Open Educational Resources
Document Type
Case Study
Publication Date
Spring 5-31-2026
Abstract
For most of the twentieth century, nuclear energy was the quiet backbone of Germany's electricity system. At its peak in 1997, nuclear power supplied over 31 percent of all electricity generated in the country. It was a reliable, low-cost source that kept German industries competitive across Europe. The country's industrial base, including automakers, chemical producers, and heavy manufacturers, depended on affordable, stable power. Nuclear delivered exactly that.
The political climate changed in the late 1990s. After years of advocacy based on concerns about nuclear waste and reactor safety, the Green Party joined the Social Democrats to form the Red-Green Coalition from 1998 to 2005. In 2002, they amended Germany's Atomic Energy Act to mandate the phased closure of all operating nuclear plants. At the time, those plants generated a large portion of the country's electricity, roughly 28 percent. The government's assumption was that wind, solar, and other renewables would scale up quickly enough to fill the gap over the 20-year transition window.
Renewables expanded, but not fast enough to fully remove Germany's exposure to coal and natural gas. The bridge fuel turned out to be coal and natural gas, including Russian natural gas delivered through long-term pipeline contracts. Germany's fossil fuel share of electricity generation stayed above 60 percent through much of the 2000s and 2010s. In 2011, the Fukushima disaster in Japan accelerated the timeline. Eight German reactors were shut down immediately, dropping nuclear's share from 22.5 percent in 2010 to 17.9 percent in a single year.
The full cost of this dependence became clear in 2022. Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent disruption of gas supplies sent European energy prices to historic highs. Germany, more exposed than many EU countries, saw industrial electricity prices rise sharply. Inflation climbed to levels not seen in decades: 5.2 percent in 2022 and 5.3 percent in 2023. Meanwhile, France, which kept nuclear at a much larger share of its electricity mix throughout this period, had lower and more stable power-sector emissions and industrial energy prices.
You are part of an internal strategy team advising a German industrial manufacturer in Spring 2026. Senior management must decide how strongly the company should treat Germany's energy policy as a strategic risk. The company is considering several options: keep production concentrated in Germany, invest in energy hedging and efficiency, shift some future capacity to lower-cost electricity markets, or publicly support a policy agenda that includes nuclear life-extension, renewables, storage, and grid investment. Your task is to use the workbook evidence to make a defensible recommendation.
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CUNY OER Funding
CUNY OER Initiative
dataset
Comments
This OER was funded in part by the CUNY OER Initiative.