Student Theses and Dissertations
Date of Award
5-20-2025
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
B.A. with honors
Honors Designation
yes
Program of Study
Political Science
Language
English
First Advisor
Stephanie Golob
Second Advisor
Thomas Halper
Third Advisor
Carolyn Abott
Abstract
Following the 2008 financial crisis, the United States enacted financial crisis reforms, particularly the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, to prevent future failures and enhance regulatory oversight of financial corporations. However, financial institutions pushed back against these reforms by utilizing lobbying and campaign finance mechanisms to weaken key provisions. Their efforts increased following the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), which allowed unlimited corporate spending. This thesis argues that financial corporations significantly weakened key provisions of post-2008 financial reforms through lobbying efforts and campaign finance. Through a case study of JPMorgan Chase, this research explores legislative history, lobbying disclosures, and campaign finance data, to show how financial institutions influence policymaking. The findings reveal that financial corporations were able to delay implementation, dilute regulatory language, and introduce loopholes in key provisions such as the Volcker Rule and derivatives oversight. While lobbying did not prevent reform, it successfully reshaped them in favor of the corporation’s interests. Through a literature review of political science scholarship from Martin Gilens, E.E. Schattschneider, Pamela Ban and Hye Young You, and Robert E. Prasch, this thesis contextualizes these findings with discussions of elite influence, representation, and regulatory capture. This thesis adopts an elite theory framework, contrasted with pluralism and other interest group theories, and highlights how the JPMorgan case study aligns with an elite theory perspective of policymaking. Ultimately, this thesis shines a light on the challenges of achieving financial reform during growing corporate influence, posing risks on democracy and fairness in the economy. The study concludes with policy recommendations and suggests future topics to further explore the impact of lobbying on legislation.
Recommended Citation
Plepi, Jessica, "Lobbying Laws and Campaign Finance: Shaping the Trajectory of Post-2008 Financial Reforms" (2025). CUNY Academic Works.
https://academicworks.cuny.edu/bb_etds/211
