Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
Date of Degree
9-2026
Document Type
Doctoral Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy
Program
Political Science
Advisor
Enrique Desmond Arias
Committee Members
Mark Ungar
Julie George
Subject Categories
Comparative Politics
Keywords
Competitive authoritarianism; Opposition parties; Subnational politics; Mixed-method research; Mexican politics; Turkish politics
Abstract
How do opposition parties leverage subnational executive offices to defeat autocrats in competitive authoritarian regimes? While competitive authoritarian regimes tilt the national-level playing field in favor of incumbents, subnational executive offices offer opposition parties a unique opportunity to build viable challengers from below. Yet the opportunities that emerge from the subnational level produce divergent trajectories: some opposition leaders convert these offices into national breakthroughs, while others fail to build national viability, or despite demonstrating their viability through subnational governance, are sidelined by their own parties. This dissertation explains this variation by developing a framework for understanding the opposition pathway from winning subnational offices to fully leveraging them in national elections.
I argue that subnational executive offices become stepping-stones to national power when opposition leaders complete two sequential steps. First, they must construct national viability by governing subnational offices effectively with national ambition and demonstrating resilience against authoritarian obstruction. Second, they must leverage that viability by overcoming party gatekeepers and securing national candidacy. I develop these arguments through cross-national analysis using the Subnational Elections in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes (SECAR) dataset, an original dataset covering 43 competitive authoritarian regimes and 154 national elections since 1990, combined with comparative case studies of six subnational units in Mexico and Turkey: Mexico City, San Luis Potosí, and Guanajuato in Mexico, and Ankara, Diyarbakır, and İstanbul in Turkey. The analysis further focuses on Vicente Fox and the National Action Party (PAN) in Mexico and Ekrem İmamoğlu and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) in Turkey.
The dissertation first demonstrates statistically that greater opposition control of subnational executive offices is associated with a higher likelihood of subsequent national electoral breakthrough. It then traces the mechanisms underlying this relationship. Fox and İmamoğlu both converted governing under autocratic obstruction into national credibility, demonstrating competence and resilience beyond their existing constituencies. Yet viability alone proved insufficient. Survival-oriented party characteristics created gatekeepers whose interests could conflict with the electoral opportunities generated by viable subnational leaders. Fox overcame these gatekeepers, transformed PAN, secured its presidential candidacy, and defeated the PRI in 2000. İmamoğlu was contained by CHP gatekeepers before the 2023 election, leaving the stepping-stone unleveraged until the electoral defeat disrupted the existing party order.
Recommended Citation
Demir, Guney, "Confronting Autocrats: Opposition Strategies and Subnational Governments as Stepping-stones" (2026). CUNY Academic Works.
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/6896
