Characterizing Effective Auction Mechanisms: Insights from the 2007 TAC Mechanism Design Competition

Authors

Jinzhong Niu, CUNY Guttman Community CollegeFollow
Kai Cai, CUNY Graduate Center
Simon Parsons, CUNY Brooklyn College
Enrico Gerding, University of Southampton
Peter McBurney, University of Liverpool

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

5-2008

Abstract

This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design competition. It presents a classification of the entries to the competition, and uses this classification to compare these entries. The paper also attempts to relate market dynamics to the auction rules adopted by these entries and their adaptive strategies via a set of post-tournament experiments. Based on this analysis, the paper speculates about the design of effective auction mechanisms, both in the setting of this competition and in the more general case.

Comments

This work was originally published in Proceedings of the Seventh International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008).