Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
Date of Degree
6-2026
Document Type
Master's Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts
Program
Political Science
Advisor
Mark Ungar
Subject Categories
Comparative Politics
Keywords
Elite manipulation, Accountability institutions, Anti-corruption commissions, Comparative politics, Democratic backsliding, Institutional Strength, Guatemala, Honduras, CICIG, MACCIH
Abstract
Strong accountability institutions are expected to limit elite manipulation. Yet elites continue to manipulate them. This paper shows that strong accountability institutions are insufficient to prevent elite manipulation. A comparative analysis of Honduras (MACCIH) and Guatemala (CICIG) traces the relationship between institutional strength and elite manipulation. The findings indicate that this relationship is contingent on context. Preventing manipulation would require accountability institutions to sustain greater mobilization and institutional leverage than elites. Accountability institutions alone are insufficient to achieve this condition.
Recommended Citation
Contreras, Kevin E., "Elite Manipulation of Accountability Institutions: A Comparative Analysis of CICIG and MACCIH" (2026). CUNY Academic Works.
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/6651
