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In this paper the Buechner–Tavani model of digital trust is revised—new conditions for self-trust are incorporated into the model. These new conditions raise several philosophical problems concerning the idea of a substantial self for social robotics, which are closely examined. I conclude that reductionism about the self is incompatible with, while the idea of a substantial self is compatible with, trust relations between human agents, between human agents and artificial agents, and between artificial agents.


This article was originally published in Information, available at doi:10.3390/info11010048.

This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (

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