with close U.S. assistance with planning and implementation. Second, the central focus of the plan would be to reduce the cultivation and export of drugs..."48 The US representatives put the responsibility for the creation of a strategy to confront the transnational threat of illicit narcotics trafficking in the hands of the Colombian government, and then directed them on the priorities and content of that strategy.

The Plan laid out by Pastrana following this visit was formulated at the behest of and with the assistance of US policymakers:49 “The plan that was unveiled in September of 1999 cited the production of illegal drugs as central to Colombia’s political violence, dedicating entire sections of the document to this topic.”50 Michael Shifter argues that, “The drug question was the hook that enabled Congress to enact the $1.3-billion package.... By focusing on counter-narcotics, the Clinton administration sold a plan that could garner bipartisan support.”51

Shortly after the passage of P.L. 106-246 a New York Times article alleged that, “Although the Clinton administration has portrayed Plan Colombia as Mr. Pastrana’s work, much of it was drafted by American officials, according to people familiar with its preparation.”52 The article went on to connect the emergence of the Plan to pressure on the democratic Clinton administration, and specifically General Barry McCaffrey, by Congressional Republicans for being “soft on crime.” Moreover, the funding for the Plan

52 Marquis, (2000).
from Colombia fell short of its goals, possibly signaling reluctance on the part of the Pastrana administration:

Analysts say Mr. Pastrana is torn between hopes that the American attention and largess could provide Colombia with a rare opportunity for foreign investment, on the one hand, and concerns, on the other, that deepening ties to the Pentagon could unleash greater violence in Colombia and possibly draw in its neighbors.53

The debate in the US took place both at the executive and legislative ends of policymaking. According to a 2009 USAID report on Plan Colombia:

The fundamental philosophical camps within the US centered on whether US aid should emphasize counter-narcotics, social programs, counter-insurgency and in what relative proportions the aid should be provided. [...] As the PC [Plan Colombia] proposal worked its way through the political process on the Hill, the counter-insurgency objective was dropped from the plan. What was left was a robust CN [counter-narcotics] (interdiction & eradication) effort on the “hard” side (about ¾ of funds) and significantly increased support for “soft” programs (about ¼ of funds).54

The political compromise eventually arrived at did not take Pastrana’s plan as a point of departure. The USAID report goes on to say that:

Rather than a traditional building of the budget from the ground up with input from the people at the “worker bee” level, the appropriations amount to fund U.S. assistance to PC ($1.3B) was arrived at by leaders in Congress who picked an initial amount because they believed this was as much as the “political market” on the Hill would support. PC contained dozens of line items earmarking sums of money for specific pet projects, often without clear guidance as to what agency would be responsible for executing the program.55

On the Colombian end, in the words of a former Colombian peace commissioner:

The plan was never consulted, discussed, or debated within Colombia before it was presented abroad. Neither the directly-affected local communities nor their elected officials were brought into the decision-

55 “Assessment,” p. 3.
making process. While the U.S. Congress has held countless hearings and open sessions on Plan Colombia, the Colombian Congress has yet to hold its first.\textsuperscript{56}

From accounts inside the US and Colombian administrations, the formation of Plan Colombia took place primarily inside the US. The European Parliament’s resolution on Plan Colombia states that:

\begin{quote}
…Plan Colombia is not the product of a process of dialogue amongst the various social partners or of progress in the negotiations with the guerrillas, has not been approved by the Colombian Congress and has provoked widespread opposition from many sectors of Civil Society in the United States, Europe, Latin America and particularly in Colombia itself…\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

These accounts indicate that Colombian legislature and civil society had little input in the formation of Plan Colombia, and were, by and large, unsupportive of the Plan following its publication.

Based on the methodology outlined above, Plan Colombia and its subsequent iterations were an example of (1) strong state imposition of a strategy to confront transnational crime. While there was some weak state input, the strategy was formulated nearly entirely inside the US, by US policymakers in the executive and legislative branches. What high-level meetings took place appear, by the accounts of those in attendance, to have been used by US policymakers to outline the strategy they expected the Colombian government to condone. Weak state priorities, such as economic and social development, were not included in Plan Colombia, except as “alternative development.” Part of what accounts for this was the expectation that European countries


would provide funding for those “softer” goals, but as we will see below the EU did not provide that funding and subsequent US funding did not react to that development and adjust funding accordingly. Finally, as noted above, Colombia under the Pastrana administration did not fund the Plan fully, indicating a lack of domestication of the strategy.

The European Union and Colombia

The preceding section illustrated and categorized the United States’ strategy of cooperation with Colombia against transnational drug trafficking. Here I will do the same for the European Union’s strategy of cooperation with the same weak state, confronting the same problem. I expect to find a large difference between the US and the EU’s approaches to cooperating with Colombia on the issue of transnational crime.

European countries consumed about 30 percent of Colombian produced cocaine at the time Plan Colombia was being debated in 1999 – the world’s second largest market after the US. The cocaine market in Europe grew rapidly in the 1990s, though it remained overshadowed by Europe’s much larger heroin market. In the year 2000, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in the US estimated that up to 220 tons of cocaine made its way to Europe. The US received an estimated 330 tons, by far the largest recipient in the world, but not an increase from years past. Though the European

58 “Everyone was looking for the rest of the world, particularly the Europeans, to do the soft side,” a senior congressional staff member anonymously quoted in Juan Forero, “Europe’s Aid Plan for Colombia Falls Short of Drug War’s Goals,” New York Times, web, accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 3/12/14, (10/25/2000).
estimate was numerically smaller, it represented a very large increase in a short period of
time, jumping about ten percent every year in the 1990s.61 “Europol, the European
Union’s fledgling police agency, said in a recent report that 35 percent of Colombia’s
cocaine was winding up in the union,” stated a 2001 New York Times article.62 Sayaka
Fukumi, the author of a recent study of US and EU policy responses to Latin American
cocaine said of the European cocaine market in the late 1990s, “Due to the rapid growth
of the European cocaine market, the EU began to become involved in cocaine control.”63

In October of 1999, a month after unveiling Plan Colombia, President Pastrana
traveled to Europe to request EU participation in the Plan. In his speech before the
European Parliament, Pastrana addressed the link between drug trafficking and the
guerrilla groups operating in Colombia, and asked for European assistance in Colombia’s
path to peace:

To this end I have drawn up the Colombia Plan for peace, prosperity and
the strengthening of the State. It is not a military plan. It is a
comprehensive and unified plan aimed at strengthening such basic issues
for our country as the search for peace, the reactivation of our economy
and the generation of employment, the protection of human rights, the
strengthening of justice and the increase in social participation. The final
result will be the strengthening of our State, as the essential requirement
for the achievement of peace and progress.

We need your participation on all these fronts but principally we
need you, your nations and the whole of Europe to invest in peace for the
sake of peace, and to open up your markets so that we can create
employment for the sake of peace.

For this reason, Colombia is presenting the international
community with an alternative policy for the eradication of illegal crops
based on an alternative development which offers the rural population,
which is currently involved in illegal cultivation, a permanent escape from
their economic and social problems, replacing illegal crops with

62 Ibid.
63 Sayaka Fukumi, Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America: EU and US Policy Responses, Burlington, VT:
commercial, mining, agricultural, agro-industrial and service companies, and with the necessary infrastructure so that they may compete adequately in the world’s globalised economy.\textsuperscript{64}

Though very different from the Plan discussed in the last section, the aims discussed in Pastrana’s speech do not conflict with the general outline given by Pickering, McCaffrey, and the other US policymakers who visited Bogotá in 1999; rather they emphasize the elements of his original strategy – peace with the guerilla groups, and economic and social development – that were minimized or entirely neglected in the US strategy.

Pastrana’s emphasis on peace and development in his attempt to sell Plan Colombia to the EU bears a striking resemblance to his early speeches on a “Marshall Plan” for Colombia – a plan to modernize Colombia and alleviate poverty in order to address the social and political issues underlying the violent conflict.\textsuperscript{65} This similarity makes claims that Pastrana was simply playing to his audience – speaking in terms of counternarcotics to the US and in terms of peace and development to the EU – dubious. Rather, it seems that in Europe Pastrana found an audience more receptive to his original plan. Europe was interested in assisting Colombia with its peace process.

In July of 2000 the EU sent a delegation to the Support Group for the Peace Process in Colombia, a group of states offering support and good offices for negotiations regarding the cessation of hostilities in Colombia’s civil conflict with the FARC, ELN, and AUC, urging the government of Colombia to do more to break up paramilitary groups. In October of 2000 the General Affairs Council released a statement reaffirming


the EU’s support for the peace process and offering the EU’s good offices for negotiations. The EU Presidency and Commission attended the Support Group for the Peace Process in Colombia meeting in October of 2000 in Bogotá. Furthermore, in the European Parliament’s resolution on Plan Colombia it is stated that, “lasting peace cannot be achieved in Colombia without deep-seated changes to the means by which wealth is distributed, since many of the problems confronting the country stem from the fact that peasant farmers do not own land,” echoing the sentiment of President Pastrana’s State Secretary of Culture who argued that agrarian reform is necessary for peace and development.

