Publications and Research
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2022
Abstract
Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one’s higher-order thoughts being conscious, which would require a third-order thought—i.e., a thought about a thought about a mental state. In this work, we offer an alternative account of introspection that builds on the recent Higher-Order Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory of phenomenal consciousness. According to HOROR theory, phenomenal consciousness consists in having the right kind of higher-order representation. We claim that this theory can be extended to introspection by recognizing that there is a distinctive kind of consciousness—i.e., introspective consciousness—which can be accounted for as the theory does for phenomenal consciousness generally. We call this novel view: Higher-Order Representation Intentionally for Introspective Consciousness (HORIFIC). We argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that introspective consciousness can be either ‘stimuli-induced’ or ‘self-triggered’ and that one of the benefits of the view we develop is that it can embrace a pluralist approach. Our view also accounts for which specific mental state is represented by a particular higher-order representation, and for the way in which we are aware of changes, transitions, and boundaries between mental states in specific cases of introspective consciousness.
Comments
This is the author's accepted manuscript of an article originally published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, available at https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.11.155.