Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

Date of Degree

6-2026

Document Type

Doctoral Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy

Program

Criminal Justice

Advisor

Mark Ungar

Committee Members

Jana Arsovska

Maria Haberfeld

John Kleinig

Subject Categories

Defense and Security Studies | Ethics and Political Philosophy | International Humanitarian Law | Political Science | Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration

Keywords

Lethal Autonomous Weapons, Principle of Distinction, Principle of Proportionality, Artificial Intelligence, United Nations, International Humanitarian Law

Abstract

Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) challenge the core principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), distinction and proportionality, by delegating life-and-death decisions to algorithms rather than human judgment.  This dissertation examines whether LAWS can conform to these principles and, if so, under what conditions.  Through process tracing, the study traces the historical integration of disruptive weapons technologies, including chemical, biological, nuclear, and armed drones, into IHL-compliant frameworks or their exclusion via prohibition.  Each case reveals distinct pathways: outright bans for indiscriminate or inherently inhumane systems (chemical and biological weapons), normative restraint and limited acceptance despite destructive power (nuclear weapons) and phased regulatory tolerance under strict human supervision (armed drones).

The central argument asserts that a middle path between outright prohibition and unrestricted deployment offers the most realistic governance model.  Defensive, fixed-position LAWS can operate in low-civilian-risk environments.  These systems can first demonstrate verifiable compliance with distinction and proportionality.  They do so through transparent design features, tamper-proof logging, post-mission audits, and measurable performance metrics. Successful empirical performance in such constrained settings would narrow accountability gaps.  It would also build confidence and create a foundation for gradual, evidence-based expansion of permissible uses.  At the same time, offensive systems in fluid or populated environments would be excluded.  The phased, evidence-based acceptance of fixed defensive LAWS aligns with emerging CCW elements, including requirements to limit operations to defined perimeters to reduce civilian harm and ensure context-appropriate human judgment and control (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2025, Section III).

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war serves as a contemporary test case.  Widespread drone employment has occurred on both sides. Rapid advances toward greater autonomy continue and documented incidents show both parties testing semi-autonomous and counter-drone systems.  These developments illustrate the accelerating shift toward machine-mediated targeting.  Ukraine has reportedly deployed fixed defensive counter-drone systems.  These systems maintain human target selection while allowing autonomous terminal guidance in jammed environments.  This provides early, albeit limited, evidence and supports phased acceptance of defensive LAWS in controlled zones.

The dissertation concludes that existing IHL treaties do not adequately address full autonomy, yet neither do they categorically prohibit it.  Rather than awaiting a comprehensive ban that major powers are unlikely to accept, states should pursue incremental regulation grounded in demonstrated compliance.  Defensive LAWS that achieve consistent adherence to distinction and proportionality in low-risk settings can close accountability gaps, reduce proliferation risks to non-state actors, and preserve meaningful human control (MHC) before broader offensive applications are contemplated.  Without such structured, evidence-based safeguards, the rapid diffusion of autonomous systems risks eroding the humanitarian protections that IHL has sought to uphold since the mid-twentieth century.

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