Despite the evident accord between Pastrana and the EU’s approach, the EU refused to have any part of Plan Colombia. In a resolution passed in the European Parliament condemning Plan Colombia for being overly militaristic, the Parliament asked for a different strategy with more input from the government of Colombia, Colombian civil society, neighboring states, and an EU-sponsored team of experts sent to Colombia. Even before the Parliament’s resolution, a largely symbolic act, the European Union undercut Plan Colombia by not funding it as expected: “Signaling reservations about Colombia’s deep reliance on American military support, the European Union announced a package of nonmilitary aid today that fell short of expectations.”

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67 Ibid, p. 3.
68 Pedro Arenas, quoted in Schemo, “Coca Growers in Colombia Scorn New President’s ‘Marshall Plan’.”
70 Forero, (2000).
different news article discussed in detail how the EU balked at providing expected funding for a plan they find overly militaristic.\textsuperscript{71}

The European rejection of Plan Colombia was neatly summed up by a European envoy quoted in a \textit{New York Times} article at the time, “The E.U. and member states are supporting the peace process in Colombia and not specifically the Plan Colombia, which is an American project.”\textsuperscript{72} Joaquin Roy, a professor at the School of International Studies in the University of Miami, characterizes the European perception of Plan Colombia as follows:

In crude terms never present in documents or veiled declarations, there is the prevailing European impression that the Colombians will contribute the dead, the Americans will supply the military hardware, and the Europeans will contribute the money to defray the cost of the social and environmental damage caused by the other two parties. That is to say, European assistance is perceived in different European circles as a sort of remedy once the implementation of the U.S.-led military plan is terminated.\textsuperscript{73}

The EU, determining that Plan Colombia was a US invention and betting that it would not work, contributed a small amount of nonmilitary aid under the auspices of the Plan, and then attempted to create a different strategy.

This alternative approach focused on the peace process rather than narcotics, though it recognized the tie between the two issues:

The EU knows, however, that the biggest contribution it could make to peace and sustainable economic growth in Colombia would be to curb drug demand, and stifle the numerous illegal activities related to drug trafficking that fuel the Colombian conflict.\textsuperscript{74}


\textsuperscript{72} Quoted in Marquis, (2000).


Observing European trepidation regarding the US-backed Plan Colombia, Colombian officials invited Europe to propose “a special plan for Colombia,” and arranged for a meeting between Colombian Foreign Minister Fernández de Soto and EU External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten.\(^75\) Patten spearheaded the project of EU involvement in and support for what was called the Peace Process, avoiding the term Plan Colombia. He proposed to “member states that a European aid programme for Colombia be set up.”\(^76\) This aid would not be primarily through Plan Colombia, but rather through the Cartagena Agreement,\(^77\) the agreement EU relations with Colombia, and the other Andean Community states, is based on.\(^78\)

The EU approach to Colombia was more complex than the US approach in part because the EU is a collection of member states whereas the US is a single state. Some member states cooperated with both the EU plan and Plan Colombia. The UK, for example, provided military assistance to Colombia despite the EU insistence that further militarizing the conflict would be detrimental to the peace process.\(^79\) However, according to Fukumi, “Although the member states have different approaches, the common aim of the European Union is to support the Colombian government to achieve its goals for peace building.”\(^80\)

\(^{75}\) Ibid, p. 5.
\(^{79}\) Fukumi, p. 207.
\(^{80}\) Ibid, p. 208.
The major project supported with EU funding in Colombia was the Peace Laboratory in Magdalena Medio, Colombia.\textsuperscript{81} Magdalena Medio is “one of the poorest and most violent areas of the country,”\textsuperscript{82} though rich in natural resources like oil, and therefore it has been host to FARC, AUC, and ELN forces since the 1960s.\textsuperscript{83} The Peace Laboratory grew from the Program for Development and Peace in Magdalena Medio (PDPMM), a joint NGO, church, and Colombian government project that began in the mid-1990s. The aim was to create the Consortium for Development and Peace Magdalena Medio (CDPMM) to act as program manager, to form and strengthen a network among citizens in the region, and to provide technical support and funding to community organization for specific projects.\textsuperscript{84}

Following the EU consultation process, the high level dialogue between Patten and Fernández de Soto as well as the fact-finding missions the EU and member states sent to Colombia,\textsuperscript{85} Chris Patten announced in 2001 that the EU had confirmed a contribution to the Colombian Peace Process of about $304 million, later raised to $366 million.\textsuperscript{86} Ten months later, the first of the specific projects funded by the EU were announced in the Magdalena Medio region.\textsuperscript{87} The Peace Laboratory was simply the application of EU funding to an existing Colombian civil society program, scaling up an already successful program: “The strategic and methodological conception of the Peace

\textsuperscript{81} Patten, (2003).
\textsuperscript{83} Fukumi, p. 209.
\textsuperscript{84} World Bank, p. 2.
Laboratory is based on the original concept of the Peace and Development Programme of Magdalena Medio. By 2001 the PDPMM had already carried out 67 investment project initiatives, won Colombia’s National Peace Prize, and was an organization trusted by the local communities. The Peace Laboratory more than doubled the budget of the original PDPMM, but maintained local control over the program through the CDPMM. The Peace Laboratory enabled the CDPMM to channel funding to specific projects in education, health, infrastructure, agrarian reform, voluntary drug crop eradication, and alternative development. Fukumi summarizes the EU approach to Colombia as follows:

In order to support Colombia, the European Union launched a project to create a peace zone to weaken the insurgency groups and encourage legal crop cultivation. Its non-military approach has helped to promote voluntary eradication. However, the issues of safety and security related to the project’s operation have remained unsolved.

The EU believes that the military is the wrong tool to use when combating the production and trafficking of illicit narcotics, and this belief is made manifest in the EU contributions to the Colombian Peace Process – funding for grassroots projects managed by Colombian civil society with an emphasis on alternative development. The strategy of cooperation employed by the EU to develop their approach to the Colombian drug issue has its roots in the region-to-region “Framework Agreement on Cooperation” signed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, and the

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89 World Bank, pp. 3-4.
90 Ibid.
94 Fukumi, p. 215.
European Community (which would become the EU). The general strategy of cooperation the EU employs for cooperation with other states is laid out by the European Commission: the EU plays the role of an assistant on projects “owned” by member states. “The EU claims that it does not ‘negotiate’ with the Latin American countries to sponsor a project, but they ‘discuss’ the priorities and requests from the Latin American governments.” Fukumi’s interpretation of the EU’s perception of its own strategy, drawn from EU documents and interviews with European Commission officials, is that they allow the weak state to take the lead in developing a strategy (program, policy, or plan), “because the EU considers that the initiatives belong to the host state (or the ‘owner’ of the project) and this influences the progress and outcome of the project.”

However, according to Colombian officials, the process is less weak state-led than the EU would like the world to believe. According to a Colombian official at the Colombian embassy in Brussels, the negotiation process with the EU begins with the EU revealing the amount of money that will be spent on the recipient state. Then the EU reviews a list of proposals from potential civil society partners, and the decision on which proposals is made. According to the EU country strategy paper, the decision is supposed to be made jointly between the EU and the recipient state, but in reality, according to this Colombian official, the EU sometimes decides alone. That said, the process by which the EU Peace Process plan was drafted had many of the elements of weak state strategic leadership. The process of strategy formation began in Europe with President Pastrana’s

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95 “Framework Agreement on Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the Cartagena Agreement and its member countries,” p. 127/18.
96 Fukumi, p. 119.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid, pp. 119-120.
plea for assistance and submission of the US-backed Plan Colombia. The subsequent debate in Europe centered on the degree to which Plan Colombia represented the interests of the US, and not of Colombia. The European rejection of Plan Colombia stated that Plan Colombia was a Clinton administration military aid package and that, “Plan Colombia contains aspects that run counter to the cooperation strategies and projects to which the EU has already committed itself and jeopardise its cooperation programmes,” and that increased militarization threatened to escalate the conflict.

The rejection of Plan Colombia came alongside a recommendation to reformulate the strategy – to create a “special plan for Colombia” in the words of the Colombian authorities – in a way that situated the issue of counternarcotics within the broader social, economic, and political issues in Colombia. To do so, the EU sent a group of experts to Colombia to seek input and to work with Colombian officials to develop a strategy. At the same time, high level meetings between the Colombian Foreign Minister Fernández de Soto and EU External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten resulted in the re-branding of the EU-Colombia plan as the “Peace Process.”

The three areas Patten and Fernández de Soto agreed would receive significant aid were human rights, the reduction of socio-economic disparities, and institutional reinforcement. These fit with Pastrana’s priorities:

It is a comprehensive and unified plan aimed at strengthening such basic issues for our country as the search for peace, the reactivation of our economy and the generation of employment, the protection of human

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104 Ibid, pp. 7-8.
The final result will be the strengthening of our State, as the essential requirement for the achievement of peace and progress.\textsuperscript{105}

The provisions of the weak state, economic and social development, peace, institution building, and human rights are all maintained in the final EU strategy.

