Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
Date of Degree
9-2018
Document Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Program
Philosophy
Advisor
Jesse Prinz
Committee Members
Eric Mandelbaum
Shaun Nichols
John Greenwood
Felipe De Brigard
Subject Categories
Cognitive Neuroscience | Philosophy of Mind | Philosophy of Science
Keywords
Working memory, central cognition, cognitive architecture, consciousness, first-order theories of consciousness
Abstract
In both philosophy and the sciences of the mind there is a shared commitment to the idea that there is a center—the seat of consciousness, the source of deliberation and reflection, and the core of personal identity—in the mind. My dissertation challenges this deeply entrenched view. I review the empirical literature on working memory, psychology’s best candidate for the workspace of the mind, and argue that it is not a natural kind and cannot inform these central cognitive processes. This deflationary view directly imperils many naturalistic theories of consciousness that rely on working memory, which are reviewed in this project. This dissertation thus serves as the necessary first negative step required to begin the process of articulating socially-embedded accounts of many central cognitive processes that dominate the contemporary philosophical literature, including consciousness and reasoning.
Recommended Citation
Gomez-Lavin, Javier, "The Fragmented Mind: Working Memory Cannot Implement Consciousness" (2018). CUNY Academic Works.
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2755
Included in
Cognitive Neuroscience Commons, Philosophy of Mind Commons, Philosophy of Science Commons