Date of Award

Summer 9-1-2017

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

Departments/Programs

Economics

First Advisor

Kara Basu

Second Advisor

Matthew Baker

Academic Program Adviser

Randall Filer

Abstract

In economic experiments, players often demonstrate concerns for the relative payoffs between themselves and other subjects, in addition to their own payoffs. In addition, they appear to do their parts to achieve efficient outcomes, particularly when they are ignorant of the opponent's decision. I present a parsimonious model of other-regarding preferences and quasi-magical thinking that explains such behavior, and I apply it to four games: the prisoner's dilemma, the traveler's dilemma, the ultimatum game, and the trust game.

 
 

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