Finally, the provisions of the strategy that needed to be implemented by Colombia, participation and support for the Peace Laboratories and other Civil Society-EU partnerships, was fully implemented under President Pastrana.\textsuperscript{106} However, there was a significant degree of polarization within Colombian society. As the conflict dragged on, the Colombian government became more militarized as evidenced by the election of Alvaro Uribe Velez in 2002, a hard-line candidate committed to defeating the FARC, as well as by Pastrana’s tonal shift following the 9/11 attacks in the US, labeling the FARC “narcotraficantes” and terrorists, in line with US rhetoric.\textsuperscript{107} A strong peace movement was still present, but it was located primarily within Colombian civil society. The Peace Process ended in 2002, but the Peace Laboratories went on, with more opening up in 2003 and 2006.\textsuperscript{108} Still, in the Peace Laboratories, civil society and the central government (as well as local institutions) all participated and utilized EU funding.\textsuperscript{109}

The EU strategy of cooperation is more complicated and nuanced than the US strategy, with different levels and interests at work. However, in the reformulated strategy known as the Peace Process, Colombia, both civil society and government, seems to have cooperated equally with the European Union (4). There was substantial

\textsuperscript{105} Pastrana, (1999).
\textsuperscript{106} Fukumi, pp. 208-209.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid, pp. 40-42.
Colombian input in the plan, demonstrated by the high-level meetings between Patten and Fernández de Soto as well as between Pastrana and European experts and ambassadors both in Brussels and Bogotá. Also, the priorities articulated by Pastrana and his cabinet were maintained in the final strategy. The formation of the strategy took place both in Europe and in Colombia, and the primary aspects of the strategy were implemented by both parties.

Summary of Cases

The US and the EU approaches to cooperation with Colombia regarding transnational crime were vastly different. The US imposed a set of policies and programs on Colombia with Plan Colombia, taking a Colombian initiative and transforming it to suit the US’s domestic political exigency. The EU strategy included much more Colombian input, forming and implementing programs in Colombia with the Colombian government and civil society. In chapter six, below, I will attempt to judge the relative success or failure of these policies and programs in order to see which strategy of cooperation tends to produce more effective solutions to the problem of transnational threats.
Chapter 5: Case Study 2 – United States and European Union Strategies to Confront Global Terrorism in East Africa

This case study will compare and contrast the United States and the European Union’s approaches to working with East African states to disrupt terrorist networks and plots. In undertaking this case study I am attempting to categorize the US and EU’s strategies of cooperation towards the countries and region of East Africa in order to correlate those strategies with the degree of success or failure in confronting the threat of global terrorism. I hypothesize that in confronting transnational terrorist groups, strong states should cooperate with small states, and if necessary, allow for weak states to take the strategic lead.

For the purposes of this thesis, within the region of East Africa I will focus on Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.¹ The greater region, which will be included in the general overview of the US approach, encompasses countries in the Horn of Africa, the Nile Valley, and the Great Lakes regions of Africa: Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Rwanda, Burundi, and Somalia.² All of these states share proximity to, if not a direct coastline with, the Indian Ocean or the Red Sea, making them near neighbors to the Arabian Peninsula.³ The majority of US and EU policy to this region, as will be shown below, targets some combination of these states. This chapter will begin with an account

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³ “Horn of Africa,” United Nations, Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section, Map No. 4188 Rev. 5 (2012).
of the US approach to working with the region with respect to counterterrorism, devoting more time and detail to significant (in terms of resource contributions) policy changes either on the state or regional level. Then I will analyze the policy formation process, with special attention to Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, and code the US strategy of cooperation according to the table discussed in chapter two. I will then repeat those steps with the EU approach and policy formation process. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a brief summary of the case study.

The United States and East Africa

There is no single day that has more changed the face of international politics in recent history than September 11, 2001. Both the attacks themselves and the US response to them contributed to creating the new normal we now live in. The attacks commonly referred to as the “9/11 attacks” triggered the Bush administration in the US to completely revise its approach to national security:


To say that the 9/11 attacks caught the US by surprise would be a gross understatement. Even after the first plane hit the World Trade Center the White House went about its

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everyday business, assuming the crash was accidental.\textsuperscript{6} By the end of the day 19 al Qaeda members, directed from afar and instructed in both the US and abroad, had killed nearly 3,000 people on American soil in a coordinated attack.\textsuperscript{7} Beyond the immediate death toll, thousands more were injured, families were destroyed, the economy was badly shaken,\textsuperscript{8} and a psychological blow had been dealt to the American psyche.\textsuperscript{9}

The US response to the 9/11 attacks was to declare the “War on Terror.” On September 20, 2001 in an address to Congress, President Bush said, “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”\textsuperscript{10} The traditional policy instruments states have to use are diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, military means, and finance. However President Bush’s statement indicated that the US approach would focus on the military.

East Africa was the location of the first salvo in al Qaeda’s fight against the United States. Sudan was a safe haven for Islamic extremist groups in the 1990s when the Khartoum government actively supported groups including al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden based al Qaeda out of Sudan from 1992-1996, at which point he was expelled from the state due to US pressure. In Somalia, al Qaeda claimed to have trained the factions involved in the “Black Hawk Down” incident, otherwise known as the Battle of

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
Mogadishu, that resulted in the deaths of 18 US soldiers.\textsuperscript{11} In 1998, US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were the targets of al Qaeda bombings, killing 227 and wounding hundreds.\textsuperscript{12} In 2002 al Qaeda-linked terrorists attacked a hotel in Mombassa, Kenya.\textsuperscript{13} Following the US invasion of Afghanistan, East Africa was suspected of becoming the next headquarters of al Qaeda, most likely in lawless Somalia.\textsuperscript{14} This suspicion proved to have some validity when internal al Qaeda documents showed that their leadership had considered Somalia as an alternative to Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{15} According to Lyman and Morrison, the conditions in the region are ripe for transnational terrorism: “The Greater Horn of Africa – an area that includes Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya – is home to interlocking conflicts, weak and failing states, pervasive corruption, and extreme poverty.”\textsuperscript{16}

However, the region has not become al Qaeda’s home. “Al Qaeda has used the region less to foment terrorism than to protect and expand its finances.”\textsuperscript{17} Al Qaeda took advantage of the chaotic situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to gain a foothold in their mineral trade, having already established a stake in the trafficking of gems through East African networks.\textsuperscript{18} In order to disrupt this practice, the US under the Clinton administration was a strong supporter of the Kimberly Process, an initiative

\textsuperscript{15} Ploch, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid. p. 83.
put forward by diamond-producing countries along with diamond manufacturing companies to keep gems from conflict zones like the DRC from the market. The Bush administration, however, had been “largely indifferent to it, having been slow to sign up to its monitoring provisions.”

Other globally-oriented terrorist groups in the area are al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), a Somalia-based globally-oriented terrorist group, which was active in Somalia in the 1990s but has since been significantly damaged by Ethiopian military efforts, and al Shabaab, a Somalia-based al Qaeda affiliated terrorist group that has struck targets across the region and shares capabilities with other affiliates like al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AIAI, though based in Somalia, gained in influence in Kenya as it was forced out of Somalia in the 1990s. Young leaders of AIAI split off to form al Shabaab in the 1990s. In 2010, the US State Department characterized the threat posed by the globally-oriented terrorist groups in East Africa: “Al-Shabaab’s leadership was supportive of al-Qa’ida (AQ), and both groups continued to present a serious terrorist threat to American and allied interests throughout the Horn of Africa.”

US counterterrorism cooperation in the area was focused on bilateral efforts from the embassy bombings in 1998 until 9/11. Following the 1998 embassy bombing in Nairobi, the security sector of Kenya (the police and the military) began to work in closer cooperation with US forces. This cooperation was sometimes direct, for example, when investigating links between Islamic NGOs and militant Islamic terrorist groups, US FBI

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19 Lyman and Morrison, p. 84.
20 Ploch, p. 5.
21 Ibid, pp. 6-10.
23 Ploch, p. 6.
24 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, quoted in Ploch, p. 13.
agents and Kenyan police conducted a joint raid on the Islamic NGO Mercy Relief International.\textsuperscript{25} Between the US and Sudan, “An intensive counterterrorism dialogue between the two governments commenced in the spring of 2000 and accelerated dramatically after September 11, when the United States threatened additional measures [following the US bombing of a factory in 1998] – while also promising to improve relations if Sudan cooperated fully and quickly.”\textsuperscript{26} The stuff of these bilateral efforts was primarily functionalist and ad hoc, alliances of convenience against a common enemy when the need arose. The 9/11 attacks changed that approach.

