Auction mechanism design is a subfield of game theory dedicated to manipulating the rules of an auction so as to achieve specific goals. The complexity of the dynamics of auctions, especially continuous double auctions, makes it difficult to apply the usual analytic game-theoretic methods. This paper takes an experimental approach, searching a parameterized space of possible auction types, and presents a new pricing policy for continuous double auctions. The paper further demonstrates how this policy, together with a shout improvement rule, helps to reduce the fluctuation of transaction prices in auctions involving agents with minimum intelligence while keeping the overall efficiency high.
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, and Elizabeth Sklar. Reducing price fluctuation in continuous double auctions through pricing policy and shout improvement rule. In Proceedings of the Fifth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2006), pages 1143–1150, Hakodate, Japan, May 2006.