Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

Date of Degree

2008

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Ph.D.

Program

Philosophy

Advisor

Douglas P. Lackey

Committee Members

Steven Cahn

Steven Ross

Peter Simpson

Subject Categories

Philosophy | Psychiatry and Psychology | Psychology

Abstract

An amoralist is defined as a person who rejects the claims of moral reasons to special authority, and systematically acts without regard to the generally accepted moral standards. A psychopath can be seen as a paradigm case of an extreme amoralist, although the less severe cases of selective amoralists are considered. The research into the typical behavioral pattern, motivational structure, and the value system of psychopaths can shed light on at least three aspects related to the analysis of the moral agency. First, it can help elucidating the emotive and cognitive conditions necessary for moral performance. Secondly, it can provide empirical evidence supporting the externalist theories of moral motivation. Finally, it can bring into greater focus our intuitive notion of the limits of moral responsibility. In this work I concentrate on the first and the last aspects, but the discussion has an indirect bearing on the second theme as well.

The phenomenon of amoralism presents a challenge: the psychopaths are not usually diagnosed as psychotic, and yet there is a sense in which their condition is clearly abnormal and needs explaining. The main purpose of this work is to specify the typical features of amoral individuals and point to the roots of this abnormality. The two explanatory options are considered: the amoralist may suffer either from emotive deficiency, or else exhibit a cognitive failure of some sort. The comparison of amoralists with autistic individuals allows dismissing the emotive deficiency as the main reason of the amoral condition, and an argument is developed to show that a fundamental mistake in judgments about good and evil is ultimately responsible for this condition.

The amoralists, however, can be held morally responsible for their actions. I seek to show that certain arguments that encourage us to see the psychopath as a badly wired machine that is exempt from responsibility are wrong. Finally, it is argued that the libertarian interpretation of a free choice puts an important constraint on our ability to explain the basis of one's decision to adopt a set of values incompatible with the essential values of the moral point of view.

Comments

Digital reproduction from the UMI microform.

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