In late 2002 the US State Department and the Pentagon began to implement a series of Africa-focused counterterrorism initiatives. In 2002 the United States created the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). This involved 1,800 US soldiers backed by US Central Command and based in Djibouti.\textsuperscript{27} In June 2003 US President Bush launched the East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), promising $100 million to the region over 15 months.\textsuperscript{28} Around half of the funds were aimed at improving coastal and border security programs, $10 million was directed towards the Kenyan Anti-terror Police Unit, and $14 million was aimed at the softer side of US counterterrorism – Muslim education.\textsuperscript{29} In 2009 the State Department launched a follow-up program to EACTI called the East African Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI), which “aims to foster regional counterterrorism efforts, build partner capacity, and diminish support for violent extremism.”\textsuperscript{30} In 2007 the US established the United

\textsuperscript{25} Haynes, p. 1324.
\textsuperscript{26} Lyman and Morrison, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28} Haynes, p. 1326.
\textsuperscript{29} Lyman and Morrison, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{30} Ploch, p. 24.
States African Command (AFRICOM), a unified military command dedicated to US security interests in Africa.31

The most ambitious of these projects was the EACTI. In the words of US Department of Defense official Vincent Kern, the EACTI was “a $100 million, 15-month Eastern Africa counter-terrorism initiative under which the United States is expanding and accelerating counter-terrorism efforts with Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Tanzania, and Eritrea.”32 The EACTI was designed to build up East Africa’s coastal, border, and airport/seaport security; assist in law enforcement training; establish a terrorist tracking database; disrupt terrorist financing; and enhance community outreach programs through education and aid projects.33

Additionally, the US sponsored the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program, which funds and trains local police units in counterterrorism, and the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), which provides technical assistance and funding for updating and modernizing technology at airports/seaports and borders.34 The US also provides funds, advice, and technical assistance for airport security through the Safe Skies for Africa Program, and for maritime and coastal security through the Africa Coastal/Border Security Program.35 Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania each signed on to participate these technical support and harmonization programs. They were all developed in the US, and applied broadly to the region. In each East African state with a legislature, the US

31 Emerson, p. 56.
32 Vincent Kern, quoted in Haynes, p. 1338.
33 Haynes, p. 1338.
pushed for the passage of aggressive counterterrorism legislation, which succeeded in Uganda and Tanzania, but, as will be explored below, was held up in Kenya.\footnote{Whitaker, “Compliance,” pp. 650-653.}

Several East African states were interested in joining the EACTI when it was announced: “After 9/11, in common with its counterparts in Kenya and Uganda, the Tanzanian government sought the West’s cooperation in fighting terrorism and took part in the EACTI.”\footnote{Haynes, p. 1331.} The governments of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda went so far in their support of the US that they were counted among the US “coalition of the willing” during Operation Iraqi Freedom.\footnote{Lyman and Morrison, p. 77.}

However, not all US efforts were received so positively. In testimony before the House of Representatives, Princeton Lyman, a former US diplomat to several African states, presented evidence that Kenyan civil society opposition to US intervention prevented the ratification of an antiterrorism law:

The U.S. strongly backed anti-terrorism legislation being proposed by the government of Kenya. But democracy advocates and civil society groups in Kenya, fresh from having rid the country of one-party, one-man rule, resisted, seeing in the legislation the seeds of new political oppression. In addition, Kenyan Muslims argued that the legislation was anti-Muslim, aggravating the alienation in that community that opened the door to terrorist infiltration in the first place. The Kenyan Government finally agreed to redraft the legislation.\footnote{Princeton N. Lyman, “The Terrorist Threat in Africa,” testimony before the House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Hearing on “Fighting Terrorism in Africa,” Washington, D.C. (2004).}

Kenya has a much stronger civil society on average than its neighbors,\footnote{Whitaker, “Compliance,” p. 659.} and that civil society has been strongly opposed to US-backed counterterrorism legislation: “Strong U.S. support for antiterrorist measures under consideration by the Kenyan Parliament has also [along with US travel advisories for the region] provoked anger, particularly from
civil libertarians…”\textsuperscript{41} In her review of compliance with the US-backed counterterrorism regime in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, Beth Elise Whitaker finds that the less open societies of Uganda and Tanzania\textsuperscript{42} were more compliant with the US-proposed counterterrorism policies, laws, and support than Kenya.\textsuperscript{43}

In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni has adopted the language of the “war on terror” to apply to a variety of actors within Uganda. Museveni has used US counterterrorism funding on major military offensives against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group known for kidnapping children and forcing them to become child soldiers, and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a smaller group that included dissident soldiers, Islamic extremists, and radical Hutu Rwandans.\textsuperscript{44} Museveni has also used US-sponsored anti-terrorism legislation to “silence journalists and go after non-violent political opponents, including labeling as a terrorist the main opposition candidate in two recent presidential elections.”\textsuperscript{45} The US Department of State “has documented serious human rights abuses and electoral irregularities in Uganda, and some observers have expressed concern that Museveni’s cooperation on counterterrorism constrains Western criticism for alleged political abuses.”\textsuperscript{46} The implication of this evidence is that although the Ugandan government seems to be cooperating fully with US counterterrorism strategy, Museveni may be taking what he can from the US and adopting the rhetoric US policymakers want to hear, just as many states adopted

\textsuperscript{41} Lyman and Morrison, p. 78.  
\textsuperscript{42} Whitaker, “Compliance,” pp. 654, 656.  
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, p. 654.  
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid, pp. 651-655.  
\textsuperscript{46} Ploch, p. 59.
anticommunist rhetoric during the Cold War to receive US assistance for internal problems.\textsuperscript{47}

In Tanzania, US proposals such as the ATA and TIP, as well as coastal, border, and airport/seaport technical support and regulatory harmonization were immediately accepted.\textsuperscript{48} The government of Tanzania, however, was adamantly opposed to the US invasion of Iraq, and, as explored in more detail below, refused to sign an Article 98 Agreement with the US, signifying its partial independence from the US.\textsuperscript{49} US-supported and funded police and military units have been accused of human rights abuses, spurring protests against the increases in funding and subsequently impunity that came with new antiterrorism legislation.\textsuperscript{50} Outside of the government, opposition to the US-sponsored 2002 antiterrorism law, referred to as the “Ashcroft Law” after US Attorney General John Ashcroft, is strong within civil society organizations and the Muslim community: “When the FBI arrested two local Muslim leaders, activists organised a massive anti-American rally in June 2003; protestors carried signs that read ‘FBI get out’ and ‘Tanzania is not an American colony’.”\textsuperscript{51}

The US strategy of cooperation with weak African states has tended to be heavy-handed at best. An example of that heavy-handedness was the Bush administration’s Article 98 Agreement, a Bilateral Immunity Agreement to protect Americans from prosecution before the International Criminal Court. The Bush administration pressured

\textsuperscript{48} Whitaker, “Compliance,” pp. 655-656.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, p. 656.
\textsuperscript{50} Dagne, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{51} Whitaker, “Complaince,” p. 657.
African states to sign the agreements, but Kenya and Tanzania (along with four other African countries) refused to sign. In response the US suspended a significant amount of aid to Kenya ($17 million over two years) and Tanzania.\(^{52}\)

Following the 9/11 attacks, the US developed a counterterrorism strategy that emphasized unilateralism, pre-emptive force, and a “with us or against us” hardline perspective on alliances.\(^{53}\) Weak states, however, are not powerless in this interaction, and as demonstrated above, they can take advantage of the additional economic, technical, military, and political support made available when a strong state is pushing a policy agenda. In the East African case, the US strategy of cooperation is closest to a (2), the strong state dominates and the weak state concurs. In Tanzania and Kenya there was vocal civil society objection to US-backed antiterrorism laws, objections which were overridden in Tanzania, but effective in Kenya. In Uganda there was not much of a civil society presence, and the antiterrorism laws were used by Museveni to further his own political ends and to strike at groups that use terrorist tactics, like the LRA, but do not have a global orientation and pose no direct threat to the US or its interests. There was little weak state input in strategy formation, and the antiterrorism laws proposed in Kenya, and Tanzania followed the 9/11 attacks in the US, not the 1998 attacks in East Africa, indicating that they came from US pressure and did not originate domestically.\(^{54}\) That said, in Uganda and Tanzania, the governments were able to maintain their own priorities in the execution of the strategy, and all three states took advantage of the available

funding and technical support made available through the US. While the civil societies of East Africa protested, the governments, and in particular the security apparatuses, concurred with the US dominated strategy of counterterrorism.

The European Union and East Africa

Europe has dealt with terrorist groups since long before this most recent evolution of the tactic. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) struck against targets in the UK throughout much of the twentieth century. Basque separatists in northern Spain used terrorist tactics, and the group Basque Country and Freedom (Eta) has been classified by Spain, the US and the EU as a terrorist organization. Italy and Germany both dealt with persistent terrorist groups from the 1960s to the 1980s. These terrorist groups belong to the old school of terrorism. They were insurgent groups, by and large, with limited political support that used terrorism as a tactic to strike against their larger foes. Their goals were limited in scope to achievable aims, and they could be, and were, negotiated with.

