Date of Degree
metaphysics of time, McTaggart Paradox, A-time b-time
Our metaphysical notion of temporality is exhausted by the concepts of fluid and static time. Following James Ellis McTaggart, philosophers refer to these times as the A-series and B-series respectively. To have a metaphysical argument against the reality of time as such, therefore, separate arguments against the reality of both temporal series are required. In the dissertation, I shall offer a number of both types of arguments. In the first chapter, McTaggart’s program is assessed. It is concluded that McTaggart has an argument against the reality of the A-series, but does not have one against the reality of the B-series. In the second chapter, additional arguments against the reality of the A-series, as well as against hybrid A/B series, are presented. In the third chapter, it is argued that the B-series is as unreal as its counterpart, the A-series, is. This outcome leaves us with the following philosophical predicament: on the one hand, our philosophical notion of time is exhausted by the concepts of fluid and static time; on the other hand, neither concept, nor any of their amalgamation, is adequate to give us a coherent metaphysical theory of time. The dilemma, I believe, is a sufficient reason for the conclusion that time, as it is conceived by philosophers, is not part of physical reality.
Freeman, Edward, "On A and B Theories of Time" (2018). CUNY Academic Works.