Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
Date of Degree
9-2026
Document Type
Doctoral Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy
Program
Philosophy
Advisor
Graham Priest
Committee Members
Melvin Fitting
Anandi Hattiangadi
Muhammad Ali Khalidi
Subject Categories
Epistemology | Logic and Foundations | Logic and Foundations of Mathematics | Metaphysics | Philosophy of Language | Philosophy of Science
Keywords
model theory, model-theoretic arguments, Willard Van Orman Quine, Hilary Putnam, metasemantics, realism and anti-realism
Abstract
This dissertation is on model-theoretic arguments in philosophy, especially those of Quine, Davidson, and Putnam. In the first part, to ground the debate, I give a rigorous introduction to the salient parts of first-order model theory. I start the second part by giving an introduction to Quine's philosophy, and how the model-theoretic arguments fit into it. After considering how Donald Davidson adopted the Quinean lesson, I move on to Putnam's model-theoretic arguments. Putnam's spin on these model-theoretic considerations significantly departs from Quine and Davidson, while retaining many of the core ideas. Most importantly, I argue that the target of Putnam's arguments has largely been misunderstood in the literature by many philosophers. In particular, I argue that by 'metaphysical realist', Putnam essentially means someone who subscribes to epistemic structural realism (ESR), the view that of the external (alternatively, unobservable) world, we can only know its structure, by way of the model-theoretic semantics for our best theory of the world. Then, in the third part, I argue that contrary to contemporary philosophical orthodoxy, Putnam's arguments are not failed arguments against a generic sort of realism, but successful arguments against epistemic structural realism. In particular, I will consider the objections of Lewis and Devitt to Putnam's arguments that many philosophers took to be decisive in the debate. I will argue that if we understand Putnam's arguments as arguments against ESR, these objections are unsuccessful, and Putnam's challenge stands.
Recommended Citation
Susanszky, Peter, "Model-Theoretic Arguments in Philosophy" (2026). CUNY Academic Works.
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/6824
Included in
Epistemology Commons, Logic and Foundations Commons, Logic and Foundations of Mathematics Commons, Metaphysics Commons, Philosophy of Language Commons, Philosophy of Science Commons