The 9/11 attacks were an alarm bell for Europe as well as the US, and they reoriented EU foreign policy at a time when EU foreign security policy was just

beginning to take shape. The first major action of the EU following 9/11 was to adopt the Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (the Framework Decision), which harmonized member states’ laws and regulations regarding terrorist acts. The EU also created an EU Arrest Warrant to cut through jurisdictional problems across member states, and made other changes within the EU to attempt to adapt to transnational terrorism’s advantages over nation states:

The European Union, through its collective organs, and highlighting that terrorism constitutes a serious threat to fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law responded immediately to the terrorist attacks of 11 September with the adoption of a series of measures for the criminalisation of the commission and funding of terrorist activities and the imposition of restrictions against individuals or groups involved in such activities.61

The EU approached terrorism as a law enforcement problem, not as a war, and that approach applied both domestically and internationally. The EU defines the problem of globally-oriented terrorist groups operating in East Africa as a homeland security issue. However, the EU sees that security issue as one that has many linked causes. In a communication to the European Council on the EU strategy toward Africa, the European Commission states that:

Cross-border dynamics, such as illegal migration and trafficking of arms, drugs and refugee flows, are factors contributing to instability and tensions that spread throughout the Horn of Africa and beyond, and could even reach the EU. The Horn has come under increased international scrutiny in the war against terrorism due to the spreading of religious extremism

63 Specifically the Horn of Africa, which in this communication includes Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and the Sudan. Ibid, p. 4.
and ideological influences from neighboring sub-regions. Prevailing insecurity in the region has also contributed to a culture of lawlessness, banditry and warlordism. As a result the boundaries between political conflict, criminality and terrorism tend to be blurred.64

This more multidimensional view of the problem predisposes the EU to search for different kinds of solutions than the US did following 9/11. Additionally, the EU’s general counterterrorism strategic commitment begins, “To combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights [...]”65 The emphasis on human rights here originated in the EU itself. It is important not to conflate the differences between EU and US approaches to counterterrorism with differences in strategies of cooperation. Just because the policies arrived at by the US and the EU are different does not necessarily mean that the cooperative strategies are as well.

EU counterterrorism strategies in Africa focus on international laws and norms.66 The laws and regulations the EU refers to stem from UN resolutions following the 9/11 attacks, and the Framework Agreement.67 The norms have to do with human rights, but also local ownership of foreign aid projects – “African solutions for African problems.”68 Thus, EU projects begin with the justification of “African ownership” or “multilateral subsidiarity,” that is, either African states or regional organizations take action and lead on issues, or, when that is not possible, the EU stands ready to offer support.69 Of course, these rhetorical commitments do not always determine the reality of events.

64 Ibid, pp. 5.
66 Smis and Kingah, p. 155.
67 Ibid.
As stated above, the EU counterterrorism strategy has as a guiding principle the norm of human rights. The EU fight for human rights has embraced the idea of human security, or “the security of individuals and communities, expressed as both ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’.”\textsuperscript{70} For the EU, the struggle against global terrorism is inextricably bound to peace initiatives and economic and social development.

The international dimension of the EU’s counterterrorism strategy is defined primarily in support of UN and regional efforts to harmonize counterterrorism apparatuses and regulations (encompassing borders, airports, seaports, law enforcement, intelligence sharing, and anti-radicalization communications) within “third countries,” or states that lie outside of the EU.\textsuperscript{71} The strategy itself is divided into Prevent, Protect, Pursue, and Respond,\textsuperscript{72} and the tools the EU uses to implement it are the European Intelligence Agency,\textsuperscript{73} foreign aid, technical assistance, and support for peace processes and development at the East African and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Greater Horn of Africa) regional level.\textsuperscript{74}

EU counterterrorism initiatives in partnership with East African countries have often taken the form of region to region cooperation, EU-African Union (AU), EU-EAC, and EU-IGAD. Following 9/11, in response to the attacks and subsequent US initiatives, many African states reinforced regional counterterrorism commitments, and the EU moved to support those efforts:

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid, pp. 1-40.
\textsuperscript{73} Haynes, p. 1335.
For their part, African States fortified their commitment to implement the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention to Combat Terrorism that had been endorsed in 1999. They [the EU and the OAU] equally decided to create a counter-terrorism centre in Algiers.\textsuperscript{75}

This center, named the African Centre for the Study and Research of Terrorism (ACSRT), was formally established by the African Union in 2004, and “serves as the AU’s technical arm on counter-terrorism-related issues and is responsible for evaluating the terrorist threat in Africa and for promoting intra-African cooperation against terrorism.”\textsuperscript{76}

The foundation for much of this subsequent EU-African cooperation was the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, an agreement meant to normalize trade relations between the regions by subjecting them to WTO rules and codifying human rights and good governance conditionality.\textsuperscript{77} Upon its revision in 2005, a number of counterterrorism provisions were included in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement II, as was more money for African, Caribbean, and Pacific states to increase their ability to execute those provisions.\textsuperscript{78} One of the main features of the EU contribution to counterterrorism efforts included in the revised Cotonou Agreement was technical assistance for African countries attempting to bring their counterterrorism apparatuses up to spec.\textsuperscript{79}

Another fundamental building block of the EU’s interactions with African nations is the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2007.\textsuperscript{80} The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement calls for integrated cooperation – across the spheres of politics,

\textsuperscript{75} Smis and Kingah, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid, p. 143.
\textsuperscript{78} Smis and Kingah, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, p. 156.
economic development, and security. Through the framework established by the Cotonou Agreement, the Revised Cotonou Agreement, and the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, the EU Political and Security Committee and the AU Peace and Security Council have held regular meetings on security matters. These consultations have focused on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force, and the African Centre for the Study and Research of Terrorism.\textsuperscript{81}

Echoing the Colombian “Peace Laboratories,” African states, in partnership with the EU, established the African Peace Facility.\textsuperscript{82} The Peace Facility was conceived in 2003 by the African Union, and it aims to address many of the underlying causes of violent extremism, such as poverty, food scarcity, and poor governance.\textsuperscript{83} It also aims to cut down on the proliferation of small arms and support African peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{84} This is an explicitly African-led initiative, as the opening of the EU resolution allocating funding to the project reads:

At the Summit of the African Union in Maputo from 4 to 12 July 2003, the African Heads of State took a ‘Decision on the Establishment by the European Union of a Peace Support Operation Facility for the African Union’. In their decision, they specified that such a facility should be financed from resources allocated to each of them under the existing cooperation agreements with the European Union and be supplemented by an equivalent amount of unallocated European Development Fund resources.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid, p. 108.
It is important to emphasize that not only did the participating African governments request the peace facility, a small part of an overall strategy to make the region more peaceful and therefore less amenable to penetration by globally-oriented terrorist groups, but they also specified to the EU how they would like it to be funded.

The Horn of Africa Initiative, targeting the IGAD countries of the greater Horn of Africa region, “identified the problems originating from the Horn region and affecting the EU and promised cooperation with IGAD to find a lasting solution in drugs, trafficking, illegal immigrants, Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and governance issues.” Here again the EU and African states include counterterrorism in the context of other transnational issues, along with root causes. This initiative was conceived of by the EU, but, “The implementation of the strategy was launched jointly by the seven governments in the Horn region (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) and EU in April 2007.” Also dealing with the Horn region, the Euromarfor, a European maritime force, has taken part in US Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa, an ongoing military operation led by the US Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, based in Djibouti and meant to fight globally-oriented terrorist groups and piracy. This operation demonstrates how the EU often supports US counterterrorist operations, even while working with African states on different counterterrorism measures.

In the main, EU counterterrorism efforts in East Africa are on a smaller scale than those of the US. While the EU has worked to harmonize counterterrorism apparatuses

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88 Gilbert, p. 147.
throughout the continent, it has done so by offering financial and technical support, like
the US ATA and TIP initiatives, but without the domineering ‘stick’ of threats to aid cuts.
Additionally, I have found no evidence of the EU applying pressure on or advocating for
antiterrorism laws within East African states. When the EU makes trade agreements
conditional, it does so with on the condition of more stringent human rights guarantees or
more democratic societies, not counterterrorism.89

The counterterrorism projects and programs undertaken by the EU in cooperation
with African states tend towards the weak state leadership end of the strategies of
cooperation spectrum (5). The African Centre for the Study and Research of Terrorism
in Algiers was proposed and established by the AU with support and funding by the EU.
The Cotonou Partnership Agreements and the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership have
enabled close coordination between the EU and AU security committees. Regular high-
level meetings between the EU and the AU on security matters have allowed for feedback,
adaptations, and revisions in policies.

The Horn of Africa Initiative (HOAI) originated in the EU out of concern for how
problems in the Horn region were affecting EU security. The initial formulation of the
HOAI was problematic and widely criticized. IGAD’s website says of the HOAI, “The
Horn of Africa Initiative had indeed ignored the underlying causes such as abject poverty,
poor physical infrastructure communications and institutionalized dependency on food
aid.”90 However, following the Joint Assessment Missions of 2007 and 2009, the first of
which occurred six months after the HOAI was implemented by the seven IGAD states,
the EU and IGAD received feedback that led to changes in its implementation.

89 Karen Del Biondo, “EU Aid Conditionality in ACP Countries: Explaining Inconsistency in EU Sanctions
90 “About Horn of Africa Initiative (HOAI),” (2011).
“Consequently the focus of the strategy widened and the initiative became a regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa region.”\(^91\)

While feedback and adaptation are not a part of the metric for classifying cases, the degree of weak state input and high-level meetings indicated by such a dynamic change in policy are, pointing towards strong and weak states participating equally (4).

