Publications and Research
Document Type
Book Chapter or Section
Publication Date
2018
Abstract
In this chapter I argue that the traditional interpretation of the commonly accepted moral asymmetry between secrets and lies is incorrect. On the standard interpretation of the commonly accepted view, lies are prima facie or pro tango morally wrong, whereas secrets are morally permissible. I argue that, when secrets are distinguished from mere acts of reticence and non-acknowledgement, as well as from acts of deception, so that they are defined as acts of not sharing believed-information while believing that the believed-information is relevant, the correct interpretation of the commonly accepted moral asymmetry between secrets and lies is that secrets are also prima facie or pro tango morally wrong, albeit less morally wrong than lies.
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Comments
Chapter originally published in Michaelson, Eliot, and Andreas Stokke (eds), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, and Politics, Engaging Philosophy. Oxford University Press.