Date of Award
Summer 9-1-2017
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Department
Economics
First Advisor
Kara Basu
Second Advisor
Matthew Baker
Academic Program Adviser
Randall Filer
Abstract
In economic experiments, players often demonstrate concerns for the relative payoffs between themselves and other subjects, in addition to their own payoffs. In addition, they appear to do their parts to achieve efficient outcomes, particularly when they are ignorant of the opponent's decision. I present a parsimonious model of other-regarding preferences and quasi-magical thinking that explains such behavior, and I apply it to four games: the prisoner's dilemma, the traveler's dilemma, the ultimatum game, and the trust game.
Recommended Citation
Klevans, Gregory, "Cooperation and Reciprocity in Anonymous Interactions: Other-Regarding Preferences and Quasi-Magical Thinking" (2017). CUNY Academic Works.
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/hc_sas_etds/216