The African Peace Facility, conceived and executed by the AU with technical and financial support from the EU, is a solid example of weak state strategic leadership (5). As described above, it is included in this consideration of the EU’s approach to counterterrorism cooperation with East Africa because it is the primary mechanism by which the EU has been contributing large sums towards the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007, fighting against al Shabaab.\(^92\) The African Union requested that the EU become a partner in the establishment of a Peace Facility, and the EU applied the requested funding in the manner in which it was requested. The EU remained a partner, and in 2007 the AU and EU decided to “broaden the scope of the African Peace Facility to cover conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation as well as to accelerate decision-making and coordination processes.”\(^93\) This program allocated 100 million Euros to capacity building through the African Peace and Security Architecture; 600 million Euros for Peace Support Operations, more than 440 million of which went to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), combating al Shabaab;\(^94\) 15 million Euros for an Early Response Mechanism, a fund for responding rapidly to disasters or crises; and 40 million Euros for contingencies. Of those sums, 740

million Euros were spent from the Peace Facility’s establishment in 2004 to 2013, the majority of which went to confronting al Shabaab in Somalia through AMISOM.95

A problem with this analysis is that it takes place at the regional unit of analysis. While one of the assumptions of this thesis is that the EU can be treated as a state due to its political, economic, and foreign policy coherence, I make no such assumptions about the AU, IGAD, or the EAC. This problem is addressed by looking at the implementation of agreements and participation in programs. Evaluations of these programs, like the African Peace Facility, show a high degree of participation by the weak states. For example, Kenya took advantage of an EU civilian training mission for coastal police forces sponsored through the African Peace Facility in 2012.96 Uganda utilized the Early Response Mechanism in response to incursions by the LRA.97 Uganda and Kenya have both been involved in the HOAI, participating in projects to increase interconnectivity in transport, energy and water resources for development.98 Tanzania has been involved in many projects stemming from the Cotonou Partnership Agreements.99 The EU strategy of cooperation towards the East African states is between equal participation by the strong and weak state (4) and weak state strategic leadership (5). There is substantial evidence of weak state leadership in terms of weak state input, maintenance of weak state priorities in the final execution, and the implementation of and participation in the agreements and programs. However, the strategy formation took place both in the strong and weak states, through regional organizations, and through many high-level meetings.

97 Ibid, p. 4.
Finally, the EU had a significant amount of input on the counterterrorism strategies employed, demonstrated by conditionality arrangements and human rights provisions.

**Summary**

Here again the approaches of the US and the EU are very different. Though the US found some cooperative governments, the civil societies in Kenya and Tanzania objected to the implementation of US formulated policies and programs. Charles Stith, former US ambassador to Tanzania, urged the US to include more weak state input in its approach to counterterrorism:

> America cannot break the back of organizations like al Qaeda without the help of governments in Africa. While in Tanzania, I saw firsthand how invaluable African intelligence assets were to the investigation of the U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa. Without the help of the Tanzanians and the South Africans, the United States would not have captured K. K. Mohamed, the only person tried, convicted, and incarcerated for the Dar [es Salaam] bombing.  

According to Rohan Gunaratna, “Until a month after US embassies in East Africa were destroyed by the organization in 1998, the CIA did not even know the correct name of Bin Laden’s group.” The EU approach, in contrast, has a much higher degree of weak state input. There is no vocal opposition to EU policies, and East African states are eager to participate in the regional policies and programs the EU has created in partnership with African organizations like the AU and IGAD. In the following chapter I will analyze the relative success of the policies and programs resulting from both the US and the EU’s

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strategies of cooperation with East Africa, attempting to conclude whether increased weak state input leads to more successful policies against transnational threats.
Chapter 6: Analysis – The Effect of Depth of Cooperation on the Success of a Strategy

The essential question of this thesis deals with the utility of different strategies of cooperation. Does deeper cooperation between weak and strong states tend to produce policies and programs that are more successful at addressing transnational threats? Are the strategies devised by weaker states more effective? Because of historically recent changes in the international system that give threatening transnational forces an advantage over states weak and strong, states must cooperate to confront them. The depth of that cooperation, meaning the degree to which the weak state is involved, is a factor that dramatically affects the policies and programs that are the outcome of that cooperation.

This chapter will examine the degree of success each of the policies and programs discussed in the cases achieved. It will begin with an evaluation of the success of the US followed by the EU approach to transnational crime in Colombia. Next it will do the same for US and EU approaches to terrorism in East Africa. To measure the success of the policies and programs undertaken to address the problem of transnational crime, I will look at how the initiatives undertaken through the cooperation between the US/EU and Colombia in Plan Colombia affected the rate of drug-related crime, and the amount of drugs entering the US/EU. For terrorism success will be measured by a decline in the rate of terrorist attacks in and originating from East African states following the
introduction of the policies and programs resulting from US and EU cooperation with those states.

Transnational Crime

Success against transnational crime, meaning, in this study, drug trafficking, presents a difficult challenge for measurement. Governments and news organizations tend to focus on the amount of land used for the production of illicit drugs,¹ but because of the balloon effect, wherein drug production and trafficking routes tend to respond to increased pressure by shifting to another location, this alone is not a good measure. When used as part of a composite measure, however, it can help to create an accurate picture of the share of illicit drugs flowing into a sink state from a specific source state, which this thesis will use as one part of the metric of success for strong and weak states against transnational crime. The first task of this analysis of the success of transnational crime is to measure the amount of cocaine, because of the focus in Colombia on cocaine, that flows into the US and the EU. Because Colombia has accounted for the production of 68 percent of the world’s cocaine,² I expect to see the flow of cocaine into the US and EU decrease substantially if the strategy worked. A reliable estimate of the flow of cocaine into a state is the price of cocaine by purity. This estimate is based on the principle of supply and demand and can tell us if the supply of the drug into the US or EU has been disrupted causing a surge in prices, or if supply has become more plentiful.

causing a drop in prices. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides street cocaine prices by purity level going back to 1990. Figure 6.1 shows that the price of cocaine has declined from 1990 to 2010, with occasional spikes, one of which occurred immediately following the introduction of Plan Colombia and the EU Peace Plan.

Figure 6.1: Price of Cocaine in the US (per Gram)

The 2001 spike, up to $201/gram in the US, correlates with a large reduction in the production of coca bush in Colombia from 163,300 hectares in 2000 to 144,800 hectares in 2001. Figure 6.2, below, shows that while in the early 1990s there was a strong negative correlation between Colombian cocaine production and US prices (low production in Colombia occurred at the same time as high prices in the US), after 2001 things get murky.

Figure 6.2: Price in the US vs. Production in Colombia
Solid Line = US Price/Gram
Dashed Line = Colombia Production

The price in the US falls, indicating either an increase in supply or a decrease in demand, at the same time as production in Colombia falls. According to the *World Drug Report*, demand in the US remained stable and insatiable until 2006, so supply during this period must have risen. The best explanation for this is the balloon effect. As counternarcotics forces applied pressure to Colombian producers, the source of supply went elsewhere. Colombian production and US prices both remained relatively low from 2002 to 2007, prices remaining between their lowest point at $129/gram in 2007 and $155 in 2003, and production between 78,000 and 102,000 hectares of coca bush. From 2008 to 2009, prices rose in line with a reduction in acreage dedicated to the cultivation of coca bush, showing that by that time the supply of US cocaine was again tied to Colombia, and a reduction there meant a shortage in the US, driving up prices to their highest point since 2001. By 2010, however, prices seemed to be falling slightly while acreage declined, most likely echoing the trend from 2002 to 2007 of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) adapting and working around supply and transit-targeting programs.

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Demand has not been as high for cocaine in the EU as it was in the US, so the price of cocaine was comparatively lower there to begin with. Figure 6.3 shows EU prices for cocaine from 1990-2010. The price in the EU begins and ends lower than in the US, and this is explained by lower demand. In the EU, estimates of cocaine users in 2004 were at just above 3.25 million, and at the same time in North America, primarily
the US, users were at around 6.5 million. Demand in the US dropped significantly following 2006, so by 2011 users were estimated to be at around 4.75 million, while in Western Europe demand had increased to about 4 million users by that time.

Interestingly, Figure 6.3 shows low stable prices in the EU at the same time that Figure 6.1 shows a spike in US prices (2001). Though the US spike in 2001 was short lived and prices plummeted to a new low the following year, there was only a very slight rise in price in the EU. As the effects of Plan Colombia took hold, prices in the US rose from $162/gram in 1999 to $204/gram in 2001, before dropping again to $143/gram in 2002. In the EU, on the other hand, prices dropped from $88/gram in 1999 to $70/gram in 2000, then rose slightly to $74/gram in 2001. Whatever temporary success was achieved by the implementation of Plan Colombia between 2000 and 2001 did not translate into a significant drop in prices (hence, supply) for the EU at the same time.

Prices in European states dropped steadily in the 1990s before bottoming out in 2000. They really started to pick up again in 2003, going from $70/gram in 2000 to $84/gram in 2003. In 2008 the post-2000 price peaked at $94, before it began to decline again. As described above, cocaine use in the EU gained approximately 1.5 million users between 2003 and 2011, which explains some of the price increase from 2003 to 2008, but then prices began to fall again, despite a larger market. This indicates that supply grew faster than demand from 2008 to 2010, dropping the price.

