Student Theses and Dissertations
Date of Award
Fall 12-20-2024
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelor of Arts (BA)
Honors Designation
yes
Program of Study
Political Science
Language
English
First Advisor
Xiaonan Wang
Second Advisor
Stephanie R. Golob
Third Advisor
Till Weber
Abstract
What explains the variation in states using state versus nonstate actors in responding to civil unrest? Prior research on state repression has predominantly focused on the direct use of force by state authorities, often neglecting the critical role of third parties, such as organized crime groups, in executing repression. This practice, known as "outsourcing repression", enables states to maintain control while preserving plausible deniability, particularly in contexts requiring substantial coercion. This study aims to elucidate the conditions under which states opt to outsource repression. I propose a two-step logical framework. First, I argue that outsourcing repression depends on the availability of thugs to hire. Second, when third-party actors are available for hire, the state must consider the reliability of such violent delegations, which ultimately depends on the effectiveness of controls exerted by the states over the proxies. The empirical evidence supporting this framework is derived from 1) a cross-period comparison of Hong Kong police responses to the social movements in 2003, 2014, and 2019 and 2) cross-regional comparisons of police responses in different episodes of protests within the 2019 movement. The first comparison highlights the changing relationship between police and triad that provides the state with available pools to outsource. The second comparison of the 2019 movement illuminates the strategic calculations made by the police when outsourcing. Based on these findings, I conclude that states are more likely to outsource repression when reliable proxies are accessible and reliable, thus enabling a mutually beneficial relationship that fosters a conducive environment for outsourced repression.
Recommended Citation
Kong, Ming, "When do States Outsource Repression: Evidence from Hong Kong" (2024). CUNY Academic Works.
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/bb_etds/197
