Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

Date of Degree

6-2026

Document Type

Master's Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts

Program

Political Science

Advisor

Peter Romaniuk

Subject Categories

Political Science

Keywords

the Coalition, Kunduz, COIN, the Surge, Taliban, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Abstract

The Taliban return to power in Afghanistan on August 15th, 2021, is a watershed moment in the 21st century history of the United States of America. The swift collapse of the U.S. backed Afghan government shocked American politicians, military leadership, and the general public. To many, trillions of dollars were wasted in funding a government that could not even survive a month without U.S. troops. But those dollars were used by U.S. military leadership to implement a new and innovative strategy those same leaders thought would guarantee success: counterinsurgency, abbreviated as COIN. In this thesis, I will ask: what effect did the provision of U.S. military aid and support for counterinsurgency purposes have on the effort to stabilize the country and defeat the Taliban? I examine the tenets and history of COIN doctrine, how U.S. military leadership viewed COIN as well as how COIN doctrine was deployed on the ground in Afghanistan. I argue that the implementation of COIN in the Afghan theatre was so hamstrung by institutional and structural problems that the implementation of one tenet of COIN doctrine would hurt the implementation of others. I show this by examining and analyzing how U.S. support became incongruent and ineffective on the ground. In short, COIN cannibalized itself within Afghanistan.

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