Judging by prices, drug flows into the US were somewhat impacted, and in the EU not substantially impacted by Plan Colombia and the Peace Process. Success in stopping cocaine from entering the US was achieved briefly in 2001, when prices

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8 Ibid.
climbed 126 percent, indicating a blow had been struck against US cocaine supply. However, despite continued declines in hectares of land dedicated to the production of coca, from 163,300 in 2000 to 80,000 in 2004, the supply of coca into the US rebounded in 2002, demonstrated by the steep price drop from 2001 to 2002, and an average decline up to 2007. This does not exactly mean that Plan Colombia has not been somewhat successful, from a Colombian point of view at least. Production in Colombia has continued to decline (except for 2007) so the US market is probably being supplied from elsewhere. In the EU, prices shifted less dramatically as a whole, indicating a market less responsive to shifts in supply due to lower demand. When cocaine flow to the US was seriously impacted by US defoliation and interdiction efforts associated with Plan Colombia, I expected prices per gram in the EU to either spike as well, demonstrating a shortage in the supply of cocaine for the EU as well as the US, or plummet, demonstrating that TCOs were avoiding the US market and going elsewhere due to fear of US interdiction efforts. Instead the price in the EU stayed between $70 and $74/gram from 2000 to 2002, indicating that the EU cocaine market was not significantly impacted by either Plan Colombia, or the EU efforts at crop reduction. The primary determinant of EU prices seems to be its own climbing demand, unless estimates are wrong and Europe has a greater diversity of producers. This seems unlikely because of Europe’s geographic distance from cocaine producing countries compared to the US. If spikes in prices in the US are caused by sudden drops in Colombian supply, and assuming geographic proximity makes transit cheaper, then one must assume that the more expensive transit to the EU would make the EU market even more vulnerable to fluctuations in Colombian
production if they had a similarly high demand, even if, as is surely the case for both the US and the EU, their supply comes from several states.

The second factor impacting the success of the venture is on the weak state side. The main problem for Colombia was not the flow of drugs into the US and the EU, but instead the high rates of violence linked to the drug trade. Originally, President Pastrana asked the world for the tools to find peace against the various rebel groups profiting from the drug trade, economic stability to provide other options for farmers, and institutional strength to fight corruption.9 Did the policies and programs adopted by the US and the EU weaken the grip of TCOs in Colombia, at least in terms of levels of violence? To begin, I will focus on the US impact. At this level the effects of the policies implemented by the two strong states are easier to separate, as the EU effects are sure to be concentrated geographically near their Peace Laboratories, which were set up near high-coca producing areas.10 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) offers the public a comprehensive database that includes the rates of violent crime linked to the production and trafficking of illicit drugs.11

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The share of homicides directly attributed to organized criminal groups is a small percentage of total homicides. Figure 6.4 shows that the two rates vary together, and therefore fluctuations in the overall homicide rate are an accurate proxy of the overall trends in transnational crime-related violence in Colombia. Because data are not available on organized crime before 2005, I am including this figure to support the proxy use of earlier data in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5 displays the homicide rate per 100,000 for Colombia since the late 1990s. The rate peaks in 2002 at 70.2 per 100,000 population, before declining rapidly to just above 30 per 100,000 population in 2012. The rise from 60 to 70 homicides per 100,000 population corresponds with the introduction of Plan Colombia. However, the overall trend shows that from 2002 to 2012, levels of violence in Colombia have declined significantly as the political situation has improved. A map in the UNODC’s publication, “Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms Trafficking in Colombia,” clarifies those numbers by
illustrating where in Colombia the violence continues to exceed the national rate. The homicide rates used in the publication are for 2005, when Colombia’s homicide rate had dropped to 39.6/100,000. By comparison, the US homicide rate at that time was 5.6/100,000.\textsuperscript{12} The map shows that violence was worst in the center of the country, near urban areas or places high in resources. However, the map is remarkably clear in Magdalena Medio, near the north of the country, where the first EU peace laboratory stands.\textsuperscript{13} Magdalena Medio was one of the most violent areas of Colombia, according to the World Bank, until the Peace Laboratory took root.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} “Intentional homicide, count and rate per 100,000 population (1995-2011),” (2014).
\textsuperscript{14} World Bank, p. 1.
Figure 6.6: Homicide Rate (as in Figure 6.5) vs. Battle Related Deaths (new line)\textsuperscript{15} in Colombia

\begin{center}
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Figure 6.6 seems counterintuitive at first. Here I have juxtaposed the homicide rate, shown in Figure 6.5, with battle-related deaths from clashes between the government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and

the National Liberation Army (ELN). In this chart it looks like the homicide rate and battle-related deaths were closely entwined until 2004, when the number of battle-related deaths rocketed upwards, from a low of 500 in 2003 to a peak of 1,389 in 2005. From those highs it dropped again, dramatically, to 244 in 2008, popped up to around 400 in 2010, and declined for 2011 and 2012 to near 200. The point of showing battle-related deaths is to trace the levels of violence in Colombian society. Both the FARC and the ELN, as discussed in the case study in chapter 4, have converted coca production into a source of revenue. The first escalation in violence corresponded to the initial influx of military aid and weaponry from Plan Colombia in early 2001. The second corresponded to the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) used by President Bush to re-brand the drug war as a part of the broader war on terror, and the FARC as a narco-terrorist group. The ARI funding and arms was dispersed in 2003, and the peak of the government’s battles with the rebels followed shortly after, in 2005. After this escalation, however, battle-related deaths declined sharply, dropping to a stable range of between 200 and 400 deaths a year between 2007 and 2012. This decline, and the decline in the homicide rate for the same time, represented a significant positive development for Colombia.

Can the trend of decreasing levels of violence from 2005 to 2012 be ascribed to the support offered the Colombian government through Plan Colombia and the ARI? The declining levels of violence in Colombia do correlate with the influx of funding for

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16 Ibid.
Colombia’s security forces included in US aid, strengthening the hand of the Colombian government and possibly enabling it to break the stalemate with the FARC, ELN, and AUC. However, they also correlate with the EU’s Peace Process. This data does not show causation, and it is impossible to disentangle the effects of the two large-scale aid projects in this case, but it does seem to indicate that the grasp of transnational crime has been weakened in Colombia following the implementation of these programs and policies.

The results of the EU’s actions were mixed. As demonstrated above, the price of cocaine per gram in the EU did not rise significantly following the implementation of EU alternative development and crop substitution programs, parts of the Peace Process. The EU did not manage to reduce the flow of drugs into its member states by any significant amount. However, the Magdalena Medio Peace Laboratory seems to have succeeded in reducing levels of violence in the region. Additionally, EU good offices and mediation were available when the Colombian government and FARC agreed to come to the table, though they were rarely used. The declining homicide rate at the national level, and the decrease in battle-related deaths, are both things that the EU was explicitly working towards in its Peace Plan.

According to the factors taken into account in this analysis, the implementation of Plan Colombia was followed by decreased levels of violence (after initial spikes) and decreased overall cocaine production in Colombia. These constitute successes for Plan Colombia, and for the state of Colombia. Were the operations of TCOs, which profited from Colombian supply, disrupted by Plan Colombia and its successor, the ARI? Judging from how quickly cocaine prices in the US dropped following their spike at the outset of the implementation of Plan Colombia, TCOs were impacted for only a short
time. If the goals of Plan Colombia were to stabilize Colombia and reduce cocaine production there, it must be judged a success based on the analysis above. If it was meant to confront transnational crime and to prevent the flow of cocaine into the US in a sustained way, it seems to have had little impact for all of the reasons discussed in chapter three. When pressure was applied in Colombia, TCOs worked around the measures meant to stop them and found other sources of cocaine.

Which strategy of cooperation led to more successful outcomes? From the analysis above, it would seem that the outcomes were moderately successful regardless of the strategy of cooperation. This case does not support my hypothesis a great deal. The degree of weak state input in the formulation of policies to confront transnational threats was not a crucial factor that determined success, although the EU approach did lead to successful outcomes in key social areas. The EU approach which took in more weak state input led to policies and programs that decreased levels of violence, which is favorable in a normative sense.

Global Terrorism

Terrorist groups have adapted just as quickly to the changing world as TCOs, making use of state borders, weak state institutions, and a non-hierarchical network structure to evade capture, grow their organizations, and strike at strong state targets. In order to capture how the policies and programs created through the cooperation of weak and strong states fare against terrorist groups, I will examine the number of terrorist incidents that occurred following the implementation of the policy, allowing for a year of
lag time for the policy to begin having an effect. Measuring the rise and fall of terrorist acts does not perfectly predict the increase and decline of the strength of a particular globally-oriented terrorist group. It does, however, make for a serviceable rough-cut glance at the issue. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is a publicly-available database that counts and codes incidents of terrorism by perpetrator, incident type, and place.\textsuperscript{19}

Figure 6. 7: Terrorist Incidents 1995-2012 in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania

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Figure 6.7 draws from the GTD to analyze terrorist incidents by year from 1995-2012 in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. It shows that though terrorist incidents were few and held steady in the region from 2001 to 2006, they nearly doubled their former peak from 2010 to 2012. Most of the attacks from 2010 to 2012 took place in Kenya and were carried out by the Somalia-based terrorist group with strong ties to al Qaeda, al Shabaab. Tanzania and Uganda were much less affected by terrorism. In fact, extending the timeline back to the late 1990s, when al Qaeda was first establishing a foothold in the region, there are very few incidents, save the large scale attacks discussed in chapter five in Dar es Salaam and Mombasa. The GTD recorded three total terrorist incidents in Tanzania and Uganda, two in Uganda that occurred on the same day in 2010 and the Dar es Salaam bombing in Tanzania, in the period between 1995 and 2012. As discussed in chapter five, al Qaeda, al Shabaab, and Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) are the three organizations this analysis covers because of their activities in the region, global orientation, and maximalist goals. Figure 6.7 shows that, despite the introduction of antiterrorist measures in the region, incidents perpetrated by globally-oriented terrorist groups have increased.

