Publications and Research
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2019
Abstract
This review essay examines Stephen Kotkin’s account of Stalin’s leadership, Soviet foreign policy, and military strategy during the increasingly dangerous international environment of the 1930s and the approach of war in 1941. It focuses on three problems of particular relevance to international relations and military and diplomatic history: Stalin’s difficulty in balancing against Nazi Germany through alliances with the Western democracies; the Soviet turn toward internal balancing through military modernization and defense preparations; and the political-military failures that contributed to the catastrophe of 1941. The review assesses Stalin’s perceptions of external threats, his extensive involvement in military-industrial development, the consequences of the military purges, and tensions between Soviet efforts to build military power and failures of readiness, strategy, and war planning on the eve of the German invasion.
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Copyright is held by the author and uses a CC BY-NC-ND license