Publications and Research
Document Type
Book Chapter or Section
Publication Date
2022
Abstract
This chapter examines Soviet military planning and preparedness on the eve of Germany’s June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union. Drawing on archival evidence and post-Soviet scholarship, it reassesses explanations for the Red Army’s catastrophic initial defeats. It argues that the General Staff’s unrealistic offensive plans and force posture conflicted with Stalin’s political strategy of deterrence and war avoidance. This mismatch, rooted partly in the Soviet military’s organizational preference for offensive operations and flawed assumptions about mobilization and the initial period of war, increased Soviet vulnerability to surprise attack. The chapter considers the development of Soviet war plans in 1940–1941, the relative neglect of strategic defense, and the respective roles of Stalin and the senior military leadership in the failures preceding Operation Barbarossa. Its archival evidence documents significant civil-military policy disjunctures within a highly authoritarian, top-down system, challenging conventional assumptions that centralized political control associated with personalist dictatorships necessarily produces integrated political-military strategy.
Comments
Originally subject to a two-year publisher embargo. The embargo period expired in 2024. The author’s publishing agreement permits posting on the author’s or institution’s website after two years. No further embargo is required.