Figure 6.8 looks at the frequency of terrorist incidents perpetrated by al Qaeda, al Shabaab, and AIAI, which operate in and draw strength from the East African region, both in the region and abroad, in an effort to judge the strength of those organizations following the implementation of the policies discussed in chapter five.

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Figure 6.8: Terrorist Incidents 1995-2012 Perpetrated by Groups Linked to East Africa


Figure 6.8 shows that, like the frequency of incidents within East Africa, the frequency of incidents by groups linked to the region (that is, both within the region and abroad) has escalated since the introduction of the policies and programs meant to prevent them. Unfortunately, Figure 6.8 most likely underestimates the strength of these organizations. As cautioned in chapter five, these organizations share information, training, and equipment with other iterations of al Qaeda and with ideological brethren, so their impact may be felt in other ways than just attributed attacks, like sheltering bomb-makers or
recruiting. The main takeaway from Figures 6.7 and 6.8 is that the rate of terrorist incidents in and from groups linked to the East African region have not decreased despite interventions by the US and the EU.


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If Somalia is included in the analysis, as shown in Table 6.1, incidents of terrorism committed by the organizations included in this case have grown considerably since 2006. Seven out of 62 incidents, or just over eleven percent of the incidents perpetrated by

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22 Bolded states are part of the Greater Horn of Africa region, specified above in chapter 5.
groups linked to East Africa, occurred in the region from 1995-2005. From 2006-2012, 519 of 530 incidents, or nearly 98 percent, occurred in the region.

As can be seen in the table, incidents of terrorism in Kenya rose substantially after 2006. This resulted from contagion from Somalia’s instability, with Kenya sending troops to Somalia in 2011. Kenya has been slow to react to terrorism: of the East African countries, it alone did not pass an antiterrorism law. According to US congressional testimony, the Kenyan antiterrorism legislation was adamantly opposed by democracy advocates and civil society groups in Kenya who viewed the law as amenable to abuse as an instrument of political oppression, and as a vehicle of US intervention in Kenyan domestic affairs. This analysis tracks with the sentiment expressed in Tanzanian civil society, where those opposed to the antiterrorism law referred to it as the “Ashcroft Law,” after US Attorney General John Ashcroft. Indeed, one of the primary motivating factors of opposition to the antiterrorism law was the perception in Kenyan civil society of the law as originating externally, that is, imposed by the US. Thus, US pressure may have had the inadvertent effect of hindering counterterrorist action in Kenya.

The primary goals of the US and EU attempts to harmonize East African transportation security, through programs like the US-sponsored Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program, Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), Safe Skies for Africa Program, and Africa Coastal/Border Security Program, all discussed in more detail in chapter five, are to prevent the kind of hijacking that occurred on 9/11, and to prevent

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Weapon of Mass Destruction being used for acts of terrorism. Because there were no hijackings specifically involving those states and the groups in this study either before or after the implementation of those programs, it is impossible to say based on this data whether the programs have had an effect on terrorism. On the other hand, since 9/11 there were two incidents involving al Shabaab in nearby Somalia; according to the Global Terrorism Database, neither involved fatalities.

There have been no terrorist WMD attacks in the intervening years. The goals of the softer programs pushed by the US and the EU to harmonize security regulations for travel were met, for the most part, although we cannot say if there would have been terrorist incidents without these programs inasmuch as there were no incidents before 9/11. It is important to note that these programs, though developed in the strong state, did not prompt protests by civil society organizations and were all domesticated by the weak state.

Where the EU’s policies diverge from the US’s are in the former’s more regional approach and its focus on what it believes to be the roots of the problem – economic and social development and human rights. The African Peace Facility has aspects that have been enacted too recently to judge them, such as the coastal policing training for Kenya that began in 2012. That facility has been contributing large sums towards the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007, but AU forces with EU support have not made much headway stabilizing Somalia or reducing terrorist incidents.

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Finally, economic and social development are defined by the EU as important aspects of their approach to fighting terrorism. The Horn of Africa Initiative and the Cotonou Partnership Agreements are included in the EU’s counterterrorism framework. In addition to the conditionality built into the 2005 revisions of the agreement, the EU sought to decrease terrorism by increasing trade with the region. Significantly, EU-Tanzania trade has grown by an average of 8.9 percent for imports into the EU and five percent for exports from 2008-2012. The EU is one of Tanzania’s top three trading partners, along with China and India. Partly as a result of this, Tanzania’s Gross National Income Purchasing Power Parity (GNI PPP) has grown from $1,280 (current USD) in 2008 to $1,560 in 2012, registering a nearly seven percent annual increase in GDP. Both Kenya and Uganda have similarly increased trade with the EU from 2008 to 2012, and the EU is high on both of their lists of top trading partners. Kenya has grown during the time period of 2008 to 2012, though more slowly than Tanzania. Uganda saw nine percent annual growth in GDP in 2008, but quickly dropped back down to seven and six percent and then fell precipitously in 2012 to three percent as the global recession hit. Thus, until recently, all three states experienced economic growth at the same time as they increased trade with the EU, one of their most important trading partners.

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partners. Did this economic growth correlate with falling rates of terrorist violence? If it did, we would expect the state with the highest GNI PPP to have the least terrorism. World Bank data shows that Kenya has the highest GNI PPP of the three, and yet has the highest frequency of terrorist incidents. This indicates that increased trade and economic growth are not, by themselves, effective against terrorism.

Summary

My hypothesis posited that strong states would more effectively confront transnational threats if they cooperated with weak states; especially if they let weak states lead in developing strategies to deal with transnational threats. The results, however, are more complicated. The US-formulated Plan Colombia was an example of strong state imposition, and although it succeeded in lowering drug production in Colombia, it failed to stem the flow of cocaine into the US for longer than a year. The implementation of the US plan corresponded with temporarily higher homicide rates and an escalation in the war with the FARC, but was followed by a drastic decline in the levels of violence there. The EU’s impact on Colombia in the region of the Peace Laboratory, Magdalena Medio, was that homicide rates dropped from far above the national average to well below. While it is hard here to attribute causation in a region affected by the broader national environment, we can at least say that EU support for the Peace Laboratory coincided with decreased rates of violence. Cocaine continued to flow into the EU at a comparatively

steady rate, showing that neither the US nor the EU approaches addressed the TCOs profiting by the production, trafficking, and sale of cocaine.

In East Africa, the US has tended to impose strategies to confront terrorism, but the weak states there concurred with those strategies and sought to make the most out of them. In the states that concurred strongest with the US approach, the US policies were implemented immediately, with little measurable effect one way or the other. In Kenya the heavy-handed US approach, in part, caused the failure of the implementation of the antiterrorism law. The EU’s deeper cooperation with East African states, nearly to the point of weak state strategic leadership, met with no unqualified successes in confronting globally-oriented terrorist groups there. On the other hand, it met with fewer outright failures than the US did. In each case, no policy was successful in addressing transnational threats. The EU approach, however, seems to have failed the least simply because it was based on social and economic cooperation rather than military strategies.

My initial hypothesis was not proven by the cases explored here. It does not seem that allowing weak states to take the lead necessarily increases the probability of success of the policies adopted to confront transnational threats.

The predictions extrapolated from hegemonic stability theory fared no better than my own. Hegemonic stability theory is the realist theory that argues that the state with a preponderance of power will act to stabilize the international system by taking the lead and imposing its strategies on weaker states, shaping the system to facilitate and perpetuate its hegemony. The logical extension of this theory is the prediction that strong states, especially hegemonic states like the US, would lead the world in developing strategies to confront transnational threats, and strong state imposition of

those strategies would beget more successful policies and programs than weak state strategic leadership. However, the evidence provided in the analysis above shows that a lack of weak state input has little demonstrable impact on the probability of success.

The generalizability of these results may be limited, but it opens the door to further research. Does geographic proximity of strong state to weak state affect the effectiveness of the cooperatively formed policies and programs? Does ideological affinity between governments? Does the magnitude of the policy or program, in terms of financial or military commitments? Does the inclusion of military components? Does the degree of violence in the weak state? Are some transnational threats more amenable to weak state leadership than others? The evidence above suggests that increased weak state input might correlate with the formulation of policies that result in less civil unrest in the weak state (for example: temporary spikes in levels of violence in the Colombian case, domestic opposition in the Kenyan case, and domestic antiterrorism laws in Uganda and Tanzania that have been used to stifle political dissent). Is there a causal link here, or is this coincidental? More research is necessary to answer these questions.
Bibliography


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