Document Type

Article

Publication Date

1-16-2020

Abstract

In this paper the Buechner–Tavani model of digital trust is revised—new conditions for self-trust are incorporated into the model. These new conditions raise several philosophical problems concerning the idea of a substantial self for social robotics, which are closely examined. I conclude that reductionism about the self is incompatible with, while the idea of a substantial self is compatible with, trust relations between human agents, between human agents and artificial agents, and between artificial agents.

Comments

This article was originally published in Information, available at doi:10.3390/info11010048.

This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

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Philosophy Commons

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