What the 2007 TAC Market Design Game tells us about effective auction mechanisms

Authors

Jinzhong Niu, CUNY Guttman Community CollegeFollow
Kai Cai, CUNY Graduate Center
Simon Parsons, CUNY Brooklyn CollegeFollow
Peter McBurney, University of Liverpool
Enrico Gerding, University of Southampton

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2010

Abstract

This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design Game. We present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to compare these entries. The paper also attempts to relate market dynamics to the auction rules adopted by these entries and their adaptive strategies via a set of post-tournament experiments. Based on this analysis, the paper speculates about the design of effective auction mechanisms, both in the setting of this competition and in the more general case.

Comments

This work was originally published in Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.