The evil god challenge is for theists to explain why a good god’s existence should be considerably more reasonable than an evil god’s existence. Challengers note that there is a symmetry between a good god and an evil god. Moreover, the classical arguments for a good god can prove the existence of an evil god just as well. Furthermore, theodicies can be mirrored by reverse theodicies. Consequently, the evil god challenge leads to two implications. One, if an evil god is deemed absurd, by logical symmetry, a good god must also be absurd. Two, if an evil god is not absurd, then no reason exists in favor of the existence of a good god. This paper offers two strategies to show that a good god’s existence is plausible, but an evil god’s is not. One is to argue that an evil god’s motivations for creating the world are inconsistent with its alleged nature. The other is a close examination of theodicies and reverse theodicies, which shows that no symmetry exists between them and that theodicies are effective, but reverse theodicies are not.