Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
Date of Degree
6-2025
Document Type
Doctoral Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy
Program
Philosophy
Advisor
Jonathan Gilmore
Committee Members
Noël Carroll
Linda Martín Alcoff
Subject Categories
Philosophy
Keywords
Relatability, Self-Other Merging, Self-Relation, Trust, Belief Formation
Abstract
Relatability has been neglected in philosophy. My dissertation aims to correct this oversight. I provide an analysis and put relatability to work. I argue that relatability is not simply a matter of recognizing shared overlapping features with someone but a window into certain kinds of values. Relatability is an interpersonal dynamic that hinges on the recognition of features/experiences in some other that you evaluate as having significance to your self-conception, which relies on individual assessment. While there is overlap with perspective-taking (see Todd and Galinsky 2014) and experience-taking (see Kaufman and Libby 2012), relatability puts us in the position for perspective/experience-assigning. These processes lead to changes in attitudes and, in turn, changes in behaviors. After establishing what relatability is and what happens when we find someone relatable, I turn to what happens when we chronically do not encounter relatable others. Where loneliness denotes an absence of self (Seemann 2023), relatability correlates with the recognition of self.
I then focus on practical applications of the relatability thesis by highlighting two areas where the stakes in recognizing the phenomenon are especially salient: medical and educational settings. While there has been work on the role of empathy in medical treatment, this is different from relatability. Relatability enhances perceived similarity due to self-other merging. As Yu et al. (2022) demonstrate, physicians have an easier time empathizing with those they perceive as similar, which can improve trust and communication. In this chapter, I demonstrate that relatability can also achieve these aims but in a way distinct from empathy (while also responding to several concerns raised against clinical empathy). My discussion here further cements the relationship between relatability and trust: to find X relatable is to trust something about X. Next, I position relatability as a pedagogical tool, regarding both the material and the instructor. I compare this practice to current literature on education. Through the lens of the classroom, I explore factors that increase and decrease relatability, such as temporary or biographical features. Are there limits? If so, are these limits context-specific? I position the second half of my argument against the potential criticism that instructors need to maintain authority within the classroom, and relatability undercuts this authority.
I then discuss how the relatability approach can shed light on engagement with fiction. In particular, I propose relatability as part of the explanation of why we sometimes sympathize with immoral characters. I position my account against Katherine Tullmann’s (2016) argument that fascination is necessary to sympathize with immoral characters that inspire pro-attitudes. I challenge this claim. I argue that while fascination is appropriate for immoral characters, it is not a foundation for sympathy. Instead, fascination is an obstruction to sympathy because it is othering. Then, I present the relatability approach. Because we relate to characters (both immoral and otherwise), we export our biases when engaging with literature or motion pictures. Here, I engage with and aim to solve several problems in the philosophy of art: the sympathy for the devil phenomenon, the problem of personality, and the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Finally, I explore if shame is an appropriate response to relating to bad characters or people. It seems like maybe it should be. Here, I explain that while friendship with such individuals puts us in moral danger (see Cocking and Kennett 2000), we should not only be friends with moral saints (see Wolf 1982). Through my discussion of relating to bad characters, I explore if we can discern moral commitments from aesthetic preferences and look at cases where our moral disgust interferes with aesthetic appreciation.
Recommended Citation
Papigiotis, Alexia, "Examining Relatability" (2025). CUNY Academic Works.
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/6191
