Winning the War While Losing their Souls: The Crisis of Honor and Discipline Within the French Army in Algeria

Author

Thomas A. Schellhammer, The Graduate Center, City University of New YorkFollow

Date of Degree

9-2024

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Ph.D.

Program

History

Advisor

David G. Troyansky

Committee Members

David Gordon

Leonard V. Smith

Clifford Rosenberg

Benjamin C. Hett

Subject Categories

European History

Keywords

Military, Algerian War, Generals' Putsch, de Gaulle

Abstract

From 1939 to 1962, the French military fought in continuous conflicts. In 1961, in the midst of the Algerian War, these wars would result in military coup attempts and mutiny, as well as the formation of a breakaway terrorist group of army officers known as the Organisation de l’Armée Secrete (OAS), dedicated to the political overthrow and assassination of President of France Charles de Gaulle. While both the insurrectionists and the OAS and its adherents were ultimately unsuccessful, for members of a stable, functioning military to even contemplate such dire political action, these events illustrated a profound breach of military discipline.

The roots of these agonizing conflicts and the disaffection ran deep, and extend to the 1930s. Yet it is clear that while a portion of members of the military supported the extreme measures of mutiny and assassination, many more did not. It was a highly vocal minority of members of the officer corps which led the army to this ultimate crisis of insurrection. Contrary to popular belief, the military did not act as a unified body of sadistic torturers. Instead, the answers are deeply complicated; the army was in no way a united institution, and while the alienation of the army from French society was real and widespread, it did not corrupt the entire military establishment. Most officers were not inclined toward revolt.

Using memoirs, trial records, and archival materials, it is now possible to chart the levels of dissidence and the events of the putsch in a more complete way than was available before. This dissertation traces the roots of a culture of indiscipline that grew within the army from the post-World War I period, through World War II, and into Indochina and Algeria. Following that, this analysis tracks the deepening divide between the military and the civilian government it served through the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958 and into the later years of the Algerian War. The lessons of Indochina, the adoption of the theory of revolutionary warfare, and a misguided belief that the military was fighting Communism in Algeria all contributed to a deleterious atmosphere and morale. Finally, it will discuss the 1961 putsch itself and its aftermath, as well as compare this mutiny to other relevant instances of military interventions into the political realm in other countries around the world. The goal here is to understand just how and why such a deep estrangement between a portion of the officer corps and its government led certain soldiers to rebel against the government.

Ultimately, this dissertation finds that the implications of this mutiny were profound. It not only led to the extremely violent actions of the OAS, but also to a deep re-imagining of the mission of the military. Even broader, the military emerged from these tribulations with a deeper commitment to its relationship with both the civilian government and the population. While the 1961 putsch is often dismissed as a moment of pure folly, it does serve as a cautionary tale for those militaries whose officers substitute their own judgment for that of its political and civilian leaders.

Recommended Citation

Schellhammer, Thomas A., "Winning the War While Losing their Souls: The Crisis of Honor and Discipline Within the French Army in Algeria" (2024). CUNY Academic Works.
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/5989